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Towards a Research Agenda for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking INFORMAL LOGIC XII.3, Fall 1990 Towards a Research Agenda for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking MARK ,,'EINSTEIN Montclair State College This paper recommends that the recent Toulmin has been too hastily criticized and concern with informal logic and critical seen as lacking, and that Toulmin's analysis thinking be redirected from its general of the structure and function of argument philosophical focus and towards a greater should be placed at the center of work in appreciation of the particulars of practice informal logic. Next, that the current con­ in the various domains of human under­ cern with ordinary argument needs to be standing. The redirection recommended is moderated by a deepening appreciation of prompted by the central role that critical what I call "stylized" argument, that is, thinking and informal logic can be seen to argument within the various special play in meaningful educational reform, disciplines. 2 Last, that informal logicians especially at the undergraduate level. Such and critical thinkers, working within a central role is implicit in many of the texts undergraduate education as proponents of and theoretic discussions within the expand­ educational reform, must develop col­ ing field, and has been made explicit in the laborative approaches that draw the writings of some of the most thoughtful ad­ members of all of the academic disciplines vocates of critical thinking. In order to into an ongoing dialogue in which all par­ render the recommendation plausible, the ticipants are equally valued contributors. paper will sketch an image of informal logic and critical thinking that places the field within three significant contexts. These con­ 1. Informal logic and texts include the circumstances within which applied epistemology the field was first developed, some theoretic assumptions common in the field's Recent concern with informal logic understanding of itself, and finally, the begins against the backdrop of the teaching educational framework within which the of aspects of symbolic and traditional logic field's endeavors take place. Relative to in­ as a standard undergraduate course in formal logic, the recommendation is that philosophy. First level logic courses, with argument analysis should evolve into what their typical mixture of fallacies, fragments has been called "applied epistemology." I of formal logic, linguistic analysis and Critical thinking, similarly, should be rudimentary scientific method were redirected from concerns typical of presented in order to accomplish at least two philosophers and towards issues and ap­ educational objectives. The first of these proaches more representative of critical was to offer an analysis of argument and thinking both within and across the wide the beginning of a method of argument range of disciplines represented by the assessment and the second to furnish some course of undergraduate studies. foundational knowledge and help develop A number of quite particular conse­ basic reasoning skills. The latter objective quences will result from the position was based on a vague, but traditional no­ developed in the paper. Among them is the tion, that the teaching of logic is relevant view that the seminal work of Stephen to the teaching of thinking. The former was 122 Mark Weinstein based on the equally venerable notion that fundity. It has been identified with argument analysis is relevant to argument reasonableness in general, as in Harvey assessment and that skill in argument assess­ Siegel's definition of the critical thinker as ment enables students to, in some sense, one who is "appropriately moved by develop the skills and even dispositions of reasons."5 And it has been identified with reasonable persons, traits and abilities now the most all-embracing notion of the commonly identified with critical thinking. 3 intellectual virtues, as in Robert Ennis' It was the inability of the then standard characterization of critical thinking as introductory logic courses to achieve these "reasonable and reflective thinking focused ends, and the compelling nature ofthe ends on deciding what to believe or do". 6 themselves, that furnished the impetus for It is such very general objectives that, informal logic. 4 Thus, informal logic stands so it seems to me, require that informal logic between formal logic on the one hand and move beyond the logical in order to embrace critical thinking on the other. And as such, what might be called applied epistemology: informal logic is subject to two opposing that is, the study of the epistemologies in tensions. The first of these prompts concern use in the various domains of human with analogues to formal principals, con­ understanding in order to ground the assess­ text independent criteria for identifying and ment of arguments as they occur within assessing arguments. The second demands them. Notice, that I am assuming that there that informal logicians offer an educational are distinguishable domains of human program that is of general utility, enabling understanding, that the domains of human students to better assess arguments both in understanding have epistemologies, and that their courses of study and in their every­ these need to be made explicit, if informal day lives. logic is to lead to critical thinking. 7 Needless The logical aspect of the informal logic to say, my claim is controversial, since, for project has been taken to include a theory among other reasons, it implies that pure of argument structure (functionally epistemology is insufficient to the task of analogous to syntax in formal systems) critical thinking. That is, I maintain that through the circle arrow diagrams, now epistemology that is purely philosophical commonly accepted as the most adequate and independent of the various domains of means of representing arguments, and ap­ inquiry cannot effectively result in critical paratus that addresses the acceptability and thinking in the broad sense required by the unacceptability of inferential relations educational ideal sustained in its name. 8 (analogous to semantics). The latter has Notice also that this implies that the domains been, for the most part, limited to fallacies, of human understanding are generally rele­ both traditional and newly defined. vant for' 'deciding what to believe or do." The model of formal logic and the deep­ My position is that domain specific ly rooted tendency of philosophically trained knowledge, including knowledge of the informal logicians to search for purely epistemologies of domains, is relevant for general and, hopefully, a priori principles critical thinking both within and across do­ (or at least principles that require no more mains, and in relation to ordinary affairs: than an analysis of language and common those "realHfe problems" that have been sense) has resulted in a predisposition that, the focus of much of the theory and prac­ as I shall hope to convincingly argue, tice of informal logic. 9 creates problems for the satisfactory ap­ The need for an applied epistemology plication of informal logic as a tool for is grounded in the nature of informal logic critical thinking. itself. For if the assessment of arguments Critical thinking is, whatever else, an is to be seen through the analogy with for­ educational ideal of great breadth and pro- mal logic, what is required is both a theory Research Agenda 123 of premise acceptability (analogous to say, critique. But again, as Govier has argued, a Tarskian definition of truth) and some ac­ the minimal conditional in no way extends count of how acceptability is transmitted the force of the argument beyond the stated from premises to conclusions (analogous to premises and thus, in no way guarantees the semantic entailment).10 The theory of stronger sense of analytic or nomic entail­ fallacies, in such an image, shows how ment that is required if the premises are to, various fallacious moves block acceptability non-trivially, imply the conclusion. By from being transmitted through the chain 'non-trivially' I mean imply them without of argument from premises to conclusions. the addition of the minimal conditional But notice an important asymmetry between generated ad hoc. a theory of fallacies and a theory of semantic The unavailability of deductivism has entailment. Fallacies shows how the chain serious consequences for informal logic as of argument is broken, not how the chain a tool for argument assessment. For. as just is validated. The asymmetry is sufficient to mentioned, the fallacies merely show why account for the attractiveness of deductivism arguments fail, and so, what is needed is in informal logic, since if all appropriate additional apparatus to demonstrate how arguments are deductive than no semantics arguments succeed. This opens the door for other than that of the preservation of truth­ what I have called applied epistemology. like properties is required. For I will claim that the assessment of the Unfortunately for generalist tendencies strength of support premises afford conclu­ in informal logic, the deductivist solution sions can only be assessed when the domain has been generally seen to be unattractive, within which the argument is presented is at least if we mean the sort of deductivism taken into account. To use a distinction I that makes all arguments analytic or nomic owe to Rob Grootendorst,12 fallacies are entailments. Trudy Govier's careful argu­ norms for argumentation that cannot be ments found most recently in Problems in violated, if it is to be reasonable, but they Argument Analysis and Evaluation, 11 seem do not afford criteria that allow us to assess compelling when she points out, both by the degree of success with which a set of abstract reasoning and persuasive examples, premises support a particular conclusion. the inappropriateness of the very general That is, assessing the success with which universalizations that would be required if premises support conclusions requires, in deductivism is to be sustained in the con­ the words of Tjark Kruiger, another texts of argumentation that informal logic member of the Amsterdam school, appeal is most concerned with.
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