DOCSLIB.ORG

Arc of Containment Wen-Qing Ngoei

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Arc of Containment Wen-Qing Ngoei Arc of Containment Wen-Qing Ngoei Published by Cornell University Press Ngoei, Wen-Qing. Arc of Containment: Britain, the United States, and Anticommunism in Southeast Asia. Cornell University Press, 2019. Project MUSE.muse.jhu.edu/book/65138. https://muse.jhu.edu/. For additional information about this book https://muse.jhu.edu/book/65138 [ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ] Introduction Recovering the Regional Dimensions of U.S. Policy toward Southeast Asia The war in the Pacific was fi nally over. Now, the western powers— battered, licking their wounds— entered the colossal wreck of Japan’s Co- Prosperity Sphere to reclaim their Southeast Asian territories. Some of these campaigns went badly. France’s recolonization dream in Indochina, sustained almost en- tirely by U.S. aid, became a nightmare. The Viet Minh had the French reeling by early 1954. And just a week into that new year, U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower met with senior officials of the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss France’s flagging military efforts. Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles was the first to speak. He informed Eisenhower that the French garrison was “locked up” at Dien Bien Phu, “surrounded by approximately three Viet Minh divisions” as “fresh Viet Minh battalions were en route.” Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thought— wrongly, as it turned out—that the Viet Minh would “avoid an all-out assault on Dien Bien Phu.” Dulles was less sure. He believed that the Viet Minh might attack this French “fortress” and accept severe military losses if only to inflict “psychological damage” on the French “ will to continue” the war. As talk lurched toward how the United States might respond to the prospect of a French withdrawal, Eisenhower became agitated. Though none in the NSC dared say it, he could sense that they waited on his answer to one question above all: would he commit U.S. troops to Indochina? On rec ord, he declared “with great force” that he “could not imagine the United States putting ground troops anywhere in Southeast Asia, except possibly in Malaya.”1 2 Introduction At the time, Britain and its local allies in Malaya as well as Singapore were six years into counterinsurgency operations and politi cal campaigns against the mostly Chinese Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Like the Viet Minh, the MCP had been the backbone of a popu lar anti- Japanese re sis tance army in occupied Malaya during World War II. In 1948, MCP guerrillas launched an armed revolt against British authorities, attempting to leverage support from the hundreds and thousands of ethnic Chinese who constituted nearly 40 percent of Malaya’s population. In Singapore, affiliates of the MCP infiltrated workers’ unions and middle schools, mounting frequent labor strikes and student pro- tests that para lyzed the country. British leaders had named these troubles an “Emergency.” But Eisenhower considered them critical Cold War contests with wider regional ramifications. Throughout his first year in office, he had agonized over communist aggression in Malaya and Indochina. In his inaugural speech of 1953 and others that year, he held that Malaya was “indefensible” if Indochina went to the Viet Minh, that should Malaya fall, then Indonesia would also quickly succumb to communism. In April 1954, he envisioned the states of Southeast Asia as a row of dominoes, their fates all interconnected in the Cold War strug gle.2 Little wonder, then, that the Singapore domino also preoccupied Eisenhow- er’s officials. Singapore Island was host to Britain’s most impor tant naval and air installations in Asia and vital to the U.S.- led Southeast Asia Treaty Organ- ization (SEATO) military alliance. In March 1955, Kenneth Young of the State Department returned from Southeast Asia to report not only that Malaya would soon become a “Chinese state” but also that Singapore faced “real danger of communist subversion.” He explained: “80% of Singapore was Chinese” and more than half of them under the age of twenty- one— the communists had already made such “headway” in the country’s middle schools that in the com- ing years most of Singapore’s labor force would be “oriented toward and under the control of Peking.”3 Months later, U.S. strategists still grappling with Young’s assessment warned that in the interconnected region, losing Singa- pore ensured “the power of the West to influence events in Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam would be greatly reduced.”4 Recently declassified documents show, furthermore, that until 1959 NSC officials so feared an “internal takeover by the Communists or the extreme leftists” in Singapore that they resolved to “take all feasible measures to thwart the at- tempt, including even military action.”5 It did not come