CHAPTER b
The Dragons Peninsula Campaign
RICE ANCHORAGE 1 New Georgia Occupation Force as it fought its way from Zamma Beach to the Munda’s eventual capture was a triumph airstrip, mot her tense struggle was waged over initial frustration and failure. Ad- simultaneously in the northern part of the mittedly, the campaign to take the airfield island in which the jungle combat was as had been costly and time-consuming. But bitter and as deadly. The results were while the spotlight was focused on the much less conclusive. From the initial ship-to-shore movement of the Northern ‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this Landing Group through the following six section is derived from : CominCh Rept of SoPac weeks of fighting, this phase of the New Action, 21)ee42-31Jan44, hereafter CominC1/ Iixpt of SoPac Action; WesternForO No. All-43, Georgia campaign contributed as much to cltd 28 Jun43; TG 3(;.1 OpO No. 1043, dtd 1Ju143; the feeling of dis:lppointment and futility Ncw Georgiu Campaign; 2JGOF Account; 1st as the first Munda attacks. RdrRegt SAR 4Jul-29Aug43, dtd 60et43, here- Early plans of the NGOF called for after Ist RdrIi!c~t NAR; Ist RdrRegt R-2 Est of Colonel Harry B. Liversedge’s 1st Marine Situation, c. 23 Jun4J ; 1st RdrRegt R-2 Jnl 2J~n–31Aug43, hereafter IstRdrRcflt .Jnl; 1st Raider Regiment (less two battalions) to RdrRegt MsgFile 5Jul-28Aug43, hereafter 1st be a ready reserve. When intelligence re- RdrRegt NsgFile ; 1st RdrRegt PtlRepts ported a garrison of some 500 enemy 23Jul–14Aug43 ; 1st RdrBn WarD, 20Jun-29Aug troops with coast defense guns at Bairoko 43, dtd 14 Sept43, hereafter I.stRdrl;ti WcwD; Harbor, the Kula Gulf landing was written 3/148 URepts, 7Jul–3Ang43, hereafter 3/1.j8 Rcpt; SW .-trra NavOp8-I; SE Area NavOpts- into the att~ack order. Of prime concern 11; Maj Clay A. Boyd interview by HistIJiv, to the Allied planners was the road con- HQMG, dtd 16 Feb51 ; Col Si~muel B. Griffith, II, necting Bairoko with Munda airfield. itr to DirPubInfo, HQMC, dtd 121’eb51 ; CO1 Scarcely more than an improved jungle Samuel B. Griffith, H, ltr to Maj John N. Rcntz, trail, the road was nevertheless a vital link dtd 12Feb51, hereafter (7ri~tfi2tr;Col Samuel B. Griffith, II, ltr to Col Enstace R. Snmak, dtd between Munda and Vila, the main source 3MnrY2 ; Lt Robert Il. Pape ltr to CMC, dtd of Japanese reinforcements and supplies. 2M?eb51 ; LtCol William D. Stevenson ltr to CMC, Bairoko Harbor was the knot which tied dtd 22 Feb51, hereafter 6Vwrnson ltr; Adm Rich- the overland route to the Kula Gulf barge mond K. Turner ltr to CMC, dtd 22Feb51 ; Col Samuel B. Griffith, II, “Corry’s Boys,” Marine system. An Allied ground force between f’orps Gazette, v. 36, no. 3 ( Mar52) and “.4ction Munda and Bairoko Harbor would have at Enogai, ” Marine Corp8 Ga.zettc, v. 38, no. 3 the double-barreled effect of cutting OR the ( Mar54 ) ; TSgts Frank J. McDevitt and Mnrrey flow of memy supplies and reinforcements J[ill”(lf2r, ‘“Capture of Enogai,” Marine t70rp.s to Munda as well as keeping the airfield {; fixtte, v. 27, no. 9 ( Sep43 ) ; Morison, Iircakin(l the Bii+m(frclis 17arricr; ONI, Com bat Narrativc8 forces and the Bairoko garrison from rein- .Y; Rentz, Marines in tl!e Central Solomon8, forcing one another.
691–360 0—63—9 119 1!20 ISOLATION OF RABAUL
Factors involved in risking a secondary ing CIroup was to move overland to the attlrk north of the airfield had been care- southwest ~capturing or killing any enemy fully considered before a decision to land forces encountered in the Rairoko and at Rice Anchorage at tl~e mouth of the Enogai Inlet a~ea. After establishing P(lntlakona (Wharton) River in Kula road blocks across all road.< leading from Gldf lmd been reacllwl. Two area-the Ila iroko to M{lnda, the NLG was to ad- Ihlndakona and the Piraka Rivrr in Rovi- van(w along the Mund:~-T3airoko trail as ana Ln~ooll—were scout cd before the for- far as possible to prevent any enemy sup- mer was selected. Admiral Tlu-ner’s staff plies or reinforcements reaching Muncla, reasoned tl~at a 1anding from Roviana La- and also to block ~ny withdrawal from goon would be unopposed but that the re- that area. Contact with the right (north) sultant, over]al]d trek would be excessively flank of tl~e lG9th Infantry was to be n~ain- slow, fatiguing, and difficlllt to resupply. tained by Liversed~e7s command. Further, this landing wol~ld not bring the The Marine-Army force had only a lim- enemy under immedinte attack. Despite ited knowledge of the terrain between Rice the native trails crossing the island, ~ large and Enogai Inlet and practically no in- force could not travel fast enough through formation on Dragons Peninsula, the area the jungle to give assistance to the ex- between Ilairoko and Enogai. For one pectecl rnpid seizure of Munda. thing. no oblique angle aerial photographs On the other hand, a landing at Rice of the area were available. This type of Anchorage would 1ikewise be unopposed, aerial intelligence was particularly desir- and the enemy could be taken under ak- able, since jungle terrain photographed tack almost immediately. This would from high altitudes directly overhead force the Japanese into one of three rarely revealed anything of tactical value. courses of action: withdrawal to either In addition, tl~e peninsula had not been Munrla or Vi]a, a counterattack in scoutecl. The New Georgia guides had stren@, or an attempt at defending the been relnctant to enter this area, fearing Ilairoko Harbor area. The latter course, treachery because of v:qg~e. rumors that it was believed, woulcl be the logical enemy tile n~tives of this area were hostile to men reaction to such a threat to the Munda- fronl Roviana Lagoon. ~Tila link. Defense by the enen~y at Most of the SoPac reconnaissance pa- Bxi roko wolll d keep that garrison f rom re- trols bad been more concerned with Munda inforcing Mundn. Though the disadvan- where the main effort of the NGOF was ta~es.— of making a landing on a narrow, to be made. Those few patrols which ven- confined beach on the Puudakona River turecl into the vicinity of Enogai Inlet l~early outweighed the advantages, the were forced to turn back by close brushes Rice Anchorage nttack held the most, hope with ,Japmnese patrols. Only the long, for success in dividing the Muncla-13airoko narrow I,eland Lagoon which borders the forces. ( See Map 8.) north shore of Dragons Peninsula had Liversedge’s gro[~p, nugmented by the been pxtrolled, ancl this had been done in 3d Battalion, l-18tl~ Infantry, was given canoes. As a result, the dark stretches of a multiple mission in ~~T(_)F orders. jungle between 13airoko and Enogai were After lmding at Rice, the Northern Land- still an unknown area. THE DRAGONS PEAUNSULA CAilIPAIGN 121
With the chte of the lmrding set for 4 doubt. Rice Anchorage could not be .JIIly, a one-day postponement was granted Iocat ecl iu tl~e darkness and rain. The to allow anot]ler 37th Division unit, the trallslmrt group slowed and waited-un- 3d Battllioll of the 145th Infantry, to join comfortably remembering warnings of a Liverserlge’s force. ITnexpectedly, the 4th lllrking enemy submnrine force—while one Rai(ler Battalion was still ellga:ed in the destroyer with a s}~eep radar probed ahead, TTiru Harbor attack ancl could not be witl~- seeking tllc allcllortige. After a short de- (lrawJl in time to join the NLG. 1i~~, the l’lm(lakona River mouth WaS 10- It was a li~l~tly armed force. The only catwl ancl the transport group moved into weapons c:nrried, other tl~an i])d ivi dIIal debarkat ioI~. positions. ils Marines and arms and light machine. guns, were the soldiers clambered int,o landing craft 60n~m mm-tars of the raiders and the alon~side the APDs, enemy star shells 81mnl mortars and heavy machine guns of gl immerecl tllrol[gl~ the rainy darkness and the Army battalions. Sotice:Lbly lacking sllel IS splnshed among the transports. in artillery support, the. NLG expected to This fire the, raiders shrugged off with the nave air power available upon request. comnlent, “erratic and inaccurate,)’ 3 but Sl~ortly mfter midnight, 5 July, a cover- it was disconcerting, too. ing bomb:llc{lnellt of Ii(Jl~>rrll):lIIX:lraand A sh:lllow bar blocking the entrance to 13airoko by a cruisel-clestroyer force l}egal~ Rice JInchorage further delayed the land- on schedule. Pron]pt, retaliatory tire from ing operation. The landing craft, each enemy shore bat tcries at Enoga i surprised towing 10 men on a rubber raft, were the task force, however, because the pres- forced to return to the transports to ence of large g(ms at F.nogai as well as lighte,rl loads before crossing the reef. Ba iroko hacl not been reported. In a mat- Some of the rations were unloaded before ter of moments, part of the covering tires tl~eboxts returned for a second try. Scout- was shifted to these. new targets and the ing reports had termed the beach as bombardment cent inuecl. The destroyer “small.” The raiders found this almost an t$’trong was the only task force casualty; understatement to describe the narrow it was hit at 0046, not by she]lfire but by stretch of landing area hacked out of the a torl)edo Iired by a ,Japznese destroyer j(lngle on the south side of the river, about runl~irtg along Kolombang:lra’s northeast 300 yards Ilpstream from the anchorage. Shore.z The ship sank fast, but n~ost of While four boats at a.time beached to un- the crew was sa\7ed. load troops and supplies, the other boats The actual landirrg of the Live.rseclge jammed the river mouth or idled in Rice mf~r{)ul)st:lrted about 0130 in the midst of n .fuchorage waiting for a turn to unload. torrential downpouv and spora(lic shell- The black night obligingly curtained the fire. For a snort time the success of the nlilling confusion. amphibious vent ure seemed in serious .ishore, drenched Marines and soldiers stumbled about the confined beach, slip- ‘ 310st s{)urres credit this sllccessful torpe(loin~ ping in the mud and tripping over hidden t{) enemy destroyers }vhich were fleeing tl)e task banyan roots. Since enemy shellfire force : however, one official po~t~~ilr source as- si~ns credit to a submarine. S:lvI1istDiJ-, Off of ral)ged overhead to hit about 2,000 yards the CXO, NI), Ulliicll ~tat~.s A’f17,f17C1/lYMt01001/ i)l. lrorkl li’frr II ( lvtishingtou, 1955) , p. 53. “ 1st12dv13n W7arD, P. 1. 122 ISOLATION OF RABAITL
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\ \ \ I I J m n a z THE DRAGONS PEA’INSLT..L CA31P-LIGN 123
farther up the coast, Liversedge’s officers Boyd had made several scouting trips to decided that the Japanese at, Enog,ai were New Georgia. The last time, in mid-June, not aware of the exact location of the land- he ancl his men had remained with coast- ing ancl ~.isked the Ilse of ]Iooded fl:lsh- watcher Hnrry l~~ickham to direct the Iights. Thereafter, the unloading and re.- 1audings at Onaiavisi Entrance and Za- organizzt ion l~roceeded more smooth] y. nana Beach before cutting across the island Near dawn, with almost all supplies to 1ink up with Liverseclge. After the ar- ashore, Colonel Liversedge broke. radio si- rival of the hTLG at Rice. Anchorage; he re- lence with one uncodecl word, “Scranl.” sumecl commanc{ of his company in the 1st The anxious .IPI)s and destroyers, unhap- Raider Battalion. pily expecting enemy retaliation at any On one of his earlier trips, Boyd had moment, quickly turl~ed and headed back scouted a trail leading from Rice to Eno- for the southern Solomons. The IInding, gia, and Corrigan’s natives had then although delayed, hail been accomplished chopped a parallel trail on each side of without, serious mishap. One unit, an Ar- this track. Afi er the N’LCTstacked all ex- my company, w-m taken to the wrong kmd- cess ammunition, equipment, rations, and ing area ; it went, ashore farther llort]l blanket rolls in assembly areas prepared along the coast. The company rejoined by the nmtives, the march to Enogai the main body later in the day. started over these three trails. Companies The NLG had been welcomed ashore by A ancl B of the 1st Raider Battalion (Lieu- a ]nixecl greeting committee. Heading a tenant Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, II) large group of native guides and carriers- were assigned to move along the left trail who were obviously frightened and be- (southern ) with the demolitions plwtoon wildered by the sudden inilux of so many of the raiders hemding along the right white men to their island-were an ikLls- (northern) path. Thus protected on each tralian coastwatcher, Flight Lieutenant J. flank, the main elements of the NLG .4. Corrigan, and a Marine raider patrol started along the center trail with the re- leader, Captain Clay A. Boyd of Li\-- maining Marine companies leading and ersedge’s regiment. Corrigan had been on the two Army battalions following. Two the island for some time, radioing reports companies, M and 1, of Lieutenant Colonel George G. Freer’s 3/145 with a medical of enemy activity in Kula Gulf and re- detachment, communications unit, and the cruit ing a labor force of nearly 200 natives. antitank platoon remained behind to guard Small, wiry ll~enwith powerful arm, back, the supply dump. and leg muscles, the native carriers were Scouting reports had termed the Rice- to receive one Australian shilling, a stick Enog~i area an open jungle with small, of trade tobacco, and two bowls of rice broken hills and few swamps. Rain- and tea each day for carrying ammunition soaked Marines and soldiers, struggling and rations for the &-LG. A few spoke over the sharp, irregular slopes made pidgin English, a jargon of simple words treacherous by the mud and hidden roots, which bridged the language barrier. could not agree. The meager trails, hard- Colorful in cotton “lap laps” wrapped ly more than narrow defiles gashed through around their waists, they were intensely the thick, soclden jungle, were trapped loyal to the coastwatchers. with sprzwling banyan roots slick with 124 ISOLATION OF RABALTIJ green moss, coral outcropping, vines, and The rains drowned the radio equipment, underbrush. The rain col~tinned unabtited. :~rlcl communication wire laid along the The Army battalions, carrying heavier trail was grounded as the protective cox-- weapons and n)ore amnl unit ion and gear eri n~ peeled off in the hands of the in- than the lightly equipped rwiders, were fantrymen who used the wires as guide- forced either to tr:~ve] :~t :1slower pace or lil~es. Runners (’arrj-il~g fie]d messages to stop to estzbl ish anot]ler sllpp]y dtunp. kept Liverse(lge in contact, with his base Tile soldiers, choosing to keep going, :~tRice. pushecl on but dropped steadily behind. Tile N’LG lmd divided into two segnlellts Tl~e leading NTLG ~ll~its. heatling deeper early that morning. Lieutenant Colonel into the hTew Georgia jungle on a course D[~lbert E. Scl~llltz lmd been directed to rong-h]y south from Rice, reached the Giza t:dm l~is M I;attalion, lMtll Infantry, Giza River late in the :~ftcrl~oon nnd set along allotller trail to tile southwest to clltj up a perillleter (lefense. Sllort]y :tfter tl~e lfllllcl:l-l~:lirol
listening watch had been set l~pat i~ll l~alts, screen the advance of the rest of the force. but the NLG commander llwl not nswl the The next brush with the enemy came as radio in the liope that his cross-collntry suddenly m the first. The demolitions ]narch was still a secret. .-llthollgl~ Liver- platoon, meeting a strong enemy patrol, scdge carried mwlimmpowered radios withdrew slightly to high ground and en- ( T13X), contact with Hester sonle 20 miles g:aged the Japanese in a hot fire fight. away was nmde with diffkulty. Such conl- Boyd’s Company D then flanked the en- municltion problems were to seriously emy and killed 10 before the Japanese fled. handicap NLG operations. A lligll-pow- Tbo brief fight cost the raiders three killed ered r~clio, (leek-loaded ml one of the and fOLlr wounded. By nightfall, Grif- iiPDs, had not been unloaded dllring tile fith’s Ilfxrines hxd occupied the native vil- anxious landing operations and was no]v lage of Triri on Enogai Inlet. Liver- back at GIladalcnnal — a logistics over- sedge’s (31>w7as set up at Maranusa I with sight, which was to be regret te(l n)any the hTLG reserve units, Companies K and times. L of the 145th Infantry. Hasty perime- First contact with the enemy came ters were placed around each village. shortly before noon on the 7th of ,July. The absence of defensive works at Triri Liverse.dge’s wet and hungry men strug- further convinced the Marines that the ~yledo~lt of t]lc swamp earl~~in the lnort- ,Japanese at Enogai had not been expect- ing nnd moved along x tortllolls ridge par- ing nn zttack from the direction of the alleling the west bank of l?nogai Inlet. inlet. The only item of value found at The delay calwed by the Tmnalmu and the Triri was a detailed enemy map which swamps was emphasized when tl]e sounds pinpointed the location of four 140mm of an air strike at Enogai were heard. This guns at Enogai. As Griffith’s battalion hacl been the designated day for Liver- prepared hasty defensive positions, the seclge:s assault of that stjrongpoint. .1 fter document, was rushed to Liversedge at moving through the native village of 3fa - Maranusa 1. The NLG commander im- ranusa I without incident, the point pla- mediately radioed for an air strike to toon of the NLG suddenly encountered knock out tl~ese weapons, but his message seren ,Japanese riflemen. Surprise to failed to raise a response from either both forces was zpparent, b[lt the Marines h“GOF headquarters or the 43d Division. recovered first. In a brief tight, two of An Army radio station at Viru, hearing the enemy were killed before the rest fled. the request for a relay, accepted the mes- Uniforms identified the dead as members sage for transmission to CornAir New of the SNLF, probably from the Kure fit}l Georgia. at l?nogai. Early on the morning of 8 July, Griffith Realizing that the fight hzd warned the hurried two platoons down divergent Enogmi gwrison of an attack through the pat,hs north and west from Triri to am- back door, Liversedge increased the speed bush any enemy probing attacks. The of the adv:lnce. Griffith was directed to Marines on the west trail scored first. A take his raider battalion forward as Japanese p a t r 01 of near-company quickly as possible to take advantage of stren$th, blundering along the trail with- an-y remaining element of surprise and to out advance security, walked into the trap. 126 ISOLATION OF RABAUL
Premature firing, however, spoiled any pressure of the enemy assaults. Company surprise effect and the enemy withdrew L, on the right, received only scattered without difficulty. Within a few minutes, sniper fire. The demolitions platoon of a full-scale counterattack had been di- the raider battalion, which had remained rected at the Marine amblwhing party, and behind with Liversedge’s CP, rushed to Griffith rushed Boyd’s Company D for- assist Company K in its defense just as ward to help hold the trail. In the mewn- Griffith’s battalion returned. On orders time, Colonel I,iversedge picked up his from Liversedge for a quick counterat- command post and the two Army compa- tack, Griffith directed First Lieutenant nies and rushed to Triri to be closer to the Robert Kennedy’s platoon from Company conflict. B to circle back and hit the left flank and The fight continued for three hours, the rear of the Japanese. Kennedy’s counter- close jungle terrain handicapping the ob- move completely surprised and crushed servation and maneuvering of both forces. the enemy’s left flank. The Japanese fled Company C (Captain John P. Salmon), once more. Another 20 enemy dead were moving forward to relieve Company T) left behind. CompanY K, which had three under fire, broke the deadlock with a soldiers wounded, estimated that 75 addi- 60mm mortar barrage and continuous ma- tional Japanese had been killed in the at- chine gun fire. As the raiders moved for- tempted breakthrough. Kennedy’s pla- ward, the enemy disengaged and fled down toon suffered no casualties. the trail. Fifty dead Japanese were left littered about the scene of the fight. CAPTURE OF EiVOGAI 4 The Marines did not pursue. Enogai After a quiet night at Triri, the Marines was the first objective. While the Army again started toward Enogai the follow- companies took over the defense of Triri, ing morning. A radio team with a TBX the raider batt alien hastily reorganized and headquarters personnel of the raider and resumed the march toward Enogai— regiment rema.ined behind with the Army nlong the north trail where the second am- companies, but Liversedge moved out with bush force had set up. The trail, how- Griffith’s battalion. The raiders had more ever, ended abruptly in an impassable luck this day. A good trail, apparently swamp. Reluctantly, after considerable unknown to the Enogai garrison, was dis- time had been spent in trying to find an covered and rapid progress was made by acceptable trail to Enogai, the battalion the Marines. Sounds of an air strike at commander ordered the return to Triri for Enogai indicated that the request for the another start the following day. destruction of the enemy guns there was Meanwhile, the Japanese force had rein- forced and reorganized for another attack 4Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: i?GOF .Accomzt; New on Triri. Late on the afternoon of the !%h, Georgia Campaign; I.st RdrRe@ MsgFiJe; an estimated 400 Japanese struck quickly 1st RdrRcgt SAR; Ist RdrRegt Jnl; Ist at the left flank of the thin perimeter es- Rdrlln WarD; Griflth ltr; Steuenson ltr; tablished by the two Army companies. Pape ltr, OP. cit.; Boyd interview, OP. tit.; Rentz, Marines in tltc Central Solomon*; The lines of Company K of the 145th slow- Griffith, “Action at Enogai,” op. cit. ; McDevitt ly began to give way under the continuing and Marder, “Capture of Enogai,” op. a’t.
128 ISOLATION OF RABAUL being executed. Shortly before noon, Le- were hit by intense fire from rifles and 1and Lagoon was sighted and the Marine automatic weapons. The two companies battzlion turned east toward the enemy paused for a 60mm mortar barrage to soft- defenses at Enogai Point. After several en the enemy line before plunging on. hours of cautions approach, the raiders Company B, ilt last meeting strong defens- were halted by the stutter of two light ma- ive fire, raced through a small native vil- chine, guns. The Marines pallsed for bat- lage on the inlet’s shore south of 13nogpi. tle orders. As they waited, the, volume of Dead enemy were sprawled throughout the enemy fire picked up, The Enogai de- village. A number of machine guns were fense line was being reinforced. taken and turned about to put more fire The attack WNS made without mortar on the fleeing Japanese. The break- preps.ratioll—Conlpany A (Captain through put raiders almost in the rear of Thomas .i. Mullahey) with its left flank the enemy lines. Opposition facing Com- rest ing on thq 1agoon, Salmon’s Company pany C in the center abruptly faltered, C in the, center, and Company B (Captain then scattered. Edwin B. Wheeler) on the right flank. As enemy resistance began to crumble, Boyd’s Complny D was held in reserve. the raider zttack gained momentum. Be- The frontal assault, made with grenades Ilind a withering fire of automatic weap- an(l machine g{lns, was beaten back. With ons ancl machine guns, the raiders moved the jungle daylight fast closing into deep through Enogai. Mortarmen, in positions twilight, I.iverwdge called off the, assault. on the high ground overlooking the village, Griffith was told to holcl in place and re- dropped 60mm mortar shells along the sume the xttack the follon’ing morning. shoreline of ~~LdaGulf, trapping the vil- Tl~e Marines’ defensive positions, facing ]:~ge defenders be,tween t,w~ofires. Strag- commanding grOL~nd)were not to Liver- glers, attempting to swim across Leland sedge’s liking, but the NLG commander Lngoon, were machine gunned by the raid- wanted to keep the pressure on the enemy ers. By earl-y afternoon, the coast defense during the night and decided to risk a positions were in raider hands, and only .Japanese connterattmk. The gamble paid two small pockets of enemy resistance re- off. The night passed without incident ex- mained. These the Marines contained, cept for the s:ldden crash of a huge, bomb- postponing mopping-up operations until weakeneci banyan tree in the command the next dny. Late that afternoon, Com- post area which crushed one raider, in- pmny L of the 145th strl~ggled into Enogai. jured three others, and completely each soldier carrying rations, ‘bandoleers of srnashecl the command’s TBX. ammunition, and three extra canteens of Breakfast on the morning of the 10th water. Without food for more than 30 was not a problem for the raiders who had hours, the rniders had been reduced to not, eaten since the morning of the 9th. cat ch ing drinking water in ponchos during There was no food. After a few quiet or- tl~e intermittent rains. ders from Griffith, the 1st Raider Batt- The food was part of an air drop which alion renewed the attack. Wheeler’s the rear headqllzrters at Triri had received Company B on tile right front reported early on the morning of the 10th. Liver- 11oopposition and movecl forward rapidly. s~dge had requested the drop the previous Companies .i and C, as expected, however, day. The original three-day sLlpply of ra- THE I) RAGOX’S PEA’INSTTLA CA?tfPAIGh” tions carried ashore at Rice Anchorage seck~ng to evacuate stragglers from the had been stretched over five clnys, and ~andspit bet~yeen Leland Lagoon and Kula fresh water w:(S n] so scarce. W’olmdecl Glllf. were fed worlny rice wllic]~ ]Ild ken Tile f 01lowing nlorning, mop-up oper- follncl xt Triri. The situntion l~ad become :~tions begxl} with rompanies A and D tense-so serions, in fact, that tile Marines moving ~lli~lil~ tllrollgh the two remaim were fzr more concerned with tile proslwct il~y points of ol)lmsition, :~ltholl:ll com- of cent inllec[ dinlinishec{ rations than they pal]y I) was lmr{l-hit initially. Only x were with the threat of having anot]ler few ,Ia]mnese were flllslled by the other enenly garrison in their rezr at 13airoko. patrols, and these the Marines killed quick- Anxiety increased when tl~c planes ap- ly. Tl~e 1st R:\iders now owned all of peared over ‘rriri on schedulr but could E]]og:l i Point between Lelnnci I.agoon nnd not locate the purple smoke grenades the inlet. ,JapaJI(vw c:wllct]ties were est,- markinx tile NLG positions. An air nlnted at 350. Tile rziders, in moving liaison officer finally macle contact, with the from ‘Ikiri, h:~d lost 47 killed in action and plal~es ancl (Iirected the air drop. Par~- 74 wounded. I?ollr ~t]~ers were n~is~ing chutes drifted down, and soldiers al~d Ma- i~nd presllmed dead. The wolmded were rines dodgecl tl]e welcome ‘~bonlbi ng” to place(l in :ti(l stations housed in the co] lect the blllky packages. The, first con- tllatcllecl llllts at F.nowai. tainers opened held only mort m shells, The fol~r 140mm naval guns, three .50 and the troops howled their disappoint- caliber ant iaircraf t guns, and numerous ment. K-rations and chocolate bzrs soon )n:~cl~i~~egllns. rifles, and small mortars followed, however. An immediate relief were raptured, in addition to large stocks party wzs organized to cmry supplies and of ammnnit ion, food, clothing, two trac- water to (lrit%th’s battalion, then hotly tors, and a smrclll igllt. Alliecl bonlbnrd - engaged at Enogai. lnents and bombings l)ad not materially That, night the Marines clined on K- dxmnged an v of the F.nogai inst :lllxt ions. rations ant{ tJapnnese canned fish? rice, znd Tile ,T:Ipa~~eseretaliated quickly on the sake. ‘1’he capture(l enemy r:~tions l~ere nlorniug of tl~e llth with a bombing at- 1iherally seasoned with soy sa~~ce found t:wk wllicll lasted for lllore tl~:m an hour in several large b:~rrels. Art i~’lesof Japan- :11](I left the Marines with 3 more men ese unifornls were usrcl to rep] nce the killed a]ld 15 wounded. Three American muddy and tattered Marine uniforms. PBYs }~ere called in tl~at afternoon to The even ing passed without, further activ- evammte tl~e more serimlsly injurd, andt ity, the Marines resting easily behind z after landing at, Rice .fncllorage, the big perimeter defense an~’horecl on Leland La- flying boats taxied along the shoreline to goon on the right flank and Eno~~i Inlet Enog:li where (he woundecl were loaded on the left. The tlefeuses faced to~vard aboard from rllbber rafts. Shortly before Ilairoko. During the lligllt, .Japanese takeoff, the 1’11Ys were bombed nnd barges were hearcl in I{ul:l Gulf and t,he strafed by t~~o etlenly floatp] znes. The raiders scrambled for positions from l~arilles on snore iired everything they which to repel an enemy counterlandin.g. luld at ihe att:~ckers, in(luding smnll arms The
nese believed that two regiments were at- pany B led the approach march with Com- tacking Dragons Peninsula and ordered pany D ( I1OWcommanded by First Lieu- half of the %2 E/ntfa?;on. I,?t]t I?pg;menf tenant Frank A. Kemp, Captain Boyd from Vi]a to Okumura’s assistance. The ]laving been evzcuate.d with malaria), the reinforcements included a machine gun demolitions platoon, Currin’s 4th Raider company. The new troops were to have Batta]ion, and the regimental command been rushed to Enogai to defend the coast post following in column. The two com- defense guns but the. move was made too panies in the 1st Battalion had been late. By the time the i?d Battalion units brol~ght np to nenr-full strength for the reached Bziroko, Enogai had been cap- attack by taking men from Companies A tured. When LiverSedge’s intentions to and C. These nnderstrength companies continue the attack toward Bairoko be- mnlained behind with the 145>s Company came more evident, more reinforcements L at Eno~ni. (See lfap 9.) were rushed to the harbor. These included AS the NI.G file moved throngh the several companies of the $2d Battalionl dripping jnn~le , scrambling over sharp .&5thl?eg~ment and the 8th Battery of the coral rocks and climbing low but, steep 6th Field Artillery Regiment which had hills and ridges, the Marines waited to recently arrived from Bougainvillea. hear the first sounds of bombing and straf- Since contact with the enemy had been ing which wo~lld indicate that the 0900 air negligible after the capture of Enogai, the strike on 13airoko’s defenses was being ex- NLG had no basis for comparison of ecuted. The raiders waited in vain-there strength and were not aware of the added would be no strike. enemy capability to defend Bairoko. Pa- Unknown to Liversedge, his request, was trols did not, aggressively test the Japa- apparently made too late. The support nese defenses; in fact? no probing attacks against the outposts guarding Bairoko strikes by C’on~.iirSols for 20 ,JLdy were were attempted. The only enemy prisoner already scheduled and the planes allotted. taken during this period was a badly The NLG commander, howewr, did not, burned pilot, rescued from an offshore is- kno~v this. Considerable difficulty was land and immediately evacuated. In ef- enco~ll~tered in transmitting the messmge fect, the NLG was facing an unknown on the afternoon of the If)th, but the mes- quantity in its attack against the harbor. sage was finally cle:ued. Scheduling of the strike was not confirmed, Liversedge.’s “Z HAVE COMMITTED communication officer recalls: THE WOliK&” 10 Acknowledgment was requested, as I re- member, but this acknowledgment did not The approach to Bairoko by the raiders come until night. It was actually nothing began over trails and terrain now familiar more than an acknowledgment of the re- through much patrolling. Whee]er’s Com- .Vs~Filc; 1st RdrRegt PtlRepts, op. cit.; .jth ‘0 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this Rdr131& Ju143 TTJarI); Griflth Ur; LtCol Anthony section is derire(l frolll : 3’r/r Cror, qioCampa ifpl; Walker ltr to CMC, dtd 23 Feb51; LtCol Edwin NGOF .4 mount; (k)nlAir%ls Jf-arD, ,Ju143: R Wheeler ltr to CMC, dtd 20Mar52; ONI, Com- CornAir New Georgia S.4R, 29Jun–13Aug43;Ist bat A-orratiues X; Rentz, Marines in the Central Rdrltcgt SAR; Ist Rc7rRegt Jnl; Ist RdrRegt 6’olomons.
691–360 O—63—lO 136 ISOLATION OF RABAUL
ceipt of the message by the staff officer on withering fire from automatic weapons duty at the headquarters addressed.11 and machine guns which raked the jungle. Without air support, the odds for suc- Recovering qnickly, the Marines returned cess in capturing 13airoko Iengt hened con- the fire, the battle racket becoming louder. siderably. Disappointed but determined, As the intensity of the firing increased, the the two Marine batt al ions kept, moving din was punctured by hoarse shouts and forward. curses as the Marines tried t.o maneuver The first shots crone shortly after 1015. against the murderous fire pouring from A ,Japanese o{~tpost opened fire on the the jungle facing them. hTLG column, nnd Wheeler and Kemp Confronting the raiders was a series of quickly deployed tl~eir companies into at- log and coral bunkers dug into the rising tack formation. The outpost was over- ground under banyan roots, and well cam- ouflaged with palm fronds and branches. run. Without pause, the raiders contin- The ridge ahead blazed with fire from ued forwnrd. feeling their wzy through these low fortifications. Similar to those the tangled jungle. .It 1040, Griffith in- encountered by the NC~OF in its approach forn~ed Liversedge by messzge tlmt he was to Munda, the emplacements supported deployed ancl pushing forward ag~inst exch other with lanes of interlocking fire. several machine gulls. Further protection was furnished by Jap- Five minutes later, the raiders were in anese soldiers in trees overhead who sniped a violent, all-out battle. A sudden erup- at the Marines with l-Tambu (.25 caliber) tion of intense and accllrate fire from close light machine guns. Okumura had pre- range raged at them. The Marine attack- pared his defenses well. ers were pinned down, closely pressed The pitched battle went on, both sides against banyan roots, logs, and coral out- firing at a rapid rate. Wheeler’s company, c.roppings, unable to move against the with its right flank near the end of the lagoon, was unable to move forward and “ Stevensonttr. All NLG records, both Marine COU1d not make contact with Christie’s and Army, indicate that such a strike was ex- platoon on the sandspit. Heavy firing pected. ComAirSols and ComAir New Georgia records, however, do not reveal any notation of across the lagoon indicated that Christie, the request. This particular incident, which il- too, was engaged. Kemp’s company, on lustrates IW.G liaison difficulties with higher the left, finally regained fire superiority, echelons, remains nnrf?solved. Evidently a staff however, and begwn to inch forward in an officer at ComAirSols, adhering to a policy that air support requests had to be received before attempt to take high ground to the front. 1600 on the day prior to the date of execution, As casualties began to mount in both com- took no action on the request. The XIV Corm panies, Griffith moved his sole reserve unit G–3 Journal of 19 JUIy cent sins a message from —the demolitions platoon under Marine Liversedge, sent at 2235, 18 July, requesting a 12-plane strike on the 19th and a “large strike Gunner Angus R. Goss—to the left flank to stand by for July 20 A M and SBD’S to stand for protection from attacks from that di- by for immediate call remainder of day. ” Corps rection. At 1105, after 20 minutes of furi- headquarters replied that a “large strike stand- by” for the 20th was “impracticable.” Quoted ous combat, Griffith reported to Llvers- in .Miller, Reduction of Rabaul, p. 1.30n. e.dge: “Harry: I have committed the THE DRAGONS 1’ENIAWI;I,A CAMPAIGN 137 138 ISOLATION OF RABAUL works. . . . Movement forward cent inues. full fury all along the line, the raider Sam.” ‘2 gains measured a yarcl at a time. Con- By noon, tile first line of Pllemy resist- tact, with the platoon on the sandspit still ance crumbled, broken under the relel~tless ha(l not been made. Christie’s unit, facing pressure of the raider units. ITnable to a marshy swanlp backed by a strong line use the 60nml mortars because of the jun- of Japanese fortifications, COUIC1not ad- gle canopy, lacking the ne~vflan}e-thro]yer vance.. Seven enemy machine guns, pour- weapons, tnd without air or artillery sup- ing t deadly fusilade, over the swamp and port., t]le Mari IIW brencheci ~klmlur:~’s cle- along the shores of the sandspit, resisted fensive ]inc by lmocking out first one pill- every attempt at forward movement. box and tl)en anotl~er by demolitions nnd In the next two hours, the raider attack over~vlle]ming small-arms fire. BUt losses slowly pllncbed through two different de- were heavy and progress was slow. fensive lines, uncovering a number of Shortly after noon, with the 1st Bat- bunkers on the reverse slopes. Company talion clearly needing quick assistance, D, riddled with casualties by the heavy Liversedgc con~mitted Currin’s battalion and continuous enemy fire, scrambled to to the fight. Company P (Captzin the top of a ridge line which overlooked Walker) was in close sl~pport behind Grif- the hzrbor at Bairoko, about 500 yards fith’s battalion. and thus able to move away. But between the raiders and their quickly into the line. Kemp’s Company objective lay another series of formidable D, which had moved stemdily ahead de- fortifications. Hoping to cement Kemp’s spite numerolls casualties, was receiving position on the commanding terrain, Liv- heavy fire on its left flank and Walker now ersedge directed First Lieutenant Ray- xttacked toward this opposition. Goss’ mond L. Luckel’s Company O into the gap demolition platoon, in turn, circled between Company D on the ridge and through the rear of the 1st Battalion to Company P. Both companies had been take up a new position on Kemp’s right hit hard by several machine guns in this flank to bridge the gap between Company area, and I~uckel’s company was ordered D and Company B. to silence these weapons. k Company O Walker’s fresh company, uncier orders lunged forward, the maneuver reduced fire to attack southwest to the shores of the on Company P and Company N. Walker inlet before turning north to hit the ene- and Snell then moved their companies for- my;s right flank, was barely able to move ward to take a small ridgeline to the left forward before criss-crossing fire from front. both right, and left flanks held it back. At this time, the NLG front lines arched Whi]e Walker scouted his front lines to in a wide U pointed towards the harbor determine the location of the machine with Company D as the leading unit. On guns facing him, Captain Snell moved his the left flank, Currin had three companies, Company N into position behind Walker’s bent around to the southwest. Griffith’s unit to refuse the left flank and support two companies and the demolitions pla- W’alker;s attack. The battle continued in toon, on the right, had managecl to move
“ IstRdrRcflt,lJsyFi/e, Griffith to Liversedge, nearly to the end of the lagoon, but a {ltd 20Ju143. slight gap still existed between the bat- THE DRAGONS I’ENINSULA CAMPAIGN 139 talion and the lagoon’s shoreline. Livers- hit the south flank of the enemy, but sounds edge, in all attempt to plug this gap nnd of firing from that direction indicated that try once Illore to contact (?hristie, n~oved Schultz was engaged. I’reer’s battalion, First Lieut en:~nt Leonard W. Al ford with scattered between Rice, Triri, and 13nogzi a reinforced platoon flom Coll]pa]]y O to was not in position to help, even if those this flank. Al ford’s platoon ll]ade a sl)ir- bases coldd have been left unguariie(l. itecl attack, but the volume of el)emy fire Company L at Enogai had been ordered prevented Illoven)ent beyond that of to the front lines with ammunition, ra- Wheeler% con~pany. The move, howwer, tions, and blood plasma at 1400, but had tied Christ ie’s platoon closer to the main not yet arrived. Liversedge would have to NLG line. take the Japanese position with the. troops Atj 1445, spora(lic but accurate mortar already at hand. fire from enemy positio]is on the il]let sLld- Following Company D’s return to its denly changed il)to an intense barrage tl]at former position, the 4th Batti~lion found shook the attacking lines. ‘rhe Marines, movement easier, and Companies N and without wmpons for coll]]terl)ntte.l”j7 fire, P managed to move forward in the face of could only press closer into their shallow stiffening fire to extend the NLG lines positions hehin(l scant cover on the ridge more to the southwest. Bllt the move was lines and try to weatl~er the pol]nding. costly: both companies received heavy cas- Estimated to be 90mm rou]~clsj the sl~ells ualties. Company Q (Captain Lincoln N. inflicted further casualties, mainly from Holdzkom), the sole remaining company tree bursts overhead. The barrage JVaS in~- as yet lmcommitted, moved up to the rear mediately followed by a screnming coun- of the other three 4th Battalion units to terattack. Kemp’s comp~ny, bearing the be in position for an attack when directed. brunt of the enen]y chi~]”~~,was pinnecl be- By 1600, the ,Japanese had been p~lslled, tween searing fire fron~ the front and the still defimt. and dangerous, into m m-es mortar shelling. \Yithdra~v ing to the first on the l~airoko Harbor headlands mbout ridge taken, Kemp orgal~ized a counterat - 300 yarcls wide and 800 yards long. Their tack of his own, ancl with a badly deplete(l back to the sez, the enemy defel~ciers kept company stormed lx~ck to l]is old position up x sustained and nlurdelolls machine in a sudden rush. The quick conquest was gun and mortar fire that showec] few signs the first visible crzck in the ,Japanese de- of slackenil~g. In an effort to strike one. fenses. Mnrines reported tile enemy flee- last, conclusive blow, Liverseclge ordered ing, ma~y of them without weapons. Company Q into the lines. Holclzkom’s Griffith sent x hasty note to I.i~-ersedge, company moved arouncl the left flank of advising the iW,G comrna,n(ler that the Company N in an attack straight into the addition of just one company (I. of 3/145) teeth of hewvy enemy fire. Action along WOU1d take Pmiroko I)y night. Tl~e ,Japa- the rest of the front line dwindled as the nese, C~riffltllbelieved, wele on the rim, but fury of the attack on tile sollth flank in- casllalt ies were heavy among the raiders creased. Now all combnt units had been ancl rein forcen~ents Ivould be neede(l. committed; only the demolitions platoon Unfortunately, there were no rezdy re- of Currin’s battalion remained as security serve units. Nothing had been l~eard from for tile command posts in cwse of an enemy the Army battalion which was supposed to breakthrol@l. l~lleeler’s Conlpany R, re- 140 ISOLATION OF RAFlA12L questing reinforcements for a last attackj from Triri. Steve told Dutch to keep push- was told that no help was available. ing and try to connect with our outfit. Ar- The outcome of Liversedge’s last at- tillery fire is falling betweenRice and Triri. LaHue.” tempt to take his objective was not long in doubt. Despite the vigor of Company Q’s Schultzl battalion had departid Triri on attack, the overwhelming fire of the enemy schedule that morning, Company K lead- won. Badly depleted in a matter of mo- ing the colurnl) down tile Triri-Bairoko ments, Company Q was forced to retire. trail. Progress was slow, the heavy ma- Repulsed, the company reeled back, vir- chine guns and nlortars carried by the sol- tually noneffective through its losses. The {liers adding to the difficulty of movement tactical situal ion had been opportune for over the slippery jungle terra in. By noon, one last heavy punch to knock out the en- the battalion had rezched a point on the emy defenders, but without artillery, air trail where el~emy posit ions had been re- w~pport, or other heavy weapons, the ported, bl~t tile .Japanese had apparently raider battalions could not deliver it. evacuated the area. The only enemy con- During the, early part of the Marines’ tact Jvas a :1 impse of a ,Japanese pat,rol attack, (?olone] T.iverswlge he:ircl nothing of about, 15 men moving hurriedly down from Schultz, w-11owas supposed to have the trail al~ead of the colt~mn, but no shots bit the enemy’s other flank. From his \vere tired. ,Short Iy afterwards, however, command post just behind the raiders> the chatter of an enemy light machine gun front, lines, the NIX+ commxnder tried to sent the colnm]) oti the tr pre-atta.ck bombardment was to start at tied up getting them evacuated to aid sta- 1600. Enemy strength, Schultz decided, tions and to Enogai. There was nothing to was about one company. Shortly after the do but pull back to reorganize, re-equip, get some rest, try to get something to cope with mortar barrage began, LiverSedge was the Jap !30mm mortars, and get the wounded able to contact Schultz directly by tele- out. phone and advise him of the situation that The decision to pull back was made by faced the Marines on the right flank. Harry the Horse on recommendation from Schultz must establish contact with the me after I had talked to Currin and his and my company commanders and had made a main positions at Bairoko--and soon— personal reconnaissance of the front. Harry Liversedge told him, or the attack on Bai- had a mission and was understandably loath roko would fail. to abandon it. The final determining factor The Army commander, not knowing was the Japanese capability to reinforce whether his present attack would succeed, from Vila Stanmore during the night by barge. We were already up against a stone reported that. he did not think it possible wall, low on ammunition and out of water, that contact with the Marine units could and had a responsibility to 200 wounded men. be made before nightfall. McCaffery, who In any case, reorganization was a paramount had reached Schultz after the attack had requirement. I feel that the decision to with- been started, could only urge that Schultz draw was entirely sound and the only sensi- ble one to have made.n push forward as rapidly as possible. The battalion’s attack carried forward only a Victory had been close. At 1630 Grif- few hundred yards before stiffening enemy fith had joined Kemp on his hard-won resistance stopped the advance. Schultz ridgeline overlooking Bairoko. The har- then ordered his men to dig in and hold the bor was about 300 yards away—but still ~~ound taken. He had, he fibmred, reached unattainable. For more than seven hours, a position from which he could launch an the raiders had been in continuous attack, attack the following morning. trading punch for punch with the enemy For LiverSedge, Schultz’ failure to at- and had almost won. Exhausted and tack aggressively on the left flank was the nearly out of ammunition, with almost as final blow in a series of sharp disappoint- many men wounded as were still fighting, ments. To his front, the battle din had the raiders could only retire, carrying subsided into an uneasy calm broken oc- their dead and wounded. The positions casionally by the stutter of a machine gun won through courage and indomitable will or the sharp report of a rifle. While both could not be held during the night be- forces—the Japanese compressed into a cause them were no other troops ready to corner and the Marines clinging tenacious- pick up the fight. Regretfully, Liversedge ly and tiredly to shell-pocked ridges won ordered the withdrawal of his forces. through sacrifice and courag~waited for The retirement began shortly after 1700. the next move, Liversedge asked Griffith First to leave were the litter cases, about to reconnoiter the front lines and report 90 in number. Marines from the battalion what action could be taken. Griffith’s rec- and regiment al headquarters companies ommendation: withdraw. carried the wounded off the ridgeline in By this time the Raiders (1st and 4th) crude stretchers made from folded pon- had nearly 250 casualties, or about 30 per- cent of the force. We had another 150 men 142 ISOLATION OF RABAUL chos and tree branches. The walking perimeter. A light Japanese force at- wounded followed, a thin stre~m of lurch- tempted to penetrate the defenses on the ing, bloody men who had remained in the west flank, but was repulsed by Com- fight despite injuries. While Companies panies B and D in a sharp fight that N and P held the main positions. Company wounded nine more Marines and killed an- Q pulled back. Companies O and D dis- other. Four dead Japanese were found engaged next. Despite a continued spatter the next morning. of enemy mortar and machine gun fire, the At dawn on the 21st, another group of retirement was orderly, Marines assisting walking wounded started toward Enogai the wounded and each other whenever nec- where three PBYs waited. The main body essary. As they moved back, the men sal- of the NLG followed, the Marines carry- vaged weapons and ammunition which ing the more seriously wounded men on had been dropped in the fight. stretchers. Shortly after the grueling As the abrupt jungle darkness closed in, march began, a group of Corrigan’s na- the rest of the raider companies disen- tives appeared to take over the stretcher gaged to retire to the high ground east of bearing. Progres was slow and exhaust- the end of the lagoon. A rough defensive ing as the natives and Marines, burdened perimeter was set up both flanks resting with extra weapons and packs, labored on the lagoon. Company L of 3/145, over the rough terrain. A stopWa,smade which arrived at 1800 with badly needed every 200 yards to rest the wounded and medical supplies and water, also moved the carriers. The main body of troops into the defensive line. Christie’s platoon, had gone about halfway to Enogai when pulled back a short distance on the sand- the Marines were met by Company I, spit, blocked a possible enemy counter- 3/145, which had hurried from Triri to attack from that direction. take over the rear guard. The rough After seeing 80 walking wounded start march was further eased when a number the long and tortuous night march back to of the wounded were transferred to land- Enogai, the Marines settled down into an ing craft about halfway down Leland La- uneasy rest in their shallow foxholes. goon. After that, the march speeded and That night Liversedge made another re- by 1400 all troops were within the defen- quest for air support. To forestall any sive perimeter at Enogai. Christie’s pla- swift counteract ack by the Bairoko de- toon, which retired down the spit, also ar- fenders, the NLG commander asked that rived without incident. the area between the NLG perimeter and Schultz, who had been surprised at the the harbor be worked over by a bombing abrupt change of events, had kept his and strafing attack the next morning. soldiers on the alert for a morning attack Liversedge then concluded his request if a switch in orders came. When the with: “You are covering our with- order for withdrawal was repeated, drawal.” “ Schultz turned his battalion around and The night of 2&21 July passed with within several hours was back at Triri. only one enemy attack to test the hasty During the march toward Enogai, the Marines had been heartened by the sounds ‘= Wevenson ltr. of continuous bombing and strafing attacks THE DRAGONS PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 143 at 13airoko. Although Liversedge’s re- The raiders had faced an estimated 30 quest for air support the night previous machine guns in coral and log emplace- hzd been received at 2244, well past the ments, c]everly camouflaged with narrow, required deadline for such requests, the hard-to-detect firing slits. Only 33 enemy CornAir New Georgia headquarters ap- dead had been counted during the day-long parently read the appeal in the NLG mes- attack, but the evidence of much blood in sage and the request was passed to Con~- the bunkers which had been reduced in- AirSols. Every available plane, including dicated that the Japanese casualties had some outmoded scout planes, was diverted been considerably higher. to attack the enemy positions at Bairoko. The following day, 22 July, Liversedge The strikes began at 0950 on the 21st, and received orders from Griswold to remain 1asted until 1710, long after the raiders at Enogai and Rice Anchorage. Active hnd remched the base It F.nogai. In all, 90 patron ing was to be continued, and the scout bombers, 84 torpedo bombers, 22 NTGOF was to be apprised of any hostile medium bombers, and 54 fighter planes troop movement from Bairoko to Munda. took part in the continuous air attack. A Evidently, no further attempt to take the total of 135 tons of bombs were dropped well-fortified harbor would be made for on enemy positions, and strafing attacks a while. With these orders, the conflict by the mediums started a number of fires on Dragons Peninsula settled down to a in Suppl ElVI) OF A CAiJf PA Z(7LV ‘8 The following day, 10 August, on Gris- wold’s orders, operational control of the The virtlml stnlemate on Ihwgons Pe- NLG passed to the 25th Division. Con- ninsulz ended on 2 .%llgust. The XIV trol of Schultz’ battalion passed to the Corps, poised for x last headlong break- 27th Infantry, and Ryneska’s battalion throllgh to Mundfl fiel cl, directed the NLG joined the NLG in Schultz’ place. Leav- to rush another blocking force between ing the road block position to be defended Mun& and 13airoko to trap any retreating by Ryneska’s outfit, Liversedge and his enemy. After a hurried night conference Marine-Army force returned to Triri and with his battalion commanders, Liver- Enogai. There the Marines had been ac- se.clgeordered Schu]tz; battalion on a quick tively patrolling to determine if the enemy nmrch down the Munda-13niroko trail was preparing to make another deter- from Triri. The 4th Raider Battalion, at mined stand at Bairoko. Heavy barge Rice, ret urned to reserve positions fit traffic, however, and lack of aggressive re- sistance indicated that Bairoko was being Enogzi and Triri. Schultz’ battalion, evacuated. Meanwhile, the nightly enemy leaving Triri on the 3d, moved quick]y past air raids continued with practically the its old positions abandoned on 17 July to saule results as before: “No casualties, no another trail junction farther southwest. damage, no sleep.” “ Here he established a road block. On 5 on 9 Augustl a light antiaircraft battery .~ugust, as Munda fell, I.iversedge joined from the 1lth Defense Bat.talien arrived him with wreinf orcin.g ~roup (Companies at Enogai. The 50 Marines with 40mm I and K) from the 145th Infantry and a antiaircraft guns and .50 caliber machine reinforced platoon from each of the two guns were a welcome addition to the base’s raider battalions. The first enemy contact defense. The first night that the battery came on 7 August when a patrol from was in action: the 40mm guns scored a hit Schultz> battalion encountered Japanese on a surprised Japanese plane which hur- building a defensive position and killed ried away trailing smoke. The gleeful seven of them. Marines scored the hit as a “probable.” Contact between the forces capturing Thereafter, the nightly enemy raiders Munda and Liversedge’s command was climbed considerably higher; and as the made on 9 Auagust when a patrol from the altitude increased, the accuracy of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, commanded bombing decreased. by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph F. Ryneska, The final assault on Bairoko was made appeared at Schultz’ road block. on 24 August after two regiments of the 25th Division (161st and 27th) had “ ITnlessotherwise noted, the material in this pushed inexorably toward the last Japa- section is (lerived from : .Vrw Georgia Campaign ; nese stronghold. In the late afternoon of .VGOI,’ .$cmmnt; 1st RdrR(>qt N.1R; Ist IMrR@ 24 August, R-yneska-whose battalion had .1)![ : Ist I:{?rRrgt :~1.s,qFil~ : Ist li’drI{~t WarI) ; advanced steadily toward the objective on -4th R(lrI\n Jy:l rI). lug-l:] : f Ith I)rflln TVarD ; the Munda-Bairoko trail—sent a message llth DefBn QImrterly A.\ ReI)t, dtd 13Se@3 ; Maj ~I:lr~in D. Girardeau, USA, ltr to CMC, dtd to Liversedge that he was one hour’s flFeb5i ; Gvifitll ltr ; Rentz, Marines in the Cen- tral Solomons. THE DRAG(3XS PEA’13WULA CAMPAIGN 145 mnrrh fronl the smlthern end of the harhor 130 wounded. Cnrrin’s battalion, in three and that llQ was ~oiug into Elairoko on the operations ( ~Tiru,Wickham, and Ilairoko) followil~,c n~ol.nin~ “come hell or high wr- ha~l 2 officers killed and 8 wounded, 52 iter.” 3(’ Ryneska’s message was followed enlisted nleu killed and another 160 by another nlessa~e from the 3cl Battalion, ~vollllded. (>f tile 591 men remaining in l$5th (llo~lc ollllll;lllclecll ly~~ajot.~farlin tl~e 1st Batt alien, only 245 were judged D. ~rirardeatl) which l]md advanced from e (~ective by batt aliou mediczl officers. Enogai over tile raiders’ routeof 20,Tuly. Ollly 154 M:~rines out of the 412 officers ii comp:lny from that bnttalion reported and men in the 4th Battalion could be that. it ll:lclelltered 13airol “ Ist RdrRty)t SAR, p, 17, ‘4Ibid., pp. 1>13. THE DRAGONS PENINSUI,A CAMPAIGN 147 hTaval glmfire support, m known lwter in harbor could have been taken by more ag- the war, was at this point in mid-19+3 still gressive action by tile 3d Battalion, 148th in tile exploratory st:l “ Col Robert. D. Heinl. Jr., ltr to Head, HistBr, merable shortcomings in the initial phrn- G–3, HQMC, dtd 3M:uW?. ning and in tile support subsequently re- ‘c 31:1jor Gf.ller:~l Rolx?rt S. 13eightler, who com- ceived. Falllty intelligence which under- m:lnde(l the 37th Infnntry I)iyis ion at hTew estimated the enemy, fanlty task organizat- (lef)r~i:l, nf)tecl th:tt he h:ld ‘{perso]l:illy urged” ion wl~ich n~glected the incll~sion of re- (“( IIow1 Liversdxe “to a(lequately eqnip the Ma- qui red fight illg elements. and something riue Imttalions \vith heavy nutom atie weapons” lCSS than full support, by higher headqnar- before they left Gl]n End of a Campaign made sanctuary for Japanese fleeing the bigger island. As such, the densely - In a matter of days after its seizure by wooded appendage was a stepping stone the hTGOF, the airfield at Mnnda-shell- along the ,Japfinese route of retreat. The craterecl, with stripped and fire-blackened original island garrison h~d been small— pahn stllmps ollt ]in ing the ru]lways-was about 100 ~irmy xnd Navy troops—but the converted to :~n illlied b:~se for further general exodus from Munda swelled the operations ill the Central Solon )ons. *il- population. Tag ends and remnants of most as soon as enemy resist allce around Munda’s defenders fled to the islancl either the airfield was ended, tl]e busy bulldozers to go olrer]allc~ to\\-ard Arundel or await of the hTxvy>sconstruction battalions were evacuation by barge. (See Map II, Map smoothing the coral landing strips ancl re- ,Sectio l].) pai]ing revetments for use by ConlAirSols On 11 .iugust, as the 43d Division p]tnes. As the 25th Division turned north widened its cleanup efforts around the air- to follow the enemy’s wit hdrawa] toward field, a p:~trol confirmed reports of Japa- Bairoko, the 43d Division took over de- nese activity on 13aanga. The following fense of the airfield and began mop-up op- day, a company-sized ll~lit moved by lanCl- erations on the offshore islands. ing craft to the island. As the soldiers Separated from New Georgia by only disembarked, n withering fire from the a few yords of shallow water> Ilaanga Is- jungle fe.]led abollt half of the force and land north of Muncht Point was a. ready- forced its withdrawal. Two days later, while an artillery barrage from 155mm ‘ ~nl~ss otherwise noted, the material in this guns hastily emplaced at Munda paved the wction is doriwd from : CinC’Pac–CinCPO.\ way, two battalions of the 169th made an Rept of 01}s, PO.L, for Sep43, dtd 17Dw43 : PO]*[ii){’11 l:r~,t of 8oPac .1 ctif,$l; (70msopac unopposed dawn landing on the shore .4?1g–fJcp43 WnrI)s; NGOF Account; ~3d In f- opposite the site of the ill-fnted assault of Dil. Hi.st; 9th DefILn WarD, .\ug-Se1A3 : Iltl/ the 12th. As the infantrymen moved in- I)efBn lt’arl); 9th I)rfBn Tank OTIS; loth I)efBn Rept on Action of the TkPlnt in the N’ew Georgia land, crossing the island from east to west, Campaign, dtrf 3Se1A3 ; -L3d InfI)i~Rept to (2G, resistance stiff enecl. An estimated 400 XIV Corps, Employment of Tanks in Arnndel Japanese manned a strong line of hastily- Ops, dtd 23 Srp43 ; SE .-1rm 37(/uOps-11; S’mxN- bl~ilt fortific:tt ions blocking the advance. teenth .1 rm?l OIM—Z; ,JICPOA Item No. 1973, Translation of Captured J~pan(?Se Document, dtd On 16 August, two battalions of the 172d 2Z>-OT-4El:CIIC SoPacFor Item Nos. 799 and 814, Re~iment wel~t to 13aanga to reinforce the dtd 260ct43, Translation of Captured ,Japantwe attack. ~b n]ore artillery units ( illClLld- Documents; New Gcorgic Contpaig}$; Karoleyitz, ing tile 155mIli gun batteries of the 9th 2~flI InfDirIIi.~t; Rentz, .l[ari?/cs in the Crn- tral solonlons; Zimmer, ~37’,s Historq. Marine l)efense Ratta]ion) moved into po- 148 END OF A CAMPAIGN 14!) sition at Munda and on the offshore. is- difficult,. First, enemy contact was made Iands, and syst emat ica}ly knocked out by the east shore patrol on 1 September every known enemy gun emplacement, re- sollth of Stima Lagoon. Pushing on, the sist~nce dwindled. Il~creascd barge traffic patrol fought its ~yit~ through brief skir- on the night of 19 A~qy~st indicated that, n~ishes and delaying actions without trou- the ,Japauese were withdrzwinx. The fol- ble. To Ilelp cut off the retreating enemy, lowing day, the southern part of the island the Qd Battalion of the 172d established was quickly occi~pied, and two battalions x beachl~ead near the lagoon and rein- then moved north along opposite coast- forced the eastern patrol. Meanwhile, the lines. Only scattered stragglers were enc- 1st Rxttal ion moved by I.CMS through ountered; the enemy had abandoned ~Vana ~V:LnnI,a,goon to link up with the 13aanga. The 43d Division lost 52 nwn western patrol which had reached Bus- killed ancl 110 wounded in the week-long tling Point on the northwest coast w’ith- battle? out so much as seeing an enemy soldier. Contact with the Japanese was reestab- The beachhead on that coast was then ex- lished on Arundel. One of the smallest of pancled to include the extreme western the major islands in the group and virtu- encl of Bomboe Peninsula. ally unoccupied by the Japanese except as When the 2d Battalion’s attack near a barge staging base, Arundel was within St ima Lagoon on 5 September was ab- easy distance of both New Georgia and rl~ptly halt ecl by fierce enemy resistance, Kolombangarw Its eastern shore bor- the 3d Batt al ion was landed to reinforce dered Hathorn Sound and its northern the effort. Neither battalion, however, fringe of n~rrow reef islands was just was able to penetrate the enemy’s strong 1,200 yards from Kolombangara-a stra- line of defense which included mine fields tegic position which became increasingly and booby traps as well as many machine important to both forces. For the Jap- glms. Art illery fire from Kolombangara xnese, the island was mnimportant outpost supported the defense. The arrival of the to Kolombangara nnd an invaluable evac- 1st Battalion from Bustling Point, where a uation point. The NGOF wanted the is- battalion of the 169th hacl assumed re- land because Aruudel in Allied hands sponsibility for the western beachhead, would bring Vila airfield within range of placed the entire 172d Infantry on the east artillery. (See Map 10.) coast and paved the way for the commit- On 27 lfLlgUSt, troops from the 172d In- ment of the 27th Regiment. (25th Divi- fantry crossed Diamond Narrows from sion) on Bomboe Peninsula. Two bat- hTewGeorgia and landed unopposed on the teries of 155mm howitzers and a 4.2-inch southeastern tip. After securing the south- chemicxl mortar company also landed at ern part of the islznd~ the landing force Bustling Point to support the 27th Regi- split into two reinforced companies to be- ment on that coast, while, XTGOF artillery gin extended patrol action north along the on New Georgia emplaced on the shores of east and west coastlines of Arundel. Hathorn Sound delivered counterbattery As on New Georgia, thb dense jungle fire on Kolombangara to support the 172d’s and large mangrove swamps made travel attack on the east coast. Of the two in- fautry regiments, however, only the 27th Infantry was relatively fresh, although its 150 ISOLATION OF RABAUL rifle companies were =riously under- On the night of 14-15 September, the strength and its men “well seeded with remaining battalions of the 13th Regi- malaria.’? 3 The 172d had been through ment on Kolombangara were loaded on nearly two months of arduous fighting and barges for transfer to Arundel to begin a T1-ilSl):I(llJ’ Illlderstreugth. counteroffensive which was supposed to While troops from the. 169th held the regain the initiative in the Central SOlo- Bustling Point area, the 27th Infantry on mons. Undaunted by the loss of Colonel 12 September openecl a drive east along Tomonari and two battalion commanders the length of 130mboe Peninsula. The who were killed by American artillery fire lezcling battalion, restricted to a narrow as their barge beached on the Arundel strip of island only 400 yards wide and coast., the Japanese unleashed a near- unable to make a flanking attack, could fanatical attempt to break out of the pe- only grind straight ahead when it ran into rimet er. The desperation thrust failed. stiff opposition. Small gains with mount- The lT2d and 27th, reinforced quickly on ing casl~alties were the inevitable results. line by troops from the 169th, contained As the front lines inched abreast of the attack although the battle was touch- Sngekarasa Island, which parallels 130m- and-go for some time. As the attack sub- boe Peninsula, a second batt alien swam sided, the ,Japanese reverted once more to and waded across a lagoon to establish an- delay ins tactics to preserve their thin foot- other front on that island. Unable to hold on Arunde]. The repulse decided the erase the beachhead in a series of scream- tJapanese upon withdrawal from Arundel ing Counterattacks that night, the Japa- and eventual evacuation of the Central Solomons. nese then hurriedly evacuated their barge The counterattack, however, resulted in base on the extreme western tip of the is- Marine Corps tanks joining the 43d Divi- land. Souncls of barge traffic each night, sion. Alerted earlier for possible commit- however, indicated that the enemy still ment, the tank platoons of the 9th, 10th, had other bases on Stima Peninsula which and llth Defense Battalions moved their could be used to resupply and reinforce remaining 13 serviceable machines by the Arundel defenders. LCM from Munda to Bomboe Peninsula By dusk of 14 September, the two bat- on the 16th. While the tanks of the 9th talions of the 27th were in secure positions and 10th went into bivouac, five tanks of astride Sa~ekarasa Island and Bomboe the llth Defense Battalion moved up to Peninsula while the 172d Infantry pressed help the 27th Regiment in the Bomboe slowly northward along the east coast. In Peninsula area. The armored attack on the gap between, stragglers from the %i?9th 17 September took the Japanese by com- and a battalion from Tomonari’s 13th plete surprise. The heavy jungle rains ap- Regiment fought determinedly to hold parently drowned the noise of the tanks Stima Peninsula and a corner of Arundel’s clanking into attack position. Moving northeastern coast. forward in two waves with infantrymen following, the Marine tanks crunched ‘ MajGen l~illi:un W. Dick, Jr., USA, ltr to .\ClofS, G–3, HQMC, dtd 310(.t60, including com- through the enemy defenses before ments by 31aj Gen David H. Buchanan, USA. abruptly turning to the left in a flanking END OF A CAMPAIGN 151 0 0 0 0 0 0 .3 . c c c c . c * . c . . Q CL a > 691–360 0—63—11 152 ISOLATION OF RABAUL manellver to complete the rout of enemy Instead of being a routine mopping-up in that sector. Infantry units advanced job, the fight for Arundel had unexpect- about, 500 ynrds in the attack. The fol- edly developed into a major operation lowing day, however, as four tanks and wb]ch required the principal elements of an infantry company jumped forward in 1hree infant ry regiments as well as ar- another assault, the enemy suddenly mored and artillery support. The decision to switch targets was made :lrews, :lnd MTIl anchorakres in the area. a month earlier. On 12 July, just six days l’ell:~ Lavella, the pi~trol reported, differed after asking for Admiral Turner’s plans 1ittle from New Georgia. A dense jlmgle for Kolombangara, Halsey changed his of tangled creepers and huge trees covered mind and directed that this island be side- tlie island from comt line to the low but stepped and J-ells Lave]la taken instead. sharp mountain peaks in the interior. One By this time it, was obvious to the staff of of tlle most developed islands in the group ComSoPa{! that Munda was not, going to before the w:lr, Vella Lavella’s l+;uropean- be taken as quickly as estimated and that lype buildil~gs included a hospital, several the island of Kolombangara, with nearly missions, and tt Ieprosariurn. (See Map 10,000 entrenched defenders, would be lo.) even harder to take. Further, Vila air- Coast watchers on the island added to the field was reported to be poorly (lrained and report. Chly about 250 ,Japanese were poorly situated. If a better airfield site estimated to be, occl~pying the northern could be found, the chance to land virtu- part of the island where Jrella Lavella’s ir- ally unopposed at Vella Lave]la would be regular coastline provided many coves for a much sounder tactical moves I)rotect ion for barges shut t1ing between A reconnaissance tealll wllicll scouted Kolon~ban~ara and Bougainvillea. The na- the island in late July returned to report tives on the island had remained friendl~; that the sm~thern end of the island near to the Allies, and were well orgmized. Barakoma drained sufficiently well to en- They had, in fact, aidecl the man-y survi- able construction of an airfield there, and vors of the USS FIe7ena who had managed that there were adequate b~iicl~es, bivolmc to swim to the island and had assisted in their evacuation by fast APDs on 16 July.’ AR, 10-19 Au$343, dtd 20Dec43 : COIU III PhibFor Rept of Occupation of Vellm I,avella, 12 Aug- on 11 August, orders were issued by 3Sept43, dtd 20 Sep43: CTF 31 OPO A12+3, dtd Con~SoPac for the seizure of Vella Lavella 1lAug43 : 3“r?e Gcorf/ia ~(~mpai~?? ; NGOF Ac- by Admiral Wilkinson’s Task Force 31. rount ; A-IF FO h-o. 1, dtd llAu~43 ; ~WCYttC(’nth The forces on New Georgia were directed .Irmy Ops-I: SE Arm XfJv Op,s-11: Frankel, J7’fh I)lfDirHist : 0. .k Gillespie, Th c O~riat to continue the cleanup operations in the Hi8tory of New Zealand in the Second World Munda area and to interdict T-ila airfield U’ar—T’h c I’ac’ific ( Wellington : War History by artillery fire. The Allies had decided Branch, Dep:nrtment of Interrml Affairs, 1957). hereafter Gillespie, Ncw Zrala Jtd History ; Hal- tImt enemy troop concentrations on Ko- sey and B~~iln, Hu7sry’s Story ; Karolevitz, 25th Ioml.)angara did not necessitate an attack, IttfI)i!,Hist: 310rison, Brc({l;itiq tllcBix>))arcksthat neutralization of the island would be Barrier; 0S1, L’ojjfbat A-arratities, The S’olomotl as effective :W occupation and not as costly Is7a)lds Campfl iqn: .YI—I{070t)lban~/(!ra [J}ld T-(’l[a L/[rel[a. 6 .Illgt(s-i C)ctolwr 1943 (Washington. in terms of troop casualties or supplies. 1944), hereafter OXI, t70ntbat 7Vf/rnztiwx XI: Rentz, .lforinm i)~ tl{c Cv~t)//t S(~70mon.s ; CSSBS, “ 1’. S. ships ~Jicked up 93 men and 11 officers (’awpflig)t Further, soggy Vil a airfield was no longer only 8 of the following 12 LCIIs. The deemed worthy of capture. LSTS, which arrived later at the correct The Xortl~er~~ Landing Force (NLF),7 time, were forced to stand offshore wait- organized to attack and occupy Vella La- ing to unload. Limited beach areas had ~-ells, con~priwd the .~rrny’s 35th Regi- resulted in the very delay and exposure mental Combat Team which included the which it was hoped the staggered schedule 64th Fiel(l Artillery Battalion, the 58th would prevent. There was, however, no NaT7al Construction Battalion, and the Ma- enemy opposition ashore. As the beach- rine Ah Ilefense Battalioll! as well as M- head widened, soldiers reported scattered ditional ;irmy and N:Lvy support. units. ,Japanese troops fleeing northward. 13rigadier General Robert R. lf,’Clllre, the Shortly before 0800, jnst as the LCIS 25th Divisioll”s assistant commander, was were in the unloading stage, the first of named to head this organization. four frantic. ,Japanese air attacks struck. Emb~rkztion of major l~nits began at After making one pass at the protective Chmdalcanal on 12 August. That same destroyer screen standing offshore, the en- night, an ldvance force landed near 13ara- emy bombers and fighters turned their at- koma to mark channels and landing tack on the LCIS and I.STS, evidently beaches and to select bivouac areas and ti~lring that the smzller transports car- defensive positions. After being forced ried the bulk of invasion troops and SLlp- to fight their way to snore, however, plies. Al] four attacks were driven off by through fire from a motley collection of alert planes from ComAir~Sols and the survivors from sunken barges, the recon- fierce antiaircraft fire from the task force naissance group hurriedly requested rein- destroyers. forcements. The next night a infantry The fighter cover came from Munda air- company landed to help them. field, which hnd begun operations only the The main landing force departed Gua- day before. As a dividend for having won dalcanal on 14 August on a split-second, an airfield closer than Segi or Guadal- staggered schedlllc. The slowest transport canal, the All ies were able to keep an um- ,~rotlp, L$+Ts, st:~rled first and WaS PaSsed - brella over the beachhead most of the day. later by the faster .kPDs. In this manner, Despite, the presence of this air cover, how- the transports which had departed Gau- ever, the .Japznese persisted in sporadic dalcanal in reverse order arrived off Vella attxcks, striking from different altitudes Lavel]a in the proper order and at the right, nnd directions. The results were negligi- time. ble. None of the ships in the convoy were Debarkation of troops began at dawn on dzmag-ed, and during the day more than 15 .fugmt, the i\PDs nnloading quickly 4,600 troops and 2,3(Io tons of equipment, in one hollr. The first snag in the inva- and supplies were unloaded at Barakom:l. sion sche(ln]e occurred lv]lell it \V:lsdiscol~- Twelve men were killed and 40 wounded ered that the beach could accommodate in the day’s attacks. That night, as the convoy withdrew S1OW1 y down Gizo ‘ This was a new echelon of the A’(2OF an(l is Straits, the shil)s fought, off repeated tor- Ilot to be confused with the A’orthern I.anding Group commanded by Colonel I.iversedge at Eno- l)e(lo attacks. Enemy float planes kept the gai and Bairt)ko. area lit with flares. IIND OF A CAMPAIGN 155 The successful jump from Muncla to As the fight for \’ells Lavella pro- Vella Lavella asserted Allied domination gressed, the 35th began driving the enemy in the Cemtral Solomons. Failing to re- before it. Toward the end of Au5gust, in- pulse the landing, officers of the Eighth creased resistance was met on the east ~l~ef and the (~e11e7/ tcenth AP71/y hzst ily coast near Lambu I.ambu, and it was 15 called a conference to consider making a .September before the regiment’s assault counterl anding on the island. One batt al- battalions broke through the Japanese ien was :L1l that, could be sptredj it was defenses to overrun the barge base at decided. This proposal was promptly Horaniu on the northeastern coast. The squelched by ~~qh th .1 reu :l?’?/2.Y. Such a enemy, however, escaped and fled north. move would re~t~ire at ltmst two brigades, At this point., the 14th Brigade of the the higher headqlmrters decided; and, in New Zealand 3d Division landed at Bara- view of the existing difficulties in reinforc- koma with two infantry battalions, the ing ~n~ reslll)plying other central sOlO- 35th and 37th, as the main units. In a mons ~arrisous, the iden was better for~ot- reshuille of command, Major General ten. ‘1’Ile only help the str ,., 156 ISOLATION OF RABAUL the SL?:l.A Japanese priscmcr reported that, organization to seize T7ellg Lavella was tl~e tired illld hungry enemy force W:ls planned, tile inclusion of a similar unit willing to surrender, but that, ,Japanese seemed logical. Closest and most availa- officers would not permit it. ble was the 4th Defense Rattalion, then On the night of 6-7 October, Allied on C+uaclalcana]. Organized at Parris Is- troops heard voices and the sound of land in 1940, the battalion was stationed at barges scraping coral, but the supportin~ Ilfate, New Hebrides, before transfer to fires were ordered too 1ate. The next >Tew Zealand, then @lada]canal. Its or- morning, only littered stocks of ,Jmpanese e’mtnization was similar to other Marine equipment and supplies were scattered defense battalions-155mm seacoast, artil- over the peninsula. The enemy cori]ered lery group, 90tnm antiaircraft group, a on Vella I~il},ella—589 by ,Tapanese ac- special weapons group of 40mm, 20mm, counts—had been successflllly withdrawn. and .50 caliber weapons, and a tank The hTe\vZe~li(]](lers ha(l estimated tllzt platoon. the Tell a I~avell a campaign would end in 13y ni@~tf all of the first day ashore at less than tTT70weeks. The conclusion came Earakorna, about two-thirds of the light sever:ll dttys early—one of the few success- ant iaircraft weapons were in temporary f~d tinletables in the Central Solomons firing posit ions. Otller guns of Major fighting. The 14th Brigade cwsllalties to- McDonald I. Shuford’s special weapons tfiled 32 killed and 32 woul~ded. .Jap:mese group were kept set up on two LSTS in losses for the defense of the entire islan(l were about 250. the l~arbor, an innovation which increased The price for an island of considerable 1he firepower of the beachhead. The ad- strategic xnd operational value was not dition was effective. A total of five enemy exorbitant. Allied casualties for the seven p] anes -were claimed by the 4th the first weeks of fighting were less than 150 killed, clay. most of these in air attacks, The practice During the next, six days, other echelons of bypassing a strong point to bit at a of the battalion arrived and moved into weaker point somewhere else was now es- positions to defend the beach. Only the tablishecl. Future Pacific operations fol- air defense units of the battalion got into lowed the strategy initiated in the A]eu- action, however. Tl~e 155mnl gun groups, tians and used with success in the Central which moved ashore shortly after the orig- Solomons. inal landings, were in coastal defense posi- tions ready to fire within a few days, but WIRIA~Efi AT VELLA LA T7ELLA 8 the need never arose. The tank platoon Success of the Rendova beachhead had proven the value of z Marine defense bat- dtd 30Jan44; I?wd Ech, Corps Troops, IMAC, ( )1x) Xo. 143, dtd Z3SelA3 : Col John H. Cook, talion in a landing effort. When the task .Jr., ltr to CMC, dtd 2MarW ; (Jo1 IWcDonald I. Shnford ltr to (XC, dtd 4Mar52; llCol ]Jonald ‘ C nless otherwise noted, the material in this 11. Srhmuck ltr to (XC, dtd 28Apr32; LtCol section is derived frmn : X(;OF ..1c(’ounf; 4th Chtirles T’. ]Iodges ltr to C31C, dtd 21 Mar52 ; 1)efB1l Warl ), .