Privatization of Open Public Spaces in Lima, Peru

Dispossessing the Public: Privatization of Open Public Spaces in Lima, Peru

By Daniela Chong Lugon

Bachelor of Architecture, Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP) (2012)

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master in City Planning at the MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

September 2020

The author hereby grants to MIT the permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of the thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now known or hereafter created.

Author______Department of Urban Studies and Planning June 22, 2020

Certified by ______Lawrence J. Vale Associate Dean, School of Architecture and Planning Ford Professor of Urban Design and Planning Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by______Ceasar McDowell Professor of the Practice Chair, MCP Committee Department of Urban Studies and Planning

Dispossessing the Public: Privatization of Open Public Spaces in Lima, Peru

By Daniela Chong Lugon

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on June 22, 2020, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in City Planning.

Abstract

The Metropolitan Area of Lima has on average 3.6m2 of green area per person, for a total of 10 million inhabitants. Although this is not the most accurate metric, it is the most available proxy to measure and understand the magnitude of open public space in the city. In addition, it is not equitably distributed: districts with higher socioeconomic levels and larger municipal budgets have greater area and higher quality public spaces. In a context of inequitable distribution on quantity and quality, one of the biggest threats that public spaces face is their privatization, a process in which a space is dispossessed from the public and transformed for a private or restricted use. From sidewalks, streets, parks, and plazas, to natural spaces such as beaches and the coastal lomas natural ecosystems, in recent years, these unprotected areas have become shopping centers, supermarkets, parking lots, private clubs, formal and informal housing, amusement parks, synthetic grass courts, and other infrastructure that has altered at some degree its openness, ownership, accessibility, and function. This shift from public to private spaces ultimately reduces the opportunity of all citizens to have available open public spaces, increases social fragmentation, and ultimately deepens issues of social injustice and spatial inequalities.

In such a scenario, this thesis examines the conditions under which open public spaces are privatized and identifies the mechanisms. Through different case studies and interviews, I create three types that attempt to explain the different forms in which privatization develops to expose the motivations behind it, the processes of how it happens, the actors who are involved, and the manifestations it has in the built environment. The first type is Concession for Development, and takes place when public space is rented to private entities in the form of concessions with the excuse of bringing development and improvement. The second is Appropriation for Livelihood, and occurs when public space is informally appropriated to fulfill a basic need such as housing or a productive activity. The third is Enclosure for Control, and results when public space is enclosed and its access is restricted in order to provide safety or facilitate its management. I analyze and expose the structural governance conditions and flaws in current planning processes — formal and informal, top-down and bottom-up — that lead to privatization in order to help create awareness about how and why this invisible phenomenon takes place and who is most affected by it. Finally, this thesis proposes recommendations that can help Lima and other Peruvian cities promote the protection and preservation of public spaces and also encourage a more equitable distribution.

Thesis Advisor: Lawrence Vale, Associate Dean, School of Architecture and Planning & Ford Professor of Urban Design and Planning, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT

Reader: Sharif Kahatt, Professor at Department of Architecture and Urbanism, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (PUCP)

Acknowledgements

These past two years at DUSP have been an amazing journey. The courses, projects, and the process of writing a thesis were challenging, yet incredibly rewarding. I want to thank the people who supported and guided me throughout this process.

To Larry, my advisor, I feel honored to have had the opportunity to work with you. Your thorough revisions, feedback, and comments helped me to constantly improve my research and work. Thank you for your continuous support, guidance, and encouragement, you have helped me grow as a person and as a professional. To Sharif, thank you for being my ground wire to Lima and for providing me enriching advice filled with wisdom that only grows from experience and local insights.

To all the DUSP community, thank you for all the moments and memories shared and for the most interesting discussions I have ever been part of, they have fed my soul and brain. To the DUSP latines, older and younger generations, you have all been very special in my journey through MIT. To my peers Nati, Vane, Diego, and Dani, I would not have been able to do this without you! Thank you to the Casa Latina crew, former, and current: Mechi, Jess, Mori, Fio, and Luismi, you gave me the best home and companionship along these past two years.

To my family, thank you for their constant support and cheers although the distance and for always believing in me. Last but not least, I want to thank Humberto, for the edits and uncovering my typos, for your support 24/7, and for your constant encouragement to be better. I couldn’t have done this without you.

Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 8 1.1 Research Question...... 10 1.2 Methodology ...... 11 Case Studies Selection ...... 12 Semi-structured interviews and site visits ...... 12 Limitations ...... 15 Literature Review ...... 16 2.1 Public Spaces Theories ...... 16 Definitions of Public Space ...... 16 The Role of Public Space ...... 17 2.2 Privatization Theories ...... 17 Definition of Privatization ...... 17 Other Forms of Privatization ...... 19 Privatization of Public Spaces in Lima, Peru...... 20 2.3 Metropolitan Governance Theories ...... 21 Governance Structures and Models ...... 21 The Challenges of Effective Metropolitan Governance ...... 22 Context...... 24 3.1 Lima’s Governance Structure and Challenges ...... 24 3.2 Lima’s Urban Transformation and the Role of Public Spaces ...... 26 3.3 Lima’s Public Spaces and their Governance ...... 27 Types of Privatization and Case Studies ...... 30 4.1 Building a Typology of Privatization ...... 30 Criteria to Classify Types ...... 30 4.2 Privatization Types ...... 31 Type 1: Concession for Development ...... 33 Type 2: Appropriation for Livelihood ...... 39 Type 3: Enclosure for Control...... 45 Findings: Who, Why, How? ...... 53 5.1 Who privatizes open public spaces? ...... 53

5.2 Why are open public spaces privatized? ...... 53 Indifferent State of Authority and Lack of Control ...... 54 Promotion of Private Developments and the Neglect Towards Open Public Spaces ...... 56 Privatization for Economic Extraction...... 57 5.3 How is Privatization Stopped? ...... 59 Stopping Privatization and its Challenges ...... 59 Case Study of Bottom-up Stoppage: Manhattan Park and CADNEP ...... 61 An Attempt at Top-down Stoppage: Bill in Defense of Public Spaces ...... 64 Conclusions ...... 66 6.1 Privatization as One Phenomenon: The Effects and Consequences at the City Scale ...... 66 6.2 The Different Scales of Impact of Privatization ...... 67 6.3 Recommendations ...... 69 Legal Framework at a National Policy Level ...... 69 A New Governance Institution: Lima’s Public Space Authority ...... 69 Appendix 1 List of Interviews ...... 74 Bibliography ...... 75

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1 Green Area and Average Monthly Income Per District ...... 9 Figure 2 Green Area and District Budget per District ...... 9 Figure 3 Map of Green Area per Inhabitant per District and Case Studies Location ...... 13 Figure 4 Map of Average Monthly Income per Capita per Household per District and Case Studies Location ...... 14 Figure 5 Primavera Park before and after privatization ...... 34 Figure 6 Primavera Park and its Surroundings ...... 35 Figure 7 Neglected Area Next to the Football Court ...... 36 Figure 8 Maps and Photos of Castilla Park ...... 37 Figure 9 Ticket Booths Inside the Park ...... 38 Figure 10 Lomas de Amancaes ...... 41 Figure 11 Invasions on Lomas de Amancaes ...... 42 Figure 12 Gamarra ...... 45 Figure 13 Location of Gates in Zone 42, Santa Catalina ...... 47 Figure 14 Entrance Gate in Santa Catalina ...... 48 Figure 15 Sinchi Roca Zonal Club ...... 50 Figure 16 Enclosed entrances in Sinchi Roca Park ...... 51 Figure 17 Reasons why open public spaces are privatized ...... 54 Figure 18 Google Street View in Av. El Retablo, Comas ...... 56 Figure 19 Maps and photos of Manhattan Park ...... 62 Figure 20 Advertisement of the new project, by the Municipality of Comas ...... 63 Figure 21 Privatization, its consequences, and side effects ...... 67

Table 1 Case studies selection ...... 12 Table 2 Privatization types summary table ...... 32 Table 3 Case studies summary table ...... 52

