History of the US Marine Corps in WWII Vol II
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
CHAPTER b The Dragons Peninsula Campaign RICE ANCHORAGE 1 New Georgia Occupation Force as it fought its way from Zamma Beach to the Munda’s eventual capture was a triumph airstrip, mot her tense struggle was waged over initial frustration and failure. Ad- simultaneously in the northern part of the mittedly, the campaign to take the airfield island in which the jungle combat was as had been costly and time-consuming. But bitter and as deadly. The results were while the spotlight was focused on the much less conclusive. From the initial ship-to-shore movement of the Northern ‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this Landing Group through the following six section is derived from : CominCh Rept of SoPac weeks of fighting, this phase of the New Action, 21)ee42-31Jan44, hereafter CominC1/ Iixpt of SoPac Action; WesternForO No. All-43, Georgia campaign contributed as much to cltd 28 Jun43; TG 3(;.1 OpO No. 1043, dtd 1Ju143; the feeling of dis:lppointment and futility Ncw Georgiu Campaign; 2JGOF Account; 1st as the first Munda attacks. RdrRegt SAR 4Jul-29Aug43, dtd 60et43, here- Early plans of the NGOF called for after Ist RdrIi!c~t NAR; Ist RdrRegt R-2 Est of Colonel Harry B. Liversedge’s 1st Marine Situation, c. 23 Jun4J ; 1st RdrRegt R-2 Jnl 2J~n–31Aug43, hereafter IstRdrRcflt .Jnl; 1st Raider Regiment (less two battalions) to RdrRegt MsgFile 5Jul-28Aug43, hereafter 1st be a ready reserve. When intelligence re- RdrRegt NsgFile ; 1st RdrRegt PtlRepts ported a garrison of some 500 enemy 23Jul–14Aug43 ; 1st RdrBn WarD, 20Jun-29Aug troops with coast defense guns at Bairoko 43, dtd 14 Sept43, hereafter I.stRdrl;ti WcwD; Harbor, the Kula Gulf landing was written 3/148 URepts, 7Jul–3Ang43, hereafter 3/1.j8 Rcpt; SW .-trra NavOp8-I; SE Area NavOpts- into the att~ack order. Of prime concern 11; Maj Clay A. Boyd interview by HistIJiv, to the Allied planners was the road con- HQMG, dtd 16 Feb51 ; Col Si~muel B. Griffith, II, necting Bairoko with Munda airfield. itr to DirPubInfo, HQMC, dtd 121’eb51 ; CO1 Scarcely more than an improved jungle Samuel B. Griffith, H, ltr to Maj John N. Rcntz, trail, the road was nevertheless a vital link dtd 12Feb51, hereafter (7ri~tfi2tr;Col Samuel B. Griffith, II, ltr to Col Enstace R. Snmak, dtd between Munda and Vila, the main source 3MnrY2 ; Lt Robert Il. Pape ltr to CMC, dtd of Japanese reinforcements and supplies. 2M?eb51 ; LtCol William D. Stevenson ltr to CMC, Bairoko Harbor was the knot which tied dtd 22 Feb51, hereafter 6Vwrnson ltr; Adm Rich- the overland route to the Kula Gulf barge mond K. Turner ltr to CMC, dtd 22Feb51 ; Col Samuel B. Griffith, II, “Corry’s Boys,” Marine system. An Allied ground force between f’orps Gazette, v. 36, no. 3 ( Mar52) and “.4ction Munda and Bairoko Harbor would have at Enogai, ” Marine Corp8 Ga.zettc, v. 38, no. 3 the double-barreled effect of cutting OR the ( Mar54 ) ; TSgts Frank J. McDevitt and Mnrrey flow of memy supplies and reinforcements J[ill”(lf2r, ‘“Capture of Enogai,” Marine t70rp.s to Munda as well as keeping the airfield {; fixtte, v. 27, no. 9 ( Sep43 ) ; Morison, Iircakin(l the Bii+m(frclis 17arricr; ONI, Com bat Narrativc8 forces and the Bairoko garrison from rein- .Y; Rentz, Marines in tl!e Central Solomon8, forcing one another. 691–360 0—63—9 119 1!20 ISOLATION OF RABAUL Factors involved in risking a secondary ing CIroup was to move overland to the attlrk north of the airfield had been care- southwest ~capturing or killing any enemy fully considered before a decision to land forces encountered in the Rairoko and at Rice Anchorage at tl~e mouth of the Enogai Inlet a~ea. After establishing P(lntlakona (Wharton) River in Kula road blocks across all road.< leading from Gldf lmd been reacllwl. Two area-the Ila iroko to M{lnda, the NLG was to ad- Ihlndakona and the Piraka Rivrr in Rovi- van(w along the Mund:~-T3airoko trail as ana Ln~ooll—were scout cd before the for- far as possible to prevent any enemy sup- mer was selected. Admiral Tlu-ner’s staff plies or reinforcements reaching Muncla, reasoned tl~at a 1anding from Roviana La- and also to block ~ny withdrawal from goon would be unopposed but that the re- that area. Contact with the right (north) sultant, over]al]d trek would be excessively flank of tl~e lG9th Infantry was to be n~ain- slow, fatiguing, and difficlllt to resupply. tained by Liversed~e7s command. Further, this landing wol~ld not bring the The Marine-Army force had only a lim- enemy under immedinte attack. Despite ited knowledge of the terrain between Rice the native trails crossing the island, ~ large and Enogai Inlet and practically