DOCSLIB.ORG

Inflation and Growth

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Inflation and Growth MAY/ J U N E 1 9 9 6 Michael Bruno is vice president and chief economist and William Easterly is a principal economist at the World Bank. We are grateful for com- ments from participants in the 20th Annual Policy Conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, in particular our discussants Kenneth D. West and Jon Faust. Correspondence may be addressed to either author at World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433; (202) 473-8965; fax:(202) 522-3518. Inflation and ingless; and the process of wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble and a lottery.”1 Growth: The emphasis on information and the fi- nancial system has returned to the litera- In Search of ture today.2 But inflation and growth rela- tionships have looked very different over a Stable time. We take snapshots of the literature in the 1960s and then in the 1980s. Relationship The View from the 1960s Michael Bruno and In the high-growth, low-inflation William Easterly 1960s, the traditional view that inflation was destructive no longer seemed so com- re inflation and growth inversely as- pelling. It was the Golden Age of the sociated, directly associated, or not Phillips Curve, in which inflation and A associated? Is the empirical inflation- growth were positively related in the short growth relationship primarily a long-run run. Even in the long run, Tobin and relationship across countries, a short- Sidrausky suggested a positive effect on run relationship across time, or both? Like growth from higher inflation. When infla- a bickering couple, inflation and growth tion was high, wealth would be reallocated just cannot seem to decide what their rela- away from money and into physical capital. tionship should be. Similarly, some development theories In this article, we characterize the lit- suggested that inflation was as good a way erature on inflation and growth. Aware of as any to mobilize resources for capital the limits of our comparative advantage, accumulation. There was little in the early we do not intend to do a general survey of experience of developing countries to con- the literature. Instead, we look at the tradict this view. Israel’s economy, for aspects of the literature that motivated us example, grew at around 10 percent per to pursue one particular angle in our own annum between 1948 and 1973, with an recent work: the behavior of growth inflation rate of around 6 percent to 7 per- before, during, and after discrete high cent per annum. Both of these figures were inflation crises. double the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) numbers for the same period. The higher, INFLATION AND GROWTH: largely anticipated inflation was a price A TOUR ACROSS THE considered well worth paying, especially as DECADES widespread indexation of wages, exchange Observers of extreme inflation have rates, and savings minimized the never had much doubt that inflation was distortionary costs of inflation. Israel was bad for the economy. Keynes, as usual, no exception—several growing economies gave the most eloquent statement, “As the in Latin America and Asia seemed to be inflation proceeds and the real value of the following the same strategy. currency fluctuates wildly from month to The early empirical studies of inflation 1 Keynes (1920), p. 220. month, all permanent relations between and economic development were as am- 2 See, for example, Ball and debtors and creditors, which form the ulti- biguous as the theory set forth in the pre- Cecchetti (1990), Tommasi mate foundation of capitalism, become so ceding paragraph. Harry G. Johnson in (1994), and De Gregorio and utterly disordered as to be almost mean- 1967 suggested that there was no conclu- Sturzenegger (1994). F E D E R A L R E S E RV E B A N K O F ST. L O U I S MAY/ J U N E 1 9 9 6 Figure 1 inflation rates greater than 20 percent, esti- mated relationships were sensitive to Inflation and Per Capita which observations were included—a Growth (1960–72*) problem that recurred in the 1980s. Per Capita Growth Rate (Percent) In sum, the view from the 1960s on inflation and growth was surprisingly ambiguous. Theory presumed that the short-run relationship was definitely posi- tive, whereas the long-run relationship could go either way. Empirical studies usu- ally found nothing. The View from the 1980s Because research on growth went into % hibernation in the 1970s, we jump next to the 1980s and new waves of research. The 1970s and 1980s had provided a Inflation Range % 0-5 5-10 10-20 20-40 40+ new set of extreme inflation experiences, Number of Observations 415 194 88 29 19 which were investigated by an interesting case study literature after the 1980s. 6 This literature’s treatment of output behavior sive evidence one way or the other. The usually focused on the short-run output International Monetary Fund (IMF) was costs of