\ug-0ct43 ; 4th I)ef13n SAR, dt(l I.t(.’ol C:trl M. Johnson ltr to CMC, dtd 2MarW2 ; !).J:III-M ; C(). Corps Troops :ind St aging .lrea, X 160 ISOLATION OF RABAUL rassed by the vigilant MTIk and the black- field on Vella Lavella was operational al- hulled Catalina flying boats (“Black tl~ough not yet completed, and enemy Cats”) which prowled the waters of Vella troops on Kolombangara were caught in and Kula Gulfs. Nearly stymied in their a vise between ComAirSols planes at bmrge supply attempts, the Japmnese fi- Munda and 13arxkonm. In addition, .41- nally resorted to supplying garrisons by lied 155mm guns and howitzers emplaced floatplanes and submarines. on New- Georgia’s northern coast were These inadequate measures and a care- pounding a steady tattoo on Kolombang- ful second look at the strategic situation ara’s defenses. forced the enemy to make the only decision The effect of waning moonlight — plus possible: general evacuation of all forces the increased barge activity-was not lost from the Centrnl Solomons. The opera- on the Allies. By late September it be- tion began with the removal of troops from came evident that all Japanese activity the seaplane base at Reketx on Santa Isa- was directed toward withdrawal. Imme- bel Island in early September. An .illied diately, all available Third Fleet destroyer patrol, landecl from an MT13 on 3 Sep- squadrons rushed with protecting cruisem tember, verified the absence of enemy into interception duty in Vella and Kula troops. Quantities of rations and am- Gulfs. li~unition found on shore indicaled thzt the The planned withdrawal begin, but was withdrawal lmd been hurried. disrupted many times by the sudden ap- After scattered outposts on Gizo and pearance of Allied planes and ships. On Ganongga Islands reh~rned to Kolomban- the night, of 28 September, the Japanese gara on the 19th and 23d of September, the managed to load 11 destroyers with 2,115 only remaining enemy troops were the sick and wounded for a qllick sprint to small force defending Arundel, a sizeable safety at Bougainvil]e. Despite the Allied body of troops on Kolombangara, and the interference and considerable loss of small stragglers back-tracking along the coast craft and men, the Jxpanese relayed an- of Vella Lavella-about 12,000 troops in other 5,400 men by landing barges to all, by ,Japanese estimates. Choiseul during the next few clark nights Weighing two factors—the direction of and an additional 4,000 men were picked the Allied effort and the capability of the up by six destroyers. In the squally 13th Regiment on Arundel to conduct a weather and murky darkness of the period, delaying action-the Japanese scheduled the Allied destroyers were hard-pressed the withdrawal for late September during to keep track of al] enemy activity. In a a moonless quarter. The northern coast number of instances, the destroyers had of Kolombangara was designated as the to choose between steaming toward tar- evacuation point. Landing craft from gets which radar contacts indicated as the Buin area would ferry troops across small craft or heading towards reported The Slot to Choiseul for further transfer enemy destroyer forces. Sometimes con- to Bougainvillea. Sick and wounded tact could not be made with either target. would be evacuated by fast destroyers. Allied ships, however, reported a total of The Japanese schedule began none too 15 barges sunk on the nights of 29 and 30 early. By 27 September the fighter air- September. ,., END OF .4 CAMPAIGN 161 During the night of 1-2 october, all troops stranded almost within the grasp zvailwble Allied destroyers steamed of New Zealand forces. through The Slot seeking the main Jap- The removal of troops from Vella La- xnese ev~cuation attempt. Few contact,s vella ended the Japanese occupation of the were made in the pitch darkness. About New Georgia Group. The lOSS of the 20 of the 35 barges encountered were re- islands themselves was not vital, but the ported sunk. The following night the expenditure of time and effort and the re- .Lllied ships again attempted contact with sultant loss of lives, planes, and ships was the Japanese but could not close to firing a reverse from which the ,Japanese never range. Aware that the enemy destroyers recovered. There could only be a guess as were acting as obvious decoys to lure the to the number of casualties to the enemy attackers away from the barge routes, the in the various bombings, sea actions? and Allied ships abandoned the chase and re- land battles. Postwar estimates placed turned to The Slot to sink another 20 the number at around 2,733 enemy dead,l” barges. but this does not account for the many Further enemy evacuation attempts more who died in air attacks, barge sink- were negligible. and the Allies reasoned ings, and ship sinkings. In any event, the units evacufited after the costly defense of that the withdrawal had been completed. the New Georgia Group were riddled .i patrol landed on Kolornbangara on 4 shells of their former selves, and few ever October and confirmed the belief that the appeared again as complete units in the Japanese had, indeed, successfully com- Japanese order of battle. pleted evacuation of all troops. Jumbled More than three months of combat had piles of supplies and ammunition attested been costly to the New Georgia Occupa- to the fact that the enemy had been con- tion Force, too. Casualties to the many tent to escape with just their lives. The units of the NGOF totaled 972 men killed -withdrawal, the Japanese reported later, and 3,873 wounded. In addition, 122 died was about 80 percent successful, the only of battle wounds later, and another 23 losses being 29 small craft and 66 men. were declared missing in action. Marine The final evacuation attempt was made Corps units, other than the 1st Marine on 6 October from Vella Lavella. A size- Raider Regiment, lost 55 killed and 207 able enemy surface force was reported wound ed.1~ leaving Rabaul in two echelons, and three U.S. destroyers moved to intercept, the enemy. Another Allied force. also hurried hTew Georgia lacked the drama of the to the scene. Contact was made in high early months of Guadalcanal and the awe- seas and a driving rain. In a fierce battle some scope of later battles in the Central which lasted less than 12 minutes, the United States lost one destroyer to enemy ‘03-GOF Accow t, p. 29. The figure reported torpedoes and two other destroyers were here includes the 230 enemy dead at Vella badly damaged. The ,Tapanese lost only Lavella. “ Ibid., p. 29; Rentz, Marines in the Central one of nine destroyers, and during the bat- Sol(mons, p. 174. These figures do not include tle the transports managed to evacuate the non-battle casualties. ISOLATION OF RABAUL Pacific. Instead, it was characterized by pnssing Kolombangar-a’s defenses won for a considerable amount, of fumbling, incon- tile .111ied forces the advantage of selecting clusive combat; and the final triumph was the next vulnerable point in the enemy’s mm-red by the f~ct that a nllmber of com- supply, communication, and reinforce- mand changes were required to insure the ment 1ines. The ,Japanese, guarding an victory. There were few tact ical or stra- empire overextended through earlier easy tegic successes and the personal lmrdships conquests, could now only wait and guess of a rigorolls jllngle campaign were only where the next blow wol~ld fall. The New underscored by tile planning f milures. Georgia Campaign presented the ,Japanese And too, the ori~inal optimistic t.imetable in his true light-an enemy of formidable of Operation T013&T.lII,S later becnme fighting tenacity, but not one of over- all embnrrassirrg subject. For these ren- whelmin~ sllperiority. His skill at con- sonsj n postwar resum6 of tile kmttle for ducting night evacuation operations, dem- the Central Solbmons pnles in comparison onstrated at (~uadalcmal and confirmed at with accounts of later and greater Allied New Georgia, col~ld not be denied, how- conquests. ever. Both withdrawals had been made The primnry benefit of the occupation of practicfllly under the guns of the Allied the New (3eorgia Group was the :i(lvance- fleet. ment of Allied air power another 200 miles On the Allied side, the campaign fur- closer to Rabaul. The fields at Munda, thered the complete integration of effort Segi Point, and 13arakoma provided by all arms of service—air, sea, and ComAirSols 1)1anes with three additional ground. Seizure of the Central Solomons bases from which to stage raids on the ,Jap- was a victory by combined forces—and anese strongholds in the Northern Solo- mons and to intercept quickly any retali- none could smy -who played the dominant atory raids aimed by the enemy at the main role. Each force depended upon the next, Allied dispositions on Gua(lalcana] and in and all knew moments of tragedy and wit- the Russe]ls. Behind this protective buf- nessed acts of heroism. The New (3eorgia fer, relatively free from enemy interfer- battles marked a long step forward in the ence, the .Illies were able to mass addi- technique of employment of combined tional troops and materiel for future arms. operations. This extended cover also gave There were valuable lessons learned in :Mliecl shipping near immunity from at- the campaign, too-lessons which were put tack in southern waters. . . . PART 111 Northern Solomons Operations CHAPTER 1 Continuing the Pressure STRATEGIC REQ UZ12EN ENTS ‘ well as the overture to the forthcoming Bougainvillea attack. There was little time for extended rest The importance of Rabaul had not di- for iillied sea, air, and ground forces after minished durin: the long period involved the final Central Solomons action in Oc- in taking New Georgia, but the events of tober. AS early as the previous March, a the last six months had put the ,Japanese clecision had been made tbzt the Northern stronghold on New- Britain in a new light. Solomons would be the target next after In 1942 there had been no doubt that Ra- New Georgia; and by the time Munda field baul would have to be physically elimi- w%s operat ionl] under Allied control, nated to insure an inviolate hold on the By mid- plans for the seizure of a beachhead in the .$otltllITest-ASoutll Pacific area. 1943, there wxs a growing realization that Shorthands - Choiseul - Bougainvillea area the enemy air and naval base might not were in the final stages. In effect, ComSo- have to be erased by force, that neutraliza- Pac operations of September and October tion would serve the Allied cause as well. were the last. act to the successful comple- Concurrent with this shift in thinking was tion of the Central Solomons campaign as a proposal that, the main Allied effort be directed through the scattered islands of *Unless otherwise noted, the material in this the Central Pacific instead of through the section is derived from : CinCPac–CinCPO.4 larger land masses of New Guinea and W:lrDs, Arrg through Nov43 ( COA, XIII) ) ; (Yonrgopur .JulL–Xov~.j IVarT)s; ThirdPlt .Narr- the Philippines. Rept; 1111’hil~For AR, Seizure and (kcupation Both concepts bad many high-ranking of Xorthern Err]press Augusta Bay, Borrgain- proponents. The divergent views resulted ville, 1–13SOV’H, dtd 31)ee43 ( Bougainvillea in some open disagreement among the AreaopFile, Hist,Br, HQMC ) hereafter ZIZPhib- many strong-willecl commanders and staff J’(,t+ AJi’; IM.\C AR, Phase I, Sec A, Rept on Bongainville Operation, dtd 2131ar44 ( Bougain- officers responsible for the Allies’ opera- villea .\reaOpFile. HistBr, HQMC ) hereafter tional strategy, bLLt, the eventual solution IJIA C AR–I; E[aj .John X. Rentz, J;ouqwinvitlfi was born of the imagination and experi - and tile .~’ortl[cm t3010nLO?Z8, (Washington: ence of all, and there was no fl~rther dis- HistSec, DivInfo, HQMC, 1948 ) hereafter pute once the course of action had been Rentz, BougainviUe and tli e Northern Solo- tn OHS; Morison, Breul; ing theBiwnarcks Barrier; chartecl. The actual decision to strangle Isely and Crowl, Marines and Ampl! ibious War; Rabaul by air instead of capturing it was Halsey and Bryan, Hal,sc{/’,s Story; King rmd made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff Whitehill, Ki//y’,s ,47ara7 L’ccorz; lliller, Rrdltc. Llpon reconlnlell(btt ion of the JCS. The tion of Ra0au7; I{ist I)iv, HQMC, ““1’he Bougairl- ville Operation,” MS, cu. Feb-lfi ( HistBr, HQ31C ), CCS conference at Quebec in August also hereafter HistL)iti Acct. directed that the advance through the 691–360 0—63—12 167 168 ISOLATION OF RABAUL ,Sol~tl~\~’est-So~lthPacific by (%meral Mac- fighter escortrange of New Britain; and .irth~lr and Admiral Halsey was to con- Mac.4rthur was of the opinion that an tinue while .fdmiral Nimitz aimed a new assault on Choiseul did not directly offensive alon and Trllk—points outside the range of east and west, are markedly different. The most Allied land-based planes-Bougain- eastern side of the mountain ranges slopes ville was also under the umbrelln of naval to a fairly open plain with good beach support from Rabaul and Truk. In short, areas. The western side, however, is deep- the Allies needed Bougainvillea for further ly etched by rushing mountain streams operations against ~~abau]; the ,Japanese which carry silt into a swampy, alluvial needed Ilougainville to defend Rabaul. plain bordering the coastline. The char- Viewed from either camp, the island was a acteristic result is a series of deep valleys priority possession. ending in swamps and sand bars cut by 130ugainville was never a part of the meandering waterways and sluggish rivers British Solomon Islands protectorate. of varying depths. This soggy fringe German expansion had claimed the isbmd area, covered with tall marsh grass and in 1899, some 130 years after its belated bamboo-like growth, is trapped between discovery by the French explorer whose mountains and the sea by a grey-black name it bears. Mandated to Australia beach strip which seldom exceeds 15 yards after World War 1, the island still was in width. influenced b-y. German missionaries, for The island interior is enveloped by a the 130ugainvll]e natives in 1943 were rec- dense rain forest and choking jungle ognized as ]lost,ile to t,l~eA]lies and consid- growth which combine with the rugged erably more friendly to the Japanese.4 mountain ranges to discourage overland Some 40,000 natives were on the island, exploration. A number of good trails tra- {rathered nl:li]~ly in small villages of less verse the more populated areas in the south ~han 200. Energetic and industrious, they and east, but only a few native tracks ven- provided an adequate ]ahor force for the ture across the inhospitable interior. One large plantations which, before the ,Japa- path cuts across the mountains from Numa nese occupation, were owned by European Numa to Empress Augusta Bay where it companies.5 connects with the East-West trail. This The island is the largest of the Solomons pat ]L joins the western villages of Maw- group. Nearly 30 miles in width, Bougain- areka anti Mosigetta to Buin in the south. villea is divided clown the center by moun- Fairly wide and cleared, the East-West tain ranges which extend nearly the entire trail skirts the coastal swamps and can be 125-nlile length of the island. The north- traveled most of the year. ern Emperor range is capped by the dis- Although the Japanese had occupied the tinctive 10,171-foot peak, Mt. Balbi. The island since March 1942, only those facili- second range, Crown Prince, is less rugged ties necessary to maintain the war in the and settles gradually into a broad, widen- Solomons had been constructed initially. ing plain at the southern end of the island. In time, four airfields were in operation, This area has the best anchorages and the two at each end of the island, and addi- biggest plantations. The two coastlines, tional troops were stationed on Bougain- villea. Scant attention, however, was given ‘ IMAC’ .4 R–1, C–2 Est of Sit, p. 26. to the island region between the major air- ‘ Rentz, Bougainvillea and the Northern tYolo- n~ons,Appendix V, contains an excellent descrip- fields. For more than a year, ,Japanese tion of the island of Bougainvillea and its people, activity was restricted largely to the Buin terrain, and geographic features. area in tbe south ancl the Buka-Ronis pas- 172 ISOLATION OF RABAUL sage in the north. G There was little over- soldiers of the Seventeenth Army were land travel. Barges moving along the headquartered. .4nother 5,000 troops were coastline served most of the transportation believed to be in the Buka-Bonis area, with needs. AS a result, few roads were im- a similar number at Kieta. The only proved and in the later defense of the is- known enemy concentration on the west land, this proved an important, oversight. sance efforts to obtain every possible scrap and personal observation was added to of information and intelligence about the ConlSoPac’s growing file. various projected landing sites continued. Two patrols, dispatched to Bougain- AS at Guadalcanal and New Georgia, prior villeain September after Halsey announced knowledge of the Bougainvillea area was his two-part alert, helped the SoPac com- limited to sketchy reports from former res- mander decide on the final choice of ob- idents, planters, medical officers, schooner jectives. One Marine-ATavy team, with an masters, and missionaries. Although Australian officer and four natives as these report~ were valuable in regard to guides, remained four days in the Kieta general conditions and physical improve- vicinity, prowling the northeast coast of ments in certain areas, few facts of mili- the island during the night and spending tary significance were obtained. As be- the daylight hours underwater in the sub- fore, personal reconnaissance by trained marine USS Gccto. Considerable Japanese observers was required to accumulate the troop activity was observed; and despite necessary detailed geographic and hydro- several close scrapes from patrolling en- graphic information upon which to base a emy barges, the group measured beach decision. The first intelligence efforts cov- distances, took depth soundings, and ered the entire Northern Solomons-Santa scouted the area inland. On 28 September, Isabel, Choiseul, the Treasurys, Short- the patrol boarded the submarine for the hands, ancl Bougainvillea. Later, as some last time and returned to Guadalcanal. islands were eliminated and the choice of The patrol’s report was generally unfavor- targets mwrowed to either tile east or ~vest able,ll indicating that the harbor had many coast of Bougainvillea, reconnaissance ac- reefs and coral outcropping, and that the tivities were concentrated on the Kieta and area inland was not, suitable for airfields Empress Augusta Bay areas. since the Japanese had apparently given Initial combat intelligence was gathered up on Kieta. from air reconnaissance and submarine pa- Another patrol similarly organized trols. Aerial photography was limited be- landed from the submarine USS GuardfLsh cause of unfavorable weather, enemy air in- near the Laruma River in north Empress terference, and lack of fighter pla~,e es- Augusta Bay. Here the terrain was found corts. Submarines moved’ in close to the to be fairly solid with thick bush and a island t.o shoot pictures through raised dense rain forest inland. Reluctant to periscopes, but this practice was hazardous arouse the ,Japanese to any Allied inten- since the outdated hydrographic charts tions, the patrol studied Cape Torokina then available failed to show the exact, through binoculars and took photographs location of dangerous coral outcropping through telescopic lens. The long-range and reefs known to exist. Besides, the examination revealec] a narrow. beach strip pictures did not reveal much except a good some 10,000 yards long with the expected profile shot of Bougainvilleas rugged coastal swamps inland. Tidal range in the peaks. In time, patrols from submarines, bay was moderate, about 3~2 feet. A coco- torpedo boats, and seaplanes slipped ashore “ IIIPhibFor Rept of Reconnaissance of the to scout various areas, and the inforn~a- Northeast Piougainville Coast, 2.3-27 Sep43, n.d. tion gained from physical reconnaissance (Bougainvillea AreaOpFile, Hist13r, HQMC). CONTINUING THE PRESSURE 175 nut, grove on Cape Torokina looked like a 1 November. The Sol$TesPac commander favorable spot for an airfield, the patrol expressed his complete agreement with this decided, since the area appeared dry decision.’3 enough and long enough to support a After 12 days of planning, Halsey’s fighter plane strip. Unable to obtain a ComSoPac headquarters issued the orders soil sample of the area~ the patrol did the which outlined the missions of the sea, air, nextbest thing andbrought back soil from and ground forces under the admiral’s a similar area. The scouts then turned command. Specifically, ComSoPac di- back tothe Laruma river and headed into rected the III Amphibious Force to the bush in a -wide circle that ended four seize and hold (on D-minus five days) the days later in a rendezvous with the Guard- Treasury Islands as a staging area and fish in ~tsinima Bay, some distance to the advanced naval base, prior to establishing north. The only enemy si@ed were a. lone a beachhead on D-Day in the northern sentry on post near the Laruma river, Empress Augusta Bay area for construc- and a number of Japanese reconnaissance tion of airfields and another advanced planes flying patrol duty over Empress naval base. The ultimate aim was stran- .lugusta Bay beaches.” gulation of enemy operations in south The endeavor had one big dividend. Bougainvillea and preparations for further Jvhile waiting for the patrol, the subma- offensives against Rabaul. rine commander checked his position and Code names selected by ComSoPac for discovered that the navigation chart then the planning phases were DIPPER, de- in use was about seven miles in error in its noting the entire Northern Solomons op- location of Cape Torokina. Undetected, eration, and CHERRYBLOSSOM, the this one factor mi@t well have jeopar- Empress Augusta Bay area. The Treas- dized any future operations. Too, the soil ury Islands phase of the operation was sample returned by the patrol was de- labeled GOODTIME. Later the code clared favorable for construction of an name DIPPER was applied to the Bou- airfield. gainvillea operation and the island, while The prospect of landing in a lightly de- the Treasury Islands landing retained the fended area close to an acceptable airfield GOODTIME designation. site appealed to Halsey and his SoPac Selection of Cape Torokina as a land- planners. To confirm the patrol’s recom- ing site despite its disadvantages was tac- mendation, a number of low-level aerial tically and logistically sound. The loca- reconnaissance fl@ts were made by tion fitted well into the plans for neutral- IM~C staff members. Their quick ization of Rabaul by air, and a beachhead glimpses of the Cape Torokina area con- on the weskrn side of 130ugainville made vinced them that the operation could be a logistic support much easier. Moreover, success. On 1 October, Halsey notified the attack was aimed at a weak point in Mac~rthur that Cape Torokina was the the Japanese defenses, thus avoiding a di- main objective and that D-Day would be rect assault on main enemy defenses in the southern and eastern coasts of the island. “ IMAC Reconnaissance Rept of Empress Au- Success of the venture depended upon the gusta Bay area, 23–26 Sept43, dtd 10ct43 (Bou- gainvillea AreaOpsFile, HistBr, HQMC). ‘a ComBoPa.c Oct& WarD. 176 ISOLATION OF RABAUL ability of the Allies to beat back any de- task of preparing for the assault on the termined sea and air offensive by the Jap- Treasurys ancl Bougainvillea. anese during the critical stages of landing and estnhlishin,g a beachhead. ComSoPac AMPHIA’10 UA~ PL.4NNZNG ‘5 planners admitted that a strong enemy reaction was highly probable, but this The planning team that clirectecl the threat was accepted as a ca]cukted risk. preparations for the Bougainvillea opera- The projected operation was ‘(no better tion was essentially the same command demonstration of the firmly held, but at lineup that out 1ined the ATew Georgia times sorely tried, belief in the Allied su- lttack-with one important change. As periority over the enemy in the South before, Admiral Halsey retained personal Pacific.” “ control of the proceedings> dividing his attention between completion of the Cen- Less obvious in the choice of Empress tral Solomons campaign and the develop- Augusta Bay was the fact that the Cape ment of a new operation. From his Torokina plain, bordered by the natural helclquarters in Noumea, Halsey coordi- obstacles of the I.arLll]a River to the north- west, the mountains inlancl, and the Toro- nated the planning activities of Admiral kina river to the southeast, fell into an Fitch on Espiritu Santo and Admiral ideal defensive area about six miles deep Wilkinson and General Harmon on and eight miles long which could be de- Guadalcanal. A new member of the plan- fended by tile Allied forces then available. ning staff was Lieutenant General Alex- The location, too, was believed so isolated ander A. Vancleg-rift, who had replaced from known Japanese dispositions by the General Vogel as commanding general nature of the island’s terrain that at, least of the I Marine Amphibious Corps, the three months would be required before a counterpart to the Army’s ground force strong force moving overland could seri- command under Harmon. .4s such, ously threaten the beachhead. In short, Vanclegrift, held administrative respon- large bodies of reinforcing enemy troops sibility over practically all Marine Corps could come to the area only from the sea, personnel in the South Pacific, the ex- and the Thircl Fleet felt confident that it ceptions being land-based air units un- could handle that. threat. The Allies hacl der General Mitchell’s command (Marine no desire to capture the entire island—the .iir, South Pacific) and ships; detach- size of Bougainvillea and the rough terrain ments. The lMAC staff had not partici- precluded SLICII zrnbitions — but two in- pated in the New Georgia planning since fantry divisions could hold the (lape Toro- the bulk of the troops were to be furnished kina area against any enemy forces in the immediate area or likely reinforcements. “ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this These facts clid little to increase enthu- section is derived from: ComiSoPac S’ep-Ott-j3 siasm for such bold plans. Sent iment was WarDs; IIIPhil)For AR; CTI? 31 WarDs, Se~ mixed — some optimism, some hesitatio]l, 0ct43, n.d. ( COA, hTHD ), hereafter CTF .31 WarD some reluctance — but with D-Day less with month ; IM.4C AR-1; ThirdlW NarrRept; lIi.~tDi?> .4cct; Rentz, Bougainvillea and the North- than a month away, all hands bent, to the frn Solomons; Isely and Crow-1, Marines and .Arnphibiows War; Morison, Breaking t7Le Bis- “ IM.4G’ AR–?, p. 2, marclcs Barrier; Miller, Redaction of Rabaul. CONTINUING THE PRESSURE 177 by Griswold’s XIV Corps, but Halsey’s IMAC to Major General Roy S, Geiger on first planning directive designated the 9 h’ovember, well after the success of the Northern Solomons as an IMAC assign- beachhead was assured. ment. As a result, the Marine command Even as the Northern Solomons plan- became tactical as well as administrative. ning shifted through a number of changes Vandegrift, who had won a Medal of before the final draft emerged, so did the Honor for his leadership of the 1st Marine task orgmization assigned to the IMAC Division at Guadalcanal, was the first of landing force. Of the three Marine divi- three IMAC commanders to participate in sions in the Pacific in 1943, only the 3d was the 130ugainville operation. After com- available for the 130ugainville operation. pleting preliminary plans, Vandegrift was The 1st Marine Division was scheduled by relieved by Major General Charles D. Bar- MacArthur to spearhead the Cape rett cm 15 September and was en route to Gloucester beachhead on New Britain, and the United States to become the 18th Com- the 2c1Marine Division lmd been shifted to mandant of the Marine Corps when his the Cent ral Pacific for the C~ilbert 1s1ancls return was abruptly sidetracked. 10 Gen- assault. To augment the 3d Marine Divi- eral Barrett had suffered a cerebral hemor- sion and IMAC troops, the Army’s 25th rhage in an accidental fall, and his un- Division and the 1st Marine Raider Regi- timely death left IMAC planning in mid- ment were tentatively assigned to the air. The operational order for IMAC’S 130ugainville venture; but, as the Central part in the seizure of the Treasurys and Solomons campaign wore on, both or- Bougainvillea had been drafted before Bar- ganizations were committed to action far rett’s death, and Vandegrift resumed com- beyond original plans, with the result that mand on 18 October in time to sign neither was available for the Northern the completed order “-noting, meanwhile, Solomons. that the entire concept of the operation A number of provisional units were had changed within the space of one formed from scattered battalions, and month.lx Vandegrift completed the plan- these—with the later addition of the 37th ning and witnessed the start of the opera- Infant ry Division—were assigned to tion before relinquishing command of IMAC. Vandegrift’s command eventu- ally included his own headquarters and ‘0 Vandegrift was informed in January that his corps troops, the 3d Marine Division, the nomination to succeed General Holcomb as Com- Army’s 37th Division, the 8th Brigade mandant hi](l been approved by Admiral King Group of the 3d New Zealand Division, :lnd the Secretary of the A’avy. The general, accompanied by Colonel Gerald B. Thomas, had the 3d Defense Battalion, the 2d Marine reached Penrl Harbor when his retention in the Raider Regiment (Provisional), the 1st South P/icilic was requested by Halsey to King Marine Parachute Regiment, the Army’s 1hrough Ximitz. (len Alexander A. V&ndegrift interview by HistBr, G–3, HQMG, dtd 5Aug59 190th Coast ~lrt illery Regiment (.4ntiair- ( WWI1 OpHistFile, HistBr, HQMC ), hereafter craft ), and varied naval small craft, con- T’andcorift ~?ttf’WieU). struction, and communication units. The “ BGen James Snedeker ltr to CMC, dtd Marine pzrachute regiment, then on l’ells 14May48 ( 130ugainville Monograph Comment File, HistBr, HQMC ). 1,avella2 was designated the corps’ reserve “ ~7undrgrif t Intt?rvieu~. force. In area reserve were several coast 178 ISOLATION OF RABAUL artillery battalions on Guadalc anal and aerial support was to be under the opera- the .lrmy’s .Imerical Division, then in the tional control of air officers. This air Fiji Islalltls. This latter clivision, how- echelon, Comnlander Aircraft hTorthern ever, coulcl be committed only on Halsey’s ,Solonlo]~s ( (xom.iir XorSols) was a subor- approval. dinate commancl of Com.lirSols and was After the target had been defined in uncler the di l’ect ion of Ilzrine Brig Wilkinson, in charge of the entire 130 LI- Treasurys) as well as operational control g-itj ll\~ille-Tl.e:lsllrys expedit ion. Wilkim of all supporting aircraft entering this son maintained control of Task Force 31 region. Harris’ responsibilities also in- (III Amphibious Force ) with the ground cl~~decl establishment of an air warning force and transport grollps as subordinate system for both Torokina and the Treas- commands. As clirectecl by Halsey, Wil- urys and organization of air support con- kinson would cent inue. to conmlwlcl all trol procedures for both areas. forces afloat and ashore until t}le ]ancling For tl~e.Treasury 1s1ands phase of the force commander was ashore ancl had in- operation, Wilkinson acidecl another eche- dicated that he w-as able to take commanc{ lon to his commancl, dividing his task of tl~e Wolmd forces.lg The 1~1:~~ com- force into a h-orthern Force for the Em- mancler, i~t tirst Elarrett ancl then ~Tande- l)ress .iugustn Bay landings anc~a South- ern Force (Task Force 31.1 ) for the diver- gri ft, was responsible for the scheme of sionary landings. Wilkinson retained manellver ashore at, both Cape Toroltina command of the. Nort hem Force ( actu- ancl the Treasurysj ancl was to exercise ally, a name designating the main units of comman(l over all units asliorej whether Task Force 31) and placed Admiral Fort ;\llied forces, Jlarine corps, .Irmy, ~’a~-y, in conmland of the Southern Force. The or grolmcl echelons of :air ltnits. .1s Let Trensllrys lttncling force, comprising New Georgia, the actual employment of mostly troops from the 8th Brigade Group of the 3cl New Zealand Division, was conl- “ This con(+pt of comnmnd evolved durinz the nlal~clecl by 13rigaclier P~. A. Row, uncler Gllad:llc:lnal mlIap:lign nftcr disagreenlent be- tween ~’ancle~rift and the commander of the tlw general clirection of the IMAC conl- .~mphibious Force, South I’nc4itic, Rear Admiral n~ancler.zo Tllrner. 31:l]ly J]>lv:[] ofi{.prs ~{,nsidered the By nlicl-October, all s~lbordinate echel- fol’(.~s ashore as ;In c.xtellsi[}u of the forces ons of Task Force 31 and IMAC had is- :Iflo:]t, :~(llllillistr:ltively a]ld militarily suborcli- sued operational orclers, ancl the cliverse IInte to the amphibio~ls comm:tnder at all times. T-all(legrift sllcccssfn]ly fmlltellded th:lt the l:ln,l- sea and air clenlents under Third Fleet iug force c{jlllulander \vas more experienced :ind commancl had been assignecl general n~is- better qualified in ~ronncl ol)erations and sholdd siolls ill support ot’ Wilkinson’s task force h:iye u]l(livi(le{l rt,sl)f)msillility on(e the tr(l(~lx in the ll{>u~,~in\~ille-Tre:~s~lr~~s venture. \vere :lshf)re, I,t(’t)l Fr:ll)lc (). Hough, lIaj Verle E. I,udwig, and Henry I, Shnw, ,Jr,, PcarZ Har- T~an(l-basetl air units of (’om.fi rSols ?Ic)r to {; lladc(7mt )lal-lfi.xtor~t of ~. A’. Mc!rinc (’orp.! Opfratio)/, s iit TI”o/lf7 TI~(/). 11, v. 1,(Wash- “ The l}l;lllnillg nnfl cf)n(lucl of the Tre:wurys ington : HistBr, G–3, HQMC, 1958), p;). 240–241. {}lwri[tiotl is related in the following chapter. CONTIA’UING THE PRESSURE 179 (TaskForce33) wereorde.redto continue Tactical limitations in launching the the general lllissions of reconnaissance and 130ngainTille operation became apparent CIestrllction of ellem~ ships and aircraft enrly.zl In fact, tl~e entire ~entllre l~ore with the added duties of providing air the title of “Shoestring No. 2,7’ a reference cover and sllppol”t for the land and sea to the general pallcity of means lvllich fc)rcesill~-olve(lilltlle X’ortllerl~Sololllolls characterized the Guada]canal ol)eration assault. Rear Admiral Frederick C. ill 1942.ZZ Early in :iugust, Halsey llacl Sllerl~lal\’sc:lrriem (Task Force3S) were revie]ved tile shil)ping sitllation ill t]w dirwtecl to support, the expedition by air .Solltll Pacific and estimated that he would strikes at Ruka find Ilol~is airfields which need six additional troopships to complete were beyond the effective range of fighter I)reparatiolls for tlie next operatic)ll, de- planes from the nowconlpleted airfields claring tl~at at least 14 .iP.~s and 6 ~~l under attack by 25th Divisio]l and Ne\v “ 11[.ic’ ( )1)0 x-o. 1, .Anx F), IMAC Airfiel(l 1’1:111, dt(l 13C)(t43 ( P,ougainville .h-eaOIEFile, “l”a?~dc~rift Intcrcicw. IIistllr, IIQ31C’), her(’after IX.IC OpO Xo. 1. . . . . 182 ISOLATION OF RABAUL Georgia” —a situation likely to be re- &Tew enthusiasm, however, had been peated on Bougainvillea. Since the. Cape generated for naval shore bombardments Torokina area was still relatively un- after Kolombangara’s capture. The is- scouted, xnd the existence of coral a debat- land’s fortified defenses were still in- able question, plans were made to use tact after the Japanese withdrawal, and pierced planking for all fields. This added IIIPhibFor was granted permission to z fresh burden to the limited shipping, but test new gunfire procedures on these bunk- provided insurance that runvvays could be ers and pillboxes. One of Wilkinson’s de- fashioned for at least local air support.27 stroyer squadrons did the shooting, with The proposed fighter runway, located in all available IMAC and 3d Marine Divi- the plantation area at Cape Torokina, was sion gunfire liaison otlicers and spotters to be about 4,500 feet long and about 600 aboard to witness the demonstration. zo feet wide. A bomber strip inland about The destroyers pounded the beach defenses 2,000 to 7,500 yards would require an ex- in a simulated pre-H-Hour strike before tensive amount of clearing. Even though one destroyer moved inshore to act as a swamps were prevalent, drainage was be- spotting ship for omcall missions. At the lieved possible.’* The remaining fields conclusion of the firing, snips’ officers and would have to wait for the widening of the observers went ashore. The prepma- the beachhead. tion fires, they found, had blasted the Another facet of the landing—naval beach areas, and the adjusted firing mis- gunfire support—also received close atten- sions had knocked out other bunkers and tion during the last. weeks of preparation. fortifications.’” As a result of this con- Coordination between the amphibious vincing display, IMAC officers were eager force and the landing force had improved to give naval gunfire support a prominent markedly since the first days of Guadal- part in the assanlt plans for 130ugainville. canal, but many imperfections unfortu- To retain the element of surprise, no nately still existed in the tire support of pre-D-Day shelling of Cape Torokina was ground forces by ships’ guns. The use scheduled. This further increased the of naval gunfire by Allied ships at Guadal - necessity for effective gunfire which would canal had little effect on the progress of knock out beach defenses before the Ma- rines went :Ishore and provide as well for the initial landings, and bombardrne.nts to quick fire support to reduce any undis- cover a landing force in the Central Solo- covered Japanese defenses which might mons had been impromptu affairs; ~.e., re- hold up the assault waves long enough for turning the fire of the Munda batteries the expected enemy counteraction to during the Rendova landing, and the threaten the landing force. The IMAC shelling of the Enogai garrison during gunfire officers initially made plans for a the Marine raider operations at Rice support group of about 4 heavy or light Anchorage. “ Col Frederick 1’. Henderson, “Naval Gunfire “ Col Francis M. M{Alister ltr to CMC, dtd Support in the Solomon Islands CamPaim,” 2!)May48 ( Bougainvillea Monograph Comments, MS, 19754 (Bougainvillea AreaOpsFile, HistBr, HistBr, HQMC). HQMC), pp. 51–52, hereafter Henderson, “Naval ‘7 IIIti. Gunfire Support.” 2“1.W.4COpo No. 1. ‘0 Ibid., p. 52. CONTINUING THE PRESSURE 183 cruisers and at least 10 destroyers; gl but inexperienced, outfit, a fusion of a nunl- in light of the multiple commitments ber of combat teams and supporting of the Third Fleet, this was a prohibitive troops. Three infantry regiments-the request. Eventually, four destroyers, 3d, 9th, and 21st Marines—together with none of them practised in shore bombard- the 12th Marines (artillery) and the 19th ment, were scheduled for pre-H-Hour and Marines (engineers and Seabees) formed post-H-Hour gunfire support. In all the nucleus for the division which was trut hf (llness, IM.kC liaison officers were first assembled as a unit in May 1943. unhappy with the amount of assistance To these major commands was added a offered by the IIIPllibFor, but accepted number of service and support groups- the preferred support with the realization tanks, special ~veapons, nmphibian trac- that Wilkinson’s force had other missions, tors, motor transport, signal, and medical too. battalions. With a background of ex- The final gunfire plan 32positioned three tensive jungle warfare training in Samoa destroyers (Sigouwtey, Anthony, Wads- and Guadalcanal, the 3d Marine Division ~to~~fi,)on the southeast flank of the ]and- was fully expected to be capable of meet- ing area, with the fourth ship (Terry) ing the rigors of the 130ugainville stationed on the opposite or extreme north- operation. west flank. These ships were to open fire The missions assigned the 3d Marine at 10,000 yards before closing to 3,000 Division were an” extension of lMAC yards for close support and on-call mis- sions. Target designation was to be taken tasks: capture or destroy enemy forces from a photo mosaic of the Cape Torokina in the area: establish a beachhead in the coastline, photographed from about 1,000 Cape Torokina area about 2;250 yards in- yards off-shore by a low-flying plane. Af- land and about T,350 yards wide to include ter one final rehearsal in the New Hebri- the two small islands offshore; commence des area where the four ships tried to selection of airfield sites and construction approximate area, range, bearings, and of air strips; establish long-range radar maneuvers as close as possible to those points and an advance naval base to in- 33the destrover sqll~d- expected on D-Day$ clude operating facilities for torpedo ron joined the assault echelons for the boats: expand the beachhead on corps move to the objective. order. After Turnage had been alerted to the FINAL PRZ?PARA TIONS 34 major role of the division in the f orthcom- Major General Allen H. Turnage’s 3d ing landings,35 the task organization as- Marine Division was a well-trained, albeit AR-I; 3d MarDiv AR, 1-11 Nov43, dtd lSDec43, % Ibid., p. 58. hereafter .!?d MarDiv AR; H&?tDiv Acct; Rentz, “ ~TP’ OPO 3T0. AIS43, dtd ltWct43, Arm A Bouguinville and the Northern Solomona; Isely ( Bougainvillea AreaOpsFile, HistBr, HQMC ) ; and Crowl, Marines and .4mpitibious War; Henderson, “Naval Gunfire Support,” pp. 61–62. Miller, Reduction of Rabaut; Morison, Breaking “ ComDesDiv 90 AR of 1Nov43, dtd 14Jan44 the Bi.!imarck8 Barrier; Aurthur and Cohlmia, (COA, NHD) . $d ,MarDivHist. WUnless otherwise noted, the material in this = CG, IMAC Itr of Instm to CG. 3(1 MarDiv, section is derived from: IZIPhibFor AR; IMA(7 dtd 27 Se@3. 691–360 0—63—13 184 ISOLATION OF RABAC1, signed to the division grew rapidly with coulcl be consolidated behind the contem- the addition of a number of corps troops plated force beachhead line.3s ancl provisional battalions, some of them The 21st Marines plus the remaining still in the process of forming. The major artillery units and supporting troops were attachments were the 2d and 3d Raider formed into task units which would be Battalions, now joined in a provisional brought to the objective area after D plus regiment, and the 3d Defense Battalion. 3 clays. By 7 November, all elements of the As expected, the combat experience of 3d Marine Division would be ashore with these corps and division forces varied. the last increments of the IMAC head- Elements of the 2d Raider Battalion had quarters troops slated for arrival by 15 raided W&in Isltnd in 1942 before going November. The first unit of the 37th In- to Guadalcanal, and the 3d Defense Bat- fantry Division-the 148th Combat talion was battle-tested at Tulagi and Team—was to be unloaded starting 7 Guadalcanal. But the rest of the IMAC hTovember with the remaining combat force—with the exception of the 37th Di- tewns-the 129th and the 145th—sched- vision—were without prior experience. uled to be on Bougainvillea by 22 Novem- The Army division, however, had been ber. In all, an additional 13,000 troops blooded in the Munda campaign. and another 26,672 tons of cargo were to be brought to the Torokina beachhead to Early in October, the diverse elements reinforce and resupply the assault ele- of IMAC and the 3d Marine Division were ments.37 Originally these echelons were assembled at Gundzlcxnal where the tmsk to be transported by LSTS and APDs, but of welding them into landing teams began. later Allied sea and air victories permitted The three task units were based on the the continued use of the larger APAs and reinforced 3d and 9th Ilarines and the AKAs in reinforcing the Bougainvillea 3d Defense Battalion. Task Unit A-1, beachhead. four landing teams comprising the 3d With only limited shipping space avail- Marines and the 2d Raider Battalion, was able to the combat troops, the assault assigned six beaches in the vicinity of Cape echelons carried only enough supplies— Torokina. Task Unit .4-2 (9th Marines) three units of fire, B-rations, and fuel—to was scheduled to land over five beaches on continue operations ashore for 10 days. the left (northwest ) flank, with the Marine The rest of the allotted cargo space con- 3d Raider Bzttalion, attached to the tained additional ammunition, rations, 9th Mmrines, to go ashore on Puruata Is- fuel, engineering tools, and equipment land. Task IJnit A–3, the antiaircraft which could be unloaded quickly if the batteries of the 3d Defense Battalion and situation permitted. The heavier equip- nlel~t and facilities materiel would be sllpporting troops, was to land behind the assault. troops in each sector. Each task 36CofS, 3d MarDiv ltr to CO, 3d Mar, dtd unit included artillery, air liaison and 16Ck.t43. signal personnel, engineers, and naval base 3’ IM.4C OpO No. 1; IM.\C, Movement of Task construction troops. .4s directed, every Organization, dtd 290ct43 ( Bou~ainville Area- Ol,sPile, IIistIlr, HQMC ) ; NorFor LoadingOs landing team was self-sustaining and self- Nos. X)1-43 throuxh 309+3, dtd 120ct–15hTov43 supporting until the division as a whole in lIIP1! ifiFor CJct-No@$ WarDx. CONTINUING THE PRESSURE 185 brought ashore in later echelons. The dezvous point off Guadalcanal for the final IMAC troops making the initial landings run toward Bougainvillea. would carry a haversack only; knapsacks and blanket rolls were to be carried ashore I,90LA TING THE TARGET ‘0 with organizational gear. Officers of IMAC anti the 3d Mm-ine Division ordered As Wilkinson’s transports and screen- all seabags, cots, and mattresses to be stored ing elements formed into the main con- VOv to open the second phase of OperatiOII at Guadalcanal; ancl these were never embarked. D~PPER, the final naval bombardment and air strikes aimed at the complete neu- The three assault task units and equip- ment were embarked at Guadalcanal. tralization of Bougainvillea airfields be- Tzsk Unit A–1 went on board four trans- gan. For nearly a month the island’s de- ports on 13 C)ctober for rehearsals at fenders had been on the receiving end of Efate, and then stood by at Espiritu Santo frequent bombing and strafing attacks as a preliminary to the actual landings. The to await the assembly date. Task Unit &2, after embarking 18 October on the final strikes were calculated to insure neg- remaining four transports, also rehearsed ligible air interference by the Japanese the landing operation for four days at during the amphibious assault the next Efate before heading back to the Guadal- day. canal area for the rendezvous. The third Although the .411ied air power was rec- task unit continued training and rehears- ognized as greater than that which could als at Guadalcanal until 26 October, at be mustered by the ,Japanese in the area, which time the troops and equipment were the fact that the Allies were moving closer taken on board the four .kKAs.38 The re- to the main enemy strength was an equal- hearsals indicated that, with a 2,500-yard izing factor. Late September estimates run to the beach and each ship restricted placed the Japanese air strength in the to about 500 tons, uninterrupted unload- Northern Solomons at about 154 planes, or ing could be accomplished in about 41/2 less than $f~ of the estimated 476 in the hours.30 JTTith allowance for time losses Rabaul-Bougainville area. Against this by air alerts while underway and during number, the Allied air command—Com- the assault phme, the amphibious force AirSols-could ante 728 planes of all commander was sure that troops and sup- plies could be xshore before the end of D- mIJnless otherwise noted, the material in this Day. On 30 October, the various elements sf?ction is derived from : MarCorpsBd Study and of the Northern Lancling Force—trans- Evaluation of AirOps Affecting the USMC dur- ports, cargo ships, mine sweepers, and de- ing the War With Japan, dtd 31 Dec45 ( HistBr, HQMC ) ; ComSoPac 0ctJ3 WarD; TMrdFlt stroyers—began steaming toward the ren- A7arrR~pt; ComAirSols StrikeComd WarD, 26.Jill–19A”ov43, dtd 17Jan44 ( CO.4, NHD ), here- 3’c(l, 3d }larDiv ltrs of Instrn, ~td 7C)ctA3 after i5’trike(70md WorD; ComAirSols IntelSee aI)d l~()~t~3 (Bougainvillea .kreaOp~File, Hi~tBr, Repts for 0ct43, n.d. ( COA, hTHD ) ; ZIZPhibFor HQMC) . .4 R; I.UAC AR–I; HistDiv Acct; SE A?xm Naw w ComTransGru, IIIPhilJFor, Rept of I,and- Op.+III; Miller, Reduction of 17abaal; Morison, ingOps, Empress Augusta Bay area, Bougain- Brcoking tile 13ismarcl:8 Barrier; Rentz, Bou- villea Island, 1–2A”ov43, dtd 22 Dec43 (Bougain- {]aiari71e ond ttt c ii’orihem S’olomons; Sherrod, villea AreaOpsFile, HistBr, HQMC). .UarAirHist. 186 ISOLATION OF RABAUL types. This composite group included 14 strip. By the 22d, Kahili was likewise in- Marine Corps squadrons with 181 planes, operable. ~ week later, Ballale was hit. 19 Navy squadrons with 274 planes, 16 again, and the enemy’s repair work ren- Army squadrons with 216 planes, and 3 clered ineffective. Postwar enemy records NTew Zealand squadrons with 57 planes. also attest to the attention ~iven the By n~id-October, at least 314 fighters and enemy airfields by Com~irSols. The 317 bombers were being- clirected against Japanese admittecl that, just prior to the the enemy bases. The recent acquisition invasion, the airfields on Bougainvillea of airfields on Sew Georgia and Vella La- were useless. vella was a decided asset to ComAirSo]s llabaul, too, w7as feeling the sting of operations; for, although most of the .\llied bombings. General Kenney’s Al- bombers were still based on Guadalcanal liecl Air Forces, committed by General and the Russells, nearly all of the fighter Alac.lrthnr to ]encl all assistance to the strength had been moved forward within neutrcclization of Rabaul by air, roared striking distance of Bougainvi]le. This ont of 3Tew ~uinea bases on 12 October to included 31 fighters and 148 bombers at slug Simpson I1arbor and the Rabaul air- Muncla, 103 fighters at nearby Ondonga, fields with a 349-plane raicl. This blast 48 at Segi, and 60 at Barakoma. was e.ncorecl by an equally large attempt The ai,r activity over Bougainvillea had six clays later, but this time bad weather steadily increased as D-Day moved closer. closed in over NTew Britain and only 54 During the month of October, ComAirSols bombers completed their mission. Day- planes rangecl northward on 21 of the 31 li@lt attacks by fighter-bomber groups days in raids that ranged from tree-level were ,repeatecl on the 20th, 24th, and 25th strafing runs by torpedo and scout bombers of October. Kenney’s fliers insistecl that ancl fighter planes to high-level bombing the bombings had crippled Rabaul, and attacks by B–2% and B–25s. ih the optimistic reports of clamage inflicted and month neared its encl, intermittent attacks enemy aircraft destroyed were relayed to became almost daily occurl’ences to the the invasion forces. Later assessments, beleaguered ,Japanese defenclers. Kahili however, discounted these evaluations. and Kara were hit most often, 23 times Far from being a smoking ruin, the Jap- and 17 times respectively, but Buka, Bal- anese stronghold with its five airfields was lale, Kieta, and the Tre.asurys also were still very much operational and still a fac- raked ancl cratered by .lllied planes. tor to be reckoned within the Bougainvillea Choiseul, too, was ,rocked occasionally by seizure. ConAirSols craft with Choiseul Bay ancl As a matter of record, however, the So- the Kakasa submarine base the favorite WesPac bombers did considerable dam- targets. age to enemy installations and consider- By 18 october, jubilant aviators hacl ably recll~ced the. Japanese ability to strike reported that Ballale>s airfield was “pul- at the Bougainvillea assault forces. Fur- verized.>? ‘I Photographs verified their ther, this damage was accomplished on claims by showing 98 bomb craters on the restricted tmgets in the face of hot recep- runway, 23 of them in the center of the tions by enemy fighter craft and accurate antiaircraft clefenses. Unfortunately, “ 8trihvContd WarD, 180et43, foul weather near D-Day prevented the COXTINUIATG THE PRESSURE 187 Allied .kir Forces from cent inu ing their at- by enemy planes. TWO hours and 60 miles tacks which woulcl ha\-e f urt her diverted 1ater, the BLIka flames were still visible to tl~e .Japanese attention from the Bougain- the task force.. villea ]an{lings. As it turilcd out, the So- llerrill was barely o~~t of the nei@bor- WesPac fliers Ivere able to stl’ike another hood before Shernmn arrived in the area solid blow against P~abald only after the with tile carriers flarato~ctand Przkeetonj IMAC troops ~~ere.a]ready ashore at Cape escortecl by 2 light cruisers and 10 cle- Torokina. stroyers. Undetectecl by several enemy As part of ComSoPac’S progr:un to stun flights, the C:lrrier planes took off and the Bougninville clefenses dllring the dropped an additional 20 tons of bombs on initill stages of tlm operntion, tile support- tl~e. two airfields before the carrier task ing task forces of ~ldnlirals Merrill and force retirecl nnopposed and unchallengecl. Sherman took UIJthe cudgel for a whack .idn~iral Merrill, meanwhile, was complet- It the ,Japanese airfields prior to D-Day. ing the second part of his mission. The Merrill, with fo(lr light (misers and eiglil destroyers, steamed close inshol’e to tile :lll’ezcly- riclcllecl airstrip at Ballale was Buka Passaxe shortly after nli(lni~llt, ;;l shelled by his tmk force, as was Faisi and October–1 November, to r:~ke Ilukn an(l several of the smaller islan~ls. Still uno- 130nis airfields with a 30-nlil]llte bonlbar(l- pposed, Menill’s force headed for Vella ment. The glllltire was givel~ addecl ac- IJavella to refuel ancl rearm, satisfied that CLU’aC~ by the. spotting reports froln two t]~e s~~ppolting bonlbardments hacl slLc- Com.\irSols plnnes overhead. The t:~sk cessflllly launc]~ed tl~e assault on I;ougaill- force then retired, Imrasse(l but nllscathecl ville. CHAPTER 2 Diversionary Assaults TREASURY ISLA,$’Z) LANDINGS 42 sance patrols to the Shortkmds and diver- sionary operations on the island of Choi- If the initial plans for the direct assault seul—plus low-flying photo missions over on the Buin area or the Shortlands had the Short lands—were scheduled by IMAC been carried out, the two small islands of to increase the enemy’s conviction that the the Treasury Group would have been by- follow-up objective was the Shortlands. passed and left in the backwash of the This could have been a natural assump- campaign. Instead, with the change in tion by the enemy. The Treasurys are plans to strike clirectly at Empress Augus- about 60 miles northwest of Vella Lavell a ta Bay, the islands of Mono and Stirling ancl ol~ly 18 miles south of the Shorthands. became important as long-range radar sites While the size of the Treasurys limited con- and torpedo boat anchorages. Moreover, sideration as a major target, Mono and in an attempt to deceive the enemy as to Stirling were close enough to Shortland the direction of the attack on Bougaim Island to cause the Japanese some concern vine and convince him that the ultimate that, tl~ey might be used as handy stepping Allied aim might be the Buin area or the stones by SoPac forces. But then again, Shorthands, the seizure of the Treasurys the Tremurys are only 75 miles from Cape was given added emphasis by being set Torokim-a fact which the Allies hoped as a preliminary to the Torokina Ianclings. might be lost on Bougainvilleas defenders. To help this deception succeed, reconnais- The Treasury Islands are typical of other small islands jutting out of the sea “ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this ill the Solomons chain. Mono is a thickly section is derived from: CornSoPac Ott-iVov&3 WarDs; ThirdFlt NarrRept; IMAC AR–I; IMAG forested prominence of volcanic origin, C–2 Repts, 270ct–13Dec43 ( Bougainvillea Area with abrupt peaks and hill masses more OpFile, HistBr, HQMC ), hereafter IMAC C–2 than 1,000 feet high in the southern part. Rept.$; IMAC C–2 .Jnl, 270ct–27Nov43 ( Bougain- These heights slope gradually in an ever- villea AreaOpFile, HistBr, HQMG ), hereafter ZMAC C–2 Jut; IMAC D–2 MiscRepts ( Treasury widening fan to the west, north, znd east Is), 270ct43, dtd 10 Nov43 (TreasuryIs AreaOp- coasts. The shores are firm, with fe~~’ File, HistBr, HQMC ) : 8 ( XZ ) BrigGru Rept on swamps, and rain waters drain rapidly Ops, TreasuryIs ( Op GOODTIME ), dtd 30Sov- through deep gorges. The island is small, 43 (TreasuryIs AreaOpFile, HistBr, HQMC ) ; about four miles north to south ancl less 8( NZ ) BrigGru OpO Xo. 1, Op GOODTIME, dtd 210ct43 (TreasuryIs AreaOpFile, HistBr, than seven miles lengthwise. HQMC ) : OA’1, ComZJut 37arra.t tve XII: Hender- Stirling Island to tile south is smaller, son, “lNaval Gunfire Support ;“ Rentz, Bouqain- more misshapen. Fairly level, this island ville aufl the Northern Rolomons; Miner, Reduc- is about four miles long and varies from tion of Rabaul; Morison, Breaking the Bis- marckg Barrier. 300 yards to nearly a mile in width. There Ma DIVERSIONARY ASSAULTS 189 are several small, brackish lakes inland, about Mono armed only with swords or but the island is easily traversed and, once hand guns. Stirling Island was appar- cleared of its covering forest, would be an ently undefended. excellent site. for an airfield. Between The 8th New Zealand Brigade Group, these two islands is a mile or more of deep, attached to I Marine Amphibious Corps sheltered water+ne of the many ancl~or- for the seizure and occupation of these is- ages in the Solomon Islancls to bear the lands, arrived at Guadalcanal from New name Blanche Harbor. The combination Caledonia in mid-September. Although of these features—airfield site, radar the New Zealanders would form the bulk points, good anchorage-was the factor of the assault troops, the GOODTIME which resulted in the seizure of t]le Treas- operation was IMAC-directed and IMAC- urys as part of the Bougainvillea operation. supported. The landing force comprised Early information about the islands about 7,700 officers and men, of whom was obtained by an IMAC patrol which about 1,900 were from I Marine Amphi- spent six days in the Tremur-ys in Au- bious Corps support troops-antiaircraft gust, scouting the area, observing the artillery, construction battalions, signal, movement of the Japanese defenders, and and boat pool personnel. Marines at- interrogating the natives. In this latter tached to the brigade task organization instance, the loyal and friendly people of included a detachment from the IMAC the Trezsurys were a remarkable contrast Signal Battalion and an air-ground liai- to the suspicious and hostile Bougain- son team from General Harris’ Com.&ir- villea inhabitants. Additional details were XorSols headquarters. received from rescued aviators who found On 28 September, Brigadier Row, the Mono Island a safe hiding place after landing force commander, was informed their planes had been forced down by of the general nature of the GOODTIME damage incurred in raids over Buin and operation, and planning in conjunction the Shortlands. This first-hand intelli- with .idmiral Fort began immediately, al- gence was augmented by aerial photo- though there was only enough informa- graphs. The reports and photos indicated tion available to the commanders of the that the best landing beaches were inside task grol~p and the landing force to for- Blanche Harbor, on opposite shores of mulate a plan in broad outline. The task Mono and Stirling. The only beaches was far from easy, for the Southern Force suitable for LSTS, however, were on Mono was confronted with the same logistical between the Saveke River and a small and transportation problems that faced promontory, Falamai Point. the Empress Augusta Bay operation, As limited as this information was, the Fort and Row decided that the main amount of intelligence on the enemy dis- assault would be made in the area of positions on the two islands was even more Falamai, where beaches were suitable for meager. The Japanese strength was esti- LSTS. Stirling Island would be taken mated at 135 men, lightly armed. These concurrently for artillery positions. No were bivouacked near Falnmai but maiw other landings were planned; but after tained a radio stztion an(l ol)servation Row was informed that the long-range ra- posts in various areas. Natives reported d~r wonld have to be positioned on the that much of the time the Japanese moved northern side of Mono to be of benefit to 190 lSOLATION OF RABAUL TREASURY ISLANDS LANDINGS I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS 27 OCTOBER 1943 MAP 12 the Bougainvillea operation, another land- talions and limiting the number of artil- ing at Soanotalu on the north coast was lery weapons, motor transport, and en- written into the plans. gineering equipment in the first echelon. Final shipping allocation to Fort’s The brigade’s assault units included 3,795 Southern Force included 31 ships of six troops with 1,785 tons of supplies and different types—8 A1’Ds, 8 1.(.’1s, 2 LSTs, equipment. Succeeding echelons were and 3 LCTS for landing troops and sup- scl~edu]ed to sail forward at intervals of plies, 8 LCMS and 2 APCS for heavy five days. equipment. and cargo. The limited troop The final plans, issued by Row’s head- and cargo capacity of this collection of quarters on 21 C)ctober, clirected the 29th ships and landing craft restricted the and 36th Battalions to land nearly abreast Southern Force’s ability to put more than near Falmni Point, with the 34th Battal- a minimum of troops and supplies ashore ion landing on Stirling Island. Sinlul - initially, but this problem was solved by taneously, a reinforced infantry company reducing the strength of the brigade’s bat- accompanied by radar personnel and Sea- DIVERSIONARY ASSAULTS 191 bees would go ashore at Soanotalu in the The Southern Force departed with a north. The two battalions on Mono would message which delighted the hTewZealand- then drive across the island to link up ers as typical of the remarks to which with the Soanotalu landing force while Americans at war seemed addicted: “Shoot naval base construction got underway at calmly, shoot fast, and shoot straight.” 2 Stirling. At 0540 on the 27th, the seven APDs The initial landings in Blanche. Harbor of the first trmsport group lay to just were to be covered by a naval gunfire sup- outsicle the entrance to Blanche Harbor port group of two destroyers, the Prhgle and began putting troops over the side and Philip. Liaison officers of IMAC into landing craft. Heavy rain and over- planned the gunfire support, as the NTew cast weather obscured the beaches, but the Zealand officers had no experience in this pre-assault bombardment by the Prinqle phase of operations. While the brigxde and PhiZip began on schedule. The L~SS group expectecl to have no trouble in seiz- .Eaton moved to the harbor’s mouth and ing the islands, the naval support was took up station as fighter-director ship as scheduled to cover any unforeseen diffi- the destroyers registered on Mono Island. culties. The gunfire plan called for the The firing was accomplished without as- two destroyers to fire preparation salvos sistance of an air spotter, who later re- from the entrance to Blanche Harbor be- ported radio failure at the critical moment. fore moving in toward the beaches with This probably accounts for the disappoint- the landing x’aves to take targets under ing results of the preparatory bombard- direct fire. The IIIPhibFor, however, ments, which proved to be of little value took a dim view of risking clestroyers in except to boost the morale of the assault such restricted waters. The desired close- troops. The Pringle’s fire was later de- in support mission was then assigned to clared to be too far back of the beach the newly devised LCI ( G) —gunboats area to be helpful, and the bombardment armed with three 40mm, two 20nlm, and by the PhiZip left a great deal to be de- five .50 caliber machine guns-which were sired in accuracy, timing, and quantity. making their first appearance in combat. A fighter cover of 32 planes arrived Two of these deadly landing craft were to promptly on station over the Treasurys accompany the assault wav~s to the at 0600, ancl, under this protective screen, beaches. the assault waves formed into two columns After one final practice landing on for the dash through Blanche Harbor to Florida Island, the brigacle. group began the beaches. L’nexpectedly, enemy ma- loading supplies and embarking troops for chine gun fire from Falamai md Stirling the run to the target arew Admiral Fort’s greeted the assault boats as they ploughed Southern Force was divided into five through the channel. At 0623, just three transport groups under separate conl- minutes before the landing craft nosed into manders, and these groups departecl inde- the beaches on opposite sides of the har- pendently when loaded. The slower LSTS bor, the pre-assault cannonading ceased; and LCMS left first, on the 2%1 and 2-lt.h and the two LCI gunboats-one on each of October, ancl were followed the next day by the LCIS. The APDs sailed on 26 ‘ Quoted in Gill(,sI)ie,XC70Zcalwid History, P. October 148. ISOLATION OF RABAUL flank of the assault wa~~e-took over the in a dismal rain which had begun again task of close support for the landing for- after a clear afternoon. Evacuation of ces. At least one Mmm twill-mount gun, casualties began with the departure of the several machine guns, and several enemy IJ3Ts. With the exception of one I. ST, bunkers were knocked out by the accurate which still had 34 tons of supplies aboard [ire of tIlese.two ships. Promptly at 0626, when it retracted, all ships and landing the announced H-Hour, New Zealand craft had been unloaded and were on their troops went ashore on Mono and Stirling. way back to Guadalcanal by the end of D- At Falamai, the 29th and 36th Battal- ~kLy. The casualties were 21 h’ew Zea- ions moved inland quickly against 1ight landers killed and 70 wounded, 9 Ameri- rifle and machine gm fire, mostly from cans killed and another 15 wounded. the high ground near the Saveke River. The landings at Stirling and Soanotalu Casualties in the first wave were light–- were uneventful and without opposition. one New 2kdand officer and five sailors There were no casualties at either beach- wounded-and the second -wave had no head. At Stirling, the 34th Battalion im- casualties. mediately began active patrolling as soon The New Zeal anders began to widen the as the command was established ashore. perimeter as more troops were unloaded. Tile Soanot al11 landings proceeded in a .&t 0735, enemy mortar and medium artill- sitllilarly Ilnhindered manner. A perim- ery fire registered on the beach area, caus- eter was established quickly, and bull- ing a number of casualties and disrupting dozel’s iulmediately went to work con- unloading operations. Both LSTS were Struct in: a position for the raclar equip- hit, with one shil) reporting 2 dead and 18 ment which was to arrive the next day. wounded among the sailors and soldiers The fighter cover throughout the day aboard. The other ship reported 12 had shielded the troops ashore from enemy wounded. Source of the enemy fire COUIC1 air attacks. The escorting destroyers, not be determined. The Eaton, with Ad- however, were hit by an enemy force of 25 mirxl Fort on board, ignored a previous llux1illn~ and dive bombers at about 1520, decision not to enter Blanche Harbor and and the USS Oony took two hits. Eight resolutely steamed between the two islands. cre.~vmenwere killed and 10 wounded. The This venture ended, however, when enemy tire from the destroyer screen and the planes were reported on the way, and the fighter Co>.er downed 12 of the enemy Eaton reversed course to head for more l)laues. That, night the bombers returned maneuvering room outside the harbor. to pollnd the Mono Island side of Blanche .4ssured that the air raid was a false IIarbor and, in two raids, killed two New alarm, the destroyer returned to Blanche Zealanders and wounded nine. Harbor and added its salvos to those of the Action along the Falamai perimeter the LC1 gunboats. This fire, directed at 11ight of 27 October was concentrated likely targets, abruptly ended the Japa- mainly on the left flank near the Saveke nese exchange. River, the former site of the Japanese By 1800, the two battalions had estab- l~e.adquarters, and several attacks were lished a perimeter on Mono Island and beaten back. The. following day, patrols were dug in, trying to find some comfort moved forward of the perimeter seeking DIVERS1ONARY ASSAU1,TS 193 the enemy, and onc reinforced company through the New Zealand clefense to seize set out cross-comltry to occupy the village a hmding craft and escape the island. The of Malsi on the northeast coast. There iig]lt, pllllctnated by grenade bursts and ~l:lslittlcc olltact. .Tilp:LllesegrOulld:t~tiI’- mori ar fire, raged for nearly five hours in ity on the night of tl~e28tl~\v:~s ligl~t, :~~l(l t11Pflarklless. one small group of enemy enemy air :Ictivity was liniitdto one low- penetrated the, defenses as far as the beach level strafing attack ancl severzl quick before being destroyed by a command bombing r~ids-zl 1 without danlage to the group. About, 40 ,Japanese were killed in brigade group. tl~o attack. The Soanotalu defenders lost By 31 octobm-, the entire situation was one killed and nine wounded. The follow- stable. The perimeter at F’a,lamai was se- il~g night, 2 hTovember, another attempt (’lll’e~3[:llsi IIil-(1 1)(’ell occupie(l witl~o(lt O])- by a smaller ,Japanese force was made and position, ant{ radar equipment at Soano- tl~is attack was also beaten back. This talu lmcl been installed ancl was in opera- wns the last organized assault on the Soan- tion. With the arrivxl of the second otalu force, and the remainder of the echelon on 1 November, the New Zealande- Japanese on the island were searched out rs bega]l an extel)sive sweep of tl~e island and killed by the New Zealand patrols to search out a]1 remaining enemy troops striking overland. on the island. The going was rough in l~y 12 November, the New Zealanders tile l~igl~, rllgged mountain areas, but, by had occupie(l the islxnd. ,Japanese dead ,; Novel llber, enenky stragg]ers in groups of counted in the various actions totaled 205; 10 to 12 had been tracked down zncl killed. tile Sew Zealanders took 8 l)risoners. The New Zealanders lost one killed and It is ckmbtful that any Jxpanese escaped four wounded in these n~op-up operations. the islancl by native canoe or swimming. ~~ndistilrbed for some tinle, tl~e perim- In addition, all enemy weapons, equip- eter at Soanotalu WZSlater subjected to a ment, and rat ions on the island were cap- nllmber of sharp att~cks, ench one. growing tured. The Allied casualties in this pre- in intensity. The Soanota]u force was liminary to the _Bougainville operation struck first on 29 October by small groups were 40 New Zealanders killed and 145 of Japanese who were trying to reach the wounded. Twelve Americans were killed beach after travel ing across the island and 29 wounded. from Falamai. These attacks continued During the period of fighting on Mono tl~roughout the afternoon until a final Island, activity on Stirling was directed charge by about 20 .Japnnese was hurled toward the establishment of supply dumps, hack. Construction of the radar st.a.tion the buildin: of roads, and the construction continlled throughout the fighting. Enemy of advallcc naval base and boat pool facil- contact on the next two days was light, and ities. Althollgli several nlinor enemy air the first r:~dar stntion was completed and raids darnxged installations in the early a second one be~un. phases of the operation, the landing at on the l~ight of 1 November, a strong Enlpress Augusta Bay diverted the attel~- force of about 80 to 90 .Japanese suddenly tion of the enemy to that area and ended struck the perimeter in an organized at- all Japanese attempts to destroy the force tack, apparently determined to break in the Treasurys. ,.. . 194 ISOLATION OF RABACL attack; but when the decision was made that the Allied attack would strike directly If the ,Japanese had opportunity to amidships on the western coast of Bou- speculate on the significance of the Treas- gainvillea, the Cboiseul idea was dropped. urys invasion, the problem mity have been Then, v-hen the suggestion was advanced complicated a few hours later by a land- by Major ,James C. Murray, lMAC Staff i]lg of an Allied force on the northwest. .Serretary, tllatl because of the size and lo- const of Choiseul Island, just, 45 miles from cat ion of Choi seul, a feint toward that the southeasterly] coast of Ilougainvil]e. island might further deceive the Japanese ‘he landing was another ruse to draw as to the .\ll ies’ intentions, the diversion- ,Japanese al tention from the Treasurys, ary raid was aclded to the Northern Solo- point away from the Allies’ general line Tllons operation. of attack, and divert, the enemy’s interest— Choiseul is one of the islands forming if not effoti-toward the defense of an- the eastern barrier to The Slot; and as other area. More specifically, the Choiseul one of tl~e Solomon 1slxnds, it shares the diversion was calculated to convince the l~igh rainfall total, the uniform lli~b heat ,Japanese that the southern end of Bou- an(l humidity common to other islands of gninville was in imminent danger of attack the chain. About 80 miles long and 20 from another direction. The salient facts miles wicle nt the widest point, C%oiseul which the Allies hoped to conceal were that is joined by reefs at, the southern end of the rei~l objective was Empress Augusta two small islands (Rob Roy aml Wagina) Bay, and thzt the Choiseul landing force wllicl~ seems to extend Choiseul>s lel~gth consisted only of a reinforced battalion of another 20 miles. The big island is not as Marine parachute troops. rlqgged as 130ugainville and tile mountain .4ctually, the raid on Choiseul was a peaks are not as high, but Choiseul is fully small-scale enactment of landing plans as overgrown and choked with rank. im- which had been discarded earlier. I)enetrable jungle and rain forest. The Choiseul was considered as a possible ob- mount ain ranges in the center of the island jective for the lnain h’orthern Solomons extend lo])g spurs and ridges toward t]le coasts, thus effectively dividing the island ‘ ~Tnl~ss(ythel-wi~enoted, the ~ateri~l in t,hl~ set.tio]l is (lerirwl from : ComN(/PacOtt–.No?.4.7 into a series of large compartments. The Il”fIrT); SoI]arF(}rCIC, Study of (IhoiseulISl~n[I, beaches, where existent, vary from wide, (~td 1~SeIM (Choiseal Are:lOIJFile, HistBr, s:tlld}~ ~lreas to narrow, rocky Shores with HQMC) : IIII)lt ibFor .4 R; 1.1[.4C :11{–1, Anx liewvy foliage growing almost to the wa- Q. 1;1,1SSkI~TJ: I.lf.-!(’ (’–.2.J)L/; IM.