no in- force could not travel fast enough through formation on Dragons Peninsula, the area the jungle to give assistance to the ex- between Ilairoko and Enogai. For one pectecl rnpid seizure of Munda. thing. no oblique angle aerial photographs On the other hand, a landing at Rice of the area were available. This type of Anchorage would 1ikewise be unopposed, aerial intelligence was particularly desir- and the enemy could be taken under ak- able, since jungle terrain photographed tack almost immediately. This would from high altitudes directly overhead force the Japanese into one of three rarely revealed anything of tactical value. courses of action: withdrawal to either In addition, tl~e peninsula had not been Munrla or Vi]a, a counterattack in scoutecl. The New Georgia guides had stren@, or an attempt at defending the been relnctant to enter this area, fearing Ilairoko Harbor area. The latter course, treachery because of v:qg~e. rumors that it was believed, woulcl be the logical enemy tile n~tives of this area were hostile to men reaction to such a threat to the Munda- fronl Roviana Lagoon. ~Tila link. Defense by the enen~y at Most of the SoPac reconnaissance pa- Bxi roko wolll d keep that garrison f rom re- trols bad been more concerned with Munda inforcing Mundn. Though the disadvan- where the main effort of the NGOF was ta~es.— of making a landing on a narrow, to be made. Those few patrols which ven- confined beach on the Puudakona River turecl into the vicinity of Enogai Inlet l~early outweighed the advantages, the were forced to turn back by close brushes Rice Anchorage nttack held the most, hope with ,Japmnese patrols. Only the long, for success in dividing the Muncla-13airoko narrow I,eland Lagoon which borders the forces. ( See Map 8.) north shore of Dragons Peninsula had Liversedge’s gro[~p, nugmented by the been pxtrolled, ancl this had been done in 3d Battalion, l-18tl~ Infantry, was given canoes. As a result, the dark stretches of a multiple mission in ~~T(_)F orders. jungle between 13airoko and Enogai were After lmding at Rice, the Northern Land- still an unknown area. THE DRAGONS PEAUNSULA CAilIPAIGN 121 With the chte of the lmrding set for 4 doubt. Rice Anchorage could not be .JIIly, a one-day postponement was granted Iocat ecl iu tl~e darkness and rain. The to allow anot]ler 37th Division unit, the trallslmrt group slowed and waited-un- 3d Battllioll of the 145th Infantry, to join comfortably remembering warnings of a Liverserlge’s force. ITnexpectedly, the 4th lllrking enemy submnrine force—while one Rai(ler Battalion was still ellga:ed in the destroyer with a s}~eep radar probed ahead, TTiru Harbor attack ancl could not be witl~- seeking tllc allcllortige. After a short de- (lrawJl in time to join the NLG. 1i~~, the l’lm(lakona River mouth WaS 10- It was a li~l~tly armed force. The only catwl ancl the transport group moved into weapons c:nrried, other tl~an i])d ivi dIIal debarkat ioI~. positions. ils Marines and arms and light machine. guns, were the soldiers clambered int,o landing craft 60n~m mm-tars of the raiders and the alon~side the APDs, enemy star shells 81mnl mortars and heavy machine guns of gl immerecl tllrol[gl~ the rainy darkness and the Army battalions. Sotice:Lbly lacking sllel IS splnshed among the transports. in artillery support, the. NLG expected to This fire the, raiders shrugged off with the nave air power available upon request. comnlent, “erratic and inaccurate,)’ 3 but Sl~ortly mfter midnight, 5 July, a cover- it was disconcerting, too. ing bomb:llc{lnellt of Ii(Jl~>rrll):lIIX:lraand A sh:lllow bar blocking the entrance to 13airoko by a cruisel-clestroyer force l}egal~ Rice JInchorage further delayed the land- on schedule. Pron]pt, retaliatory tire from ing operation. The landing craft, each enemy shore bat tcries at Enoga i surprised towing 10 men on a rubber raft, were the task force, however, because the pres- forced to return to the transports to ence of large g(ms at F.nogai as well as lighte,rl loads before crossing the reef. Ba iroko hacl not been reported. In a mat- Some of the rations were unloaded before ter of moments, part of the covering tires tl~eboxts returned for a second try. Scout- was shifted to these. new targets and the ing reports had termed the beach as bombardment cent inuecl. The destroyer “small.” The raiders found this almost an t$’trong was the only task force casualty; understatement to describe the narrow it was hit at 0046, not by she]lfire but by stretch of landing area hacked out of the a torl)edo Iired by a ,Japznese destroyer j(lngle on the south side of the river, about runl~irtg along Kolombang:lra’s northeast 300 yards Ilpstream from the anchorage.