List of Abbreviations

ACR: Regional Conservation Area

ANP: Protected Natural Areas

CADNEP: Citizens Activating and Defending Our Public Spaces

INEI: National Institute of Statistics and Informatics

LOM: Organic Law of Municipalities

LPSA: Lima’s Public Space Authority

MML: Metropolitan Municipality of Lima

PAFLA: Environmental Protectors of the Flower and Lomas de Amancaes

PLAM: Metropolitan Plan of Urban Development

RADTUS: Territorial Conditioning and Sustainable Urban Development Regulations

RENAMU: National Registry of Municipalities

SERFOR: National Forest and Wildlife Service

Serpar: Lima’s Park Services

SINIA: National System of Environmental Information

Chapter 1

Introduction

Lima, the capital of Peru, has experienced an explosive growth that started in the 1940’s and was initially driven by internal migration. The following and continuous population expansion has led the city to develop and extend in a disorganized and unplanned way since then, occupying whatever land was available. Today, it contains almost 10 million people, one third of the total country’s population. Among other components of city planning, public space has been the one that has been deemphasized the most during this growth process. Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly one of the most important elements of cities, as it provides a collective space for encounter and gathering, supports and strengthens citizenship, and fosters diversity (Amin, 2008; Jacobs, 1961; Mitchell, 1995; Varna & Tiesdell, 2010; Young, 2011). In Lima, such as in other developing cities in the world, competing priorities such as boosting economic growth or providing basic services to vulnerable populations have overridden the creation and planning of public spaces.

Reports from 2019 show that 30.7% of the population in Lima is unsatisfied with the public spaces in the city (Lima Como Vamos, 2019a). Regarding parks and green areas, the percentage escalates to 50.9%, with an increasing trend during two consecutive years (37.8% in 2017 and 45.4% in 2018) (Lima Como Vamos, 2019b), showing that the perception of public space in the city is not improving. Moreover, there is a lack of comprehensive metrics that quantify public spaces in the city, which is due to two main reasons. First, because there is not a clear definition of the concept and how to measure it, and so it can be interpreted in different ways. Second, because data collection is a challenge, not only because of a lack of technical capacities, but also due to a fragmented governance of public spaces. There is not one designated institution that is responsible of managing and measuring public spaces. It is done at multiple levels and by different institutions, from the country, to the city, to the district scale, and there is not a unified and regulated process. Because of these reasons, the default metric used for public spaces in Lima and the rest of the country is green area per inhabitant, which only covers part of it.

According to the last reported metric from 2017, the city of Lima has 3.36 m2 of green area per inhabitant (Lima Como Vamos, 2019b). However, this number changes drastically when measuring it at a district level. The results show that there is a large difference between the district with the highest area of green space — San Isidro, with 22.09m2 per inhabitant — and the one with the lowest area — Pucusana, with 0.11m2 per inhabitant (SINIA, 2018). Furthermore, when looking at satisfaction of public spaces in people’s neighborhood, results differ according to socioeconomic sectors. 33.1% of the highest socioeconomic sectors (A/B) are satisfied, while in the lower socioeconomic sectors (D/E) this number decreases to 19.2% (Lima Como Vamos, 2019a). Although this can be due to different reasons, there seems to be a direct relationship with the quantity of green areas and both the income levels and concentration of public investment in each District Municipality (See Figure 1 Green Area and Average Monthly Income Per District and Figure 2 Green Area and District Budget per District)

Figure 1 Green Area and Average Monthly Income Per District1

Elaborated by author. Sources: SINIA (National System of Environmental Information, Ministry of the Environment), 2018 and INEI (National Institute of Statistics and Informatics), 2016.

Figure 2 Green Area and District Budget per District

1 Note: The district of Santa Maria has not been included in Figure 1 and 2, as it is an outlier. Although it does not have a high number of total green area, it is a beach summertime destination located in the south of the city which has a permanent population of only 1675 people. Its low population causes that in the normalization of the indicator, the district has a disproportionately highest number of green areas per inhabitant.

Elaborated by author. Sources: SINIA, 2018 and Evaluation Management Report of Lima and Callao, Lima Como Vamos, 2017.

It is well known that open public spaces are not limited to green areas. At the same time, Lima is located in a desert and there are other types of spaces, such as paved ones, that provide many benefits to the population but do not include vegetation. Regarding its definition, there are four components that will be used in this thesis to define open public spaces: openness, ownership, accessibility, and function. These are spaces that are mostly open and have none or few building interventions, they are owned by the government, they are accessible without any restriction (physical, visual, economic, social, etc.), and are destined for a collective use, one that provides a space for citizens’ encounters and which fosters diversity and inclusion.

