INFORMAL LOGIC XII.3, Fall 1990

Towards a Research Agenda for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking

MARK ,,'EINSTEIN Montclair State College

This paper recommends that the recent Toulmin has been too hastily criticized and concern with informal logic and critical seen as lacking, and that Toulmin's analysis thinking be redirected from its general of the structure and function of argument philosophical focus and towards a greater should be placed at the center of work in appreciation of the particulars of practice informal logic. Next, that the current con­ in the various domains of human under­ cern with ordinary argument needs to be standing. The redirection recommended is moderated by a deepening appreciation of prompted by the central role that critical what I call "stylized" argument, that is, thinking and informal logic can be seen to argument within the various special play in meaningful educational reform, disciplines. 2 Last, that informal logicians especially at the undergraduate level. Such and critical thinkers, working within a central role is implicit in many of the texts undergraduate education as proponents of and theoretic discussions within the expand­ educational reform, must develop col­ ing field, and has been made explicit in the laborative approaches that draw the writings of some of the most thoughtful ad­ members of all of the academic disciplines vocates of critical thinking. In order to into an ongoing dialogue in which all par­ render the recommendation plausible, the ticipants are equally valued contributors. paper will sketch an image of informal logic and critical thinking that places the field within three significant contexts. These con­ 1. Informal logic and texts include the circumstances within which applied epistemology the field was first developed, some theoretic assumptions common in the field's Recent concern with informal logic understanding of itself, and finally, the begins against the backdrop of the teaching educational framework within which the of aspects of symbolic and traditional logic field's endeavors take place. Relative to in­ as a standard undergraduate course in formal logic, the recommendation is that philosophy. First level logic courses, with argument analysis should evolve into what their typical mixture of fallacies, fragments has been called "applied epistemology." I of formal logic, linguistic analysis and Critical thinking, similarly, should be rudimentary scientific method were redirected from concerns typical of presented in order to accomplish at least two philosophers and towards issues and ap­ educational objectives. The first of these proaches more representative of critical was to offer an analysis of argument and thinking both within and across the wide the beginning of a method of argument range of disciplines represented by the assessment and the second to furnish some course of undergraduate studies. foundational knowledge and help develop A number of quite particular conse­ basic reasoning skills. The latter objective quences will result from the position was based on a vague, but traditional no­ developed in the paper. Among them is the tion, that the teaching of logic is relevant view that the seminal work of Stephen to the teaching of thinking. The former was 122 Mark Weinstein based on the equally venerable notion that fundity. It has been identified with argument analysis is relevant to argument reasonableness in general, as in Harvey assessment and that skill in argument assess­ Siegel's definition of the critical thinker as ment enables students to, in some sense, one who is "appropriately moved by develop the skills and even dispositions of reasons."5 And it has been identified with reasonable persons, traits and abilities now the most all-embracing notion of the commonly identified with critical thinking. 3 intellectual virtues, as in Robert Ennis' It was the inability of the then standard characterization of critical thinking as introductory logic courses to achieve these "reasonable and reflective thinking focused ends, and the compelling nature ofthe ends on deciding what to believe or do". 6 themselves, that furnished the impetus for It is such very general objectives that, informal logic. 4 Thus, informal logic stands so it seems to me, require that informal logic between formal logic on the one hand and move beyond the logical in order to embrace critical thinking on the other. And as such, what might be called applied epistemology: informal logic is subject to two opposing that is, the study of the epistemologies in tensions. The first of these prompts concern use in the various domains of human with analogues to formal principals, con­ understanding in order to ground the assess­ text independent criteria for identifying and ment of arguments as they occur within assessing arguments. The second demands them. Notice, that I am assuming that there that informal logicians offer an educational are distinguishable domains of human program that is of general utility, enabling understanding, that the domains of human students to better assess arguments both in understanding have epistemologies, and that their courses of study and in their every­ these need to be made explicit, if informal day lives. logic is to lead to critical thinking. 7 Needless The logical aspect of the informal logic to say, my claim is controversial, since, for project has been taken to include a theory among other reasons, it implies that pure of argument structure (functionally epistemology is insufficient to the task of analogous to syntax in formal systems) critical thinking. That is, I maintain that through the circle arrow diagrams, now epistemology that is purely philosophical commonly accepted as the most adequate and independent of the various domains of means of representing arguments, and ap­ inquiry cannot effectively result in critical paratus that addresses the acceptability and thinking in the broad sense required by the unacceptability of inferential relations educational ideal sustained in its name. 8 (analogous to semantics). The latter has Notice also that this implies that the domains been, for the most part, limited to fallacies, of human understanding are generally rele­ both traditional and newly defined. vant for' 'deciding what to believe or do." The model of formal logic and the deep­ My position is that domain specific ly rooted tendency of philosophically trained knowledge, including knowledge of the informal logicians to search for purely epistemologies of domains, is relevant for general and, hopefully, a priori principles critical thinking both within and across do­ (or at least principles that require no more mains, and in relation to ordinary affairs: than an analysis of language and common those "realHfe problems" that have been sense) has resulted in a predisposition that, the focus of much of the theory and prac­ as I shall hope to convincingly argue, tice of informal logic. 9 creates problems for the satisfactory ap­ The need for an applied epistemology plication of informal logic as a tool for is grounded in the nature of informal logic critical thinking. itself. For if the assessment of arguments Critical thinking is, whatever else, an is to be seen through the analogy with for­ educational ideal of great breadth and pro- mal logic, what is required is both a theory Research Agenda 123

of premise acceptability (analogous to say, critique. But again, as Govier has argued, a Tarskian definition of truth) and some ac­ the minimal conditional in no way extends count of how acceptability is transmitted the force of the argument beyond the stated from premises to conclusions (analogous to premises and thus, in no way guarantees the semantic entailment).10 The theory of stronger sense of analytic or nomic entail­ fallacies, in such an image, shows how ment that is required if the premises are to, various fallacious moves block acceptability non-trivially, imply the conclusion. By from being transmitted through the chain 'non-trivially' I mean imply them without of argument from premises to conclusions. the addition of the minimal conditional But notice an important asymmetry between generated ad hoc. a theory of fallacies and a theory of semantic The unavailability of deductivism has entailment. Fallacies shows how the chain serious consequences for informal logic as of argument is broken, not how the chain a tool for argument assessment. For. as just is validated. The asymmetry is sufficient to mentioned, the fallacies merely show why account for the attractiveness of deductivism arguments fail, and so, what is needed is in informal logic, since if all appropriate additional apparatus to demonstrate how arguments are deductive than no semantics arguments succeed. This opens the door for other than that of the preservation of truth­ what I have called applied epistemology. like properties is required. For I will claim that the assessment of the Unfortunately for generalist tendencies strength of support premises afford conclu­ in informal logic, the deductivist solution sions can only be assessed when the domain has been generally seen to be unattractive, within which the argument is presented is at least if we mean the sort of deductivism taken into account. To use a distinction I that makes all arguments analytic or nomic owe to Rob Grootendorst,12 fallacies are entailments. Trudy Govier's careful argu­ norms for argumentation that cannot be ments found most recently in Problems in violated, if it is to be reasonable, but they Argument Analysis and Evaluation, 11 seem do not afford criteria that allow us to assess compelling when she points out, both by the degree of success with which a set of abstract reasoning and persuasive examples, premises support a particular conclusion. the inappropriateness of the very general That is, assessing the success with which universalizations that would be required if premises support conclusions requires, in deductivism is to be sustained in the con­ the words of Tjark Kruiger, another texts of argumentation that informal logic member of the Amsterdam school, appeal is most concerned with. There is, however, to "mutually accepted testing procedures," another sense of deductivism that needs to and a "mutually accepted system of be distinguished from the one just mention­ logic," 13 in my terms, accepted principles ed. That is the notion of deductivism that of methodology and substantive generaliza­ is parasitic on the minimal conditional. As tions and analytic hypotheses. 14 has been noticed by almost everyone who has discussed the issue, to present premises PI through Pn and conclusion q is to assert 2. Toulmin and stylized argument at least the material conditional if PI and ... and Pn then q. Thus, elementary deduc­ The rejection of a thoroughgoing deduc­ tive relations of the sort captured by modes tivism has consequences for the assessment ponens and modes tollens are built into the of arguments, for if the relation between very fabric of argumentation. In this sense premises and conclusion is not deductive, deductive moves are always included in then some sense must be made of the claim argumentation and the correlative deductive that particular premises offer varying fallacies are always appropriate means of support for the conclusion. This can 124 Mark Weinstein