to this. Britain and Singapore’s anticommunist nationalists managed in the early 1960s to suppress the country’s socialist movement. Yet it was never a remote prospect given Introduction 3 Eisenhower’s track rec ord of covert maneuvers against the left- leaning gov- ernments of Iran, Guatemala, and Indonesia. These Cold War anx i eties explain why Eisenhower was relieved when Malayan and British efforts ultimately sent a tattered MCP fleeing north to the Malayan- Thai border in the late 1950s.6 He was cheered also that Britain had cultivated anticommunist Malayan nationalists who won popu lar legiti- macy at the ballot box in the mid-1950s, led their country to in de pen dence in 1957, and continued thereafter to align their nation with the West. In 1960, Eisenhower would hail the end of the Malayan Emergency as a “victory” against communism “in all its forms.”7 U.S. officials entertaining the possi- bility of Southeast Asia’s dominoes falling for the West sought to adapt Britain and Malaya’s example for the United States’ Cold War playbook. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations, too, invested high stakes in the smooth decolonization, stability, and avowed anticommunism of Malaya and Singapore.8 In 1962, Roger Hilsman, adviser to President John F. Kennedy, judged that the creation of Malaysia— the merger of Malaya, Singapore, and Britain’s Borneo territories scheduled for 1963— would complete a “wide anti- communist arc” that linked Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and the Philippines, encircling China and its Vietnam ese allies.9 Kennedy, with the entire region in view, soon acclaimed Malaysia as “the best hope for security in that very vital part of the world.”10 In September 1964, with President Lyndon Johnson poised to send U.S. troops to Vietnam, RAND Corporation delivered (per the State Department’s commission) five detailed studies of British- Malayan counterin- surgency and jungle warfare tactics.11 As U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia deepened, U.S. leaders clutched at those older hands, the British, from which world power was slipping, as if to seize some cache of imperial knowledge that might be brought to bear on the once heavi ly colonized region. Britain’s empire would cast a long shadow on U.S. relations with Southeast Asia, dissolving only in the 1970s when the British fi nally vacated their military bases in Singapore. So what? Of course British decolonization, the pro gress of Malaya and Sin- gapore toward in de pen dence, and their victories over communism shaped U.S. Cold War policy. Every domino in Southeast Asia was critical to the United States—by the domino logic their destinies were all intertwined. For good or ill, Eisenhower’s idiosyncratic depiction of Southeast Asian security had flattened the distinctions between the countries of the region. As domi- noes of identical dimensions, all must have appeared equally impor tant to U.S. strategy. 4 Introduction Yet most studies of the United States’ involvement in Southeast Asia have focused on the U.S. war in Vietnam. Indeed, historian Robert McMahon’s decades- old remonstrance about the liter a ture concerned with U.S.-Vietnam relations could easily have been penned today—it is still “dauntingly volumi- nous” and liable to “overwhelm virtually all other regional issues.”12 There are far more histories of the Vietnam War than of U.S. relations with the rest of Southeast Asia combined. And as long as Vietnam’s fraught decolonization dominates our perspective, the history of U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia traces familiar narratives of the United States’ best and brightest feeding their hubris and meeting ultimate failure, or the irony of U.S. leaders’ reluctant, pessi- mistic, and irrevocable slide into an unwinnable conflict in Vietnam. Fixation with Vietnam also burrows into the psychological wounds of U.S. defeat, the “Vietnam Syndrome” that for decades haunted U.S. citizens’ perceptions of their armed forces as well as shook their confidence in their leaders and the nation. Consequently, the views and responses of Southeast Asian actors clos- est to the war itself, besides those of the Viet nam ese, have curiously escaped detailed study. A number of historians have responded to this imbalance by delving into the United States’ other bilateral relations within the region. The work they do is invaluable. But these studies also tip the scales in the opposite direction, claiming the primacy of another Southeast Asian domino instead of Vietnam. One scholar has called Indonesia the “largest domino” in postwar U.S. foreign policy because of its “demographic weight . ​geo graph i cal expanse . ​[and] abundance of natural resources.”13 Another reminds us that Eisenhower voiced exceptional concern about Laos when he handed the reins of government to Kennedy in 1961; that U.S. officials thought Laotians more susceptible to communism than all other Southeast Asians, making Laos the domino that teetered at the head of the line, its position not “interchangeab[le]” with any other.14 One other historian has suggested that U.S.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Australians in Vietnam 1962-1972