stabilization of high inflations. certainly no hotbed of inflationists, but The consensus was that stabilization of hy- studies in the IMF Staff Papers around that perinflation had little or no output costs, time could detect no relationship between whereas stabilization of mere high infla- growth and inflation.3 Latin America had tions was indeed costly. double-digit inflation rates in the 1950s Thus the presumption remained in the and 1960s, but economic growth was re- 1980s that there was a positive short-run spectable.4 Brazil was often cited as a high- relationship between growth and inflation. inflation, high-growth counterexample to This presumption in case studies of high the antiquated notion that inflation was inflation in developing countries was prob- bad for the economy. ably inspired in part by the industrial One interesting exception to this lack country literature, which continued to of findings in the literature was Wallich’s confirm that stabilization of low inflation (1969) pooled time series, cross-section was costly. Ball (1993), to take one recent (43 countries) study, using two five-year example, calculated large sacrifice ratios averages over the period 1956-65. Typical for foregone growth in inflation stabiliza- 3 Wai (1959), Dorrance (1963 of the literature of the time, he had postu- tions in OECD countries. and 1966), and Bhatia lated a positive relationship between The case study literature pointed (1960). inflation and growth. But he found instead out that high inflation was inherently a significant negative relationship. unstable. Once inflation got above a 4 Pazos (1972). We can see why the 1950s and 1960s certain range, it was prone to sudden ac- 5 The figure is from Bruno and yielded ambiguous findings when we look celerations. Increased indexation of the Easterly (1995). at the data for that period. Figure 1 shows economy weakened the nominal anchor 6 See, for example, Bruno et al. that the per capita growth rate actually that tied down the price level. Countries (1991); Dornbusch, rose as one went from single- to double- cannot tolerate such high and unstable 5 Sturzenegger, and Wolf digit inflation. Only when the annual inflations, so they pursue stabilization (1990); Kiguel and Liviatan inflation rate exceeded 20 percent did the fairly quickly after such inflations de- (1988, 1992a and b); and relationship seem to turn negative. Since velop. Hence high inflation was not so Calvo and Vegh (1994). there were not many observations with much a steady-state phenomenon as a F E D E R A L R E S E RV E B A N K O F S T. L O U I S 140 MAY/ J U N E 1 9 9 6 discrete burst of inflation followed by literature were from pooled time-series, stabilization. cross-section samples using decade In contrast, case studies pointed out averages, five-year averages, or even that there was an intermediate range of annual data. moderate inflations around 15 percent to Cross-section inflation and growth 30 percent.7 These moderate inflations can equations just did not work. Levine and be sustained for long periods without dis- Renelt (1992) and Levine and Zervos aster—Colombia is the archetypal (1993) used Leamer’s extreme bounds example. analysis to study how inflation entered into Inflation was slow in attracting atten- cross-section growth regressions. Not only tion as a key policy variable in the new was inflation not robustly significant in growth literature. Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s Levine and Renelt (1992), it was not ever 1995 survey of the empirical growth litera- significant in their many combinations of ture discusses 10 right-hand-side variables variables in growth regressions. Levine and for a basic growth regression. Inflation is Zervos (1993) found that any cross-section not among them. They then mentioned relationship that did show up depended on 14 other possible right-hand-side variables. a couple of influential points—Nicaragua Inflation was not among them either. Infla- and Uganda. In tests we ran with our data tion is not mentioned anywhere in the set, we found the significance of the cross- Barro and Sala-i-Martin text except in one section relationship to depend entirely on of the end-of-chapter problem sets. Nicaragua. Nicaragua and Uganda, both of But inflation gradually attracted atten- which had discrete bursts of extreme infla- tion from new-growth theorists. Theorists tion during civil wars, do not form much of postulated mechanisms by which inflation a basis for anti-inflation counsels to, say, might affect growth adversely. Authors the Bank of Canada. such as Jones and Manuelli (1993) and De The cross-section relationship was not Gregorio (1993) pointed out that inflation working in part because it had a number was a tax on capital in models with cash- of high- inflation, high-growth outliers off- in-advance requirements for investment.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Is the International Role of the Dollar Changing?