not be accomplished through argument methodological assumptions that govern diagramming alone, especially if diagrams inquiry in the domain. are limited to identifying premises and It might be countered that even if conclusions. But even where diagrams are Toulmin's model of argument is correct as complicated by a more sophisticated notion an analysis of arguments in the stylized con­ of the roles of premises in argumentation, text of the special disciplines, it is irrele­ difficulties with levels of support still vant to the practice of informal logic in persisLI5 respect of its most essential domain of ap­ This can be most easily seen if we plication, that is ordinary argumentation. accept Toulmin's model as a plausible ac­ I now turn to that concept. count of the complex roles of premises in The distinction that the concept of or­ arguments. 16 For as Toulmin maintains, the dinary argumentation was seen to make, structure of functional roles he identifies is contrasted ordinary arguments with the dependent on particular methodological argument samples that were frequently principles in the domains within which presented in logic textbooks. Turning sam­ argumentation occurs. The notion of war­ ple arguments into overt and formally ex­ rant serves as a telling example. Toulmin pressed implications requires that the argu­ sees warrants as sentences that show the ment samples offered be treated as con­ relevance of grounds to claims. In science, stituted, at least in their essential aspects, for example, a warrant might be a cover­ by those formal renderings that become the ing law showing a functional relationship textbook's exercises in derivation and between data and some predicted out­ proof. Translation, the rendering of or­ come.17 But as many of Toulmin's early dinary arguments as formal proofs has been, critics maintained, data can be challenged thus, a significant component of introduc­ in other ways. In particular the data may tory logic texts. The artificiality of this pro­ be relevant in the sense that they are ap­ cess prompts two separate quasi-deductivist propriate to some generalization, but yet moves, first, the concern with missing may be methodologically suspect. IS The premises as a necessary addition to ordinary data may be challenged, not only in respect arguments if arguments are to be rendered of their relevance, but also as regards their as valid; 19 second, the attempt at alternative factidty. But, how are such challenges to reconstructions based on core notions of be distinguished, how are warrants validity so that arguments can be assessed presented in response to such concerns to holistically without regard to the strength be identified? The answer seems obvious of individual premises. A characteristic ex­ to me, such differing warrants can only be ample of this sort is the possible world in­ identified if substantive knowledge of the terpretation that utilizes the notion of a domain within which the argument takes counterexample to validity claims as an place is brought to bear on the issue. Fur­ essential core, while relinquishing the ther, how can such warrants be assessed? details of logical reconstruction. 20 How do the different considerations render As evidenced by the recent literature, the conclusion more or less worthy of both of these strategies create as many prob­ belief? It seems to me that only a sense of lems as they resolve. 21 But there is a more the basic epistemological issues in the field fundmental problem with these typical could possibly help. How well entrenched quasi-deductivist accounts. Contrasting or­ are the generalizations, how canonical is the dinary arguments with those in formal methodology, what latitude is acceptable in languages obscures a more relevant distinc­ practice? Clearly these are domain specific tion. That is, the distinction between or­ issues, and not merely issues of fact, but dinary argumentation as contrasted with the rather, issues that refer to substantive more stylized argumentation common in Research Agenda 125 specific subject domains. Argumentation 3. Critical thinking across the disciplines seen in relation to an enhousing domain and discourse community exhibits differing and The sense that there is an internal rela­ characteristic styles of argument, specific tionship between arguments, argumentation "inference tickets" (warrants), particular and domains of knowledge persists despite epistemologies (backing), and individual re­ attempts to show relevant and useful notions quirements for closure. 22 This for me is the of critical thinking that are generally insight Toulmin's position affords. available for instruction and neutral in Seeing argumentation as occuring within respect of the disciplines. The resolution of paricular domains, does not, however, the issues generated by these competing mean that a given argument need be limited views, requires that reflective practitioners to some particular domain. Many of of the disciplines, students of the history of Toulmin's critics appear to confuse the ideas, methodologists and specialists in former view with the latter, and therefore teaching increasingly engage in the task of see the unavailability of a uniquely iden­ generating and organizing the data upon tifiable domain for particular argument which an informed and adequate notion of fragments as a problem for Toulmin. It is critical thinking across the disciplines must not. But, more importantly, such criticism be based. has resulted in a pernicious non-sequitor My own research responds to such an that seems implicit in the views of many agenda. Increasingly, my interest involves informal logicians and critical thinking working with colleagues from a variety of theorists. That is, if no particular enhousing disciplines attempting to analyze and con­ domain is identifiable, the argument needs trast methods in the various fields, what has to be assesssed by the growing sub-discipline been called by John McPeck and others, the of philosophy, informal logic and critical "epistemology of the disciplines. "24 If the thinkingJ3 This, if my view is right, is a locus of critical thinking is to be found in disaster for any argument that requires do­ the particulars of disciplinary language and main specific considerations for its modes of inquiry, then critical thinking, at appropriate analysis and assessment. the undergraduate level at least, will require Arguments can, in general, be presented a focus different from the common concern and developed in different ways in many with topic neutral skills and dispositions. fields. Short argument samples may have At Montclair State College some of us are been abstracted from discussions in a field attempting to grapple with the reformula­ (if they are real and substantial), but in the tion of the focus of critical thinking through textbook they stand alone. If they are ex­ the study of the disciplines in an "ecological amples representative of a vast number of perspective. ' '25 This requires a systematic sample argument used in texts, they are exploration of the continuities and dif­ available to many fields. Arguments can be ferences in language and inquiry across the framed by many different kinds of consider­ various fields; the relation of particular ations. Doubtful claims can be addressed disciplines to multi-field concerns; and the from many disciplinary points of view and application of disciplinary knowledge to many combinations of disciplinary perspec­ broad, "real world," problems. tives. The question is, which fields and The ecology of the disciplines develops which approach yields what kinds of suc­ a stance in relation to real-world multi­ cess in analyzing and developing the salient logical issues. We accept the fact that aspects of the argument, finally, offering methods within the disciplines are frequent­ an adequate assessment of the various con­ ly inadequate to problems that transcend siderations put forward as arguments in narrow disciplinary frames. But we insist respect of the points at issue. that information drawn from within these 126 Mark Weinstein