    “They Were Hard Nuts”: The Australians in Vietnam, 1962-1972 A focus on the American failure to make maximum use of the Australians’ counterinsurgency tactics in South Vietnam Kate Tietzen Clemson University Abstract: Addressing the need for studies examining the relationship between Commonwealth militaries and the American military, this paper examines the American military’s relationship with the Australian military contingency sent to Vietnam between 1962 and 1972. Analyzing Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUSA) documents, Australian government documents and Australian primary sources including interviews, papers, and autobiographies, this paper argues that the Americans deliberately used the Australian army in South Vietnam for show rather than force. The paper also illustrates American efforts to discredit and ignore Australian counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics; this undertaking only hindered the overall American anti- communist mission in Vietnam. Australia (1) Met all day Sunday (2) They were hard nuts (3) They had a long list of their contributions to Vietnam already (4) Real progress was made with Holt when went upstairs alone and told of the seriousness of the matter (5) Holt told Taylor that he was such a good salesman that he was glad he had not brought his wife to the meeting —Dr. Clark Clifford, meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson 5 August 19671 While the Viet Minh and the French fought each other during the First Indochina War in Vietnam, Australia was fighting a guerilla-style war in Malaysia in what has been dubbed the “Malayan Emergency” of 1948-1960. In October of 1953, the Australian Defence Committee, the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff and the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff met in Melbourne to air concerns regarding the possibility of Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia.2 The delegation feared Chinese determination for communist control in Southeast Asia, which would threaten the accessibility of strategic raw materials for western powers in the area.
    [Show full text]
  • A New Historiography of the Origins of the Cold War
    SOSHUM Jurnal Sosial dan Humaniora [Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities] Volume 9, Number 2, 2019 p-ISSN. 2088-2262 e-ISSN. 2580-5622 ojs.pnb.ac.id/index.php/SOSHUM/ A New Historiography of the Origins of the Cold War Adewunmi J. Falode 1 and Moses J. Yakubu 2 1 Department of History & International Studies, Lagos State University, Nigeria 2 Department of History & International Studies, University of Benin, Edo, Nigeria Lasu, Ojo Campus Ojo Local Government, 102101, Lagos, Nigeria E-mail: [email protected] Article Info ABSTRACT ________________ ___________________________________________________________________ History Articles The Cold War that occurred between 1945 and 1991 was both an Received: international political and historical event. As an international political event, Jan 2019 the Cold War laid bare the fissures, animosities, mistrusts, misconceptions Accepted: June 2019 and the high-stakes brinksmanship that has been part of the international Published: political system since the birth of the modern nation-state in 1648. As a July 2019 historical event, the Cold War and its end marked an important epoch in ________________ human social, economic and political development. The beginning of the Keywords: Cold War marked the introduction of a new form of social and political Cold War, Historiography, experiment in human relations with the international arena as its laboratory. Structuralist School, Its end signalled the end of a potent social and political force that is still Revisionist School, st Orthodox School shaping the course of the political relations among states in the 21 century. ____________________ The historiography of the Cold War has been shrouded in controversy.
    [Show full text]
  • And the Dynamics of Memory in American Foreign Policy After the Vietnam War
    UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) ‘Whose Vietnam?’ - ‘Lessons learned’ and the dynamics of memory in American foreign policy after the Vietnam War Beukenhorst, H.B. Publication date 2012 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Beukenhorst, H. B. (2012). ‘Whose Vietnam?’ - ‘Lessons learned’ and the dynamics of memory in American foreign policy after the Vietnam War. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:25 Sep 2021 2. Haig’s Vietnam and the conflicts over El Salvador When Ronald Reagan took over the White House in 1981, he brought with him a particular memory of the Vietnam War largely based on the pivotal war experiences of his generation: World War Two and the Korean War.