    Is the International Role of the Dollar Changing? Linda S. Goldberg Recently the U.S. dollar’s preeminence as an international currency has been questioned. The emergence of the euro, changes www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues ✦ in the dollar’s value, and the fi nancial market crisis have, in the view of many commentators, posed a signifi cant challenge to the currency’s long-standing position in world markets. However, a study of the dollar across critical areas of international trade January 2010 ✦ and fi nance suggests that the dollar has retained its standing in key roles. While changes in the global status of the dollar are possible, factors such as inertia in currency use, the large size and relative stability of the U.S. economy, and the dollar pricing of oil and other commodities will help perpetuate the dollar’s role as the dominant medium for international transactions. Volume 16, Number 1 Volume y many measures, the U.S. dollar is the most important currency in the world. IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE It plays a central role in international trade and fi nance as both a store of value Band a medium of exchange. Many countries have adopted an exchange rate regime that anchors the value of their home currency to that of the dollar. Dollar holdings fi gure prominently in offi cial foreign exchange (FX) reserves—the foreign currency deposits and bonds maintained by monetary authorities and governments. And in international trade, the dollar is widely used for invoicing and settling import and export transactions around the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Econ 753 Syllabus
    Economics 753: Applied Econometrics – Fall 2017 Monday/Wednesday 9:05–10:30 am & Lab Monday 10:30-11:30 Gordon Hall 303-304 Michael Ash, [email protected] 306 Crotty, Office hours: Tue 10-11:30; Wed 10:30-12 Robert Pollin, [email protected] 313 Gordon, 577-0819, Office Hours: Tue 2-4 or by appt. http://courses.umass.edu/econ753 http://courses.umass.edu/econ753/econ753.pdf COURSE SYLLABUS “There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits.”—Karl Marx The purpose of this course is to help you become comfortable and creative as empirical economic researchers. We will therefore introduce a series of econometric techniques and models by observing life in the trenches, i.e., working through how practitioners have approached econometric problems and built models as a vehicle for addressing substantive questions. We also put stress on communicating econometric results and descriptive statistics in ways that are illuminating, persuasive, and rigorous. But we will also ask the question: what does it mean to be rigorous with econometrics and with statistics in general? Indeed, early in the course, we will even address so basic a methodological question as that raised by John Maynard Keynes himself in the infancy of econometrics—whether the entire enterprise was worth pursuing. Finally, in the course of your studying and then doing real-world econometrics, we aim to get you to become comfortable, and perhaps even proficient, in least one major statistical software package and with manipulating data sets.
    [Show full text]
  • From Chronic Inflation to Hyperlnflation
    j From chronic inflation to hyperlnflation André Lara Resende Swnmary: 1. Introduction; 2. Moderllte inflation; 3. C1ronic intlation; 4. Feuibility of padua1ism; S. Hyperinflation. 1. Introductlon Phenomena that are essentially different in cause, consequence and therapy are often discussed under the generic name oí inflation. This is certain1y one oí the reasons behind the difficulty in understanding chronic inflationary processes and consequently in reaching some consensus as to the remedy. A triple classification oí the phenomena oí generalized price increases as moderate inflation, cronic inflation, and finally hyperinflation offers some help in understanding the numerous íacets of inflationary processes. 2. Moderate Inflatlon Moderate inflation is a rise in the general price levei provoked by excess oí demand, which appears most intensely in the [mal stage oí ecónomic cycles. Prices are pressured si­ multaneously by lower inventories leveis and the approach oí the limits oí installed capaci­ ty. The increase in prices is followed by higher wages in a tighter labor market. This is the phenomenon analyzed in the macroeconomics textbooks oí the 60s and 70s and synthesized in the Phillips Curve. The hegemony of Keynesian ideas on the control oí aggregate demand - as a way to avoid the deep, prolonged recessions observed in the first half of the century - introduced an inflationary bias which appeared with greater or less intensity in the industrialized coun­ tries after the 60s. Milton Friedman and the macroeconomic school oí the University oí Chi­ cago were isolated voices in criticizing the optimism with respect to the possibilities oí ag­ gregate demand management. Their theses were confrrmed by the empirical evidence oí the 60s and 70s.