frames is necessary, if the multi-logical prob­ a concern with disciplinary norms, does not lems are to be addressed in an informed and preclude interdisciplinary assessment. responsible fashion. Further, we maintain Siegel is clearly correct in maintaining that that information from the fields includes inter-disciplinary assessments must be based substantive methodological principles, prin­ on good reasons, but it is equally clear that ciples of epistemological and logical there is no reason to suppose that such stan­ relevance that are drawn from the practice dards for assessment must be drawn from of the disciplines and that are not available philosophical epistemology whether as cur­ in the general characterizations of rently understood or as understood by some methodology developed by philosophers future heir of the contemporary philoso­ working in abstraction from practice. The phical tradition. 28 For, contrary to Siegel, ecology of the disciplines also includes a I maintain that it remains to be seen whose perspective that sees methodological insight methodological practice is best suited to to be garnered from the comparision of constitute the forum within which particular methodological principles in the various cross-disciplinary assesssments are to be disciplines, This requires the detailed made. Historically, philosophers, being description and assessment of disciplinary concerned with the most abstract principles practice from the points of view of diverse of inquiry have played the role-frequently disciplines. Such a cross-disciplinary self-appointed-of court of last resort in perspective certainly includes methodology methodological disputes. Certainly, the drawn from the work of philosophers, but practice of assessing methodology at the philosophy is not uniquely relevant to this highest level of abstraction can be called study. Philosophers work in specific ways, philosophy with historical and philological perhaps in ways that are useful as con­ warrant. But that is not the issue. The issue trasting points of methodological perspec­ for me is, rather, to identify the domains tive, but so do sociologists, art historians from which the most adequate and chemists. 26 There is no a priori argu­ methodological concept set is to be drawn. ment that I accept that substantiates the Call the result philosophy if you will, the claims of any discipline to methodological issue is still from whose practice is priority. epistemological warrant to be drawn, and The lack of arguments that demonstrate in which cases. Is the a priori practice of a priori precedence of any argument style philosophers to be the model, or is it rather or disciplinary approach should not be con­ the hermeneutic analysis of literary fused with the argument that shows the a theorists; is it the narrative explanations of priori necessity of some argument or other historians, or the descriptive and analytic required for even the most abstract rational offerings of sociologists, the axiomatic prac­ disputes. Forthe latter, as demonstrated by tice of mathematicians, the theory bound Plato in the Theatetus and reiterated by derivations of physics, or is it, perhaps, the Harvey Siegel, shows the availability of a inductively generated accounts common in non-question begging argument to be a the social sciences? Which of these. and in necessary condition for rational justification which combination, in respect of what within disputes in general. 27 Siegel employs aspects, and on which particular occassions? his version of Plato's argument in a varie­ The preceding remarks offer an argu­ ty of ways and against a variety of targets, ment scheme applicable to the vast majori­ but he shows particular concern with a view ty of critical thinking skills identified in lists that is a cousin of the one argued here: the of critical thinking concepts. So, for exam­ emphasis on disciplinary particulars as ple, whose notion of causality is most rele­ essential for epistemological concerns. But vant to critical thinking, the historians' , the we still must distinguish the two points, for literary critics', the quantum physicists' or Research Agenda 127 the educational psychologists'? Or is it various disciplines has normative force, and rather some philosophers' and if so which that critical thinking must be closely tied of those available in a rich and varied to sound educational policies consistent with literature? Analyses of causation, judging an adequate knowledge base in the various from classic and contemporary philoso­ domains. phical texts, include a host of related but distinguishable notions. Looking at prac­ tices in the various disciplines increases the 4. Critical thinking and the language available models for understanding causali­ of the disciplines ty. To ask, as do some critical thinking theorists, that students be helped to ad­ The preceding is, perhaps, most per­ judicate which of various causal claims is suasive to those who already share my con­ most adequate, is to require that students victions. What is missing is a deeper be familiar with the various ways that causal theoretic analysis that exhibits the general claims are grounded in the various domains structure of argument in a fashion that ex­ of inquiry. There is just no univocal analysis poses its disciplinary underpinnings. I of causation that stands as the final court believe that such a theory is available, and of appeal. 29 The same is true of other cen­ in fact, grows out of an analysis of argu­ tral epistemological concepts. Whose no­ ment that sees an intimate relationship be­ tion of observation is most salient to a given tween argument and language. Language, multi-logical dispute, the art critics', the in such a theoretic analysis must, however, neuro-physiologists', the cognitive scien­ be seen in its full complexity, especially tists' or the chemists'? What standards for when the focus is on language as it is authority are required, the sociologists', the employed within the context of inquiry in political scientist's or the theologian's? the various disciplines. What I will now tum Whose requirements of clarity should be to is the beginning of a sketch of language sustained, the poet's, the bio-chemist's or in use that will point to the deep connection the geometer's? Such issues, I maintain, can between language, argument and inquiry. only be joined by contrasting available con­ But first a word about critical thinking. cept sets and looking to our epistemological As is by now, perhaps, well known, The purposes. The various domains of Institute for Critical Thinking takes critical knowledge all have particular insights to of­ thinking to include the skillful, self­ fer. These domains include philosophy as corrective and context-sensitive use of a member. Philosophy does not, however, criteria. Critical inquiry thus requires the exhaust the available methodological in­ identification and reasonable application of sights, neither through its method nor criteria appropriate to the context of in­ through its concepts. quiry.30 But where are these criteria to be The focus I have been describing, an found and how is the notion of critical in­ ecological perspective on the disciplines, quiry related to the language in which it is shifts both the normative and descriptive embedded? It should not be surprising, core of critical thinking. The concern is less given the perspective outlined above, that with the general concepts of informal logic the answer to these questions should be and more with the concept maps that govern found in the particular role that the assessment of information in the fields. disciplines playas a crucial context for in­ Most importantly, an ecological approach quiry. To see this, it is necessary to explore leaves open the possibility that abstract the relation between the disciplines as the epistemological arguments drawn from the locus of inquiry, and the languages within work of philosophers are not the court of which inquiry takes place. last resort, that successful practice in the Language as related to the disciplines 128 Mark Weinstein

can be differentiated into three essential already available to the philosophical aspects. The first two are general; the last thinker, either as intuitive knowledge or addresses the disciplines in their relation to perhaps as the result of the internalization undergraduate education. These three of conceptual frameworks and linguistic aspects of language are: structures. It is evident from such practice 1. Language as a "language game, " to that philosophers maintain that basic use Wittgenstein's pregnant phrase. Ex­ philosophical concepts are available to pressive of a "form of life," language in­ reflection and can be clarified through cludes a set of paradigmatic practices that dialectic. underlie the particular concepts and argu­ In Chemistry, on the other hand, the ment types characteristic of a discipline. 31 central paradigm is based on the procedures Language as "language game" relates the of classic chemists such as Lavoisier and overt language in use to the lived reality of Dalton. These procedures are quite specific: practitioners of the discipline, and draws weighing, heating and combining in sim­ from the historical experience that gives ple proportions, and are a small sub-set of each discipline its characteristic profile. the possible procedures that could be ap­ 2. Language as a specific set of concepts plied to material substances. The success and argument prototypes: particular of these initial methods of inquiry leads vocabulary and characteristic modes of chemists to look to analogous procedures. organizing disciplinary content, that reflect This reflects the field's fundamental practice, permit disciplinary communica­ assumption that complex chemical tion, and set the stage for the development phenomena are best explained when shown of appropriate tasks that initiate new to be the result of analogues of these primor­ members into the field. dial practices (analysis in terms of mass, 3. Language as a set of basic competen­ measurement of electrical resistance and the cies required of students and assessed like). through tasks deemed necessary, if students are to demonstrate understanding of the 4.2 Language as concepts and arguments. discipline and the information and pro­ Language in this sense offers an even cedures that it includes. clearer image of the' differences that Such a schematic representation remains characterize inquiry in the disciplines. Each opaque without a few telling examples. discipline includes both a set of concepts Perhaps the following will offer some sense and a logic-a set of tacit or explicit rules of how the specifics of various disciplines governing how discourse is to be organized point to the need for a careful look at the for presentation, challenge and defense. In particulars of disciplinary inquiry as related Classical Economics, for example, typical to the three aspects of language presented. concepts include value, exchange and market. Their variants pervade Economics 4.1 Language as the expression ofa "form as a discipline and importantly define a pro­ of life" totypical argument type: the explanation of To take an example: In Philosophy a economic behavior in terms of subjective central paradigm shows a marked discon­ preferences and descriptions of market force tinuity with an analogue in Chemistry. deemed relatively objective and describable Philosophers take the practice epitomized in quantitative terms. by Socrates as a basic model for inquiry. A far removed example of similar struc­ That is, the practice of doing Philosophy ture is the analysis of harmony in Music in includes at its core, careful and pointed terms of Dominant and Tonic. Both musical questioning whose purpose is to elicit and analysis and composition reflect this in clarify concepts that are thought to be prototypical dominant-tonic relations, these Research Agenda 129