    [Show full text]
  • Evelyn Goh, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the 'Soviet Card' in the US Opening T
    H-Diplo Article Commentary: Kimball on Goh Evelyn Goh , “Nixon, Kissinger, and the ‘Soviet Card’ in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971- 1974”, Diplomatic History , Vol. 29, Issue 3 (June 2005): 475-502. Commentary by Jeffrey Kimball , Miami University of Ohio Published by H-Diplo on 28 October 2005 Evelyn Goh, a professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, describes how and asks why Henry Kissinger increasingly emphasized the Soviet military threat to China’s security in his negotiations with Beijing between 1971 and 1973. Drawing from the archival record and the literature on U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China during the Nixon presidency, she traces Kissinger’s evolving policy through three phases: parallel détente with a tilt toward China (1971 to early 1972); “formal symmetry” but “tacit alliance” (mid 1972 to early 1973); and strategic shifts, attempted secret alliance, and stymied normalization (mid 1973 to 1974). Her purpose is to “understand and assess the nature and value of the Soviet card to the Nixon administration in the development of Sino- American relations” (477), because, she asserts, histories of triangular diplomacy have given more attention to Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s playing of the China card vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than of the Soviet card vis-à-vis China. Goh argues that in pursuing rapprochement Nixon and Kissinger “sought to manage . Chinese expectations” about improved Sino-American relations and dissuade Beijing from thinking that the U.S. aim was really that of playing “the China card in order to persuade the Soviet Union to negotiate détente with the United States” (479, 489).
    [Show full text]
  • H-Diplo ARTICLE REVIEW 984 9 October 2020
    H-Diplo ARTICLE REVIEW 984 9 October 2020 James G. Hershberg. “Soviet-Brazilian Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Journal of Cold War Studies 22:1 (Winter 2020): 175-209. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00930. https://hdiplo.org/to/AR984 Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Michael E. Neagle | Production Editor: George Fujii Review by Felipe Loureiro, University of São Paulo f there is one single event that represented the dangers and perils of the Cold War, it was the US-Soviet confrontation over the deployment of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba in October 1962, which is best known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The world had never been closer to a thermonuclear war than during that tense thirteen-day standoff between U.S.I President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. For decades, the Cuban Missile Crisis was studied as a classic example of a U.S.-Soviet bilateral confrontation, with Fidel Castro’s Havana playing at most a supporting role. Over the last two decades however, scholars have globalized and decentralized the crisis, showing that countries and societies of all parts of the world were not only strongly impacted by it, but also influenced, in multiple and sometimes key ways, how the superpowers’ standoff played out.1 As the geographic theater of the story, Latin America stood out as one of the main regions where the U.S.-Soviet stalemate produced major social and political impacts. Scholars have explored how President Kennedy’s 23 October public announcement about the existence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba sent shockwaves across the continent, prompting different reactions from state and non-state actors, including government crackdowns against local Communists and leftist groups, as well as a multilateral initiative for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the hemisphere, which culminated years later with the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967.2 Latin American countries also played direct roles in the crisis itself.
    [Show full text]
  • The Malayan Communist Party's Struggle for Hearts and Minds In
    No. 116 ‘Voice of the Malayan Revolution’: The Communist Party of Malaya’s Struggle for Hearts and Minds in the ‘Second Malayan Emergency’ (1969-1975) Ong Wei Chong Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore 13 October 2006 With Compliments This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author’s own and not that of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) was established in July 1996 as an autonomous research institute within the Nanyang Technological University. Its objectives are to: • Conduct research on security, strategic and international issues. • Provide general and graduate education in strategic studies, international relations, defence management and defence technology. • Promote joint and exchange programmes with similar regional and international institutions; and organise seminars/conferences on topics salient to the strategic and policy communities of the Asia-Pacific. Constituents of IDSS include the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) and the Asian Programme for Negotiation and Conflict Management (APNCM). Research Through its Working Paper Series, IDSS Commentaries and other publications, the Institute seeks to share its research findings with the strategic studies and defence policy communities. The Institute’s researchers are also encouraged to publish their writings in refereed journals. The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The Institute has also established the S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cold War and Washington's Policy of Containment
    FORCED TO FLUTTER: The Cold War and WashingTon’s PoliCy of ConTainmenT Sunny Khanna (Karan) – 212509923 Ap/pols 4280 – sergei plekhanov Abstract: Most now regard Cold War as a surreal phase of a tremulous dream in which few leaders held the fate of millions within their grasp and juggled nuclear bombs for www.google.ca/hegel=p ortrait_fur1846 ideological purposes before the circus of humanity. The paper analysed Washington’s III. Conflict in Containment of Communism. The first part of Historical and ww.google.ca/george_kennan.lkw=sdgd=/soviet+usa quar the paper examined how George Kennan Philosophical Contexts I. Kennan’s Prophecy gave philosophical foundations to the In 1989, the Berlin Wall Kennan gave philosophical conflict. The second part surveyed the policy lay in ruined in rubble. foundations to the Cold of containment by arguing that America was Were people like war. eventually successful by renewing capitalist Reagan, Thatcher or Predicted that Soviet’s economies of Western Europe, by using soft Gorbachev Hegelian decline is inevitable. and hard force throughout the “neutral” “world-historical Soviet Union’s economy is Global South, and through tactical alliances individuals”? Or was inherently unsustainable. with other communist nations. The paper there unconscious Believed that American concluded by situating the Cold War in a development of history? government can historical context. Post-structural emphasis overwhelm the Soviets with Methodology: Tolstoy: “Life of nations strategic military and The interdisciplinary paper relied on both in not contained in few political prowess. primary and secondary sources. It consulted men.” Soviets system is “fragile memoirs and diaries of key politicians of the My conclusion: The and artificial in its era, and also their biographies.