\C 01)() Xo. 2. dt Japanese that a major landing was in automatic weapons. The nine-man squads progress. In addition, reconnaissance in Lieutenant Colonel I{rulak’s rifle pla- would be conducted to detel’mine possible toons carriecl three Johnson light machine sites fol a torpedo boat patrol base. guns G and six Johnson semi-automatic The lMAC opemt ion order, giving the rifles; each company had, in addition, six cocle nanle 1)1.ISSFTIL to tile (’hoiseul di- Wmm mortars. version> was issued o]~ 2’2 October. Based Krulak’s return to his command set off on information and l.ec~ollll~lel~cl:~tiollsfrolu a flurry of near-frenzied activity, since Seton, the Marines’ ]allding \Yas set for tile battalion had a minimum of time for the beaches in the vicinity of Voza vil- preparation. For the next four days, offi- lage, about mi(lway between Choiseul Bay cers and men worked almost around the and Bambat ana Missiml. Thel’e the clock to assemble equipment, make final benches were good, friendly hat iYes would plans, ancl brief themselves on the task help the invaclinx forces, and there re- ahead. Ch the 24th, Coastwatcher Seton portedly were no enemy troops. More- and two of his native guides arrived at over, it was firmly astride the mxin route Yells I,avella to meet Kru]ak’s officers of evacllation of the ,Japa]]ese stragglers and illen and give them last-minute infor- from Kolombal~gara a)~d points south. mat ion. i~fter being briefed by Seton, After receiving fhe order: Krulak v-ent to Krlllak requested ai~ci was given author- the airstrip on Guadalcanal, and, while ity by lMAC to operate in any direction waiting for a l)lane to take l~im bark to on Choiseu], if consistent with his mission. his comnmnd, wrote out the operation or- Eqllipment and supplies for the opera- der for his b~ttalion’s lancling. tion were pre-sorted into four stacks; and This was to be the first combat operat iol~ late on the afternoon of the 27th of Octo- of the 2d Battalion as well as its first ber the parachute battalion and its gear amphibious venture. Althm~~h equipped \Y:LSembarked on board eight LCMS bor- and trained for special assignnlents be- rowed fronl the Ve]la Lavella boat pool. hind enemy lines, these, Marines-known Krulak’s three companies were reinforced m Pararnarines to their co]rll”:lcies—neT7(’r by a communications platoon, a regimental chuted into action bemuse sllitable ob- weapons company with mortars and light jectives were usLmlly beyon(l the range machine guns, and a detachment from an of airborne troops and the necessary trans- experimental rocket, platoon (bazookas port planes were in chron icall-y short sup- and rockets) from IMAC. Total battalion ply. The 1st Parachute Battalion, how- strength was 30 officers and 626 men, In ever, had taken Gavutu and Tanambogo addition, one naval officer accompanied the Islands before going to Gllzdalcmlal to battalion for reconnaissance purposes re- take part in the defense of the airfield lat ed to the possible estabolishment of a there in 1942. This battalion had then torpedo boat base. formed the nucleus for the present 1st At dusk, when four APDs which had Parachute Regiment, now consisting of just co]nplet ed the Treasury landings ar- three bntta]ions in IMAC reserve nt Vella Lave]la. Each battalion, of three. rifle G“The ,Johnmn light machine gun was more cornpmies each, was armed with a pre- :)n autwrifle th:ln a nuachinegun : more .a m,a- ponderance of light automatic and semi- {,hine gun than the BAR.” Ibid. 198 ISOLATION OF RABAUL rived off Vella Lavella, the troops and II lone enemy plane detected the ~on- equipment were transferred from the zuay standing patrol duty seaward, and LCMS to the ,VcXean, ~ro~b,y, Kilt,y, and dropped two bombs near the ship. The Wa~d in a qnick operation that was com- (’on.ll;(ty: reluctant. to draw attention to pleted in less than 45 minutes. The de- the landing, did not return the fire, and stroyer division , with the ITSS (?wnuwy the enenly l)lal~e droned away. An Allied acting as escort, sailed from Vella La- escort plane, :Issigned to protect the con- vella at 1921. The don?ooy)s radar wou]d voy agccinst sL~chattacks, d,rew consider- locate the hmding point in tl~e dark. able criticism, however, for not remaining Moving in rolnmn through the night, low enough to spot sl~ch bombing runs. the convoy was sigl~ted short 1y after 2300 Two hours after arrival in the area, the by an enm~ly snooper p] me which droppe(l convoy reversed course and steamed back one bomb, scoring a llezr miss on the last to T’ell a I.avella, leaving behind four land- APD in line. Shortly before midnight, ing cr:~ft, (LCP (R) ) with their crews for at a point son~e 2,000 yar(ls off the nortli- tl~e battalion’s use. These craft were dis- west coast of Choiseul, the convoy stopped, persed llnder the cover of overhanging and x reconnaissance party in a rubber nml~groves near the offshore island of boat l~eadecl toward shore to scout the Zinoz, and the Marines turned to moving landing area. A signal light was to bc sL~pplies off the beach. Seton, who landed shown if no enemy defenders were en- on Choiseul with the battalion, disap- connterecl. While waiting for the signal. peared into the bush and returned almost Krulak ordered Companies F and G into inlmedi atel y with a group of native bear- the lanc{ing boats. ers. With their help, the Marines moved After waiting until 0019 (28 october), into the jungle. The transfer was none Company F hea(led toward the beach w’itl~ too soon; enemy reconnaissance planes ap- Company G close behind. The operation order had directed Company G to make peared at dawn to bomb the area but -with- the initial assault, but the APDs had out success. drifted apart and the Kitty with Com- Early on the morning of the 28th, a pany F embarked was closer to shore. base of operations was established on a Since no light on sl~ore was yet discm-nible, high jungle plateau about a mile to the the Marines expected opposition. The northwest of ~~oza and outposts were set landing, however, was uneventful, ancl the up on the beac]~ north and south of the patrol was waitin~ on shore. Observers village. Security was established and on ship reported later that the light was wire communications installed. The pla- visible at 0023, just four nlinutes after the teau, behind natural barriers of rivers and parachute companies beg-an the run for high cliffs, was an ideal defensive spot the beach. After setting the troops and :Lnecessary base camp for the heavy ashore, the 1anding craft immediately re- radio gear with which IMAC had turned to tl~e transports to bring in a load equipped the parachute battalion. of supplies.7 Islan(i, dtd Nov-13: USS Con?ra~ AR, 27– ‘ DesDi,\-M AR for night of 27–280ct, Initial 280ct4:l, [M 25Ncw43 (Ci]okeul AreaOpFile, I,illlciing of h~~~rineI’:iratroopers oil Choiseul IIistBr, lIQMC). DIVERSIONARY ASSAULTS 199 During the day of 2?8 October, while the Vag-ara to hole] a landing point for the Marines established their camp, an- Kru] ak)s boats ancl to block the Japanese other enemy tligl~t appeared and raked the who might be following t}le Marines> beachhead with a strafing ancl bombing track. The patrol ran into a platoon of attack, The effect was wasted. The Ma- the enen]y about three-quarters of a mile rines had dispersed; their equipn~el~t had from the original Marine landing point been moved; and good camouflage disci- and drove the lvithdraw tIle groul) fronl 1lle ( ‘lloise~d The Japanese , attempting to cut off ]Iay area. Bigger’s ret iren-mnt, landed troops from Bigger was unaware of the activity be- barges along the coastline; and the Ma- hind him. Intent upon his mission, he de- rine, force W:LS~lllder attack four separate cided to continue toward Choiseul Bay. times before it successfully reached the After determining his position, Bigger Warrior River. There the patrol set up ordered another small patrol to make its a perimeter oll the west bank and waited way to the river base camp and rac]io a for the expected boats. request that the boats pick up his force Several mel~ were in the river washing that afternoon, 2 hTovember. This second the slime :Lnd muck of the jungle march patrol soon cliscovered the l)resence of an from their clothing when a fusillade of enemy force to Bigger’s rear, and was shots from the opposite bank hit the Ma- forced to fight its way towards hTukiki. rine force. The patrol at first thought it This patrol was wziting there, when the was being fired upon by its own base camp, landing craft returned to h-t~kiki. but, when display of a small American flag The main force, meanwhile, followed the drew increased fire, the Marines dove for new ~guide to the coast and then turned cover. Heavy return fire from the Marine north along the belch toward Choiseul side of the river forced the enemy to with- Bay. opposite Redman Island, a small draw. Seizing this opportunity, Bigger offshore islet, a four-man Japanese outpost clirected three Marines to swim across the suddenly opened fire. The Marines quickly Warrior to contact the expected boats and knocked owt this opposition, but one warn the rescuers of the ambush. Before ,Japanese escaped—undoubtedly to give the trio coL~ld reach the opposite shore, the alarm. though, the ,Japanese returned to the fight, Because any element of surprise was and only one survivor managed to return lost and thinning jungle towards Choiseul to the il[arine perimeter. Bay provided less protection and cover Even as the fierce exchange continued, for an attacking force, Bigger decided to the Marines sighted the four boats making execute his alternate mission of shelling for the 11’arrior River from the sea. An approaching storm, kicking up a heavy Guppy Island. Jungle vegetation grow- sl~rf, added to the clifficulty of rescue. Un- ing down to the edge of the water masked cler cover of the Marines’ fire, the lancling the fire of the 60mm mortars, so Bigger craft finally beached on the west shore, and ordered the weapons moved offshore. The the Bigger patrol clambered aboard. shel]ing of Guppy was then accomplished one boat, its motor swamped by surf, with the, mortars emplaced on the beach drifted toward the enemy shore but was ~vith part of the baseplates under water. stopped by a coral head. The rescue was The enemy supply center al~d fllel base was completed, though, by the timely arrival hit with 143 rounds of hig]l explosives. of two PT boats—which came on the Two 1arge fires were observed, one of them scene with all guns blazing.’l While the obviously a fuel ({ump. Bigger’s force, under return ene]lly tire, turned around “ One of these boats was commandedby Liem and heaclecl back toward the Warrior tenant tJohnF. Kennedy, USNR, later the 33th River. President of the United States, Krutak ltr. DIVERSIONARY ASSAULTS 203 patrol boats raked the jungle opposite with for seven days, adequate ammunition, and 20mm and .50 caliber fire, the Marines a strong position; but that if IMAC con- transferred from the stalled craft, to the sidered his mission accomplished, he rec- rescue ships and all craft then withdrew. ommended withdrawal. A timely rain squall helped shield the re- Commenting later on his situation at tirement. Aircraft from Munda and PT this time, Krulak remarked: boats provided cover for the return to As a matter of fact, I felt we’d not possi- Voza. bly be withdrawn before the Japs cut the The time for withdrawal of the battal- beach route. However, we were so much ion from Choiseul was near, however, de- better off than the Japs that it was not too spite the fact that Krulak’s force had worrisome (I say now !) The natives were planned to stay 8-10 days on the island. on our side-we could move across the is- land far faster than the Japs could follow, On 1 November, another strong patrol, one and I felt if we were not picked up on the of a series sent out from the ~70za camp to Voza side, we could make it on the other keep the enemy from closing in, returned side. Seton agreed, and we had already to the Vagara to drive a strong Japanese planned such a move. Besides that we felt force back towards Sangigai. From all confident that our position was strong enough to hold in place if necessary.’* indications, the ,Japanese defenders now had a good ideza of the size of the Krulak on the night of 3 November, three LCIS force, and aggressive enemy patrols were appeared offshore at a designated spot slowly closing in on the Marines. Seton’s north of Voza to embark the withdrawing natives on 3 November reported that 800 Marines. In order to delay an expected to 1,000 Japanese were at Sangigai and enemy attack, the Marines rigged mine that another strong force was at Moli fields and booby traps. During the em- Point north of Voza. barkation, the sounds of exploding mines After the recovery of the Bigger patrol were clearly audible. Much to the para- from Nukiki, IMAC asked Krulak to make chutists’ amusement., the LCI crews nerv- a frank suggestion as to whether the ori- ously tried to hurry embarkation, expect- ginal plan shou]d be completed or whether ing enemy fire momentarily. Krulak’s bat- the Marine battalion should be removed. talion, however, loaded all supplies and The Cape Torokina operation was well equipment except rations, which were underway by this time, and IMAC added given to the coastwatchers and the natives. in its message to Krulak that Vandegrift’s Embarkation was completed in less than headquarters considered that the mission 15 minutes, and, sholtly after dawn on the of the parachute battalion had been ac- 4th of October, the Marine parachute bat- complished. Krulak, on 3 November, talion was back on Vella Lavella. radioed that the Japanese aggressiveness Krulak’s estimate of the Japanese in- was forced by their ul”gent need of the tentions was correct. Within hours of the coastal route for evacuation, and that large Marines’ departure, strong Japanese forces on either side of the battalion indi- forces closed in on the area where the para- cated that the Japanese were aware of the chute battalion had been camped. The size of his force and that a strong attack, enemy had been surprised by the landing prob~bly within 48 hours, was likely. The Marine commander statid that he had food = Il)id. 204 ISOLATION OF RABAUL and undoubtedly had been duped regard- The effect of the diversionary attack up- ing the size of the landing force by the on the success of the Cape Torokina oper- swift activity of the battalion over a 25- ation ww slight. The Japanew expected mile f rent. Then, after the operation at an attack on Choiseul; the raid merely Empress Augusta Bay got underway, the confirmed their confidence in their ability Choiseul ruse became apparent to the to outguess the Allies. In this respect, Japanese, who began prompt and ag-gres- the Japanese were guilty of basing their sive action to wipe out the Marine force. planning on their opponents’ intentions, The continued presence of the Allied not the capabilities. There is little indi- group on Choiseul complicated the evacua- cation that enemy forces in Bougainvillea tion program of the Japanese, and, once were drawn off balance by the Choiseul aware of the size of the Krulak force, the episode, and enemy records of that pe- enemy lost no time in moving to erase that riod attach little siamificance to the Choi- complication. seul attack. Before the battalion withdrew, though, This may be explained by the fact that it had killed at least 143 Japanese in the the main landing at Cape Torokina took engagement at Sangigai and the Warrior place close on the heels of Krulak’s ven- River, sunk two barges, destroyed more ture and the, ruse toward Choiseul became than 180 tons of stores and equipment, and apparent before the Japanese reacted suf- demolished the base at Sangigai. TJn- ficiently to prepare a counterstroke to it. known amounts of supplies and fuel had Certainly, the size and scope of the land- been blasted and burned at Guppy Island. ing operations at Empress Aua~sta Bay Mine field coordinates shown on the cha~ were evidence enough that Choiwnd was captured at Sangigai were radioed to the only a diversionary effort. task force en route to Cape Torokina, vastly easing the thoughts of naval com- THE JAPANE~YE 14 manders who had learned of the existence Enemy reaction to the Allied moves was of the mines but not their location. Later, a bit slow. The Japanese knew that an the charts were used to mine channels in offensive against them was brewing; what southern Bougainvillea waters that the they could not decide was where or when. Japanese believed to be free of danger. The Seventeenth Army was cautioned The destruction of enemy troops and again to keep a watchful eye on Kieta and equipment on Choiseul was accomplished at the loss of 9 Marines killed, 15 wounded, .Jnl,4Nov43, and the report of the diversion at- and 2 missing in action. The latter two tack, Operation BLISSFUL, p. 4, indicate that 9 KIA and 16 WIA is correct. IZIPhibFor AR, Marines were declared killed in action at pp. 34, states that 8 KIA, 14 WIA, 1 MIA, and the end of the war.’s 1 captured is correct. LMA C AR–I, p. 11, gives the casualties as 8 KIA, 14 WIA, and 1 MIA. ‘8This is the casualty figure given by Rentz, ONI, Combat Narrative XII, p. 24, gives the Bougai)tciUe and the il’orthern Solornons, p. 114. losses as 9 KIA, 15 WIA, and 2 MIA. The figure Few accounts of the Choiseul attack are in ac- given by Rentz undoubtedlytakes into cognizance cord on Marine casualties. Muster rolls of the a 13Dec43 message from Coastwatcher Seton to battalion indicate 9 KIA, 12 WIA, and 5 MIA. the effect that the bodies of two Marines, one of Of those missing, four were later declared dead them bound as a prisoner, had been found near and one believed a prisoner of war. IMAC C-2 the Warrior River. Co?nfYoPac De+ WarD. DIVERSIONARY ASSAULTS 205 Buka, and General Hyakutake in turn The enemy had no hint that such an un- directed the 6th Division to maintain a likely area as Empress Augusta Bay firm hold on Choiseul as well as strong would be attacked. The defense installa- positions in the Shortland Islands. Then, tions were concessions to orders directing the tJapanese defenders on Bougainvillea that the western coast be defended, and the waited for the next developments. troops at Mosigetta-the only force cap- After the Allied landings in the Treas- able of immediate reinforcement to the urys, the Japanese thinking crystallized: Cape Torokina area—were alerted only to Munda was operational; Vella Lavella was the possibility that they might be diverted not. Therefore, the only targets within on short notice to the southern area to de- range of NewT Georgia were the Short- fend against an assault there. hands or Choiseu]. And based upon this Japanese sea and air strength was like- wise out of position to defend against the reasoning, the .illies scarcely would at- Bougainvillea thrust. Admiral Mineichi tempt a landing on 130ugainvil]e before Koga, commander in chief of the Com- staging bases on Mono or Choiseul were bined Fleet at Truk, had decided earlier to completed. Reassured by this assumption, reinforce Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka’s the ,Japanese relaxed, confident that the Southeast .4rea P7eet and the land-based next Allied move would come during the planes of the Eleventh Air F7eet at Rabaul dark quarters of the moon—probably late so that a new air campaign could be aimed in November. at the Allies in the South Pacific. This With the All iecl move toward Choiseul, operation, li?o, to start in mid-October, the Japanese were more convinced that was to short-circuit Allied intentions by the Allied pattern was predictable. With cutting supply lines and crushing any a firm foothold on Mono and Chois@ the preparations for an offensive. To Ku- Allies would now move to cut Japanese saka’s dwindling array of fighters, bom- lines and then land on the southern part bers, and attack planes, Koga added the of Bougainvillea in an attempt to seize the planes from the carriers Zuikaku, Sho- kai%u,and Zuiho-82 fighters, 45 dive bom- island’s airfields. Basing their estimates bers, 40 torpedo bombers, and 6 recon- on the increased number of Allied air naissance planes. strikes on Buka and the Shorthmds, the Koga’s campaign, though, was delayed. Bougainvillea defenders decided that these Allied radio traffic indicated that either were the threatened areas. .411 signs Wake or the Marshall Islands would be pointed to a big offensive soon—probably, hit next, and to counter this threat in the Japanese agreed—on 8 December, the the Central Pacific, Koga sent his fleet second anniversary of the declaration of and carrier groups toward Eniwetok to war. set an ambush for the Pacific Fleet. After a week of fruitless steaming back and “ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this forth, the Japanese force returned to Truk, section is derived frt)m: SE .4rea. NaoOpS-III; and the carrier groups moved on to Ra- Scm’ntwnth Army Ops-II; Rentz, Bougainvitle haul. The Japanese admiral had at first a~~dthe .Vorthwn Nolomons; Miller, Reduct@n of Rubaul; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcka decided to deliver his main attack against Barrier. New Guinea, but the Treasurys landings 206 ISOLATION OF RABAUL caused him to swerve towarcls the Solo- operation. The elements of the Japanese mons. Then, when .Mliecl activities be- fleet reached the area north of the Bis- tween 27 October and 1 IYovernber dwin- mamks on 1 November> just in time to died, the fleet again turned toward New head back towards the Solomons to try to Guinea to take up the long-delayed Ro interrupt the landings at Cape Torokina. CHAPTER 3 Assault of Cape Torokina ;{. . . THE TROOP8 ARE dova and Vella Lavella toward the Short- MA G.VIFI(~l?NT.7’ 1 land Islands. ComAirSols fighter planes provided protection overhead and destroy- The Northern Landing Force arrived er squadrons screened the flanks. Subma- off Empress Auagusta Bay for the assault rines ranged ahead of the convoy to warn of Cape l’orokina shortly after a bright of any interception attempt by the enemy. dawn on 1 November, D-Day. The ap- When darkness fell on 31 October, the proach to the objective area had been un- convoy abruptly changed course and, eventful. After rendezvousing near Gua- picking L~pspeed, started the final sprint dalcanal, the transports steamed around toward Empress Augusta Bay. Mine the southern and western coasts of Ren- sweepers probed ahead for mine fields and uncharted shoals, while Navy patrol ‘ unless otherwise noted, the material in this bombers and night fighters took station section is derived from : ComNoPac .No043 Warn; over the long line of transports. Eight Tltir(7F7t Xarrl{rpt; IIIPII ibFor :1R; IIIPhib- air alerts were sounded during the night. For 3’0174,{Tt”arD; ComTransGru, IIIPhibFor, Each time the night fighters, directed by Rept of I.:nnrlin@ps,EmpressAugustaBay, Bou- ~:lin~~illeIsland, 1—2Nov43,dtd 22Dec43 (COA, the destroyers, intercepted and chased the NHD) ; 11~.1C AR-I; IJfAC’ C–2 Rept.s; I,IfAC?enemy snooper planes away from the con- (’–zJn7;M Marniv, Combat Rept of the 3d voy. The amphibious force, moving di- MarDiv in the BougainvilleOps, lhTov-28Dec43, rect as an arrow toward the coast of Bou- dtd 21Milr44 (IIougainville .LreaOpFile, HistBr, gainvillea, was never attacked. HQM(<), hereafter ;?d .lIarDii ~onlbatl{ept; ,?d .J[arJ)iv AR; M MarT)iv D–1 Jnl, 10ct–14Nov43 Nearing Empress Augusta Bay, the con- (Ilougainville AreaOpFile, HistBr, HQMC) ; 3d voy slowed so tl~at the final movement into MarI)iv D–2 SAR, Empress .iu.gusts Bay Ops the objective area could be made in day- dtd lFeb44 (130ugainvilleAreaOpFile, HistBr, light. General quarters was sounded at. HQMC), hereafter .’3(7MarI)iv D–2 SAR; 3d 0500, and, after the sun came Lip, the as- 31:lrDiv 1)–2 .Jnl, 2SOct–28Dec43 (130ugain- ville .\reaO1)File,HistL3r,HQM~,). hereafter :;/i sault troops on the transports could see l[arJ)iv D–2 ,Jnl; 3d MarI)iv D+ .Tnl,310ct– the clark shoreline and rugged peaks of 281)w43 (Rouxainville AreaOpFile, HistBr, Bougainvillea directly ahead. Only a thin HQJIC), hereafter $ftMarDio D–3 Jnt; 3d Mar- cloud mist hung over the island, scant con- J)iv D–3 Periodi(,Repts,(?.Tu-27Dec43(Bougain- villeaAreaOp],’ile, HistJ3r,HQhIC) , hereafter 3,1 cealment f o,r enemy planes which could MarJ)iL,r)–3 Rrpt.s;Hi,silliv .4rrt; OAT,Combot have been waiting to ambush the amphib- Yarratire .1’11; He]lderson,“X”aval Gunfire SulJ- ious force. The element of surprise, which port :“ Aurthur and Cohlmia, 3d .lfarJ)ioHi.st; had been zealously ~guarded during all Rentz, T{onqainvi{!e and the Northern Eolomons; Isely and (’rowl, Marines and Am~JIIibio?ts’ l~ar; preparations for the offensive, apparently hfiller, Reduction of Rabaul. had been retained. The conflicting re- 207 208 ISOLATION OF RABAUL ports by Japanese snooper planesof task strength, any change in the enemy situa- forces observed at various points from tion at this late date was cause for worry. Buka to the Shorthands and Vella Lavella H-Hour, set for 0715, was postponed for had the general effect of confusing the 15 minutes on signal from Admiral Wil- Japanese.z kinson, but the landing was ordered as At 0545, mine sweepers and the destroy- planned. (The patrol later reported un- er Wadsworth opened fire on the beaches harmed, citing radio failure and terrain north of Cape Torokina to cover their own difficulties for the lack of messages.) mine-sweeping operations. As the Wads- Preparatory fires by the main support worth slowly closed to within 3,000 yards group began as soon as visibility permit- to fire directly into enemy installations, ted identification of targets. From their the busy mine sweepers scouted the bay. firing positions south of the transport Thirty minutes later, advised that no area, the Anthofiy and Sigourney-and mines had been found, the transports later the Wadsworth — poured 5-inch moved into the area. Off Cape Torokina, shells into Puruat a Island and the beaches each APA shelled the promontory with north of Cape Torokina. The Terry, on ranging 3-inch fire before turning hard to the left flank of the transport area, fired pofi- to take Pnruzta Islancl under fire into known enemy installations on the with 20mm guns. i~t 0645, the eight troop north shoulder of the cape. The effect transports were on line about 3,OOOyards was a crossfire, centered on the beaches from the beach and parallel to the shore- north of Cape Torokina. This indirect line. Behind them, in a similar line, were fire on area targets was controlled by the four cargo transports with the de- spotter aircraft. stroyer squadrons as a protective screen Debarkation of troops began after the seaward. transports anchored in position and while On board the transports, observers the pre-assault bombardment crashed peered anxiously toward the beaches near along the shoreline. The order to land the Laruma River. A two-man patrol the landing force was given at 0645, and had been landed on Bougainvillea on D within minutes assault craft were lowered minus 4 days (27 October) with the mis- into the sea, and embarkation nets tossed sion of radioing information or lighting a over the side of the transports. Marines signal fire near the Laruma if the Cape clambered down the nets into the boats, Torokina area was defended by less than and, as each LCVP was loaded, it joined the circling parade of landing craft in the 300 Japanese. Concern mounted as H- Hour approached without the expected rendezvous circles, waiting for the signal message or signal. The alternatives were to form into waves for the final run to the that the patrol had been captured or that beach. Nearly 7,500 Marines, more than the cape area was unexpectedly reinforced half of the assault force, were boated for by the enemy. Because the landing waves the simultaneous landing over the 12 had been organized to handle cargo and beaches. supplies at the expense of initial combat At 0710, the gunfire bombardment shifted to prearranged targets, and five ‘ i3h’ Area NavOps-IZI, p. 12, minutes later the first boats from the 210 ISOLATION Oli’ RABAUL APAs on the south flank of the transport dicated to observers on board ship that the area started for shore. The support. ships landing was successful. continued to shoot a.t beach targets unt i] Once ashore, combat units of the 9th 0721, when the shelling was lifted to cover Marines completed initial reorganization targets to the rear of the immediate shore- and moved inland to set up a perimeter line. As the fire lifted, 31 torpedo and around the five beaches. Active patrol- scout bombers from Munda streaked over ling was started immediately, and a strong the beaches, bombing and strafing the outpost was set up on the west bank of the shoreline just ahead of the assault boats. Larurna River. Other Marines remained The planes, from VMTB-143, -232, and on the beach to help unload the ‘ank light- –%X3, and lTMSB-144, were covered by ers and personnel boats which continued VMF-215 and -221 and a Navy fighter to arrive despite the obvious inadequacy squadron, VF-–17.3 The air strike lasted of the beaches and the difficult surf. At until 0726, cut short, four minutes by the least 32 boats were wrecked in. the initial early arrival of the first landing craft at assault and lay smashed and awash along the beaches. the beach. By mid-morning, hulks of 64 The 9th Marines (Colonel Edward A. LCVPS and 22 I,CMs—many of them be- Craig) landed unopposed over the five yond repair—littered the five beaches.’ northernmost beacheeRed 3, Red 2, Yel- The landings on the six southern beaches low 4, Red 1, and Yellow 3. Although ( Yellow 2, Blue 3, Blue 2, Green 2, Yellolv no enemy fire greeted the approach of the 1, and Blue 1) and the single beach on boats, the landing was unexpectedly haz- Puruata Island (Green 1) were in stark ardous. Rolling surf, higher and roug-h- contrast to the nort hem zone. Enemy re- er than anticipated, tossed the landing sistance in this area wzs evident almost craft at the beaches. The LCWPS and the as soon as the boat groups from the right- LCMS, caught in the pounding breakers, flank transports came within range. The broached to and were smashed against 2d and 3d Battalions of Colonel George W. shoals, the beach, and other landing craft. hfcHenry’s 3d Marines landed on the The narrow shoreline, backed by a steep three beaches south of the Koromokina 12-foot embankment, prevented the land- River against small-arms fire. Surf was ing craft from grounding proper]y, and high but not difficult, and no boats were this further complicated the landing. lost. The Marines, disembarking without Some boats, unable to get near the shore clelay, sprinted across the narrow beach because of rough surf and wrecked boats, t.o take cover in the jungle. Reor~~niz:~- unloaded the Marines in chest-deep water. tion was complekd quickly, and the bat- Other Marines, in LCVPs with collision- talions startec] to dig out the small nuln- damaged ramps, jumped over the sides of ber of Japanese defenders attempting to the boats and made their way to shore. hold back the assault, from hastily pre- In -spite of these difficulties, the battalion 4“Many automatic weapons were mounted on landing teams managed to get ashore these landing boats. These weapons were sal- quickly, and, by 0750, several white para- va~ed by the Marines and used later to reinforce chute flares fired by the assault troops in- their normal arms when the final defensive line \~ilsestablished.” I,tGen Edward A. Craig ltr 2SherrocL,MarAirHist, p. 181, to CMC, dtd 240ct60, hereafter Craio ltr. ASSAULT OF CAPE TOROKINA 211 pared positions. In a fev- nlinlltes, the the waves of boat groups rounded the scattered enemy in the area had been killed, western tip of I>uruata Island, they were and sniper patrols began n~oviug inland. caught in a vicious criss-cross of machine Contact was established with the 9th gLUIand artillery fire from Cape Torokina Marines on the left, but a wide sl~anlp pre- and Purl~ata and Torokina Islands. vented linkup with the 2cl Raider 13at- Heading towarcl the extreme right of the talion on the rigl~t. landing area over beaches which included The raiders, Iecl by Major Richard T. Cape Torokina, the 1st Battalion plougl~ed Washburn, went ashore in the face of ashore straight through this deadly cross- heavy machine gun and rifle tire from two fire. An enemy 75mnl artillery piece, enemy bunkers and z number of support- which had tried emlier to hit one of the ing trenc]~es about 30 yards inland. J:ip- transports, remained under cover during anese defenders v-ere estimated at about, the aerial bombing and opened fire a~~in a reinforced platoon. After the first SaV- only after the assault boats reached a age resistance, the enemy fire slackened as point sorn~ 500 yards offshore. Its loca- the raiclers blasted the bunkers apart to tion was such that all boats heading to- kill the occupants. Otller enemy soldiers ward the beach had to cross the firing retreated into the jungle. only after the lane of this g-LuI.’ beach area was secured did the raiders dis- One of the first casualties in the assault cover that the regimental executive officer, waves was the LCP carrying the boat Lieutenant Colonel ,Joseph W. McCaffery, group commander. The command boat, had been fatally wounded while coordinat- blasted by a direct hit, sank immediately. ing the assault of combat units against the The explosion resulted in dispersion, dis- enemy dispositions.s organization, and confusion among the Extensive lagoons and swwnpland back- boat group. In a split second, the ap- ing tile narrow beach limitecl reconnais- proach formation was broken by landing sance eflorts, and reorganization of the craft taking evasive action to avoid the assault platoons and companies was hin- xntiboat fire. dered by constant sniper fire. Despite The result w-as a complete mixup of these handicaps, the raiders pushed slowly assault, waves. A total of six boats were into the jungle and, by 1100, had wiped out hit within a few minutes; only four of all remaining enemy resistance. Raider them reimaged to make the bezch. As Company M, attached to the 2d Raider tl~e first waves of boats grounded on the Battalion for the job of setting up a trail beaches, the ,Japanese opened up with ma- block farther il~land to stall :Lnyenemy at- chine gun and rifle fire, and mortar bursts tempt, to reinforce tile beachhead, movecl began to range along the shoreline. A out, along the well-marked Mission Trail withering fire poured from a concealed and was soon far out ahead of the raider complex of log and sand bunkers con- perimeter. nected by a series of rifle pits and trenches. The 1st 13atta]ion of the 3d Marines hit 8Col George O. Van Orden ltr to CMC, dtd the hot, spot of the enemy defenses. As 27May48 (Bougainvillea Monograph Comment File, HistBr, HQMC) places the location of this 5MajGen Alan Shapley ltr to ACofS, G–3, gun well within the limits of Blue Beach 1, the HQMC,dtd 130ct60,hereafter S1/aplc~ ltr. landing area of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. ,., 212 ISOI,~TION OF R~BA :JI. . . . z o 1- H ASSAULT OF CAPE TOROKINA 213 The enemy emplacements, barely above ontory. Several squads from Company ground level and hidden beneath the F of the 2d Battalion also landed in this tangled underbrush along the shoreline, area and were forced to fight their way were sited to cover the beaches and bay along the beach to reach their parent unit. with interlocking bands of fire. The pre- Only Company B of the 1st Battalion assault bombardment by glmfire ships and landed on its assigned beach. Casualties planes had not knocked ont tile enemy were fairly light, though, despite the in- fortifications; in most cases it had not even tense fire of the enemy. In addition to at hit them. least 14 men lost in the landing craft The Marines, -with all tactical integrity which had been sunk, fewer than a dozen and coordination lost, p]unged across Marines had been killed on the beach. the thin strip of beach to take cover in the The 1st Battalion hesitated only a short jungle. An orderly landing against such time; then the extensive schooling of the concentrated fire had been impossible. past asserted itself. Training in small After the scrambling of the assault waves, unit tactics against a fortified position units from the battalion landing team had t~ow paid big dividends. Rifle groups gone ashore where l)ossible and practically began to form under ranking men, and the every unit was out of position. Contribut- fight along the shoreline became a number ing to this confusion was the fact that the of small battles as the Marines fought. to majority of the boats hit were LCPS widen their beachhead against the enemy carrying boat group commanders. The fire. As the Marines became oriented to Japanese, correctly surmising that the their location and some semblance of more distinctive. LCPS were command tactical integrity was restored, the pace of craft, directed most of their fire on these the assault, quickened. boats. Before the operation, all units had been The initial reorganization of the ele- thoroughly briefed on the mission of each ments of the battalion landing team was assall]ting element, and each squad, pla- handicapped further by the wounding and toon, and company was acquainted with later evacuation of the battalion com- the missions of other units in the area. In mander, Lieutenant Colonel Leonard M. addition, each Marine was given a sketch Mason. Control of boat teams was dif- map of the Cape Torokina shoreline. ficult under the pounding of 9tlmm and Small groups formed under the leadership “knee mortar” ‘ bursts mixed with the and initiative of junior officers and staff raking fire of machine guns and rifles. l~oncomrnissioned officers, and these groups, Platoons and squads from all companies in tllrn, were consolidated under one con- were mixed along the bench. The original mand by other officers. Bunker after plans directed Company A to land on Cape bunker began to fall to the coordinated Torokina, but after the assault waves were and well-executed attacks of these groups. dispersed and tangled by the effective fire As the Japanese defensive complex slowly of the Japanese 75nlm artil]ery piece, e]e- cracked, the 1st Battalion command was established under the battalion executive ments of Company C landed on the pronl- officer, and the hastily re-formed com- 7The common term for the ,Japanese50mm panies took over tile mission of the area xrenwle discharger. in which they found themselves. 214 ISOLATION OF RABAUL The efficient reduction of the enemy’s de- McHenry: “ . . . the troops are mag- fensive position added another testimonial nificent. ” 8 The Marine officers who had to prior training and planning. officers directed the assault on the fortified posi- of the 3d Marine Division had studied the tions added sincere endorsements to this Japanese system of mutually prokcting expression of admiration. bunkers on New Georgia and decided that On Puruata Island, the 3d Raider Bat- in such a defensive complex the reduction talion (Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. of one bunker would lead to the elimina- Beans) landed with one reinforced com- tion of another. In effect, one bunker un- pany in the assault and the remainder of locked the entire position. The quickest the battalion as reserve and shore party. way to knock out such pillboxes with the Only sporadic fire hit the boats as they fewest casualties to the attacking force neared the island. By 0930, the raiders was for automatic riflemen to place fire had established a perimeter about 125 on the embrasures of the bunker while yards inland against hidden snipers and other Marines raced to its blind side to accurate machine gun and mortar fire. drop grenades down the ventilators or The Japanese, obviously outnumbered, pour automatic rifle fire into the rear en- gave little indication of yielding, and, by trance. 1330, the reserve platoons of the battalion By midmorning, through such coordi- were committed to the attack. The raid- nated attacks, most of the Japanese bunk- ers, with the added support of several self- ers on Cape Torokina had been knocked propelled 75mm guns attached from the out. The position cent aining the murder- 9th Marines, then moved about halfway ous 75mm gun was eliminated by one across the island. Marine who, directing the assault of a rifle Puruata was not declared secured until .ggoup, crept Up to the bunker and killed midafternoon of the following day. A the gun crew and bunker occupants before two-pronged attack, launched by the raid- falling dead of his own wounds. After ers early on the morning of 2 November, the last emplacement was silenced late swept over the island against only spo- that afternoon, Marines counted 153 dead radic rifle fire, and, by 1530, all Japanese 216 ISOLATION OF RABAUL The Marines’ fight uncovered extensive way from center. This prohibited the gun enemy defenses which were not disclosed from bringing enfilade fire to bear on the in aerial photographs taken before the beaches. Had this been possible, the large operation. The entire headland was number of boats along the shoreline would ringed by 15 bunkers, 9 of them facing have been sitting targets which even poor to the west and 6 of them overlooking gunners could not, miss, and the casualties the beaches on the east side of the cape. to the landing force would have been cor- Behind this protective line and farther respondingly greater. inland was another defensive line of eight The unexpected resistance on Cape bunkers which covered the first line of Torokina and Puruata island after the fortifications. Two other bunkers, about naval gunfire bombardment and bombing 750 yards inland, provided additional was a sharp disappointment to lMAC of- cover to the first two lines. ficers who had requested much more exten- Constructed of ironwood and coconut sive preparatory fires. The gunfire plan, ]c)gs t~~o feet thick, t]le bunkers ~Yerebill. which was intended to knock out or stun warked by sandbags and set low into enemy defenses that might delay the land- the ground. Camouflaged by sand and ing, had accomplished nothing. The .4n- tangled underbrush, the bunkers were thony, firing on Puruata Island, reported hard to cletect and difficult to knock out that its target had been well covered; without flamethrowers or demolitions. but tile raider battalion, which had to dig Despite this, the 3cl Marines suffered fe~~ the clefenders out of the emplacements casualties in destroying this defensive in- on the island, reported that few enemy stallation. Twenty of the bunkers had installations had been damaged. been eliminated by the coordinated fire ancl The Wudsworth and Sigourney, firing maneuver of individual Marines; the re- at ranges opening at 11,000 to 13,000 maining five were blasted apart by self- yards, had difficulty hitting the area and propelled tank destroyers firing 75n~m ninny shots fell short of the intended tar- armor-piercing shells directly into the gets. The Terry, closest to the shore but embrasures. firing at an angle into the northwestern The enemy 75mm artillery piece sited face of Cape Torokina, was poorly posi- as a boat gun hit 14 boats during the ini- tioned for effective work. &Tone of the tial landings before it was put out of 25 bunkers facing the landing teams on action. Only four of the boats sank. De- the right had been knocked out by gunfire, and only a few of the ,Japanese huts and spite the high velocity of the shells and buildings inland were blasted by the ships’ the slow speed of the landing craft, the 50 fire. The gunnery performance of the or more rounds fired by the enemy scored destroyers left much to be desired, III- remarkably few hits. This was attributed PhibFor admitted later. Particularly to two factors: the poor accuracy of the criticized was the fact that some ships fired Japanese gunners and the limited traverse short for almost five minutes with all sal- of the gym. Marines found, after knock- vos hitting the water. After two or three ing out the bunker, that the aperture in rounds, the range should have been ad- the pillbox permitted the muzzle of the justed, but apparently the practice bomb- gun to be moved only three degrees either ardment at Efate had not been sufficient. ASSAULT OF CAPE TOROKINA 217 Thelong-range snipiug at ~ape Torokina tercepted at about 0800 by a New Zealand with inconclusive results was vindication tighter squadron flying cover over the for the lMAC requests prior to the opera- befichhead. Seven of the Japanese planes tion that, tile clestro-yers move as close to Ivere knocked down, but not before a few the shoreline as possible for direct fire. enemy raiders strafed the beaches and The sa{l thing about the tyhole show, to dive-bombed the frantically maneuvering the t,or]man[l tlivisiou guufire I)lanners,w:ls .~P.% and .IKAs. Ten minutes later, sn- th:lt the n]e:~msactually Tyere~lvail:~bleto other flight of enemy fighters and bombers A.iveus just wh:~t\ve~v;intwl,ljllt ~~ereflissi- struck the area in a determined attack, but I)ated elsewhere in what we felt was fruit- less cmnnonacling,’” were turned away by the fierce interference of other ComAirSols planes, including Valuable lessons in gunfire support were Marine fighters from TTMF-215 and VMF- learned at Ilougainville that D-Day. For 221. Radical evasive tactics by the trans- one thil~g, the line of flat trajectory fire in ports—aided by excellent antiaircraft some places passed through a fringe of gunnery by tl~e destroyer screen and sav- tall pxlm trees which exploded the shells age pulswit by the fighter cover—pre- premztnrely and denied direct observation vented tl~e loss of any ships, although the of the tnrget area. Further, the ships had Weds ~rmth took some casualties from a trouble seeing the shoreline through the near miss. Tl~e fighter cover downed eight combination of early morning haze znd planes, and the destroyer screen claimed the smoke and dust of explodinx shells another four raiders. znd bombs, rising n~~inst a mountainous Two hours after the attack began, tl~e bitck~ronnd. .~P.\s and AI<.Is returned to resume op- .\lt bough the enemy airfiel ds in the 130u- erations. Valuable time, however, had gainville m-es were knocked out by Ad- been lost. Intruding enemy planes con- miral Merrill’s final bombardment and the tinued to harass the transports, but un- prior action of Com AirSols bombing lcmding operations kept up until about strikes, the ,Japnnese reaction to the lancl- 1300, when the arrival of another ]arge ing came swiftly. .it 0718, less thfin two format ion of about TO enemy planes put IIours after the transports nppeared off the ships into action a~~in. Cape Torokina and about eight minutes One APA, the American Legion, before the first assault boats hit the befich, grounded on a shoal and remained there a large flixht of ,Japanese plmnes was de- during the attack despite the persistent ef- tected winging toward Empress Augusta forts of tw-o tugs which attempted to free Bay. The transports, most of them trail- it. A destroyer resolutely stood guard, ing embarkation nets, immedi ttely pulled pumping antiaircraft fire into attacking out of the bay toward the sex to take eva- planes. The ship was pulled free before sive action again. tl~e air attack was driven off. As before, The first enemy flight, of abont 30 planes, the :Iggressive fighter cover and heavy fire evidently fighters from the naval carrier from the destroyer screen prevented dam- groups land-based in New Britain, was im wge to the amphibious force, and the ships turned bxck to the task of urdoading. ‘0Henderson, “x’aval Guntire Support,” pp During the attacks, the Allies claimed 26 61-62. enemy planes as shot down-four more 218 ISOLATION OF RABAUJJ than the ,J~panese records indicate—with the difficult surf conditions, led to further the loss of four planes and one pilot. For complications because the beaches in the the first day, at least, the threat of enemy 3d Marines’ sector were already crowded, air retaliation had been turned back. and the coxswains on the landing craft had no instructions regarding where the ESTABLISHING A BEACHHEAD “ supplies should be dumped. The landing beaches in the 3d Marines’ Ashore, the defensive perimeter now sector were hxrdly an improvement. Few stretched a long, irregular semi-circle over had any depth, and from the outset it was the area from the La.rums. River past Cape apparent that the swampy jungle would Torokina, a distance of about four miles. stall operiat.ions past the beaches. The Only the northern beaches were quiet; the only means of movement was laterally area around the cape was still being con- along the thin beach, and the gear already tested by snipers \vithin this perimeter and stacked along the shoreline was causing by small groups of enemy in the jungle congest ion along this route. The difficult outside the line. Within this area, the terrain inland made the formation of Sitllat,ion was beginning to be logistics dumps impractical, so all carg-o was placed cause for concern. above the high water mark and some de- Confusion began after wrecked tank gree of orderliness attempted. Despite lighters and personnel boats were broken this, the 9th Marines lost much organiza- on the northern beaches, closing those tional property and supplies, most of areas to further traffic. When unloading which was never recovered. operations began once more after the first As cargo and supplies mounted on the air raid, the northern beaches were ordered beaches assigned to the 2d and 3d Elat- abandoned and all cargo destined for the talions of the 3d Marines, the. bulk cargo !%h Marinss sector was diverted to beaches was diverted further to Puruata Island. south of the Koromokina River. This The landing craft were unloaded within a change, the only move possible in view of few hundred yards of the battle between the raiders ancl the small but determined 11Ilnless ~therlvisenoted, the material in this group of defenders emplaced there. Al- derived from : CizcPae-CincPOA section is most 30 percent of the total cargo carried Nov.j3 Warn; Corn SoPac A’0vJ3 J+TarD; Tltird- Flt NnrrRcpt; IIIPh ibFor .4R; lIIPhibPor by the 1!2transports was unloaded by 1130 ~ov~~ Ji7arD; IMAC AI<–Z; $d .liarDiv Cow bat of l)-l)ay, and this figure was extended Rept; 3d .l[arDiti AR; 3d MarI)iv 1)–4 Jnl 1-16 to almost 50 percent completion by the xOTT# (Rougainville AreaOpFile, HistBr, time that the APAs and AKAs had to de- HQMC!). hereafter .?dMarIJivIPl J*1Z; 3d Mar- Div ServTrps Rept of Ops, Nov–Dec43, dtd part the area for the second time. The 27Jan44 (Bougainvillea AreaOpFile, HistBr, cargo remaining on board was varied; HQMC), hereafter $d MarDiv S’crvTrp.s Rept; 3d some ships had unloaded all rations but 3fi{rDiv SIIpply and E~ac Rept, DIPPER Opera- tion, dtd 29.Jan44 (BougainviUe AreaOpFile, 1ittle ammunition. Other transports had HistBr, HQMC) : Hi.stDiv Acct; OATI,Conlbat unloaded ammunition first and were ju* Narra,tice ,YZZ; Aurthnr and Cohlmia, 3d ~far- starting to move the other supplies. DivHist; Rentz, Bougai?wil!e and the Northern TVhile the combat troops ashore pre- i3010mons; Morison, Rrcakinfl tJ\r Bisntarcks Rarrier. ,m~red to defend the newlv. won beachhead, ASSAULT OF CAPE TOROKINA 219 the transport groups proceeded to unload distances, and, by the end of D-Day, each as rapidly as the air attacks, loss of boats, of the battalions was established in a and elimination of a number of beaches rough perimeter along the first of these would permit. lly 1600 on D-Day, only clesignated Inland Defense Lines. The the four northernmost transportethe division front lines extended into the jun- ones most affected by the boat mishaps and gle about 600 yarcls near the Laruma River the unsuitable beaches-still had cargo on and about 1,000 yards in front of Cape board. Torokina. Although the 1st Battalion, 3d The quick unloading of the other five Marines, in the area of the cape plantation, AP.is and three .~KAs, despite the inter- and the 3d Raiders on Puruata Island were ruptions, was a reflection of the measures Still receiving occasional sniper fire, the taken by Admiral Wilkinson and General remainder of the perimeter was quiet and Vandegrift to insure rapid movement of defense was not, a special problem. supplies ashore. Embarked troops on There was, however, still congestion on each APA and AKA had been required to tl~e shoreline. In order to bring some or- furnish a complete shore party of about c]er out of the near chaos on the beaches 500 men. During the unloading, 6 officers an(l to redlwe the paralyzing effect of the and 120 men remained on board ship to n~ountains of supply piled helter-skelter, act as cargo handjers w]lile a further 60 additional Marines from the combat forces were boat riders to direct the supplies to were detailed as labor gangs to sort the the proper beaches. Another 200 Marines supplies and haul them to the front-line stayed on each beach to help unload the units. This placed a double-burden on landing craft. The remaining personnel some units who were already near half- were used as beach guides, vehicle drivers, strength by the assignment of troops to cargo handlers, and supervisors.12 The the shore party work. 3d Service Battalion, augmented by sup- .In additional problem, late on D-Day, porting troops—artillerymen, engineers, was the correlation and coordination of the military police, signal men, tank men, com- defensive positions and missions of the municators, and Seabees-forrned the bulk maIly assorted and unrelated supporting of these working parties. In some in- nnits which had landed during the day. stances, these supporting troops were not These included echelons of artillery, anti- released to their units until several days aircraft artillery, and seacoast defense after the beachhead had been established. nnits. The 12th Marines, decentralized In all, about 40 percent of the entire land- with m battery attached to each landing ing force was engaged initially in shore team, was in varying stages of readiness party activities. for defense of the beachhead. Battery B, By late afternoon, each landing team re- in the 9th Marines area, was in position ported its mission accomplished. In the by early afternoon but was so engaged in absence of any identifiable terrain features c:~rgo hauling that the first L’e~LleStSfOr a in the interior, the landing teams had been firing mission could not be completed. Otber batteries were also in position by directed to extend the beachhead certain the end of D-Day, and several had fired registration shots and were available for “ IMAC Adn]inO No. 1, dtd 150ct43 in IMAC .411-I. interrnittent fires during the first night. 220 ISOLATION OF RABAUL The remaining batteries were ready for nated at daybreak. An open-wire tele- support missions the following day. phone watch was kept by all units, and ra- Selection of positions in most areas was dios were set to receive messages but no difficult. The battery supporting the 2d generators were started for transmissions. Raider Battalion was forced to move in- The night passed as expected—Marines land about 100 yards through a lagoon huddling three to a foxhole with one man before a position could be located. TWO awake at all times. A dispiriting drizzle, amphibian tractors ferriecl the guns and which began late on D-Day afternoon, most of the xmnlunition across the water, continued through the night. Japanese and the artillel’ymen transferred the re- infiltrators were busy, and several brief maining ammunition from the beach to the skirmishes occurred. An attack on a gun position by rubber boats. This bat- casualty clearing station was repulsed by tery registered on Piva Village by air gunfire from corpsmen and wounded Ma- spot, and the next day fired 124 rounds on rines; and one battalion command post, di- suspected enemy positions in the vicinity rectly behind the front lines, was hit by an of that village. enemy patrol. l’he attackers were turned Antiaircraft batteries (90mm) and the back by the battalion commander, execu- Special Weapons Group of the 3d Defense tive officer, and the bat talien surgeon who Battalion landed right behind the assault wielded knives to defend their foxhole. units. Advance details of the seacoast While the Marines ashore had busied defense battery also moved ashore early themselves getting ready for the first night and immediately begzn seeking suitab]e of defense of the beachhead, the transport positions to mount the big guns. After groups proceeded with the unloading de- the first air raid on the morning of D-nay, tails. At 1645, the transports were ad- the remaining antiaircraft guns of the vised to debark all weapons, boat pool per- Marine defense battalion were hurried sonnel, and cargo handlers and leave the ashore so that protection of the beachhead area at 1700. The four transports still could be increased as soon m possible. By with supplies aboard (the A zchhz, .4mer- night fal 1 of D-Day, 20 Mknrn Nlns, 8 ican Legion, Hwnte~ Liggett, and the N)mm guns, and the .50 and .30 cali- Crescent City) were to keep working until ber mzchine guns of the battalion were the final moment and then leave with the integrated into the defense of the perime- rest of the transports despite any Marine ter nnd were ready for action. working parties still on board. As nightfall approached, tbe frontline Admiral Wilkinson, aware that the situ- units sited all weapons along fixed lines ation ashore was well under control, had to coordinate their fire with adjacent units, decided that all ships would retire for the and nll companies set,up an all-around de- night and return the next day. In event fense. Supporting units on the beach also of a night attack, the transports in Em- established small perimeters within this press Augusta Bay would be sitting ducks. defensive 1inc. There was to be no unnec- The admiral felt that his ships could not essary firing and no movement. Marines maneuver in uncharted waters at night, were to resort to bayonets and knives when and that night unloading operations were needed, and any .Japanese infiltrators were not feasible. The admiral had another to be left unchallenged and then elimi- reason, too. An enemy task force of four ASSAULT OF CAPE TOROKINA 221 cruisers and six destroyers was reported At 1800, all destroyers raced out of Kula heading toward Rabaul from Truk, and Gulf to rejoin Merrill. The 108-mile these ships, aft er one refueling stop, could trip was made at 32 knots, although the be expected near Bougainvillea later that engines of two of the destroyers were on evening or early the next morning. The the verge of breakdown. By 2330, the amphibious force, as directed, moved out ships joined Merrill’s cruisers south of the to sea for more protection. Treasurys, ancl the entire task force headed At 2300 that night, 1 h’overnber, the toward Bougainvillea where it interposed four transports which were still to be un- itself between the departing transports loaded were ordered to reverse course and and the oncoming enemy fleet. Allied head back toward Empress Augusta Bay patrol planes had kept the attack force while the rest of the transports continued lll~der surveillance all day, and, by night- toward Guadalcanal. The four trans- f i~l1, the direction of the ,Japanese ships ports, screened by destroyers, rebwlated was well established. If the Allied think- their speed and dirwtion so as to reach the ing was correct, another trap had been Cape Torokina area after daybreak. A baited for the Japanese. The enemy, short time laterl alerted to tile fact, that a guessing that, the same task force that hit large enemy fleet was in the area, the Buka had provided the shore bombard- transports headed back toward Guadal- ment for the Cape Torokina landing, canal again. might be lured into assuming that the Admiral Merrill’s Task Force 39, after fighting ships were now low on fuel and the successful bombardment of Buka and ammunition and had retired with the the Shortlands -which opened the Bou- transports. If that was the enemy as- gainvillea operation, had moved north of sllmptioll, then Merrill was in position for Vella Lavella to cover the retirement of a sllccessful ambush. the transport group. At this particu]xr Moving slowly to leave scant, wake for time, Merrill’s concern was the condition enemy snooper planes to detect, Merrill’s of his force which had been underway for force WM off 130ugainvil]e by 0100, 2 No- 29 hours, steaming about 766 miles at vember, i~l~dbeginning to maneuver into near-maximum speed. .41though the position to intercept the enemy fleet. At cruisers were still able to fight, the fuel that time, the enemy was about 83 miles oil snpply in the destroyers was below distant. Merrill’s basic plan was to stop the level required for anything but sm~ll the enemy at all costs, striking the ,Jap- engagements at moderate speeds. anese ships from the east. so that the sea So, while Merrill’s ciwisers waited, one engagement would be deflected toward the of the two destroyer divisions in the task west, away from Bougainvillea. This force turned and headed for New Georgia would give his ships more room to maneu- to refuel. That afternoon, 1 November, ver as well as allow any damaged ships to while an oil barge was pumping oil into the destroyers at maximum rate, the re- ret ire to the east on the disengaged sicle. port of the Japanese fleet bearing down Further, Merrill respected the ,Japanese on 130ugainville was received. The de- torpedoes and felt. that his best chance stroyers, impatient to get going, hurried to divert the enemy force and turn it through the refueling. back-possibly without loss to his owm 222 ISOLATION OF RABAUL force—was by long-range, radar-directed 39 ships opened fire on each other before gunfire. discovering their error. The naval battle of Empress Augusta In such confused circumstances, estimat- Bay began just 45 miles offshore from the ion of damage to either force was almost beachhead whose safety depended upon impossible, although some of the .kmerican Task Force 39. Merrill-s cruisers opened destroyers believed that their torpedoes fire at 0950 at ranges of 16,000 to 20,000 had found Japanese targets, and other yards. The enemy fleet, spread out over enemy ships were believed to have been hit a distance of eight miles, appeared to be in by gunfire. In the scramble for positions three columns with a light cruiser and de- to take new targets under fire, two destroy- stroyers in each of the northern and southe- ers of Merrill’s force scraped past. each rn groups and two heavy cruisers and other with some damage, and several other two destroyers in the center. Detection close collisions between other destroyers was difficult because, with the enemy so were narrowly averted. One American spread out, the radar on Merrill’s ships destroyer, the Foote, reported itself dis- could not cover the entire force at one abled by an enemy torpedo and two other time. destroyers were hit by gunfire but re- The enemy’s northern force was hit mained in action. The only cruiser dam- aged was the Denver, which took three first, the van destroyers of Task Force 39 8-inch shells and was forced to disengage engaging this section while the rest of the for a short time before returning to the American ships turned toward the center fight. and southern groups. As planned, the att- By 0332, Task Force 39 was plainly in ack struck from the east. Task Force possession of the field. The enemy force, 39 scored hits immediately, drawing short roukd in all directions, had ceased firing and inaccurate salvos in return. The and -was retiring at high speed. Merrill’s Japanese, relying on optical control of cruiser division ceased firing at 0349 on gunfire, lighted the skies with starshells one last target at ranges over 23,000 yards. and airplane flares; but this also helped This ended the main battle, although the Task Force 39, since the enemy’s flashless TF 39 destroyers continued to scout the powder made visual detection of the Jap- area for additional targets and disabled anese ships almost impossible without enemy ships. At daybreak, TF 39 was light. reassembled and a flight of friendly air- The two forces groped for each other craft appeared to provide escort for its with torpedoes and gunfire. In the dark retirement. The Foote was taken under night, coordination of units was difficult tow and the return to Guadalcanal started. and identification of ships impossible. The Merrill force believed that it had The maneuvering of Merrill’s task units sunk at least one enemy light. cruieer and for firing positions, as well as the frantic one destroyer and inflicted damage on a scattering of the enemy force, spread the number of other ships. This estimate was battle over a wide area, which further in- later found correct.’3 In addition, the creased problems of control and identifica- tion. on at least one occasion, Task Force 1’ SE Area NavOps—ZIZ, p. 14. ASSAULT OF CAPE TOROKINA 223 Japanese also had several ships damaged tions, of a limited nature, were positioned in collisions. to repel an Allied landing in this area. Task Force 39 was struck a few hours But the small garrison in the vicinity of later by a furious air attack from more Cape Torokina, about 270 men from the than 70 enemy planes, but, the Japanese fi?dCompany, 2Vd Regiment, -with a regi- made a mistake in heading for tl]e cruisers mental weapons platoon attached, was well instead of the destroyers guarding the dis- trained. From the time that the alarm abled Foote. The hex~-y anti~irmaft fire was sounded shortly after dawn on 1 No- and the aggressive protection of the Coln- vember, the Japanese soldiers took up their AirSols fighter cover forced the enemy defensive positions around the cape and planes away. The air cover shot down 10 prepared to make the invading forces pay planes, and the ships reported 7 enemy as dearly as possible for a beachhead. aircraft, downed. Only one American The invading Marines found the island’s cruiser, the Montpelier, was hit by bombs defenders dressed in spotless, well-pressed but, it was able to continue. Nlile tlie air uniforms with rank marks and service rib- battle raged, the amphibious force’s trans- bons, an indication that the Cape Torokina ports reversed course once more and re- garrison was a disciplined, trained force with high morale., willing to fight to the turned to Cape Torokina without interfer- death to defend its area. But after the ence and completed the unloading. The first day, when the. ,Japanese were knocked sea and air offensive by the ,Jzpznese had out of the concentrated defenses on Cape been stopped cold by the combined action Torokina, the enemy resistance was almost of (lm-ISoPac’s air and sea forces. negligible. A wounded Japanese sergeant major, captured by Marines the second THE JAPANEgE “ day, reported that the understrength gar- rison had bem wiped almost out of exist- To the Japanese defenders, the sudden ence. The prisoner confirmed that the appearance of a number of transports off Japanese had expected an attack on Bou- Cape. Torokina on the morning of 1 No- gainvillea for about three days—but not at vember came as something of a shock. All Cape Torokina. Japanese plans for the island had dis- With the notice of the Allied operations counted a landing north of Cape Torokina again% Bcmgainville, all available Japa- because of the nature of the beaches and nese air power was rushed toward Rabaul, the terrain. If the .411ies attacked the and Admiral Kusaka ordered the inter- western coast of Bougainvillea, the enemy ception operations of the .Southeaat Area thought the logical place would be south- Fleet (the Ro operation) shifted from ern Empress Aubgusta Bay around Cape New Guinea to the Solomons. Because all Mutupena. ,Japanese defensive installa- planes of the IstAir h’qtuzdron and addi- “ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this tional ships were already en route to Ra- section is derived froul : Ilf..l (YAR-1; 3d MarI)i17 baul, this action placed the entire mobile CwthbatRrpt; Iflf.4 (1 C–2 .Jnl; .!?d .lfarDiv AR; surf ace and air strength of the Combined SE AT(YZ ?ia~;Ops—111: S’m.x>ntccnth Army Ops— Fleet under the direction of the comman- 11; [JSSBS, C’ampaiflns; I“SSBS, l~/tcrroflation.s; JIi.91Div Acct. der of the Southeast Area Fleet. 224 ISOLATION OF RABATJL The protests of some commanders ing in determination to destroy the enemy. against the use of surface vessels in the The army’s intention at that point was only area south of New Britain-which was to obstruct the enemy landing. 16 well within the range of the area domi- There were many avenues of obstruction nated by the planes of ComAirSols-w,ere open to the Japanese, despite the fact that brushed aside. Combined Fleet Z?ead- the Alliecl sea and air activity probably qwmtens. convinced that, this was the last discouraged the enemy from many aggres- opportunity to take advantage of the stra- sive overtures. Deceived originally as to tegic sitl~ation in the southeast, was deter. the intentions of the Allies, the Japanese mined to strike. a decisive blow at the Al- apparently remained in doubt for some lied surface strength in the Solomons and time as to the strategical and tactical im- directed Kusaka to continue the operation. portance of the operations at Cape Toro- After the battle of Empress Augusta kina. The enemy could have counter- Bay, however, the defeated .Tapanese re- manded or prevented extension of the tired from the area with the realization defensive positions and occupation of the that combined sea and air operations projected airfield sites by shelling or air were difficult with limited air resources, bombardments. But nune of these courses especially “in a region where friendly of action were initiated immediately or and enemy aerial supremacy spheres carried out with sufficient determination overlapped broadly.” 15 to jeopardize the beachhead seized by the The Seventeenth Army, charged with lMAc forces. the actual defense of Bougainvillea, took The chief threat to the Cape Torok@a the news of the Allied invasion a bit more perimeter seemed to be from the right blandly: flank. Operation orders, taken from the In formulating its operation plan, the Sev- bodies of dead Japanese at Cape Torokina, enteenth Army planned to employ its main indicated that forces in the area southeast force only on the occasion of an army inva- of the Cape could strike from that direc- sion in the southern or northern region, or tion, and it was to this Si& that the lMAC the Kieta sector. Therefore, at the outset of the enemylanding in the vicinity of Toro- forces ashore pointed most of their combat kina Point, the Seventeenth Army was lack- strength. “ SE Area NavOp.s-11, p. 18. ‘“ Neven.teentl&Army Op&—ZII, p. 103, CHAPTER .4 Holding the Beachhead .EXPANS1ON OF THE PEl?Zi7[ETER 1 Patrols had to thread their way through a maze of swamps that stood just back of The landings on Bougainvillea had pro- the beaches, particularly in the 3d Ma- ceeded as planned, except that the 3d &1a- rines’ zone of action. Brackish water, rines encountered unexpectedly stiff re- much of it knee to waist, deep, flooded in- sistance initially and the 9th Ylarines land- land for hlundreds of yards. The bottom ed over surf and beaches which were later of these swamps was a fine., volcanic ash described as being as rough as any encoun- which had a quicksand substance to it. tered in the South Pacific. The success Marines had trouble, wading these areas, of tile operation! though, was obvious, and and bulldozers and half-tracks all but dis- ( }ene,ral lTande~rift, leaving Turnage in appeared under the water.3 tactical control of all lE1.~C troops ashore, Chdy two paths led out of this morass, confidently returned to (Iuadalcanal with both of them in the sector of the 3d hla- JVilkinson.2 rines. These two trails, in some places .~t, daybreak the second day, the 31a- only inches above the swamp]and, extend- rines began expansion of tl~e beachhead. ed jnland about 750 yards before joining Flank patrols along the entire perimeter firmer ground. One of the pathways, established a cohesive defensive front, and the Nlission Trail toward the Piva River fl”om this position a number of reconnais- sance patrols were pushed forward. There and Piva I?illage, was believed to be the was no enemy activity except occasional main route of travel by the Japanese sniper fire in the vicinity of Torokina forces, and this trail was blocked on D- plantation and on Puruata Island, where Day by the quick action of raider tim- the raiders were still engaged. pany bf. &lore deta&d information on the extent of swamps ,and the location of ‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this higher ground would have been invalu- sectionis derivedfrom: C’omS’oPacNovj<’?Warn; able at this stage of beachhead expansion, ThirdFlt XarrRcpt; 1[1[’hit)Por AR; llIPliibFor but, the aerial photographs and hasty ter- Nov~L? lVarD; 1.1(.4(?.4R–Z; IMAC Rel)t on Rou- gainville Operi]tion, l’h;lse II, dtd 21 Mar43 ( 130u- rain maps available furnished few clues gainville Area OpFile. IIist13r, HQMC ), hereafter I.1[.IC .11(–1[; 1.V.4 (} (:–2 Rcpts: I.1[..lP &2 Jnl; ‘ Col Francis M. McAlister ltr. to CMC, dtd ,;d .lfar~ic (’o*aTJfltRr/Jf; 3f73farf)il .41/ ; fld .Var- 29Mar48, hereafter McA 1Lster ttr. The fact l)ir D–,2 N.(R; 3(7 MarIjiv D–2 Jal; :jd lfarI)io that the 9th Marines was able to dig in deeply 1)–J Rept.?; Histlliv .4 CC4; Rentz, Boa,qnint?illc an(l well shortly after it landed “indicated that and thr .A”orthcm S’02017toHs; Isely and Crowl, ther(~ was a good deal of firm ground back of Ilarine.s and ,Impllibiow War; Aurthur and the heaehes>”much more than is Kenerally rec- Cohlmia, 3(7Mm”DiuHist. ogn ized or remembered by men who got soaked 2 Vande.qrift intrroiezo. wading the swnmps. Craig W. 225 ,.. 226 ISOLATION” OF RABACL M to sl~itable locations for defensive posi- a reserve force for IMAC. Prior to the tions or supply (lumps. The result was operation, General Turnage had been con- complete dependence upon reports of the cerned about the possibility of his lengthy reconnaissance patrols.4 but narrow beachhead being rolled up like Because the routes inland were passable a rug by enemy action. Without a re- only to tracked vehicles, road building be- serve and l~nable to organize a defense in came the priority act.ivi ty of the operation. depth to either flank, the division com- Wheeled vehicles and half-tracks could be lnander lmd planned to move individual used only along the be:tches, and in places battalions laterally to meet enemy threats where the shoreline was only a few yards :W tl~ey developed. Now, with the beaches wide, the supplies piled around had a in the !lth Marines~ sector unsuitable for paralyzing efiect on trnffic. The 53d and continued use, and the 3d Marines needing ‘ilst Seabees, which lancled in various sollle relief after the tough battle to take. echelons wit h the assaLdt troops, began rape Torokina, redisposition of certain construction of a lateral road along the units was directed.s beach while waiting for the beachhead to .kt 0830, the 2d Battalion, $lth Marines expand. started drawing in its left flank toward Construction of a similar road along the the beach while 1/9, the extreme left ~[ission Trail was handicapped by the flank landil~g team, began withdrawal to swamps and the 1ack of brid~i ng material. tile vicinity of Cape Torokina. .Some Progress was slow. Airfield reconnais- units lnoved along the beach; others were sance on Cape Torokina was begun at day- lifted by amphibian tractors. By night- bretk despite tile sporadic sniper fire, but, fall, 1/9 was under the operational con- plans for immediate patrols to seek air- trol of the 3d Marines and wzs in reserve field sites further inland was postponed by positions behind 1/3 on the right flank. the nerd for roads and tile limited beachh- Tw-o artillery batteries of the l!!th Marines ead. l,egi stered fire o~l t]le I,aruma River to 13zrly on the morning of !? I$Tovember, a provide support for 2/9 on the left flank. shift in the tactical lineup along the perim- The. following day, 3 November, 2/9 eter was ordered in an attempt, to pull in made the same withdrawal and moved into the flanks of the beachhead and constitute positions to the right of the 2d Raider Battalion. T)nring the day, 1/9 relieved 4Ck?nernl Crai# recalls : “It was almost impossi- 1,/~ 011 t,he right, flank of the perimeter, ble to spot onr troop dispositions on operations and at 1800 operational control of Cape maps at tinies. The nlaps \vere very poor and Torokina passed to the !lth Marines. At there were few identifying’ marks on the terrain until we got to thp high ground. .kt one time I this time, 3/9 with its left flank anchored had eaeh fwmpany on the line put :]1) weather bal- to the beach north of the Koromokina loons ( sul:all ones ) above the treetops in the jnn- River, was placed under the control of the gle and then had a plane photo~raph the area. 3d Marines; 1/3, withdrawn from ac- The small ~vhite dots made by the balloons gave a true picture finally of just how my defensive tion, was designated the reserve unit of the lines ran in a particularly thick part of the jungle. It was the only titae during the early 5 I.tCol Alpha 1., Ihnvser, .Jr., ltr to CMC, dtd I)art of the campaign that I got a really good i{lea l$)II:ly~X ( BollK2\invi]le Monograph Comnlent as to exactly how my lines ran, ” Craig ltr. I{~i](,, IlistBr, HQMC ) , hereafter Bower Zfr. HOLDING THE BEACHHEAD Qg7 ,/,, IA I + 0— CL i a > 228 ISOLATION OF RABAUL 9th Marines. In effect, after three days, and some enemy activity was reported in the two assault regiments had tr~ded posi- front of 2/9; other than that, enemy tions on the perimeter and had exchanged resistance had vanished. one battalion. By the end of the following day, 5 No- The last Japanese resistance within the vember, the IMAC beachhead extended perimeter had been eliminated, also. On 3 about 10,000 yards along the beach around hTovember, after several instances of spo- Cape Torokina and about 5,000 yards in- radic rifle fire from Torokina Island, the land. Defending along the perimeter artillery pieces of a battery from the 12th were five battalions (3/9, 3/3, 2/3, 2/9, Marines, as well as 40mm and 20mm guns and 1{;9) with 1/3 in reserve. The 2d of the 3d Defense Battalion, were turned Raiders, leaving one company blocking on Torokina Islxnd for a 15-nlinute bonl- Mission Trail, and the 3d Raiders were as- bardment. A small detachment of the 3d sembled under control of the 2d Raider Raiders landed behind this shelling found Regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel no live Japanese but 8–10 freshly dug Alan Shapley, in IMAC reserve on graves. The enemy had apparently been Puruata Island and Cape Torokina. forced to abandon the island. All other IMAC units which had been Extension of the perimeter continued engaged in shore party operations also re- despite the shuffling of front-line units. verted to parent control. By this time, On the left, 3/9 and the two battalions of two battalions of the 12th Marines were the 3d Marines continued to press inland in position to provide artillery support to in a course of advance generally north by the beachhead and the antiaircraft bat- northeast. Contact was maintained with teries of the 3d Defense Battalion were the 2d Raider Battalion on the right of the operating with radar direction. With all 3d Marines, and patrols scouted ahead units now able to make a muster of per- with the mission of locating the route for sonnel, the IMAC casualties for the initial a lateral road from the left flank to the landings and widening of the beachhead right flank. The 2d Raiders, moving were set at 39 killed and 104 wounded. along the Mission Trail in front of the .4nother 39 Marines were reported missing. 9th Marines, extended the beachhead al- The Japanese dead totaled 202. most 1,500 yards. In this respect, the ad- Nearly 6,200 tons of supplies and equip- dition of a war dog platoon to the front- ment had been carried to Empress Au- line units was invaluable. Not only did gusta Bay by the IIIPhibFor transports. the alert, Doberman Pinschers and Ger- By the end of D-Day, more than 90 per- man Shepherds smell out hidden Jap- cent of this cargo was stacked along the anese, hut tbeil’ presence with the patrols beaches in varying stages of organization gave confidence to the Marines. and orderliness. The problem was com- On 4 November, extensive pwtrolling plicated further by the final unloading of beyond the perimeter north to the IJaruma the four transports on D plus 1. Prac- River and south to the Torokina River tically every foot of dry area not already was ordered, but enemy contact was light occupied by troop bivouacs or gun em- and only occasional sniper fire was en- placements was piled high with cargo, count e.reel. The 1/9 pat rol to the Toro- and the troops still serving as the shore kina River killed one sniper near the Piva, party were harcl-pressed to find addi- HOLDING THE BEACHHEAD 229 tional storage areas within the narrow ling in front of the defensive positions by perimeter. Ammunition and fuel dumps the Marines who preferred to have no one had to be fitted in temporarily with other in advance of the lines except Japanese. supply dumps, and these in turn were situ- This problem was solved by the frontline ated where terrain permitted. The result units fnrnislling combat patrols for engi- was a series of dtunps with explosives and neer survey parties who moved ahead fuels dangerously close to each other and and then ~~orkecl a survey back to the old to troop areas and beach defense installa- positions. tions. The swamplands were successfully at- Main source of trouble was the lack of tacked by a series of drainage ditches into beach exits. Some use of the two trails the sea. As the ground dried, the volcanic had been attempted, but these had broken fish was spread back as fill dirt. The air- down quickly under the continual drizzle field work was slowed by the many supply of rain and the churning of tracked ve- dumps and gun emplacements which had hicles. The lateral road ‘along the beach been placed in the vicinity of the planta- was practically impassable at, high tide, tion, one of the few dry spaces around. and at all times trucks were forced to Many clivision dumps and artillery posi- operate in sea water several inches to sev- tions had to be moved from the area, in- eral feet deep. Seabees and engineers, at- clnding one battery of 90mm guns of the tempting to corduroy some of the worst 3d Defense Battalion which occupied a stretches, had their efforts washed out. position in the middle of the projected The bordering swarnplands. which re- runway. stricted the nse of wheeled vehicles and By the time the first supporting echelon half-tracks in most instances, forced the of troops and cargo arrived on 6 Novem- discovery of the amphibian tractor as the ber, the Torokina beachhead was still han- most versatile and valuable addition to the dicapped by the lack of good beach facili- landing force. Already these lumbering ties and roads. Airfield construction had land-sea vehicles had proven their worth slowed the development of roads, and vice in carrying cargo, ferrying guns, and evac- versa, and the loose sand and heavy surf uating wounded men through the marsh action along the Cape Torokina beaches lands and the lagoons, and the variations resisted efforts to construct proper docking of their capabilities under such extreme facilities for the expected arrival of the circumstances were just beginning to be supporting echelons.s Coconut log ramps, realized and appreciated. The arrival of lashed together by cables, were extended the LST echelons later bronght more of about 30 feet from the shoreline, but these these welcome machines to the beachhead. required constant rebuilding. Later, sec- lMAC and M Marine Division engi- tions of bridges were used and these neers landed in the first echelons on D- proved adaptable to beach use. Day, but, reconnaissance to seek supply The reinforcements arrived at Torokina routes into the interior and supply dump early on the morning of 6 h~ovember. The locations was handicapped by the limited expansion of the beachhead. Many sur- 6 I,tCol IIarold Il. West Itr to CMC, dtd vey missions bumped into the combat bat- 28 May48 ( Bougainvillea Monograph Comment talions and were discouraged from patrol- l’ile, HistBr, HQMC), 230 ISOLATION OF RABAUL 3,548 men and 6,080 tons of cargo were The countermanding fulfilled an ambi- embarked at Guadalcanal on the 4th on tion long cherished by the Japanese. At eight LSTS and eight APDs, which were Rendova, an attempted landing against escorted to Cape Torokina by six destroy- the Allied invasion forces fizzled out dur- ers. The APDs unloaded a battalion lancl- ing a downpour that prevented the ren- ing telm from the Zlst Marines and other dezvous of the Japanese assault force; and division elements quickly and tl~en headed at New Georgia, the enemy considered— back to Guadalcanal for another echelon. then rejected—an idea to land behind the 13ut the unloading of tl~eLSTS wzs slowed 43d Division on Zanana Beach. The Cape by the crowded conditions of the main Torokina operation, however, gave the beaches and the lack of beach facilities. tJapanese a chance to try this favored coun- Most of the cargo was unloacled at Puruata terstroke. Such a maneuver was in line Island where the tank landing ships could with the basic policy of defense of Bou- beach aclequately, and the cargo was then gainvillea by mobile striking forces, and, in transshipped to the mainland.’ This cre- fact, a provisional batt alien was in read- ated something of a problem, too, for sup- iness at, Rabaul for just such a counter- plies were poured onto Puruata without a manding attempt. shore party to organize the cargo; and This raiding unit was actually a miscel- this condition was barely cleared up before lany of troops from several regiments of another echelon of troops and supplies the 17’th Division. Specially trained, the arrived. battalion included the 5th Company, 5.&h Infantry; the Cth Company, 53d Znfan- CO UNTEli?LANDING AT try; a platoon from the 7th Company, 54th K(7ROMOKIN.48 Znfan.try; and a machine gun company from the 5ith Infantry, plus some service After the first desperate defense of Cape troops. ,Japanese records place the Torokina, the enenly had offered no rwist- strength of the battalion at about 850 ante. Then, on 7 November, the ,Japa- men.~ nese suddenly launched a countermanding The attack force started for Cape Toro- a~~inst the left flank of the beachhead. kina on the night of 1 November, but the The move caught the. 3d Marine Division reported presence of an Allied surface in the midst of reorganization of the fleet of battleships and cruisers in the perimeter to meet the expected threat on area, and the threat of being cliscovered by the right flank. Allied planes, convinced tl~e Japanese that a countermanding at this time would be dif- ‘ Ibid. ficult. Accordingly, the attempt was post- RT:nless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from : C’om6’o~flc hTor& poned, ancl the troops returned to Rabaul Warn : Tl! irdFlt Sarrli’rl)t ; 1.11.4C A A-II; while Admiral Kusaka7s Southeast Area T,I[.4 (: C–2 Rc/)ts ; 1.11..1C C–2 ,Jn7; .3d Ma.rll iv Fleet concentrated on destroying the Con! batRrpt,s; 3d llarD iv :1 R; ,?(1 .JlarT)ir D–2 Allied interference before another try was S’,4R; Sd MarDiv D–2 .Jnl; 3@ lfar~iv D–3 made. The landing party finally departed Rrpts; Histl)ir Arct: Sk’ A rra XacOps—111; S’cvcntrentlt Arm!] Ops-11; Rentz, Bo?lgainvilk’ Rabaul on 6 November, the four troop UMItJLc IVurtfi cm. No70mon,s; Aurthur and Cohl- rni:~, .Id MarDivHist. ‘ IMAC c’-2 Jnl; SE Area NavOpa—IZZ, p. 20. 232 ISOLATION OF RABAUL destroyers screened by a cruiser and eight white paint on the bow.== In the early escort destroyers. dawn mist, such resemblance in silhouette Shortly after midnight, the transport was enough to allay the suspicions of the group entered the objective area, but the sentries. once the alarm was sounded, first landing attempt was hurriedly aban- artillery pieces of the 12th Marines and doned when Alliecl ships were discovered coast defense guns—including the 90mm blocking tihe way. The destroyers headed ant iaircraf t bat teries-of the 3d Defense north again, then back-tracked closer to Battalion were turned on the enemy barges the shoreline for a second try. This time and landing beaches.13 the troop destroyers managed to unload Instead of landing as a cohesive unit, the troops about two miles from the however, the Japanese raiding force found beaches. The landing force demanded itself scattered over a wide area, a victim protective gunfire from the destroyers, but of the darkness and the same surf troubles the Japanese skippers, considering the that earlier had plagued the Marines. Allied fleet nearby, paicl little heed. The Troops were distributed on either side of troops, loaded in 21 ramp boats, cutters, the Laruma and were unable to reassemble and motor boats, 10 ~vere landed at dawn quickly. The ,Japanese w~re faced with near the Laruma River, just outside the the problem of attacking with the forces left limits of the lMAC perimeter. on hand or waiting to reorganize into tac- First indication that a Japanese coun- tical units. LTnder fire already, decid- termanding was in progress came from one ing thzt further delay would be useless, of the ships at anchor which reported the enemy began the counterattack almost. sighting what appeared to be a Japanew fit once. Less than 100 enemy soldiers made the first, assault. barge nbout four miles north of Cape The 3d Battalion, %h Marines (I,ieu- Torokina.” Before a.PT boat could race tenant Colonel Wxlter .4smuth, ,Jr.) — out to check this report, 3d Marine Divi- occupying the left-flank positions while sion troops on that flank of the beachhead waiting to be moved to the Cape Torokina confirmed the fact that enemy barges were area—drew the assignment of stopping the landing troops at scattered points along enemy counterthrust. Artillery support the shoreline and that the Marines were fire was placed in front of the perimeter engaging them. and along the beach. At 0820, Com- The first landings were made without pxny K, 3/9, with a platoon from regimen- opposition. A Marine antitank platoon, tal weapons company attached, moved for- sited in defensive positions along the ward to blunt the Japanese counterattack. beach, did not open fire immediately be- About 150 yards from the main line of re- cause of confusion as to the identity of the sistance ( MI>R ), the advancing Marines landing craft. The Marines who wit- nit the front of the enemy force. The nessed tl~e landings said that the Japanese ,Japznesej seeking cover from the artillery ramp boats looked exactly similar to fire, lmd dug in rapidly and, by taking ad- American boats, including numbers in “ Ibid. “ I,t(lol .Jack Tabor ltr to CMC, dtd 7Jun48 lo,~(1~J[a~n~o11-~.Jn 1, 7Nov+M. ( Rougainville Monograph Comment File, HistBr, ‘1Ibid. HQMC) . HOLDING THE BEACHHEAD 233 vantage of abandoned foxholes and em- gan— to mrive. .4t 1315, the 1st Battalion placements of the departed 1/9 and 2/9, of the 3d Marines in reserve positions in had establisl~ed a hasty but effective de- the left sector was ordered into the fight. fensive position. Whi]e Company K held the Japanese Heavy fighting broke out immediately, engaged, Company B of 1/3 moved across the Japanese firing light machine guns the MLR on the left flank and passed from well-concealed fortifications covered through Company K to take up the fight. by ~ut.omatie rifle fire from tree snipers. At the same time, Company C of 1/3 Agzinst this blaze of fire, the Marine com- moved forward on the right. The 9th pany’s attack stalled. The left platoon Marines’ company withdrew to the MLR was pinned down almost at once, and, leaving the battle to 1/3, now commanded when the right and center platoons tried by Major ,Jolm P. Brody. In the five to envelop the defensive positions, the hours that Company K resisted the Japa- dense jungle and enemy fire stopped their nese countermanding, it lost 5 killed and advance. The Japanese resistance in- 13 wounded, 2 of whom later died. creased as reinforcements from the re- The two companies of 1/3 found the mainder of tl~e countermanding force bE- going no easier. The Japanese were well- 234 ISOLATION OF RABAUL hidden, with a high proportion of machirie the main forces during the day. one pla- guns and automatic weapons, and the Ma- toon from Company K, 3/9, scouting the rine attack was met shot for shot and upper Larurna River region, ambushed a grenade for grenade. In some instances, pursuing ,Japanese patrol several times Marines knocked out. machine gun em- before escaping into the interior. This placements that were almost invisible in platoon returned to the main lines about the thick jungle at distances greater than 30 hours Iater with one man wounded and five yards. Tanks moved up to help with one man missing after inflicting a number the assault, and the Mmrine advance inched of cmualties on the enemy landing force. along as the 3’i’mm canister shells ~~nother outpost patrol from company stripped foliage from the enemy positions. M, 3/9, was cut off on the beach between High explosive shells, fired nearly point two enemy forces. Unfortunately, the blank, erased many of the enemy enlplace- radio of the artillery officer with the patrol ments, and in some cases the HE shells- did not function, and so support could not striking iropwoocl trees—knocked enemy be summoned. suipels out, of the branches. The artillery officer found his way back Late in the afternoon, the advance was to the main lines where he directed an halted and a heavy artillery concentration, artillery mission that landed perfectly on in preparation for a full-scale attack by the Japanese position to the left. The the 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, was placed patrol then moved toward the division on enemy defenses in front of the Marines. main lines, only to find the beach blocked The artillery fire raged through the enemy by enemy forces opposing Company ~. ~ positions; and to keep the Japanese from message scratched on the beach 14called an seeking cover and safety in the area be- air spotter’s attention to the patrol’s tween the artillery fire znd the Marine plight, and, late that afternoon, two tank 1ines, Companies B and C placed mortar lighters dashed in to the beach to pick fire almost on top of their own positions. up the patrol. Sixty men were evacuated The attack by 1/21 (Lieutenant, Colonel successfully after killing an estimated 35 Ernest W. Fry, Jr. ) was set for 1700 on Japanese. Only two of the Marines had the 7t~ but the effective artillery-mortar been wounded. fire and the approaching darkness post- T’wo other Marine groups became iso- poned the attack until the following morn- lated in the fighting along the perimeter. ing. Fry’s battalion, which landed on One platoon from 1/3, scouting the ene- Puruatz the previous day, was moved to my’s flank position, slipped through th~ the mainland to be available for sLIch re- jungle and passed by the enemy force serve work after the Japanese struck. The without being observed. Choosing to head battalion spent the night, behind the 1/3 for the beach instead of the interior, the perimeter, which, by the end of 7 Novem- platoon struggled to the coast. There the ber, was several hundred yards past the patrol cleaned its weapons with gasoline original perimeter position of 3/9 that f roxn a wrecked barge, and spent the night morning. in the jungle. The next morning, the at- The enemy’s action in lznding at scat- tention of an Allied plane was attracted tered points along the shoreline resulted in several Marine units being cut off from “ Ibid. HOLDING THE BEACHHEAD 235 and within anhourth eplatoon-w aspicked taken refuge in the Laruma River area. up by a tank lighter and returned to the There was no further enemy activity on n~ain lines.1~ The other isolated unit, a the left, flank oft he perimeter, and, at noon lJ:ltrol froln Coirlp:\lly 13, was cutoff from of that, day, control of the sector passed to the rest of the battalion during the fighting the 14%11 Infantry Regiment of the 37th and spent the night of 7—8l\”ovenlber be- Division, wl~ich l]a(] arrived the preceding hind the enemy’s lillm without detection. day. The battalion from the 9th Marines on tile nmrning of 8 h-oven]ber, after moved to the right flank, and 1/3 returned a X)-minute preparation by five batteries to regimental reserve in the 3d Marines of artillery allgnlented by lnachine gllllst area. Fry’s battalion, holding down the mort m-s, ancl antitank guns, 1}?1 passed left-flank position, remained under oper- through the lines of the 1/3 conl])anies ational control of the 148th Regiment and began the ~tta(’k. Light fnuks, pro- until other units of the 37th Division tected by the infantrymen, spearhe:~clecl arrived. the front. Only a few clamd survivors The .Japanese attempt to destroy the of two concentrated artillery pl’eparations IMAC forces by countermanding had contesteci the advance , and these were ended in abject failure. The landing killecl or captured. More tlmn 250 dea(l force, woefully small to tackle a bristling ,Japane se, some of them L-illeclthe previons defensive position, had only limited day, were found in the area,” The bat- chances for success, and these were crushed tal ion f mm the 2?1st Marines moved about by the prompt action of Company K, 3/9, 1,500 yards throllgb the jungle parallelil]g and the rapid employment of the avail- the shoreline. No opposition vas encoun- able reserve forces, 1/3 and 1/21. tered. ‘That afternoon, 1/21 established a Estimates differ as to the size of the defensive line behind an extensive la- raiding unit which the ,Japanese sent goc)ll “ and sent out strong patrols on mop- against a force they believed numbered no up clnties. There was no enemy cwntart. more than 5,000 men. Japanese records The following morning, 9 November, ii~clicate that, 850 men were landed, but the area between the Marine positions and IMi3 C intelligence ofiqers believed that no the Laruma River was bombed and strafecl more than 475 Japanese soldiers were by clive bombers from Munda. The air thrown against the defensive perimeter. strike completed the annihilation of the Most of these were killed in the artillery ,Japanese landing force. Pltrols from ~}iLrrageS and the air strike on 7–9 No- 1/21 later found the boclies of many Jap- vember. The landing site was an unfor- anese in the area, apparently survivors of tunate choice, also. The ,Japanese had no the attacks of 7 and 8 November who had idea of the exact location of the Allied beachhead and believed it to be farther ‘5 Maj Robert D. Kennedy Itr to CMC, cltd east around Cape Torokina. The landing 21 May-48 ( Bou~ainville Monogr:tph Comment File, Hist13r, HQMC ). was not plannecl for an area so close to the ‘6 Two different counts are given for enemy beachhead. With all tactical integrity lost, c;lsualties, .?d .l[ar~ i?? I R, p. ‘i. gives 234 enemy forced to attack before they were ready dead : 1$1.4 C AR-II, p. 9, gives 277 enemy dead. “ This enga~ementis mLledthe Battle of Koro- :Ll~d reorganized, the ,Japanese were handi - mokinaLagoon in someamounts. ~:~PPedfrom the fi~t. 236 ISOLATION OF RABAUL .4nother factor in the defeat was the path by raider companies, and, by 5 No- Japanese inability to coordinate this coun- vember, the Marines hacl established a terattack with a full-scale attack on the op- strong trail block about 300 yards west of posite side of the perimeter, although this the junction of the Piva-Numa Numa was the original intention of the counter- trails. Although the responsibility for manding. The enemy’s error of carrying the defense of this sector now belonged to situation maps and operation orders into the 9th Marines, the i?d Raider Battalion combat was repeated in the Laruma River still maintained the trail block. IJntil the landing. Within hours of the attack night of 5–6 November, there had been no by 1/21 on 8 November, IM.AC intelli- interference from the enemy except occa- gence oficers had the Japanese plan of sional sniper fire. That night,, with Com- maneuver against the entire beachhead and pany E of the Xi Raiders manning the were able to recommend action to thwart defensive position, the Japanese struck the enemy strategy. twice in sharp attacks. Company E man- aged to repulse both attacks, killing 10 PZVA TRAIL 13ATTLE “ ,Japanese, but during the fight an undeter- mined number of enemy soldiers managed The enemy pressure on the right flank of to evade tl~e trail block and infiltrate to the perimeter began as a series of small the rear of the raiders. probing attacks along the Piva Trail lead- The following day was quiet., but antici- ing into the beachhead fronting Cape To- pating further attempts by the Japanese rokina. Japanese activity on this flank, to steamroller past the road block, the 2d in contrast to the countermanding effort, and 3d Raider Battalions, under regimen- was entirely expected. Since D-Day, the tal control of the 2d Raider Regiment, 2d Raider Battalion with Company M of were mored into position to give ready the 3d Raider Battalion attached had support of the road block. The raiders slowly but steadily pressed inland astride remainecl att,mhed to the %h Marines, and the trail leading from the Buretoni Mis- Colonel Craig continued to control opera- sion towards the Piva River. This trail, tions of both regiments.” hardly more than a discernible pathway The first enemy thrust came during the through the jungle, was the main link be- early part of the afternoon of 7 Novem- tween the Cape Torokina area and t,he Nu- ber, shortly after Company H of the 2d ma Numa trail; and if the Japanese Raiders had moved up to the trail block to mounted a serious countw-stroke, it would relieve Company F which had been in po- probably be aimed along this route. sition the night before. A force of about Advance defensive positions were one company struck the defensive block pushed progressively deeper along this first; but Company H, aided by quick and effective 81mm mortar fire from 2/9 in the “ Unless other-wise noted, the material in this defensive perimeter to the rear of the trail section is derived from : IMA o AR_II; I.WA c block, turned the enemy’s assault. One C–2 Rcpts; IMAC C–2 .3??1; $d MarDiv Combat- platoon from Company E, 2d Raiders, then Rept; .!3dMar13iv AR; 8d MarDiv D–2 t3AR; .!ld .lfarDiv D–3 h?epts; HistDiv Acct; Rentz, Bou- rushed to the trail block to reinforce Com- gainvillea and the Northern S’olomon.s; Aurthur and Cohlmia, $d MarD ivHi8t. “ Cruigltr. HOLDING THE BEACHHEAD 237 pa.ny H until another raider unit, Com- gun fire. By 1100, the trail block was en- pany G, was in position to help defend the veloped on all sides by a blaze of gunfire trail. The enemy, unable to penetrate the as the Marine units sought to push the Marine position after several furious at- attackers back. Company G, solidly tacks, withdrew about 1530, and was ob- astride the trail, bore the brunt of the served digging in around Piva Village, enemy’s assault. some 1,000 yards east. The ,Japanese force Shortly after 1100, Company E moved was estimated at about battaliol~ strength. from a reserve area into the trail block Several small-scale attacks \vere start- ant] took LIppositions on the right of Com- ecl later that afternoon by the Japanese, pany G. The platoons of Company E but each time the two raider companies were then extended to the right rear to re- called for mortar concentrations from fusg that flank. At this time, the com- ~/~ :llld t]le ass:ll~lt,s were beaten back. bined fronts of G and E Companies astride One determined attempt by the ,Japanese the Piva Trail measured about 400 yards. to cut the trail between the road block and An hour later, at noon, Company L of the the lMAC perimeter was repulsed by 3d Raiders also advanced from a reserve Company G. During the night, the enemy area and stationed itself on the left flank rained !lOmm mortar fire on the trail block of Company G. The Marine position now and sent infiltrating groups into the Ma- resembled a rough horseshoe, with Com- rine lines, but the two raider companies, panies E, G, and L holding the front and sticking to their foxholes, inflicted heavy flanks and Companies H and M connect- casualties by withholding return fire until ing the trail block to t,he main _fMAC the enemy was at point-blank range. One perimeter. Marine wm killed. Flanking movements by either the at- Early the next morning, 8 November, tackers or the defending Marines were im- Company M of the 3d Raiders hurried for- possible because of the swampy ground on ward to relieve Company H while Com- either side of the trail, and two attempts pany G took over the responsibility for by enemy groups to envelop the flanks of the trail block. Company M took L~pposi- the Ilarine position ended as near-frontal tions behind the trail block and deployed attacks with heavy casualties to the attack- with two platoons on the left side of the ing troops. In each instance, the Japanese trail and one platoon on the right. Be- were exposed to the direct fire of a Ma- fore Company H could leave the area, rine company in defensive positions. however, enemy activity in front of Com- Both attacks were beaten back. pany G increased and returning patrols At 1300, with the enemy assault per- report ed that a large.-scale attack could ceptibly stalled, the 2d Raiders at- be expected at any time. Reluctant to tempted a counterattack. Company F, re- leave a fight, Company II remained at the turned to the trail block from a reserve trail block. ‘rbe ,Japanese assault, was not area, together with Company E began a long in coming. Elements of two ba.t- flanking maneuver from the right. After talions, 1ater identified as the Ist and 3d struggling through the swamps for only [;attalion.~ of the 2.70?Inf antmj from the 50 yards, the two raider companies struck 13uin area, began pressing forward be- a large force of ,Japanese, and the fight for hind a heavy mortar barrage and machine possession of the trail began once more. 238 ISOIATION OF RABAUL m dT BATTLE FOR PIVA TRAIL + 2d RAIDER REGIMENT .1, 8-9 NOVEMBER 1000 0 1000 YARDS Y%,6 ,3 ,0 Q JO a~ese , ~1 r hckow” cm m. t ; l’, .,. R ~ )] flankln’g ottocks -. .4, J I / ( AI-1(“-, > The enemy soldiers, attempting another lJrelmred 1ines, and the Marines began to counterattack, ran full into the fire of withdraw through the trail block. Com- Company G’s machine guns and once again pany F covered the disengagement and took heavy casualties. Half-tracks of the beat back one final enemy attempt before %11Marines Weapons Company, with two the withdrawal was completed. The supporting tanks, moved forward to help raider casualties were 8 killed and 27 the Marine attack gain impetus, but the wounded. The Marines estimated that at thick jungle and the muddy swamps de- least 125 Japanese had been killed in the feated the attempts of the machines to re- day’s fighting. inforce the front lines. Unable to help, That night, General Turnage directed the machines began evacuating wounded. Colonel Craig to clear the enemy from the By 1600, the fight, at the trail block was a area in front of the 9th Marines and the stalemate. The Marines were unable to trail block so that the perimeter could be nlove forward, and the enemy force had advanced. Craig, planning an attack with been effectively stalled. Another ,Jap- an extensive artillery preparation, decided anese counterattack. noticeably less fierce to use Shapley’s 2d Raider Regiment than the first, was turned back with addi- again because the raiders were already tional casllalties to the enemy. familiar with the terrain. The attack was With darkness approaching, the raider to be supported by 2/9 with a section of companies were ordered to return to their tanks and half-tracks attached. HOLDING THE BEACHHE.4D 239 At 0620 the following morning, 9 No- Neither the tanks nor the half-tracks vember, the raider units returned to the could negotiate the muddy wrridor to re- trail block area which had been held over- inforce the Marine attiack. Unable to night by Company M and a fresh unit, flank the enemy position, the raiders could Company I. The two assault companies move forward only on the strength of a deployed behind Company I with Com- concentrated frontal attack. The fight along the corridor became a toe-to-toe pany L taking positions on the left of the slugging match, the Marines and Jap- trail and Company F on the right side anese screaming at each other in the midst of the trail. At, 0730, the artillery pre- of continual mortar bursts and gunfire. parat ion by 1/12 began to pound into the Slowly at first, then with increasing tJapanese positions ahead of the trail speed, the Marine firepower overcame that block. More than 800 rounds were fired of the Japanese. The raider attack, stalled as close as 250 yards from the Marine lines at first, began to move. to prepare the way for the attack by the Threatened by a desperate enemy count- two raider companies. eraction on the right flank, Colonel Craig The Japanese, though, had not waited —personally directing the attack of the to be attacked. At first light, the enemy raiders—moved Company K into the gap started strong action to overrun the trail between Companies L and F and deployed block and moved to within 100 yards of the Weapons Company of the 9th Marines the Marine position. There they had on the right rear of the trail block for ad- established a similar trail block with both ditional support. These moves stopped flanks resting cm an impassable swamp. the ,Japanese counterattack on that flank. Other enemy soldiers, who had crept up to Later, another platoon from Company M within 25 yards of the front. lines during moved into the front lines to lend its fire- the night, remained hidden until the artil- power to the raider advance. lery fires ceased and the raider companies Suddenly, It 1230, the .Japznese resist- began the attack. Then the Japanese ance crumbled and the raider companies opened up with short-range machine gun pressed forward against only scattered fire and automatic rifle fire. snipers and stragglers. By 1500, the junc- The enemy’s action delayed part of tion of the Piva-Numa Numa Trail was Company F, with the resl~lt tlmt, when reached, and, since no enemy had been seen Company L began the attack at 0800, only for more tlmn m l~our, the assault units half of Company F moved forward. Co- halted. nefensive lines were dug, and pa- ordination between the two attacking trols began moving through the jungle and units was not re~ained, and, by 0930, the i~loll~ the Numa N-urea Trail. There was raider attack had covered only a few no contact, amd a large enemy bivouac yards. The two companies were forced to area mlong the Nurn,a Numa Trail was dis- move along a narrow front between the covered abandoned. More than 100 dead swamps, and the enemy fire from a large .Japanese were found after the attack. number of machine guns and “knee nlor- Tile Marines lost 12 killed and 30 wounded tars” stalled the Marine at,tack, in the operation. 240 ISOLATION OF RABAUL An air strike set for early the next began fanning out toward the Piva River morning, 10 November, was delayed for a ancl along the trail, seeking the enemy. short time by the late return of a patrol The IMAC beachhead, by the end of the from Company K, 3d Raiders, which had day, was extended another 800 yards in- been on an all-night scouting mission to land and contact had been established with Piva Village. The patrol reported no con- the 3d Marines to the left. tacts. Twelve torpedo bombers from Ma- Tile 2d Raider Regiment, which had rine squadrons VMT13-1K3 and –233 based ttken the full force of the enemy’s attack at Munda then bombed ancl str~fed the on the right flank, returned to bivouac areu from the Marine position to l?iva Vil- positions within the perimeter as the di- lage. The front lines were marked by vision reserve force. In the space of three white smoke grenades and a Marine air days, the threat to the beachhead from liaison party guicled the pilots in their either flank had been wiped out by the im- strike. The first bomb fell within 150 mediate offensive reactions of the 3d Ma- yards of the markers. A 50-yard strip on rine Division. The attempted mouse-trap botl~ sides of the Numa Numa Trail was play by the tTapanese to draw the Marine worked over by the planes, and, at 101,5, forces off balance towards the Korornokina the infantry began moving toward Piva flank, tQ set the stage for a strike from the Village.zo Piva River area, had been erased by well Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Cush- conducted and aggressive attacks sup- man’s 2/9, followed closely by 1/9 com- manded by Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Sa - porteci by artillery and air. The landing bater, passed through the raider companies force of nearly 475 ,Japanese on the left and moved along the trail. The xdvance flank had been almost annihilated, and at was unopposed, although scattered enemy lexst 411 THE COCONUT GROV.E21 could be constructed in the area scouted. The survey party was unchallenged by the The second major battle in the vicinity enemY, although a combat patrol the fol- of the Numa Numa Trail began after a lowing day clashed with a Japanese patrol two-day lull following the seizure of Piva near the same area. Villzge. During that interval, only minor Recause the numerous swamps and diffi- skirmishes occurred, most of them inad- cult jungle terrain prohibited the possibil- vertent brushes between Marine scouting ity of extending the beachhead immedi- patrols and ,Japanese stragglers. Al- ately to cover the proposed airfield site, though contact with the main force of the General Turnage decided that a combat enemy had been lost, there was 1ittle doubt outpost, capable of sustaining itself and that the enemy was still present, in large defending the selected area until the front numbers north of the Piva River. The lines could be lengthened to include it, Mb Marines, holding the area around Piva should be established at the junction of Village, concentrated on improving the the ~uma ~uma and East-TVest Trails. supply routes into its position. Defensive On 12 November, the division commander installations and barriers were also ex- directed the 21st Marines (colonel Evans tended and strengthened. O. Ames) to send a company-sized patrol As the beachhead slowly widened be- up the Numa NTuma Trail the following hind the 3d and %h Marines, airfield re- morning. This group was to move to the connaissance efforts were extended, and, junction of the two trails and reconnoiter during the time that, the trail block fight- each trail for a distance of 1,000 yards. ing was underway, a group of h’avy and This would delay any Japanese attempts Marine engineers with construction batt- to occupy the area, and would prevent alion personnel were busy making a per- having to fight m extended battle later for sonal ground reconnaissance of an area its possession. which had earlier been selected as a possi- At this time, the 21st Marines had two ble airfield site. This location, about mid- battalions ashore and a third due to land way between the Koromokina and Piva within the next few days. Fry’s battalion Rivers, was about 5,500 yards inland or was still in support of the 37th Division about 1,500 yards in advance of the 3d on the left, and 2f121 (Lieutenant Colonel Marine Division positions. Eustace R. Smoak) was then in bivouac The engineers, accompanied by a strong near Cape Torokina. Smoak’s battalion, combat patrol, managed to cut two 5,000 - with the regimental command post group, foot survey lanes nearly east to west across had arrived on 11 November. Alerted for the front of the lMAC perimeter. The act ion, 2/21 moved to a new bivouac area patrol then returned to report that at,least about 400 yards behind the 9th Marines one bomber strip and one fighter strip and waited for orders. On the night of 12 November, the divi- “ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this sion chief of staff (Colonel Robert E. sectiou is derived f rem.: IM.40 AR–II, IMA C C–2 Blake) directed that the size of the patrol I?epts; IMA C C–2 Jnl; 3d MaTDiv CombatRept; be increased to two companies with a suit- $d MarDiv .4R; 8d ,VarDiv D–3 Rept.s; Hi8tDiv Acct; Rentz, Boagain.wille and the Northern Solo- able comrnxnd group and artillery observ- ??um.s; Aurthur and Cohlmia, .?d MaTDivHi8t. ers to establish a strong outpost at the trail 242 ISOLATION Ol? RABAUL m-m-m-mini 2d BATTALION, 21st MARINES 13-14 NOVEMBER 500 0 500 1000 YARDS ----- MAY Iu junction. Aware of the importance of the force located in an overa,gown coconut mission, Smoak requested and received per- palm grove about 200 yards south of the mission to use his entire battalion in the trail junction which was the objective. assignment. Company E deployed to return the fire, At 0630 the following morning, 13 No- but mortar shells and machine gun fire vember, Company E as the advance unit restricted movement and casualties began of 2/21 moved to the assembly area behind to mount. the 9th Marines but was ordered to hold The enemy had won the race for the up at this point. An hour later, with the trail junction. remainder of the battalion still en~~ged in Although it is possible that the Japa- drawing ammunition, water, and rations, nese had been in an organized position in Company E was directed to begin the ad- the coconut, grove for some time, it is un- vance. The remainder of the battalion -would follow as soon as possible. An ar- likely that the airfield reconnaissance tillery observer party, attached to the bat- patrol would have been allowed to operate talion, failed to arrive until after Com- without, attack if such were the case. A pany E had departed. better possibility is that the Japanese The rifle company cleared the 9th moved into the position coincidental with Marines perimeter at 0800, and three houre the decision by Turnage to establish an later was ambushed by a sizeable enemy outpost there. HOLDIh”G THE BEACHHEAD 243 Smoak’s battalion, at that time some battalions knocked out, Smoak ordered 1,200 yards to the rear of Company E, l~is companies to disengage and withdraw received word of the engagement at 1200. from the coconut grove. A defensive line The battalion, pulling in its slower mov- was established several hundred yards ing flank security patrols, hurried up the from the enemy position. tr~il toward the tight. By 1245.2 /21 was Shortly after the Marines began to dig about 200 yarcls behind Company E and a in along the trzil, a runner from Company nllmber of disturbing and conflicting re- F returned to the lines to report that Com- ports were being received. The battalion pany F—failing to make contact with conunal~(ler was told tl~at Company E was Company E—had continued into tihe pinneci clown by heavy fire and slowly ,Japanese position and had penetrated the being annihilated. A personal reconnais- enemy lines. The company had taken sance by an officer indicated that the com- heavy casualties, was disorganized, and pany had taken severe casualties and seeking to return to the 2/21 lines. Smoak needec{ help immecliately: While artillery orclerecl the runner to guide the company assistance was orciered, Smoak sent, Com- around the ri~rl~tflank of the Marine posi- pany G forward to help the beleaguered tion int o the rear of the lines. The missing Company E, and Company H was ordered company returned, as clirected, about 1745. to set Up 81mnl mortars for additional At 1830, communication with the regi- support. mental CP and the artillery battalions was In the meantime, more conflicting re- rest ored, and artillery support requested. ports were received as to the enemy’s loca- Cone.ent rations from 2/12 were placed on tion and the plight of Company E. As the north, east, and west sides of the bat- might be expected, several of the messages talion’s lines: and the 2d Raider Battalion, bordered on panic. Smoak then moved now attached to the 21st Marines, was his own command group nearer to the fire rushed forward to protect the communica- fight, and sent Company F forward so that tion and supply lines between 2/21 and the Company E could disengage and with- regiment,. There were no enemy attacks draw to protect the battalion’s right flank. and only sporadic tiring during the night. Company G was directed to maintain its The following morning, despite sniper position on the left. fire, all companies established outposts In a matter of moments, the combat and sent out patrols in preparation for a situation deteriorated from serious to criti- coordinated attack with tank support. A cal. Company F failed to make contact scheduled air strike was delayed until the with Company F., the battalion executive last of these patrols were recalled to posi- officer became a casualty, and a gaping hole tions within the Marine lines. At 0905, widened in the Marines’ front lines. Com- the 18 Navy torpedo bombers then on sta- pany E, not as badly hurt, M had been tion began bombing the coconut, grove and first reported, was rushed back into the the area between the enemy position and lines and established contact, with Com- the Marine perimeter. A Marine air- pany G. There was no sign of Company ground liaison team directed the strike. F. At 1630, with communication to the .4rtillery smoke-shells marked the position regimental command post and the artillery for the aviators, who reported that 95 per- 244 ISOLATION OF RABAUL cent of the bombs fell within the target cluding 5 officers) and 39 wounded in the area. Bombs were dropped as near as 100 two days of fighting. yards from the forward Marine foxholes. The 2d Battalion emerged from this bat- Unfortunately, the ground attack was tle as a combat-wise unit. A series of delayed until 1100 by the need to g-et water events, unimportant, on the surface, had to the troops, so that the effect of the air resulted in serious consequences. The at- strike was lost. A break in communica- tack on 13 November with companies com- tions further delzyecl the attack, and new mitted to action successively without prior plans were made for an attack at 1155. A reconnaissance or adequate knowledge of 20-minute artillery preparation followed the situation was not tactically sound. by a rolling barrage preceded the assault. Company E was beyond close supporting At 1155, 2/!21 began moving forward, distance when attacked, and the conflict- Company Eon the left and Company G on ing reports on the number of casualties the right with Companies F and H in re- forced the battalion commander to push serve. Five tanks from Company B, 3d his remaining strength forward as quickly Tank Battalion, were spaced on line with as possible. These units were engaged the two assault, companies. prematurely and without plan. The or- In a short time, the attack had stalled. derly withdrawal on 13th of November, The Japanese soldiers had reoccupied and the prompt cessation of the attack on their positions; and the enemy fire, plus 14 November when control was nearly lost, the noise of the tanks and the rolling bar- was convincing evidenca that 2/21 was rage, resulted in momentary 10SSof attack rapidly gaining combat stability. The control. The tanks, depending upon the last well-coordinated attack was final Marine infantry for vision, lost direction proof. and at one point, were directing fire at Ma- In view of the bitter fighting later, the rines on the flank. One tank was knocked lack of preparatory artillery fires before out of commission by an enemy mine, and Company E began its advance on 12 No- another was stalled by a hit from a large vember has been pointed out as a costly caliber shell. The battalion commander, omission. Actually, had the presence of seeing the confusion, ordered the attack to the extensive and well-organized Japanese cease and the companies to halt in place. position been determined by prior recon- This act restored control, and after the naissance, the support of this valued arm three remaining tanks were returned to a would have been used. Marine command- reserve position, the attack was continued ers were well aware that infantry attack- behind a coordinated front. The enemy ing prepared defenses would sustain positions were overrun, and the defenders heavy casualties unless the assaults were killed. Mop-up operations were com- preceded by an effective combination of pleted by 1530, and a perimeter around the support ing arms—air, artillery, or the position was established. Only about mortars. 40 dead .Japanese were found, although The seizure of the coconut grove area al- the extent of the defensive position indi- lowed the entire beachhead to leap for- cated that the enemy strength had been ward another 1,000 to 1,500 yards. By 15 greater. The Marines lost 20 killed (in- November, the IMAC perimeter extended HOLDING ‘THE BEACHHEAD 245 to the phase line previously established as Division on 13 hTovember, its commander, Inland Defense Line D. Major Generwl Robert S. Beightler, as- sumed command of the ArmY secto,r of the DEFEiV/SE OF TIZE CAPE perimeter. T(2ROKZNA AREA 2’ The enemy’s attempts to bomb the beachhead af&r D-Day”were sporadic and In the first two weeks of operations on uncoordinated. The fighter cover of Com- Bougainvillea, the Marine-.irmy lJerimeter AirSols, which included Marine Fighter had progressed to the point where nothing Squadrons -211,-212,-215, and –221, per- less than an all-out efiort by major Japan- mitted few interlopers to penetrate the ese forces could endanger its contin~~ed tight screen; ancl the Japanese—after the success. From the long and shallow toe- losses taken in the strikes of 1 and 2 No- hold along Empress Augusta Bay on D- vember-could not, mount an air attack of Day, the IM.~C perimeter graduzlly crept sufficient size and numbers to affect the inland until, on 15 3Tovembe.r, it covered beachhead defenders. The enemy air in- an area about 5,000 yards deep with a terference over Cape Torokina was lim- 7,000-yard base along the beach. Included ited to a few night raids, and these were within this (lefensive area were the pro- intercepted by Marine planes from VMF jetted sites of a fighter strip at Torokina (N)-531. and fighte,r and bomber strips near the During the first 15 days of the beach- coconut grove. head, there were 52 enemy alerts, 11 bomb- The expansion of the beachhead and the irigs, and 2 strafing attacks. The only ,, arrival of the first echelons of the 37th Di - significant, damage was done in a daylight visiol~ marked a change in the command raid of 8 November during the unloading of the troops ashore. General Turnage of a follow-up echelon of troops and sup- had been in command of the 3d Marine 1>1ies. More than 100 Japanese fighters Division and all IMAC troops on the and carrier bombers jumped the 28 badly beachhead since D-Day; 2’ but after the outnumbered AirSols planes, and, during arrival of the. ~irmy troops, IMAC once the air melee over the beachhead, the trans- more took up the. command of all forces port. FuWr was bombed. Five men were ashore. On 9 November, Vandegrift re- killed and 20 wounded. A total of 26 linquished command of the Marine am- ,Japanese planes were claimed by the phibious corps to Mzjor (ieneral Roy S. Allied fighters. Geiger, another Guadalcanal veteran, and Eight .4irSols planes, in- returned to the united States. With the cluding one from VMF-212, ware lost. arrival of the second echelon of the 37th In the first days of the beachhead, the responsibility for turning bqck any coor- WKTnless otherwise noted, the material in this dinated sea and air operations by the Japa- section is derived from : ComSoPac A’aw& WarIl; nese rested with the overworked cruiser- Thir{7F’lt NarrRrpt; IJI.1 C! .4%11; 3d MorDiv (70uabatRept; Ifi8tDiv .4 cct; Rentz, Bo+tgainville destroyer forces of Admiral Merrill and (Lnd the A70rtlLern A’olornons; Aurthur and Cohl- the ~lanes. of ComAirSols. Admiral Hal- mia, 3d MarDiuHist; Isley and Crowl, Murines seyl weighing the risk of carriers in enemy and Amphibious War; Morison, Breaking the waters against the need to cripple further l vember sent Admiral Frederick C. Sher- few ships in the harbor. The two raids man on a dawn raid against N’ew Britain encled the Japanese attempts to destroy with the carriers Smwto,qa ancl Princeton.. the Bougainvillea beachhead by concerted Despite foul weather, the carrier plane.s- air and sea action. 97 in all—found a hole in the clouds and While the perimeter had been slowly poured through to strike the enemy fleet pushed inland, the arrival of additional at anchor in Simpson Harbor. The planes troops and supplies strengthened the re.portecl damage to four heavy and two lMAC position. By the time of the ar- light cruisers and two destroyers. rival of the third echelon on 11 N“overnber, Six days late,r, three carriers (Essex, beach conditions were more favorable and Bunker $lill, and lrulepencZence ) on tem- facilities to allow quick unloading were” porary loan from h’imitz’ Central Pacific developed. The third and fourth echelons fleet struck from the east while Sherman’s were unloaded and the ships headed back force hit from the south. The 11 Novem- towards Guadalca.nal within the space of ber strike found few targets. The enemy a day. During the period 1–13 NTovem- fleet was absent from Rabaul; but the car- ber, the following troops, equipment, and rier planes knockecl 50 Japanese intercep- supplies were delivered to the beach- tors out of the air and worked over the head: 24 Date Echelon Ships Troops cargo tons 1 Nov...... 1 8APA,4AKA ...... 14, 321 6, 177 6NOV ------2 8 APD, 8LST ------3, 548 5, 080 8Nov ------2A 4APA,2AKA ______.5. 715 3, 160 11 Nov ------3 8APD,8LST ...... 3,599 5, 785 13 Nov ------4 4APA,2AKA- ...... 6, 678 2, 935 Total ______33, 861 23, 137 z~III PtlibFOr AR, pp. 11–12. CHAPTER 5 Advance to Piva Forks the Allies would occupy a base of opera- tions and then at the first opportunity at- Throughout the first weeks of opera- tempt to occupy the Buin sector with the tions on Bougainvillea, there was no indica- main force while striking the Buka sector tion that the Japanese were aware of the with other elements. In such a case, the true intentions of the I Marine Amphib- Seventeen th Amy explained, it was better ious Corps and its activities at Cape Toro- to intercept, such movements from pre- kina. Had the enemy guessed that the pared positions in the Buin and Buka sec- .~llied ]Jurl)ose l~as 1inlit ecl only to the tors than to abandon these established construction and defense of several air- positions to counterattack at Torokina. 2 fields and a naval base in preparation for This may have been wishful thinking. further operations, the Japanese might Hyakutake was well aware of his own have objected more strenuously to the situat ion—there were no good roads lead- presence of uninvited co-tenants. But the ing into the Allied position over which the Seventeenth Army, hesitating to commit Se~’enAwath Army could mount a counter- the forces available at Buin before being offensive, and barges were in short supply. more certain of Allied plans, held back. Two attempts to wipe out the beachhead The lack of immediate and continued had resulted in crushing defeats, and the aggressive action against the lM.AC Navy’s ill-timed Ro offensive hxd like- beachhead was a sore point between the wise ended wit h heavy losses. Reluc- Japanese sea command in the Southeast tantly, the ,Japanese finally admitted Area and tl~e iyercwteenth .4 rm.y, which what Allied planners had gambled on still chose to take a lighter, more optimis- some time before--that a decisive counter- tic view of the situation than the Navy. stroke against the beachhead could not be .4dmiral Kusaka’s Southeast Area FZeet undertaken for some time. contended that, if the Allies constructed Despite this estimate., the Allies kept a an airfield at Torokina, further ,Japanese wary eye on the enemy dispositions in the operations on Bougainvillea would be im- Ikmgainville area. .kerial reconnaissance practical and sea movements impossible. General Hyakutake, though, argued that to the north disclosed that the Japanese were constructing extensive defenses in the ‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this 13uka area to keep their one remaining air- section is derived from : Thir(71’tt ATarrRrpt; field in operation. The Allies reasoned IIIIVI jl)l’or Not,~3 WarI) ; IMA C .4R–11 ; 1.lf.4 C that if the enemy was committed to a de- C–2 li’rpt,s ; Z.1f.1C P–2 ,Jn7 : F[i.st Diz~ .4 cct ; SE .4rw NavOp,v-111; Scre?? twnth .4 rm?l Ops—11; fense of 13ukn, then he was not likely to Rentz, I{ougainvi77? an(7 tll f>Nortf! mw Solomon.?: Morison, Breaking t?!c Riwlarlcs llarricr. ‘ Sli! .4rea NavOps—IZI. pp. 3*3I. 691–360 0—63—17 247 !248 draw troops from there for an offensive in the Empress Augusta Bay area. This re. moved one threat to the beachhead. A number of changes in the disposition The main danger to the Allied position, of IMAC units within the perimeter had however, w-as from the south where the been made during the widening of the bulk of the 6th ~Lvkz’on and, therefore, beachhead to the 15 hTovember line. After most of the fleventeenth Army was lo- General Geiger took command of the Cakcl. The Japanese, moving by barge Marine amphibious corps, all units tem- from Buin to Mawareka could strike over- porarily attached to the 3d Marine Divi- land from that point. The meager trail sion for the landing reverted to IMAC net from Mosigetta and Mawareka was control once more, and defensive installa- the logical route of approach to Cape tions within the beachhead were improved Torokina, and reliable intelligence reports and strengthened. indicated that these paths could be trav- The Marine 3d Defense Battalion, sup- eled by pack animals as well as by troops. ported by long-range radar installations, This gave the ,Japanese the added capa- continued to provide antiaircraft and bility of packing artillery into the area seacoast artillery protection for the beach- to support an attack. The overhanging head and offshore islands. .411 field ar- jungle foliage would screen any move- tillery units—both Marine Corps and ments of troops and make the task of de- Army—were placed under central com- tection more diflicult. mand as an IMAC artillery group to be A coastwatcher patrol kept the trails to available as massed fires for interdiction, Mosigetta and Mowareka under close sur- neutralization, counterbattery, beach de- veillance. Daily air searches and photo- fense, or attack support. Brigadier Gen- graphs were made of the beaches in south- eral Leo M. Kreber of the 37th Division ern Empress Auagusta Bay to detect was designated commander of the artillery evidence of enemy landings during the group. A corps reserve was established by night. In addition, captured enemy let- withdrawing most of Lieutenant Colonel ters, diaries, notebooks, and plans were Shapley’s 2d Raider Regiment from the processed and interpreted by intelligence front lines. This reserve was then held in readiness for counterattacks in any sec- officers for further information. These tor of the perimeter or for quick rein- documents and interrogations of a few forcement of the front line defenses. prisoners gave a comprehensive order of battle for the immediate area and some Following the battle of the Coconut Grove, contact with the main forces of approximation of forces. The Japanese apparently had no immediate plans for the enemy was lost once more and the period was one of relative inactivity by a counterst roke. The constant and alert protection of the combat air patrol ‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this over Bougainvillea and the expanded and section is derived from: ZMAC AR–II; .$d Ma?= increased activity of .illied ships in south- Dio CombatRept; .!d Marlliv D–3 Jnl; Sd Mar- ern Bougainvillea waters undoubtedly Div D–3 Rept8; .!ld MarDiv D–h Rept8; .!Yd MarDiv ServTrps Rept; Rentz, Bougainvillea and played a major role in discouraging the the A’orthern Solwno?w; Aurthur and Cohlmia, enemy from exercising this capability. $d MarDivHist. ADVANCE TO PIVA FORKS 249 the Japanese. Perimeter units of the 3d to enemy opposition, continued through- Marine Division and the 37th Division out the campaign until March 1944. continued active combat. patrolling, but The Marine half of the perimeter at this there were few enemy contacts. The ,Jap- time, in contrast to the area held by the anese had apparently withdrawn. The 37th Division, was still marked by lagoons activity by the lMAC forces was mainly and swamplands. In most places, the to fix the location of enemy troops and to front lines could be reached only by wad- obtain information on the terrain abed ing through water and slimy mud which in preparation for the continuing ex- was usually knee deep, was often waist pansion of the beachhead. .\fter 15 No- deep, and sometimee was up to the arm vember, these offensive moves ~~ere made pits. The defensive perimeter in the Ma- to improve the defensive positions of the rine sector actually consisted of a num- perimeter, and the attack objectives were ber of isolated positions, small islands of usually just lines drawn on a map a cer- men located in what was known locally tain distance from an established position. as “dry swamp’’-meaning that it was These moves to new phase 1ines were more only shoe-top deep.’ The frequent down- in the nature of an active defense. pours discouraged attempts to dig foxholes The 37th Infantry Division, during this or gun emplacements. Machine guns were period, found the expansion of the perim- lashed to trees, and Marines huddled in eter in its sector much lew difficult than the water. In this sultry heat and jungle the Marines did in their sector. There slime, travel along the line was extremely was little enemy activity in front of the difficult, and resupply of the frontline 148th and 129th Infantry Regiments after units was a constant problem.5 the Koromokina engagement, and the Improvement of the supply lines to the Army units received only glancing blows perimeter positions was the greatest con- from scattered ADVANCE TO PIWl FORKS 251 bomber field was already surveyed, con- transport. Dispersal areas were limited, struction was held up by the Iackof access and there was much needecl work to be roads to the area. The diversion of equ~p- done on access, turn-around, and loop ment and resources to the construction of roads. llut this rutted and muddy road- roads and supply trails instead of airfields way joined the two sectors of the beach- handicapped the work which had begun on head to the (lumps along the shoreline and the fighter strip at Torokina and delayed greatly aided the supply and evacuation the start of the Piva bomber strip, but the problems of the frontline battalions. problem of supply was too pressing to be As the lateral road was cut in front of ignored. 2/3, this battalion advanced about 1,000 By 16 November, the lateral road across yards inland to protect the roadway and to the front of the perimeter was completed cover tile widening gap created between after two weeks of feverish activity. Ihr- the two divisions l>ythe. continual progress ing the time of the Piva Trail and Coconut of 3,/3 toward the Piva River. The road Grove engagements, the 3d Battalion of construction force nnd 3/3 broke out, of the 3d Marines had pushed the construc- the jungk at the junction of the Numa tion of this supply road as fast as the lim- Numa and Piva trails on 16 November, its of men and machines would permit. having connected the lateral road with the The speed was dictated by the need to keep amphibian tractor trails from the Cape pace with the assault battalions which were Torokina area. .klthough rains sometimes seeking the main enemy positions before ~vashe(i out, the crude trailway and mired the Japanese could consolidate forces and trucks often stalled an entire supply op- prepare an established defense in depth. eration, the roadway was assurance that Engineers moved along with the 3d Bat- the IMAC forces could now make another talion as the Marines moved inland. On offensive-defensive advance, confident that more than one occasion, bulldozer opera- the essential supplies would reach the f rent tors had to quit the machines and take lines. cover while Marine patrols skirmished The critical supply situation’ had been with enemy groups in a dispute over the corrected by an nbrupt revision of the orig- right of way. inal plans. The rapidly changing tactical The end product was a rough but pass- circumstances and the redisposition of able one-lane roadwmy which followed the combat, elements along the beachhead left path of least resistance, skirting along the the benches cluttered with all classes of edge of the swampy area. The road began supplies and equipment. .4fter some sem- near the Koromokina beaches, then wound blance of order had been restored, it was inland for several thousand yards before apparent tl~at the landing teams could not cutting to the southeast toward the coco- lmndle and transport their own supplies as nut grove and the Piva River. Small lmd been planned. Tile battalions, strik- streams \vere bridged with hand-hewn ing swiftly at the first-served basis to all units of the I Ma- as possible, then amphibian tractors took rine Amphibious Corps. Rations and am- over. As the battalions advanced, forward munition were picked up by most units at supply points were set up. An attempt the first available source. was made to build up an emergency sup- The first corrective action by the Marine ply Ieyel at each of these forward points. division’s G–4 and the division quarter- The front lines, however, moved ahead so master was to direct that all shore party steadily that usually an untracked jungle dumps revert to division control. A new stretched between the troops and their sup- plan was outlined under which the division ply dumps. The LVTS, when possible, quartermaster assumed responsibility for skipped these forward points to continue control and issue of all supplies in the as close to the front lines as they could dumps and on Puruata Island.’ A divi- manage. sion dump or distribution point was estab- A total of 29 of these LVTS had been lished adjacent to the plantation area on landed with the assault waves on D-Day Cape Torokina. All supplies littering the and more arrived in later echelons. Their beach were recovered and returned to this contribution to the success of the beach- area. Succeeding echelons of supplies and head, however, was in far greater propor- equipment arriving at the bemhhead were tion than their number. Without the 3d also placed in this dump for issue by the Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Ma jor Syl- division quartermaster. vester L. Stephen), the operation as Before the completion of the lateral planned could not have been carried be- road and control of supplies by the divi- yond the initial beachhead stages; and it sion quartermaster, the battalions holding was the work of the LVT companies and the perimeter were supplied on a haphaz- the skill of the amtrac operators that made ard schedule by the versatile amphibian possible the rapid advance of the IMAC tractors. When the new program was ef- forces during the first two weeks. The fected, supplies were virtually leap- tractors broke trails through the swamps frogged forward in a relay system that in- and marshes, ploughing along with vital volved handling of the same stocks as loads of rations, water, ammunition, wea- many as four times. This system, however, pons, medical supplies, engineer equip- provided for an equitable distribution ment, and construction materials. Even of ammU1litiOIl and rations to a]l units. towing the big Athey trailers, the LVTS From the division dump at the beach, sup- were able to move over muddy trails plies were carried to regimental dumps, which defeated all wheeled vehicles; and, which in turn issued to the battalions. in fact, the broad treads of the trailers Trucks carried the supplies as far forward sometimes rolled out and restored rutted sections of roadways so that jeeps could 0when the 37th Division took over its own folIow. sector of the IMAC perimeter,corps took charge .4s might be expected, the maintenance of the duulps On l>uruata and handled suuplY of these machines under such conditions distribution to both fmntline divisions. In ~et- of operation became a problem. Many tin~ needwl su~pliesup to forward elements.the amtracs were in use continually with vir- ~rmy llnit Iw+ essentially the same system of delivery as that described for the %1lIarine Di- tually no repairs or new parts. As a re- vision. Beiflhtlrr ttr. sult, numerous tractors were sidelined be- ADVANCE TO PIVA FORKS 253 cause of excessive wear on channels and repellent. Dry clothes were a luxury tracks caused by the constant operation seldom experienced and then only when through jungle mud. The largest number gratuitous issues of dungarees, underwear, of machines available at one time was 64, and show were made. Knapsacks and but the number of tractors still in service blanket rolls seldom caught up with the declined rapidly after the first two weeks. advancing Marines, and most bivouacs Ironically, by the time that a major battle were made in muddy foxholes without the between the Marine forces and the Japan- aid of covering except the poncho-which. ese appeared likely (24 November), the served a variety of uses. number of amtracs available for use was Troops received few hot meals, since 29—the same number that was available food could not be carried from kitchens on D-Day. through the swamps and jungle to the pe- rimeter positions. Besides, there were no COMBAT LESSONS 7 facilities for heating hot water for wash- ing mess kits if hot food could have been Throughout this period, the individual brought forward. Troops generally ate Marine (and his Army counterpart in the dry rations, augmented by canned fruit 37th Division) learned how to battle both and fruit juices, and waited for cooked the Japanese and the jungle. For two food until they were in reserve positions. weeks the Marines had struggled through When the combat situation and the swamps of varying depth, matching train- bivouac areas in the swamps permitted, ing and skill against a tenacious and Marines sometimes combined talents and fanatic enemy. This fight for survival rations and prepared community stews of against enemy and hardship in the midst C-rations, bouillon powder, and tomato of a sodden, almost impenetrable jungle juice which was heated in a helmet hung had molded a battlewise and resourceful over a fire. Only the canned meat or soldier, one who faced the threat of death cheese, the candy bar, and the cigarettes with the same fortitude with which he were taken from the K-rations; the hard- regarded the endless swamps and forest tack biscuits found little favor and were and the continual rain. Danger was con- usually thrown away. After the beach- stant, and there were few comforts even head became more fully established, bread in reserve bivouac positions. was supplied by regimental bakery units The combat Marine lived out of his and delivered to the front lines. The bread marching pack with only a few necessi- was baked daily in the form of handy rolls, ties--socks, underwear, and shaving instead of large loaves, which helped solve gear—and a veritable drug store of jungle the problem of distribution to Marines in aids such as atabrine tablets, sulpha scattered positions. powders, aspirin, salt tablets, iodine (for Heat tabs met with varied reaction until water purification as well as jungle cuts the Marines found that at least two tabs and scratches), vitamin pills, and insect were required to boil a canteen cup of water. Experience also taught that C- ‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this rations could be cooked twice as fast over section is derived from : 3~ MarDiv CombatRept; Rentz, Boaguin.oille aad tl[e Northern Solomons; one heat tab if the ration was divided in Aurthur and Cohlmia, 3d MarDivHLst. half. The first half-can could be heated, 254 ISOLATION OF RABAUL then eaten while the second half-can was Both stripped foliage from hidden enemy heating. positions, exposing the emplacements to a During the Marine advance, there was coordinated attack. Although the 60mm little water brought forward, and most of and !31mm mortars were virtually ineffec- the drinking water was obtained from tive against emplacements with overhead swamp holes and streams. This was puri- cover, both shells were valuable in stopp- fied individually by iodine or other chemi- ing attacks by troops in the open and in cals supp]ied by the Navy ~orpsnmn with keeping the ,J~panese pinned to an area each platoon. Despite this crude sanita- being hit by artillery. tion and continued exposure to jungle mal- Artillery was usually adjusted by sound adies7 there were few cases of dysentfiry. ranging. The artillery forward observer, The 3d Marine Division, as a whole, main- estimating his position on the map by in- tained a healthy state of combat efficiency spection, requested one round at an ob- and high morale throughout the entire vious greater range and then adjusted the campaign. fire by sound into the target. The loca- The Marines, after defeating the Japa- tion of the target was then determined by nese in three engagements, were becoming replot, and the observer was able then to increasingly skilled jungle fighters, tak- locate his position as well as the front ing cover quickly and quietly when at- lines. tacked and using supporting weapons Mortar fire was restricted in many cases with f Ull effect iveness. Targets were by the overhanging jungle. Because most marked by tracer bullets, and the Marines fighting was conducted at extremely close learned that machine guns could be used to range, the mortar rounds in support were spray the branches of trees ahead during fired almost vertically with no increments. an advance. This practice knocked out When there was any doubt about foliage many enemy snipers who had climbed trees masking the trajectory, a shell without the to scout the Marine attack. Although vis- arming pin removed was fired. If the un. ibility was usually restricted by the close armed shell cleared, live rounds followed jungle foliage, the Marines learned to take immediately. advantage of this dense underbrush to ad- Movement through the jungle toward just supporting tires almost on top of their ,Japanese positions was usually made in a own positions. This close adjustment dis- formation which the 3d Marine Division couraged the ,Japanese from moving to- called “contact imminent.” This forma- ward the Marine lines to seek cover during tion, which insured a steady, controlled a mortar or artillery barrage. advance, had many variations, but the In the jungle, 60mm mortars could be main idea was a column of units with registered within 25 yards of the Marine tlank guards covering the widest front positions, 81mm mortars and 75mm pack possible under conditions at the time. howitzers within 50 yards, and 105mm Trails were avoided. A security pa- howitzers within 150 yards. The latter trol led the formation; and as the shell was particularly effective in jungle column moved, telephone wire was un- work, as were the canister shells used in roll ed at the head of the formation and direct fire by the S’i’mm antitank guns. reeled in at the rear. At the instant of ADVANCE TO PIVA FORKS 255 stopping, or contact with the enemy, com- front lines, the battalion’s bivouac position pany commanders and supporting weap- near the beach was bombed by the Japa- ons groups clipped hand telephones onto nese and another five Marines were killed the line and were in immediate contact and six wounded. Gerard’s battalion with the column commander. Direction joined the 3d Marines for operations the and speed of the advance was controlled same day. Without having been in action by the officer at the head of the main body against the, enemy, 3/21 had already lost of troops. A command using this forma- as many men as most frontline battalions. tion could expect to make about 500 yards The 9th Marines, at this time, occupied an hour through most swamps. Such a positions generally along the west bank column was able to fend off small attacks of the Piva River. .imtracs were the only without delaying for-ward movement, yet vehicles which could negotiate the swamp was flexible enough to permit rapid de- trails from the beaches, and the supply ployment for combat to flanks, front, or situation in this sector was critical. Most rear. This formation was usually em- of the 9th Marines! units were forced to ployed in most advances extending the de- take working parties off the front lines to fensive sectors of the perimeter. hand-carry supplies forward and to break Holding the Marine front lines at this supply trails into the regiment’s position. time were the M Marines on the left and Evacuation of wounded was also by hand- the !Nb Marines on the right. Although carry. The period after the movement to Colonel McHenry’s 3d Marines had re- Phase I.ine D was spent improving the de- sponsibilityy for the left subsect.or, only fensive position, seeking enemy activity, one battalion, the 3d, was occupying pe- and gathering trail information. A num- rimeter positions. The 1st Battalion w-asin ber of patrols moved across the Piva River reserve behind 3/3, and the remaining bat- looking for enemy action, but there were talion, 2/3, was attached temporarily to few contacts in the several days following the 129th Infantry in the Army sector. the final Coconut Grove action. During this time, however, two battalions of the 21st Marines were attached to Colo- THE BATTLE OF PIVA FORKS 8 nel McHenry’s command for patrol oper- Combat activity in the Marine sector ations. Elements of 2/21 took part in numerous scouting actions along the East- picked up again on the 17th and 18th of hTovember after all units had devoted sev- west trail past Piva }Tillage to develop the enemy situation in that area; 1/21 eral days to organization of the defensive perimeter and extension and improvement moved into reserve bivouac positions be- hind the 3d Marines. ‘ ~’nless otherwise noted, the material in this On the 17th of November, the convoy section is derived from : IM.4 C AR–II; lMAC bearing 3/21 (Lieutenant Colonel Archie (’–2 Rr~)t.s ; 1.11.4[; C–2 JMt; .!ld MarDi. v Combat- V. Gerard) was attacked by Japanese air- I:cpt: .Jd MarD iv D–2 SAR; .3d ,lfarDiv D–2 Jnl; craft off Empress Augusta 13ay: and the .Id lIarDiv D–.7 Jnl; $d JfavDiv D–3 Repts; 3d APD McLean was hit and sunk. At least ,1[//rlliv D–h Itcpts; Snrdekxr ltr; Bou.x?er ltr; .Ifr.ltistcr ltr; BGen John ‘s. Letcher ltr to CMC, 38 Marines from 3/21 were lost at sea. tltd lJun48 (Bougainvillea Monograph Comment Two days later, as 3/21 prepared to join 1,’ile, IIistBr. HQMC ), hereafter Letcher h’r; the remainder of the regiment, near the I.tCol Jack Tabor ltr to CiWC, dtd 7Juu48 (Bou- 256 ISOLATION OF RABAUL of supply lines. The 37th Division sector dence of Japanese intentions for a deter- remained relatively inactive, with few re- mined defense of this area, and plans were ports of enemy sighted. Marine units made for an immediate attack. The 3d started aggressive patrolling in search of Raider Battalion was attached to the 3d routes of advance and terrain information Marines to release 3/3 (Lieutenant Col- as far out ahead as the next phase line to onel Ralph M. King) for the reduction of be occupied by the 21st of November (In- the Numa Numa trail position the follow- land Defense Line E). There were minor ing day. skirmishes with enemy outposts as the Ma- King’s battalion, accompanied by light rines scouted the jungle, but the flareups tanks, cut through the jungle to the left were brief and there were few casualties in front of the 129th Infantry subsector. to either side. In the 9th Marines subsec- After an artillery preparation, the bat- tor, both 1/9 and 2/9 reported that enemy talion struck the enemy position in a activity had increased, and the 3d Marines flanking attack that completely routecl reported that all units along the line had the Japanese. A total of 16 dead enemy been in contact with small parties of Japa- were found, although more than 100 fox- nese. ii patrol from 3/3 successfully am- holes indicated that at least a reinforced bushed a Japanese group, killing eight company had occupied the position. enemy solcliers and one officer who had in King’s battalion immediately took posses- his possession a sketch of Japanese disposi- sion of the trail block and established a tions to the immediate front. The draw- perimeter defense at the junction of the ing, and other captured documents, indi- h’urns Numa trail and the Piva River. cated that the enemy was preparing Meanwhile, 1/3 and 1/21 had advanced extensive defenses along both the Numa without difficulty, opposed only by a few Numa aud the East-West trail. bypassed survivors from King’s attack. Another patrol from 3/3, moving down The 3d Raiders then moved forward to be the Numa Numa trail on 18 November, available for support, and 2/3—released discovered an enemy road block about from operational control by the 129th In- 1,000 yards to the front. A patrol from fantry—also started east behind the Numa 1/21, probing along the East-West trail, Numa trail toward an assembly area. The encountered a similar enemy position march was made under fire; the Japanese about halfway between the two branches sporadically shelled the advancing batt- alion with 90mm mortars. of the Piva River. This was further evi- The following morning, 20 November, gainvi]le Monograph Comment File: HistBr, the same ,Japanese company that had been HQMC ) , hereafter Tubor Itr; Capt Richard C. forced to withdraw the previous day came Peck Itr to HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 3Jun48 ( Bou- gainvillea Monograph Comment File, HistBr, bouncing back, full of fight. The enemy HQMC ), hereafter Peck ttr; HistDiv ACCt; attempted to outflank the Marine positions Rentiz, Botigaint’ille and the Northern Solomons; along the trail, but King’s battalion drove Aurthnr and Cohlmia, .9d .lfarZ)ivHi8t; Maj the enemy back again. The ,Japanese then Harry W. Edwards, “Cibik Ridg+Prelude to undertook to harass the Marines by sniper Victory, ” .l[arine Corp,~ Gazette, v. 35, no. 3 fire and mortar concentrations, and the re- ( Mar51 ) ; iUaj Donald M. Schmuck, “The Battle of Piva Forks, ” Marine Corps Gnwtte, v. 28, no. sistance grew more determined when 6 ( Jun44). King’s force started a counterattack. ADVANCE TO PIVA FORKS 257 Two of the light Marine tanks were dis- 3d Marine positions had been scouted abled in the close fighting along the trail earlier, but this jungle-shrouded elevation before the Marine battalion could advance. had escaped detection. Although the The general course of attack by 3/3 was height of this ridge was only 400 feet or SO, east along the NTuma Numa trail toward the retention of this position had impor- the two forks of the “Piva River. tant aspects, since it was the first high A number of changes in the front line ground discovered near the Marine front dispositions were ordered as 3/3 advanced. lines and eventually provided the first The 3d Raicler Battalion moved out of re- ground observation posts for artillery dur- serve posit ions to cover the slowly widen- ing the Bougainvillea campaign. There is ing gap between the 129th Infantry and no doubt that the enemy’s desperate at- the 3d Marines. At the same time, Lieu- tempts to regain this ground were due to tenant Colonel Hector de Zayas’ 2/3 on the fact that. the ridge permitted observa- tile right of 3/3 passed through the front tion of the entire Empress Augusta Bay lines of 2/21 to aclvznce across the west area and dominated the East-West trail fork of tile Piva River. The objective of and the Piva Forks area. 2/3 was the enemy position reported earlier All this, however, was unknown when between the two forks of the Piva River. First Lieutenant Steve J. Cibik was di- The Piva crossing was made over a hasty rected to occL~py this newly discovered bridge of mahogany timbers thrown across ridge. His platoon, quickly augmented the stream by engineers. The enemy out- by communicators and a section of heavy post was then cliscovered abandoned but machine guns, began the struggle up the clumsily booby-trapped. The only op- steep ridge late in the afternoon of the position to the attack by 2/3 was scattered 20th. Telephone wire was reeled out as snipers and sereral machine gun nests. By the platoon climbed. ,Just before sunset, late afternoon of the 20th, de Zayas’ bat- the. Marines reached the crest for the first talion was firmly astride the East-West look at the terrain in 20 days of fighting. trail between the tw-o forks of the Piva Day] ight was waning and the Marines did River. Elements of the 21st Marines, now not, waste time in sightseeing-. The re- in reserve positions behind the two battal- maining light was used to establish a hasty ions of the 3d Marines, moved forward to defense, with machine guns sited along the take up blocking positions behind Colonel likely avenues of approach. Then the Ma- McHenry’s regiment. rines spent a wary night listening for AS the Marine forces prepared to con- sounds of enemy. tinue the attack, the opportune discovery The next morning Cibik’s men discov- of a small forward ridge was a stroke of ered that, the crest of the ridge was actu- good fortune that ultimately assured the ally a ,Japanese outpost position, used success of the Marine advance past the dl~ring the day M an observation post and Piva River. This small terrain feature, abandoned at night. This was confirmed which was later named Cibik Ridge in when ,Japanese soldiers straggled up the honor of the platoon leader whose patrol opposite slope of the ridge shortly after held the ridge against repeated Japanese (Iaybreak. The enemy, surprised by the assaults, was reported late on the after- [ll~expected blaze of fire from their own noon of the 20th. The area fronting the o~ltpost, tnrneci and fled down the hill. 258 ISOLATION OF RABAUL “\ “\, \ \ \! 19 NOV \1 20 NOV \,~ II \? Iz\c \3 \O ,: \O, \- Japanese discovered attack after 2/3 withdrawal ~rfin ,=,G ~ft.er that opening move, however, the Piva River without, difficulty. By early enemy attacks were organized and in con- afternoon, the two assault battalions ( lf121 siderable strength. Cibik’s platoon, hast- and 3/21 ) had reached the designated line, ily re.inforcecl by more machine guns and and the attack was held up to await fur- mortars, held the crest, clespite fanatical ther orders. The approach march had attempts by the Japanese to reoccupy the been made without enemy interference, ex- position. The h$arines, grimly hanging cept on the extreme left flank where a re- to their perch above. the enemy positions, inforced platoon, acting as the contact be- hurlec] back three attacks cluring the day. tween the 21st Marines and the ad Ma- The expansion of the beachhead to In- rines, was hit by a strong Japanese patrol. land Defense Line I? jumped off at 07’30 The Marine platoon managed to repulse on the.morning of 21 November. The gen- this attack with heavy losses to the enemy. eral plan called for a gradual widening Important documents, outlining the Jap- of the perimeter to allow the 21st Marines anese defenses ahead, were obtained from to wedge a defensive sector between the the body of a dead Japanese officer. 3d and 9th Marines. This action would By 1425, the 21st Marines had estab- then put all three Marine infantry regi- lished a new defensive sector, and contact ments on the front lines. Colonel .&mes’ between 3/21 and the 9th Marines had been 21st Marines passed through the junction established. There was, however, no con- of the 3d and %11Marines and crossed the tact between 1}21 and 3/21 along the front ADVANCE TO PIV.4 FORKS 259 lines. The remaining battalion, 2/21, was a withdrawal to allow artillery to soften then released from operational control by up the enemy positions. the 3d Y1arhs, and this unit moved into The retrograde movement was difficult reserve positions behind 3/21 and 1/21 to since there were many wounded Marines block the gap between the battalions. and the terrain was rugged, but the with- The enemy resistance in the 3d Nlarines’ drawal was managed despite the deter- sector, however, was unexpectedly strong. mined efforts by the Japanese to prevent .