include harmonic substitutions (G#min7, undergraduate education?32 C#7 in C major) and large formal analogues A procedure for testing the current no­ (Sonata-Allegro principle). tion is available from Harvey Siegel's ac­ count of the ideals underlying critical think­ 4.3 Language as a set of student ing found in Educating Reason. And so the competencies. question is: How far does the current con­ This involves the set of student skills re­ ception go towards addressing "respect for quired in the disciplines, and helps to students as persons ... self-sufficiency and specify student tasks and grounds the assess­ preparation for adulthood ... initiation into ment of student achievement. Analogous to the rational traditions ... (and) ... democratic reading and writing, such skills are grouped living"?33 The answer seems to be: Not around information gathering and informa­ very far at all. Although critical thinking tion use. These vary in obvious ways: instruction may furnish students with a understanding and producing laboratory budget of concerns, it is not clear that these reports in Physics, and reading and writing concerns are readily translated into the com­ short stories in English. There are more plex contexts of their other courses or their subtle distinctions as well. Take as an ex­ ordinary affairs. Nor is it clear that such ample, the contrast between analyzing a concerns are equally relevant to substantive classic philosophical text to draw out its disputes, especially given the level of main points and writing an analytic essay abstraction (or caricature) with which such showing where crucial philosophical dif­ concerns are represented in most texts in ficulites lie, on the one hand, as compared the field. 34 to reading original documents to develop Siegel, accepting the need for attention a sense of an historical period, and using to the specifics of disciplinary knowledge, documents to argue for a particular perspec­ what he calls' 'pluralism, " follows McPeck tive or interpretation of an era, on the other. by recommending that critical thinking pay attention to the "epistemology of the disciplines." That is, critical thinking 5. Critical thinking as an should include in its purview the standards educational goal that govern "good reasons" in disciplinary efforts to substantiate claims in their field. 35 Given the apparent discipline specifici­ This conception of knowledge in the fields ty of the languages presented above, the ob­ does not sit comfortably with a position such vious question is: Is critical thinking, and as Paul's that sees disciplinary thinking as its supporting discipline, informal logic, as artificial and too narrow to address multi­ currently conceived, sufficient to engender logical and ethical issues. Nevertheless, critical thinkers in particular fields and at even if we agree with Paul that social and various educational levels? Before we con­ political concerns transcend narrow tinue, however, it should be immediately disciplinary focus, it seems plausible that conceded that much of what is included in information from the fields may be relevant the current conception of critieal thinking to the amalgam of information necessary to is general, discipline neutral and relevant address cross-disciplinary concerns and real to aspects of instruction in a variety of col­ world problems. How can a student be lege courses, as well as to arguments that helped to evaluate and apply information can be characterized as involving issues of from a variety of fields when responding daily life. But are those aspects, conceived in an informed fashion to multi-logical as general and subject neutral, adequate to issues? How can students be helped to educational objectives consistent with the critically assess information within the goal of critical thinking and appropriate to range of subjects that they are required to 130 Mark Weinstein master, and how can they be helped to apply reserved for philosophers, shifts to include such knowledge to the rich multi­ the realities of concepts and practices that dimensional issues that characterize social warrant the central role the disciplines play and political argument and decisions in in furnishing much of what is worth know­ everyday life?36 ing about the world around us. This raises a number of specific ques­ One more point before we move on. Our tions that define a research agenda for earlier consideration of the sufficiency of critical thinking conceived as relevant across critical thinking as currently conceived, the disciplines and at the undergraduate points to the analagous notion of necessi­ level. Do the procedures neutrally ty. And so we might well ask: Is there some characterized by critical thinking theorists core to the notion of critical thinking that retain sufficient continuity when translated is a necessary aspect of education in the into the languages in use in the various various fields, given the ends for which fields? Do they retain significant similari­ critical thinking is envisioned? Here too, the ty when instantiated in the various pro­ question requires careful analysis of actual cedures that govern inquiry in the domains practice. For even if there is some definable of knowledge? Are critical thinking skills, core, necessary for thoughtful practitioners undifferentiated by disciplinary specifics, in the various fields, does this core require adequate to the analysis of real world pro­ a common set of educational strategies to blems at a level of sophistication that is ap­ be included in schooling in the various do­ propriate to educated members of a con­ mains? Or are the particulars of disciplinary cerned citizenry? These are not trivial ques­ study sufficient to engender critical think­ tions. They have been a concern of critical ing skills and dispositions without a thinking theorists for almost a decade. But systematic focus on the skills and disposi­ they have been addressed, for the most part, tions themselves? on a level of generality and through These crucial questions require a philosophical arguments that seem to me in­ response from critical thinking theorists adequate for their clarification and resolu­ concerned with undergraduate education tion. I maintain that an adequate response across the disciplines. As mentioned earlier to the issues such questions reflect, requires it is my conviction that working towards an careful analysis of the particulars of the appropriate response requires a research various disciplines. The brief account of the agenda that is more concerned with actual diversity of the languages of the discipline, disciplinary practice and less with abstract offered above, points to a framework of epistemological or logical arguments. In this argument that is relevant to the dispute. For I see continuity with the tendency that if the various disciplines are embedded in motivated the movement from formal logic relevantly dissimilar practices, and if these to informal logic and the shift from abstract, practices support and require argument frequently formal philosophy of science, to structures and epistemological norms that the analysis of case studies drawn from the are substantive, in the sense that good history of science. These tendencies raise reasons are warranted through them, then profound questions as to the locus of the claim to significant generality and sub­ epistemic wisdom. It is my sense that, in­ ject neutrality is weakened. creasingly, insights into epistemological The consequences of such a research adequacy must be drawn from successful agenda are crucial to the relevance of critical practice and be couched in terms that reflect thinking across the disciplines. For if my the complexity and sophistication of stylized argument is sound, critical thinking across argument. That is my intuition; its defense the disciplines will only become a reality ultimately relies on the research agenda when the normative function, heretofore recommended here. But the intuition is Research Agenda 131

afforded prima facie support by the analysis readily translated into correlative principles of language offered above. It is reinforced in the various fields. Neither are the by my sense that critical thinking skills, philosophical analyses afforded within characterized as general and topic neutral, critical thinking and informal logic un­ gives the form of the concerns, but none problematic in themselves or in application of the necessary substance. And it is to cases. A sobering example for critical rendered more persuasive by examples of thinking advocates is all too available from disciplinary particulars of the sort offered the fifty years of rational reconstructionist above. But that is to repeat my convictions. attempts in philosophy of science alluded Additional support must wait upon the to above. The attempts at logically based careful analysis of critical thinking skills as general analyses of scientific practice were instantiated in the various domains. This, seen as both logically suspect and descrip­ of course, is the reason for my call for the tively inadequate by philosophers them­ research agenda outlined here. But even at selves. Both within and among the the level of these programmatic remarks, disciplines, faithfulness to scientific prac­ there is more to the issue of the adequacy tice points up the inadequacy of the available of critical thinking as currently understood, general accounts of scientific method, of to the notion of critical thinking across the causation, of induction and of the nature and disciplines and at the college level. role of observation and its relation to theory. But there is more to the problem, for the judgment of philosophers is not the only insti­ 6. Critical thinking in its tutionally relevant judgment, if critical think­ institutional setting ing is to reach across the disciplines. Scholars, researchers and teachers in all of the fields The impact of the critical thinking move­ to be touched by critical thinking must, ment as a practical vehicle for educational themselves, see the relevance of any given reform raises additional considerations rele­ account of critical thinking to their efforts. vant to the reform of actual educational in­ stitutions. 37 I claim that if critical thinking 6.2 The pedagogic context. is to be effective as a vehicle for reform the Given the concern with educational issues raised must be seen within three reform, an acount of critical thinking of­ essential contexts: fered as relevant to disciplinary issues must 1. The theoretic context of the various be appropriate and effective in teaching disciplines. across the curriculum. Critical thinking 2. The pedagogical practices appropriate to theorists have questioned pedagogical prac­ education in the fields. tices that are common throughout 3. The pragmatic context generated by undergraduate education. The use of lec­ overarching institutional concerns. ture, didactic teaching, objective examina­ tions and grading are all brought into ques­ 6.1 The theoretic context. tion by critical thinking advocates who see Even if it is ultimately seen that critical dialogical and multi-logical pedagogy at the thinking is generally available and neutral core of critical thinking instruction. 38 This in respect of the methodological standards becomes an issue for any discipline whose in particular disciplines, it is not apparent­ practice supports didactic models as most ly so, once the relevance and diversity of appropriate for instruction in the field. The disciplinary languages is acknowledged. epistemological basis of critical thinking has Critical thinking and the epistemological barely been explored; its relation to theories and logical criteria that are espoused in its oflearning is nowhere near resolved. Stan­ name are not obviously identical with or dard pedagogical practices, on the other 132 Mark Weinstein