    [Show full text]
  • LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR a DAILY PUBLICATION of the DIALOGUE Thursday, December 10, 2015
    LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR A DAILY PUBLICATION OF THE DIALOGUE www.thedialogue.org Thursday, December 10, 2015 BOARD OF ADVISORS FEATURED Q&A TODAY’S NEWS Diego Arria Director, Columbus Group ECONOMIC Genaro Arriagada What Challenges Nonresident Senior Fellow, Moody’s Puts Inter-American Dialogue Brazil on Review Joyce Chang Global Head of Research, Face Argentina’s for Possible Junk JPMorgan Chase & Co. Status W. Bowman Cutter Former Partner, New President? If Moody’s strips Brazil of its E.M. Warburg Pincus investment-grade credit rating, it Dirk Donath would be the second of the three Senior Partner, major ratings agencies to do so. Catterton Aimara Such a move would likely cause Marlene Fernández Corporate Vice President for investors to drain money from the Government Relations, country. Arcos Dorados Page 2 Peter Hakim President Emeritus, Inter-American Dialogue BUSINESS Donna Hrinak President, Boeing Latin America Mexico Approves Jon Huenemann Sanofi ’s Dengue Vice President, U.S. & Int’l Affairs, Philip Morris International Vaccine Mauricio Macri is only the third non-Peronist candidate to have won Argentina’s presidency James R. Jones since military rule ended in 1983. // File Photo: Facebook page of Mauricio Macri. Mexico became the fi rst country Co-chair, Manatt Jones to approve a dengue vaccine for Global Strategies LLC Mauricio Macri, who takes offi ce today as Argentina’s pres- sale, however the approval does Craig A. Kelly not allow for the vaccine to be Director, Americas International ident, has signaled big policy shifts away from those of his Gov’t Relations, Exxon Mobil given to children under nine or predecessor, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.
    [Show full text]
  • Download (Pdf)
    RELEASE DATE: On delivery: September 25, 1965 - Philadelphia October 2, 1965 - Los Angeles FORCES OF INFLATION AND DEFLATION By Karl R. Bopp, President Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Before the Eastern and Western C.L.U. Educational Forums and Conferment Exercises Sponsored by the American College of Life Underwriters and the American Society of Chartered Life Underwriters 10:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., on Saturday, September 25, 1965, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Saturday, October 2, 1965, in Los Angeles, California Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FORCES OF INFLATION AND DEFLATION By Karl R. Bopp Among the reasons that Dave Gregg asked me to discuss Forces of Inflation and Deflation with you are, first, that the balance of these forces is of enormous importance to all of us and particularly to life underwriters who deal in long-term money contracts; and, second, because there is a wide­ spread view that the economy of the United States suffers from chronic long­ term inflation. It is for this latter reason, incidentally, that I shall concentrate on inflation although the consequences of severe deflation are even more devastating. More specifically, I want to talk about what inflation is and what damage it can cause in an economy such as ours. Then I want to outline some of the causes of inflation. Finally, I should like to look at the problem of price stability in the context of our other economic goals and comment briefly on the recent behavior and outlook for prices. What, then, is inflation and what sort of damage can it cause? Before discussing what inflation is, I should like to say what it is not.
    [Show full text]
  • CID Working Paper No. 165 :: Estimating
    Estimating SARB’s Policy Reaction Rule Alberto Ortiz and Federico Sturzenegger CID Working Paper No. 165 May 2008 © Copyright 2008 Alberto Ortiz, Federico Sturzenegger and the President and Fellows of Harvard College Working Papers Center for International Development at Harvard University Estimating SARB’s Policy Reaction Rule* Alberto Ortiz and Federico Sturzenegger May 2008 Abstract: This paper uses a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to estimate the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) policy reaction rule. We find that the SARB has a stable rule very much in line with those estimated for Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand. Relative to other emerging economies the policy reaction function of the SARB appears to be much more stable with a consistent anti-inflation bias, a somewhat larger weight on output and a very low weight on the exchange rate. Keywords: monetary policy rules, exchange rates, structural estimation, Bayesian analysis JEL Codes: C32, E52, F41, O57 This paper is part of the CID South Africa Growth Initiative. This project is an initiative of the National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa within the government’s Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGI-SA), which seeks to consolidate the gains of post-transition economic stability and accelerate growth in order to create employment and improve the livelihoods of all South Africans. For more information and the entire series of papers, visit the project's web site at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/southafrica. * Originally published as: Alberto Ortiz and Federico Sturzenegger (2007), “Estimating SARB’s Policy Reaction Rule,” The South African Journal of Economics 75 (4), 659-680.