    [Show full text]
  • Decolonization in the British Empire at the End of the Second World War, Britain Still Controlled the Largest Empire in World History
    Decolonization in the British Empire At the end of the Second World War, Britain still controlled the largest empire in world history. Thanks largely to the empire, Britain raised enough supplies to sustain its war effort and took its place at the top table of the victorious powers alongside the United States and the Soviet Union. It was, however, a Pyrrhic victory; the war drained Britain’s finances and significantly lowered its prestige in the colonies. Less than two decades later, the British had given up almost all of their empire. This reading examines the period from 1945 to 1963, when the British surrendered almost all of their overseas colonies. There will be special focus on India, Kenya, Malaya (Malaysia), and Egypt. Finally, we will examine the legacy of empire for today’s Britain. The Effects of the Second World War The experience of the Second World War was not the sole reason that Britain eventually lost its colonies, but without the war the decolonization process doubtless would have taken longer. It is worth noting, however, that the origins of nationalist and anticolonial revolt across the British Empire were often rooted in the early twentieth century. After the First World War, British imperialists still preached about the superiority of Western (especially British) civilization, but their arguments often fell on deaf ears. Many subject peoples, especially Indians, had fought on the Western Front in the First World War. They saw that the British were no more immune to machine guns than any other group of people. They also observed Britain’s weakened state after the First World War and during the economic crisis of the 1930s.
    [Show full text]
  • Kissinger's Triangular Diplomacy
    Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy Veronika Lukacsova 2009 1 Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy BAKALÁRSKA PRÁCA Veronika Lukacsova Bratislavská medzinárodná škola liberálnych štúdií v Bratislave Bakalársky študijný program: Liberálne štúdiá Študijný odbor 3.1.6 Politológia Vedúci/školite ľ bakalárskej práce Samuel Abrahám, PhD BRATISLAVA 2009 2 Prehlásenie: Prehlasujem, že som bakalársku prácu vypracovala samostatne a použila uvedené pramene a literatúru. V Bratislave, d ňa 30.4. 2009 3 Po ďakovanie: Na tomto mieste by som rada po ďakoval svojmu konzultantovi Samuelovi Abrahámovi,PhD za cenné rady a pripomienky pri písaní tejto práce. 4 Abstract: The main idea of this bachelor’s thesis is to point out the phenomena of policy of triangular diplomacy as developed by Henry Kissinger, first Security Advisor and later the Secretary of State in Richard Nixon Administration. The aim of this thesis is to describe the main principles of Kissinger’s policies that included a new element: the policy of détente. After a brief characteristic of the history of balance of power, and comparing the 19th Century Europe to the 20th Century diplomacy, the thesis continues by describing the events which influenced the policy of triangular diplomacy. It also aims to show how Kissinger’s policies were influenced by the main protagonist of 19 th Century balance of power, Count Clemens von Metternich. Finally, the work focuses on the relationship between the United States, Soviet Union and China and the policy of détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Finally, the thesis deals with the successes and the failures of triangular diplomacy. 5 Content: 1.Introduction.......................................................................................7 1.