hand, are supported by tradition and prac­ of research vs. teaching, and of institutional tice and have been addressed in a systematic and disciplinary reward structures are con­ way by educational psychologists and founding variables in any program of institu­ specialists in teaching. Although the critical tional reform in the name of critical thinking. thinking movement is not without plausi­ Student expectations,39 patterns of assess­ ble pedagogical recommendations and a ment and the demands of particular fields of growing body of successful educational study are all serious roadblocks to meaningful practice, paradigms for critical thinking in­ institutional change. And all of these must struction have been drawn from philosophy be resolved within the complex of personal­ and some few other academic subject areas. ities and politics that characterize colleges. It is just not obvious to me that Socratic The concerns that each of these contexts discussion, so at home in the philosophy contribute cannot be overlooked if critical class, is equally pertinent to teaching thinking across the disciplines is to become calculus, or that group problem solving a reality. For those of us who see critical strategies so useful in mathematics instruc­ thinking as more than a particular course, tion are relevant to literature, or that writing as more than the perspective of a particular process approaches are helpful in teaching discipline, critical thinking must be seen economics or sociology. Clearly what is within the total institutional context, within needed is further exploration, open­ the realities of teaching and within the mindedness and careful analysis. That is to perspective of disciplinary practice, if say, wherever else critical thinking is re­ critical thinking is to be effective at all. quired, critical thinking about critical think­ The ecological focus that I have sketched ing is a necessity. here has an additional yield in the institu­ tional contexts within which we strive. It 6.3 The institutional context per se. makes critical thinking a central concern of Although frequently disregarded as the entire educational community and af­ "political, " institutional issues must be fords an invitation to' practitioners of all dealt with if critical thinking is to playa disciplines to join with philosophers in the meaningful role in educational reform. The epistemological enterprise. Most importantly, education of undergraduates takes place in for educational reform, it offers a framework a holistic context. The various elements in­ for the totality of college studies that re­ cluded in the curriculum are required to quires synthesis and significance, flexibility amplify each other, enabling the student to and creativity. An ecological framework for achieve his or her professional goals while critical thinking across the disciplines offers responding to the more idealistic aims of a real possibility of educational reform, humanistic education and the liberal arts since it gives credence to the entire range tradition. The relation of critical thinking of methodological alternatives, is open to to the complex of interlocking course re­ the pedagogical demands of the various quirements and professional accreditation fields, and welcomes all members of the must be taken into account if critical think­ college community as equal participants in ing reform is to be effective in under­ the task at hand. If we accept the relevance graduate education seen as a whole. Critical of higher education for the larger objectives thinking across the disciplines requires a for which the reasonable life is deemed best, careful effort to educate faculty in the par­ such an approach equips our students for ticulars of the field and to the desirability their lives as citizens, as decision makers of critical thinking outcomes. This, more and as rational persons, for it is no less than likely than not, requires a complex and equipping our students with what seems best long-term program in faculty development. in the realm of reasons as warrants for their Issues of the autonomy of the disciplines, judgments and as backing for their practices. Research Agenda 133

Notes

I The tenn "applied epistemology" is gaining in­ that has defined the field for decades (Ennis, creased currency in discussions of informal 1987). logic and critical thinking. One plausible use, 4 The story has been told in a number of places. by analogy with "applied ethics," denotes ap­ A recent version is by Alex Fisher (1988). plications of concepts drawn from philosophical epistemology to extra-philosophical discourse 5 Siegel (1988), p. 8. Although Siegel's defini­ that results in knowledge claims. My use, tion is acceptable as it stands. it leaves open the although not inconsistent with the preceding, question of how such a concept is to be ar­ refers to the identification and analysis of extra­ ticulated in practice. See Weinstein (199Od) for philosophical epistemological concepts in use a discussion of this issue. within substantive knowledge generating prac­ 6 Ennis (1987), p. 12. Ennis' definition has been tices, most essentially the sciences and other widely accepted, although little effort has been disciplines that are paradigmatic of the most expended in confronting just how difficult reliable and sophisticated knowledge claims changing students' beliefs may be. See Wein­ humans have made to this point. By "extra­ stein (199Oa) for a review of some of the prob­ philosophical" I intend concepts that are not lems identified in recent work in cognitive available within the philosophical literature, per psychology. se, and that reflect the experience derived from the exploration of particular subject matters in 7 The notion that understanding can be differen­ specific ways. tiated into domains is justifiably viewed with I would argue that my sense of "applied suspicion. The discussion surrounding P.H. epistemology" has a rich philosophical history, Hirst's attempt at a similar project: forms of and, in fact, lies behind some of the major knowledge (Hirst, 1965), points to the difficulty philosophical epistemologists who drew heavily of rigorously distinguishing the components of from, for example, the scientific practices of human understanding (Phillips, 1971). If I were their time. to hazard an account it would begin with the following: Domains can be distinguished as a 2 I have introduced the teml "stylized argument" weighted function of subject matter and in Weinstein (199Oe) where I use it to distingush methodology (weighted differently in different arguments in specialized fields from arguments cases). The basic insight is that various aspects couched in ordinary language on the one hand, of the world have been best seen to respond to and formal arguments on the other. What different strategies for explanation, prediction characterizes stylized argument is both special and comprehension. Of course, at any given vocabulary and regularized procedures, in­ period many aspects of the world are under­ cluding inferential apparatus specific to the field stood in competing or even incommensurable and particular patterns of argument. An exam­ ways. Further, different aspects of the world, ple of specific inferential apparatus would be respond to similar methodological approaches. chemical fonnula as used in support of explana­ This makes life difficult since, for example, tions of chemical reactions. Patterns of argu­ some areas of the academic subject area called ment include, for example, limits on the sorts psychology are methodologically closer to of evidence appealed to, as in behaviorist quantitative sociology than they are to other psychology, and even such broad patterns of areas of psychology which are, in turn, meth­ claim and challenge as standards for publica­ odologically similar to, say, various areas of tion in professional journals. literary criticism. Thus, domains do not fit 3 The idea goes back, of course, to Socrates, neatly into the standard subdivisions of Plato and Aristotle. The recent movement relies academic practice. heavily on the work of Robert Ennis whose in­ This creates problems for critical thinking itial explication of critical thinking as, "the cor­ theory construed as applied epistemology, while rect assessing of statement" (Ennis, 1962) pointing to the enormous need for the project foreshadows what remains at the heart of his that my view recommends. For a rational conception: a long list of dispositions and understanding of subject matter across the cur­ abilities, which in its enumeration of critical riculum requires that some articulation of thinking abilities resembles notl1ing more than methodological similarities and differences both an index to the sort of comprehensive logic texts within and across the academic disciplines be 134 Mark Weinstein

attempted, that is, if we agree that the ideal of vation of say, DNA through an electron critical thinking requires that students under­ microscope as opposed to observations by an stand the information in eourses within a nexus historian? What standards of rigor are required of justifieation and application. On such a view, in laying out first principles, a geometer's or courses in particular academic disciplines need an economist's? Whose standards for deduction to provide their students with a range of dif­ apply to the arguments of a mathematical ferent considerations supporting their practice: physieist, to those of an evolutionary biologist? frequently such considerations are mcthod­ How do inductions differ in a domain that ological and metaphysical, as frequently they studies uniform natural kinds, e.g., geology, involve historical and social concerns, and from induction in a domain such as social almost always they involve consideration of the psychology? How are statistics employed in needs of practice, utility and understanding. But quantum mechanics as opposed to population all disciplines owe their students an account of genetics, as opposed to educational psychology? why their procedures are deemed best, and how (They all satisfY the axioms of probability, but their procedures appeal to the concerns of what ice does that cut?) How does narrative sup­ humans. port analysis in literature, as opposed to case Such a schematic presentation may be less study analysis in the social sciences, as opposed than persuasive to those epistemological uniform­ to philosophical essays? And how does such itarians who focus on underlying similarities. analytic prose contrast with technical papers in I rely heavily on examples to make my case for an engineering science, or research reports in the central epistemological role of disciplinary quantitative social science, or molecular biology specifics. This creates two sorts of problems. or mathematics? The first is the Plato-like demand for general What is the point of these examples? People descriptors. I prefer the Wittgensteinian mode: receive, present, analyze and assess informa­ "assembling reminders for a particular pur­ tion in widely different ways. And these ways pose" (Wiltgenstein, 1956, 127). A general are relevant if our students are to under­ argument is subject to a philosophical analysis stand the material put before them. Critical in terms of necessity and sufficiency. This fre­ thinking, and the assessment of arguments, for quently obscures more than it illuminates, by which informal logic is deemed relevant, must permitting countcrexamples that although com­ penni! students to see what they learn as respon­ pelling to the logical mind, arc of little relevance sibly based on warrants and that the warrants to the points at issue. Recall in this regard, the are appropriately backed by the historical cottage industry of counterexample and revi­ dialectic reflected in the methodology of the sion characteristic of the philosophical literature various fields. Information must also be on D-N models of explanation (see Eberle, presented so that its relevance to the domain Kaplan and Montague, 1961 and Hempel, of its application is apparent and the goodness 1965). Rather than necessity or sufficiency, I of fit (as well as strategies for adjustment) be­ prefer a salient common core of similarities tween principles and application is identifiable and differences, an interesting "family for evaluation. resemblance." This raises the second Objection: One caveat, I have no quarrel with a view examples prove nothing, since apparent dif­ such as Paul's when he claims that the world ference does not guarantee essential difference. as well as our conceptual schemes, "can be Examples do not prove the case; rather, their classified in indefinitely many ways" (Paul, function is to shift the burden of proof onto 1985, p. 40). Rather, I would claim that there those who would disregard apparent differences are classifications of the world and of the do­ in the name of underlying continuities. For mains that are optimal for critical thinking con­ given the salience of differences, it is up to the ceived of as applied epistemology The thrust advocate of underlying similarities to show how of this paper is that informal logicians and the similarities are at least as illuminating as critical thinking advocates should begin paying the differences for the understanding of inquiry. more attention to what such a task requires. Here are the sorts of examples, in question 8 My claim may contend with a straw man alone. form, that press me into arguing for the Pure epistemology, in the sense of epistemology discipline specifieity of key epistemological that is indifferent to discipline specific concerns, concepts: How is the adequacy of a causal ac­ and general in respect of disciplinary practices, count assessed in literature as opposed to may be no one's cup of tea, although Siegel is chemistry? What counts as an adequate obser- clearly pointed in that direction (Siegel, 1988a, Research Agenda 135