    [Show full text]
  • Deep Crises and Reform: What Have We Learned? / Michael Bruno
    DI RECTIONS I N DEVELOPM ENT Deep Crises Public Disclosure Authorized and Reformn What Have We Learned? MICHAEL BRUNO Public Disclosure Authorized N i1j'' i- W 0 1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT Deep Crises and Reform What Have We Learned? Michael Bruno The World Bank Washington, D.C. © 1996 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First printing September 1996 The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this study are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affil- iated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. Michael Bruno is senior vice president and chief economist, Development Economics. This booklet draws heavily on work done jointly with William Easterly. For useful dis- cussions and comments on an earlier draft the author is grateful to Masood Ahmed, Mark Baird, Mario Blejer, William Easterly, Carol Graham, Christine Jones, Yair Mundlak, Dani Rodrik, Deborah Wetzel, and Holger Wolf. The author is also indebted to Paulo Vieira da Cunha, who commented extensively on an earlier draft and helped with the editing of the final draft. Giuseppe larossi provided valuable research assis- tance. The booklet was edited by Paul Holtz and Bruce Ross-Larson and laid out by Christian Perez, all with American Writing Corporation. A slightly different version of the paper on which this booklet is based will be published in Daniel Cohen, ed., Trade, Payments, and Debt, Macmillan, forthcoming.
    [Show full text]
  • Credibility Dynamics and Inflation Expectations∗
    Credibility Dynamics and Inflation Expectations∗ Rumen Kostadinov† Francisco Roldán‡ April 2021 Abstract We study the optimal design of a disinflation plan by a planner who lacks commitment and has imperfect control over inflation. The government’s reputation for being committed to the plan evolves as the public compares realized inflation to the announced targets. Repu- tation is valuable as it helps curb inflation expectations. At the same time, plans that are more tempting to break lead to larger expected reputational losses in the ensuing equilib- rium. Taking these dynamics into consideration, the government announces a plan which balances promises of low inflation with dynamic incentives that make them credible. Wefind that, despite the absence of inflation inertia in the private economy, a gradual disinflation is preferred even in the zero-reputation limit. JEL Classification E52, C73 Keywords Imperfect credibility, reputation, optimal monetary policy, time inconsistency ∗The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its ExecutiveBoard, or its management. For insightful comments we thank Alberto Bisin, Marcos Chamon, Daniel Heymann, Boyan Jovanovic, Ricardo Lagos, Pablo Ottonello, David Pearce, Francisco Roch, Tom Sargent, Andrés Schneider, Ennio Stacchetti, Federico Sturzenegger, Martín Uribe, as well as seminar participants at NYU, UTDT, UdeSA, IIEP, andthe IMF. †Department of Economics, McMaster University; e-mail: [email protected] ‡Research Department, International Monetary Fund; e-mail: [email protected] 1 IntRoduction Macroeconomic models give expectations about future policy a large role in the determination of current outcomes. Policy is then generally set under one of two assumptions: commitment to future actions or discretion.
    [Show full text]
  • Social Cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE SOCIAL COST OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES Dani Rodrik Working Paper 11952 http://www.nber.org/papers/w11952 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 January 2006 The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. ©2006 by Dani Rodrik. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. The Social Cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves Dani Rodrik NBER Working Paper No. 11952 January 2006 JEL No. F3 ABSTRACT There has been a very rapid rise since the early 1990s in foreign reserves held by developing countries. These reserves have climbed to almost 30 percent of developing countries' GDP and 8 months of imports. Assuming reasonable spreads between the yield on reserve assets and the cost of foreign borrowing, the income loss to these countries amounts to close to 1 percent of GDP. Conditional on existing levels of short-term foreign borrowing, this does not represent too steep a price as an insurance premium against financial crises. But why developing countries have not tried harder to reduce short-term foreign liabilities in order to achieve the same level of liquidity (thereby paying a smaller cost in terms of reserve accumulation) remains an important puzzle. Dani Rodrik John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 and NBER [email protected] 1 THE SOCIAL COST OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES Dani Rodrik Harvard University January 2006 I.
