ICG Central Asia Report

PAKISTAN: TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY? 3 October 2002 ICG Asia Report N°40 Islamabad/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN .......................................... 3 A. POLITICAL ROADMAP............................................................................................................3 B. BACKGROUND.......................................................................................................................5 1. Enter the Military.......................................................................................................5 2. Military Rule with a Vengeance ................................................................................6 3. Indirect Rule ..............................................................................................................8 C. THE FAILED DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION ..............................................................................10 1. Civilian Folly...........................................................................................................10 2. Consequences of Peace and War .............................................................................10 3. The Coup d’État.......................................................................................................11 III. RETURN OF THE MAN ON HORSEBACK ......................................................... 12 A. REGIME SURVIVAL..............................................................................................................12 1. Legal Sanction .........................................................................................................13 2. Restraining the Judiciary .........................................................................................13 B. CONSOLIDATING POWER .....................................................................................................14 1. Accountability..........................................................................................................14 2. Divide and Rule .......................................................................................................15 3. Devolving Power .....................................................................................................16 IV. EXTERNAL IMPERATIVES, MILITARY RULE, AND DEMOCRACY........ 17 A. ALLIANCES, EXPEDIENCY, AND DEMOCRACY...................................................................17 B. MUSHARRAF AND THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM ..............................................................18 C. REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS ................................................................................................19 V. MILITARY MANOUEVERS...................................................................................... 20 A. PREPARING THE GROUND....................................................................................................20 B. CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING .......................................................................................21 1. President versus Prime Minister ..............................................................................21 2. President Versus the Legislature..............................................................................22 3. Restricting Federalism.............................................................................................22 4. National Security Council and Military Supremacy................................................23 5. Judicial Independence..............................................................................................23 C. RULE BY EXECUTIVE FIAT..................................................................................................24 1. Confronting Adversaries..........................................................................................24 2. Empowering Allies ..................................................................................................25 VI. STATE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES ................................................................... 27 A. THE ACTORS.......................................................................................................................27 1. Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) ...............................................................28 3. Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)...........................................................................29 4. Muttahida Qaumi Movement...................................................................................30 B. POLITICAL PARTIES, POLLS, AND DEMOCRACY ...................................................................30 VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 32 APPENDICES A. MAP OF PAKISTAN..............................................................................................................35 B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................36 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................37 D. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS .................................................................................38 E. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................43 ICG Asia Report N°40 3 October 2002 PAKISTAN: TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS As the national elections in Pakistan draw near, from standing in this month’s parliamentary election. President, Chief Executive, and Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf has vowed to Pre-election rigging cannot be ruled out since the restore democracy and transfer power to an elected same Election Commission that oversaw Musharraf’s government. Musharraf’s roadmap to democracy flawed referendum is overseeing the electoral process. is in reality a blueprint for more military rule. If Political leaders doubt that the elections on 10 October his political and constitutional reforms become the 2002 will be free and fair. The military government law of the land, any democratic transition will can, however, be reasonably confident that the falter before it has started. The military judiciary will endorse them and the constitutional government’s constitutional and political reforms reforms. When it validated the October 1999 coup, the will radically transform Pakistan’s parliamentary Supreme Court also gave Pakistan’s military ruler the system, tilting the balance of power from elected mandate to amend the constitution, but only within the representatives and democratic institutions to framework of federal, parliamentary democracy. unelected leaders and organisations. Subsequent forced resignations, selective appointments, and inducements have, however, Negating the principal of parliamentary subordinated the judiciary to the executive. sovereignty, a powerful head of state will have the power to dissolve the National Assembly. Almost all major Pakistani political parties, civic Appointed by the President, provincial governors groups, and media have rejected Musharraf's will have the authority to dismiss provincial constitutional and political reforms as an legislatures. The President will appoint military undemocratic means for perpetuating military rule. chiefs, and the armed forces’ political role will be These parties have vowed to reject the constitutional sanctified through a National Security Council amendments in parliament. Hoping to control a future (NSC). Chaired by the president, this military- parliament through divide-and-rule strategies, dominated, supra-parliamentary body will oversee however, the military is using pressure and the conduct of elected governments and the persuasion on the politicians. functioning of representative institutions. In the past, the political elite has succumbed to the Having indefinitely extended his tenure as Army military’s tactics, tempted by the spoils of power. Chief, President Musharraf has also given himself From 1988 to 1999, Pakistan’s democratic transition a five-year extension of his presidential term. first faltered, then stalled when elected governments Assuming the right to dismiss parliament, failed to deliver, their credibility undermined by Musharraf has warned future parliamentarians of maladministration, corruption, and political vendettas. the choice before them – to either accept his The political elite failed to work collectively in constitutional engineering or lose their jobs. parliament to strengthen democratic institutions and Leaving little to chance, the military government norms. Instead, elected governments and their has also revised electoral procedures to neutralise political opponents joined hands with military leaders civilian threats. Newly devised rules and to gain or retain power. As the democratic transition regulations have disqualified scores of politicians stalled, the military was given the opportunity and the pretext to disrupt the process. Pakistan: Transition to Democracy? ICG Asia Report N°40, 3 October 2002 Page ii Should civilian leaders once again succumb to the federal, parliamentary and democratic military’s pressures and incentives, Musharraf and structure in order to forestall

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