especially chapter 2, 1987; and also, 1980). some modified form of deductivism is to be Clarification is clearly needed. Although Siegel salvaged. is a richer and more robust notion of has offered arguments for the need for an entailment. A beginning sketch of such a model, epistemological analysis at the highest level, he reflecting some of the work of this paper, is offers few examples of what he has in mind. found in a paper recently read at the Second And so we might ask ourselves as a preliminary: International Conference on Argumentation. What role do the following classic positions have June 1990 (Weinstein, 1990b) The anonymous to play in critical thinking across the disciplines referee reminds me of Hintikka (1989). and in relation to meaningful application in 11 Govier (1987), chapter 5. Govier's critique of ordinary life? (substitute your own list of deductivism relies heavily on the unavailabili­ epistemological positions, if you will; but the rhetorical thrust requires that it be an actual list ty of natural and plausible deductive reconstruc­ with real candidates): Sense data theory? Or tions of actual arguments. There have been perhaps modem discussions of the Gettier other quarrels with deductivism, for example Harman (1977), chapters 10 and 11. Most rele­ counterexample? Humean empiricism? Carte­ sian rationalism? Plato's doctrine of vant, given our concern with the educational role of critical thinking and informal logic, are reminiscence? Positivism? Which of these tradi­ trends in cognitive psychology that point away tions is sufficient to help students to understand from the usefulness of formal deductive or prob­ their education and their lives? Would combin­ ing them help? How much of them should be abilistic logic for understanding actual reason­ taught? And instead of what? How do these in­ ing. I have explored these issues in Weinstein terface with critical thinking as standardly con­ (1988a), citing many of the seminal works in the bibliography. A recent work that offers a ceived? What is their relation to the radical reconceptualization of the structure and methodological core of the other courses that function of logic based reasoning, offering a students take? (For a more elaborate list of par­ theoretic synthesis of recent work in cognitive ticulars see Weinstein, 1990c). science, is Margolis (1987). 9 This is argued in a number of ways throughout The relation between philosophical norms the remainder of the paper. See Weinstein and empirical discoveries has been the focus of (l99Oc) for more elaborate presentations of this much discussion; one of the most salient discus­ last point as well as other issues raised in this sions is found in Cohen (1981) and the paper. responses that it prompted. The issue to me seems to be centered around which practice 10 If deductivism is not to reduce to the minimal should be normatively central, the heuristics conditional (see below in the text). some sense employed by ordinary people, the a priori prac­ of the strength contributed by premises must tice of philosophers, or the standards implicit be assessed. This requires that the relation be­ in the practice of the various disciplines, science tween premises and conclusion be analyzed in most typically. It is such issues that applied as other than truth functional terms. That is. that contrasted with pure epistemology brings to the the internal connections between terms in foreground. The "ecological approach" to arguments be put forward. The most reliable critical thinking that is described below opera­ class of entailments, those warranted by scien­ tionalizes this concern through the model tific theories, the constructions of which they developed at Montclair State (section 3 below; are comprised, and the analytical postulates that n. 25 and n. 37.) Obviously, this paper is a define terms and point to conceptual connec­ call for allies in this effort, which includes. tions, can only be analyzed and assessed among other things, some determination of the through information from within the area do­ normative priorities given underlying tensions mains of particular disciplines. We do not, after in the theory of reason. all, get knowledge written in some ideal language composed of primitive predicates and I2 The position is to be found in Grootendorst logical connectives, and even if we did there (1989). is no uniform account of the implication rela­ 13 Kruiger, (1989) read at TISIL An abstract of tions required. Arguments in the various the paper can be found in Informal Logic, voL disciplines do not come complete with the 11 (1989) p. 50. associated Ramsey sentences and a theory of implication, and neither do arguments in or­ 14 The beginning of an analysis sufficient to sup­ dinary language. Thus, what is required. if port this claim is found in section 4, below, 136 Mark Weinstein

where I begin an account of the language of the scientists and historians, physical scientists and disciplines. The upshot is that methodology is teachers of the applied arts and sciences. For carried by both practices and maxims, aspects one such experience, see Weinstein (1989). The of language that are internalized when learn­ newsletter, Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across ing a field "from the inside. " It is my conten­ the Disciplines has an ongoing record of tion that students should be helped towards ex­ workshops with Montclair State College facul­ plicit knowledge of such methodological par­ ty, the overwhelming majority of which use ticulars as they learn discipline-bound aspects of Toulmin's account. knowledge. The testimony is clear; Toulmin's As far as the term "substantive generaliza­ framework speaks directly to faculty and their tions" is eoncerned, think of the role of dif­ discipline-bound understanding. The model ferential equations in Physics. They tell you makes connections with how they see their what the relationships between entities are, but disciplines, and through its use, they can ap­ also limit the available descriptions of data, the preciate what I am about as a critical thinking acceptable manipulations, and point to areas of advocate in the context of undergraduate educa­ connection with related issues both within and tion. In addition, my own work in the analysis outside of the domain of inquiry. Knowledge of scientific argument finds Toulmin's struc­ that is built right into the equations limits what ture furnishing an illuminating perspective and and how we can say and do things in the field, an available tool (Weinstein, 1990e). therefore the term' 'substantive generalizations." 18 Manicus fl966). Johnson (1981), perhaps 15 Freeman (1988) offers such an elaborated Toulmin's most detailed critic, argued against model. What seems to be required in addition Toulmin's model based on the difficulties of to Toulmin's apparatus is a supporting theory distinguishing warrants and backing in the ex­ of entailment, general in respect of the par­ amples offered in Toulmin's introductory text ticulars, but yet sensitive to the actual context (Toulmin, et al., 1979). Certainly this difficulty of argumentation (Weinstein, 1990b). renders Toulmin's text difficult to use. But the problem seems to me to be general in respect 16 Toulmin (1969) and Toulmin, et a1. (1979). of informal logic textbooks whose exercises are readily rendered ambiguous if the arguments 17 Using Toulmin to make my point is question are reconstructed within differing contexts begging enough to give me pause. Toulmin is, (Weinstein, 1982). The problem seems to be admittedly, the philosopher in the infornIallogic less the analytic framework employed, and movement who best represents the sorts of con­ more a function of the artificially simplified cern with the disciplines that I advocate. But. arguments in most logic texts, presented devoid although that gives my position little enough of significant context. support, something else does. Toulmin is also the individual who has offered the most detailed 19 The reason for the phrase "quasi-deductive" account of argument analysis to date, especially is to mark the issues of concern as equally rele­ if you permit me to beg the question once again, vant to formalized inductive argument (prob­ by pointing to Toulmin's historical works that abilistic argument). Although informal logicians outline the course of argument using actual have generally not involved themselves in cases from the history of science (Toulmin and discussion of formal theories of inductive in­ Goodfield, 1961, 1962, 1965). What I see in ference, the classic discussions of Bayes's the disciplines, and find reflected in Toulmin's theorem show structural continuity with prob­ historical work, are arguments of considerable lems of deductive reconstruction. So, for ex­ complexity, arguments that are invariably ample, the discussion of Suppes (1966) points sensitive to the methodological context and the to the need for contextually sensitive reconstruc­ particulars of the problem situation at the time. tions of formal inductive argumentation, even If what is required is an account adequate to in the context of mathematically sophisticated the phenomena, Toulmin is the most likely apparatus. candidate in a field of one. He is not only 20 Noh (1984). complex but thoughtful, a student of the history of science and a philosopher of insight. 21 The most notorious problem involves the so Toulmin's model of argument analysis has called' 'principle of charity. " For a comprehen­ worked for me in workshops with teachers of sive discussion see Govier (1987), chapter 7. writing and with reading specialists, with social For problems with the possible worlds approach Research Agenda 137