\ll three battalions were engaged with such a disengagement. .kfter de Zayas’ tile ,Japanese during the course of the ad- battalion had reentered the lines of 1/3, vance. The left battalion, 3/3, crossed the tl~e .Japanese nttempted a double envelop- Piva River without trouble and advanced ]]lent of the position held by the 1st Bat- toward a slight rise. h the 3/3 scouts ta]ion (now commanded by &lajor Charles came over the top of this ridge, the ,Japa- .J. Bailey, Jr.). This was a mistake. The nese opened fire from reverse slope posi- el~emy followed the obvious routes of ap- tions. The scouts were pinned down by proach down the East-~Vest Trail, and his this sudden outburst, but after the rest of effort perished in front of the machine the battalion moved forward a strong gm~s sited along this route. by 1/3. Bai- charge over the ridge cleared the area of ley’s battalion then extended to the left all ,Japanese. Before the battalion could toward Cibik Itidge. consolidate the positionj though, enemy The 9th Marines, meanwhile, had crossed !Xhnrn mortars registered on the slope, and the Piva River in the right sector and the kfarines were forced to seek shelter in were now occupying a new- line of defense the 200 or more foxholes which dotted the mbout, 1,000 yards east of the river. The iirea. These enemy emplacements and the l]ew positions extended from the beach to steep slope prevented many casualties. the 21st llarines in the center sector. The The 3d Battalion decided to halt in this 129th Infantry , completing the general position and a defensive perimeter was set advance of the Marine-.b-rny perimeter to up for the night. inland Defense I~hle E, also moved for- The 2d Battalion, making a reconnais- ward another 1,000 yards. The 3’7th Divi- sance in force in front of the 1/3 positions, sion unit was also unopposed. bumped into a strong enemy position &tion along the entire beachhead dwin- astride the East-~~Test trail near the east dled on the 22d of ~ovember. The 21st fork of the Piva. iibout 18 to 20 pillboxes Marines bridged the gap between the two were counted, each of them spitting rifle front line battalions by shifting 3/21 and machine ~gm fire. Ile Zayas’ battal- about 400 yards to the right to make con- ion managed to crack the first line of tact with 1/21. A considerable gap still bunkers after some fighting at close range, existed bet ween the 21st Marines and the but could make no further headway. Com- 3d Marines. This break in the defensive pany 13, ntternpting to flank the enemy po- lines was caused by the fact that the sitions to relieve the intense fire directed frontage of the Marine positions was at Company (1, was knocked back by the greater than anticipated because of map .Japanese. defenders. ~ware now that the inaccuracies. enemy was organized in considerable The expansion of the perimeter was depth, the battalion commander ordered halted on these lines while a concerted at- 260 ISOLATION OF RABAUL \ I-.\g I A I } / 5 13,0 lZ 1: >/’;: J?3\,% /, \ -. \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ‘“: BATTLE OF PIVA FORKS ,;: \\ \ FINAL PHASE I 21-25 NOVEMBER 1000 1000 24 NOV // 0 25 NOV YARDS ,,,,. ,.v h-- ~K tack was planned to push the Japanese out River despite intense sniper fire and har- of the strongly entrenched positions ahead. assment by enemy mortars. Supply sec- The enemy fortifications, which faced tions moved huge quantities of ammuni- nearly south because of tile twists of the tion, rations, and medical supplies forward trail, would be assaulted from the west to in a relay system that began with trucks east in a flanking attack. To insure a co- and amtracs and ended with Marines hand- ordinated advance, the attack was sd for carrying the supplies to the front lines. 24 November, with the East-West trail as A medical station was established near the the boundary between the assaulting terminus of the road to facilitate evacua- regiments. tion of the wounded. All signs indicated It was now apparent that the main Jap- that the 3d Marines, scheduled to advance anese dispositions had been reached, and on the 24th, would be meeting a strong intensive preparations for the full-scale as- sault on the enemy forces were rushed. enemy force. All available tanks and supporting wea- By the evening of the 22d, several pons were moved forward into positions changes had been made in the sector of the behind the 3d Marines as fast as the inade- 3d Marines. The 2d Raider Battalion, qliate trail net would permit. Engineers now attached to the 3d Marines, was and Seabees worked to extend the road as ordered to relieve King’s battalion on the close to the Piva River forks as possiblej small hill which had been taken the day erecting hasty bridges across the Piva before, and 3/3 then moved to a reserve ADVANCE TO PIVA FORKS 261 bivouac area behind 1/3 and nearly job of reducing this strong position even abreast of !2/3. The dispositions of the 3d more difficult. Marines at this time resembled a triangle The attack order for 24 November di- with the apex pointed along the F~ast-West rected the two battalions, 2/3 and 3/3, to trail toward the ,Japanese positions. The advance abreast along the East-West trail 1st Battalion wzs in front, with 3/3 on the and attack for about 800 yards beyond the left of the trail and 2/3 on the right. east fork of the Piva River. Seven bat- Cibik’s force, holding a position in front talions of artillery—four Marine and three of the perimeter, was reinforced with a Army—would provide support for the at- company of raiders and a platoon from the tack after an opening concentration of 20 3d Marines Weapons Company. By this minutes fire on an area about 800 yards time, the observation post was defended by square. During the day of 23 November, more than 200 Marines and bristled with while the artillery group registered on all supporting weapons. The Japanese, to probable enemy positions, Bailey’s 1/3 reclaim this position, would have to moved every available weapon, including pay a terrible price. captured Japanese guns, into the front On 23 November, artillery observers lines. By nightfall, 1/3 had emplaced 44 moved to the crest of Cibik Ridge to ad- machine guns across the trail and had reg- istered the concentrations of a dozen 81mm just fires in preparation for the attack the mortars and 9 60mm mortars along the next day. The Marines holding the front zone of action of the attacking battalions. lines marked their positions with colored Early the next morning, the two bat- smoke grenades, and both artillery and talions beg-an moving out of bivouac and mortars were then registered in the area up the trail toward the front. lines held by ahead. The sighting rounds caused some 1/3. It was Thanksgiving Day back in the confusion when several explosions occur- States; but on Bougainvillea this was just red within the Marine positions. It was another day of possible death, another day then realized that the Japanese were firing of attack against a hidden, determined in return and using the same smoke signals enemy. Few Marines gave the holiday for registration on the Marine lines. any thought—the preparations for this Shells from long-range enemy guns advance during the last two days had built were also falling on Torokina strip and an up too much tension for anything but the echelon of LSTS unloading near the cape. job ahead. Behind the Marines, in the The observers on Cibik Ridge shifted reg- early dawn mist, trucks and amtracs istration fires toward several likely artil- churned along muddy trails, bringing for- lery positions and the enemy fire ceased. ward last loads of rations, ammunition, The news that the enemy had artillery sup- and medical supplies. Tanks, assigned to port for the defense of his positions was a secondary role in this attack, clanked disturbing, though. Scouts had estimated toward the front lines to move into sup- that the enemy force, located in the area port positions. around the village of Kogubikopai-ai, At, 0835, just 25 minutes before the at- numbered about, 1,200 to 1,500. The addi- tack hour, the seven battalions of the artil- tion of artillery support would make the lery glolll~ opel~e(l fiIT on the ,Japanese g~g ISOLATION OF RA13AUL positions in front of the 3d Marines. From adjusted quickly by direct observation, the opening salvo, the roar of the cannon and in a matter of moments the enemy fire and the sharp blasts of the explosions battery had been knocked out of action.’ in the jungle ahead merged into a near- Even as the last Japanese artillery shells deafening thunder. In the next 20 min- were exploding along the Marine lines, utes or so, more than 5,600 shells from the two assault battalions began forming 75mm and 105mm howitzers hammered into attack formation behind the line of into the Japanese positions. The enemy departure. At 0900, as the continuous area was jarred and shattered by more hammering of machine guns, mortars, and than 60 tons of explosives in that short artillery slowly dwindled to a stop, the time. At the same time, smoke shells hit- two battalions moved through the 1/3’s ting along the hills east of the Torokina lines and advanced. River cut down enemy observation into After the continuous roar of firing and the Marine positions. explosions for more than 20 minutes, a As H-Honr approached, Bailey’s bat- strange stillness took over. The only talion, from the base of fire position sounds were those of Marines moving astride the East-West trail, opened up through the jungle. The neutralization of with close-in mortar concentrations and the enemy positions within the beaten zone sustained machine gun fire which shred- of the artillery preparation had been com- ded the jungle ahead, preventing the Jap- plete. The first few hundred yards of the znese from seeking protection next to the enemy positions were carried without diffi- Marine lines. But just. before the attack culty in the incredible stillness, the Ma- was to jump off, Japanese artillery began rines picking their way cautiously through a counterbarrage which blasted the Marine the shattered and cratered jungle. Blast- lines, pounding the 1/3 positions and the ed and torn bodies of dead Japanese gave ‘assembly areas of the assault battalions. mute evidence of the impact of massed The extremely accurate fire threatened to artillery fires. Enemy snipers, lashed force a halt to the attack plans. At this into positions in tree tops, draped from point, the value of Cibik Ridge was brought into full prominence. The for- shattered branches. ward observer team on the ridge di scov- This lull in the battle noise was only Gradually, as the stunned ered the location of a Japanese firing temporary. battery and requested counterbattery fire. survivors of the concentrated bombard- There were several anxious moments when ‘ Although this account of the silencing of the commun icat ions abruptly f niled, but the enemy battery agrees with contemporary records, line break \vasfound and repaired in time. the former executive officer of the 12th Marines The enemy guns ~vere located on t,he for- questioned its accuracy, recalling: “The [line] ward slope of a small coconut grove area break was not found or repaired for more than one hour and the Japanese battery firing from some several thousand yarckj from the a position in full view of the observer on the Piva River. As the two Marine officers nose of Cibik Hill was able to withdraw behind watched, the return fire from the 15~mm the crest of what was later to be known as Hill 1000 before counterbattery fire could be brought howitzer battery of the 37th Division be- to bear on the position. ” BGen John S. Letcher gin to explocle near this grove. Fire was ltr to Head, HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 60ct60. ADVAA-CE TO I’IVA FORKS 263 ment began to tight back, the enemy re- 500 yards from the line of departure, sistance swelled from a few scattered rifle the enemy forces hxcl managed to reorgan- shots into a fllriolls? fanatical defense. ize and lalmch a desperate counterattack ,Jiipa]les~ troops from reserve bivoll:lc which King’s men met in full stride. areas outside the beaten zone were rushed Without stopping, 3/3 drove straight into position and opened fire on the :1{1- thL’OL@ the enemy flanking attempt in a vancing Marines. Enenly artillery burst S violent hand-to-hand and tree-to-tree blasted alony tile line, tmversing the struggle that completely destroyed the front of the a(lvancing Marillm. Ex- Japanese force. tremely acmlrate 90n1n1mortar fire locked By 1200, after three full hours of furi- the attacking companies. ous fighting, the two battalions had Enemy fire was partic(~larly heary in reachecl the initial objectives, and the at- the zone of 2/3 on the ri~ht of the East- tack was held up for a brief time for re- West trail, and de Zaya’s battalion, after organization and to reestablish contact moving about 250 yards, reported 70 ccLs- between units. Following a,short rest, the uall ies. A small streal)l near the trail Marines started forward again toward the meandered back and forth ~ct-oss the zone final objective some 350+Lo0 yards farther of adwmcel and the attacking Marines on. Meanwhi]e, artillery again pounded were forced to cross the streanl eight times ahead of the Marine forces and mortars during the morning’s nlo~enlent. .It least ~vere moved forward. The final attack three enemy pillboxes were located in tri- was supported by 81mm mortars; but as angular formation in eacl~ bend of the the advance began again, enemy counter- streamj and each of these emplaren~ents nlortar fire rained on the Marines. Tile had to be isoli~ted and destroye(l. A nun- attack was continued under this exchange ber of el~gineers equil)pecl with flame of supporting and clefensive fires. throwers moved along wit h the zssault King’s hzttalion was hit hard once companies: and these weapons v-ere used effectively on most bunkers. The Ji~p- more, but mnnaged to keep going. Em anese, fully aware of tile deatl~-denl ing emy machine gun and rifle fire from posi- capabilities of the fl:llne t]lt”ol~ers. directed tions on high ground bordering a swampy most of their fire towar(l these weapons, arect raked throl~gh the attzcking Marines, Many eu~ineers were killed tryi)]g to get, forcing them to seek cover in the knee- close enough to enemy enlplacenlents to deep mud and slime. Company L, on the (Iirect tile flame into tile emblasllres. extreme left; was hit hardest. Reinforced The attxck by King’s batt alien (3/3) on quickly with a platoon from the reserve the left of the East-West trail encoun- unit, Company K, tile company managed tered less resistance, and the battxlion was to fight its way through heavy enemy fire able to tout inl~e.its advance without, pallse. to the foot of a small knoll. Company I, Many dazed and shocked survivors of the with the batt al ion command group at- bombardment were killed by tl~e attacking tached, came up to help. Together, the Marines before the ,Japanese colllcl recover two companies staged a final rush and cap- from the effects of the artillery fire. But turecl the Iising groLmcl. After clezring by the time tile battalion had movec] nearly this small elevation of all enemy, the bat- 691–360 0—63—18 264 ISOLATION OF RABAUL talion organized a perimeter defense and front line units. ‘0 Not every isolated de- waited for 2/3 to come up alongside. fensive position was reached, but most of The 2d Battalion, moving toward the fi- the Marines had a piece of turkey to re- nal objective, was slowed by strong enemy mind them of the day. reinforcements as it neared its goal. Quickly requesting 60mn~ and 81mm GRENADE BILL “ mortar concentrations, the 2d 13xtt.alien The following morning, 25 November, o~ercame the enemy opposition and lunged tl~e M Marines remained on the newly- forward. The. final stand by the ,Japanese taken ground, while a number of changes on the objective was desperate and deter- were made in the lineup along the perim- mined, but as the Marines struggled ahead, eter. Two days earlier, General Turnage the resistance dwindled and died. The 2d had directed that the 3d Marines and the Battalion then mopped up and went into 9th Marines exchange sectors as soon as a perimeter defense to wait out the night. possible. This move would allow Colonel Behind the two front battalions, however, McHenry’s 3d Marines, by now badly de- the. battle continued well into the night m pleted by battle oasualtiee, sickness, and isolated enemy riflemen and machine gun- exhaustion, to take over a relatively quiet ners tbnt had been overrun attempted to sector while the 9th Marines returned to ambush and kill ammunition carriers and action. stretcher bearers. The changes had been started on the During the day, the corps artillery 24th while the 3d Marines were engaged group, providing support for the Marine in the battle for Piva Forks. The 1st Bat- attack, fired a total of 52 general support talion of the 9th Marines, now commanded missions in addition to the opening bom- by Lieutenant Colonel Carey A. Randall, bardment. Nine other close-in missions was in regimental reserve positions be- were fired as the 37th Division also moved hind 2/9 and 3/9 on the right flank when its perimeter forward. In all, during the attack on 24 November, the artillery alerted by a warning order that the bat- group fired 4,131 rounds of 75m, 2,534 talion would move on 30-minute’s notice. rounds ~f 105mm$ and 688 rounds of ‘0ln the 9th Marines’ sector, company cooks 155mm ammunition. did the honors for the holiday birds using 50 The casualties during this attack also gallon drums in which the turkeys were boiled reflected the intensity of the combat. together with rice. “The turkeys together with After the conclusion of the advance by the any other Thanksgiving extras were then deliv- ered boiled to units in position on the lines.” Marines, at least 1,0’71 dead bodies of Jap- Craig h%-. anese were counted. The Marine casual- “ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this ties were 115 dead and wounded. section is derived from : IMA C A R–II; .3d Mar- For some Marines, the day was Thanks- D iv CombatRrpt; $d Marllifl D–2 &7AR; 3d Mw- Div D–2 Jnl; 3d MarDiv D-3 Jnl; 3d MarDi.v giving Day after all. A large shipment D-$ Repts; Letcher ltr; Nnedeker ltr; LtCol of turkeys was received at the beachhead, Harold C. Boehm ltr to CMC, dtd 9Aug48 ( Bou- and, unable to store the birds, the division gainvillea Monograph Comment File, HistBr, HQMC ) ; Peck ltr; Hi.*tDiv Acct; Rentz, BOU- cooks roasted the entire shipment and gainwitleand the Northern Solomaw; -4urthur packed the turkeys for distribution to and Cohlmia, 3d MarDioHist. ADVANCE TO PIVA FORKS 265 Late in the afternoon, Randall’s battalion an area of high ground north of the East- was ordered to move north along the Piva West trail, was about 800 yards distant. River to report to Colonel McHenry’s Randall’s battalion, guided by a patrol regiment for operational control. Shortly from Cibik Ridge, proceeded single file to before dark, Randall reported to Mc- the crest. There the Marines could see the Henry and was directed to an assembly attack objective ahead. At 1000, after an- area. The battalion was to be prepared other crushing 10-minute artillery prep- for relief of the front lines as soon after aration, the attack was started straight daybreak as possible. The 2d Battalion (Iov-n the opposite side of Cibik Ridge. of the raider regiment, with two companies The assault companies lined up with A on of the 3d Raiders attached, was also or- the left and C on the right. Company B dered to move up behind the 3d Marines was to follow on order. Attached nm- for commitment to action. chine guns supported each company, and On the morning of the 25th, as the 2d a hea~y mortar barrage from Cibik Ridge Raiders and 1/9 moved toward the front pounded ahead as the Marines attacked. lines to extend the perimeter, a number of At the foot of the ridge, both attacking other changes were directed. De Zayas’ companies were held up by extremely 2/3, south of the East-West trail, extended heavy machine gun fire from concealed its right flank to the southeast to make positions on a small knoll just ahead. The contact with the 21st Marines. King’s bat - fig]lt for this knob of ground continued talion, 3/3, organized defensive positions the rest of the clay. on the left of the East-West trail to make The 2d Raiders, meanwhile, had ad- contact with Cibik Ridge where a rein- vanced against sporadic resistance. The forced company was holding. AS the attack was held up several times by enemy front lines were straightened, 1/3 was groups; but, as the raiders prepared to as- withdrawn from action and 3/9 moved sault the defenses, the enemy suddenly into reserve positions behind the ?ld Ma- gave ground to retire to new positions. By rines. To substitute for the 10SSof 1/9 afternoon, Major Washburn’s battalion and 3/9 to the left sector, a newly arrived had occupied the hill mass dominating the battalion of the 37th Division was at- East-West, trail and established a strong perimeter defense on the objective to wait tached to the 9th Marines. This unit, the for the battalion from the 9th Marines to 1st Battalion of the 145th Infantry, was come up on line. placed in reserve positions in the extreme Randall’s battalion, however, had its right. sector near Piva Village. hands full. Both attack companies had Meanwhile, as these changes were made, committed thei,r reserve platoons to the as- the 2d Raiders and 1/9 moved east along sault of the small knoll facing them with- the East-West trail to begin the day’s at- out making headway. The enemy was tack. Randall’s 1/9 was to move up Ci- well dug-in with a complete, all-around bik Ridge and then attack almost directly defense. Marines estimated that the small east on a front of 400 yards to extend the hill was held by at least 70 Japanese with left flank of 3/3. The 2d Raiders were 4 heavy ( 13mm ) machine guns and wbout to attack on the left flank of 1/9 on a 12 Nambu ( 6.5nlm ) machine guns. In ad- front of about 800 yards. The objective, dition, the Japanese apparently had plenty 266 ISOLATION OF RABAUL of grenades, since ~ Continual ~clin of to locate the left flank of 3/3 before dark, explosives was hurled from the enemy organized a defense position across the positions. The Marines, unable to ad- trail and settled down to wait for morn- vance against this formidable strongpoint, ing. dubbed the knoll “Grenade Hill.” Meanwhile, the fight for Grenade Hill Many attempts to envelop this position had dwindled and stopped. The two were repulsed. At some points, the Ma- companies of 1/9, unable to capture the rine attackers were only five yards from hill, dug in around the base of the knob to the enemy emplacements, engaged in a hot wait for another day. The 2d Raiders, exchange of small-arms fire and grenades, on the objective, remained in front of the but unable to carry the last few yards. lines in a tight defensive ring. The fight was conducted at such close The next morning, 26 November, scouts quarters that the mortars on Cibik Ridge from 1/9 reported that the Japanese had could not be registered on the enemy posi- quietly withdrawn from Grenade Hill tion. Many of the dugouts along the side during the night and the small knoll was of the hill were destroyed by the Marine abandoned. The two assault companies attacks, but the. crown of the hill was never rushed for the hill at once, taking over the carried. One platoon from Company .4, enemy positions along the crown of the circling the knoll to the left, managed to knoll. The small knob of ground, about fight Up a. small trail into the position. 60 feet across at the base and hardly more Fierce enemy fire forced the Marines back than 20 feet high, was dotted with a num- before the crest of the ridge was reachecl. ber of well-constructed and concealed rifle Fourteen Japanese were killed by the Ma- pits and bunkers. Each bunker was large rine platoon in this attempt to take the enough for at least three enemy soldiers. hill. Only 32 dead Japanese were found on the By midafternoon, Company B was or- hill. At 1015, the attack was pushed for- dered from Cibik Ridge to plug the gap ward again and contact was made with between the 1/9 attack and the positions Company B. This company, during the of 3/3 on the right. Company B moved morning, had linked up with the left flank down the slope of Cibik Ridge toward the of the 3d Marines, thereby establishing East-West trail south of Grenade Hill and contact along the line. Company B then continued east on the trail for several joined with 1/9 to complete the move to hundred yards in a.n attempt to locate the the final objective. By nightfall, the left flank of the 3d Marines. Shortly be- ridgeline blocking the East-West trail was fore dusk, the company abruptly ran into in Marine hands. a Japanese force. After an intense but During the attacks of 25–26 November, short fire fight, the Marine company de- the Marines lost 5 killed and 42 wounded. cided that the Japanese position on higher At least 32 Japanese had been killed in bground was too strong to overrun and the assaults on Grenade Hill, and there had broke off contact. The company then undoubtedly been additional casualties in withdrew to a defensible position closer the attacks in other areas. The number of to Cibik Ridge. The Japanese made a enemy killed during the period 18–26 No- similar decision and also withdrew. Com- vember in the 3d Division sector was at pany B, out of touch with 1/9 and unable least 1,196, although the total number of ADVANCE TO PITA FORKS 267 casualties must have been considerably ment was back near Cape Torokina within higher than that figure.” the limits of patrols of the first two days The fight for expansion of the beach- ashore. head in this area was recorded as the Bat. In the right, sector, the exhausted infan- tle of Piva Forks, and marked the tempo- try battalions of the 3d Marines were given rary end of serious enemy opposition to a respite by the formation of a composite the occupation ancl development of the battalion from among the Regimental Cape Torokina area. The only high Weapons Company, the Scout Company, ground from which the enemy could several headquarters companies, and sup- threaten or harass the beachhead was now porting service troops. This makeshift held by IM.iC forces, and possession of bzttalion took over a position along the the commanding terrain facing the Piva Marine lines on the 28th of hTovember and River gave the Marine regiments an ad- maintained the defense until early in De- vantage in defending that sector. cember so that Colonel McHenry’s 3d Ma- After the objective of 26 November had rines could reorganize and rest. The Army been secured, the remainder of the directed battalion, 1/145, assigned to this sector reliefs were completed. The 3d Battalion was also placed in frontline defenses un- of the 9th Xfarines relieved 3/3 in the der the operational control of the 3d Ma- front 1ines, and this batt alien then became rines and aggressively patrolled past the the reserve unit behind 1/9 and 3/9. con- Torokina River seeking the enemy. trol of 1/3 -wasthen shifted to the 9th Ma- The ,Japanese, however, evidently in- rines, and at 1600 on the afternoon of the tended to do no more than keep this area 26th, the 3d N1arines and 9th Marines under observation. Other than a few exchanged commands in the left and right brushes with enemy outposts, the 3d Ma- subsectors. The 21st Marines, maintain- rines were out of contact with the Japanese ing positions in the center subsector, for the remainder of the campaign. The moved forward about, 500 yards after problem, as before, was mainly one of the attack on Grenade Hill. The IM.4C maintaining and supplying the Marine dispositions at the conclusion of the fight- fighting units in the midst of swamplands. ing on 26 November had the 148th and On the 28th of November, General Gei- 129th Infantry Regiments on line in the ger ordered that the IMAC perimeter in 37th Division sector, and the 9th Marinw, the center and 1ef t subsectors be moved for- the 21st Marines, and the Sd Marines on ward to Inland Defense Line F, and, after line, left to right., in the Marine sector. this line was occupied, artillery was dis- For the 3d Marines, this last move to the placed forward to defend the area seized right sector completed a full cycle of the and to support the last push to the final beachhead which was begun on D-Day. beachhead line.’3 Following the landing, the regiment The area fronting the Marine perimeter rnovecl toward the Koromokina River, then at this time varied from mountainous ter- traveled inland through the jungle and rain to deep swamps and dense jungle. swamps to the Piva Forks area. Finally, after 27 days of jungle fighting, the regi- “ The 148th Infantry and most of the 129th had already reached the final beachhead line by ‘2TilIAC AR–II, p. 14. 25 November. Beigtitler ltr. ADVANCE TO PIVA FORKS 269 The !lth Marines, on the right flank of the scouts who were trying to keep the Ma- 37th Division, reported rugged terrain in rines’ progress under surveillance. this subsector with many ridges and deep The Marines continued to gain combat gorges cut by water falls and streams: The experience. Two rules of jungle warfare 21st and 3d Marines, however, still faced were found invaluable during this period. the task of holding areas in the midst of The first rule was to avoid using the same swamps. These. the Marines reported, trail twice in a row—because the second were not, impassable, but it, was certain time the trail would be ambushed. The that large forces of enemy could not ad- second rule was to avoid heckling a Japa- vance through these swamps without de- nese outpost twice unless prepared to fight tection by one of the many patrols which a full-scale battle on the second go-around. roved back and forth between units during Inevitably, in these brushes with the Jap- the. day. .M night, small groups moved anese, the second fight was more vicious into tile swamps as listening posts. and determined than the first. While Every possible battle position, however, was wired and mined. Gaps in the front- the enemy clid not actively seek out the line defense were covered by automatic Marine units for battle, the small outpost weapons. The Japanese, however, never engagements convinced the Marines that attempted an infiltration during this time, the enemy was still in the area in force and only scattered groups of enemy were :md prepared to fight any further expan- encountered. These were evidently only sion of the beachhead. CHAPTER 6 End of a Mission vous each night with the raiding unit if communications failed. The orders Throughout the expansion of the beach- for withdrawal would be given by IMAC head past the Piva River forks, the possi- headquarters.’ bility of a major counterattack by the Jap- The raid was originally scheduled for anese along the right flank was a constant the morning of 28 h“ovember so that es- threat. To short-circuit possible enemy corting destroyers of a shipping echelon plans to carry out a full-scale reinforce- could provide naval gunfire support if ment effort along this route, a raid on Jap- needed. A trial landing on the selected anese lines in the southern part of Empress beach, about 3,000 yards nort,h of Koiari, Augusta Bay was proposed. This would was made after dark on the 2’ith by one disrupt enemy communications, destroy boat, whose crew then returned to report installations and suppliesj and obtain in- that there was no evidence of enemy in the formation about any troop movements to- area. Because of delay in the actual em- wards the beachhead. The foray was barkation of the parachute battzlion, how- aimed at reported Japanese installations ever, the entire operation was postponed near Koiari, about 10 miles down tile coast until the 29th. from Cape Torokina. Destroyer support -would no longer be The unit selected for this operation was available, but this lack was not disturbing. the 1st Parachute 13attalien (Major Rich- One 155mm howitzer battery from the ard Fagan), -which had arrived on BOLI- 37th Division was in position near Cape gainville from Vella Lavella on the 23d Torokina to support the parachute battal- of November. Fagan’s battalion was to ion with lon~-range fire, and air support operate much in t]~e manner of Krulak’s could be expected during the day. Two group on Choiseul. The parachute battal- l~CI gllnboats, which had proved success- ion was to harass enemy units as far in- ful during the Treasurys operation, were land as the East-West trail but was to also available. (leneral Creiger, taking ac- avoi(l z decisive engagement with major count of the fire sl~pport at hancl, decided Japanese forces. A boat would rendez- tlmt one day’s postponement would not jeopardize the. operation and another re- I IIrlleR: oth~r~~rise not@, the material in this connaissance boat was sent to the selected section is [lerived fronl : Z.lf.4 C .ili-II; 3d Mflr- beach 1nte on the evening of 28 lJovember. L)i?j 6’())}/b(/t T{cpt ; .3(/ Mar nil? D–J J?/ 2; .$(7Mur- The second report was similar to the first: Diti D–.3 Rf’pts; 1st MarPar:a13n L“uit Rept, Koi- no enemy sighted, In view of later devel- ari Raid. dtd 30 XOV43 ( 130ugainville AreaOpFile, HistBr, HQMC ) : S’ncdcker Ur; Henderson,“Na- val Gunfire Support:“ Rentiz,Bougainvillea and ‘ IMAC OPO No. 5, dtd 27 Nov43 (Bougainvillea the Northertz Solomons. AreaOPFile, HistBr, HQMC). 270 END OF A MISSION 271 opments, it is doubtful that either of the The battalion commander, meanwhile, reconnaissance boats landed at the desig- mdioed IMAC headquarters of the para- nated beach. chutists> plight and requested that the unit Fagan’s battalion, with Company M of be withdrawn since accomplishment of the the 3d Raider Battalion and a forward mission wiw obviously impossible and the observer team from the l!2th Marines at- slow annihilation of the battalion extreme- tached, embarked on board LCMS and ly likely. General Geiger immediately I,(WPS at cape Torokina early on the took steps to set up a rescue attempt, but morning of 29 NTovember. One hour later, unfortunately the return radio transmis- at 0400, the boats moved in toward the sion was never received by Fagan. By Koiari beach and the Marines were landed midmorning, Fagan’s radio failed and virtually in tl~e middle of a ,Japanese sup- although it would transmit, it could not ply dump. The surprise was mutual. A receive inconling messages. Contact with ,Japanese officer, armed only with a sword, IMAC was later made over the artillery and apparently expecting ,Japanese boats, net to the forward observer team. At greeted the first Marines ashore. His de- 0930, the beachhead was strengthened by mise and the realization of his mistake the arrival of the two companies which were almost. simultaneous. The Marines, had been separated. These Marines had now committed to establishing a beach- fought their way along the shoreline to l~eacl in the midst of an enemy camp, dug reach the main party, losing 13 men dur- in as quickly as possible to develop the ing the march. sitnat ion. As time passed, Fagan became more con- Before the .Japanese recovered from the vinced that his battalion was in a tighter sudden shock of American forces landing spot than IM.4C headquarters realized. in the middle of the supply dump, the The battalion commander estimated that parachute battalion had pushed out a the Japanese force numbered about 1~200 perimeter which extended roughly about men, with better positions than the Ma- 350 yards along the beach and about 180 rines for continued fighting. l$Then the yards inhmd. The force was split—the first rescue attempt by t?le landing craft raider company and the headquarters com- was beaten back by an intense artillery pany of the parachute battalion had land- concentration along the shoreline, the situ- ed about 1000 yards below the main force ation looked even more grim. When a and outside the dump area, The Jap- second rescue attempt was also repulsed anese reaction, when it came, was a furious by the ,Japanese artillery, the Marines re- hail of 90mm mortar shells and grenades signed themselves to a long fight. from “knee mortars.” The entire beach- Late in the afternoon, when enemy head was raked by continual machine gun trucks were heard approaching the perim- and rifle fire. Periodically the ,Japanese eter from the south, the parachutists mounted a determined rush against one guessed that an all-out attack that night flank or the ot,her: The Marines, taking or early the next morning would attempt cover in hastily dug slit-trenches in the to wipe out the Marine beachhead. Tak- sand, returned the fire as best they could. ing stock of the situation—their backs to Casualties mounted alarmingly. the sea, nearly out of ammunition, without 0?0 ,21,0 ISOLATION OF RABAUL close support weapons—the Marine para- naval gunfire-there was no return enemy chutists reluctantly but realistically con- fire. As the rescue boats beached, the cluded that the enemy’s chances for success Marines slowly retired toward the shore. were quite good. There was no stampede, no panic. The During the day, 155mm guns of the withdrawal was orderly and deliberate. 3d Defense Battalion at Cape Torokina After waiting to insure that all Marines registered along the forward edge of the were off the perimeter, the battalion com- parachutists’ perimeter, keeping the mander gave the signal to clear the beach enemy from making a sustained effort and at 2040 the last boat pulled away with- from that direction. IMAC, in the mean- out drawing a single enemy shot. The time, sent an emergency message to the task artillery battery and the gunfire support force escorting transports back to Guadal- ships then worked over the entire beach, canal, and three of the screening destroyers hoping to destroy the Japanese force by immediately reversed course and steamed random fires. at flank speed for Bougainvillea. The The attempt to raid the Japanese system three support ships--the FuUa.m, Land~- of communications and supply along the douxw, and Lardner and one of the LCI Bougainvillea coast ended in a dismal fail- gunboats arrived shortly before 1800. The ure. Although the Marines had landed in Fullam, first to arrive, opened fire imme- an area where great destruction could have diately under the direction of two gunfire been accomplished, they were never able oi?icers from lMAC who had raced for the to do more than hug the shoreline and at- beleaguered beachhead in a PT boat. tempt to defend their meager toehold with There was little daylight left for shoot- dwindling ammunition until rescued. In ing on point targets by the time the de- the pitch darkness a.t the time of evacua- stroyers arrived. Unable to see the beach, tion, much of the Marine equipment was they stationed themselves by radar naviga- lost. Although the withdrawal was order- tion and opened LZpwith unobserved fires ly, some crew-served weapons, rifles, and which the gunfire officers adjustid by packs were left behind. Enemy supplies sound. The ships fired directly to the destroyed would have to be credited to the flanks of the Marine beachhead, while the bombardment by Allied artillery and de- 155mm guns at Cape Torokina fired paral- stroyers after the evacuation. The Ma- lel to the beach. The effect was a three- rines estimated that the Japanese had lost sided box which threw a protective wall about 291 men, about one-half of whom of fire around the Marine position. Be- were probably killed and the others hind this shield, the rescue boats made a wounded. The Marine parachute battal- dash for the beach. The Marine battalion, ion, which landed a total of 24 officers and which had been alerted for the evacuation 505 enlisted men plus 4 oficers and 81 en- through the artillery radio net, was wait- listed men from the 3d Raiders, listed ing patiently despite the fact that its last casualties as 15 killed or died of wounds, three radio messages had indicated that it 99 wounded, and 7 missing.’ was out of ammunition. “ 1st MarParaBn UnitRept; lM.4C AR–II, p. For some reason-probably because the 15, gives 15 killed and 71 wounded for this opera- Japanese were busy seeking cover from tion. END OF A MISSION 273 HELLZAPOPPIN RIDGE of the hills until the perimeter could be AND HILL 600A 4 extended to include this area. On 27 November, a patrol of 1 oficer Aftm the move to Inland Defense Line and 21 men from Colonel Ames’ regiment F, corps headquarters kept its eyes on a moved to Hill 600 where observation could hill mass some 2,OOOyards to the front be maintained over the other two hills and which dominated the area between the the Torokina River. Hill 600, just south Piva and Torokina Rivers. These hills, if of the East-West trail, was bordered on held by the Japanese, would give them the left by a higher, longer ridge about observation of the entire Cape Torokina 1,000 feet high. A smaller hill, about 500 area and a favorable position from which feet high, was farther south. to launch an attack against the IMAC As a preliminary to eventual occupation beachhead. Geiger’s headquarters felt of the hills by IMXC forces, the 1st Ma- these hills were a continual threat to the rine Parachute Regiment., commanded by perimeter. Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Williams, On the other hand, Marine occupation was moved from reserve positions on Vella of the hills would provide a strong natural Lavella on 3 December. Two days later, defensive position blocking the East-West this unit—actually just the regimental trail at its Torokina River crossing and headquarters, the weapons company, and would greatly strengthen the final Inland the 3d Parachute Battalion—moved to- Defense Line. That line, which included ward the largest of the three hills, Hill the hill mass, was to have been occupied 1000. The parachute regiment made a by 30 November, but the supply problems forced march with a half-unit of fire and through the swamps and the enemy action only three days> rations. This shortage of had caused an unavoidable delay. Despite food was later partially solved by an air- drop on the regiment’s position. Williams’ the added logistical difficulties which oc- regiment pushed forward along the East- cupation of this hill mass would involve, West trail almost to the Torokina River corps headquarters directed the 21st Ma- before turning to the north to start the rines tio maintain a wmbat outpost on one climb of the ridgeline toward Hill 1000. By the end of 5 December, the 1st Para- ‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from : IMAC Rept. on Bougain- chute Regiment with units of the 3d, 9th, villea Operation, Phase HI, l–15Dec43, dtd 21Mar- and 21st Marines in support, had estab- 44 ( Bougainvillea AreaOpFile. HistBr. HQMC ), lished a general outpost line stretching hereafter 1,1[.4C .4R–III; lMA C C–2 Rept8; from Hill 1000 to the junction of the East- IMAC C–2 ,Jnl; 3d .lfarDie CombatRcpt; 3d Mar- Div D–2 S.4 R; ,qd ,~[arDiv D–2 Jn.l; t?d MarDiv West trail at the Torokina River. A Pro- D–3 Rcpts; 3d MarDiv D–4 Rept8; 1st MarPara- visional Parachute Battalion, under Ma- Regt UnitRept, &131 Jec43, n.d. ( Bougainvillea jor George R. Stalling-s, was formed by AreaOpFile, HistBr, HQMG), hereafter ParaRegt Williams from regimental headquarters Rf’pt; LtCol Robert T. Vance ltr to CMC, dtd and Company I to occupy the left sector 27Ma@S (Bougainvillea Monograph Comment File, Hist13r,HQMC) ; Saedeker Ur; McAllister of his defenses.5 Williams’ command, ltr; Bower Ur; Letcher ltr; Rentz, Bougainvillc ~)jd the Nortkern Solomo?)s; Aurthur and 6 Col Robert T. Vance ltr to CMC, dtd 60ct60, Cohlmia,.3<1MarDivHi8t. hereafter J’unce Wr. 274 ISOLATION OF RABAUL Ar <1 with about 900 men, was strung over a December, the Japanese attemptxl to shell thinly held line about 3,000 yards in the beachhead once more. This time the length. Meanwhile, the 21st Marines out- artillery was emplaced on a forward slope, post on Hill 600 was reinforced. A full and a fierce counterbattery fire from three rifle company with a machine gun platoon battalions of 75mm howitzers, one bat- and the IMAC experimental rocket pla- talion of 105mm howitzers, and one bat- toon attached was moved forward to bol- tery of 155mm guns quickly smashed the ster the Marine defense on the two hills Japanese position. The artillery spotting blocking the East-West trail. problem was further aided on 4 December The move to this hill mass overlooking by the delivery of two light planes. These the Torokina River was made at about the slow-moving aircraft increased the effec- time that the Japanse evidenced a strong tiveness of artillery fire by allowing ob- interest in these positions. During the servers to spot targets of opportunity and period 27 h-ovember to 4 December, the request and adjust fires. The wout bomb- enemy activity was confined to minor con- ers which had been used as spotting planes tacts along the perimeter with the Japa- flew too fast and had too many blind spots nese using mostly long-range artillery fire to be good observation planes. to make their continued presence known. The first enemy contact of any conse- On 29 November, the Cape Torokina air- quence since Grenade Hill came in the sec- field site was hit by a number of 15cm tor of the 9th Marines on 5 December. howitzer shells from extreme range. On 3 Colonel Craig’s regiment had been ordered END OF A MISSION 275 to expand the perimeter to make contact Movement to the final defense line came with the parachute regiment. on IIill 1000, as minor patrol clashes were reported and, as a small patrol from 2/9 moi-ed out, :llong tile elltil’e I)erimeter. on 7 I)ecenl- it, was ambushec] by about 10 ,Japznese. ber, the Provisional Pnrachute Battalion The Marines lost two killecl and two cliscoverecl abandoned positions On a 650- wounded in the first exchanxe. The ,Japa- foot ridge which extended east from Hill nese then withdrew. The following day a 1000 toward the Torokina River, much in 40-nlan lmtrol from the 9th Marines ng- the manner that, Grenade Hill was an off- gressivelV scoute(l al~exd of the regiment shoot of Cibik Ridge.b Patrols returned but did ~ot encounter any enemy forces. to report tl~at a number of well dug-in and This cl~y, the entire beachhead took an- concealed emplacements hacl been found other jump forward as advance units of on the ridge, and Williams made plans to the three regiments pushed inland. On occupy this area with part, of his force the the right, flank, 3/3 advanced from posi- next morning. A patrol from the Pro- tions which had been occupied since 21 ~o- visional Parachute Battalion started down vernber and put a patrol On Hill 500 south the spur on the 8th of December but. was of the strong 21st Marines outpost on Hill driven back by unexpected enemy fire. 600. This position was then strengthened The Japanese, repeating a favorite maneu- by the extension of an amphibian tractor ver, had returned to occupy the positions trail fronl tile SJVNI)llHto I1ill 600, assllr- during the night. ing an :t(le~llilte supply rollte. The 9tl~ The patrol reorganized and made a il[arines, on the flr left, move{l up to make second attempt to seize the enemy position. contact with the llarines holding Hill No headway was made during a sharp 1000. exchange of fire. ilfter eight Marines had .1 generzl 1ine of defensive positions been wounded, the patrol returned to the now stretched from the are[l north of Hill front lines. On the morning of 9 Decem- 1000 along this ridge to the East-lT7est ber, three patrols of the 3d Parachute Bat- trail and then to the two smaller hills, talion converged on the spur; each en- 600 ancl 500, south of the trail. With the countered light resistance and reported extension of the supply lines, a growingr that the enemy broke, contact and with- supply duml) called Evansville -was es- drew. Major Vance ordered Company K tablished to the. rear of Hill 600 near the to move forward and secure the area. The East-West trail to insure supply of the advancing Marines soon discovered that, final (lefensive line. The advance to In- “far from withdrawing, the Japs were still land I)efense Line H came on a day when there and in considerable strength.” 7 tile ellt ire island was rocked by a violent Company K managed to penetrate the earthquake. Earthworks and trenches ,Tapanese positions, but continued heavy were crumbled and gigantic trees swayed casualties forced a withdrawal before the as the ground trembled and rolled. Per- entire riclg-e could be captured. During sons stttnding were thrown to the aground this attack, the enemy fire showed few by the force of the quake. Other earth signs of slackening-. Vance then ordered tremors were recordecl later, but none achieved the force of the qu’ake of 6 Decem- 0Ibid. ber. 7 Ibid. 276 ISOLATION OF RABAUL Company L to outflank the Japanese lines, Japanese soldiers and ended the attack. requesting the Provisional Battalion to The Marines, though, had 12 men killed support with Company I on the left flank. and 26 wounded in the brief struggle. “h’either of these two units could make Evacuation of wounded from this bat- headway against the almost sheer sides of tle area was particularly difficult. Only the ridge and the heavy fire of the en- two trails led to the top of the hill-one a emy.”s Several patrols from Company I hazardous crawl up a steep slope, and the were ambushed by Japanese in strong em- other a wider jeep trail leading toward the placements, and, during the confused Torokina River. Torrential rains made close-range battle, one light machinegun both virtually impassable. At least 12 squad became separated from the rest of men were required to manhandle each. the patrol. This squad did not return with stretcher case to an aid station set up about the rest of the company, and an immediate half-way down the rear slope. There, search by a strong patrol failed to locate blood plasma and emergency care were the missing men. Three of the Marines given the wounded before they were car- later returned to Hill 1000, but the rest ried to an amtrac trail at the foot of the of the squad were carried as casualties. hill. The wounded men were then moved Despite a number of sharp attacks by across the swamps to roads where jeep the parachute regiment, the enemy posi- ambulances were waiting.g tion remained as strong as kfore. The On the morning of 10 December, all Marines, eyeing the Japanese bastion, units completed the advance to the final called for reinforcements to plug the weak defense line along the general line of Hill spots caused by the casualties in the over- 1000 to Hill 500, and the 1st Battalion of extended lines, and two rifle companies the 21st Marines moved forward under from adjacent units were rushed to Hill enemy mortar fire to take over responsi- 1000. Company C, 1/21, at Evansville, bility for the defense of Hill 1000. There was attached to Vance’s unit and moved was no enemy action in the sectors of the into the 3d Parachute Battalion’s posi- 9th and 3d Marines on either flank. At tions bringing much needed ammunition 0900, Lieutenant Colonel Williams met the and supplies. At the same time, Company commanders of 1/9 and 1/21 at his com- B, 1/9 advanced to cover the gap on the mand post on Hill 1000, and the details of left between 3/9 and the lines on Hill 1000. the relief of the 1st Parachute Regiment by That afternoon, the parachute regiment 1/21 and of contact with 1/9 were worked was hit suddenly by a strong Japanese out. There was still action by the enemy, counterattack aimed at the center of the though. A small Marine patrol scouting Marine positions on Hill 1000. An esti- ahead of the lines to pick up the bodie of mated reinforced company made the dead Marines was fired upon by an enemy charge, but an artillery concentration cen- force. The Marines drew back and called tered on the saddle between Hill 1000 and for an artillery concentration on the area the enemy-held spur broke the back of the before continuing the patrol. This time Japanese rush. The quick support by 105mm and 75mm howitzers scattered the ‘ Sgt Charles 11.~lcKenna, “Saving Lives on Bougainvillea,”.Uari?aeCorps Gazette, v. 28, no. RIiw. 3 (Mar44). END OF A MISS1ON 277 there was only sporadic sniper fire. That fierce tire drove them back. The ,Japa- afternoon the. scattered elements of the nese appeared to be well dug in, with parachute reginlellt nloved otl Hi]l 1000, overhead cover, in a carefully prepared leaving the untinislle{l business of the en- all-around defense. emy stl’ol~gho]d aml tile difficulties of sup- Unable to define the limits of the Jap- ]>ly:lll(l e~’:lcllati(J1lto l/21 and l/9. The anese position, the Marines were unable parachute troops, obviously ill-equipped to bring any supporting weapons except and understrength i%r such sllsta ined con~- 60mm and 81mm mortars to bear on the bat, moved into reserve positions behind emplacements. The 60mm mortars proved the IM.iC perimeter. too light to open holes for the Marine at- The strong Japanese position on the tacks, and the heavier mortars also ap- sljllr extel](lillg east flwm tile l~eights of peared to have little effect on the enemy lIill 1oO() resistwl al] et~orts by tile 31a- positions. During the first stages of the rines for the next six days. The bitter repeated attacks on Hellzapoppin Ridge, fight ing on this snlall ridge, which did and until the final assault on 18 December, not even show on the terrain maps pro- artillery fire was also ineffective. Because vided by IMAC, earned for this strong- the ridge was on the reverse slope of Hill Ilol(l tile nallle of “Hellzapo])pin Rid~e.” 1000, the artillery batteries had trouble ad- Although Marines sometimes called the justing the angle of fire to hit the spur. enemy position “Fry’s Nose” for the com- The huge trees lining the ridge caused tree III:III(ler of I ~~1, I.ieutel)i~nt (xoloIIel Fry, bursts, with no effect on the enemy bunk- or “Snuffy’s Nose,” for Colonel Ames, the ers. The enemy fortress, effectively def- 21st Mmrines’ commander, the name of iladed by most of Hill 1000? was rela- Hellzapoppin Ridge is more indicative of tively immune to shelling. the fierce combat that marked the at- At this time the Marine artillery firing tempts to capture this spur. ]msitions Jvere near tile bonlhel airstrip in This position, abandoned at the time, the vicinity of the Coconut, Grove. The WaS first diwovered on 7 December when direction of fire was almost due east. This an enemy operations map was picked up location, however, resulted in many and interpreted. This document indi- “overs” on the enemy position or tree cated that the ridge positions were those hllrsts in the jungle along the ridge of of a reinforced company from the Japa- Hill 1000 where the front lines of 1/21 nese I?.?dInfantry. Enemy strength was were located. Some casualties to Marine estin~~ted mt xbmlt 235 men, hut, beyond personnel were taken during attempts to this, the Marines had no further informa- bring the fire to bear on the enemy forti- tion on the area which the enemy so fications. stoutly defended. The ridge was about On the I%h of December, after repeated 300 -yards long with steep slopes leading attempts to knock the Japanese off Hellza- to a narrow crest some 40 yards wide. poppin Ridge by artillery fire had failed, Comlnlt patrols sought to uncover more a request for direct air support was made information about this natural fortress, to Com.4irNorSols by General Geiger. but the enemy resisted every attempt. The IMAC commander requested that the All compnnies of 1/!21 lxunched attacks three scout, bombers and three torpedo against this position, but the enemy’s bombers which had just landed at the 278 ISOLATION OF RABAUL newly completed airstrip at Torokina be target. Each mission was led by the Air- used that afternoon. The six Marine Sols operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel planes, loaded with 100-pound bombs, William K. Pottinger, with the 21st Ma- made a run on the enemy position just, at rines Executive officer, Lieutenant Colo- dusk after the target had been marked by nel Arthur H. Butler, as observer. The smoke shells from 81mm mortars. Four first strike was completed with all bombs planes managed to hit the target area; but reported landing in the target (area. the fifth plane dropped its bombs well Later, five more TBFs made a. second behind the Marine front lil~e about 600 strike, this time dropping 36 bombs. The yards north of the enemy ridge. The ex- second strike was also guided to the target plosions killed two Marines and wounded by the lead plane. At the end of this five. The sixth plane returned to Toro- mission, the five planes continued to make kina without completing the mission. strafing runs on the target and executed The Marines, somewhat dubiously, re- dummy bombing runs to hold the enemy quested another strike for the next day. defenders in place while the 21st Marines For this mission, 17 torpedo bombers attacked and seized the ridge. from VMTB-232 landed at Torokina air- Prior to the two air attacks on the 18th, field for a pre-strike briefing. The loca- the I Mzrine Amphibious Corps and the tions of the Marine lines and the target Zlst, Marines made extensive preparations area were described for the pilots before for the final assault on Hellzapoppin the planes took off again. This time the Ridge. A battery of 155mm howitzers Marine lines were marked with colored from the 37th Di~-ision was moved by smoke grenades and the target area with landing craft (LCMS) to new firing posi- white smoke. The results were consider- tions near the mouth of the Torokina Riw ably better. The planes made the strike er. From this position the battery could in column formation parallel to the front fire north alol]g the river valley and put lines. About 90 percent of the bombs shells on the south side and crest of the landed in the target area. ridge without endangering the Marine Another strike the following day, 15 lines. The 155mm howitzers, which were December, was conducted in the same moved into these temporary firing posi- manner. Pilots of 18 TBFs (VMTB- tions early on the morning of the 18th, 134) landed at Torokina for an extensive opened fire at about 1000. Smoke shells briefing by the strike operations officer were used for registration shots before the and a ground troop commander who then final concentrations were fired. The bat- led the strike in an SBD. Smoke shells tery fired about 190 rounds in the next again marked the front lines and the tar- hour, hitting the ridge repeatedly al- get area, xncl the torpedo bombers hit the though there was some initial difficulty in ridge with another successful bombing adjusting the fire to get hits along the crest run. OIL the Iflth of December, two final strikes completed the softening process on of the knife-like ridge. The artillery the enemy-held posit ions. Six planes shells cleared much of the brush and small- from VMTB-134, each with a dozen 100- er jungle growth off the ridge, exposing pound bombs, landed at Torokina once the target to the two air strikes which fol- more for briefing before heading for the lowed the artillery tire. END OF A MISSION 279 Shortly after the final air attack, 1“units them back down the hill. Company I of of 1/21 and 3,/21 (committed to action Gerard’s battalion then started forward to from the regimental reserve) moved off reinforce the platoon. Hill 1000 and over Hellzapoppin Ridge in A double envelopment was attempted by a coordinated double envelopment. Thc Company I, but Japanese defenses on the air attacks and the direct art illery fire had reverse slope of Hill 600–A stopped that done the job. The blasted and shredded maneuver and pinned the attackers into area revealed many dead ,Japanese. The an area between the enemy lines and the stunned survivors who made a token re- Marine base of fire. Company I, under sistance were quickly eliminated. .4fter heavy rifle and machine gun fire, wriggled more ihan six days of repeated attacks on out of this predicament and withdrew to this defensive stronghold, Hel]zapoppin request artillery support. Ridge was capt~lred, and the enemy force Another attack the next day, 23 Decenl- c1eared f ron] the many conce,ale(l and en- ber, by Company K of Gerard’s battalion phrced bunkers. The victory cost, the 21st ended up much in the same manner. The Marines 12!killed and 23 wounded. More company, reinforced by a heavy machine than 50 ,Japanese bodies were fonnd in gun platoon, attempted to break the Japa- the area. Tile remainder of the enemy nese hold on Hill 600–.4 by a direct attack, defenders hxd apparently fled the area. but the advance platoon took so much fire The next three days were devoted to the that the attack could not move forward. extension of the perimeter to include this Company K withdrew and artillery sup- natural fortress allcl to improvement of port was requested. A 30-minute concen- the final defensive line. There was no en- tration pounded the forward slopes of the emy contact until the morning of 21 De- hill with the usual tree-bursts reducing the cember when a reconnaissance patrol re- effectiveness of the fire. Then Company ported that about 1~18 enel)ly soldiers K started forward again. The attack was had been discovered on a hill near the To- repulsed. A third attempt, after another rokina River. A combat patrol from the mortar and artillery preparation, also 21st Marines immediately moved out to failed. Company K then withdrew to the drive the Japanese from this hill, 600-A. front, 1ines. The Marines lost one killecl and one The next morning, in preparation for wounded in a short, action that ended in a another attack, scouts moved forward to- repulse for the attackers. Directed to put, ward the enemy position. Inexplicably, an outpost on Hill 600–.<, a platoon from after putting up a stiff fight for two days, 3/21 ( I.ieutmrant Colonel Archie V. Ge- the enemy had retreated during the night. rard) started for the hill e:irly on the Only one .Japanese body was found in the 22d of December, but once more the ,Jap:t- 25 covered emplacements on the hill. Ar- nese had occul)ied a position in strength tillery fire had damaged only a few of the during the night. As the Marines reached bunkers. The Marines, in attacking for the crown of Hill 6(X)–A, a blast of small- two days, lost four killed and eight arms fire from entrenched enemy forced wounded. 10BC,ell John S. Letcher ltr to Head, HistBr, ‘r]le next several days were quiet, the G-3, HQMC, dtd 66ct60. Marines resting and preparing for a gen- 691–360 0—6s—19 280 ISOLATJON OF RABAUL eral relief along the perimeter by the units positions by the 164th Infantry and moved of the Army’s Americal Division. There into bivouac areas in preparation for the was no further action of any consequence return to CTuadalcanal. The last units of before the Marines departed”Bougainville. the 3d Marines manning perimeter posi- After the capture of Hill 600-A, the Jap- tions were relieved by the 132d Infantry anese resistance consisted mostly of peri- on the afternoon of the 28th. With two odic shelling of the area around Evansville regiments on line, command of the right, with ‘i5mm howitzers and 90mm mortars. sector of the beachhead was assumed by This firing, however, was sporadic and in- Major General John R. Hedge of the effectual. The Japanese quickly retreated Americal Division. The 21st Marines past the Torokina River when combat pa- was relieved by the 182d Infantry on the trols went out to eliminate the enemy fire. 1st and 2d of January 1944. By 16 Jan- Three final air attacks, two on the 25th uary, the entire 3d Marine Division had and one on the 26th of December, appar- returnecl to Guadalcanal. ently discouraged the ,Japanese from The raider and parachute regiments re- staging another attack on the perimeter. mained on Bougainvillea for two weeks The object of the attacks was to clear out after the 3d Division departed as part of an arem north of Hill 600–A where Japa- a composite command led by Lieutenant nese activity was reported by patrols. Colonel Shapley with Lieutenant Colonel Eighteen torpedo bombers armed with Williams as executive officer. The provi- 500-pound and 100-pound bombs blasted sional force manned the right flank of the the target, and after the attacks patrols perimeter along the Torokina and spent its found the area abandoned. Trenches and time improving defenses and patrolling installations indicated that about 800 Jap- deep into enemy territory.” By the end anese had been in the area. A number of of January, the raiders and parachutists patrols across the Torokina River, how- had turned over their positions to the ever, failed to make contact with the Army and joined the general exodus of enemy. INC.4C troops from the island. The 3d The relief of the Marine division from Defense Battalion, which stayed on until Bougainvil]e had been expected since 15 21 .June, was the sole remnant of the Ma- T)ecember after the consolidation of the rine units that had taken part in the initial final defense line along Hill 1000 and Hill assault on Bougainvillea. 600. As additional Army troops continued The damage to the Japanese forces in to arrive zt, the beachhead, Admiral Hal. the nearly two months of Marine attacks sey directed the .4rmy7s XIV Corps to was not overwhelming. The enemy com- assume control of the Bougainvillea opera- mitted his units piecemeal, and, although tion, and, on 15 December, General Geiger most of these were completely wiped out, turned over control of the beachhead to the the total loss was not staggering. The Ma- commanding general of the XIV Corps, rines estimated that 2,458 enemy soldiers Major General Oscar W. Griswold. The lost their lives in the defense of the Cape relief of the 3d Ma,rine T)ivision by the Torokina area, the Koromokina counter- .kmerical Division began on the morn- ing of 2’7 T)ecember when all units of the 11S’hapk’V Ltr; BGen Robert H. Williams ltr to !lth Marines were relieved on frontline Head, HistRr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 4Nov60. END OF A MISSION 281 landing, and the counterattacks in the Ma- anese capability to threaten the beachhead rine Corps sector. Prisoners numbered from air bases in the Northern Solomons 25. Japanese materiel captured was also had been partially restored, and only re- negligible and consisted of a few field peated strikes against the fields at Buka, pieces and infantry weapons. Kahili, and Ballale kept the Japanese air The postwar compilation of Marine threat below the dangerous point. On 20 Corps casualties in the Rougainville op- November, ComAirNorSols estimated that eration totaled 423 killed and 1,418 at least 15 known enemy airfields within wounded. The breakdown by major units 250 miles of Empress Augusta Bay were was: Corps troops—6 killed and 31 either under construction or were repaired wounded; 1st Parachute. Regiment (less and operational once more. Completion 2d Battalion) —45 killed and 121 wound- of airstrips within the Cape Torokina ed; 2d Raider Regiment (provisional) — perimeter was then rushed to meet this 64 killed and 204 wounded; 3d Defense growing enemy threat. Battalion—13 killed and 40 wounded; and During the early stages of the beach- 3d Marine Division-295 killed and 1,022 head, the construction of the airfields had wounded.lz been weighed against the immediate need for a road net to insure an adequate sys- COJIPL.??TZON OF tem of supply to the front lines. The road THE AIIW’IELDJS ‘3 net had been given priority, and most of the efforts of the 19th Marines had been For a period of about 10 days after the directecl to this project. After the perim- landings on Bougainvillea, the Allies had eter road was completed in time to sup- almost complete air superiority in the port the fight for the Piva Forks, atten- Solomons. The Japanese bases in the Bou- tion was again turned toward airfield ~linville area had been worked over so construction. The road network was still well and so many times by Allied air far from finished, however. When the strikes and naval bombardments that the various artillery units and support outfits enemy experienced extreme difficulty put- occupying the projected airfield sites were ting them into operation again. As a asked to move out of the way of construc- result, the Japanese were forced to contest tion work, the answer was usually a suc- the Cape Torokina landings from baws at cinct, “Over which roads ?” 14 Rabaul and fields on New Ireland. By The Japanese, ironically, gave the con- the time that the beachhead had ex- struction gangs a big assist. The enemy panded to include the Piva fields, the Jap- emplaced several 15cm howitzers in the high ground east of the Torokina River, ‘2 Rentz. I)ongainvi71c and the Northern Nolo- IJIon,9,App. II, p. 140. See Appendix H, Marine and the construction work in the vicinity Casualties, for the final official totals. of the Coconut Grove appealed to his 13 ~~nless ~fher~~ise noted, the material in this curiosity. As a result, whenever there was section is derived from : Th irdFlt NarrRept; no combat air patrol over the beachhead, IM .4C AR–III; ,7(?MarIl iv Combat Rcpt; Rentz, the Japanese were quite apt to drop shells Bo?/~uinvi17c an{! tlte A’orthern Solomons; Isely and Crow], Marinr. s and .4mphi?)ious War; Mori- into the airfield area. The Seabees and the son, Z3rcuki)1g the Ri.smarcks Barrier; Miller, ~cdllction of Raba?17. “ McAltiter ltr. END OF A MISSION 283 Marine engineers moved to the end of the gave the III Amphibious Force torpedo field which was not being hit and ccm- boats a wider range, and these ubiquitous tinued to work. The other tenants, craft then prowled along the Bougainvillea though, anxious to mvoid repe~ted artillery coast as far north as Buka and as far south shelling, vacated the area. as the Shorthands in protective patrols. By the time that Inland I)efense Line The Torokina strip was finally declared F had been occupied on 28 November, operational on 10 December, just one clearing of the projected bomber and fight- month after the initial construction was er strips was well underway. The work started. At dawn on the 10th, Marine was speeded by tile arrival on tile 26th of Fighter Squadron 216, with 17 fighter November of the 36th Naval Construction planes, 6 scout bombers, and 1 cargo Battalion which brought all its equipment plane, landed as the first echelon. The znd went to work almost full time on the following day, 11 December, three Marine Piva fields. Meanwhile, the ‘rorokina torpedo bombers landed and these were strip had been unexpectedly put into oper- joined six days later by four aircraft from ation. About noon on the 24th, Seabees an Army Air Forces squadron. The first ancl engineers working on the airstrip were clirect air support mission was flown on amazecl to see a Marine scout-bomber pre- 13 December with Hellzapoppin Ridge as paring to land on the rough runway. the target, while combat air patrols began (Juickly clezring the strip of all heavy flying from the former plantation site on engineering equipment, the construction 10 December, the day that the planes ar- workers st~ocl by while the Marine pilot rived. Later in the month, additional brought his plane into a bumpy but suc- flights including night fighter patrols, be- cessfl~l landing. The emergency landing gan operations from the Torokina strip. of the plane, damaged in a raicl over Buka, After the completion of the first field, initiated operations on the new strip. Admiral I{alsey, whose cheerful mes- work was rushed on the Piva bomber field, sages delighted the South Pacific Forces and early in December another full- all through the long climb up the Solo- strength naval construction battalion, the mons ladder, provided a fitting note of 77th, arrived to help with the job. As the congratl~lations on the completion of the network of roads throughout the perime- fighter strip: ter was completed, the 71st and 53d Sea- In smashing through swamp, jungle, and bees also went to work on the airfields. Japs to build that air strip, your men have The Piva bomber field received its first proven there is neither bull nor dozing at planes on 19 December, and was com- Torokina. . . A well done to them all. Halsey.” pletely operational on 30 December. The Piva fighter field, delayed by lack of mat- The advance naval base and boat pool, ting, was operational on 9 January, after which had been underway since the first the main units of the 3d Marine Division landings, was also rushed toward comple- were withdrawn from the island. tion during the month of November. This With the opening of three Allied air- fields on Bougainvillea, the Japanese capa- “ ComSoPac msg to CG, IMAC, in W MarDiv Jnl, 13Dec43. bility to threaten the Allied position on 284 ISOLATION OF RABAUL Cape Torokina from the air was virtually JAPANESE COUNTERATTACK, eliminated. The tactical importance of MARCH 1944 “ these airstrips was demonstrated in the quick support given the ground troops in Several weeks after the 3d Marine Divi- the attack on Hellzapoppin Ridge, but the sion departed Bougainvillea, the XIV advantage was strategic as well as tacti- Corps became aware of gradually increas- cal. The Torokina airfields brought ing enemy activity around the area of the .kllied air power to within 220 miles of Torokina River and the right sector of the Rabaul and allowed fighter aircraft to beachhead now being held by the Americal escort bombers on air strikes against Jap- Division. Immediate offensive efforts were anese bases on New Britain and New Ire- directed toward the Torokina sector, and land. The completion of the three fields aggressive patrols by the Americal Divi- on Bougainvillea, and a fourth field at Stirl- sion erased the threat to the perimeter by ing Island in the Treasurys, marked the driving the Japanese out of prepared posi- successful achievement of the primary aim tions along the coast near the Torokina of the Bougainvillea operation. River. The bunkers and pillboxes encoun- The constant pressure which the ex- tered were destroyed. The perimeter, panding air strength of the Allies exerted however, was not extmded to cover this upon the Japanese installations was re- area. flected in the attempts which the enemy The following month, Japanese patrol made to delay the Torokina airstrips. action was more aggressive, and through- During the first 26 days of operation at out February the entire perimeter was Torokina, the beachhead had 90 enemy subjected to a number of sharp probing at- alerts. The vigilance of the ComAirNor- tacks by small groups of enemy sold&s. Sols tighter cover and the accuracy of the The two frontline divisions, keenly aware Marine 3d Defense Battalion’s antiairc- that the perimeter might soon be tested by raft fire was indicated by the fact that — bombs were dropped during only 22 of another determined Japanese attack, pre- these alerts. Casualties from enemy air pared extensive defenses to meet it. Forti- action up to 26 November were 24 killed fications in depth were constructed, and and 96 wounded. Damage was restricted the entire front was mined and wired mainly to the boat pool and supply stocks where possible. on Puruata Island. During the time that the 3d Marine “ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this Division remained on the island, the Jap- section is deriwxi from: ThirdFlt NarrRept; anese managed to bomb the perimeter only XIV Corp~ History of TA Operation Mar44, dtd 21 Apr44 ( Bougainvillea AreaOpFile, HistBr, five more times, and the interval between HQMC ) ; 37th InfDiv G–2 Periodic Repts, n.d, alerts grew increasingly lengthy. For the ( Bougainvillea AreaOpFile, HistBr, HQMC ) ; entire period 1 November to 28 December, 37tJh InfDiv OpRept—Bougainville, 6Nov43- there were 136 enemy air alerts with bombs 30Apr44, n.d. ( WW II RecsDiv, FRO Alex) ; .Sd dropped during only 27 of these alerts. MarDefBn &’AR; LtCol Edward H. Forney Itr The total casualties in enemy air raids to CMC, dtd 7Jun48; LtCol John G. Bouker ltr to CMC, dtd 24 Jnn48; Rentz, Bougainvillea and were 28 killed, 136 wounded, and 10 the Northern IJolomons; Miller, Reduction of missing. Rabaul. END OF A MISSION 285 The Japanese, after being forced to five infantry regiments—the 13th, .23d, withdraw from the heights around the &th, 53d, and the 81st—and two artillery Torokina River late in December, began regiments. The attack force numbered planning the counterstroke about the mid- about 11,700 troops out of a total force of dle of .January. Determined to end the some 15)400. The general plan of the Ta Allied possession of the Cape Torokina operxtion was a simultaneous attack on the area, the enemy readied the entire dth ZX- Allied perimeter from the northwest, /ui.sion,plus a number of special battalions north, and east, while the artillery units from the ,Yeventeenth Army. This force pounded the objective from positions east began training for the operation while of the Torokina River. The attack opened support troops started building roads to- on 8 March with a simultaneous shelling ward the Cape Torokina area from of the Torokina and Piva airstrips and a Mawareka. This offensive was to be a sudden thrust at the 37th Division lines joint Army-Navy effort, but when Truk newt- Lake Kathleen in the center of the Island in the Central Pacific was hit by a perimeter. large .411ied carrier force on 16 February The Army division held its positions 1944, the remainder of the naval air against light probing attacks and waited strength at Rabaul was dispatched to for the all-out assault. The following day Truk. The Xeventeentlt Awny then car- three battalions from the 13th and %’3d ried on the operation alone. Znfantvy slashed at 37th Division posi- As expected by Allied intelligence of- tions in an effort to penetrate the Army ficers, the trail net from Mosigetta- lines and obtain high ground where they Ma-ivareka was the main route of travel, could emplace artillery weapons to threat- and a rough road was completed during en the airfields. The 145th Infantry bore the early part of the year. This route had the brunt of these attacks, and by the 12th its share of troubles, though. Sections of of March had made three counterattacks the road were washed out by rains, and to dislodge the enemy forces and restore swollen rivers carried away the hasty the lines. During these bitter struggles, bridges thrown across them by the Japa- the entire enemy force was virtually an- nese engineers. Additionally, the Japa- nihilated; 37th Infantry Division troops nese activity along this road was a prime counted 1,173 dead Japanese in the area target for repeated aerial attacks from after the attacks. patrolling Allied planes. ,Japanese barge While this fight raged, another strong movements along the coast were so har- Japanese force suddenly assaulted the assed by Allied torpedo boats, LcI gnn- Americal Division in the area of the upper boats, and patrol planes that only a few Torokina River. The action here was con- of the barges remained afloat by March. siderabley less violent but more protracted In the end, the enemy force was required than in the 37th Division area, and the to move overland through the jungle, Japanese forces were not driven back until tugging and pulling artillery and supplies the 29th of March. The enemy in this area behind. suffered 541 casualties. The .Japanese offensive, known as the In sharp contrast to the weeks of No- l“a operation, included elements from vember and De@mber, the main enemy 286 ISOLATION OF RABAUL thrusts during the March counterattack potential effectiveness and heavy weapons continued in the perimeter sector held by ha-re been destroyed.” the 37th Division. After the staggering The XIV Corps estimated that more repulse near the center of the perimeter, than 6,843 ,Japanese had died in the futile the Japanese forces moved toward the charges against the strong Allied positions Laruma area, where four more determined from 8 to !25 March. These casualty fig- attacks were launched against the Army IIres compare fwvorably with Japanese positions. A coordinated attack in two records which indicate that the Ta at- places on the northwest side of the perim- tack force lost 2,389 killed and 3,060 eter on the 13th and 14th was repulsed by wounded. In addition, various suppcmt- the 129th Infantry, and more than 300 ing units under direct control of the ,Japanese were killed. On the 17th of Seventeenth Army suffered casualties of March, the ,Japanese struck another blow about, 3,000 killed and 4,000 wouncled. 