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OSW Commentary Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 295 | 27.02.2019 www.osw.waw.pl Serving politics Television’s role in Ukraine’s presidential election Krzysztof Nieczypor Television plays a major role in the formation of public opinion in Ukraine. For 85% of the pop- ulation, it represents their main source of information. By providing information about candi- dates in an election, their manifestos, and events surrounding election campaigns, television stations have a fundamental impact on the popularity of individual politicians and political parties, and their prospects of taking up senior posts. Online and press sources play a much smaller role in determining public opinion. Although the authorities in Kyiv have attempted to legislate to reform the media sector from 2014 onwards, the process of making the envisaged changes has come to a standstill. It has proven impossible to eliminate the problems that existed in the media prior to the Maidan revolution. The major television stations are still controlled by a small group of the wealthiest oligarchs, and are used by these oligarchs as vehicles for furthering their business and politi- cal agendas. The predominantly privately-owned media are highly dependent on the political and business relations between their proprietors and politicians. As a result of these ties, tele- vision stations under oligarch control have been engaging in measures to support or discredit particular candidates in the current presidential election campaign. Due to the importance and the part played by the media in shaping public attitudes, their influence over the outcome of the presidential election due to be held on 31 March will be considerable. A change that did not come to pass vych’s rule2. The media were supposed to rein in the authorities and report faithfully on the Following the Maidan revolution, the expec- domestic situation. tations of Ukrainians that the situation in the Under pressure from the public, the new gov- country would improve went beyond those re- ernment in Kyiv attempted to pass legislation lated to social and political changes, measures in line with these public expectations. As ear- to combat corruption, and integration with ly as April 2014, an act was passed to create structures in the West. They also related to re- a state-run broadcasting service based on the form of the media sector to improve freedom existing nationwide and local television and of speech1. There was a general expectation of radio stations. This state broadcasting service greater media pluralism and objectivity, which was tasked with creating a medium to make has largely been eroded under Viktor Yanuko- 1 Petro Poroshenko pledged to reform the media sector 2 T. Iwański, ‘The press and freedom of speech in Ukraine and strengthen the role of the media as a means of rein- ahead of parliamentary elections’, OSW Commentary, ing in the government in his election manifesto in May 24.09.2012, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ 2014: https://programaporoshenka.com/Programa_Po- osw-commentary/2012-09-24/press-and-freedom- roshenko.pdf speech-ukraine-ahead-parliamentary-elections OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 295 1 programmes in the public interest3. In Septem- parable to (or even exceeding) their Western ber 2015, parliament passed an act making it counterparts in terms of technology, do not compulsory for radio and television stations to generate revenue. Due to support from specif- make public their ownership structure in full. ic political forces, however, the owners of the This was done to guarantee transparency with- largest media concerns can balance the invest- in the media sector and to prevent attempts on ment outlays with measurable benefits for their the part of business and political groups to mo- business operations in the form of legislation or nopolise it. In addition, 760 press publications political decisions favourable to their business. that were under state and municipal ownership These ties mean that the owners use their tel- were privatised. evision stations to further short-term interests at the expense of credible reporting. As a result of this dependence, the value of television sta- The media in Ukraine are highly depend- tions is determined not only according to their ent on the political and business relations position in the media sector, but also according between their proprietors and politicians. to their ability to shape the image of politicians and political parties. The political and business climate in which the Despite this progress, the intended reform mass media operate has led to various kinds programme has come to a halt. The main me- of breaches of media freedom and journalis- dia outlets, among them the top ten television tic standards. To achieve political and business stations, which have an audience of more than goals, the owners of the largest media con- 60% of the media sector, are still controlled by cerns keep the journalists working for them a handful of the most powerful oligarchs: Ihor in line using a range of measures, including Kolomoysky, Rinat Akhmetov, Dmytro Firtash, proprietor censorship in the form of financial Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Viktor Pinchuk (this share or administrative penalties. It is common for is even greater when the sport, lifestyle and politicians to order and pay for material that children’s channels are included). By tightly con- presents a particular person or event in a spe- trolling the editorial policy of television stations cific light (jeansa). As the presidential election and the press, they support or oppose particular draws near, this pathological situation in the leaders and political forces, depending on how media sector is worsening, causing the amount the relationship stands at the time4. As a result, of paid material aimed at promoting particu- the media, subjected to oligarchical interests, lar politicians (parket) or discrediting them are not an adequate outlet for communication (chornukha) to increase. between the government and the public. Infor- mation is conveyed selectively and manipulated. Stars of television stations Although the oligarch-controlled television stations are not the oligarchs’ most important More than 85% of the population of Ukraine business assets, they serve as a form of politi- say that they find out about the domestic situa- cal investment. In most cases, due to enormous tion and the world at large from television news financial outlays, these media, which are com- programmes5. The role that television plays in forming the views of the public is also demon- 3 ‘Про Суспільне телебачення і радіомовлення України’, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1227-18 4 Д. Дуцик, А. Мніх, П. Бурковський, ‘Основні тенден- 5 Протидія російській пропаганді та медіаграмотність: ції медіависвітлення суспільно-політичних процесів результати всеукраїнського опитування громадської в Україні у 2014-2017 рр.’, Kyiv 2017, p. 7–17, https:// думки. Аналітичний звіт, Детектор медіа, Kyiv 2018, ms.detector.media/content/files/dm_news_2014-17_in- p. 10, https://detector.media/doc/images/news/archive/ ternet.compressed.pdf 2016/136017/DM_KMIS_ukr__WEB-2.pdf OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 295 2 strated by the high level of trust in the credibility for president as a member of the Opposition of the information provided (61% of Ukrainians Bloc that is also supported by the oligarch. consider the output of nationwide television stations to be credible6) and the role it plays in moulding the public’s image of politicians Television plays a major role in the forma- (70% of respondents obtain information about tion of public opinion in Ukraine and is the election manifestos from television stations7). main source of information for the public. The television station with the highest viewing figures is Ukraina, which is controlled by the wealthiest Ukrainian, Rinat Akhmetov (15.26% An analysis of the content of news broadcasts of airtime in 2018)8. Ukraina is also in first place on Akhmetov’s station shows that President in terms of the volume of material that violates Petro Poroshenko is presented neutrally (58.8% journalistic standards for current affairs re- of cases) or favourably (41.2%)11. The sym- porting. It was responsible for almost 40% of pathy that the oligarch has for the president, all biased and unreliable material broadcast on who is seeking re-election, takes the form of Ukrainian television in 2018)9. The person most a series of exclusive interviews with Poroshen- featured in hidden advertising is Oleh Lyashko, ko, conducted since the beginning of the year leader of the Radical Party, which the oligarch (in the past, the president’s wife was a present- finances. In return, Radical Party MPs vote in er of the station’s morning gymnastics show). parliament in line with his interests (particular- The favourable stance of Akhmetov’s media is ly in relation to legislation concerning mining provided in return for the president’s adminis- and metals, which is the same sphere in which tration assenting to the businessmen’s increas- Akhmetov’s Metinwest Group operates10). ing influence, among other things, in the en- Lyashko is regularly featured as a guest on ergy sector12. Providing media backing for as news programmes commenting on current af- many as three presidential candidates is a form fairs, and as a guest on programmes about so- of investment for the oligarch, for whom this cial and commercial issues as well. is a means of expanding his political influence. Another person who frequently appears on The second most popular station is
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