see, Kahane (1964); Thomas (1964), theorists offered arguments for the relevance of subject neutral skills to the objectives for which 22 Toulmin (1969); Toulmin, etaI. (1979). The critical thinking instruction was envisioned tcnn .. inference ticket," is Ryle' s (Ry Ie, 1949, (Weddle, 1984; Paul, 1985; Ennis, 1989). p, 121). The most elaborate use of the term in Richard Paul, for example, argued that a sense relevant to science is in Toulmin (1953, discipline neutrality is crucial since the most im­ chapter 3,) portant problems for which critical thinking is 23 Informal logicians, as evidenced by textbooks required are not resolvable within the academic and pedagogical discussions in the field, disciplines, Paul maintained that the most generally reflect a common focus on first level crucial domain of application for critical thought undergraduate courses in argument analysis or is problems that are "multi-logical" and critical thinking that purport to offer students "dialogical," problems that are inimical to general and subject neutral strategies that in­ discipline specific perspectives and training, in­ clude a common core of epistemological con­ volving issues that require a variety of perspec­ cepts, logical skills and student traits taken as tives for their analysis and assessment, as con­ central to the enterprise, trasted to issues that can be adequately dealt The textbooks in the field, in addition, point with within a particular framework (Paul, to a domain of application for the abilities and 1982). This became a common theme in discus­ dispositions developed through their use. The sions of McPeck and reflects a position that has majority of available texts draw material from been generally accepted by the field: critical the popular press, from media and from political thinking includes a generalizable set of skills discourse. Less frequently, material is drawn applicable to the complex and frequently ilI­ from student level philosophy texts, but these structured problems of daily life, closely iden­ text fragments are rarely, if ever, systematically tified with aspects of infonnal logic. explored. Rather, materials offered as examples 24 The phrase "epistemology of the disciplines" or in exercises, are abstracted from their con­ has been used by McPeck (1981). My use of text and presented within a fonnat that addresses the concept goes back to my work on the "Map the skill or concept they are taken to exemplify. of Knowledge." See Weinstein (J 985). Short fragments, whether newspaper editorials, or short passages drawn from some non­ 25 Weinstein (l988b) offers the briefest technical discipline such as history, do little to preliminary sketch of what an "ecological represent argument as it occurs in the domain perspective" includes. It includes a distinction from which it has been abstracted. Rather, in­ between two senses of "normative" relevant formal logic and critical thinking texts present to critical thinking across the disciplines. First, for the student short segments of reasoned "normative" in the sense of disciplines that discourse in order to afford the opportunity for traditionally take a normative stance that is the presentation and application of a particular meta-disciplinary, including disciplines as informal logic concept This impression, diverse as fonnal and inforrnallogic, argumen­ garnered from most available texts, is rein­ tation theory, various theories of discourse forced by the statements of advocates of critical analysis, cognitive and educational psychology, thinking. The claim, characterisitic of most curriculum theory and theories of educational members of the field, is that critical thinking institutions, as well as theories that support is generally applicable and subject neutral. This social, cultural and political critique, and has been most apparent in the responses of sociology of knowledge of many sorts, Second, members of the informal logic community to "normative" in the sense of nonnatively con­ John McPeck's challenge in Critical Thinking stituted and constituting practices within a and Education (McPeck, 1981), McPeck faulted discipline itself: that is, the disciplinary "stan­ the movement on the grounds that general and dards in use that govern knowledge production, subject neutral critical thinking was vacuous, transmission and evaluation" (ibid., p. 8.). Critical thinking, he argued, requires a subject 26 For the relationship between philosophy and domain for its appropriate application, and critical thinking, and a portrayal of philosophy varies in accordance with the methodological as a discipline that reflecl~ a commitment to par­ principles that characterize inquiry in the ticular styles of analysis and argumentation, see various areas of knowledge, Rather than rejec­ Weinstein (1988c; 1988d). ting subject neutrality as an essential characteristic of critical thinking, infonnal logic 27 Siegel (1987, chapter 1), 138 Mark Weinstein

28 Siegel (1980; 1987; 1988, chapter 2) seems to causation, the consequences of recent literary sustain, without developing the position in any theory on the availability of objective analyses detail, the relevance, if not superiority of of texts (Eagleton, 1983) and the movement philosophical epistemology in some ge~eral within the history of ideas that sees social and philosophical sense. We have looked at thIs In historical contingencies as essential for some detail in n. 8. An anonymous referee epistemological understanding (See, for exam­ sees my argument as "unconvincing," claim­ ple, Bernstein, 1983, for a synthesis of recent ing that it falls most naturally to philosophy to socially and historically sensitive views of cen­ "chart the course of such questions as 'Do dif­ tral relevance to epistemology). ferent subject matters admit (or require) 29 Robert Swartz and David Perkins (1989), in an significantly different epistemological treat­ extremely useful book that speaks to teachers ment?''' The referee does, however, seem to at all educational levels, offer a "Map of Causal agree with my position in that he or she claims Explanation. " It consists of four question that that the answer to the queslionjusl quoted, "has are intended to direct inquiry: "1. What are the been YES since Aristotle's time." How "con­ possible causes of the event in question? 2. vincing" my argument is, of course, remains What could vou find that would count for and to be seen. Nevertheless, the reviewer seems against the likelihood of these possibilities? 3. to confuse the historic role of philosophy as an What evidence do you already have, or have essential forum within which fundamental you gathered that is relevant to determining.the methodological and epistemological questions cause? 4. What possibility is rendered most like­ are raised, and the saliency of philosophical ap­ ly, based on the evidence'? (p. 77)." Wh~t is proaches to furnishing answers for such ques­ clear to me is that it is, in general. impOSSIble tions. As I have tried to show in the papers cited to answer these questions without substantive in n. 26, philosophers, although focusing on knowledge from domains within which a given foundational questions of the most general kind, causal explanation is offered. By substantive structure and respond to such questions in par­ knowledge I don't only mean "facts," but prin­ ticular ways, and in a fashion distinguishable ciples that determine what sort of weight is to from how such questions are construed in other be assigned to the considerations that support similarly foundational disciplines. The unique a given causal claim and the principles that sup­ relevance of philosophical perspectives is cur­ port the strength and reliability of the assign­ rendy disputed by scholars who reject :te a ment of weights themselves. Kahane (1979) of­ priorism of most recent and tradItIOnal fers a similarly schematic account that raises philosophy. The question cannot be resolved by similar issues. The fallacy of Questionable calling attention to the historic role of Cause is assigned, he says, "if we label a given philosophy in regards fundamental issues thing as the cause of something else on the basis without begging the very point at issue. of insufficient or inappropriate evidence." The referee also suggests that I offer ex­ Again one feels the need to touch methodo­ amples of' 'applied epistemologies" incompati­ logical ground. By what criteria are kinds of ble (incommensurable'?) with each other and evidence deemed insufficient or inappropriate? with "pure" epistemology." A recent exam­ Is there a general account of such criteria'? And ple of applied epistemology is Stephen Jay if not, where but into the disciplines are we to Gould's Wonderful Life, where the essentIal go for our answer'? And so it. seems that it is role of substantive empirical and method­ only within the various domams that the rele­ ological issues, specific to paleontology, vant alternatives can be identified, their ade­ are shown to qualify the most fundamental quacy relevantly assessed and judgments of in­ aspects of evolutionary theory, aspects that had, sufficiency and inappropriateness made. heretofore, been decided on a prioristic grounds It is reasonable to complain that the open­ (Gould, 1989). Is Gould's work incompatible textured examples of analyses of causation by or incommensurable with purely philosophical informal logicians and critical thinking epistemology'! A preliminary question must be specialists that I choose unfairly represents the answered first. Could a philosopher, utilizing analyses available in the current literature. concepts drawn from traditional or contem­ Kahane, who I cite above, spends only two porary epistemolgy have seen what Gou:d pages on the causal fallacy, wherea~ Johnson describes? Similar points could be made 10 and Blair (1983) spend ten, and GovIer (1985) respect of the profound effect of quantum in­ spends perhaps as many as four of her chapters determinancy on philosophical discussions of on factors relevant to causal claims. These Research Agenda 139 authors offer rich and complex argument types, advocates and informal logicians must play in patterns and distinctions for their students to institutional reform at the undergraduate level consider. But we may ask: What characteristic in particular? (See sections 5 and 6, below, and limits do these analyses and examples include? n. 37.) Are they, for example, relevant across the 30 Lipman (1988). disciplines students learn within the courses they take in their undergraduate education? 31 The idea of a language game has exercised Johnson and Blair, as is their practice, draw philosophers since it was introduced in the examples from complex causal issues in daily Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, life. Two questions arise: first, can the struc­ 1953). Seeing language as essentially tied to tures they identify illuminate issues within the use, and language use as embedded in practice, disciplines and second, can issues of the type ties reasoning, and therefore critical thinking, they present be adequately assessed without to the justificatory context from which analysis disciplinary knowledge, and with an appropriate and assessment take their substance. Such a no­ level of sophistication. (See Weinstein, 1990c tion rejects a priorism and rather looks to a for a hopefully provocative analysis of a light­ foundation in socially constituted and historical­ hearted example of Perry Weddle's.) ly validated practice. This is obviously tied to Govier's text is strong on causal arguments. inquiry in the sense of Dewey (1933) and has The chapter in which she deals specifically with a deep affinity with anti-formalist tendencies in causal issues connects them to "social life" and logic and philosophy of science. The connec­ so the examples include social science issues. tion oflanguage use with the deep and perplex­ when they do not reflect "daily life." This, to ing notion of form of life reinforces this inter­ me, is a step in the right direction; her ter­ pretation. Besides for the oft -cited occurence minology reflects central issues in the domain of "form of life" in the Investigations she explores, e.g. correlation, and the questions (Wittgenstein, 1958, paragraphs, 19,23 and 248, her exercises and examples raise, reflect social and pp. 174,226), see 142 for a telling instance, knowledge at a degree of sophistication that is also 144-6; 198-9. I find related comments in rightly required of college undergraduates. Her Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics choice of topic is, however, telling. First, she (Wittgenstein, 1956) particularly illuminating, chooses one topic among many relevant to especially Part I, paragraphs 142-155. The sec­ causal analysis; second, she chooses a topic that tion on translatability and proof on Part II, is rich in its relevance to many ordinary con­ paragraphs 65-76 are also relevant, emphasizing cerns and is thereby likely to acti vate students' the constructive nature of proofs and difficulties prim knowledge and prompt additional with translatability of proofs to languages that research. This raises two questions: First, how reflect different practices. Also relevant are sec­ much knowledge of facts. of appropriate tions of On Certainty, (Wittgenstein, 1969) par­ theories and of method, above and beyond the ticularly the paragraphs surrounding the sug­ informal logic structures she provides, is gestive use of "acting" in paragraph 204 and smuggled into a classroom discussion or similarly seminal analyses in paragraphs 348. homework assignment adequate to the 475, 519 and 609. phenomena presented for analysis and assess­ ment? That is, how much of what she teaches 32 This raises a crucial question that has been rare­ is functioning essentially, and how much of the Iy, if ever. discussed in the critical thinking success of her enterprise is based on what the literature: How do argument analyses typical students bring to the forum she provides? of informal logic or critical thinking look from Second, would similar exercises from the wide the perspectives of the various disciplines range of areas students study in college be as through which we want to inform students, or available to their untutored analysis? This raises remediate their cognitive deficits, or clarify the issue of division of labor. an issue that issues, or support cogent reasoning? How does Govier is particularly sensitive to (Govier, the practice of informal logic look to fields that 1987, chapter II). To what extent do critical have their own standard for the presentation and the elaboration of argumentation and especial­ thinking outcomes require that informal logic ly for assessing students' ability to understand be a mere beginning to a process that must con­ and manipulate argumentation appropriate to the tinue throughout many, if not all, of the courses subject area the student is called on to master? students take? And if such an outcome is re­ quired, what is the role that critical thinking 33 Siegel (1988) pp. 54ff. 140 Mark Weinstein