18 at tl~e37th Division positions and were met At the time of the attack against the by a tank-infantry counterattack that XIV Corps perimeter, the Antiaircraft and Special Weapons Groups of the Ma- killed ~nother 195 enemy. rine 3d Defense Battalion were operating The sixth and final attack against the under the tactical control of Antiaircraft XIV Corps perimeter was launched on the Command, Torokina, an XIV (lorps ~4t]l of ~f~~c]l. ,Japanese fanaticism car- grouping of all air defense weapons. For ried the zttack as far as one of the bat- some time., enemy activity over the beach- talion command posts of the 129th In- head had been restricted because of the fantry before the penetration was sealed almost complete dominahce of Allied air- off. Another 200 Japanese perished in craft. As a result, the Marine weapons this last attack. The following day, XIV were seldom fired. When the Japanese Corps artillery shelled the retreating Japa- attack was launched, the 90mm batteries nese, and the last bid by the enemy to re- were employed as field artillery. take the Cape Tcn-okina area was over. The Marine batteries were usually regis- Admiral Halsey, describing the “Ta” oper- tered by an Army fire direction center on ation later, reported: various targets beyond the range of light The attack came against positions that artillery units and adjusted by aerial ob- had been carefully prepared in depth, with servers. Most of the firing missions were well-prepared fields of fire ;Ind manned by well-disciplined, healthy, and ready-to-go targets of opportunity and night harass- troops of the ~ith and Americal Division. ing registrations on enemy bivouac and Some damage was done by enemy artillery supply areas. The Marine weapons fired a but the damage did not prevent aerial opera- total of 4,951 rounds of ammunition in 61 tions. The Japanese infantry attacks were savage, suicidal, and somewhat stupid. artillery missions.lg They were mowed down without mercy and the attack was actually broken up by the “ ThirdFlt NarrRept, p. 12. killing of a sufficient number of Japanese ‘a Seventeenth Army Ops—11, p. 111. to render them ineffective. At this writing, “ CO, 3d DefBn SAR Covering Employment of over 10,000 ,Japanese ha,ye been buried by (luns in Direct Ground Fire Missions, 14Mar– our forces on Bougainvillea. The remainder 15Apr44, dtd 15Apr44 ( BougainviUe AreaOps- cm probably manage to keep alive but their File, HistBr, HQMC ). EATD OF A MISSION 287 On the 13th of March, two !Xhnrn guns November with the assault waves. The from the Marine unit were moved toward withdrawal came one week after Admiral tile northwest side of the perimeter- with Halsey’s South Pacific Command was the mission of direct fire on I number of turned over to Vice Admiral John H. enemy field pieces and other installations Newton and all the Solomon Islands were located on a ridge of hills extending ill annexed as part of General MacArthur’s front of the 129th Infantry. Emplace- Southwest Pacific Command. The South ment of the guns in suitable positions for I’acific campaiam against the Japanese was such restrict ed fire was dific.nlt. but both virtually ended. Ultimately, the Cape guns were evelltlla]ly employed a~linstj Torokina area was occupied by Australian limited targets of opportunity. The guns forces which, by the end of the war, were were later used to greater advantage to closing slowly on Numa Numa and the s{~pport the soldiers in local counterat- last, remnants of the Bougainvillea de- tacks against the Japanese forces. fenders. The 155mm seacoast defense guns of the Marine battalion were also used as field artillery in defense of the perimeter. The Marine battery was called upon for 129 In an analysis of the operations against firing missions in general support of the the Japanese in the Northern Solomons, three points of strategic importance are Arnly defenses and was usually employed agail~st, 1ong-range area targets. The big apparent. The first of these is that de- gllns fired 6,860 rounds, or 515 tons of ex- spite the risk inherent in attacking deep plosives, a~ainst enemy positions. into enemy-held territory, the Allied In addition, two of the 40mm guns from forces successfully executed such a ven- the Special Weapons Group were moved ture. Diversionary and subsidiary actions were so timed and executed that the Japa- into the front, lines in the .Imerical Di~~i- nese were deceived as to the intentions and sion sector for close support. There were objective of the final attack. The South few suitable targets for the guns in the slow action in this area, and only two or Pacific forces also gambled and won on three bunkers were hit, by direct fire. One the premise that the ever-increasing su- weapon, however, fired over 1,000 rounds periority of Allied air and sea power in countermortar fire and to strip obstmlct- would counterbalance the vulnerability of ing foliage from enemy positions. Tar- extended supply lines attendant upon an gets being scarce, the guns were sometimw operation so c1ose to Rabaul. used as sniping weapons against, individual Another point is that, although the oper- Japznese.20 ations in Bougainvillea and the Treasurys were planned, directed, and executed by The defense battalion was the last Ma- South Pacific Forces, the campaign was rine Corps ground unit withdrawn from partially a maneuver to provide flank se- Bougainvillea. It departed Cape Toro- curity for the advance of the Southwest kina on 21 ,June, nearly eight months after Pacific Forces along the northern coast of the initial landings of the battalion on 1 New Guinea. The need to strike at a point which would insure this flank security was ‘03{1DefBn Memo No. 6–44, dtd 1Apr44 ( Bou- xainvil]e Area O1xsFile, HistBr, HQMC ). the factor which resulted in the selection 288 ISOLATION OF RABAUL of Cape Torokina as the I Marine Am- daring, yet sound. The diversionary land- phibious Corps objective. ing on Choiseul and the operations in the The third point is that the Bougainvillea Treasurys were conceived to mislead the campaign was wholly successful, with a Japanese, and these maneuvers served as minimum of lives lost and materiel ex- the screen behind which the I Marine Am- pended. Seizure of a shallow but broad phibious Corps moved toward the actual beachhead by Marine units and the expan- point of attack. The surprise achieved by sion of this perimeter with the subsequent the landings at Empress Augusta Bay is and continued arrival of Army reinforce- evidence of astute, farsighted thinking ments was an economical employment of behind these operations. both amphibious troops and infantry. The tactical stroke which decided the The operations in the Northern Solo- success of the Bougainvillea operation was mons knocked the Japanese off-balance. the selection of the Cape Torokina beaches The only enemy activity was a day-to-day as the landing site. To pick a landing reaction to Allied moves. After 15 Decem- area lashed by turbulent surf, with tangled ber, Allied air superiority south of Rabaul jungle and dismal swamps immediately was unchallenged, and the Japanese can- inland, was a tactical decision which the celled further naval operations in the lati- Japanese did not believe the Allied forces tude of the Bougainvillea operation. There would make. .4mphibious patrols had were other considerations, however. The failed to scout the exact beaches chosen enemy was pressed by additional Allied and general knowledge of the area was un- moves in the Central Pacific, the loss of favorable. Des,pite these disadvantages, the Gilbert Islands, and the continued ad- the shoreline at Cape Torokina was picked vance of General MacArthur’s forces in because the Japanese had decided not to the Southwest Pacific. The success at Bou- defend such an unlikely area in strength. gainvillea, however, led to the eventual col- When the I Marine Amphibious Corps lapse of the enemy’s defensive positions in was relieved by XIV Corps on 15 Decem- the Bismarcks. ber, General Geiger’s Marine forces could leave the island confident that the The Bougainvillea campaign was intended beachhead was firmly anchored along the to accomplish the destruction of enemy air strength in the Bismarcks ; not only was this prescribed lines and that the mission was accomplished but the by-products of the complete. Advance naval base facilities campaign were so extensive that the subse- were installed and functioning; one fighter quent operations at Green Island and Emirau strip was in operation and another under- were accomplished virtually without enemy way, and a bomber field was nearly com- opposition, and the entire enemy offensive potential in the Bismarcks area was de plete. Equally as important, a road net stroyed. In the matter of ultimate achieve- capable of carrying all anticipated traffic ment and importance in the Pacific War, was constructed or nearly finished the Bougainvillea operation was successful beyond our greatest hopes.= throughout the beachhead. This last By tactical considerations, the planning achievement, as much as the rapid comple- of the Northern solomons campaign was tion of airfields, insured the continued ex- istence of the Cape Torokina perimeter “ ThirdFlt NarrItept, p. 12. against Japanese attacks. END OF A MISSION 289 That the operations ashore were success- rescue operations which, despite the com- ful though faced by three formidable ob- plexities of evacuation, resulted in less stacles-–.Japanese forces, deep swamps, than one percent of the battle casualties and dense jungle-–is a tribute to the co- clying of wounds. Aid stations were lo- operation of the Marine Corps, Army, and cated as close to the front lines as possible. Na17y units assigned to the I Marine Am- Wounded Marines were given emergency phibious Corps. treatment minutes after being hit. The For the 3d Marine Division, which casualties were removed by amtracs to hos- formed the lxl]k of tile IMAC forces ini- pitmls in the rear, or, in the case of serious- ti~lly, the months of hard fiyhtinx estab- ly wounded Marines, to more extensive fa- lished skills and practices which lasted cilities at Vella Lavella. The hospitals on throughout the Pacific campaibgn, The the beach were subjected to air raids and Marines of General Turnage’s division shelling, but the treatment of wounded first experienced the difficulties of main- continued despite these handicaps. taining supply and evacuation while un- Disease incidence was low, except for der enemy fire at Cape Torokina. If there malaria which had already been con- had been any misgivings about commit- tracted elsewhere. The construction work ting an untested division to such a task, on the airfields and roads resulted in the these were dispelled by the manner in draining of many adjacent swamps which which the Marines conducted the opera- aided the malaria control. There were no tion. “ After the campaign, General Turn- cases of mnlaria which could be traced to age wrote: “From its very inception it was local infection, and dysentery and diarrhea a bold ancl hazardous operation. Its suc- were practically nonexistent-a rare testi- cess was due to the planning of all echelons monial to the sanitary regulations observ- and the indomitable will> courage, and de- ed from the start of the operation. Before votion to duty of all members of all or- the campaign, many preventive measures ganizations participating.>? ‘z were taken. Lectures and demonstrations By the time of the Piva Forks battle, which stressed the value of clothing, the 3d Division Marine was a combat-wise rel)ellcnts, bug spray, and head and mos- and skilled jungle fighter capable of swift qu; to nets, }vere part of tl~e pre-opera - movement through swamps and effective tion training. Their effect and the clisci- employment, of his weapons. By the end pline of the lfarines is reflected in the fact of the campai~gn, the Marine was a veteran that few men were evacuated because of soldier, capable of offering a critical ap- illness. praisal of his own weapons and tactics as The Marines learned that, with few ex. well as those of his opponent. ceptionsl jungle tactics were a common This increased fighting skill was re- sense application of standard tactical prin- flected by mounting coordination between ciples nnd methods to this type of terrain. all combat units, with lessening casual- Control of troops was difficult but could ties. In this respect, the 3d Meclical Bat- be accomplished by the “contact immi- talion achieved a remarkable record of nent” formation described earlier. Dur- ing most of the fighting, command posts “ $~ MarDiv CombatRept, p. 12. were situated as close to the front lines as 290 ISOI.ATIOIV OF R.kFIAIiI, possible—sometimes as near as 75 yards. Supporting weapons such as the 37nml Although this close proximity sometimes antitank gun and the 75mm pack howitzer forced the command post to defend itself were effective in the dense foliage, but against enemy attacks, Marine officers felt these guns were difficult to manhandle into that SIICIIn location provided more secu- position and could not keep up with the rity. .iclditionallyl this close contact al- advance in a rapidly changing tactical lowed rapid relay of information with situation. The 81mm mortars, aug- resultant quick action. The command post, nlellte(l by tile lighter (i(hllm 1(Ibes, pro- wm usual]y in two echelons-the battle or vided most of the C1OW support fires. forwarcl cI’ with the commanding officer These ~eitpons achieved good results on znd the operations and intelligence offi- troops in the open, but were too light for cers, and the rear command post mmned emplaced bunkers, The Marines were l)y tile executive officer and tile Sllpply and supported on two occasions by an Army communications officers. ul~it ]ritl~ cl~enlica] Illortars (4.2 inch), and I)efense in the jungle usually took the these were found to be extremely effective form of a tlli]lly-str’et(lle(l lx~rin]eter v-itl] against pillboxes and covered positions. a reserve in the center. Organization of Several attempts were macle to use flame the positions was seldom complete. Some- throwers in stubborn areas , and these times a double-apron fence of barbed wire weapons had a demoralizing effect on tl~e blocked some avenue of approach, but usu- 011 Bougainvillea, the only casualties to N“ot once bat all through the camlmign the ground troops were from bombs inexplic- amphibian tri~(~tor bridged the vital gap hi?- ably dropped 600 yards from a well- tween life and death, available rations and markecl target. The other nine strikes gnawinx hunger, victory and defeat. They were highly successful and in two in- roamed their triunlphant way o~er th~ beachhead. They ruined roads, tore down stances were made within 75 yards of the communication lines, revealecl our combat front lines without harm to the infantry. positions to the enemy-b~lt everywhere Before the Cape Torokina operation, air they were welcome.m support wcs employed mostly against NTotto be” overlooked in an analysis of targets beyond the reach of artillery. The the campaign is the contribution to the Bougainvi]le fighting showed that air success of the Cape Torokina operation by could be employed w close to friendly the 19th Marines. The Marine pioneers troops aucl as accurately as artillery, and nnd engineers, with a Seabee unit attached, that it was an additional weapon which landed with the assault waves on D-Day could be used to surprise and overwhelm and for some time functioned as shore tl]e enemy. Much credit for developing party personnel before being released to tl~is techniqlle should go to Lieutenant Colonel ,Johu T. 1,. D. Gabbert, the 3d “ John Monlcs, Jr., and .John Falter. A h’i7jijo1L a)!d a Stur, Tl( c Third Marimcs at Ro?[guinvi71e Division .kir Officer, and the ground and (New York : Henry Holt and Company, 1945), v flyiug officers who worked with him. 65. END OF A MISSION 293 perform the construction missions as- With the exception of the unexpected ac- signed. Only one trailto theinteriorex- cumulation of supplies and equipment isted at the time of landing; in slightly which nearly smothered the beaches early more tha]) two weeks a rough but passable in the operation, logistical planning road connected all units along the perim- proved to be as sound as conditions per- eter. This provided a vitally ]]ecessary mitted. An advance base at Vella Lavella supply ancl reinforcement route for fur- for a source of quick supply to augment ther advances. the short loads carried ashore on D-Day One of the reasons the Marines gained proved to be unnecessary in the light of and helcl the perimeter was this ability to later events. The III Amphibious Force construct quickly the necessary rozds, air- lost a minimum of ships during the llou- fields, al~d supply facilities. Engineering gainville operation, a stroke of good for- units and Seabees of the I Marine .4m- tune that accrued as a result of air don~ina- phibious Corps built and maintained 25 tion by the Allies. This permitted direct miles of high-speed roads as well as a net- and continued supply from Guada]canal. work of lesser roads within the space of More than 45,000 troops and 60,000 tons of two months, This work was in nddition cargo were unloadec{ in the period 1 No- to that on two fighter strips and a bomber vember-15 December, with no operational field. The Japanese had not developed tile losses. Writh tile exception of the first two Cape Torokina area and therefore could echelons, all supplies were unloaded and not defend it when the Marines landed. the ships had departed before nigl~tfall. After the IMAC beachhead was estab- The lack of an organized shore party for lished, tile ,Japanese employed a few crl~de the sole purpose of directing and cim- pieces of engineering equipment in an at- trolling the flow of supplies over the tempt to construct roads from tl~e Rllin beachhead was partially solved by the as- area toward F.mpress ~iugusta Ray. The signment of combat troops for this duty. project w-as larger than the equilnnent Luckily, the enemy situation during the available. The attacking force for tl~e T(1. early stages at Cape Torokina was such operation had to struggle more than Jo that nearly 40 percent of the landing force miles through jungle, swamps, and rivers could be diverted to solving the problem of tugging mtillery, ammunition, and rations beach logistics. This led to many con~- over rough jungle trails. XIV Corps was plaints by assault units, wllicll-clespite able to meet this threat over IAIAC-con- only nominal opposition by the .Japnnese strutted roads, which permit ted reii~force- during the landing stxges—protested the ments to rl~sl~ to tile perimeter at, high loss of combat strength at such a time. speed.zs It is to General Vandegrift’s credit that The solution of the logistics muddle, quick unloading was assured by the assign- which stzrted on D-Day and continued for ment of infantrymen to the task of cargo several weeksl was another accomplishment handling. This, however, was a tempo- rary measure to meet an existing problem which marked the Rougainville can]paign. and would have been unfeasible in future “ Col Ion M. Bethel ltr to CM(’, dtd 16.Ju148 operations where opposition was more de- ( l;(~ll~;iinville 31011cIxL:11J11Ct)]]lnlent File, IIist13r, termined. His action, though, was an in- HQ31C ) clination of the growing awareness that 294 ISOI.ATION OF RA13.\UI, ll~ons ended as the Bougainvillea operation sponsibility. It is i]]terestilly to nol(~ that drew to a close. The en-d of the Solomons after the Ilollgainyille ol)erat ion a nltn)ber clm in had been reached, and new opera- of I]]lits lwwl)lnlen(led tl]at tile snore ]Jal’ty tions were already beinx planned for the I)e :lllgnle]~te(l by a(l([ii io)lal t]xml)s or lwr- combi ~led forces of the ,Southwest and sonnel not essellti:il 10 o]x’1’:ltio])s els(’- South Pacific commands. The general— Ivlwre. I.ater in tl]e ~!ar, co])il)at le:Iders missions of the cmnpaign had been accom- realizetl tlllt ]Iothi])x N-as n)ore esw)tial plishe(l. Raballl lvas neutralimci from than an unintermlpte(l flo}f- of supl)liw to airfields on Bougainvillea, and the victory tl~e Msall]t ul]its, :Illd tllilt tile conll)licate(l won by Marines and soldiers at Czpe Toro- task of beach logistics must be handled by killa allovvecl other Allied forces to con- a trained shore party organization and not an assignecl labor force of inexperienced tinue the, attack fi~~inst the. ,Japanese at personnel. other points. The 130ngain\-ille operation was no The final aceolnde to the Bougainvillea strategic campaign in the sense of the em- forces is contained in the message General ployment of tl~ousands of men and a myr- Yandegrift sent his successor, General iad of equipment requiring months of tac- Geiger, when the Marine forces returned tical and logistical nlaneuver. As com- to Glladalcalm] : pared witl~ the ]luge forces employed in I want to congratulate you on the splen- later operations, it was a series of skir- flid work that YOU and your staff and the nlishes })etween forces rarely larger than a (’orps did on Bougainvillea. ‘L’he spectacular hattalioll. Yet, lvith all due sense of pro- atta(.li on Tarawa has kind of put Bouga in- l)ortion, tile l)rincil)al engagements have ~ille off the front page ; but those of us who the right to be called battles, from the kn(Iw the constant strain, danger, and hard- ship t~f continuous jungle warfare realize fierceness and bra~.ery with which they wh:lt was accomplished by your outfit dnr- were contest e(l ancl the im lmrt ant benefits ing the two months you were there.” resulting from their favorable ontcome.z~ The campaign for the Northern Solo- ‘7 LtGen Alexander .4. Vandergrift ltr to Maj- (;eu Roy S. Geiger, dtd 29Jan44 (Vandegrift ‘“ Hi.stT)i?;Acct. p. 1, L’ersonal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC ). PART IV The New Britain Campaign 691–360 0– -G:;--– -20 CHAPTER 1 New Britain Prelude GHQ AND ALAMO PL.4iV~q ‘ The airstrips building within the IMAC perimeter on Bougainvillea p,rovided the By late h’ovember, the parallel drives means for a heightened bomber offensive of South and Southwest Pacific forces en- against Rabaul-raids which could count visaged in ELKTON plans had reached on strong fighter protection. With the the stage where General MacArthur was completion of Torokina Field expected in ready to move into New Britain, with tile early December, and the first of the Piva main target the enemy airfields at Cape Field bomber runways ready by the Gloucester on the island’s western tip. month’s end, SoPac planes could throw LIp The timing of the attack depended largely an air barrier against enemy counterat- upon the availability of assault and resup- tacks on landings on western New Britain. ply shipping, ancl the completion of All ied In like manner, the new llarkhan-Ramu airfields on Bougainvillea and in the Mark- valley fields increased the potential of ham-Ramu River valley at the foot of ths American and Australian air to choke off Huon Peninsula. Conlplete control of the raids by the Japanese ~ourt~ Air Army Vitiaz Strait, the prize sought in t]~epend- based at Madang and Wewak and points west on the New Guinea coast. ing operation, would give the Allies a W’bile men of the Australian 9th Divi- clear shot at the ,Japanese bases on the sion drove the Japanese garrison of Fin- LNewGuinea coast and a secure approach schhafen back along the share of the Huon” route to the Philippines. Peninsula toward Sio, other Australians of the 7th Division fought north through ‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derive{] fron~ : GHQ, SWP.4 G–3 Jnl the Markham-Ramu uplancls, keeping the and File, Sep43—May44, hereafter (IHQ P-.? Jn[; pressure on the retreating enemy defend- ALA310 Force G–3 .Jnl and File 23 Ju143–10Feb ers. Behind the assault troops, engineers 44, in 20 parts, hereafter .4L.4110 G–3 ,Jnl with workecl feverishly to complete airfields at part number ; AL.lMO Force Rept of the DEX- I,ae and Finschhafen, and at Nadzab and TERITY Operation, 131Xw43–l(lFet]44, n.d., here- after DEXZ’EZ?ITI’ 17ept(all in lVW II Rem Gusap in the valley. Conlpletion sched- Div, FRC Alex) : ~-SSBS, MilAnalysisDil~, ules were slowed by the seemingly enclless +hfJ@?nl.C>ZtOf $’OYCP 297 —. 298 ISOLATION 01’ 1{.~IL$l~IJ ()]wratiolia] until tlw 15th. Prior to that ,July, was next charged with the execution (late, :111trm)l)s aII(l e(lllipl)]t’l~t were air- of D13XTERITlT (the seizure of ~~’estern lifte(l into tl~e valley lIy t]al)slmrts of tile XTew Britain). .~ll ie(l .i ir Forces. Teclmically, Blilllle~, servi]lg as Con- [“nt il tile l)e~l’ fol’\var(l bases \vP1’er!eacly mander, Allied Land Forces, had opera- to Slll)lmrt attacks 011 tllc l)t’xt Swr.i 01)- tional control of the national contingents jectiycv+, all tlw sllipl)in.g al-ailab]e to ~lcl- assigned to his command. This assig-n- ]lliral Ilarhey-s VII .Il))l)llil)iolls Forc[’ ment included the U.S. Sixth Army, led Jvas timl 111)]Ilo\-illg troops an(l sllpl)lies by Krueger, the Australian Military forward fron) (lepots at ‘1’owlls~ille, I’ort Forces, also led by Blarney, and the Royal 310resl)y, all(l JIiln(~ nay. Tile lnll(ling Netherlands East Indies .4rrny. Actu- (01’:lftan(l sllilx+ essential to a lllove across ally, most of the troops in Sixth Army T’iti:tz Stlait :Lgainst (’ape (ilollcwtel were assigned to AL.AM() Force, which (“()(11(1not he t’elease(l fOr l’ellearsal illl(l MacArthur kept directly under his Gen- lon(lillg ILntil 21 3Tmw)lber :tt the earliest. eral Headquarters (GHQ). The effect of These factors, coupled with the desire tl~is organizational setup was to make of planners to execute the movement to the New Guinea Force an Australian com- target duringthe dark of the moonl com- man(l to which American troops were in- bined to set D-Day back several times. frequently assigned and to fix .&LAMO The tzrget date first projected for Cape Force m an American command with very Glollcest el” \\”:lS 15 Xovenllmr : tile (liltt’ few Australian units. finally agreed upon was 26 December. In In contrmt to the situation on land, no both crises, provision for a preliminary s~p:~rnte nlt ional task forms were created lanclinx on the sonth coast of New Britain at sea or in the air. At a comparable wxs also made, the advance in scheduling level with RI amey, directly nncler Mac- here being macle from 9 N’ovember to 15 Arthur were two American officers, Vice lkcenlber. .Iltogetller, the planning for A(lllli r:ll .i 1+1111r S. Carl )ender, who led the operation was characterized by ;Illid Naval Forces. and Lieutenant Gen- change, not only in landing dates, but also ernl C~eorge C. Kenney, who headed Allied in the targets selected and the forces in- fir Forces. %ch man was also a na- volved. tional cent ingent commander in his own Gellel”i(l 31:1(’.\l’tllllr CIIOSPto orgatlim force: Carpender had the Seventh Fleet his troops fOr the operations on New and Kenney the Fifth Air Form. The Guinea an(l against Rabaul into two task I)ut cl~ and Aust rxlirm xir md naval forces forl’w. Tile hea(lql[altel,s of one, NelT: reported to the All iecl commanders for Gllinea Force, under Australian General Sir Thomas A. Blarney, conducted the orders. Papnnn mmpaign and directed the offen- .it this time, amphibious operations in sive opemtions on the Hnon Peninsl~la. the Southwest Pacific, unlike those in The first operation of the other. New 13rit- _fTalsey’s area -where naval command doc- ain Force, led by I.ieutenont Generzl ~V:\l- trine prevniled, -were not conducted undm- tel. K]ll(~g~]. US-!, ~lils tl~e seizllre of llnifiecl romnmnd lower than the GHQ Woodlark and Kiriwina. Kr(le:er’s con- level. Control was effected by coopera- nmml, known M AI.AMO Force after tion and coordination of landing and sup- A’EIV BRITAIN PREI,UDE 299 port. forces. Neither amphibious force The GHQ procedure ill planning an op- nor landing force commander had sole eration was to sketch an outline plan, in- charge during the crucial period of the cluding forces requirecl znc~ objectives, landing itself; the one hacl responsibility ancl then to circldate it to the Allied coln- for movement to the target, the other for nmllds concerne(l for stllcly, conuuent, ant{ operations ashore. This deficiency in the correction. In the case of l) I?XTI?RITY, control pattern, which was recognized as a the ])rincil)al work on this first l)lan Ivas critical %veakness>’ by MacArthur’s G–3, done by I~ieut enant c 01onel I)onal d J7T. Major (hneral Stephen ,J. Clmmberl in, Fllller, ol)e of the three Marines who were was not rchedied until after DEXTER- assigne(l to lfacArtllur’s llea(lquarters as ITY was officially declared successful and lizison otlicers shortly after the lst, Divi- secured.2 sion left Guadalcanal. With the others, Despite its complexity, the comrnnnd T,ieutenant (’olonels Robert 0. Bowen and setup in the Southwest, Pacific had one in- Frederick L. Wiesen~an, Fuller soon be- clispl~table virtue-it worked. And it came a working member of the GHQ staff. worked with a (lispatch t])at l)latcllecl He sun~nmrizecl the planning sequence at the efforts of Halsey’s South Pacific headq- this stage by recalling: uarters. Roth GHQ and ALAMO ‘lThe routirw was then to let all services Force displayed a tendency to spell out study the ontline l)hrn for a l)rwcribed pe- tactical schemes to operating forces, but, riod :Lud then hold it conference in GHQ. this was a practice more annoying to the ‘Me commanders conrerned [including Gen- commanders concerned than harmful. er:ll M;](,.irthur I, the General Staff, and Technical Servi(w GHQ then disvussecl the Since frequent staff conferences between 1,1:10 au(l, if any ol),jections were made, they cooperating forces and the several eche- Tvere resol~e(l at that time. .After everyme IOIISof command was the rule in plznning ;[])IwII-w1 hapl]~, the plan m-as filed. It was phases, the scheme of maneuver ordered ]lev(,r issnwl formally hut merely haudecl out for (ol])n]ent. Tht’ next stq) was the issn- was inevitably one acceptable to the men :Ill(e of orders which were called “opera- who had to make it work. In 1ike man- tiur)s instructions. ” This \vas actually the ner, differences regarding the strength of only (lire(tive issue(l to conduct an oI)eration assault and support forces were. resolved Ilever }Yhile I was there was any corn- tll:ln(l el-er directed to conduct m operation before operations began. Wlen, at vari - in a(x.or(l:ln(e with General Mac.krthur’s out- ous points in the evolution of DF,XTER- line plan.’ ITY pl ans, the differences of opinion were on c May, iUAMO Force had receivecl strong, the resolution was predominantly a warning order from GHQ which set a in favor of the assault forces.s future 1ask for it of occupying western New- Britain by combined airborne md ‘ S.7.{’. memo for CinC, dtd 12 Feb44, SLIbj : OIJsInstns for 31anns-K:l~-ir?n~ Ops, in GIIQ G–.] amphibious operations. Engrossed as it Jn 7, 13m?h44. then was in preparations for the Wood- ‘ “In all these operations General MacArthnr 1ark-Kiriwina 1an(lings, General IKrue- gt,~-e ~Tenel,;ll IIrlle~er respo]isihi]ity for cm}rdi- geI.’s ]le:~(lqll:ll.ters had 1ittle time for a(l- natin~ glound, air, and naral l)lanning, This gm~e the Kround forc~e cmmnmdw a preeminent ]Ksition,’” Dr. ,Tohn l[iller, ,Jr., 0C31H, ltr to ‘ (7o1 1)011:11(1~V. Fuller ltr to IIistI)iv, HQhIC, Head, Hist13r, G–3, HQMC, dtd 931ay62. (11(128,J:1u52. 300 ISOLATION OF RABAUL vance planning, but, as the weeks wore on called for seizure of a foothold on New toward summer, attention focused on the Britain’s south shore at Lindenhafen target date in N’overnber. .Mthough the Plantation on 14 ~ovember and subsequent assault troops were not yet formally operations to neutralize the nearby ,Japa- namecl, there V-M no doubt that they would nese base at Gasmata. Once the Gasmata be drawn from the 1st Marine Division, effort was well underway, the main DEX- and the division sent some of its staff TERITY landings would take place at officers to 13risbane in ,Tlme to help forn~u- cape Gloucester with the immediate ob- late the original plnns. These Marines jective the enemy airfields there. The served with Sixth h-my’s staff in the .hs- eventual goal of the operation was the tralian city, the location of MacArthur’s seizure of control of Jvestern New Britain headquarters as well M those of the princi- to a general line including Talasea on the pal A.lliecl commands. In the forward north coast’s ~~illaumez Peninsula and area, at Port Moresby in the case of GHQ, Gasmata in the south. and Milne Bzy for Krueger’s task force, The assault force chosen for the Gas- were advance he:~c{quarters closer to the mata operation ( LAZ.4RETT0 ) was the scene of combat. Members of the Sixth 126th Infantry? reinforced as an RCT with Army staff were cletailed to additional other 32d Division units and Sixth Army duty as the ALAMO Force staff, and the troops. To carry out operations against traffic between Brisbane and N’ew Guinea Cape Gloucester (BACKHANDED), was heavy. After the initial GHQ outline General Krueger designated the 1st Ma- plan was circulated on 19 ,July, A1..\M0 rine Division, reinforced by the 503d Para- planners were not long in coming llp with chute Infantry. In ALAMO Force re- an alternate scheme of their own. serve for all Dexterity operations Conference discussions tended to veer was the remainder of the 32d Division. toward the ALAMO proposals which dif- JThile the 32d was a unit of the Sixth fered mainly in urging that more forward .4rmy assigned to ilL.4M0, both the Ma- staging areas be used that would place rine and parachute units were assigned troops nearer the targets selected and thus from GHCj Reserve, which came immedi- conserve shipping. A second outline plan ate]y under Mack-thur’s control. circulated on 21 August was closer to the T-he basic scheme of maneuver proposecl ALAMO concept and named the units for 13ACKH.4NDER called for a landing which would furnish the assault elements: by the 7th Marines (less one of its battal- 1st Marine Division; 32d Infantry Divi- sion: 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment. ~The assault force initially selected was the By mid-September, preparations for the 5th Marines, reinforced as an RCT, with addi- operation were far enough along so that tional supporting units from the Sixth Army, all under the command of Brigadier General Lemuel detailed planning could be undertaken. C. Shepherd, Jr., ADC of the 1st Marine Division. MacArthur’s operations instructions to General Shepherd and his staff completed pre- cover DEXTERITY were published on liminary plans for the operation on board ship the Y2d; six days later, an AI..4MO Force en route from Melbourne to Milne Bay, but found draft plan was sent to GHQ for approval. on arrival that the 126th Infantry had been designated the assault element instead. Gen After a summer of discussion, refine- Lmnuel C. Shepherd, on 2 Novenlber, dllring a conference at using L(’Is to move Combat Team PI and 1st Marine, Division headquarters attend- transports to shift Combat, Tewn A to Oro ed by the (livision (w]m~lanclrr, M:ljor Bay, where it could nro~-e on, should it, (}enera] William H. Rupertus, Adrn irnl prove necessary, in APDs and L(~Is. l-larlw-y, nn(l Colonel Clyde 1). Ed(llenlan, Marry of tlm vessels 13arbey designated Krlleger’s (1–~, the matter was consi(lered wollld have to do double duty: first at at Ieng(ll. Under existing plans, tile ratio (Iasnl:lt a, then at Gloucester. of assalllt, troops to defenders would be ~~ith anlpllibious snipping heavily com- 1.8 to 1 if tile 5f)3d landed an(l only 1.3 nlit ted until late hTovember to support to 1 if weather prevented tl~e drop. If a]) Hllon Peninsula operations, the time for addit ional ]Iarine lmt talion ]anding teanl rehearsal, train iIrg, and reout fitting before Tyas coltll]litte(l~ tlie ratio would rise to !2 to 1) 1~1.XTEl< 1T}r got ul~demvay }vas woe- 1 (01” 1.7 to 1 without pitratroOPS) , :1 1}:11- fully short. Tile lapse of six days then ance closer t o the clear superiority ex- figured lwt~veen I,AZARETTO and perience (le]~li~]l (led for an attacking force. 11.i(’K11.\S l)ER landings gave planners Edd]enml] remn~l~lende(l to Krueger that little leeway , :Ind tight scheduling for a lal~ding teanl of Con}hat, Team 11be em- maxinrurn shipping use macle no provision ployed at Tauali and that all of (Xonlbat for losses at (+w,mata. ITnder the circum- ‘re:~n~C lan(l east. of the airfiel(l. General stances, (kneral Krueger asked General R[~pertlw seconde(l this finding wit]] prw hlacArtllur for pernlission to set back the posals for several alternative l:ll)ding landing {late for LAZARETTO to 2 I)e- schenlcs, mle favoring the change el~(lorse(l cember. .\t tl~e same tinle, in consider:t- ~)yEddleman. (Vonclusive]y, the ALAlio tion of tile delay in tile co]npletion of the stafl c:ulle up wit,l~ a nelv estimate of the Huotl airfiel(ls and the increase(i demand sitrlat ion on 5 November thmt recornnwncl- for sl~ipping, Krlleger sllggcsted a BACK- ed an additional kttilliOn be Pnlploye(l. HAN1 )E R D- I)a-y of 26 Decernher. Mac- .~ query from ALAMO headquarters to .frtllur ap})]w~ed deferral of the landing (IHQ at Jlrisbane brought a quick reply dates for the tlvo operations and eventual- that. Krueger had full allthority to [Ise ly decided IIpOII 15 and 26 December tile battaliol~ if IIe so desired. after additions] changes in forces and In addition to getting a sufficient nunl- object i~es. ber of assau]t troops as]]ore at 13.1CK- Eve]] while tile date for LAZARETTO H.\ N l)l~;li. Krueger’s staff \vas gravely JV:LS bf,ing :~ltered, tile need for Urlder. concerned abollt the possible need for rein- taking tile operation at. all was being forcen~ent. To meet ~his contingency. they seriously quest ioned, particularly by recomnwll(letl that shipping to lift tile re- Allied :iir Forces.s Kcnney’s staff was swinging strongly to the opinion that the mainder of (l)mbat, l’emm B to tile target forward a irst ]i p plal~ned for the Linden- be available at its staging area on J)-Day. The same reqlli rement, was stated for s lla.jor General Ennis (~, Whitehead, Com- Combat Team A, then at Milne Ray and m:l rider, *\(lvan(>e(l E(lwlm, Fifth Air Fome the unit of the Ist Division farthest fronl thollght that the whole IWew 13ritain operation was unnecessary. see his letter to General cape Gloucester. Admiral Rarbey was Kwmey, dtd llNowR, qnoted in Craven and Cate, prepared to fl~rnish the ships rqlli red, Gwzd(~2cIIna2 fO Noif)fl??.1}1).329–330. 304 ISOLATION OF RABAIH, hafen Plantation beachhead N-m not neces- tester than Gasmata. Kenney’s staff hacl sary to future air operations. Reinforcing considered placing a radar station at Ar- this conclusion was the fact that, long- awe before the LAZARETTO project range fighter planes wonld be in short sup- clouded and still was interested in the area ply until Februnry 1944. Replacement as a site for early-warning radar guard- and reinforcement aircraft scheduled to ing the approaches from Rabaul. The arrive in the Southwest Pncific had been conferees agreed that Arawe would also delayed, and, in November, Kenney had to be a good location for a motor torpeclo curtail daylight strikes on Rabaul to con- boat base from which enemy barge traffic serve the few planes he had. The Allied along the coast could be blocked. There air commander could promise fighter cover is evidence that the Commancler, Motor over the initial landings at C~asmata, but Torpedo Boats of the Seventh Fleet was nothing thereafter. The assault troops lew convinced of the need for this new would have to rely on antictircraft. fire to base, but his object ions were evidently not, fend off ,Japanese attacks, Perhaps the heedecl at this time.’” A powerful argu- most disquieting news was that the ememy ment in favor of the choice was the denial was building Up his garrison at. (3asmata, of the site to the Japanese as a staging apparently anticipating an Al]ied attack. point through which reinforcements could With General Kenney reluctant to re- be fed into the Cape Gloucester area. gard L.UARETTO as an essential opera- Then, too, the diversionary effect of the at- tion and un~ble to provide aerial cover tack might clraw off defenders from the after it began, the C~asmata area lost its main objective.11 appeal as a target. On 19 N’ovember, fol- General MacArthur quickly approved lowing a conference with air, naval, the findings of his field commanders and and landing force representatives, the confirmed the landing date they asked for, ALMMO Force G-3 concluded that carry- 15 December.” On 22 November, amen& ing through the operation would mean “that we can expect to take considerable ‘0 Morison, Breaking t?be Llkwnareks Barrier, casualties and have extensive damage to p. 372; ALAMO ForEngr memo of conference supplies and equipment as a result of with Cdr Mumrna, dtd 5Dec43, Suhj : PT Boat enemy bombing operations subsequent to Requirements DIRECTOR in ALAMO G–3 Jnl ATO.5. the landing.)> 9 An alternative objective, “ “The determining factor in the selection of one closer to Allied bases, less vulnerable Arawe was a statement by Kenney that he ccmld to enemy air attack, and more lightly de- supply air protection for the assault from his fended, was sought. air bases on A’ew Guinea. . . .“ Barbeu ltr. ‘2 Once Arawe’s landiug date was set, the final Generals Krueger and Kenney and Ad- decision on D-Day at Cape Gloucester could be miral BarbeY met on 21 November to de- made. At a meeting at General Krueger’s head- cide on a new objective. They chose the quarters on Goodenough early in December, Arawe Islands area off the south coast of General hIacArthur snggested 21 December, but approved the 26th “so that the assault craft used New Britain, 90 miles closer to Cape Glou- in the Arawe landing could return in time for a brief training period with the 1st Marine Divi- ‘ ALAfiI(} G–3 111I?II1Oto (’ofS, (ltd 19 Nov43, sion before the BACKHANDED operation.” Subj : Rept of Conference, in ALAMO &$ Jnl RAdm Charles Adair ltr to Head, HistBr, G–3, Yo. 4. dtd 1.Jun62. NEW BRITAIN PRELUDE 305 ed operations instructions for DEX- General MacArthur ordered preparations TERITY were issued by GHQ canceling for the capture of Saidor to get underway l,~ZARETT’O and substituting for it the with a target date on or soon after 2 Jan- D1R13CT0R (Arawe) operation. An uary. Many of the supporting ships and immediate benefit of the switch was a planes employed during the initial land- gain in shipping available for BACK- ings at BACKHANDED would again see H.%lJDER and an increase in the number service at the new objective. ALAMO of troops ready for further operations. Force issued its field order for Saidor on The suspected enemy garrison at Arawe the 22d, assigning the 126th Inf antry ( Re- was far weaker than that known to be at inforced) the role of assault troops. Krue- Gasmata, and the mission assigned the ger saved invaluable preparation time by landing force was less demanding in men organizing a task force which was essen- and mat eriel resources. tially the same as the one which had The LAZARETTO task force built trained for L.4ZARET’TO. around the 126th Infantry was dissolved One aspect of the BACKHANDED and its elements returned to ALAMO plan of operations—the air drop of the Force reserve. A new task force, half the 503d Parachute Infantry-gathered oppo- strength of its predecessor, was formed sition from all quarters as the time of the using troops released from garrison duties landing grew nearer. Krueger’s staff was on Woodlark and Kiriwina. ~amed to never too enthusiastic about the inclusion command the DIRECTOR Force, which of the paratroopers in the assault troops, centered on the l12th Cavalryj was Briga- but followed the outline put forward by dier (+e]~eral Julian W. Cunningham, who GHQ. Rupertus was much less happy had commanded the regiment during the with the idea of having a substantial part occupation of Woodlark. of his force liable to be cancelled out by The abandonment of LAZARETTO weathered-in fields or drop zones at the gave (2H~ planners a welcome bonus of most critical stage of the operation.13 On combat troops available for further DEX- 8 December, Allied Air Forces added its TERITY operations. once the Japanese opposition to the use of the 503d with threat at cape Gloucester was contained Kenney’s director of operations stating and both flanks of Vitiaz strait were in that “ComAAF does not desire to partici- Allied lmnds, the seizure of Saidor on the pate in the planned employment of para- north New Guinea coast could follow troops for DEXTERITY.’> 14 The air swiftly. An outline plan for the saidor commander understood that a time-con- operation issued on 11 December men- suming plane shuttle with a series of drops tioned that either an RcT of the 1st Ma- rine or the 32d Infantry Divisions might “ MajGen William H. Rupertus ltr to LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, dtd 7Dec43 (Vande- be the assault element. Within a week, grift Personal Correspondence File, HQMC). changes in the composition of the BAcK- Rather graphically, General Rrrpertus noted “if IIANYDER Force had narrowed the choice the weather is bad, then the jumper boys won’t to an Army unit. he there to help me & 1’11 be on the beach with a measly C. T. !“ On 1’7 December, impressed by the evi- “ DirOps, AAF Check Sheet to G–3, GHQ, dtd clent success of DIRECTOR operations, 8Dec43, in (7HQ G–3 Jnl, 8Dec43. 306 ISOLATION OF RM3AIT1. \v:ts plalilled, it nmlleuver which would TZ?.lZ:I’I.I’(7 . t.Yl? /S7’.4 GI!YG gre:ltl~ illcre:lse tile ~ll:lllce Of tl’illlSpOrtS BA cKIIA:vr)l?R FOR(2P ‘ 7 being c~llght by tile exl)ectd ,Jitpanese ae]’ial (m(ll~ter:~tt:~rl{on 1)-l ):ly. I]) atldi- For effect ive planning of DEXTERITY tioll to this (L()]lsi[ler’:ltioll, Kel]ney follnd operations, General Krueger md the Al- that tile troop rarriers needed to lift the 1ied Forces commanders had to strike a 50;)(1 woIIl(l crowd a heavy bomber groIIp balance between the flexibility necessary to Off tilt? l’(ltllv:iys ilt 1)01) 0(1111’:1,tile loa(ling exploit changing situations and the exact point fol tile air drop. The (lisplaced scl~eduling required for effective employ- l)ollll]ers~~-”lll(ltl~ell ]lave tooperatefrolii ment of troops, ships, and supplies. The fields at Port Iforesby, where heavy rhanges wrought in ALAM() Force plans Tveatllerovertlle O\ven St:\llleyhlollllt:lills were keyed. therefore, to the physical loca- col~ld keep them from sllpporting tile op- tion of troops in staging and training eration. areasj to the contents and replenishment Tl~e sta~ewasset fol.tl~erll:~l~ge~vlli(’1~ potential of forward area depots, and to took plareon l-l T)ecenlbe ratGoodel~ougll Tslan(l wllcrc Mac.frthllr and Krneger the number and type of amphibious craft ~verepresellt towe tile l) ITi ECTOR Force available. Throughout the later stages of off to its target. The two generals attende- the. pl arming for BACKHANDED, the d n briefill~ on tile lanclinx plans of tile variations in scheme of maneuver and 1st Marine T)ivision where (’olo]lel Edwin number of troops employed were based .L Pollock, tile division’s operations offi- upon a constant factor, the readiness of the rer, forrefll]ly st:ltw] his belief that tl~e 1st Marine Division for combat. drop of tl~e paracll~lte reyilnent should be When the division left Guadalcanal on eliminate(l ill favor of the 1)-Day l:lnding 9 December 1942, many of its men were of the rest of (’olnhnt Teanl B to give tl~e walking hospital cases wrecked by malar- division a prepol~deral~re of strength over ial fevers or victims of a host of other the enemy defe]lders. Pollock’s exposi- j ung]e diseases. All the Marines were bone tion may l]ave swunq the balance agail~,st tired after months under constant combat use of the paratroops~~’ or the decision lllil,y strain and a rest was called for. No more have already been ilssured: ‘“ in either event, the orcler went out the next day over “ Llnless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from : A ~,AMO G–$ .Jnl : VII Krueger’s signature chznying the field I’hihl’{lr C’omdHist 10 Jan43 -23 Dec45, n.d., here- ordel’ for 13.4(YI{11.-iRTI)I~~R. The seizure after T’11 P}/ il)For ContdHi.st ; VII PhillFor of (’alw C~lo[lrester was now to be an op- Rel)t on rape Gloucester Op, dtd 31?eb44, here- after T“TT Plfi~)l’orAR ; CTF 76 ( VII Phi bFor) erat ion rollduet ed by a unit whose compo- lv:Irl), .ing43, n.d. ( COA, h’HD ), hereafter nents had trained and fought together. CTF ?/) ..Auu4,? WarD and following appropriate months: CTP 76 A“rp-Dec& TT71U-DS; 1st MarDiv “ I.t(’{)1 Fr:Lllk (). llt)n~h :111(1M:i.j ,John .1. S.\It (Iape Gloucester Op, Phase I, Planning and (’r{jwn. T!!, P(())!))(fiq)( (,TI A-r Ir J lwrfect t{Jllii’(tj{ll(ll l:lvel)eeIl cllosentlmll cific. ,Se]It over from Hnlsey ’s area, the Australia. AP.4 vms assigned to 13arbey’s commancl Mellmurl]e, where the division arrived to give lli]ll at, least one of the Navy’s on 12 ,Ia]]llary, became a second home to newest transports for training purposes.lg the men of the lst. F(llldlllen~oriesoftl~e Wit h the, l~elp of the experienced Marines, city an(l of the warlll reception its people VII Ampl]it)iolls Force officers worked out gave tl~e~Iarines were often called to mind a series of standing operating procedures i]) later years by those who served there. duril]g tl~e exercises which would hold for Rewar(]ed in a ]Iun(lred ways by its relezse f~lture i raining and combat usage. from the jungles of the Solomons and a While it was in Australia, the 1st Divi- return to civilization, the 1st Division sion had no opportunity to use the variety slowly worked its way back to health and of specialized amphibious shipping thzt Imttle fitness. Althollyh at first as many ha(l come into use since its ]znding on as 7,500 men at a time were down with Guadalcanal. Most LSTS and LCIS were nullaria or recovering from its ravages,18 Sf’llt fOIW”:lrd tO par)LMll W:\t(2rs iiS S0011 aS 1he number dwindled as climate and they arrived from tile States: tl~e I.CTS, s[lpl)ressive drugs took effect. \vll~chwere shipperl out in sections, joined ii training program, purposely slow- the oceangoing ships as soon as they were starting, was begun on 18 .January with welde[l together. In the combnt zone, the emphasis during its initial phases on the landing ships were urgently neecled to reorganization an(l reequi~)nlellt of units support the operations of New Guinea and and the drill and physical conditioning of AI,.~h10 Forces. The Marines’ chance to individuals. By tl~e end of March: prac- fanliliarize thenlselves with the new equil)- tice in snl:lll-ll]~it tnctics was the order of ment would coule in tile forward :lreit the day. Throllgh .ipril, May, and June, where C~HQ pl:{~~l~eclto sencl tl~e division al] men qualifie(l with their I]ew basic wea- after it completed a sunlmer of intensive pon, the 31–1 rifle, n seljli-alltom~tic field train ing in the broken country which replaced tl]e bolt-action Springfield wroul)d Jfelboume. M-19(I3 carried by American servicemen As a necessary preliminary to etiective sil~ce tl~e deca(le before World War I. large unit training and operations, the di- Xos( algia for the old, relial)le ’03 \vas vision was organized into combat and land- widespread, but, the increased firepower of ing teams o]i 25 May. Many of the SUp- tl}e 11–1could not be de]~ied. poj-t ing ul~it attachments were the same In iipril nnd May. battalions of the 5th as those in reginlental ancl battalion enl- :1nd ~th Marines practiced assault, landings 011 tile I)eaclles of Port Philip Bay near ‘“Commenting on the state of this APA, the Melbour]le. one of the two ships used was Hc}fr!l T. Allot, Admiral 13arbey noted: “It was a converted Australian passenger liner and Iiot the newest. but if not the oldest, it was in the \vorst condition. It arrived in our area in need tl~e other was the only American attack of an overhaul so extensive that Australian yards 1l’t(])sl)(jrl ( .il’.l ) ill t}le Sotltllwest 1>:1- \vere reluctant to undertake it. It leaked oil so I)adly that it never could be used in the combat “ ~ol John 1+;. Linrh comments on draft of zone (hrougkout the campaign. It was used as Hough and Crown, Ycfc 13ritain~uf}/pai@&cltd ml administrative flagship in the rear areas.” 1lApr52. Earbrg ltr. 308 ISOLATION OF RAB.AUL barkation groups already in existence. In The inspection team expressed some con- terms of the general order outlining the cern about the substantial incidence of nssigmments, the combat team was de- malaria in the division’s ranks, but made scribed as “thenormal major tactical unit its finding of combat efficiency “Excellent” of the division,’) and the landing team was despite this. The very apparent high mo- “regarded essentially as an embarkation rale was attributed to the lst’s experienced team rather than a tactical unit.’) 20 Many leadership, as all the division staff, all reg- of the reinforcing units in the battalion imental and battalion, company and bat- embarkation groups would revert to regi- tery commanders had served on Guadal- mental control on landing, and, similarly, canal.zz This pattern of veteran leader- the division expected to re~qin control ship was eviclent down through all ranks very soon after landing of supporting of the division with a good part of the in- headquarters nnd reserve elements in- fantry squads and artillery firing sections cluded within regimental embarkation led by combat-wise NCOS. groups. The first echelons of the division to In mid-summer, while 1st Division units move northward to join ALAMO Force were either in the midst of combat team were the engineer and pioneer battalions exercises, preparing to take the field, or of the 17th Marines. On 24 August, the squaring away after return, a Sixth Army engineers ( 1/’17) sailed from Melbourne inspection team made a through survey for for Goodenough Island to begin construc- General Krueger of the Marine organiza- tion of the division’s major staging area. The pioneer battalion (2/17) moved by tion. The Army officers came away much rail to Brisbane, “where it drew engineer- impressed, noting: ing supplies, transportation, and equip- lThis rlivisit)n] is well equipped, has a ment of the regiment, and stood by to load high morale, a splendid esprit and approxi- this material on board ship if a wharf la- mately 75~0 of its personnel have had com- bat experience, The average age of its en- bor shortage developed.” 23 It departed for listed personnel is well below that in Army Goodenough on 11 September. The 19th divisions, . At the ~resent time, the com- Naval Construction Battalion, ~~which Imt efficiency of this division is considered to served as the 3d Battalion, 17th Marines, he excellent. In continuous operations, this condition would probably exist for two was working at the big U.S. Army Serv- months before de(,liniug. With nest and re- ices of Supply (USASOS ) base at Cairns> l)lawvuents bet\veen olwrations, it is believecl north of Townsville, and remained there th:lt a better than satisfactory (mmhat rating under Army control until the end of (wlold be maintained over a period of six m(mths.gt October. The formal movement orders were is- ‘“ 1st MarI)iv GO S0. 83, dtd 25 May43, in sued to the division on 31 August, setting .4 1,/t Mo (}–3 J?77No. .I, forth the priority of movement of units “ Rept of Inspection 1st MarDi}- by Sixth Army Insl)ertion Team. 9–13A~lg43, dtrl 2Sep43, Anx 1, and the amount and type of individual 1). 11. “On 22 .kl~gust, General Krueger himself arrived in 3fe1bo~lrne for a two-day inspection “ Reljt of Sixth Army Inspection, dtd 2SeIfi3, of the division and upon his departure com- op. cit., p. 11. mented favorably on the ol)servations he had “ BGen Robert G, Ballance ltr to .4CofS, G–3, made. ” Sl, qjj)crd ltr, HQMC, dtd 14,Jun62, hereafter L3dlance W. NEW BRITAIN PRELUDE 309 and organizational equipment that should before the objectionable living conditions be taken. In general, 40-days’ rations, became a health hazard. quartermaster, and medical supplies were After its move, General Rupertus’ to be loaded, as well as a month’s supply command was dispersed in three stiaging of individual and organizational equip- areas that corresponded, in nearness to ment and 10 units of fire for all weapons. the target, with the roles the combat Reserve stocks of all classes of supply, and teams were scheduled to play in BACK- any material not available on first requisi- HANDED operations. Encamped at tion to I~SASOS, were to be forwarded to Cape Sudest was the main assault force, the division’s resupply points. The troops Colonel ,Julian N. Frisbe’s ‘i’th Marines, themselves were to take only the clothing suitably reinforced as Combat Team C. and equipment necessary to “live and At Milne Bay, farthest from Cape fight ,“ “ storing service ~weens and other Gloucester, was Combat Team A, centered personal gear in sea bags and locker boxes on Colonel John T. Selden’s 5th Marines; for the better day when the pending oper- Selden’s troops, scheduled for a time to be ation would be over and a hoped-for re- the assault force at Gasmata, were now turn to Australia the reward for success. ticketed as reserves for Gloucester. On The division’s main mo~-ement begin on Goodenough Island, Combat Team B, 19 September when Combat Team C fin- under Colonel William J. Whaling, and ished loading ship and sailed from Mel- the remainder of the division moved into bourne in a convoy of three Liberty ships; camps the 17th Marines had wrested from its destination was Cape Sudest near Oro the jungle. On 21 October, ALAMO Bay. Three more convoys carrying the Force Headquarters joined the division on remainder of the division cleared Mel- Goodenough, moving up from Milne Bay bourne over the next several weeks, with in keeping with General Krueger’s desire the last Libert-ys pulling out with the rear to keep close to the scene of combat. (See echelons of division headquarters and Map 22.) Combat Team B on 10 October. The 18 Each division element, immediately ships used, hastily converted from cargo after arrival in its new location, unloaded carriers, were far from ideal troop trans- ship and turned to setting up a tent camp. Before long, combat training was again ports. Galleys, showers, and heads had to be improvised on weather decks, and the underway at Oro Bay and Goodenough holds were so crowded that many men with emphasis on jungle operations a preferred “to sleep topside, fashioning out species of warfare all too familiar to of ponchos and shelter halves and stray Guadalcanal veterans. At Milne Bay, pieces of line rude and flimsy canvas hous- Combat Team A had to clear and con- ing.” 25 Happily, the voyage had an end struct, its own camp area while providing 800–900-man working parties daily to help “ 1st MarI)iv AdminO 443, dtd 7Sep43, in 1st build roads and dumps in the base’s sup- SfarDiv 0ctJ3 T17arD. ply complex. Colonel Selden rotated the ‘5George }Ic>lillan, Z’lte Old Brer(l, .4 Hi.stor?/ major labor demand among his battalions, of the First Marine Division in Wwld War II ( Washington: Infantry ,Journal Press, 1949), p. giving them all a chance to work as a 162, hereafter McMillan, Tlte Old Breed. whole to finish their living area and get a 310 ISOI.ATION OF RAB.kT”I. start on jungle conditioning and combzt in the recommendation: and the mobile training. ” group was organized with headquarters at On 1 November, with the arrival of the Milne Bay. Seabee~ of 3/17 at Goodenough, the or- 3farines from all three 1st I)ivision stag- ganic llnits of the 1st l)ivision were all ing areas made their practice landings on asseml.)led ill the i’orwar(l area. Tl~e,Jal)a- the beaches of Taupota Bay, a jung-led site nese attempted a lively -welcome by send- on the nortl~ shore of New (3uinea in the ing bombers and scout planes over Oro lee of tl]e 1)’l?ntrecasteux Islznds. At Bay and (loodenough throughout the stag- rr:lllr)ot:l there Wm opportunity to put ing period; these raids, seldom made in ashore enougl~ troops, vehicles, and sul>- any strength or pursued with resolution, l)lies to test Iandillg and unloading tecll- mused no casualties or damage in Marine n iqlles. on 22 October, 1/1 in two AP1)s compounds and only slight damage to ad- an(l t R-o LSTS 1if ted from ~~oodenough to joining Army units. The enemy effort the l)ractice beaches. There the assault lmd nothing bllt nl~isallce Vallle as far as troolw ~ve]~tashore in LCVPS from the de- stemming preparations for future opera- stroyel’-t ra])sports mnd v-ere followed by tions was concerned, but it dicl give the la]]di]lg snips with a full deck-load of ve- .Japanese a pretty fair idea of the Allied l~icles l)lus 40 tons of bulk stores. Since buildup along the New (hinea coast. all of tlw division pioneers were attached In order to give the troops assigned to to tl]e 7th 31arines at Cape Sudest, there DEXTERITY adequnte opportunity to was 11oexperienced nucleus for the shore familiarize tl]enlsel rw \vitll tile lnn(ling party. One I.ST took three hours to un- m-aft they were to use, i~dmiral Barbey load, tile otl]er four and a half, prompting had to devise a system that wonld allow J’11 .~ml)llibious Force to observe that him to use a small nl~rnber of craft to train “unloading parties provided were quite in- a large number of men. There was no adequate and very little appreciation was time to fit the consl rllrtion of X1] illllpllib- shown for the necessity of getting the craft imls traininx base on NTew C~llinea, sinli - OR the beach as quickly as possible.” 27 lnr to those in .Iustralia, into sllpport Tl~e critique of the faults of this land- plans for the move zgainst hTew 13ritsin. ing, together with a more comprehensive Five months was the lowest estimzte of apl)licatioll of the newly prmnul~lted Di- the time necessary to complete such an un- vision Shore, Part y SOP,’” enabled 2/1, dertaking, and the nlen, materials, and using the san]e sl~ips and landing scheme ships necessary to support it could not be spared from current operations. on 16 m(“!Z’F 7’6 Ott ;J W(rrn, ~).22, .~ll~ust, Barbey recommended the est~b- ‘8 When (%neral Shepherd relmr’ted as ADC of the Ist Division. he found the Shore Party S01’ Iishment of a mobile training unit consist- to he “woefully deficient.” With General Ru- ing of enough landing craft nnd support- ]wrtus’ nljprm-al, he prepared a new SOP based ing auxiliaries to perform the amphibious on that of the :ki Marine Division which he “had training mission in the forward area. hellxxl ~~rep:ire under the direetion of Mn,jor Gen- eral (’harles 1), II:lrrett, who had made a study Carpender and Mac.4rthur both concurred (If the de!i(-ieneies nOted during the Gu:ld:l(>anal landing ontl subsequent developments in this im- ‘8 2/5 Record of Events. l(;Sel)4:;- !}31:\I-44. en- portant phzse of a landing operation. ” She& 1I’J-of 2oo(’t44, 1(m-d ltr. NEW BRITAINTPRELUDE 311 two days later, to halve unloading time. vealed that the LVT was a splendid trail On 28 and 31 October, the ‘7th Marines breaker for tractors, a fact that had im- mounting out from Oro Bay and Cape mediate application in the plans for em- Sudest was able to land all infantry bat- ployment of artillery at Cape Gloucester. talions and supporting elements in the pat- In Combat Team C’s Oro Bay training tern of assault waves coming from ~PDs, area, Alligators were used successfully to followed by LCIS with support troops, smash a path through the jungle for 4/11’s ancl LSTS witl~ vehicles and bulk cargo. prime movers and the 105mm howitzers The unloading time per LST was cut to they towed. To distribute the weapons’ less than an hour by means of adequate weight over a large area, truck wheels were troop labor details and the application of mounted hub to hub with the howitzer cargo handling techniques developed in wheels.31 The one-ton trucks assigned to training for the landings. Combat Team haul 1/11’s 75mm pack howitzers proved A was able to profit from this experience unequal to the task of following in the when the reinforced 5th Marines’ battal- LVTS’ rugged trace, and the llth Marines’ ions made a series of trouble-free practice commander, Colonel Robert H. Pepper, landings from LSTS and LCIS between 14 took immediate steps to secure light trac- and 30 November.zg tors from the Army as supplementary During the amphibious training period, prime movers for his three pack battal- Marine assault troops landed as they ions.3z The potential of the LVTS was would at Cape Gloucester in ships’ boats, firm] y demonstrated to the ALAMO LCVPS and LCMS. No serious obstacles Force artillery officer who watched them existed off the chosen beaches which could work in a swampy area of Goodenough on bar landing craft from nosing ashore, and 4 December. He reported t.othe .4LAM0 the amphibian tractors organic to the chief of staff: 1st Division were reserved for logisti- Performance was impressive. Knocked cal duties. That role promised to be quite over trees up to 8” in diameter and broke a important to the success of the operation. trail through the densest undergrowth. The branches, trunks, and brush formed a nat- Fytensive tests in the jungles that fringed ural matting capable of supporting tractors the staging areas showed that the LVT and guns. I believe that with a limited could negotiate terrain, particularly amount of pioneer work prac~lcally any jun- swamp forest, tl~at was an absolute barrier gle country can be traversed with artillery to other tracked vehicles, even the invalu- drawn by tractors if preceded by two LVTS.W able bulldozer, The cargo space of 1st As this demonstration was being con- Amphibian Tractor 13attalion’s standard ducted, the movements to final staging LVT (1) Alligator could hold 4,500 areas had begun. On 3 December, a de- pounds, and that of the few newer, larger tachment of Combat Team B left Good- LVT (2) Buffaloes that were received a few days before embarkation could con- 3’ LtCol Joe B. Russell ltr to CMC, dtd 14Mar !)‘2 . 6,500 pounds.sn The tests al~ re- tain “ Col Louis A. Ennis comments on draft af Hough and Crown, New Britain Campaign+dtd m Ballatwe ltr. 17.%pr52. = ONI 226, Allied Landing Craft and Ships, dtd 8’ ALAMO ArtyO memo to CofS, dtd 4Dec43, in 7Apr44 and Supplement No. 1, ca. Jun45. ALAMO G–3 Jnl No. 6. 691–360 -63—21 312 ISOLATION OF RAB.4UL enough for Cape Cretin near Finschhafen7 the assault phase of the operation was followed on the llth by the rest of the Ist organic to the 1st Marine Division. One Marines and its attached units. From this unit, in fact, was peculiarly the division’s point nearest to the target area, the land- own, its air liaison detachment. Im- ing team assigned the role of taking and pressed by the need of a light plane squad- holding the trail block at Tauali, the !i?d ron to handle reconnaissance and air spot- Piattalion, 1st Marines, and the rest of the ting, the division commander’s personal combat team destined to follow the 7th pilot, Captain Theodore .4. Petras, and the Marines across the main beaches, would division air officer, Lieutenant Colonel mount in separate convoys for D-Day Kenneth H. Wier, had recommended in landings. Accompanying Combat Team early summer of 1943 that such a unit be B was the Assistant Division Commander, formed within the division. General Brigadier General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Vandegrift agreecl and was able to per- Jr., and his staff. suade General MacArthur to provide the l%tween 7 and 18 December, all elements division with 12 Army L-4 Piper Cubs. of the division that would land with or When General Rupertus took over the lst’s under command of Combat Team C during command, he endorsed the idea fully and the initial phase of BACKH.4~DER, directed Petras to organize the unit and moved from Goodenough to Cape Sudest. run its training program. General Rupert,us, the task force command- Volunteers with flying experience were er, shifted his CP to Oro Bay at this time, called for and 60 men applied; from this leaving only the division rear echelon on group, 19 pilots, 1 officer and 11 enlisted Goodenough. Colonel Selden’s Combat men, were selected. Mechanics for the Team A at Milne Bay made ready to sail Cubs were similarly chosen and the main- for Cape Sudest on D minus one (25 De- tenance men who kept up Petras’ trans- cember) to be in position as division re- port served as their instructors. For two serve to answer a call for reinforcements. and a half months before D-Day, the The team was to move from Milne in trans- makeshift air force worked intensively to ports and transfer at the Oro Bay staging reawake flying skills and to learn with the area to landing ships for further move- artillery suitable techniques for air spot- ment to Cape Cretin. ALAMO Form ting of targets. The most serious problem placed a hold order on the commitment of faced was the lack of adequate air-ground one 5th Marines battalion (3/5) so that it communication; the radios available were might be used to seize either Rooke or unreliable and a system of visual signals was developed. Long Islands as the site for a sentinel For movement to Ca~e radar guarding the overwater approaches Gloucester, the planes were dismantl~d and loaded on board LSTS scheduled to to the main objective from the northwest. Besidee this tentative mission, another pos- arrive on D-Day .34 sible employment of the battalion was as In addition to the force of light planes, part of the reserve in support of the as- General Rupertus also had a pool of land- sault units of the 1st Division. 3’Hongh and Crown, New Britain Campaign, The major part of the B.ACKHANDER API) V, “The Cape Gloucester Air Force.” PP. Force assembled in the staging area for 2W-203. NEW BRITAIN PRELL’DE 313 ing craft under his direct command, both lery Group was to come in with the light elements which would give him greater antiaircraft elements of the battalion,3G flexibility in meeting combat emergencies while the remainder of Harrison’s artil- or in taking advantage of sudden changes lery would arrive with the garrison force. of fortune that might affect the .Tapanese defenders. The boat crews were not sail- ors, however, but Army amphibian engi- neers, members of a provisional boat bat- Throughout the evolution of BACK- talion of tile i392d Engineer Boat and HANDER plans, the 1st Marine Division Shore Regiment. The engineers, manning expressed its determination to preserve its L(_’VPs a]lcl I. ClIs, were products of a spe- tactical integrity as a unit and to place cial training progrmn in the States “an overwhelming force on the beach through which the Army anticipated nnd against a determined enemy.” 38 The op- met some of the problems thnt arose in eration plan that finally governed the conducting nnll)l~ibious operations. Usecl Cape Gloucester assault mirrored this con- in strenbdh first in the Lae-Finschhafen cept of the division’s most efficient employ- campaign, the en~ineers were preparecl to ment. move supplies of troops from ship to shore The tasks set General Rupertus’ force or shore to shore, to act as a shore party, were threefold: to land in the Borgen to man beach clefel]ses, and, in sum, to Bay-Tauali areas , establish beachheads, ]nzke tl~emselves generally useful .3s lit and capture the Cape Gloucester airfields; Cape Gloucestert since the Marines hacl to construct heavy duty landing strips at their own shore l)arty, the amphibian engi- l]eers providecl only a part of their serv- Gloucester as soon as possible and assist Commander, Allied Air Forces in estab- ices, but, these were of inestimable vnlue. A more usual attachment to 13ACK- lishing fighter sector, air warning, and HAhTDER Force in Marine experience radio navigational facilities; and to ex- was the assignment of Colonel lVilliam H. tend control over western hTew Britain to Harrison’s l!2th Defense Ilattalion to the include the general line Itni River-Bergen operation. The rapid-firing 40mnl guns of the battalion’s Special Weapons Group “ Col Thomas 1,, Rrrnrlall romments on draft nlimuscril)t, included in MajGen James M. Mas- would augment the fire against ]olv-lel~e~ ters, Sr., Itr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC, dtd 2Ju162. attackers put up by Battery A of the di- 37~Tnless Other}yisp noted, the material in this vision’s 1st Special Wexpons Battalion. section is derivwl from : AT,.4M0 G–3 .Jnt ; CTF 76 OPlrm 3ZL43. dtd 201XX43 ( COA, XHD ) : The searchlight battery and the 12th’s T-ll I’h il)For Comdfli.st; 1“11 P?IibFor Al? ; 90mm Group would guard the beachhead 13.ICKH.%XDER E’or OpO 243, cltrl 14iYov43; from bombers making their runs zbove the BACKHAA”l)ER For .$dminO 2-+3, dtd 14Nov43 : reach of automatic weapons. .i platoon l.~t llorI) iv A’.lh’, Phase 1, Planning and Train- ing, :lnd I’base II, Landing and Seizure of Cape of 155mm guns from the Seacoast Artil- Gloucester .iirfield : Hongh and Crown, Nem B)itaitj cr7mpa@?, AI)P IT, “The Shore Party :“ (’rnyen and (’ate, G~tadalcw?tal to tlaipaa. 3“MajGen Edw’in A. Pollock comments on draft of Hough and Crown, New Britain Campaign, dtd 27 Feb52, hereafter Pollock comments. 314 ISOLATION OF RABAUL Bay, with patrols to investigate the pos- but a large portion of their strength was sibility of developing an overland supply to revert to control of the force comman- route to Gilnit village on the Itni. With- der. The combat teams kept their close-in in the airfield defense perimeter BACK- supporting weapons, tanks, and antitank HANDED Force was to establish, con- guns, but lost their artillery and antiair- struction priority was assigned facilities craft guns to the force. Each team also to accomodat.e an Allied fighter-intercep- kept its attached engineer company, its tor group. scout platoon, and its detachments from Basically, the scheme of maneuver de- the division medical and service battalions. veloped to capture Cape Gloucester called Since its primary mission was defense of for simultaneous landings east and west a beachhead perimeter in tangled jungle of the airfields, each site about seven miles terrain, Combat Team C could not make from the point of the cape itself. On best use of some of its attachments. Ac- Green Beach near Tauali, Lieutenant cordingly, the force shore party was rein- Colonel .James M. Masters, Sr., would forced by the military police, motor trans- land his battalion, 2/1, and its attached port, and amphibian tractor units once as- units, seize a limited beachhead, organize signed to Colonel Frisbie’s command. it for defense, and hold it against enemy Similar attached units with Combat Team forces attempting to use the coastal trail B remained under Colonel Whaling’s con- to reach the airfields or to withdraw from trol to support the advance up the coastal them. On the opposite side of the cape, road. on a pair of beaches (Yellow 1 and 2) In planning the disposition and employ- near Sil imati Point., Colonel Frisbie’s 1st ment of field artillery, Colonel Pepper’s and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines would land llth Marines’ staff picked out the one in assault followed by 2/7, with the mis- open area of any extent within the chosen sion of seizing a beachhead, organizing it beachhead, a patch of kunai grass on the for defense, and covering the landing of right flank with a good all-around field of the rest of the assault force. tire, as the post-landing position of 4/11. Shortly after H-Hour, 3/1 would be- The 4th Battalion’s 105mm howitzers, in gin landing behind 3/7 on the western- direct. support of Combat Team B, could most beach, Yellow 1. Once ashore, the reach the airfield but also could fire on battalion, resting its right on the coast, counterattacking enemy anywhere along would attack west on a 500-yard front to the perimeter and its approaches. With seize the first of a series of phase lines the only good artillery position inside the designated to guide the attack toward the beachhead going to 4/11, the 75mm pack airfields. During the afternoon of D-Day, howitzers of the 1st Battalion landing in the remainder of Colonel Whaling’s com- direct support of Combat Team C were bat team would land, assemble just out- left to “fend for themselves in an area side the right flank of the beachhead pe- that appeared fairly open with only scat- rimeter behind 3/1, and prepare to attack tered growth” near Silimati Point. 