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth of Nixon's Opening of China Nick Demaris
    THE MYTH OF NIXON’S OPENING OF CHINA The Myth of Nixon’s Opening of China Nick DeMaris On February 21, 1972, Air Force One descended through Beijing’s early morning haze as the highly-trained pilots navigated the Boeing VC-137C, nicknamed the “Spirit of ‘76”, towards the runway. Inside sat the 37th President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, nervously awaiting the imminent meetings with the leaders of the Communist Party of China, including Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai.1 In the context of Cold War-era international relations and geopolitics, perhaps the single most historically significant and decisive event was President Nixon’s establishment of official (and public) diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. His trip to Beijing in early 1972 marked the beginning of a certain rapprochement between these two countries and signaled the evolution of the relationships between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. 1 Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2007) 19. 82 RHODES HISTORICAL REVIEW In the aftermath of World War II, as the Japanese threat to China ceased to exist, the two competing factions within the country, the Guomindang led by Chiang Kai- Shek, and the Communists led by Mao Zedong, were able to focus their efforts and resources on defeating each other instead of defending against Japanese occupation. This resulted in a bloody civil war between the Guomindang, the government that led the Republic of China, and the People’s Liberation Army that lasted until the Communists claimed victory in 1950.
    [Show full text]
  • Hold the Line Through 2035
    HOLD THE LINE THROUGH 2035 A Strategy to Offset China’s Revisionist Actions and Sustain a Rules-based Order in the Asia-Pacific Gabriel Collins, J.D. Baker Botts Fellow in Energy & Environmental Regulatory Affairs, Center for Energy Studies, Baker Institute Andrew S. Erickson, Ph.D. Professor of Strategy, China Maritime Studies Institute, Naval War College November 2020 Hold the Line Through 2035 | 1 Disclaimer: This paper is designed to offer potential policy ideas, not advocate for specific private sector outcomes. Neither author has a financial stake involved or any conflict of interest pertaining to the subjects discussed. Acknowledgement: The authors wish to thank multiple anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. Their inputs made this a stronger, more useful piece. Any errors are the authors’ alone. Contact information: [email protected] and [email protected]. © 2020 by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and the Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, papers are reviewed by outside experts before they are released. However, the research and views expressed in this paper are those of the individual researchers and do not necessarily represent the views of the Baker Institute, or the position of any organization with which the authors are affiliated. Gabriel Collins, J.D. Andrew S. Erickson, Ph.D. “Hold the Line Through 2035: A Strategy to Offset China’s Revisionist Actions and Sustain a Rules-based Order in the Asia-Pacific” https://doi.org/10.25613/4fzk-1v17 2 | Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy Executive Summary • Between now and 2035, imposing costs on strategically unacceptable Chinese actions while also pursuing behind-the-scenes “defense diplomacy” with Beijing offers a sustainable path to influence PRC behavior and position the Indo-Asia- Pacific1 for continued prosperity and growth under a rules-based regional system.
    [Show full text]
  • Cold War Scripts: Comparing Remembrance of the Malayan Emergency and the 1965 Violence in Indonesia
    Article South East Asia Research 2016, Vol. 24(2) 242–260 ª SOAS 2016 Cold War scripts: Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav Comparing remembrance DOI: 10.1177/0967828X16649310 of the Malayan Emergency sear.sagepub.com and the 1965 violence in Indonesia Katharine McGregor School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Australia Abstract This paper contributes to a growing field of literature on Cold War culture by comparing struggles over memory in Indonesia and Malaysia of anti-communist repressions. It demonstrates the enduring legacies of the Cold War in these neighbouring countries where the war overlapped directly with experiences of colonization and decolonization. I show how and why anti- communism in both countries became a core foundation of both Malaysian and Indonesian nationalism and related religious identification and how this largely explains successive govern- ments’ attempts to memorialize and defend these repressions. I argue that recent attempts by both survivors of the repression and younger Indonesians and Malaysians to reexamine the history of the political left or experiences of repression constitute important efforts to rethink the post- colonial predicaments of both countries in different ways. Keywords 1965 violence, anti-communism, Emergency, Indonesian Communist Party, Malayan Communist Party, memory In 2005, the Malaysian filmmaker Amir Muhammad released a film about Indonesia called The Year of Living Vicariously,whichexploredhowIndonesianshadbeguntoreconcilewiththe violence of the military-dominated New Order regime (1966–1998). The film was inspired by Muhammad’s work behind the scenes on the Indonesian film Gie by Riri Riza, which told the story of the ethnic Chinese student activist Soe Hok Gie who eventually spoke out against the 1965 mass Corresponding author: Katharine McGregor, School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia.
    [Show full text]