34 Perhaps I am too harsh, relying on my ex­ argues that critical thinking encompasses all of perience with early texts in the field, where I the knowledge required for evaluating claims found the combination of a blatant political across the college curriculum, although defini­ agenda with superficial analyses both unsupport­ tions such as Ennis's, and programs such as able and inadequate to the task of hclping Siegel's, invite just the sort of broad objectives students develop even a modest competence in that Govier foreswears. The question for ad­ dealing with complex actual issues (Weinstein, vocates of educational reform through critical 1982). Textbooks have certainly improved since thinking is to identify the optimal strategy for the earliest (but still bcst selling) offerings in utilizing the thirteen weeks at their disposal, and the field. And, perhaps, simple distinctions, more to the point, to develop strategies for even caricaturcs, are helpful as memorable enlisting the support of instructors of other "first approximations." Perry Weddle never disciplines in the task at hand. It is not enough fails to give me pause by reminding me that to fall back on the fact that we can do very lit­ even as rough and ready a distinction as that tle, when we claim to do a great deal. It is even betwecn correlation and causc can serve to worse to claim to do a great deal that is doable make students pausc in their consideration of with a concerted effort involving many friends indefinitely many claims about the world around and co-workers, while limiting oneself to go­ them. This is certainly valuable; critical think­ ing it alone on the grounds of academic turf or ing courses may serve the students well if they methodological purity. do no more than develop a budget of reminders relevant to their daily and academic lives. 35 Siegel (1988), pp. 28ff. For his advocacy of But my concern pcrsists. My problem is pluralism, see Siegel (1987), especially chapter 8. similar to that which prompted Richard Paul's 36 I share the concern expressed by Paul, (1985) rejection of "weak scnse" critical thinking that undergraduate students not be taught to be (Paul, 1982), although I am less concerned with narrow specialists, or think that real problems the facile rcjection of positions that students find are completely resolvable by "specialized unappealing, than with the sophomoric rejec­ knowledge," or feel that they have to "suspend tion of positions worthy of careful considera­ judgment and/or defer to experts." Where we tion, aided and abettcd by the standard treat­ may differ is in regards to the desirability and ment of fallacies through decontextualized ex­ the educational devices required if students are amples in infonnaI logic tcxts. Distinctions such to become, what Paul disparagingly calls as that between correlation and cause are cer­ "specialists on specialists," that is a person who tainly essential, but they play no role unless the can access and meanirigfully employ specialists' student has a sense of what, for example, counts knowledge. I also may differ with Paul on the towards supporting a causal claim as opposed role that I assign to specialist's knowledge, for to a mere correlation. It is my contention that I see special knowledge within the disciplines this cannot be decided in general, and in a man­ as offering the best available accounts of those ner indifferent to the way that causal claims are aspects of the world that fall within their do­ constituted in the particular domains within main of expertise. (This, of course, includes the which causal arguments occur. Rather they re­ specialized knowledge of philosophers. infor­ quire substantive generalizations from various mal logicians and critical thinking theorists.) relevant fields, complete with the methodo­ And so I see a major task of critical thinking logical and theoretical apparatus necessary for to be helping students understand that special causal argument in the particular fields knowledge is required, what aspects of com­ involved. (See note 29.) plex problems are amenable to which special The anonymous referee questions the im­ knowledge, and how best to assess the claims plications of my view for the" instructional pro­ of specialists, both in terms of appropriate gram" generated by recent concern with critical criteria in relevant fields, and in terms of the thinking, reminding me that" CT -ers have peo­ context of application. If we add to this that ple for 13 weeks in their freshman or sophmore students begin the process of understanding the years." This echoes Trudy Govier's call for a appropriate criteria for choosing between division of academic labor, limiting informal various sorts of specialized claims to both fac­ logic and critical thinking to . 'those aspects of ticity and relevance, and that students under­ arguments which are universal, universal within stand and apply the criteriological considerations a sub-class, or at least relatively common" that support such claims, by drawing from par­ (Govier, 1987, p. 231). Obviously, no one ticular fields, including broadly relevant Helds Research Agenda 141

such as philosophy and infonnallogic, we have (1987) has much to say in chapter 12. For me a model for critical thinking adequate to the the locus classicus of the complaint is Lipman, education of undergraduates, and one that re­ et al. (1980). quires a broadly based and energetic program of institutional and educational reform. 39 Problems involving students' expectations and their concomitant resistance to critical thinking 37 The faculty development project of the Institute are all too familiar to converts to critical think­ for Critical Thinking at Montclair State Col­ ing pedagogy who watch their student evalua­ lege is described in Weinstein and Oxman­ tions fall as students respond to the unilateral Michelli (1989). breaking of the tacit contract underlying 38 Pedagogical issues have been aptly summa­ undergraduate studies: Professors profess, rized in Paul (1988); Siegel (1988) addresses students regurgitate. See Oxman (1989) and issues of relevance in chapters 6 and 7; Govier Perry (1968) for relevant analyses.

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Weinstein, M. (199