3’ Both west on order. After landing, Combat Teams B and C “ LtCol Robert B. Luckey, “Cannon, Mud, and Japs,” Marine Corps Gazette, v. 28, no. 10 (Ott were to retain a number of the units as- 44), p. 51, hereafter Luckey, “Cannon, Mud, and signed to them under direct command, Japs.” NEW BRITAIN PRELUDE 315 artillery battalions were assibgned a pla- attached to combat teams, provided flame- toon of LVTS to help them reach and thrower teams to work with infantry maintxin their firing positions in what wzs against enemy fortifications. Colonel expected to be very rugged terrain. The Rosecrans’ regimental Headquarters and 75mm packs of 2/n, sailing and landing Service Company, 1/17 (less Companies with Combat Team B, were to set up in A, B, and C), and 3/17 formed a combat what seemecl a suitable area just off the engineer group which was responsible for coastal road outside the perimeter. While water supply, for construction, repair, and the fielcl artillery landing on the Yellow maintenance of roads, bridges, and ship Beaches would revert from combat tewn to landing facilities, and for any other llth Marines’ control, Lieutenant Colonel construction task assigned. Through Masters on Green Beach was to keep com- contacts made by officials of the Aus- mand of Battery H of 3/11 as an integral tralia-Ne-,v Guinea Administrative Unit part of his landing team. The 12th I)e- (.4NGIHJ) accompanying the task force, fense Battalion’s Seacoast Artillery Group it was hoped that maximum use could be commander was to coordinate the fire of made of native labor in all engineer all weapons used against seaborne targets. missions. The antiaircr~ft units assigned to The 17th Marines’ 2d Battalion, the di- BACKHi\NDER Force were to come un- vision’s pioneers, formed the backbone of der Colonel Harrison of the 12th Defense the shore party. Reinforced by two com- Battalion as senior antiaircraft officer. In- panies of replacements and the transport itially, he would also control air raid and traffic control units drawn from Com- warning throughout the force, but this bat Team C, the shore party under Lieu- service would become a function of the tenant Colonel Robert G. Ballance was Allied Air Forces’ Fighter Sector Com- responsible for the smooth and effective mander, as soon as this officer landed and unloading of all task force supplies. In had his radar and communications in op- order to expedite the job of getting bulk eration. The sector commander controlled stores off LSTS, a system of overlapping all airborne Allied fighter units assigned dumps was planned, with each beached to protect the Cape Gloucester area and, in LST sending its cargo to its own class addition, COUICIorder antiaircraft fire dumps, sharing with other ships only withheld, suspended, or put, up in special those on the flanks of its unloading area. defensive patterns through Harrison’s fire Most of the supplies were mobile loaded on direction center. trucks to be run off LSTS to the dumps. The engineer plan for BACK- In order to make mobile loading work, HANDED operations gave primary re- General Krueger’s headquarters assigned sponsibility for tactical support to Col- 500 reconditioned 21~-ton trucks to tempo- onel Harold E. Rosecrans’ 17th Marines, rary use of B.4CKHANTDER Force, with with airfield repair and construction as- the drivers recruited from an Army artil- signed to a base engineers group built, lery battalion not actively committed to around two Army engineer aviation bat- ALAMO operations. The trucks were to talions. In addition to the usual combat make a rouncl trip circuit from LST to engineer tasks of construction, demolition, clump and return with the ships to the and repair, the lettered companies of 1/17, staging areas. All tractors and trucks or- 316 ISOLATION OF RABA(:r. ganic to 1st Marine Division units, that make repeated trips to the Yellow were not needed for tactical pllrposes in Beaches, the speed of unloading promised the early stages of the la]lding, \rere to re- to pick up as shore party and ships’ crews port to tile shore party for use ill moving became more experienced. supplies. The LST had a prominent part, too, in Assault troops headed for Cape Glouces- the medical evacuation plan for BACK- ter were to carry X)-clays’ replenishment HANDED. The flow of casualties during supplies of all types as well as three units the first days of the operation would be of fire for task force weapons. The gar- from landing force units through the rison trool)s Jvould })]illg in :1()-tlays’ slLl)- evacuation station run by the naval ele- plies, three units of fire for ground weap- ment of the shore party. Men hit during ons, and five units of fire for antiaircraft fighting immediately after H-Hour would guns. In order to insure a smooth flow be sent out by the first landing craft availa- of supplies to Cape Gloucester, and the ble to APDs riding offshore; once land- eventual maintenance of a 30-day level ing ships had beached, the wounded would there, the 1st Division established a con- be carried on board over the ramps into trol system for loading znd resupply. At special areas set aside for casualty treat- Cape Sudest on Oro Bay, the main sup- ment. Medical officers and corpsmen from ply base for IIACKHANDER operations, .Seventh Fleet were assi~med to all ships an officer from the division quartermas- used as transports for the assault forces. ter’s office acted as forwarding officer, his To give the best possible care to the se- main duty to insure the movement of es- riously wounded on the return voyage sential mat eriel to the combat zone. Sup- to New (kinea, Army surgical-medical plies and personnel needed at the objective teams were present on one LST of every were to be funnelled through a regulating supply echelon. At Cape Sudest, an LST officer, who estahlislled priorities for load- equipped as an 88-bed hospital ship was ing and move,nlel~t, al~d a tl.i~~~s~)olf quar- ready to receive casualties from Cape termaster, who plannwl ancl sllperviswl tl~e Gloucester and pass them on to base hos- actual loading. pitals ashore when their condition war- .kdmiral Barbey’s allocation of shipping ranted. As soon as the combat situation to Iif t the BACKHANDED Force made permitted, casualties requiring less than the LST the main resupply vessel. With a month’s bed care and rest would be kept mobile loading of most bulk stores, a prac- at Cape Gloucester in garrison force hos- ticed shore party, and a dump plan that pitals. promised swift clearance of ships’ cargo The tot al of shipping assigned to space, the amphibious force commander 13ACKHANDER support was not impres- felt that he could risk the vulnerable LSTs sive in comparison to the large number of in the combat area. The schedule of ar- vessels .needecl to lznd and protect a di~7i- rival and departure of the hulking 1andin~ sion in the Central Pacific. There was no ships, oft en dubbed Large Slow Targets need, however, for massive invasion arm a- by crew and passengers, was kept tight to das. Because of the wider range of ob- lessen exposure to enemy air attack. Since jectives that the large islands of the south- the logistic requirements of shore-to-shore ern Pacific gave them, MacArthur and operations meant that many vessels would Halsey seldom had to send their assault NEW BRITAIN PRELUDE 317 troops against heavily fortified Japanese the landings on the eastern side of Cape posit ions. This fortunate circumstance Gloucester, Rarbey. had 12 destroyers in shaved the requirement for naval gunfire addition to his flagship and t~vo rocket- support ships, or at least gave the opera- firing LCIS.’I Escorting and supporting tions agpinst Central Pacific fortress is- tile attack force woLlkl be TI? 74 under lands a higher priority of assignment. Vice Admiral 1’. A. C. Ch-utchley, RN, Similarly, the availability of land-based who had two .iustralian and two Anleri- Allied air in significant force made the use can cruisers with eight destroyers. Tile of carrier planes wasteful when the naval bombardment plan called for TF 74 to pilots could be better employed against guard the approach of the main conyoy other targets. 40 agyinst surface attack, to shell the air- In total, Admiral Barbey as Com- field area before and immediately aftel mander, VII .Imphibious Force assigned the landing, and to retire westward when himself as Commander, Task Force 76, the released by Barbey to take part in further 13ACKILINI)13R Attzck Force, 9 APDs, operations. 23 LSTS, 19 L~Is, 12 L(?Ts, and 14 LC~fs All air units supportingthe Cape Glouces- to transport, land, anti nlaintain the as- ter landings came under Brigadier Gem sault and garrison trool),s. The LCTS and eral Frederick .4. Smith, Jr.>s 1st Air Task L~Ms pins five LCIS were assigned to the Force with headquarters at Dobodul’a. IYesterll Assault Gronp (Green Beach) From first light on D-Day, a squadron of under Commnnder Carroll I). Reynolds; fighters WOUIC1escort the Eastern Assault the rest of the LCIS, the APDs, and the (lroup to the target, with three squadrons LSTS were part of the Eastern Assault successively covering the landings, and a Group schwlllled for tl]e Yellow Beaches. fifth screening the planned retirement in .4dmir~l Barhey commanded the ships at midafternoon. Several destroyers in the the main lancling as well as the naval attack force, inc]uding the donyn,gham. phases of the wl~ole ol)erat ion. had the special communications equipment For fire support duties, Commander and tmined personnel to act as fighter di- Reynolds lmd two (destroyers and two rector ships. During the time the main rocket -equipped amphibious trucks convoy was in the Cape Gloucester area, ( DUKWS) carried in L(’Ms. To cover tighter control would remain afloat. Bomber control was a function of the a Commenting cm the predominance of naval .%rmy’s 1st Air Liaison Party, part of support given the Central Pacific, Admiral Bar- lwy noted that his sailors characterized the situ- 13 ACKH.4NDER Force, which was to ation as “never had and won’t get,” but quoted land with General Rupertus’ headquatiers, .+dmira] X’imitz in a contemporary comment as est.ablish cent act with Dobodura, and di - saying: “When conflicts in timing and alloca- rect aerial sl~pport of ground operations. tion exist, due weight should be accorded to the fart that operations in the Central Pacific prom- ise at this time a more rapid advance toward “ These LCIS were im~)rovised support ships us- .JaImn and her vital lines of communication ; the ing .krmy surplus 4.5-inch rockets; techniques for e:lrlier i~(quisition of bases closer to the Japa- their employment were worked out by practice ]Iese homeland ; and, of ~reatest importance, are in the vicinity of Milne Bay. VAdm Daniel E. ]nore likely to precipitate a decisive engagement Barbey interview by HistBr, G-3, HQMG, dtd \vith the Japanese fleet.” BarbeV ttr. 22 May62. 318 ISOLATION OF RA13AIT, In the hour immediately preceding H- squadrons of B–Ms and four of 1;–25s Hour, high-le~el bonlbing lJy five sqnad- that took part in the morning missions rons of 13–24s WOUIC1 hit defensive posi- were to refllel ancl rearm in]mediately tions back of the Yellow Beaches while after landing at their home fields on New destroyers sl~elled the same target, nrea. Guinea, and strike again in the afternoon When naval gunfire was lifted, three at enemy installations west of the beach- squadrons of 13–25s would streak across head. the coast bombinx and strating the imme- As the time of the main landings at Cape diate beacl~ area, while a fourthsquadron Gloucester neared, the Japanese defenders blanketed a prominent bill behind the of h’ew Britain were increasingly alert to be:~clles ~~-itll~vllite pllospllorlls bo]llbs. At the probability of Alliecl attack. The en- the same time, across the cape, another emy commanders at Rabanl, however, mediun~ bomber squadron was slated to could only guess ~~here and ill what bomb and strafe (;reen T3e.achdefenses be- strength the wssxult would come. cape fore 2/1’s landing craft touched clov-]~. Glol~ce.ster’s airfields seen]ed a lo~ical mail] (1] overlwad standby during tl~e in i- target but so did (%+mata’s, and there tial landings woul{l be four squadrons of attack aircraft; if they were not calle(l were a number of lesser bases on both CIONV1,tl~ese .\–20s would hit. targets sont]l coasts that had to be considere(l illld de- and east of the airdrome before return- fendecl. ‘1’he termin of the islal]d itself ing to base. Later on 1)-I)ay n~orning, lnay perlml)s have playecl tile largest p:lrt both a l~eavy ancl a medium bonlb group i]l determining the ALAMO Force objec- WOUI(Iattack el]emy bases and routes of tives and K~ght?~ .lreo Army’s counter- approach along the southern coast. Nine moves. CHAPTER .2 The Enemy: Terrain and Troops THh7 OBJECTIVE ‘ and southwest coasts, barrier reef forma- tions abound. Numerous islets crop up Two narrow straits, Vitiaz (Dwnpier) among these reefs, many of them jungled and St. George’s (lhannel, join the Bis- with hilly spines, copies in miniature of marck and Solomon Seas. Between them the veget ation and terrain of New Britain. lies New Britain, a 350-mile-long island Prominent among these islands is the that fm.ms a crescent-shaped link between Arawe group, which clusters thickly about New Guinea’s Huon Peninsula and h’ew the Cape Merkus peninsula, a crooked Ireland. In width New Britain varies be- finger of land lying half-way between tween 20 and 60 miles, narrowing toward Cape Gloucester and Gasmata. Cape Gloucester in the west, and in the Fourteen miles off the coast of New northeast joining Gazelle Peninsula to the Britain at Grass Point, its western tip, is trunk of the island. Jutting out from the Rooke or Umboi Island. Rooke, like so northern shore for x distance of 30 miles many islands in the Southwest Pacific, is is the narrow Willaurnez Peninsula, a nat- no more thnn the crest of a mountain range ural barrier to coast-hugging small boat rising steeply from the sea; its bulk splits traffic. Japanese troop and supply craft Vitiaz Strait into two parts. The reef- bound to nnd from Rabaul frequently studded channel between Rooke and New avoided Willaumez by making night runs 13ritain is known as Dampier Strait, a across the open sea to Garove, largest of name that the Japanese applied to both the J$TituIslands group, standing some 40 Vitiaz ancl Dampier without distinction. miles northwest of the peninsula. (See In 1943, hydrographic information avail- Map III, Map Section.) able to the Allies about this area was There is a fringing reef along most of sketchy and unreliable, enough so that New Britain’s 1,000-mile coast with occa- Barbey would not risk his larger ships in sional breaks that open the shore to the I)ampier’s waters. The approach route sea. Beyond the reef fringing the north chosen to Cape Gloucester skirted Rooke on the west and passed between that island ‘ l’nless otherwise noted, the material in this and smaller Tolokiwa to the north, offer- section is derived from : MID, WD, Surv of ing a safer passage as well as one less likely Bismarc-k Archipelago ( S3G675 ), dtd 50ct43; to be discovered by the enemy. Allied Geographical Sect, SW’)%, Terrain Hand- book No. 7—h’ew Guinea—Cape Gloucester, dtd The coastline of western New Britain is 24 Sep43 ; Sixth Army G–2, Terrain Est Cape generxllj7 regular in outlil~e, with a series Gloucester Area, dtd 15Aug43 ; Hough and of gellt]e capes and s]lallow bays marking Crown, Ncw Britain Campaign, App H, Capt Levi its length. On the south shore, tl~e most T. Burcham, “The Vegetation of h“ewBritain and its Effect on Military Operations. ” prominent land projection is tipped by 320 ISOLATION Ol? RABAUL THE ENEMY: TERRAIN AND TROOPS 821 Cape Merkus, and on the north the deepest black sand, which is quite narrow and cut forms Rorgen Bay. For a mile and a overhung with jungle. growth. Yellow 2 lmlf on each side of Cape Gloucester there was planned for the sector nearest Silimati is no fringing reef, and large ships can lie Point where the b~acb varies in width be- close inshore in the immediate vicinity of tween 30 and 60 feet. Both beaches fall the cape. Throughout the area there is a away steeply underwater, a six-foot depth firm bexcb of black volcanic sand strewn being 20 feet out at low water and 25 at with large stones. Bordering the beach is high. Barrier reef formations in the area a 5–10-foot red clay embankment; during are scattered and far enough offshore to normal high tides water covers the beach give large landing ships access to the to the bznk. In heavy weather a deep beaches. swell and high-breaking surf made the np- Behind the Yellow Beaches is an area proaclles dangerous and unloading opera- that was labeled on Marine operation maps tions impract icfible. (See Map 117, Map as “damp flat” and discussed in intelli- Sect ion. ) gence studies as being covered at times by The only other areas near Cape Glouces- storm water. Forewarned, landing force ter where a si~gnificant break occurs in the commanders were prepared to encounter off shore reefs are at T~uwli on the shore of the area’s reddish brown volcanic soil as I)xmpier Strait and on both sides of a sticky. mud and even for a good deal of small: unnamed cape a mile and a half standing water, but no one was quite ready northwest of Silimati Point. These for the swamp that stood just back of the beaches exposed by gaps in tile. reef were low embankment behind the beaches. For- the ones chosen for the IIACKH.~NDER tunately, the plans laid to counter known assault. terrain problems proved adaptable to .Just north of the village of Taual i the meeting the graver situation posed by the reef fades away for a stretch of 400 yards, unexpected obstacle. znd the usual black sand beach is backed The reason intelligence officers did not by a three-foot bank. Inland, the coastal detect the presence of the swamp was the flat is narrow and covered with secondary concealment trees and undergrowth af- growth, and the ground rises sharply to forded against the probing aerial camera. bluffs overlooking the shore. The beach One 1st Mari]le l)ivision oflicer, a forester itself is 8–lo-feet wide at high water, when in peacetime, wrote a good description of the three-foot, depth is located 10–15-feet the vegetation that covers much of the offshore: at low tide, tile same depth is beachhead area and the ground to both foun(l 40 feet from shore. flanks: he called it “the dank, steaming The reef around Silimati Point narrows tropical jungle of the fiction writer,” the and disappears about a ha] f mile from the “swamp forest” which is: point, and for a thousand yards the beach . . characterized by widely spaced trees is free of close-in obstacles. After the reef of very irregular height, the tallest being crops out again for a few hundred yards, m)\v:lr{ls of 100 feet high. Quite commonly there is another half-mile of open beach. these trees have widely spreading buttress roots, \vhirh give a fluted appearance to the BACKHANDED Force’s Yellow Beach bottom of the trunk. W’ide spacing and ir- 1 was plotted in On this second stretch of regular height of the mature trees permit a 322 ISOLATION OF RABAUL moderatelydense to very denseundergrowth to Talawe, along a ridge connecting the of varying heights. Both undergrowth and two mountains, three smaller peaks are mature trees are generally thickly matted readily identifiable. The middle of these ~~ithlianas, vines, and lawyer cane. , . . Cover and concealment are complete in lesser heights, Mt. Langila (3,800 feet), is swamp forest. Ground observation usually a dormant volcano from which a wispy is restricted to a few yards. Movement of plume of steam issues steadily; the other troops or vehicles is very difficult. ~looded mountains are all extinct volcanoes. The al!eas virtually preclude movement during whole complex of high ground is deeply the wet season. lJargeareas of swamp for- est occur in the Cape Gloucester-BergenBay cut by ravines, many the path of streams area : the vegetation behind the landing coursing downhill to the sea. On the beachesis a strip of swampforest which ex- southern and western slopes, ridge spurs tends nearly to the airdrome area on the reach out to the shore of Dampier Strait; \vest,as well as eastward around Borgen on the north, the foothills of Mt. Talawe 13ay: edge the coastal flat; and on the east, those The coastal flat west of the beachhead of Mt. Tangi form one side of the broad widens back of Cape Gloucester to two Itni River valley. miles of gently rolling ground covered by The vegetation covering the mountains kl~l~aigrass and then narrows as it nears is tropical rain forest, common to all New Dorf Point. One of the few major areas Britain at elevations of 500 feet and above. of New Britain not covered by jungle Here the tallest trees, usually 125 to 150 growth, the grassland was the site of a feet high, form virtually a complete cano- l)rewar emergency landing strip used by tlw planes of an island-hopping commer- py underneath which the crowns of a sec- cial line. The Japanese moved in during ond layer of smaller trees crowd. Fre- December 1942 and began building a new quently there is: runway diagonally across the trace of the . . . an understory of brush and young old; in +4pril 1943, a second airstrip was trees beneath these, ranging up to twenty started about 1,000 feet southeast of the or thirty feet tall. Sometimes there is a fairly complete ground cover of ferns and original one. A small stream emptying herbs up to about two feet in height. The into the eea east of Cape Gloucester sepa- actual interior of such a forest is relatively rated the two. By october, Allied air at- open except for occasional small tangles tacks and the demand for Japanese planes of climbing bamboos, rattan palms, or to garrison existing bases had combined lianas. . . . Complete cover and concealment from air to arrest development of the airfields. observation is afforded. Ground observa- Kunai grass had laid claim to one and was tion is limited—a standing man can be ob- encroaching on the other in December served at about 50 yards; a prone man 1943. usually will be concealed at 10 yards. Foot troops can move through rain forest with Southeast of the airfields the ground little difficulty and require practically no rises gradually then steeply toward the trail cutting. Physical character of the ter- twin volcanic cones of Mt. Talawe (6,600 rain—spur ridges, deep stream channels, or the lik+may make travel difficult, but feet). Ten miles to the south, Mt. Tangi the vegetation itself offers little hin- (5,600 feet) breaks the horizon, and close drance. . . .3 ‘ Burcham, op. cit., p. 192. ‘ Ibid., p. 193. THE ES13MY : TERRAIN AND TROOPS 323 One other type of jungle vegetation, reinforcements into the combat zone or secondary growth, is frequently found in withdraw their troops from cent act almost western New Britain, particularly in the at will. A coastal track, usable by motor vicinity of native villages. Because of vehicles between the airfields and Silimati the local practice of abandoning garden Point, bordered the entire objective area. patches of bushy vegetables and fruits From Tauali east across the saddle be- after one year’s cultivation, wild plants in tween Mts. Talnwe and Tamgi, a cross- tangled profusion quickly reclaim the tem- island trail led to Natamo on Bergen Bay. porary clearings. Wide areas of second- Joining this track was another, running ary growth, d] of them a formidable bar- over the shoulder of Tzlawe to the airfields, rier to troop movement, occur in the re- and a second which led southeast then gions most heavily settled b,y the natives, south, eventually reaching Gilnit. A most In prewar years, about 3,000 Melanesians important trail> its existence unknown to inhabited hTew Britain west of the Itni .411ied intelligence, linked the area picked River; the only Caucasians who lived for the 13ACKHANDER beachhead to the there were three missionaries, a Catholic Tauali-Natamo track. priest who ran a mission at Kalingi near The climate of western New Britain is Dorf Point, and a Church of England what might be expected of a region of couple who served a mission at Sag-Sag, jungle-covered mountains and swamps. three miles south of Tauali. The native At all times during the year, the humidity villages were in four main groups, two is high, and the daytime temperature II ear the missions and the others on the range hovers around 90 degrees; at night eastern slopes of the mountains, one clus- the temperature seldom drops below 72 tered near the mouth of the Itni and the degrees. The annual rainfall usually to- second fanned out along the upper reaches tals 150–200 inches and much of this, an of the river. average of 30 inches a month, comes dur- The trail network connecting the vil- ing the period of the northwest monsoon, lages is the only practical means of pene- mid-December to mid-February. In this trating the interior, and the frequent wettest season, rain may fall almost every ridges and streams cutting the tracks on clay and squalls with torrential downpours the mountainsides limit travel to men on are frequent. The northwest winds are foot. liTo waterway connects the coasts, strong and fairly steady, making the sea and of all the rivers and streams in west- rough and the surf heavy. The dry sea- ern New Britain, only the Itni is naviga- son at Cape Gloucester occurs during the ble; the others are shallow and fordable summer months when the prevailing through all their length. On the Itni, na- southeast winds vent most of their force on tive canoes can reach Relmen, 14 air miles the south slopes of the mountains. The from the river’s mouth, and small landing periods between the two seasons, and the craft can reach a point about two-and-a period of the southeast monsoon itself, are half miles above Gilnit. times of comparatively calm weather. The location of the various trails had an The campaign to seize control of west- important effect on the progress of the ern New Britain would be fought in the fight ing at Cape Gloucester. The layout worst possible weather of the year. Low- was such that the Japanese could feed lying terrain would disappear beneath a 324 ISOLATION OF RAB.4UL cover of standing water, and, on the higher time thus gained, the Japanese intended to ground, the trees, the undergrowth, and strengthen the fort ifications and reinforce the land itself would become and remain, the defending troops of the islands that rainsoaked. The prospect was that at- directly barred the approaches to Japan. tacker and defender alike, mired in com- In Rabaul, the decision that the Eighth bat in the dripping jungle, would curse .4rea Army’s zone of responsibility was the day they set foot on the island. outside the vital inner perimeter came as no shock. General Imamura believed that JAPANESE Z)EFEiV8E84 the Allied advance was inevitable, but that its force could be blunted considerably. While, at times during the war, Japanese Reinforcements were dispatched to threat- planners at Imperial General Headquur- ened bases in the northern Solomons, the tem seemed unreasonably optimistic in the Bismarcks, and eastern New Guinea, but face of repeated setbacks, that mood van- there was a strong inclination to keep back ished when Tokyo appraised the strategic a substantial force at Rabaul itself. In situation in late September 1943. The the eyes of the Japanese, Rabaul was an Army and Navy headquarters staffs con- objective that could not be bypassed, and ceded that the Allied forces were strong in estimating Allied intentions, Imamura’s enough to break through the outpost cor- staff considered its major problem to be a don of defenses in the Central and South- decision whether: west Pacific and reach the inner perimeter . . . the enemy will attempt to capture of island bases in western New Guinea, the Rabaul immediately after the occupation of Marianas, Palaus, and Philippines. To the Dampier Strait Area and Bougainvillea stave ofi that event, enemy commanders of island or the enemy will invade Rabaui after isolating our forces there by severing our the garrisons manning the barrier posi- line of communications in the rear through tions were ordered to “do their utmost to the occupation of the Admiralty Islands and hold out as long as possible.” 5 With the h“ew Ireland, especially the Kavieng sector of the latter. However, in view of the ab- ‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this solute superiority of the enemy naval and section is derived from: MilHistSec, GHQ, FEC, air strength and the value of Rabaul from Japanese Monograph No. 127, Army Southeast both the political and strategic viewpoint, Area OpsRec Part IV, Eighth Area Army Ops, it is more probable that the enemy will take rev. cd,, dtd Ju149 and Japanese Monograph No. the shortest course for capturing this valu- 128, Army Southeast Area OpsRec Part IV Sup- able base, presumably in February or March plement, 17th DivOps in Western New Britain, of next year (1944) .“ dtd Ju149 ( OCMH ), hereafter EiQhth Area ArmV The Japanese shared, along with this 0p8 and 17th DitJ 0D8; Ist MarDiv tlAR, Anx A, conviction that Rabaul would be attacked, Intelligence ; IntelSec, ADC Hq, 1st MarDiv, Doc- a feeling that its defenses could be held uments and POW Repts Folder, n.d., hereafter against Allied Intelli- .4DC IntelDocament8; Takushiro Hattori, Dai landing forces. Toa Senso Zen.shi [The Complete History of the Grew!er East ,48ia War], 4 vols. (Tokyo : Masu Army Dept Directive No. 1652, dtd 30 Sep43, in Publishing Company, 1953—MS translation at HistDiv, MilIntelSec, GHQ, FEC, IGHQ Army OCMH), hereafter Hattori, C’omplete War Hi8- Directives, v. III ( OCMH). tory ; Hough and Crown, New Britain Campaign. 0Eighth, Area Army OW, pp. 85–86. Although ‘ “Army-Navy Central Agreement on Central this document was compiled after the war, it is and South Pacific Area Operations,” with IGHQ contemporary in tone and content. THE ENEMY : TERRAIN AND TROOPS 325 gence and operations oficers on both sides On the south coast west of Cape Merkus, felt a struggle to take the base would re- the principal enemy barge hideouts were quire extensive assault forces and a bitter, located at Cape Bushing, where the Itni costly battle. What the enemy failed to River emptied into the sea, and near the appreciate, however, was that predomi- villages of Aisegt+ Sag-Sag, and Ula- nant Allied air and naval strength made maingi. Before the Allies seized control the seizure of Rabaul unnecessary if an en- of the Huon Peninsula, a steady traffic compassing ring of less important bases passed through these points to Rooke Is- was captured. land, and then onto New Guinea. Routes Even if the Japanese had been willing along the north coast, less vulnerable to to denude Rabaul’s defenses to reinforce attack and therefore more heavily trav- outlying positions, the problems of trans- elled, crossed the open sea, stopping at ferring troops and equipment were formi- Garove Island, or followed the coast dable. The sea was the only feasible sup- around Willaumez Peninsula. In succes- ply route, but its use was dangerous. Al- sion west from Willaumez, the major lied fighters and bombers vied with torpe- barge stations were Iboki, Karai-ai, Koko- do boats to cut down enemy barge and de- po, and Natamo. (See Map 29.) stroyer traffic in the forward area, and the Elements of the Id and 8th Shipping losses suffered by the Japanese crippled Engineer Regiments manned and main- their plans to meet the expected attacks. tained the boats used along the coastal Personnel losses were heavy, but even more barge routes, mainly standard Japanese damaging was the destruction of supplies landing craft. Most of the vessels that and the means of transporting them. In followed the Rabaul-Garove-New Guinea general, the closer to the Vitiaz Strait course were larger, deeper-draft coastal enemy troops were stationed, the more schooners and fishing trawlers handled by likely they were to be scantily equipped, crews of the 5th Sea Transport Battalion. poorly clothed, and on short rations. Although Japanese destroyers were oc- The barge traffic from Rabaul to New casionally called upon for emergency, Guinea was largely responsible for the high-speed movement of troops and prior- builclup of ,Japanese positions in western ity cargoes, the burden of supply fell upon N’ew 13ritzin. Aside from the Cape shipping manned by soldiers. Detach- Gloucester airfields znd the defenses that ments of the Iat L%harkation Unit acted grew up around them, enemy installations as shore party at the barge bases near west of Gasrnata and Willa17mez Penin- Cape Gloucester, while a variety of serv- sula were mainly way stations on the coast- ice units performed that mission at other hugging barge route forced upon the ,Jap- points. The shipping engineers and other anese by .Allied attacks. The miscellane- troops concerned with moving personnel ous collection of motor sailers, launches, and supplies were all armed and able to and landing craft, that, were collectively act as infantry. known xs barges, found shelt er from prob- In May 1943, General Imamura sent the ing aircraft wherever a gap in the fring- 6,5th Brigade from Rabaul to take over ing reef, a narrow beach, and overhanging the defense of western New Britain. The foliage combined to give them a chance to 6.5fh, which had earned an Imperial cita- escape detection. tion for its part in the capture of Bataan, 326 ISOLATION OF RABAUIJ was down to a strength of one two-bat- and debarkation units, and a number of talion infantry regiment and supporting troops of the i51~t Divition.7 The main signalj engineer, and medical troops when body of the 51st was fighting the Austra- it reached New B rit sin. only the Ii$l.stlians on New Guinea, but the division’s Znfan.try came from the Philippines; the rear echelon units as well as the survivors l.@?d Znfczntry, once part of the brigade, of transport sinkings were present on New remained tl]ere, and the 7.22d Infantry Britain, Garove, and Rooke Islands. Of was sent to the Marshalls. In addition to particular value to Matsuda’s force as com- regimental headquarters and signal con- bat troops were two companies of the l15th panies, the l~lsthad an antitank company Znfanztiy and a smaller detachment of the equipped with six 37mm guns and an ar- Mth Zn.fontry, two provisional infantry tillery company armed with four 75mm companies formed from artillery and en- mountain guns. Each infantry battalion gineer elements of the division, and about of the regiment had a headquarters and l~alf of tl]e 51st fl~{{j)l?~,(;.~f(olre Zi?eq;l}lent.’ supply train, three ritle companies, a heavy General Matsuda was an infantry officer mzclline g(ln company, and a glln platoon ]vitll ro]lsiderable experience in tl]e .Army ’s manning two 70mm howitzers. (See Map shipping transportation department. He 23. ) had commanded an infantry regiment in Throughout the summer, the 6,5t?i Bri- China and an infantry group in Man- gade’s main concern was keeping the sup- churia before taking over the .JthShipping ply lines to New Guinea open. Most of Command in February 1943. The com- the units attached to it were companies mand, an administrative headquarters or smaller elements of service organiza- g-eared to handle shipping activities, tions concerned with the barge traffic, air- moved from Japan to Rabaul by way of field constriction and operation, or the lo- eastern New Guine&, arriving in New gistical supl)ort of the garrison. (he type Britain in early Aubgust. On 29 October, of unit, however, antiaircraft troops, when Matsuda was also appointed to com- added significantly to defensive firepower, mand the fi.;th llrigaa’~, he formed a conl- both against, .&llied aircraft and ground posite heaclquart ers f or the Matsuda Force forces. Each of the 39th Fie?d An fija&- by merging the staffs and headquarters of rraft Batta7ion9s three firing batteries had the brigade and the shipping command.’ four ?5mn~ g-uns that coulcl be used a~zinst About a month after Matsuda estab- ground t ar~ets, The 9.?8thand ?OtiiMa- chine (7m~non ~om.panics both had eight lished his command post near Kalingi mis- dual-purpose 20mm guns and six heavy sion at Cape Gloucester, his force came machine ~guns. The E/qJ~thA re(( A rmy’s interest in the ‘ (%ief, WarHistOff, I)efAgency of Japan, ltr to IIead, Hist13r, (}–3, HQMC’, dtd 20.Jun62, here- defense of western New 13ritnin picked up after .Japatlcsc COMIY!ents. considerably as the situation in the Sala- 8 ATIS 1328, 141st InfRegt OpO A. No. 11, malla area worsened. (% 5 September, a ‘?Dec43, in ATIS (Iurrent Translations No. 122, new command. the Matxuda Force which dtd 31 MzY44 ( A(’SI Rem, FRC Alex). took its nnrne from its commxnder, Major ‘ Docu No. .59881, MilServRec of Ex-LtGen Iwao Matsuda, in HistDiv, MilIntelSec, GHQ, General Iwao Matsllda, took over the 65th FEC, Personal History Statements, 2 vols Brigade, the various shipping engineer ( OCMH ) ; .Japa?wse Comments. THE ENEMY: TERRAIh’ AND TROOPS 32’7 uncler the 17th LM&$on. The division, Matsuda’s command to reinforce the de- newly arrived in Rabaul from China, was fenses in the immediate vicinity of Cape commanded by Lieutenant General Ya- Gloucester. Also coming under i!ldsudu snshi Sakai. Orig-inally, the 27th had been Force was the 1st Battalion, 81st Infantry slated to reinforce the garrison of north- which was ordered to Cape Merkus. The ern Bongainvil]e, but General Imamura 3’d Battu.7ion, 53d Infantry and the 6th changed its mission when he was assured Company of the %d Battalion were de- by the ,!lou.th~ast .4rea Fleet that it could tached from the regiment to serve on Bou- keep another large body of men supplied gainvillea as was the rest of the 81st Znfan- in western New Britain. On 5 October, try, a battalion of the 5&h Infaru&y, and the Eighth Area Army commander added one of the 23d Field Artillery. The re- the Matsudo Force and the Gasmata gar- maining units of the 5&h and g3d were rison to (3eneral Sakai’s command and or- distributed between Gasmata, Malalia, and dered him to assume responsibility for de- Talasea. fense of New Britain west of a line j oining With a battalion and a rifle company Commodore Bay and Vahsel Harbor. stripped from its strength, the 53d Infan- Division headquarters was established at try was little stronger than the 1.41st. Malalia near Cape Hoskins to the east of Regiment al headquarters and supporting Williaumez Peninsula. companies in both units were the same, The first echelon of the 17’th Divti&m with the 5.?d having in addition a platoon left, Shanghai on 24 September, arriving of 90mm mortars. The Ist BattaUon of at Rabaul on #5 October. Three more the 53d had four rifle companies, but the convoy groups were to bring the remainder commitment of the 6th company on Bou- of the division, but shipping losses and the gainvillea pared the 2d Battalion to three. mounting danger of attack by Allied Eighth Area AwnY kept control of two planes and submarines combined to cancel rifle companies, the 70mm howitzers, and the sailing of the last convoy, which was to most of the heavy machine guns of the Z.st have lifted a number of service troops and Battalion, 81.~tInfantry. leaving the rein- 3,000 infantry replacements. The second forcements for Cape Merkus at a strength and third convoys which departed from of a headquarters and two rifle companies Shanghai late in October lost one ship to plus a machine gun platoon. submarines while passing through the Japanese destroyers were used to trans- Ryukyu Islands, had another damaged by port the 17th D&nMon troops to western B–24s south of Truk, and lost a third to a New Britain with most units landing at mine off Kavieng. Total casualties from Karai-ai and carrying on by barge or trail the three attacks were 1,173 men killed and to Cape Gloucester. The waters along the wounded.l” south coast were too close to Allied bases The main strength of the 17t/i Div&ion’z to risk destroyers there, so the skeleton bat- 53d Znfamtry Regiment and the. regimen- talion headed for the Arawe area had to tal headquarters and 3d Battalion, %?d march overland to its post. Since the Ist Field A~tWery were assigned to General Batta?;on, 81st Infantry had been on ‘0l~th Div Ops, pp. 4–5. This source dw?s not board the transport torpedoed during the provide a casualty breakdown. move from China, it had to be reorganized 328 ISOLATION OF RABAUL and refitted in Rabaul. It was early De- around elements of the 1st Shipping Eng& cember before the battalion landed at neem and the 39th FkZd Antiaircraft Bat- Iboki, terminus of a cross-island trail to ta.iion held the sector where the trail net Cape Merkus. from the interior reached the coast. Mat- While the last of the 17th Division re- suds’s scheme of defense depended upon inforcements were moving into position in retaining possession of the trails to move western New Britain, General Matsuda his limited manpower to meet Allied at- took steps to increase his combat strength tacks. Two small hills which dominate by organizing a third battalion for the the area served as focal points for enemy 141st Infantry. The existing two bat- defenses. One, a 450-foot height called talions of the regiment furnished the men Target Hill by the Allies, stands out stark- for the headquarters, one rifle company, ly above the swamp forest, its open, grass- and most of the machine ~gun company; covered crown in sharp contrast to the sur- the men of the 66th and l15th Znfantry de- rounding sea of trees. A mile and a half tachments formed the remaining.. two rifle south of Target Hilll Hill 66o rises out of companies and a platoon of machine guns. the jungle with a cover of tangled growth The new unit began organizing on 12 De- that blends easily with its environs. cember and was formally joined to the Across the island, in the vicinity of Cape regiment on the 20th. 13ushing, was the def ensive sector assigned The deployment of Matsuda’s forces, as to the lh~8t Znfant?y. The Id Battalion the time of the expected Allied assault ap- was located near the mouth of the Itni, the proached, reflected the importance the ?i?doccupied defenses at Aisega, and the Japanese general attached to the various newly formed 3d was in reserve at the regi- objectives in his defensive area. Holding mental headquarters at Nlgol, a village on the vital airfield sector was the Ist But- the Itni about three miles above Gilnit. talion, 63d Infantry, reinforced by the Farther down the coast at Cape Merkus regiment’s 37mm and 75mm guns and a the defending force was composed of a miscellany of service troops. Beach de- platoon of naval personnel manning a fenses, mainly bunkers connected by rifle communication relay station’1 and two trenches, were scattered along the shore on provisional infantry companies formed either side of Cape Gloucester. The heavi- from elements of the 51.st Division. est concentration was located back of the The garrisons of Rooke and Garove Is- most logical site for a large-scale landing lands were also part of the Matsuda Force. attempt, a stretch of beach three miles On Garove, the principal unit was the 5th southeast of the cape that led directly into Sea Transport Battalion with an antiair- the grasslands. In the foothills of Mt. craft battery and shipping service units Talawe, hidclen by the lush vegetation, was attached. The headquarters and two com- a bunker-trench complex that commanded panies of the tilst Eecon?uzissance Regi- the airstrips. ment were still on Rooke on D-Day, but, Knowing what lay behind the beaches prior to 26 December, a reinforcing 75mm near Silimati Point, the Japanese paid gun batter-y and about half of the regi- scant attention to their defense. Just to the south, however, a strong force built n S-E Area &-wvOps—Z1l,p. 39. THE ENEMY: TERRAIN AND TROOPS 329 ]uent’s cavalrymen were sent to New even the slightest disgrace will adhere to Britain to bolster the 1.41,st ln~antpy’s your name.” “ defenses. In November, General Matsuda moved I local knowledge of these men was invalu- determine that the beach was not usable able to division intelligence, as was their before he had to order his men back into understanding of the natives and their the rubber boats. ability to teach others how to live and Since .Ldmiral Carpender did not want operate successfully in the jungles of New to risk torpedo boats north of Cape Britain. Gloucester, it proved impossible to make THE ENE~IY: TERRAIN AND TROOPS 331 a reconnaissance of the main beaches searching patrols, sending their reports of near Silimati Point. An ALAMO Scout e.ne.my flights directly to fighter controls party did land at Arawe, however, on the at Woodlark and Dobodura that alerted night of 8–9 December and concluded that interceptors at Nadzab’s fighter strips. few Japanese were present to hinder the The location of the chain of observe= projected assault there. On the night of promised 30 to 60 minutes’ advance warn- 21–22 December, Bradbeer and First Lieu- ing of Japanese attacks on Cape Glouces- tenant Joseph A. Fournier of 2/1 led two ter, time enough for Allied fighters to parties ashore to check the beaches near rendezvous at the most favorable altitude Tauali. The Marine scouts confirmed the and meet the raiders. selection of Green Beach as the best that The reports of scouts and coastwatchers could be found for the landing; no enemy were only a portion of the intelligence sift- forces were encountered. Coming away ed to get accurate information about from New Britain the torpedo boat trans- New Britain and its clefenders. Japanese porting the scouts attacked some Japanese documents and prisoners taken on New barges; in the exchange of fire, three Guinea and Bougairtville proved a fruit- American crewmen were wounded and an ful source of order of battle data, and at engine was knocked out, but the boat got MacArthur’s, Krueger’s, and Rupertus’ back to base safely.” levels of command there was a constant The ALAMO Scouts were not the only m-evaluation of the strength of the de- group to penetrate the Japanese defenses fending force in western New Britain. on ATewBrit sin. As usual, the coastwatch- In light of the difficulty of piecing to- ers were there, a constant irritant to the gether the various scattered segments of enemy. One station set up inland from news, the picture of its opponents that the Cape Orford was in operation through the 1st Marine Division was able to assemble summer, giving warning of flights from was a remarkably good one. Rabaul and passing on information of the When the B.4CKHANDER Force op- Japanese forces, On 30 August, General eration plan was issued on 14 November, Kenney requested that a series of air spott- the intelligence estimate of enemy strength ing stations be established across the base west of Arawe on New Britain and on of Gazelle Peninsula. General Mac- Rooke and Garove was 7,o71 men. The Arthur agreed and his G-2 ordered the total moved steadily upward as elements coastxvatcher directorate, Allied Intelli- of the 17th Division were identified as gence Bureau, to have the spotters in posi- part of the garrison. On 9 December, the tion by 2Jovember. Sixteen coastwatchers various Allied headquarters published and 27 natives landed from a U.S. sub- minimum-maximum enemy strength fig- marine on 28 Septimber and separated ures for western New Britain that differed into five parties to take their posts in the considerably. While MacArthur’s and rain forest. cover on the island’s mountain- Blarney’s intelligence officers were content ous spine. to count only the sure identifications, there The Japanese managed to capture one was little disposition at Krueger’s or of the parties, but the others kept free of Rupertus’ command posts to ignore signs, howeyer slight, of Japanese units that “ McMillan, !2%eOICZBreed, p. 16S. might dilute the superiority of attackers 332 ISOLATION OF RABAUL over the defenders. Where GHQ and was the fact that Japanese place names Allied Land Forces found a strength on western New Britain were a far cry range of 4,000–5,000, ALAMO Force had from the names found on prewar Aus- 5,668–9,344, and the 1st Marine Division tralian maps. figured 7,416-9,816 enemy were present.” While the enemy accepted and used most The final division estimate before the of the native place names in western New .4rawe landing placed the lowest strength Britain, the result of such use was often an at 8,400 and the highest at 12,076.*G unrecognizable title. .411ied POW inter- Although the division’s educated guess rogators and the translators of Japanese proved to be high, the figures were reason- documents had to judge how native speech able in view of the information available. had been rendered in Japanese and then, in A scattering of evidence indicated that turning the result into English, to try to the 65th might have been raised from come close to the original. And often this brigade to division status, providing a transition involved the additional problem basis for a belief that at least one other of of considering how differently native dia- its regiments besides the l.JlstInfantry lects would be set down by persons used to was present. Accordingly, the I,fgd In- .4ustralian and American speech. Intel- fantqy, which could not be accounted for ligence officer% at least, became well ac- elsewhere, was added to the order of battle. quainted with the Japanese name for Cape Similarly, additional companies of units Gloucester, translated interchangeably known to be at Cape Gloucester in some as Tuluvu or Tsurubu. Other names could strength were counted present if they not be identified. The headquarters of failed to turn up in other sectors. In the General Matsuda appeared as Egaroppu absence of more exact figures, Japanese when translated, a fact that prevented its tables of organization were used as the recognition as Nakarop on prewar maps.lW basis for strength estimates, with 20 per- And there were puzzling references to vil- cent deducted for losses of all types. lages that could not be plotted anywhere Acting to counterbalance the inflated along known trails. totals was the fact that the presence of On the whole, however, the maps avail- the remnants of the 519t Division, includ- able to BACKHANDED Force were use- ing the 61st Reconnatisance Reginwnt, ful, if not precisely accurate. A German went undetected. survey of the island, made prior to the first The location of the various elements of World War, was the base on which later the Mat.wda Force remained a worrisome maps were constructed. On these, the trails problem to Allied intelligence officers. The along the coast were plotted with some 17th Division reinforcements arrived so care, but the location of trails crossing the close to D-Day that their defensive assign- interior were at best approximations. As ments were unknown, and it was not clear western New Britain attracted Allied at- just what combat units occupied the lcwated tention as a possible objective, repeated defenses. Confusing the situation further aerial photographic missions were flown over it in an effort to improve knowledge “ ALAI$IOForce G–2 PeriodieRept No. 18, dtd 9Dec43,in ALAMO 6% Jnl No. 6. “In the text, the names used by BACK- ‘61st MarDiv D–2 Seet, Enemy O/B Estimate, HANDED Force for locations on New Britain dtd 13Dee43. have been used. THE ENEMY: TERRAIN AND TROOPS 333 of its terrain. When MacArthur’s cartog- through demonstrations and review of raphers were ready to draft operation maps combat experience, on the fact that the in October 1943, the aerial photographs most insignificant appearing document gave them a clear picture of coastline and might provide the key that would shorten offshore reefs, terrain in the few open areas, the battle and save lives. The Marines and prominent heights, but the jungle trees were reminded of the importance of taking gave up little of the secrets that lay beneath prisoners and of the ordinary Japanese their branches. Information needed to soldier’s willingness to cooperate with his plot inland trails, villages, and streams was captors in providing military information often taken from old maps and charts and once he had surrendered. from the memories of islanders who had To process the flow of intelligence on visited or lived on New Britain. D-Day and after, the intelligence sections The map most often used by planners of combat teams and division were set up and combat troops was drawn in a scale of to give a quick evaluation to captured 1:20,000 with a thousand-yard military enemy maps, diaries, and orders. Infor- grid superimposed. On the back of each of mation of immediate use to Marine com- the seven sheets it took to cover the coast manders was to be extracted and the docu- from Borgen Bay to Cape Bach and the ments passed on to the ALAMO Force interior to include Mt. Talawe was the headquarters for definitive translation. photo mosaic used in making that segment. In the same manner, prisoners were to be TWO other maps frequently used by higher interrogated as soon as possible after cap- headquarters were also printed in quan- ture to extract what intelligence they had tity; one covered the immediate objective of use to BACKHANDED Force, and area in a one-mile scale and the other then shipped out for further questioning showed all of New Britain at an inch to in New Guinea. To help speed the search every four miles. To help troop leaders for useful information in enemy docu- visualize the terrain where they would be ments, ten Nisei were borrowed from Sixth fighting, the 1st Division’s relief mapping Army to augment the division’s own lan- section modeled the ground forms of the guage section. Yellow Beach, Green Beach, and airfield One other source of up-to-date informa- areas in several small scales. Copies of tion of the enemy was available before these relief maps were then moulded and D-Day—the DIRECTOR operati~n. If distributed to division units and other ele- the Arawe assault had its hoped-for diver- ments of the landing force. sionary effect, Japanese troops would be While Marine intelligence officers work- drawn off from the area of the main land- ed hard to assemble information on the ings. Any contact General Cunningham’s enemy and the objective in order to brief cavalrymen had with elements of the Mat- assault troops, they devoted as much at- suda Force promised intelligence of value tention to the problem of procuring in- to the Marines who were headed for Cape formation after the landing. Deliberate Gloucester. Exact answers to questions and repeated stress was given in all divi- about the enemy’s ability and will to fight sion training to the need for passing along and his dispositions to meet Allied attack promptly any enemy papers or material could only be found ashore on New that were found. Emphasis was laid, Britain. CHAPTER 8 DEXTERITY Landings ARA WE—Z-DA Y TO D-DAY 1 the coastal trail springs up again, forking at the Pulie River with one path leading The focal point of DIRECTOR opera- cross island to Iboki and the other con- tions was a boot-shaped peninsula with tinuing along the shore until it disappears Cape Merkus as its heel. Lying offshore in dense rain forest. Four miles east of from the boot’s sole are three islands, the neck of Arawe Peninsula (to give it Ausak, Arawe, and Pilelo, which bound the name used by Allied forces) is Lupin Arawe Harbor, an anchorage used by village, the site of a small prewar emer- coastal shipping before the war. The gency landing ground. Unused by the beach chosen for the main Allied assault Japanese, the airstrip was choked with is about 1,000 yards due north of the cape kunai grass in December 1943. on the harbor’s shore. Behind the beach, The most practical way to travel along designated Orange Beach by planners, the New Britain’s south coast is by boat, a ground slopes up sharply through a break fact that played the most important part in the cliffs that line the peninsulas west- in the selection of Arawe as an AL.4M0 ern and southerl> coasts. Most of the Force target. Once General Cunning- north shore of the peninsula and itis bul- ham’s landing force was ashore on Arawe bous toe are taken up by mangrove swamp, Peninsula, it could put an end to enemy which occurs frequently in this part of barge traffic and sever the supply and rein- Ii’ew Britain; the high ground is occupied forcement route to Cape Gloucester. by the coconut trees of Amalut Plantation. Since the .4rawe-Iboki trail was known to (See Map 24.) be difficult and little-used—hardly more Between Cape Merkus and Sipul village, than a footpath-Allied planners thought about 30 miles to the west, is a trackless it unlikely that the Japanese COUIC1move region of swamp and jungle, a formidable enough troops overland to threaten seri- barrier to movement. From the cape east, ously Cunningham’s position. The proven hunting ability of Allied planes and tor- ‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: ALAMO G–3 Jnl; CTF pedo boats made remote the prospect of 76 OPlan No. 3A43, dtd 10Dec43; ComVIIPhib- any 1ar 334 DEXTERITY LANDINGS 335 on Arawe Peninsula. The object of one experience handling the new Buffaloes landing was the seizure of a reported Jap- than any other battalion unit.’ anese radio station and defensive position Plans called for the DIRECTOR as- on Pilelo Island which commanded the sault troops to be carried to the objective best passages into Arawe Harbor. The in fast ships, vessels that could unload second landing was designed to put a quickly and promptly leave the area. blocking force across the coastal trail just Later echelons carrying reinforcements east of the foot of the peninsula. In both and supplies WOUIC1use LCTS shuttling instances, General Cunningham strove for from Finschhafen. Admiral Rarbey was surprise, planning predawn assaults with- reluctant to risk any of his LSTS at Arawe out air or ships’ gunfire support. The with the BACKHAND13R Operation so troops were to land from rubber boats in- close at hand. He did approve, however? stead of powered landing craft. the use of the Carter Hall, a landing ship For the main landing, both air strikes dock (LSD) which had just arrived in the and naval bombardment were scheduled Southwest Pacific, and of the Australian to cover assault, waves in LVTS and follow- transport Westruh to move the men, ing waves in LCVPS and LCMS. The amphibious craft, and supplies involved amphibian tractors were to be manned by in the main landing. Two APDs were Marines of the Ist Division and the land- assigned to transport Troops A and B, ing craft by Army engineers of the 2d 1st Squadron, l12th Cavalry, chosen to Engineer Special Brigade. So little sure make the two rubber boat landings. knowledge existed of reef conditions in General Cunningham issued his formal and around Arawe Harbor that Admiral field order for the seizure of positions in Barbey, who commanded the attack force, the .4rawe area on 4 December; the assault asked that ALAMO Force make LVTS troops had been alerted to their mission available to carry the first waves ashore. earlier as they assembled at Goodenough The amphibian engineers and their boats from Woodlark and Kiriwina. In addi- were detailed to DIRECTOR Force to tion to the task of securing Arawe Penin- provide General Cunningham with a boat sula and the islands forming Arawe Har- pool after the initial landings had been bor, the cavalrymen were to outpost the made. trail leading to the Pulie River and patrol On 30 November, General Krueger di- vigorously to guard against enemy attacks. rected Genernl Rupertus to assign 29 As soon as the task force position was con- LVTS and their crews to DIRECTOR solidated, Cunningham was to send an am- Force plus the Marines needed to operate phibious patrol to the Itni River and 10 new armored Buffalo amtracs to Gilnit to check the possibility of over- be provided by the Army. The ALAMO land contact with the Marines at Cape Force commander pointed out that the Gloucester. tractors would be returned to division con- The torpedo boat base called for in trol before D-Day. The choice of the unit GHQ, Seventh Fleet, and ALAMO Force to fill the assignment logically fell on Con~- plans for Ara-rre remained a vague affair pany A, Ist Amphibian Tractor Battalion. The company was part of the reserve com- ‘ Ist Ma)-Dio S.AR, Anx D, Amphibian Tractors. bat team of the division and had had more p. 1. 336 ISOLATION OF RABAUL at the operating level despite the definite fast and the ships and men had to make language directing its establishment. In last-minute preparations for the assault. conferences with General (lmningham on When the DIRECTOR operation was 5 December, the fleet’s motor torpedo boat decided upon, the Japanese defenders of commancler, Lieutenant Commander Mor- Arawe were calculated at 100–15o men ton C. Mumma, stated that he would M- with the only identified units a naval anti- sign two boats based at Dreger Harbor on aircraft platoon and a small radio detach- New Guinea to patrol east of Arawe each ment. On 5 December, reconnaissance night after the landing. The boats would planes sighted 12-14 enemy barges at report to the task force intelligence offi- Kumbum Island near Arawe and four cer for briefing on arrival and be available more along the peninsula’s shore. Al- for special missions on request, but they though it was conceded that these craft would return to Dreg-er with dawn. The might be taking part in a routine supply only naval installations Mumma asked for run, ALAMO intelligence officers felt it at Aravre were emergency fueling facili- was “prudent to assume the enemy at ties. In addition to the torpedo boats Arawe now has at least 500 [men] and con- hovering near Arawe, he said another pair siderable reinforcement potential.” 3 Gen- from Dreger would hunt barges nightly eral Cunningham asked General Krueger between Tauali and Sag-Sag and two for reinforcements to meet the added others from Kiriwina would scout the threat. On 10 December, a battalion of the vicinity of C~asmata. No boats would 158th Infantry, a non-divisional regiment, patrol the sector from Aravre west to the was alerted as reserve for DIRECTOR. Itni because of the poorly charted reefs Cunningham also asked that a 90mm and shallows among the offshore islands. gun battery be assigned to his force to sup- The Carter Hall loaded Marine tractors plement the antiaircraft fire of the two and crewmen at Milne Bay on 5 December, bat tcries of automatic weapons he already as the Westnzlia picked up a company-size had. .41though the strength of the Japa- task group from the Boat Battalion, 592d nese ground garrison at Arawe and its de- Boat and Shore Regiment. At Good- fensive potential were perplexing ques- enough the two larger ships were joined by tions, there was little doubt in the minds of the APDs Sands and Humphreys, and the All ied commanders that the enemy air re- l12th’s assault troops came on board to action to the landing would be swift and take part in two practice landings, one a powerful. The few heavy antiaircraft full:scale rehearsal of the operation. The guns available were already committed to results of the training showed that boat other operations, however, and Cunning- wave timing was off, that some junior lead- ham’s force had to rely on machine guns ers were not sure of themselves in the un- and 20mm and 40mm cannon for aerial defense. familiar amphibious role, and that unit Loading for the Arawe landings got un- commanders did not always have control derway at Goodenough during the after- of their men—all faults that could be cor- noon of 13 December. As Generals Mac- rected with further rehearsal. Time was too short for more practice, however, as 3 ALAMO For G–2 PeriodicRept N’o. 18, Z-Day (15 December) was approaching l–8Dec43, dtd 9Dec43, in ALAMO C&$ Jnt iVO. 6. 338 ISOLATION OF RABAUL Arthur and Krueger looked on, the Marine of the E7even.th Ai~ Fleet to attack. A LITTs and two rocket-firing DITKWS, ,Tapanese submarine had also sighted the manned by .4rmy engineers, drove into .411ied ships late on the 14th, but its report the water and churned through the stern did not reach enemy headquarters until gate and into the flooded well deck of the after the 1anding. Carter Hull standing offshore. The as- The Corter H07Z began taking on bal- sault troops who would ride the tractors, last before it, arrived in the transport area the l12th’s 2d Squadron nnd supporting about five miles from Orange Beach. By units, boarded the. LSD while the 1st 04(N there was 4$4 feet of water in the Squadron and regimental and task force well deck and launching began. Within headquarters rode the Wmtralia. Replac- ten minutes all the vehicles had cleared ing the regular landing craft on the the LSD. At about the same time, the Australian ship’s davits were 16 LCVPS Westra7ia lowered its landing craft and and 2 LCMS of the amphibian engineers. men began c1ambering down nets into the The troopers slated to make the rubber boats, while winches and rope slings boat landings bedded down on the lland~ handled the 40 tons of supplies and equip- and ffurnphre~js. 150 men to each ship. ment figured as essential to sustain the as- At midnight, the convoy sailed for 13una sault troops in their first hours ashore. where General Cunningham boarded the At 0500, the two large transports headed destroyer (70nynqham, Admiral Barbey’s away in the darkness for New Ciuinea. command ship for the operation. After While the L17Ts made ready for the run feinting a movement toward Finschhafen, to Orange Beach and the landing craft the task force turned toward its target circled waiting to follow the tractors’ leadj after dusk on 14 December and headed the surprise landings Rot underwzy. The across the Soloinon Sea. Guarding the APDs carrying Troops A and El hove to west flank were cruisers ancl destroyers of about 1,000 yards offshore, unloaded the .4dmiral Crutchley’s force and to the east cavalrymen and their boats, and started to was a cordon of Commander Mumma’s withdraw immediately. As they had motor torpedo boats. Escorting the trans- practiced, the soldiers paddled toward ports were nine destroyers, five. of them their target beaches in three maves of five designated a shore bombardment unit. boats each. About 15 minutes before the convoy ar- Troop A, which had the mission of cut- rived in the transport area, a Japanese ting the coastal road near Umtingalu vil- float plane scouted the ships, dropping a lage, never reached its objective. At 0522, bomb near one of the destroyers. There enemy automatic. weapons cut loose from was no return fire, in accordance with 13ar- the featureless black outline that marked bey’s orders for dealing with night snoop- the shore, raking the oncoming boats. ers; gun flashes might reveal the presence Within a few minutes, only three of the of a ship and offer an aiming point to rubber craft were still afloat. From its lurking attackers. But the Japanese pilot position 3,oOOyards out from Umtingalu, had reported the ships he had sighted as the supporting destroyer Khaw had dif- five destroyers and five transports, and ficulty seeing if the soldiers struggling in Admiral Kusaka. at Rabaul ordered planes the water were in its line of fire. At 0542, DEXTERITY LANDINGS 339 when the 87uvw finally had a clear shot, rockets on Cape Merkus to cover the move- two salvos of $ineh high explosive shell ment of the landing vehicles through Pi- were all that was needed to silence the en- lelo Passage. At 0710, the DIRECTOR emy guns. The abortive landing attempt Force air support officer on the Conyng- cost the ll%h cavalry 12 men killed, hmn called down a waiting squadron of 17 wounded, and 4 missing in action. B-25s to strafe and bomb the beach. When the Japanese fired on Troop A’s Shortly thereafter, behind a barrage boats, Troop B abandoned its original of rockets fired by the engineer D~TKWs landing plan for Pilelo and headed for and SC–742?, the assault troops of 2/112 the nearest beach on the island. Moving landed.’ quickly inland after they landed, the cav- The bombardment silenced what little alrymen isolated the small enemy garri- opposition there was at the beach, and the son in eaves near Wingm-u village and squadron moved inland cautiously but wiped them out after a fight at close quar- easily. Two of the Marine amtracs in ters with bazookas, flame throwers, and the first wave were able to negotiate the grenades called into use. The troop lost steep bank behind Orange Beach and ac- one man and accounted for seven defend- company the soldiers to their destination, ers in seizing its objective. the narrow neck of the peninsula. When While the subsidiary landings were t,ak- enemy machine guns firing from the edges ing place, a column of Marine amphibian of the mangrove swamp pinned down the tractors started on the 5,000-yard run to troopers, the armored Buffaloes crushed Orange Beach. The armored Buffaloes in the defenders’ positions and silenced the the lead, traveling at six knots, soon out- guns. By mid-afternoon the 2d Squadron distanced the Alligators which were hard was digging in on its objective. A pocket put to make 41A knots. One of the control of Japanese riflemen left behind by the boats for the main landing, the NC-7.@, assault troops was eliminated by the spotted the LVTS moving into Pilelo l12th’s Headquarters Troop, and the Passage well ahead of schedule and head- peninsula was cleared of enemy forces by ed them off. The Buffaloes then circled nightfall. off Cape Merkus wziting for the Alliga- Survivors of the 120 Japanese soldiers tors tio catch up. Meanwhile, tihe slower and sailors who had defended Arawe tractors had gotten off course and had to Peninsula, Pilelo, and Umtingalu had be herded back into the prescribed boat withdrawn from contact with the landing lane. The upshot of the confusion was force. The Army units, detachnlents from that the landing was delayed 40 minutes. two temporary companies of the 51at Divi- The pre-H-Hour destroyer bombard- sion, one of infantrymen, the other of ar- ment was extended when it became clear tillerymen, rejoined their parent unit in that the LVTS were failing behind sched- ule, but the cease fire was sounded on board 4 Contemporary reports differ considerably on the ships at 0641 to conserve ammunition the exact time of the landing, but it appears that for antiaircraft defense. When the 5-inch 0728, the time reported by the LVT commander, is correct. Co A, 1st PhibTracBn Rept of shells stopped falling, the standby control PhibTrac Ops in Arawe Landing, dtd 27 Dec43, boat, SC–981, began firing a spread of in ALAMO (K5 Jnl No. 1% 340 ISOLATION OF RABAUL positions near the Pulie River at Didmop.’ machine guns and 20mm cannon mounted The naval coastal antiaircraft platoon that on ships, LVTS, trucks, landing craft, and had repulsed the landing attempt at Um- beach proved more than enough to beat off tingalu, abandoned its guns and took off in the attack. The total of serious damage precipitate retreat north up the overland was one LCVP blown up and a few men trail. Coming south along the same trail, wounded. hurrying as best the jungle, rain, and fre- Throughout the day the attacks contin- quent swollen streams wonlci allow, was ued, but Allied fighter squadrons were Major Shinjiro Komori’s Ist Battalion, able to turn away most of the enemy 81st Infantry. Komori had arrived with- planes. The vivid imaginations of the Jap- in earshot of the preliminary bombard- anese pilots supplied them -with the dam- ment at Arawe, but was still four days’ age that they were unable to inflict during forced march from the Pulie River, illus- their attacks, and Rabaul heard tales of trating the difficulties of moving a large many sunken transports and landing craft body of men through the center of New and damaged cruisers and destroyers. Britain.’ Returning again and again during the Intensive ,Japanese ground opposition next week, the Japanese planes, mostly to the Allied landing was yet to come, but, carrier aircraft stationed at Rabaul, at- as expected, the aerial counterattack came tempted to wipe out the Allied beachhead. on the heels of the landing. At 0855, after Their effort was unsuccessful, although one one flight of enemy planes had engaged the LCT echelon arriving late on the 16th was covering P–38 squadron and led it in a under almost continuous air attack while snarling clogfight away from the target, it was at Arawe and had an escort coastal 30–40 naval fighters and bombers struck transport sunk, and an escort minesweeper at the beachhead. From the Japanese and seven LCTS badly damaged. This was point of view, the time of attack was aus- the high point of the enemy strikes; de- picious. The only heavy antiaircraft guns fending fighters and antiaircraft auto- left in Arawe waters were those on the matic weapons fire whittled down the at- Comyngham; all the other escort, control, tacker’s strength at a rate of three, four, or and bombardment vessels had departed five planes a day, losses the Japanese could moments before. The first follow-up eche- ill afford. As the foLLrth week of Decem- lon of five LCTS, accompanied by seven ber began, large-scale air raids tapered off engineer-manned LCMS, had just moved to night bombing runs and hit-and-run into Arawe Harbor to unload. The fire of daylight missions by small numbers of enemy planes. ‘ ATIS Item No. 8159, Merkus Garrison Intel The frequent air attacks on Z-Day and Rept. dtd 10Dec43, in ATIS Bnl No. 614, dtd 8Jan the days immediately following severely 44 (ACSI Recs, FRC Alex). Prior to D-Day, the infantry company at Arawe was designated the disrupted the unloading process. An in- 10tlz Company, 3d Battalion, Iblst Infantry, but experienced shore party and a short- the association with the regiment at Cape handed naval beach party, worked to ex- Gloucester wns strictly a paper matter. haustion, were unable to move supplies e ATIS Item No. 11249, Diary of Major Komori, from ships to clumps smoothly; congestion 160ct43–31Mar44, in ATIS 13ul No. 999, dtd 6May44 (ACS1 Recs, FRC Alex), hereafter on Orange Beach was constant. The beach IKomori Diary. itself proved capable of handling only two 342 ISOL.LTIOAT OF RABAUI, LCTS at a time, and other ships in each ing party struggled inland through a man- echelon had to stand by under threat of grove swamp, finally reaching a native vil- enemy air attack while waiting their turn lage where they were warmly received. to unload. Under the circumstances, LCT An Australian with the scouts was able commanders were unwilling to remain at to get hold of a canoe and report back to Arawe any longer than their movement .4rawe by the 22d to tell Cunningham that orders stated, and, on occasion, cargo holds the waters between Cape Merkus and the were only partially cleared before the Itni were alive with enemy barges. The ships headed back for Finschhafen. The natives confirmed this finding and also problem grew steadily less acute as Japa- said that large concentrations of Japanese nese air raids dwindled in number and troops were located at the mouth of the strength and the reserve supplies of the Itni, .kisega, and Sag-Sag. Special efforts landing forces reached planned levels. were made to insure that this intelligence General Cunningham lost no time in reached General Rupertus, and Cunning- making his position on Arawe Peninsula ham sent it out both by radio and an officer secure behind a well-dug-in defense line messenger who used a torpedo boat return- closing off the narrow neck. Engineer ing to Dreger Harbor. landing craft gave the general protection The barges that the 112th’s scouts ran on his open sea flanks, and a series of com- up against on the 18th were transporting bat out posts stretching up the coastal trail enemy troops from Cape Bushing to the beyond Lupin airstrip promised adequate scene of action at Arawe. As soon as he warning of any attempt to force his main heard of the Allied landing, General Sakai defenses. The l12th was brought up to of the 27th Division had ordered General strength; Troop A was re-equipped by air Matsuda to dispatch one of his battalions drop on the 16th, and, two days later, to Cape Merkus by sea. The unit Matsuda APDs from Goodenough brought in the 3d selected, the 1st Battalion, L$lst Infantry Squadron. The cavalry regiment acting (less its Ist (70nzpany), landed at the vil- as infantry and a reinforcing field artil- lage of Omoi on the night of 18 December, lery battalion seemed quite capable of han- bivouacked, and started overland in the dling any Japanese units that might come morning, heading for a junction with the against them. 7 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this *ATIS CurrTranslation No. 1324, Diary of a section is derived from : ALAMO C&3 Jnl; T71Z ground crewman at Ral)aul and Tsurubu, 5Nov– P7tiI)For AR.; CTF 76 Decj3 Jt7arD; l.st .lIurDiI; 171)ee4?, in ATIS CurrTranslatilons XO. 122, J’SAR, Anx C, Logistics and Supply, dtd 31k1aY44(.4CSI Recs, FRG Alex). 691–360 O—63—23 344 ISOLATIOYT OF RA13AI’1, The weight of bombs clroppecl on tar- Itupertus’ command and reserve elements gets in the Cape Gloucester vicinity be- of Combat Team C embarked, left Cape tween 1 December and D-Day exceeded Sudest for Cape Cretin near Finschhafen. 3,200 tons. Over 1,500 individual sorties At Cretin, the two ships were joined by were flown to deliver the explosives and five others loaded with troops of Combat to search out enemy targets with cannon Team B due to land on D-Day afternoon. and machine gun fire. TTp until 19 De- At 0100 on Christmas morning, six LSTs cember> the bombers concentrated their at- of the third echelon sailed from Sudest tacks on the airfields and their defenses, with men of Combat Teams B and C and but then target priority shifted to objec- BACKFDANDER Force supporting ele- tives that might impede the lzndings and ments; at Cape Cretin, an LST cm-rying subsequent advance of the Marines. The men and equipment of 3/1 joined the ships attacks resulted in substantial destruction which were sc]leduled to nose into the Yel- of prepared positions spotted by aerial low Beaches as soon as the infantry-car- reconnaissance and in the death of scores rying LCIS of the second echelon landed of ,Japnnese soldiers. The judgment of their cargos. air historians viewing the campaign was The main convoy of 9 A PDs ancl 11 that mass bombing of the invnsion areas L(71s got. underway from Cape Sudest at at Cape ~~loucester by the Fifth Air Force 0600, 25 December. .4ccompanying the virtlmlly eliminated the combat effective- ships and their six escort, destroyers was ness of the Japanese defenses. g Hidden the Conyn,~ham w’ith Barbey and Ruper- by the jlmgle’s impenetrable cover from tus on board. Not long after the assall]t the probing aerial camera, most of the troops departed, transports carrying re- Mutsudo F’ome survived the protracted serve Combat Tezm A arrivecl in Oro Bay aerial assault. The damage to defenders’ from Milne, and the 5th Marines and its nerves ancl morale is apparent from con- attached units landed at Cape Suclest to temporary records, however, and the wide- await the call for employment. at Cape spread destrllct ion of defensive positions Glol~cester. Tl~e 14 LSTS which were to undoubted eased the task of Marine at- land on D plus one (27 December), bring- tacking forces. ing in engineer, antiairmwft, and meclical Behind the screen of air activity, the LUlitS :UId SILPP1ieS f Or ]]:kCKHi~~’~ER assembly of Barbey ’s attack force pro- Force, loaded out, on Christmas and sailed ceeded witl]out nlajor hitch. A conlp]i- during the n igl~t in trzce of the D-Day cated scheclnle of loaclings and sailings convoys. Erich LST bound for Cape had to be met tl~at would enable the vm- Gloucester was fully loaded witl~ trucks ious e~helons to reach the target, on time. camying blllk cargo; those snips landing on the afternoon of the 24th, two I.STS on 26 December carried an average of 150 ~vith headquarters and service cletach- tons of supplies apiece, znd the ones due ments opernt ing direct 1y under General in tl~e next day 250 tons. To minil]~ize tl~e risk of sailil~g poorly ‘ Craven and Cate, 0aadalcana7 to S’aipan, p. 311 ; Dr. Robert F. I’atrell, USAF HistDiv, Itr charted waters, the five LCIS carrying to Head, HistBr, G–3, HQMC, dtd 19Jan62, 2/1’s ass~lilt troops joined the main con- DEXTERITY LANDINGS 345 voy off Cape Cretin to mdce the passage NT OiVEF’A CE TRAIL BLOCK ~~ through Vitictz Strait. A small-boat task Although they occurred simllltxneonsly group, 12 Navy LCTS plus 2 LCVPS and as complementary operations wit]lin tl)e 14 LCMs crewed by zmphibian engineers, overall BACKHANDER concept, the cut directly through Dampier Strait to- landings at. (keen and l’ellow Reaches ward (h-een Beach. .iccompanyil~g the are seen clearer when examined sepa- landing crzft zs escorts for the 85-mile rately. The primary mission of Lieuten- ~,oYage f rolll Cape Cretin to TXUI1i were ant, Colonel Masters’ 2/1, reinforced, was a an engineer navigation boat, a n:t~:]l pfitrol defensive one—to land, seize a trail block, craft, and two SCs; four torpedo hOiltS and hold it ct~ytinstall comers. The first acted as a covering force to the east flank. mission of the rest of Cxeneral Rllpertus’ While the Eastern ancl Western Assault, force was offensive in nature-the captllre Groups of Bzrbey’s force approached their of Cape Gloucester’s airfields. Mmters7 respective beaches, one possible objective commznd, code-named the STONEFACE of DEXTERITY operations was occu- (h-oup, was scheduled to rejoin the rest of pied by a reinforced boat company of tlm the 1st Division once the airfield objective 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. was secured. (See Map 25.) On 20 December, General Krueger xp - The LCIS with the STONEF.4CE proved a plan to set up a long--range Gro{~p embarked broke off from tl~e con- radar on Long Islandj abollt 80 miles west voy headed for the Yellow Beaches at of Cape (Gloucester, zfter Australian 0422 on D-llty morning. Accompanied coastwatchers had reportec] the island free by two escort and bombardment destroy- of enemy troops. Acting on fin operation ers, the Reid and ~Smith, the troop -]aclen plan published only three days before em- landing craft headed for a rendezvous barkation, the engineer boat group began point about four miles off the h’ew ~ritaill its shore-to-shore movement, from Finsch- const opposite Txuali village. contact hafen on Christmas afternoon. Preceded with the small-boat group that had made by an aclvance party that landed fronl the voyage through Dampier Strait was torpedo boats, the engineers and an Aus- made later than had been planned, but the tralian radar station went, ashore on the transfer of assault troops to LCMS begal~ island on the 26th. The lodgment on Long Island removed one target fronl the n Unless otherwise noted, the material in this list of those that might be hit by 3d Bat- section is derived from: Ist JfarDiv S.AR, Phase II, Part II, Green Beach Landing; CTG 76.3 talion, 5th Marines, held back from em- ( ComDesDiv 10) AR—130mhardment and Land- ployment at Cape Gloucester.]” ing Ops at Tauali ( Cape Gloucester), ATewBritain 26Dec43, dtd 29 Dec43 (COA, XHD ) ; CO, Det, 2d ‘0 General Krueger noted in his comments ap- ESB Rept to CG, 2d ESB, dtd 20Jan44, Snbj: proving the Long Island operation that the Ops CTF 76 LT 21 (Green Beach), in ALAMO Marine battalion slated for possible seiznre of G-.3 Jnl No. 19; OCE, GHQ, AIW’, Amphibian Rooke Island might be the source of a detach- Engineer.Y 0peratio~t8—E?lgi?? rer8 in t?le S0ut7L- ment to relieve the engineers on Long. ALAMO we.st Pacific 19.