    [Show full text]
  • Exploring the Mechanics of Chronic Inflation and Hyperinflation
    SPRINGER BRIEFS IN ECONOMICS Fernando de Holanda Barbosa Exploring the Mechanics of Chronic In ation and Hyperin ation 123 SpringerBriefs in Economics More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8876 Fernando de Holanda Barbosa Exploring the Mechanics of Chronic Inflation and Hyperinflation 123 Fernando de Holanda Barbosa Professor of Economics Getulio Vargas Foundation Graduate School of Economics (EPGE/FGV) Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro Brazil ISSN 2191-5504 ISSN 2191-5512 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Economics ISBN 978-3-319-44511-3 ISBN 978-3-319-44512-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-44512-0 Library of Congress Control Number: 2016951721 © The Author(s) 2017 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
    [Show full text]
  • William W. Hogan
    March 2021 WILLIAM W. HOGAN PERSONAL DATA Born: 1944, Holyoke, Massachusetts Address: Harvard Kennedy School Harvard University 79 John F. Kennedy Street Cambridge, MA 02138 [email protected] http://www.whogan.com EDUCATION BS United States Air Force Academy, 1966 MBA University of California, Los Angeles, 1967 PhD University of California, Los Angeles, 1971 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 2019 - Raymond Plank Research Professor of Global Energy Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2006 - 2019 Raymond Plank Professor of Global Energy Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2011- FTI Consulting, Boston, Massachusetts 1999 - 2011 Director, LECG, LLC, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1998 - 2006 Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Public Policy and Administration, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1989 - 1999 Senior Advisor, Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts 1987 - 1998 Thornton Bradshaw Professor of Public Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1982 - 1990 Chairman, Public Policy Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1980 - 1997 Director, Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts 1978 - 1987 Professor of Political Economy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1978 - 1986 Director, Energy and Environmental Policy Center,
    [Show full text]
  • Jeffrey D. Sachs CV
    CURRICULUM VITAE JEFFREY D. SACHS Center for Sustainable Development, Columbia University 475 Riverside Drive Interchurch Suite 1040 New York, NY 10115 Email: [email protected] Telephone: 212-870-2762 DATE OF BIRTH November 5, 1954 MARITAL STATUS Married to Dr. Sonia Ehrlich Sachs, Pediatrician and Public Health Practitioner EDUCATION Ph.D., June 1980 Harvard Department of Economics, Cambridge, MA. Dissertation: "Factor Costs and Aggregate Supply in the Open Economy" Thesis Advisor, Martin Feldstein Junior Fellow, 1978-1980 Harvard Society of Fellows, Cambridge, MA. M.A., Economics, June 1978 Harvard Department of Economics, Cambridge, MA. B.A., Economics, June 1976 Harvard College, Cambridge, MA., summa cum laude CURRENT POSITIONS University Professor, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. Director, Center for Sustainable Development, Earth Institute, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. President, UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, New York, N.Y. SDG Advocate under Secretary General António Guterres, United Nations Distinguished Fellow, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 1 Co-Founder and Director, Millennium Promise Alliance Founder and Co-Chair, SDSN USA Founder, 1 Million CHWs Campaign Director, Millennium Villages Project Economic Advisor to governments in Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA Member, Brookings Panel of Economists, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC Co-Chair, Asian Economic Panel of Economists Editorial Board Member, Journal of Government and Economics PREVIOUS POSITIONS Director, UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2012-2019 Chair, SDSN USA Special Advisor to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, 2016-2018 Director, The Earth Institute at Columbia University, 2002-2016 Quetelet Professor of Sustainable Development, Columbia University, 2002-2016 Special Advisor to U.N.
    [Show full text]