&Jj5, v. IV (Washington: GPO, CofS memo to Gen Krneger with Krueger’s 1959), hereafter OCE, GHQ, AE’P, Amphibian comments. dtd 201kx43, in .1 T..1.1[O G–3 ,Jn7 No. lln~i)t ect,s; IIough and Crown, New Britoin, 10. Campaign. 346 ISOLATION OF RABAUL immediately, znd the lost time was the Reid fired two star shells as a visual recovered. signal. As the medium bombers began llngineer coxswains, moving in success- making bombing and strafing runs along ive groups of four, brought their boats the long axis of the beach, the first wave alongside the three LCIS that carried the of LCMS left the line of departure. The two assault companies, E and F. The planes were scheduled to cease their bom- Marines were over the side and headed for bardment when the landing craft were 500 the line of departure within 10 minutes. yards from Green Beach, an event calcu- Accompanying the four landing craft that lated to occur at 0743. At that moment, formed the first wave were two other the engineer D17KWS began firing the first LCMS carrying rocket IXTKWS of the 2d of 240 rockets they arched ashore.lz Two Engineer Special 13rigxcle’s support Bat- strafers made a last minute pass at. beach tery; the rockets were intended for a beach targets after the DUKWS opened up bxrrage to silenre opposition in the few but fortunately avoided the plunging n~inl~tes just before the lancling. rockets.ls At 0748, the first LCMS ground- As the column of L(3Ms moved lazily ed on the beach and dropped their ramps. toward the line of departure, throttled The Marines of the assault companies down to keep from getting ahead of the moved quickly across the volcanic sand, 1anding schedule, the troops could hear the mounted the slight bank bordering the sound of naval gunfire at Cape Gloucester, beach, and then advanced cautiously into seven miles away. Falling into formation the secondary growth that covered the behind the. assault craft, two LCIS with rising ground beyond. There had been no most of Companies G and H on board enemy response from the beach during the made up the fourth wave. Bringing up bombardment and there was none now that the rear with a cargo of guns and vehicles the Americans were ashore. Well-dug and 575 tons of bulk stores were 12 LCTS trenches and gun pits commanding the sea- organized in waves of three. The ships ward approaches had been abandoned, and carried 2t)-days’ supplies and five units of there was no sign of active Japanese op- fire for Masters’ 1,500-man force; the men position. The second and third waves of themselves carried one unit of fire and a LCMS landed five minutes apart, adding day’s rations. their men to the swelling force ashore. At From his headquarters on the Reid, the Commander, Western Assault Group, “ Oddly enough, this barrage of rockets made Commander Carroll D. Reynolds, ordered little impression cm some of the troops it sup- ported ; it goes unmentioned in the division action the prelanding supporting fires to begin report and escaped the notice completely of at on schedule. The two destroyers cruising least one ofiker who witnessed the landing. Maj 5,400 yards offsbore fired 6’75 rounds of 5- Theodore R. (+alysh ltr to CMC, dtd 16Feb52. inch at targets behind the beach and to its ‘3 The engineer brigade commander had sug- gested to Admiral 13arbey “that the last plane flanks as far as Dorf Point on the north in the final strafing run drop a flare to indicate and Sag-Sag to the south. After 20 min- the way was clear for the rocket barrage to start. utes, the ships’ fire was lifted and Com- The reply was that the airmen ‘preferred to work on a strictly time basis,’ accordingly no signal mander Reynolds radioed a waiting was given,” OCE, GHQ, AFP, Amphitiian Engi- squadron of B–25s to attack; for insurance Hecrs, p, 170, n. 96(2). 348 ISOLATION OF RABAUL 0754, an amber star cluster was fired to shore defense. The engineer boats an- signal a successful landing to the waiting chored inside a reef outcrop about 200 ships. yards from the beach with their stern guns The engineer L(3Ms retracted after de- pointing seaward. Lieutenant Colonel 1ivering the msault troops and headed out Masters gave the job of organizing the to a rendezvous point a mile and a half heath clefenses to the .4rnly engineer de- from shore. When the beach was clear, tachment commrrncler, Major Rex K. the L(3Is landed, dropped their twin bow Shaul, ancl assigned a platoon of LVTS ramps, and the Marines of Companies G an{l a platoon of the 1st Marines Weapons and H filed clown into shallow water. At Company to his command. Inland, the 0830, the first of the I.(3Ts hit, and the STONEFACE con~mander disposed his others followed in rapid succession as gen- three rifle companies zlong a l,200-yard- eral unloading began. long perimeter that ran along the ridges The shore party was composed of a head- overlooking the beach. At its deepest quarters uncler 2/1’s operations officer, a point, a sal ieut where a causeway led into labor platoon of 130 men clralvn from all the Marine lines, the perimeter was 500 tbe major elements of the STONEFACE yards from shore. The riflemen were care- Group, and a beach party of an~phibian en- fLlll~ c]ug in by nightfall, ancl Company giueers.1~ Supplies were channeled H’s heavy machine guns were emplaced tln-ough four predesignated unloadiug nmidst the foxholes where their tire could points into as many clumps set up in the be most effective. The battalion weapons area just off the beach. In each dump, sim- comprrny’s 81mm mortars were set up to ilar amounts of rrrtions, fuel, ammunition, fire in front of any part of the defensive and organizational equipment were further position. In reserve behind each rifle com- segregated to cut down possible losses to prrny was z platoon of artillerymen, These enemy zir action. The absence of Japa- provisional units had been formed on Mas- nese planes on D-Day, combined with un- ters’ order as soon as it became apparent, seasonably fine weather and a light surf, that Battery H of 3/11 could not find a did much to ease the task of the inexperi- firing position that was not masked by pre- enced shore party. By l’i15 the last LCT cipitous ridges. had been emptiecl and was assembled in the By nightfall on D-Day, the STONE- rendezvous mea for the, vo~ilg(j back to NACE Group had established a tight pe- hTe-w Guinea. rimeter clefense encompassing all the objec- The convoy departed at 1900, lezving be- tives assigned it. The main coastal track hind two LCVPS and four LCMS for off- lrry within the Marine lines, denied to ene- my use. Probing patrols into the jungle “ General Rupertus asked that an Army en- and along the coast did not discover any gineer shore company be assigned to support the Green Reach l:indirlg, and 2/1’s operation or- ,Japanese troops until dusk, when there was der Tvas anlen(le(l on 23 I>ecember to inclu(ie one a brief brush with a small enemy group in the shore Imrty, but the teritative assignment near the village of Sumeru, just north of !V8S never con]l)letetl. CG, B.lCKIL\A”I)ER For the beachhead. The Japanese faded away msg to CG, .%1,. +310l’or, (lt(l 201)ec43, in AL.i.1[0 G–3 .JI12 No, 7 ; .inx C, 2/1 01)0 343, dtd, into the jungle when the Marine patrol 23 Dec43, in l.’+t JIarDir S:IJ7. Phase II, Anx 1), opened fire. DEXTERITY LANDINGS 349 Lieutenant Colonel Masters was unable planned a hot reception for the ships at to contact General Rupertns directly to re- Arawe on the 26th.” port his situation. Mt. ‘Talawe, looming The path of the invasion convoy during between the two Marine beachheads, daylight hours had been plotted to mis- proved an impenetrable barrier to the bat- lead the Japanese. Once night fell, the talion’s radios. Since the set of the am- moonless dark that ALAMO planners had phibian engineers was intermittently able waited for, the ships shifted their course to reach ALAMO Force, word of the to a more direct route through Vitiaz STO~EFACE Group’s dispositions even- Strait. The destroyers, transports, land- tually reached the division CP on the ing ships, and escorts steamed along at 12 morning of the 27th. Except for the fact knots while Admiral Crutchley’s cruiser that his force was located in a radio “dead force ranged ahead to take position in gun- spot” for overland comn~unication,15 Mas- fire support areas lying off the Cape Glou- ters was in excellent shape to accomplish cester airfields. his mission. Maintaining the convoy’s pace proved to be too much of a strain on the engines AN220RE .4 T THE of a harbor mine sweeper ( YMS ) which YELL(7 W BE.4 OHES “ was scheduled to clear the waters off the Yellow Beaches. The ship broke down On Christmas morning, a Japanese fimdly and fell out at 2120, returning to coastwatcher hiding out in the hills above Cape Cretin; earlier, another YMS had Cape Ward Hunt on New Guinea spotted been tnken in tow by an APD to keep it in the Eastern Assault Group en route to its the convoy. .4s Admiral Barbey’s ships target. This enemy observer’s report of began to move into the transport area, the the ships’ passage, sightings by a Japanese two YMSS that had completed the voyage; submarine scouting the. area, or, perhaps, two destroyers, and two SCS operated to- the last frantic message from a reconnais- gether to locate, clear, and buoy the chan- sance plane that was shot down shortly nel leading to the Yellow Beaches. (See after noon while it was skirting the con- Map IV, Map Section.) voy, may one or xII have been responsible The destroyers, taking a radar fix on for Rabaul’s deduction that the msau]t the wreck of a Japanese destroyer that was group was headed for Cape Merkus. On the strength of this faulty judgment, the hung up on the reef 7,000 yards offshore, Eleventh Air F’ket and Fourth Air Awny found the entrance to the channel in the darkness. Llsing their sound gear to locate “ LtCol Robert Hall ltr to CMC, dtd 4Mar52. shoals along the passage, the destroyers “ IJnless otherwise noted, the material in this gave their bearing and distance to the section is derived from : A L.4M0 0–9 J??!; T’11 YMSS which woldd then “strike off for the Ph. ibFor Comdl Ti.8t; VII Pl)ibFor AR; CTF 76 II Qc.&? WarD; 1st MarI)iu S.4R, Phase II, Part shoal as a dog after a bone.” 18 The mine I, Yellow Beach Landings and Plan Annexes ; Ist MarDiv r)–s Jnl, 24Der43-29Peb44, hereafter 1st “ SE A rec Na.vOpt~-111, pp. 4748; SE Area MarI)iv I)-,? Jnl—I; 17’th DivOps; craven and 4irOp8, pp. 2%30. ~ate, G!ladatcanal to &’a@an; Hough and Crown, “ C!TU 76.1.42 (CO, CSS FZtls8er) AR of Cape N(,w Britoln, C7ampaif7n; Morison, Breaking tllf Gloucester Op on 26Dec43, dtd 29Dec43 (COA, Bi.wnarc7is Barrier, N-Hr) ) . 350 ISOLATION OF R.4BAUL sweepers and a destroyer’s whaleboat whit e phosphorous bombs on its naked buoyed the three principnl reef obstacles crest. Smoke soon obscured the vision of on schedule, and one of the YMSS swept, any enemy who might still have been using the channel which proved to be free of the hill as an observation post, and three mines. Immediately, the destroyers medium bomber squadrons began working moved inside the outlying reefs to deliver over the beaches. close-in fire on the eastern flank of Yellow As General Rupertus had feared when 2. The SCS, which had also controlled the he argued against its use:’ smoke from Arawe landing, proceeded to line of de- Target Hill drifted down across the land- parture and standby stations to handle the ing beaches pushed on by a gentle south- waves of landing craft. east breeze. By H-I~our the shoreline had Throughout the clearance and marking disappeared in a heavy haze, and within of the channel, a mounting drumfire of another half hour the approach lanes were naval bombardment marked the approach obscured as far as the line of departure, of H-Hour (0745). At 0600, the two 3,000 yards out. Coxswains of the lead- Allstralian heavy cruisers of Task Force ing boat wa~”es handled their craft bold- 74 opened Llp on targets in the vicinity of ly, however, and the smoke posed no severe the airfields with the first of 730 rounds of problem of control or orientation. 8-inch high explosive fired during the next The first four waves of LCWPS assem- 90 minutes. The 6-inch guns on the Amer- bled in succession. as the APDs carrying ican light cruisers sounded next, firing the assault troops sailed into the trans- 2,000 rounds between 0625 and 0727 at Tar- port area, two znd three ships at a time. get Hill and the Yellow Beach area. Once the Marines of 1/7 and 3/7 were over Escort destroyers with the cruiser force the side, the APDs left for positions out- and those that had worked with the harbor side the reef to await the return of their control unit exploded 875 5-inch shells boats. The 12 landing craft in the first ashore while the larger ships were firing wave, 6 for each beach, moved from col- ancl, later, in the few moments immedi- umn into line at the control boat centered ately preceding H-Hour. The ground on the line of departure. At about 0730, just inland from the benches and the hil Is the SC-$81 dropped the wave number flag to the southeast drew most of the destroyer it was flying, and the assault platoons fire. Targets of opportunity were few headed for the smoke-shrouded beaches. since no evidence of enemy movement or Following waves were dispatched at five- opposition developed ashore during the minute intervals. Allied bombardment. Taking station on the flanks of the first From 0700 to 0720, while naval gunfire wave as it moved shoreward, two rocket was concentrated on the beaches and air- LCIS made ready to fire a stunning bar- fields, five squadrons of B-24s dropped rage onto possible beach defenses to wver 500-pound bombs on the Target Hill area. Then, on schedule, at the call of a command ‘o The 1st Division commander was convinced plane aloft, naval gunfire on the beaches that smoke and dust from exploding fragmenta- tion bombs, rockets, and shells would provide lifted and a squadron of B–25s streaked in enough concealment for approaching landing over Target Hill to let go eight tons of craft. Potlock cowwnents. 352 ISOLATIOA- OF RABAUL the interval between the last B–25 strafing Enemy firing first broke out to the west run and the wave’s landing. When the of Yellow 1 where Company I of 3/7 had boats were 500 yards out, the 1.(31 rockets landed. Confused by the smoke, the began dropping ashore and worked inland LCVPS carrying the company’s assault as the Marines approached the beach. .kt platoons reached shore about 300 yards 0746 on Yellow 1 and 0748 on Yellow 2, northwest of the beach’s boundary. Once the LCVPS grounded and dropped their the Marines had chopped through the ramps. jungle to reach the coastal trail, they came Charging ashore to the sound of their under long-range machine gun fire issuing own shouts, the Marines splashed through from a series of bunkers lying hidden in knee-deep water onto narrow strands of the brush. The company deployed to take black sand. There was no enemy re- on the ,Japanese and gauge the extent of sponse-no sign of human opposition— the enemy position. just a dense wall of jungle veget ztion. on The task of reducing the bunkers fell to many stretches of Yellow 1, the overhang- 3/1 which was charged with leading the ing brush and vines touched the water: aclvance up the trail toward the airfields. there was only a hint of beach. Led by The men of the 1st Marines’ battalion beg- scouts forced to travel machete in one an landing from I.CIS on Yellow 1 at hand, rifle in the other, the assnult pla- 0815, and the last elements were ashore toons hacked their way through the ti- and forming for the advance west by 0847. ngled mass, won through to the coastal Lieutenant Colonel ,Joseph F. Hankins trail, mnd crossed it into the jungle again. started his men forward on a two-com- Once they had passed over the thin strip pany front 500 yards wide, passing of raised ground back of the beaches, the through 3/7, which temporarily held up men encountered the area marked “dnmp its advance to the beachhead line. The flat” on their maps. It was, as one dis- swamp on his left flank soon forced Hank- gusted Marine remarked, “damp lLp to ins to narrow his assault formation to a your neck.” ‘0 column of companies. At 1010, the Japa- Under the swamp’s waters was a pro- nese opened up on Company K in the lead, fusion of shell and bomb craters and pot- soon after it had passed through the fir- holes, places where a misstep could end ing line set up by Company I of 3/7. The in painful injury. An extra obstacle to ensuing fight was the bitterest struggle the terrain’s natural difficuky were the on D-Day. hundreds of trees knocked down by the For a short while the course of the battle air and naval gunfire bombardment. The seemed to turn against the Marines—both roots of many of the trees that remained the commander and executive officer of standing were so weakened that it took Company K were killed; bazooka rockets only a slight, jar to send them crashing. failed to detonate in the soft sand cover- The swamp took its own toll of casualties, ing the enemy bunkers; flame throwers dead and injured, before the campaign malfunctioned when they were brought ended. into play; and antitank and canister shot ~ Hough and Crown, New Britdn Campaign, from 37mm cannon proved ineffective p, 48. against the log-reinforced dugouts. The DEXTERITY LANDINGS 353 break of fortune came when an LVT which opposition, the few dazed defenders of two had come up from the beachhead with gun positions on Silimati Point. Com- ammunition tried to crash into the enemy pany B’s men, picking their way through position. The vehicle got hung up be- the swamp in an area where two feet of tween two trees, and the well-protected mud underlay a like cover of water,2Z took Japanese broke from cover to attack the the day’s prime objective and found ample cripple, killing its two machine gunners. evidence that the ,Japanese had used Tar- The driver managed to work the tractor get Hill as an observation post. loose and caved in the nearest bunker by The task of seizing the center of the running over it. The Marine riflemen took beachhead was assigned to Lieutenant Col- advantage of the LVT’S success and onel Odell M. Conoley’s 2d Battalion of cracked the defensive system, killing or the 7th. The unit was ashore and assem- scattering the defenders of the four bunk- bled by 0845, though the men on two LCIS ers that had held up the. advance. that had eased their way into the beach Medium tanks had been requested for had to wade through neck-deep surf. The support as soon M it became apparent that sodden condition of the unfortunate Ma- 3/1 w-as up against a fortified position. rines that had to breast the water to shore A platoon of Shermans arrived shortly was soon matched by that of many others after Company K won its fight,” and led when 2/7 had its bout with the swamp. Company I forward through the ruined The battalion passed through a Japanese emplacements. Only a few snipers were supply depot south of the coastal trail and encountered on the way to the I–1 Line, ran into scattered opposition as it ad- the’ first objective on the coastal route to vanced into the jungle again. A scout in the airfields. Lieutenant Colonel Hankins Company G was the first Marine killed reported 1–1 secure at 1325 and received and other casualties occurred as the lead- orders to hold up there and dig in for the ing companies struggled through the 900- night. The brief but bitter fight. for the yard width of the swamp to rising bunkers cost 3/1 seven Marines killed and ground. By late afternoon, Conoley could seven wounded. The bodies of 25 Japa- report his battalion had reached dry land nese lay in and around their shattered and was digging in. LVTS brought up ammunition, and 2/’7 got set for counter- defenses. attacks that irregular but hot enemy fire On the opposite flank of the beachhead, promised. Both flanks hung open until the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant they were dropped back to the swamp’s Colonel John E. Weber), making Combat edge. Team C’s main effort, had driven to Target The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, led by Hill by noon and seized the left sector of Lieutenant Colonel William R. Williams, the beachhead line. A platoon of Com- reached its assi-~ed portion of the beach- pany A flushed and finished off the only head line after threading its way through ‘1 hfaj Hoyt C. Duncan ltr to CMC, dtd 14Mar52. the swamp barrier and crossing the only The tank company commander recalls that the tank took part in the last stages of the action “ CWO Sidney J. I’ishel comments on draft of against the bunkers. Col Donald ,J. Robinson Hough and Crown, Nelu Britain Campaign, dtd ltr to Head, HistBr, G–3, HQMC, dtd 5,Jun62. 14Feb52. 354 ISOLATION OF RABAUL large patch of kunai grass within the since the amphibian tractors were able to planned perimeter. ~~~illiams~unit met nO move the ~gunsdirectly from the LVTS to serious opposition during its advance, but the battery locations which had been late in the afternoon, when division or- picked from maps and aerial photographs. dered a shift to the west to link up with The battalion’s preselected positions Combat Team B, a small group of enemy proved to be in the midst of the swamp, but troops attempted to infiltrate through the Lieutenant Colonel Lewis J. Fields di- gap that, opened. The battalion was re- rected his commanders to set up their guns called to its original positions and dug in around the edges wherever a rise of ground along the edge of the kunai grass for night gave firm footing. The LVTS knocked de fen w. down trees to clear fields of fire, hauled When the second echelon of LSTS ar- loads of ammunition and equipment to the rived and began unloading on D-Day guns, and helped the tractor prime movers nfternoon, the remaining rifle battalion as- and trucks g-et across the swamp. Fields’ signed to the BA CKH.4NDER assault howitzers be~qn registering at 1400,’3 five force landed and moved into position. The and a half hours after they landed, and 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant 1/1 1 was ready to fire in direct support of Colonel Walker A. Reaves) filed up the the 7th Marines all along the perimeter by coastal trail past long lines of trucks wait- night fall. ing to move into the Iimitecl dump areas Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Hughes’ nvailable. The unit’s own equipment and 4th 13at.talion’s 105mm howitzers needed combat team supplies, mobile. londed in every bit of assistance they could get to organic vehicles, followed when traffic reach the kunai grass patch. LVTS broke would allow. Accompanying the infan- a path through the swamp’s tangle of trees trymen when the? moved out of the beach- and undergrowth for the tractors and guns head to the 1–1 Line was the 2d Battalion, and provided extra pulling power where llth Marines (Major Noah P. Wood, Jr.), it was needed. And the need was constant. Combat Team B’s direct support pack The progress of each howitzer through the howitzer battalion. The artillery batteries swamp was a.major operation which often set up along the coastal trail within the found the men of the firing section chest perimeter established by 1/1 and 3/1. deep in water hauling on drag ropes or General Shepherd and Colonel Pollock pushing mired wheels while tractor winch- visited Colonel Whaling’s CP at 1800 to es and LVTS in tandem applied full power pass on a division attack order for 0700,27 to keep the guns moving. All supplies and T)ecember. ammunition had to be carried in amphib- In contrast to the relative ease with ian tractors, since no truck could negotiate which 2/11 reached its firing site., the two the tortuous trail through the swamp. artillery battalions assigned to Combat Despite the incredible difficulties, the first Team C spent most of the day getting their battery was in position and ready to fire guns into effective supporting positions. at 1330, the second was registered by 1~00, The lighter 75mm howitzers of 1/11 had been loaded in LITTs in anticipation of the “ Arty I.iaisonO msg to ArtyO, ALAMO For, difficulties that would be met in the “damp dtd 22 Jan44, Subj : Rept on Arty in BACK- flat.” This forethought paid dividends, HAXD13R OP, in .4LAM0 G-3 Jnt No. 17. DEXTERITY LANDINGS 355 and the third was pulling into the clearing The first echelon of LSTS retracted at aS darkness fell.24 1330. with about 100 tons of bulk stores TVhile the division assault troops were still on boarcl in order that the D-Day consolidating their hold on the beachhead, landing schedule could be kept. As the Lieutenant, Colonel 13allance’s shore party seven ships in the second echelon beached was coping with the confusion of problems and started unloading about, an hour later, arising from the unloading of equipment, the long-expected Japanese aerial counter- vehicles, and bulk stores brought in by the attack materialized. AS the enemy planes LSTS. The carefully-thought-out plan of (love through tile gunfire of American overlapping dumps to be used by each fighters covering tl~e beachheacl, a squad- landing ship was adapted to meet the situa- ron of B–Ms hound for a routine bombing tion posed by the swamp. All supplies had and strafing mission in the Bergen Bay to be crowded on the narrow strip of dry area flew lo~v over the LSTS. In a tragic land between beach and swamp, nowhere lniSt.ilke of identity, tile ships’ gunners more than a couple of hundred yards wide. shot, down two of the .4merican planes The coastal track was crammed with vehi- and badly damaged two others. Con~- cles almost as soon as the first seven lJSTs pounding the original error, the B–25s beached at 0840, and the jam never eased that had weathered the LSTS’ fire bombed during the rest of the day. and strafed 1/1 1’s position on Silirnati On the beaches thenlselves, the shore Point, killing one officer and wolmding 14 party constructed] sandbag causeways out enlistecl men. to the LSTS that grounded and dropped The enemy planes that hit the beachh- their ramps in the water. Although VII ead were only a small portion of an Amphibious Force reported that D-Day’s attack group of 88 naval fighters and dive “four foot sllrf arou]lcl the romps was of bombers dispatched from Rabaul after no consequence,?’ and that “thick growth they had returned from a morning’s fruit- and soft ground behind the beach wzs the less raid on Arawe. Most of the Japanese retarding factor” ‘s in unloading opera- pilots concentrated on the ships offshore tions, the men that wrestled sandbags in and the damage they did was severe, the water had a {li fferent opinion. although they suffered heavily in the proc- Actually, the, slowness of unloading was ess. The radar on the fighter director due to a combination of factors, ]lot the ship, the destroyer .9?wv)> had picked up least of which was the reluctance of the the enemy when they were about 60 miles clrivers of the mobile loaded trucks bor- away and vectored two P—38 squadrons rowecl from AL.\MO Force to chance be- to intercept, while the escort vessels ing left behind on New Britain ~Y]lellthe clearecl the reef-restricted waters off the LSTS pulled out. h~umerous trucks were coast and steamed out to sea to get maneu- abandoned nnd “stranded on tl~e bench ver room. The interceptor missed contact exits for quite some time>’ 2’; before Ma- but wheeled quickly to get on the enemy rines could move them to the dlm]ps and tails, and a vicious dog fight took place get them unloadecl. all over the sky as the American and Jap- “ Ib~d. ; LtCol Dale H. Heely ltr to CMC, dtd “ Maj George J. DeBell comment on draft of lMar52. Hough and Crown, New Britain Campaign, cu. ‘s C’TF 76 Dec& WarD, p. 35. Feb52. 356 ISOLATION OF RABACL a]lese fig]lte~st~ngled. som~Of t],e dive LST echelon retracted at 1800. Although boxlll~ersel’acledtlle clefell[lillg figlltersto 200 tons of bulk stores returned in these strike at the destroyers. Tl~e ,~}~ar(~was ships to New Guinea, they were sent back badly crippled by near misses, two otl~er on turn-around voyages and the temporary ships were damaged, and the Brotonson, loss was not a vital one. All guns and Ve- which ttrok two bombs directly bac]i of its hicles on the LSTS had landed. During stack, sank within a few n~inntes. Che the day’s spoladic fighting, the 1st Divi- hundred and eight officers al]d nlen went sion had lost 21 killed and 23 wounded and down with their ship, but the rest of the counted in return 50 enemy dead and a bag crew was rescued while the enemy planes of 2 prisoners. were being drilrell off. At 1700, after it became evident that the The toll of lost planes, pilots, ancl crews Japanese were warming up to something was still enough so that the ,Jzpanese more effective than harassing fire, particu- never agzin attempted a dzylight raid o]] 1arly on the f rent of 2/7, Rupertus dis- Cape Gloucester in comparable strel~gth. patched a request to ALAMO Force that ,Tust w]lat the exact enemy ]OSSwas in the Combat Team A be sent forward inlme- several attacks mounted by Army and diately to Cape Gloucester. While it seemed obvious that the troops already l?’avy pilots on 26 Decenlber cannot be clis- ashore could hold the Yellow Beaches covered. The total was prObably more perimeter, the task was going to require all than the 18 plnnes recalled by the Japa- of Colonel Frisbie’s combat team. The nese in postwar years,z7 ancl a good deal planned employment of 3/7 as Combat less than the 57 planes claimed by Amer- Team B reserve could not be made, and ican pilots while the heat of battle was on Rupertus considered that the 5th Marines them.2* From 27 December on, Allied air was needed to add strength to the airfield strikes mounted from South Pacific bases drive and to give him a reserve to meet any kept Rabaul’s air garrison too busy flying contingency. defensive missions to devote much effort All along the front in both perimeters, to Cape Gloucester. the Marines were busy tying in their posi- By nightfall on D-Day, it was evident tions as darkness fell, cutting fire lanes that the BACKHANDED Forces’ main through jungle growth, and laying out trip beachhead on New Britain was secure. wires to warn of infiltrators, For a good General Rupertus had left the Conyn.gham part of the men in the foxholes and ma- at 0800 and was on the beach before the chine gun emplacements, the situation was advance echelon of his comn~and post set familiar: Guadalcanal all over again, L~pat 1030. The CP location, like so many Americans waiting in the jungles for a positions chosen prior tQ the landing, Japanese night attack. The thick overhead proved to be too “damp” for effectiveness cover was dripping as the result of an and wtts moved to dry land by noon afternoon rain that drenched the beach- Troops landed according to plan, and head and all that were in it. The dank 11,000 men were as]lore when the second swamp forest stank, the night air was hu- mid and thick, and the ever present jungle ~’.~~ ..trca .+irO~).Y, p. 30 ; SE .1 rcu iVav Ops— noises mingled with the actual and the III, p. 48. = 1st MarDiv D–2 Jnl., 26 Dec43–26Jan44, imagined sounds of enemy troops readying entry of 1035 on 27 Dec43. an assault. CHAPTER 4 Capture of the Airfields ENEMY REACTION ‘ directed to concentrate his troops against the main beachhead, leaving the Tauali The D-’Day landings on the Yellow trailblock to the attention of minor ele- Beaches came as a surprise to the ,Japa- ments of his regiment’s Ist Battalion. nese.’ To the enemy, the extensive swamp Matsuda’s reserve; the 53d’s gd Battalion along the north coast between the airfields under Major Shinichi Takabe, started and Bergen Bay seemed an effective bm-- moving down the trail from Nakarop to rier to a large-scale amphibious wssault. Target Hill shortly after General Sakai’s Generals Sakai and Matsuda hoped and order was received. The leading elements prepared for landings aimed direct] y at of Takabe’s battalion reached the ridges Cape Gloucester’s beaches, but actually in front of the Marine line late in the expected the blow to come elsewhere. In- afternoon of D-Day. The shipping en- stead of hitting these prepared defenses, gineer and antiaircraft units defending the .Japanese leaders saw the principal Al- 130rgen Bay and Hill 660 were directed to lied thrust being made against Cape Bnsh- hold their positions and support Takabe’s ing, to be followed by overland and sbore- counterattack. (See Map 23.) to-shore advance to the airfields. The strongest combat force available to As soon as he received word of the ac- General Matsudz was Colonel Kenshiro tual B.4CKHANDER landing scheme, Katayama’s l~lst [n fantry and its rein- the f?’t]~ Division commander ordered forcing units defending the Cape Bush- General Matsuda to counterattack and ing sector. After the dispatch of the major annihilate the Allied assault forces “at the part of the regiment’s Ist Battalion to water’s edge. ” 3 Colonel Kouki Sumiya Arawe, Colonel Katayama’s command of the 53d Infantry, who commanded the xmonnted to some 1,700 troops,5 the ma- 1,400-man airfield defense force.,’ was jority veteran infantrymen and artillery- men. The Iyth lXvLsion operation order ‘ Unless otherwise notecl, the material in this of 26 December that directed Matsuda to section is derived from : .4DC Intelllocument8; commit his reserve also called for the ATIS Item No. 9115, Matsuda For and 141st InfRegt OpOs, 26Dec43–8Jan44, in ATIS Bul l~lst Inf on.try to move overland from No. 721, dtd 14 Feb44 ( ACSI Rem, I?RC Alex) ; Cape Bushing to help wipe out the Allied 17tib Div OIB. beachhead. The elements of the 51st Re- ‘ Docu No. 52399, Statement of ex-LtGen Ya- con.ruukwnce li?eghn.ent on Rooke Island sushi Sakai in HistDiv, MilIntelSect, GHQ, FEC, were ordered to sail for Aisega and march Statements of Japanese Officials on WW II, V. III, p. 190 (OCMH) . 317th Div Ops, p. 15. llMar44 (ACSI Recs, FRC Alex) ; Japanese 4ATIS Item No. 9657, MatsudaFor IntelRept Col)ll?tc)lt8. No. 3, dtd 23 Dec Keeping an adequate reserve of ammu- and water refused to work, and the fire of nition on 2/7’s side of the swamp was a battalion and company mortars “layed by problem handjed by the regimental execu- guess and by God” 8 was invaluable in tive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. beat ing back repeated Japanese attacks. Puller, and his solution for it was carrying When the storm subsided and daylight parties. LVTS could not be used to haul began to filter through the tree tops, the cargo until daybreak ~~ve the drivers a tempo of battle increased and the weight chance to see the obstacles in their path. of the enemy thrusts shifted west toward In the early evening, files of men from the 2/7’s open right flank. Regimental Headquarters and Service As they arrived at their designated posi- Company snaked their way through the tion, the special weapons men of Battery swamp to Conoley’s CP with belted ammu- D tangled with the Japanese that had in- nit ion, bandoleers of rifle c1ips, and loads filtrated the gap between the 7th’s bat- of 60mm and 81mm mortar shells. At talions. The Marines counterattacked, about 2000, Colonel Frisbie decided to threw back the enemy troops, :md built up commit Battery D, 1st Special llTeapons a hasty defense line. Company F on the Battalion as infantry to reinforce 2/7, and battery’s left flank took the brunt of Lieutenant Colonel Puller told the battery Major Takabe’s attack and in a violent, commander to leave his 37mm guns behind~ seesaw battle, during which two of its ma- have each man pick LIp a load of ammuni- chine guns were lost and recaptured, final- t ion at the regimental dump, and then set ly forced the ,Tapanese to withdraw. ‘The out, across tile swamp. estimate of enem~Tdead in and around the Soon after an officer guide from 2/7 met Marine lines was 200–235, but the oppor- the ammunition-laden column, a violent tunity to make an accurate count was lost storm lashed the beachhead area and all when the action opened anew during the trace of landmarks and trail signs van- afternoon of 27 December. ished in a solid downpour of wind-driven The W Z3attdwn, 5.5’d Infantry, rein- rain. The men of the antitank battery, forced by small engineer and service units, each holding to the belt of the Marine attacked Combat Team C’s perimeter re- ahead of him, spent the night struggling peatedly during the next few days losing to get through the morass and deliver the more and more of its strength in every fu- rital ammunition. It was 0805 before the tile attempt to penetrate the Marine lines. guide was able to lead Battery D into 2/7’s The gaps that existed on the night of command post. Lieutenant Colonel Co- D-Day were closed by dark on the 27th. The 7th Marines’ Regimental Weapons noley immediate] y sent the reinforcements (lompany took over that part of 1/7’s de- to his right flank to plug the gttp between fensive sector closest to the beach to enable the 2d and 3d Battalions. Lieutenant Colonel Weber to stretch his The Marines of 2/7 had fought with the men thinly around Target Hill and make D was attached to Lieutenant Colonel Wil- ported in nine APDs. The request was re- 1iams’ command. peated several times and sent by different The center of the perimeter continued means to insure its receipt at ALAMO to be the focus of enemy attacks, and Force adwmce headquarters at Cape Colonel Frisbie was able to concentrate Cretin. what few reserves he had in the area of Krueger had agreed to release two bat- gremtest threat. Wherever the fighting talions of the 5th Mlrines to Rupertus if reached a peak, z regimental casual detach- the Marine general asked for them after he ment of 30-odd men was committed, then had landed it the objective.’” At 0751 on pulled out and used again to meet the next, 27 December, Krueger sent a liaison officer emergency.~ Pioneers from the shore to Cape Sudest with orders for Combat party manned strong points in the rear of Team A (less 3/5) to get underway for 2/7>s lines to provide defense in depth. the Yellow Beaches. At the same time, the The ,Japanese did not, discover how ALAMO Force commander sent a radio sparsely nmnned the perimeter was to dispatch to Admiral Barbey informing either flank and persisted in their attacks him of the decision. Bad weather delayed on what, became. its strongest sector. the plane carrying the messenger and In three days of intermittent but intense played havoc with radio reception so that fightiIlg, the 7th ~farines ]Ost 18 meIl kil]ed, Ikwbey received word too late in the after- 58 wounded, and 3 missing in action. Sur- noon for the APPs to load Marines of 1/5 viving records indicate th~t in the same and 2/5 and still reach the beachhead by period the attacking Japanese suffered at dawn on the 28th. Accordingly, the ad- least five times as many casualties and that miral, who did not wish to expose the 2/53 was badly crippled, remaining a bat- loaded transports to the chance of daylight talion in name only. air attack, delayed the whole movement 24 With Combat Team C fully committed hours. just to hold the beachhead it had seized Colonel Selden and his entire combat on D-Day, General Rupertus was unable to team stood by all through the morning of use 3/7 as he had intended, as a reserve for 27 December ready to load out. The first the 1st Marines advance on the airfields. troops were already embarked in DUKWS Neither was Colonel Frisbie in z position and headed for the APDs offshore when to mount an offensive and drive back the word of the change in orders was passed. ,Japanese troops attacking his lines. This situztion reinforced the opinion that the On the 28th, while LSTS loaded rear ele- 1st Division staff had held throughout the ments of the combat team and all its sup- latter stages of BACKHANDED plan- plies and equipment, the 1st and 2d Bat- ning-the 5th Marines were needed on New talions boarded their fast transports and ‘Britain. At 2314 on D-Day, Rupertus left for the target. At 2100, after a day of sent a reqllest to Krueger asking that Com- hard work, the landing ships followed, bat Tezm A be sent forward to Cape setting a course by Cape Cretin to drop off Gloucester with the advance echelon trans- Lieutenant Colonel David S. McDougal’s 3d Battalion. ‘ LtCol Charles S. Nichols, Jr., interviews with HistBr, G–3, HQMC, .ca. Jan55. ‘0Pollock comments. CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS 361 While Combat Team A was en route, limited stretch of dry land between sea and Rupertus sent Krueger “an earnest plea”” swamp. The LST unloading rate im- that no part of the 5th Marines be held proved considerably after 2’7 December, back from employment at Cape Glou- when it was no longer-necessary to handle cester. The Marine general stated that in- two echelons daily. As many as 300 dead- creasing pressure on the perimeter re- weight tons of stores and a full shipload quired a landing team reserve in that area, of vehicles were unloaded in under six while the remainder of the combat team hours. Ballance’s 1,400-man force was able was used in the airfield attack. Krueger to do its job well despite the fact that the responded almost immediately that he replacement companies and pioneers that “had no intention to deprive you of its made up the bulk of its strength were oftin use”’2 should the battalion be needed and committed to hold reserve positions back- that 3/5 would be sent forward with the ing up Combat Team C’s lines. remainder of Combat Team A. Aside from the human workhorses of On 28 December, while the reinforce- the beachhead, the shore party Marines, ments he had requested were loading at the most important logistical elements Cape Sudest, the 1st Division commander were the amphibian tractors. The ver- moved his CP to a position behind Combat satile LVT was the only vehicle capable of Team B’s front line where he could better negotiating the swamp unaided, and it was direct the advance west. Control of the used to solve every conceivable cargo and beachhead defenses was turned over to personnel-carrying problem that arose. General Shepherd, whose .4DC command When it nppeared that the tractors used group paralleled the organization of the It Arawe might be a maintenance liability division staff. The 3d Battalion, 5th at Cape Gloucester, a provisional company Marines was slated to report to Shepherd using reserve LVTS and crews from both for orders when Combat Team A’s LST- Company A and the tractor battalion’s borne echelon arrived. With the addition Headquarters and Service Company was of a sorely-needed maneuver element, the org~nized and loaded out to arfive with ADC planned an attack toward Bergen Combat Team A.13 Bay to eliminate the Japanese menacing Almost as useful in their way as the the perimeter. LVTS were the boats of the amphibian The steady influx of supplies planned engineers, particularly the LCMS which for 13ACKHANI)ER operations went on could stand the buffeting of heavy surf without wmajor hitch while Combat Team more easily than the lighter and smaller C fought to hold the beachhead and Com- LCVPS. The 592d Engineer Boat and bat Team B drove forward toward the air- Shore Regiment’s detachment at the Yel- fields. Through hard, demanding work, low Beaches, including LCVPS that were Lieutenant Colonel 13allance’s shore party carried in on ships’ davits on D-Day and W:IS able to overcome the considerable LCMS that arrived in tow behind LSTS on handicap to its operations posed by the the 27th, were used mainly to transport supplies to Combat Team B. The coastal II l~t JfaYDi~ 1)–3 Jn l—I, entry NO. 20 of 28Dec43. “ l.st JIarI)i?] S.4R, Anx D, Amphibian Trac- “ Ibid., entry No. 20 of 29Dec43. tors, pp. 1–2. 362 ISOLATION OF RABAUL road used as the axis of advance. by the 1st other section of tanks and a rifle platoon Marines quickly became a quagmire as the which preceded the rest of the 3d 13attal- result of frequent rain and the damage ion. Peeling off the head of 3/1’s column, caused by traffic far heavier than its bed a succession of small combat patrols took could stand. Moving directly behind the position in the swamp to guard the left assault troops, Marine engineers with Sea- flank and then fell in to the rear when bees following close in their trace attempt- the main body had passed. ed to keep the supply route in operation. During the day’s advance, two belts of When road maintenance efforts failed, the enemy defensive positions were overrun Army boatmen gave General Rupertus the and destroyed. When the scouts spotted assurance of adequate supplies he needed a pillbox or bunker, they signaled to the to keep the offensive rolling forward. tank platoon commander who came for- ward on foot, located the targets, and then CAPTURE OF HELL’8 POINT “ directed the tanks’ fire to knock them out. Despite day-long rain that slowed the for- Colonel Whaling’s combat team spent a ward movement, the lack of opposition en- quiet first night ashore, its position un- abled 3/1 to reach the +4 Line, 5,000 yards challenged by the Japanese. While the from the morning’s line of departure, by rifle companies of the 7th Marines were 1350. Division ordered Combat Team B hotly engaged repelling counterattacks on to remain at 4-4 for the night and set up a 27 December, assault companies of the Ist perimeter defense. advanced cautiously but steadily toward The next day’s objective was the final Cape Gloucester. A series of phase lines, phase line designated before the landing 1/2 t,. 3A of a mile apart, marking terrain to control the advance on the airfield. This objectives in the zone of attack, were O–OLine was plotted along a low, grass- reached and passed without opposition. covered ridge leading northeast through (See Map IV, Map Section.) the jungle to a promontory, soon dubbed The narrow coastal corridor forced Hell’s Point by the Marines, which formecl one arm of a crescent-shaped beach. Fifth Whaling to confine his attack formation to Air Force pilots had located an extensive a column of companies with 3/1’s Com- system of bunkers and trenches in back of pany I in the lead. A squad of scouts act- this beach with the heaviest concentration ing as point was followed by a section of on Hell’s Point. Although the enemy posi- three medium tanks, each machine trailed tions were obviously sited to oppose a land- in turn by a rifle squad to give it covering ing, they stretched along 300 yards of the fire in the event of attack. Support to long axis of the coastal corridor and prom- this advance party was furnished by an- ised to be a formidable obstacle if they ‘4 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this were defended. section is derived from : 1st MarDiv EAR, Phase At the time the Ist Division attack plan II, Part I, Yellow Beach Landing; 18t Marl)iv for 28 December was laid out, the LtCol Donald J. Robinson ltr to Dir, D–9 Jnt—I; arrival of the advance echelon of the 5th HistDiv, HQMG, dtd 7Aug52, enclosing OpLog of CO A, 1st TkBn; Hough and Crown, New Britain Marines was expected in the early morning. Sampaign. H-Hour was consequently moved up to CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS 363 permit the reinforcements to get ashore effort to broaden the regimental frontage, and started into position to exploit any suc- Colonel Whaling had 1/1 simultaneously cesses won by 1st Marines assault troops. start a company through the jungle on The starting time and span of xir and ar- the left flank in an attempt to reach the tillery preparations for the attack were open ground along the O-O ridge. adjusted accordingly. General Krueger The importance of the Marine attack sent General Rupertus a dispatch explain- objective was evident to the Japanese, and ing the 24-hour delay of Combat Team .4 Colonel Sumiya had no intention of let- as soon as he knew of it, but the message ting it fall without a fight. During the was received in garbled form and could . night of 27–28 December, the airfield de- not. be decoded until numerous transmis- fense troops who had been held under sions regarding corrections had passed be- cover of the jungle on the mountain slopes tween the two headquarters.=’ Confirma- moved into posit ions that ran roughly tion of the 5th Marines arrival finally along the O–OLine. Waiting for the ad- came in a message received at 0040 on 29 vancing men of Combat Team B was the December. major ~art of the 1st Battalion, 53’d In- On the 28th, 2/11 culminated a night of fcmtny and elements of the ,Japanese regi- harassing and interdiction fire with an ment’s 75mm gun company. hour’s heavy shelling of suspected enemy Company A of 1/1, which drew the rug- positions immediately to the front of the ged assignment of cutting through the 4-4 Line. Then at 0900, American A–20s swamp forest, hit Surniya’s defenses first. began strafing and bombing targets from At about, 1145, the Marine unit reached the O–OLine to the airfields, observing O–O the edge of an extensive clearing in the as a bomb line beyond which they could jungle about 500 yards from the coast. ..4s attack with no danger to friendly troops. the scouts and leading squads started to At 1000, when the last of the planes drew move through the chest-high kunai grass, off, a further delay in jump-off time was a fusillade of rifle, machine gun, and authorized to get additional tanks into mortar fire broke out from enemy posi- position to support the assault. tions hidden in the dense undergrowth J3rhen the order t.o attack was finally is- across the open .ggound. Falling back sued at 1100, the ~3dBattalion, 1st Marines quickly to the cover of the jungle on their moved out in the same formation it had used during the previous day’s advance. own side, the Marines replied in kind, and the grass was whipped by a killing cross- Company I was again at the head of the battalion column, working this time with fire. It was soon apparent that, the Japa- nese strength was at least equal to Com- a fresh platoon of medium tanks. In an pany A’s and neither side could gain an m The last correction needed to enable BACK- advantage. HAN’DER Force to break the original message For four hours the fire fight dragged on. was reeeived at 1133 on 29 Deeember well after The enemy force, mainly from the 1A Combat Team A’s advance echelon had landed. Ist MarDiv G–3 Jnl-1, entry No. 17, dtd Company, 5.3d Infantry, held its ground 29Dec43. but could not drive the Marines back. 364 ISOLATION OF RABAUL Company A easily beat off two Japanese The fight to capture the beach defense counterattacks and an attempt to turn its positions was joined about noon when flank. At 1545, the Marines, who were Japanese troops opened fire on the lead- running low on ammunition, began to dis- ing platoon of Company I and its spear- engage and pull back to the 1st Battalion’s head section of tanks. The tanks crushed position for the night. Fire from 2/11 trenches and bunkers and blasted guns and covered the withdrawal and discouraged crews alike, while the infantry shot down any Japanese attempt to follow. Clearly the Japanese who tried to flee. When the the task of overcoming the enemy defenses 75mm guns on two tanks malfunctioned, required an attacking force of greater the advance was halted while tank ma- strength. Next morning when this posi- chine guns poured out covering fire and, tion was found abandoned by advancing fresh armor was ordered into the fight. Marines, it contained 41 dead enemy so}- In its advance and systematic destruc- diers. The cost to Company .4 of this tion of the enemy positions in its path, hard-fought action was 8 men killed and Company I had veered to the left of the 16 wounded. coastal road. As a new tank platoon lum- In a sense, the skirmish in the jungle bered up to the front lines, Lieutenant was a grim side show to the main event, Colonel Hankins decided to use Company the battle for Hell’s Point. This Japa- K on a platoon-wide front to cover the 50- nese strongpoint of mutually supporting yard stretch between beach and road. One bunkers and trenches was covered by belts section of mediums fought with Company Hastily of barbed wire and land mines. I and another with K. The reduction of cut gun ports enabled enemy crews to Hell’s Point was the job of Company K, train their weapons alol~g the coastal trail whose commanding officer later recounted to meet the attack. At least three 75mm the fight that eliminated the defenses; regimental guns, a 70mm gun, a 20mm I put one squad of the Second Platoon machine cannon, and a dozen or more behind each tank and deployed the Third heavy and light machine guns and mor- Platoon to set up a skirmish line behind the tars were brought into play against the tanks. We encountered twelve huge bunkers with a minimum of twenty Japs in each. Marines. Steady rain and thick foliage The tanks would fire point blank into the cut visibility to 10–20 yards, and Marine bunkers; if the ,Taps stayed in the bunkers riflemen all too frequently stepped into they were annihilated, if they escaped out the fire lanes of enemy bunkers before the back entrance (actually the front as they were built to defend the beach) the infantry they spotted the Japanese positions. In would swarm over the bunker and kill them this kind of blind fighting, tanks proved with rifle fire and grenades. By the time we invaluable and helped hold down infantry had knocked out twelve bunkers the Second casualties that might have soared had the Platoon, which had originally been behind the tanks, were out of ammunition and had attack been made without the assistance been replaced by the Third Platoon and they of armor. The support was mutual, how- too were out or down to a clip of ammunition ever, and each tank% protective rifle per man. I called a halt and sent for the First Platoon. By the time the First Pla- squad kept its sides and rear free from toon arrived and ammunition was resup suicide attackers. plied forty-five minutes had elapsed. We CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS 365 continued the attack and found two more 0Bc7E(7TlVE SECURED “ bunkers but the enemy had escaped~n A new’ landing point, Blue Beach, lo- The third platoon of Company A, 1st cated about four miles northwest of the Tank Battalion, to be committed during beachhead and a few hundred yards be- the day’s action was called up and reached hind the O-O Line was opened on 28 De- Hell’s Point about 1630 in time to destroy cember. General Rupertus decided to land the last enemy bunker on the point. It the assault battalions of the 5th Marines was undefended. Apparently, Colonel there. in order to have them closer to their Sumiya had ordered a general withdrawal proposed zone of attack on the 29th. The of the survivors of the force which had order detailing the change in landing sites fought the 1st Marines. combat Team B reached Combat Team B while some units was able to occupy the entire defensive po- were disembarking from their APDs and sition and dig in for the night without any others were en route to their original des- harassment from the Japanese. The tination, Yellow 2. As a result, Colonel night’s only excitement was furnished by Selden, his headquarters, two companies a false alarm of the approach of enemy of 1/5, and most of 2/5 reached Blue tanks, which was countered by positioning Beach about 0730, while the rest of the as- two platoons of Marine mediums along sault echelon landed within the original possible approach rout= with mortars ready to fire illuminating shells to help perimeter. (See Map IV, Map Section.) General Rupertus was present on Yel- them locate targets. low 2 when the first units came ashore, After the action of 28 December, the and he got them started toward Blue Japanese undoubtedly wished they had Beach to rejoin the rest of the combat tanks and plenty of them since their guns team.zo The march was made by truck proved no match for the American armor, where possible and by foot whenever the The count of enemy dead reported to divi- condition of the river of mud called a road sion, before darkness stopped the search, demanded. The beachmaster reported the was 266.17 In return, the 3d Battalion, 1st last elements of the 5th Marines on their Marines suffered casualties of 9 killed and way west by 0935. 36 wounded. With the complete reduction of Hell’s Point,lg the way was open to the While his regiment regrouped behind the 1st Marines’ lines, Colonel Selden con- BACKHANDED Force’s major objec- ferred with Colonel Whaling, receiving a tive-the Cape Gloucester airdrome. thorough briefing on the combat situation “ Maj Hoyt C. I)uncan, Jr., ltr to CMC, dtd and word that the attack on 29 December 14Mar52. ‘7 At least one participant in the day’s action “ Uuless otherwise noted, the material in this questioned this total, and, on the basis of a per- section is derived from : AI,AMO G-J? Jnl. Mea. sonal count, estimated the enemy loss at a much 19–17; Ist MarDiu SAR, Phase II, Part I, Yellow lower iignrt+-&%8S. Maj William W. Wright ltr Beach Landing; Ist ,llarI)iv .!)-3 Jnl--I; BGen to CNC, dtd 13 Feb52. John T. Selden ltr to HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 27 Jan “ General Rupertus kiter renamed this spot 31 ; Hough znd Crown, New Britain Ca?nflaign. Terzi Point after the commanding officer of Com- ‘“ LtCol Charles R. Baker comments on draft pany K, 3/1, who was killed on D-Day—Captain of Hough and Crown, New Britain Campa$gn, .Toseph A. Terzi. ra. Mar52. 366 ISOLATION OF R.4BACL was to be delayed until both the 1st and bordering beh of forest in single file, and 5th Marines could join in the advance. progress was unexpectedly slow. Before General Rupertus and Colonel I’ollock the leading company was in position to reached Whaling>s CP shortly after this move out from the 0–0 Line, division had and outlined the day’s operation plan. At had to put off the time of attack several 1200, following an air and artillery prep- times. When 2/5 finally jumped off at aration, Combat Team B, with 1/1 in 1500, a good part of the battalion was assault, would drive forward on the right still in the swamp, and Barba’s men were with the coastal road as its axis of advance just entering. At dusk, the rear elements and .iirfield No. 2 as its objective. At the of 2/5 were clearing the line of departure same time on the left flank, Combat Team as the leading units of 1/5 came out of A, with 2/5 in the lead, would attack the forest. through an area in Talawe’s foothills be- While Barba held llp his men to get lieved to contain prepared enemy defensive the companies organized in approach positions and then strike. north toward the march formation, the 2d Battalion pullecl airfields. away from the Ist and contact was lost. After the attack order was issued, Patrols sent out ill the gathering darkness Selden and Whaling went up to the front ancl unf an~iliar terrain were unable to link lines to establish the left flank of the 1st Up, and 1/5’s conlnian(lerj ~vhose radio to Marines’ position along the O–O Line. regiment was out, decided to hold up selden then took his battalion comnland- where he was for the night. The battalion ers, Major William H. Barba (1/5) and established an all-around defensive perim- Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt (2/5), eter in the middle of the open grassy area up to the boundary for a brief inspection and spent a quiet night without enemy of the terrain. Deciding to advance with challenge.zz his assault battalion, Selden accompanied The terrain forward of Combat Team Walt when 2/5 moved to its line of de- A’s line of departure proved to be much parture 1,200 yards inland. Barba’s more rugged than it appeared on opera- orders called for his battalion to follow tion maps, The 2d Battalion column, with the 2d in attack, keeping contact with the Selden and Walt. moving close to its head, tail of Walt’s column. found the stretches of kunai grass in its On its way to the line of departure, the path were broken by ridges and bordered 2d Battalion, 5th found itself wading by gullies a]ld ravines choked with jungle through a swamp, one that the regimental growth. .ks 2,/5 swung north to move commander had been assured contained down to .~irfield No. 2, it passed through only a few inches of water. Instead an area of Ilidclen trenches and bunkers all Selden “found “the water varying in depth showing signs of recent, occupation. There from a few inches to 4 and 5 feet, making were no enemy troops to be seen. The bat- it quite hard for some of the youngsters talion ::dvanced unchecked and, by 1925, who were not much more than 5 feet in had reached the center of the airstrip and height.” 2’ The advancing Marines had linked up with Combat Team B. to move through the swamp and a thick “ Col William H. Barba ltr to HistDiv, HQMC, n Selden ltr, op. cit. dtd 24 Mar51. CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS 367 The only enemy opposition met on 29 fense line which included all of Airfield December was encountered by the 1st Bat- No. 2. talion, Ist Marines, shortly after it passed Although surviving enemy records do through 3/1’s positions on the 0-0 Line. not detail Colonel Sumiya’s orders to his A few scattered rifle shots fired at long troops, prisoner of war interrogations and range by small groups of Japanese troops Japanese actions on 30 December provide did nothing to slow the advance. When a reasonable picture of what transpired the open ground along O–O N-as crossed, on the 29th when the Marines were al- Lieutenant Colonel Reaves’ assault com- lowed to seize their objective unopposed. panies moved as skirmishers through 300- The enemy commander and the surviving 400 yards of jungle. Supporting medium members of his reinforced battalion had tanks, and half tracks mounting 75mm hidden in the rain forest that blanketed guns from the Regimental Weapons Com- the hills south of the airfield. Conceding pany, were forced to stick to the coastal to Marine tanks and infantry the owner- road and kept pace with the infantry while ship of the low, open ground of the air- filing around the right. flank of the forest drome, Sumiya planned to take advantage barrier. Once they had cleared the trees, of the terrain, his most important defen- the assault troops, tanks, and half tracks sive asset. Moving at night, the remnants joined forces again, ready for a final push of the Ist Battalion, 53d In fantvy units to the airfield in sight. ahead. which had fought at Hell’s Point plus at Artillery of ‘2/11 and 4/11 fired on sus- least half of the !l?dGompany that had not pwted Japanese positions, and two rocket yet been engaged 24occupied the prepared DUKWS of the amphibian engineers defenses hidden in the dense vegetation on which had driven up to the front lines the hillsides and in the cuts that laced the added 50 rounds to the preparation.23 As slopes. The most significant feature of if in honor of the occasion, the rain even the defensive system was Razorback Hill, stopped for a few brief moments. The ad- a high, narrow, north-south ridge with a vance wm anticlimactic, and, at 1755, the grass-covered crest that overshadowed 1st Battalion, 1st Marines reached the edge both airstrips. To aerial observers and of Airfield No. 2. mapmakers, Razorback appeared to be just As rain started falling and hastened the another kunai patch among many; from approach of darkness, 1/1 hurriedly dug the ground it was clearly the key height in in along a perimeter that looped from the the hills bordering the airdrome. coast inland to the east of the airfield. On the morning of 30 December, while The 3d Battalion, lst, which had followecl two assault companies of 2/5 moved out the attacking troops in echelon to the left across Airfield No. 1 to investigate the rear, linked up with 1/1 and extended the village area west of the night’s positions, perimeter farther around the center of the Company F in reserve sent out a pair of field. When 2/5 came down out of the scouts to locate and guide 1/5 into the hills, the battalion was directed to fill in the remaining segment. of the night’s de- 21AII1s Item h-o.99S1, Diary of CP1 Ryoiehiro Takano, 2d Co, 1/53, 310ct–29Dee43, in ATIS ‘3 OCE, GHQ, AFPac, Amphibian Engineers, p. Bul No. 808, dtd 14Mar44 ( A(ISI Rem, FRC 177. Alex ). ..- CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS tioY perimeter. On the lower portion of Ra- instznces, buried in the ruins of their fox- zorback Hill, where the 2d Battalion had holes, trenches, and emplacements. A passed through abandoned defenses on the count of more than 150 Japanese bodies 29th, the Marines surprised a group of 12 was reported to division,25 while Com- enemy soldiers just rising from their pany F had lost 13 killed and 19 wounded. night’s bivouac. The scouts withdrew Company F’s discovery that the enemy after an exchange of fire, and a platoon had reoccupied his defensive positions of Company F immediately returned to coincided with a similar unpleasant find- wipe out what was thought to be a group ing by the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine-s, of stragglers. which was marching in column toward As the rifle platoon nearecl the top of the airdrome. The point of the leading a small knob in a kunai field, a heavy out- company (A) was fired upon by Japanese burst, of rifle and nmchine gun fire met, it, who had manned defenses located in the coming from positions in the edge of the jumbled ridges and ravines east of Razor- forest ahead. As the Marines sought cov- back Hill. once it came under fire, Com- er on the hilltop, the Japanese launched pany A deployed to continue the advance, a screaming charge up its sides which was and then, as the battalion commander later bloodily repulsed. When the enemy recounted the, action, it: troops withdrew, the fires of grenade launchers, mortars, and an artillery piece . . . was pinned down by heavy small arms and machine gan fire from enemy posi- were added to the outpouring from the tions to the west, and enemy mortar fire Razorback defenses. A radio message re- began falling within the First Battalion zone questing support brought prompt response, of action. B Company was committed to and Marine mortar fire crashed down on the right of A Company in order to bring the enemy position while the rest of Com- more fire to bear on the enemy and to prevent them from pushing down through to the air- pany F moved up. field. The enemy made one sally against A The ,Japanese soldiers broke from cover Company’s left flank and was repulsed with and came racing up the hill in a second fire. Preparations were made to assault the enemy position following a mortar bar- attempt to close with the Americans, just rage. . . . The assault was made on the as a reinforcing platoon maneuvered to enemy position which was found to be aban- extend the firing line. Heavy fire drove doned—the remaining enemy withdrawing to the enemy back into the jungle again and the south into the hills. The First Battalion then withdrew to the airfield evacuating its scattered more bodies over the slopes. dead and wounded, which I believe totaled Tanks were callecl up and, when the first 18, 6 dead and 12 wounded.% machine arrived, Company F attacked. Using the tank’s gunfire and armor like a ‘5 The Commanding Officer, Company F later crowbar, the Marines split open the first estimated the dead at a lesser figure, 60 to 70. YLajJohn B. Doyle, Jr., comments on draft of line of the defensive system and drove on Hough and Crown, New Britain Campaign, dtd through, mopping up the Japanese with 13Mar52. The battalion commander believed grenades and automatic rifle fire. By 1130, that “a more accurate figure would be about the hillside position, which had contained one hundred.” BGen Lewis W. Walt ltr to HistBr, G–3, HQMG, dtd 13 Jun62, hereafter over 30 bunkers, was silent and smoking: Walt ltr. its defenders mere dead and, in many * Barba ltr, op. cit. 370 ISOL.4TION OF RABAUL The finishing blow to the Japanese de- of the airdrome. At least one unscheduled fenses was delivered by Lieutenant Colo- flag-raising, by Company I, 3/1 on Razor- nel Hankins’ battalion. Working forward back Hill~7 preceded this event. Un- with medium tanks in support, 3/1 located doubtedly, there were others, for combat the remainder of the occupied defenses in Marines have a penchant for hoisting the the area west of the strong-points encoun- Colors over hard-won heights. tered by the 5th Marines. Attacking in Once the airfields were within Marine the early afternoon along a three-company lines, General Rupertus radioed General front, Hankins’ men drove the enemy out Krueger to offer him the “early New Year of their positions, forced them to retreat gift [of ] the complete airdrome of Cape up a ravine leading to Razorback’s sum- Gloucester.”’8 The ALAMO Force com- mit, and followed so close in pursuit that mander, in turn, made the present to Gen- the ,Japanese had no chance to develop a eral MacArthur as %von by the skill and defense. At a cost of one Marine killed gallantry of the First Marine Division and four wounded, 3/1 overwhelmed the brilliantly supported by our air and naval last effective resistance of Colonel Sumi- forces.” 2’ Both Army generals sent Ru- ya’s force. Artillery forward observers with the attacking troops brought down pertus their congratulations; MacArthur’s fire on the fleeing enemy to speed them ~~as in eloquent-language ending with the on their way. phrase: “Your gallant clivision has nlain- A vastly enlarged perimeter, including tained the immortal record of the Marine Razorback Hill in the center and reaching Corps and covered itself with glory.”’0 well to the west of Airfield No. 1, marked Perhaps the best tribute to the men W11O the Marine position on the night of 30 had seized the BACKHANDED opera- December. The 1st Battalion, 5th Ma- tion’s prime objective was written by an rines took over a sector of the line between Army officer observer attached to Combat 3/1 and 2/5. During the day’s fighting, Team B when he reported to the ALAMO more supporting elements of both combat G-3 : teams and of the task force reached the The front line soldier was superb. These airfield area. On the 31st, after the LST- men were in splendid physical condition and borne echelon of Combat ‘Team A arrived spoiling for a fight. They were like hunters. at the Yellow Beaches, the assault bat- boring in relentlessly and apparently with- talions’ heavy gear and the team’s light out fear. I never heard a wounded Marine moan. The aid men, unarmed, were right up tank company and artillery battalion in the front lines getting th’e wounded. Fire (5/11) came up. The .4merican force se- discipline was excellent?’ curing the airdrome, basically four in- fantry battalions, two artillery battalions, “ LtCol George E. Ilowdoin ltr to CMC, dtd 10Mar52. and two tank companies, was far stronger 28Quoted in I.stMarIMv SAR, Phase II, Part than anything General Matsuda could I, p. 13. bring against it. ‘n Quoted in C’TF 76 Dec43 WarD, p. 43. .4t noon on 31 December, General Ru- N I.st MarDiv D–3 ,Jnl—1, entry No. 9 of 31 Dec43. pertus raised the .4merican flag over Cape a Maj J. B. Bonham memo to Col Eddleman, Gloucester to mark officially the capture dtd 4Jan44, in ALAMO CM Jnl No. 15. C.4PTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS 371 TRAIL BLOCK ?VITHDRA WN “ radios made contact with the division on R regular daily schedule. TVhile the 1st Division’s attack up the The first inkling that the Japanese north cozst was developing, the Marines would probably attack the trail block was who were to close the back door to the air- discovered on the 28th. An alert Marine drome had a relatively quiet time. Lieu- on outpost duty spotted two Japanese ob- tenant Colonel Masters’ STC)NEFACE servers on the ridge opposite 2/1’s lines Group spent the first few days after it and dropped them both with his rifle. A landed consolidating its hold on the Tauali patrol checked the bodies and found the beachhead and p~trolling vigorously to lo- men, carrying field glasses and maps, cate the Japanese. Many of the small en- were officers who had apparently been emy detachments encountered cared sur- reconnoitering the American position. prisingly 1ittle about security, and 2/1’s Toward nightfall on 29 December, scat- scouts and reconnaissance patrols were tered shots and then a growing volume of often able to jump the Japanese as they sustained fire began to strike the Marine were resting or marching at, ease, fire a defenses, coming from the jungle inland. few telling shots, nnd escape unscathed. A heavy downpour fell steadily, adding No intelligence that the Marines uncovered to the darkness and deadening the men’s indicated that a large enemy force was in sense of hearing as they strained to catch the vicinity of the Green Beach perimeter. the first sign of the attack that was clearly (See Map 25.) building. Finally, at 0155, the Japanese The direct radio link with division that charged forward along the one route most consistently eluded Masters on D-Day likely to let them break through the perim- could not be made on the 27th either. On eter—a natural causeway that joined the the following day, two engineer LCMS ridgeline defended by 2/1 and the higher with Marine radio jeeps on board were ground inland. sent north up the coast to get around the At the point the enemy chose to as- communication barrier posed by the moun- sault, the lines of Company G formed a tains. An enemy 75mm gun firing from the narrow salient. Japanese mortars and Dorf Point, vicinity dropped a few rounds machine guns poured their tire ahead of near the boats and prompted them to turn the attackers, but in vain. The first thrust back. The coastzl voyage proved unneces- was beaten back with the help of the bat- sary, however, since the bat tal ion’s radios talion’s 60mm and 81mm mortars, and “boomed in ~>33 to ~ivision receivers once the lznding craft were 200 yards offshore, Company G’s reserve platoon of artillery- men was rushed up to bolster the line. A Starting on the 29th, the LCM-borne second Japanese assault carried one of al ~Tnless ~ther~,,ise noted, the material in this Company H’s machine gun positions, but a section is derived from : 1st.MarDivLS.4R, Phase counterattack by a mixed force of heavy II, Part II. Green Beach Lanolin%; Zst MarDit~ weapons crewmen and artillerymen won it D–3’ J)?7—I; CO, I)et, 2{1 ESB Rept to CG, 2d back. After this repulse, the ardor of the ES13, dtd 20.Jan44, Subj : Ops CTF 76 LT 21 enemy troops cooled perceptibly, and two (Green Beach ), in A LAM o G-3 Jnl No. 1.9; klaj Theodore R. Galysh ltr to CMC, dtd 16 Feb52 : further attacks were blunted by Marine OCE, GHQ, AFP, .4mphibinn 13nqinccr8; Hough and Crown, A-eic Britain Campaign. “ I.tCol Robert Hall ltr to CMC, dtd 4Mar52. 372 ISOLATIOhT OF RABAIJL fire and stopped in front of the lines. To- An enemy artillery piece located about ward dawn, the ,Japanese fire slacked until, 2,500 yards east of the Tauali beachhead by 0700, it hnd died away completely. The began firing ranging shots on the 31st. cost of this victory to 2/1 and its attached While the aim of Japanese gunners was units was 6 men killed and 17 wounded. atrocious—all of their rounds fell in the Mop-up patrols found 89 enemy dead sea—Masters wasted no time getting his sprawled amongst the Marine positions own artillery in position to reply. Bat- and in the forest to the front. Five pris- tery H’s crews used block and tackle to oners, all of them dazed and some manhandle their guns to the top of a wounded, were seized. No other wounded precipitous bluff that overhung the beach. Japanese were sighted, and it appeared On the lst, when the Marine 75s began that the remnants of the attacking force firing, the enemy gun fell silent. The had fled south. The prisoners identified pack howitzers then furnished support to their units as elements of the 5G?and 4th the patrols that sought the enemy on all Contpanies of 1/53, and an enemy officer sides of the perimeter. candidate, who surrendered during the In response to an order from division, day, estimated the attacking strength at Masters sent. a small detachment to Dorf 116 men. From intelligence gained later Point on 2 January to guide Company E in the battle for western New Britain, it of 2/5 into the STONEFACE position appears that the few men who escaped un- for an overnight stay. The 5th Marines’ hurt from the attack on 2/1 were ordered company found no evidence of Japanese into the fight to contain the Marines driv- in any strength during its march from ing southeast toward Borgen Bay. the airdrome. The enemy troops that had retreated from the airfield defenses seized On New Year’s morning, torpedo boats by Combat Teams A and B had avoided which had patrolled from Grass Point to the coastal track and used the trail that Cape Bach during the night. took 10 of the led over the eastern shoulder of Mt. most seriously wounded Marines and the Talawe. Under the circumstances, there enemy prisoners back to New Guinea.34 was no longer any need for the trail block The ammunition supplies depleted during at Tauali, and General Rupertus issued the fight on the 30th were replenished in an orders for 2/1 to secure and rejoin. air drop by Fifth Air Force bombers on The movement of Masters’ command the 3d. Although almost all signs pointed began on 5 ,Jannary, when four loaded to a rirtual abandonment of the west coast LCMS, one towing an LCWP, made the by Japanese troops, Lieutenant Colonel trip from Green to Blue Beach. The pas- Masters could not chance being caught sage was a roug,h one for both crews and short. Through the week following the passengers. The heaving seas of the mon- enemy assault, there was scattered opposi- soon season battered the small craft, but tion to Marine patrols but nothing that the amphibian engineers proved equal to indicated the presence of large units. the feat of seamanship required to bring the boats in safely. On succeeding days, u ComMTBRons, SeventhFlt (CTG 70.1) WarD, Der43, dtd 27,Jan44 ( C(3A, N“HD), entry most of them equally rain- and wind- of 31 Dec43. swept, LC31s from the detachment at the CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS 373 Yellow Beaches and those assigned to the Japanese who might want to fire on the STONEF.&CE Group shuttled supplies, boats as they withdrew, the LCMS sprayed ammunition, and equipment from the west Green Beach with machine gun fire as a to the north coast.. By the llth, most of parting present, 2/1’s bulk stores and heal-y gear had been The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines rejoined transferred, and the main body of the re- its regiment on the 12th, after spending a inforced battalion marched north toward wet and thoroughly miserable night in a the airdrome. A small rear-guard bivouac area near Airfield No. 1. on 13 working party loaded the last supplies January, Masters’ battalion occupied po- during the early afternoon. At about sitions near the shore within Combat 1600, when several shots were fired from Team B’s sector of the airdrome perim- the jungle south of what had been the eter. With the successful completion of Marine lines, the remain;ng troops em- its mission, the STONEFACE Group was barked. To discourage any venturesome dissolved.