Open public spaces can be categorized in many ways: according to their physical form, location, scale (size and importance), function, degree of intervention (designed or potential), type of ground coverage, among others (Ludeña Urquizo, 2013). Even though there is not an official definition nor indicator that measures how much area of public spaces there are in the city, the closest proxy of green area per inhabitant and the perception surveys shed a light on the current condition and situation. There is no doubt that Lima has a deficit in open public spaces and that those that exist could be improved. The spatial distribution of these spaces raises the discussion around how public spaces are planned, created and maintained. Districts and areas with fewer resources have also lower access to public spaces, both in terms of quantity and quality. Certainly, there is an issue of spatial injustice at a city scale: as social and spatial dimensions of human life are deeply interrelated, the search and struggle for social justice is transferred over the territory, thus distributional inequalities create unjust geographies (Soja, 2010).

Moreover, in recent years, there have been commented cases about neighborhood groups that have protested against their district municipalities which, together with a private entity, were trying to convert their community public space into some other use that restricted their public access. Some of these escalated to the local media and have generated a conversation and discussion about the privatization of public spaces in our city. In recent years, multiple types — such as parks, plazas, boulevards, sports courts, streets, sidewalks, gardens, river banks, beaches, the coastal lomas, and the Costa Verde cliff — have become shopping centers, supermarkets, parking lots, private clubs, housing, amusement parks, synthetic grass courts, temporary markets or other uses. There is increasing attention about how privatization has been so far an almost invisible phenomenon at a city scale, and discussions have uncovered how, when there were no citizen collectives to defend public spaces, these have been ultimately privatized.

1.1 Research Question

I believe the phenomenon of privatization goes beyond a private entity taking over a park. Open public space gets privatized in the city in different ways. I define the term as the process where a space is taken away or dispossessed from the public to transform it into one that is destined for more private or restricted use. Privatization alters the definition of public space by transforming its openness if it is built on top of, its ownership if it is conceded to another private actor (even temporarily), its accessibility if it restricts the ability of people to enter, and its function if it alters in any way its condition of being a space that fosters inclusion, diversity, and interaction between all citizens. This means that on top of an inequitable distribution on the quantity and quality, plus a deficit in the total public space available in the city, some of those spaces are being privatized in different ways. At a city and neighborhood scale, this ultimately reduces the opportunity of citizens to access public spaces, and deepens the issue of social and spatial injustice even more.

In this context, the key question guiding this thesis is: under which conditions and in what ways are open public spaces privatized? My research interest lies in exploring what are the different ways that privatization happens in the city of Lima. I want to understand the motivations behind this, as well as the mechanisms of how this happens and its manifestations in the built environment. This research provides a

contribution to the discussion of planning and the defense of public spaces. First, by providing a framework to understand the privatization phenomenon, and uncovering how it happens through different ways. Although some opinion articles have addressed this topic and uncovered dispersed privatization cases, there are few academic and more thorough studies on it. Current literature alludes to some of the forms independently but there is no framework that encompasses and explains them as part of the same phenomenon.

The second contribution is that this thesis will help expose possible flaws in current planning and governance processes, both formal and informal, as well as create general awareness about how privatization takes place. So far, as this phenomenon has taken place dispersedly, it has been almost invisible. People who know about it are normally the ones that have experienced and suffered it, but it has not been widely discussed or exposed at the city scale. Understanding the conditions under which privatization happens in different ways can help identify spaces that could be under a possible threat of this phenomenon. At the same time, studying how in some cases the process was interrupted or reversed can inform what are the strategies to help prevent it.

Finally, I want to contrast the different types of privatization and evaluate how each can be more or less detrimental to public life, and expose who are the most affected by this process. Studying this phenomenon at a city-scale can also shed light on how it benefits the most powerful actors and sectors. My hypothesis is that in the end, this issue is related to the governance of public spaces: who has control and power, who is allowed to do what in the public sphere, and who is included in the decision-making processes. Definitely, what lies under the privatization of open public spaces is a lack of understanding of their importance in our city, as well as a lack of a comprehensive vision and public policy around what their role should be. In Lima and the rest of Peruvian cities, open public spaces should be planned, created and maintained to provide more safe spaces of interactions, encounters, and leisure, where active citizenship is encouraged, and where diversity is fostered.

1.2 Methodology

This thesis uses an inductive research methodology and qualitative methods to investigate the processes and ways that privatization takes place in the city of Lima. The research was carried out in two parts. The first aimed to explore and identify different cases of privatization in order to inform and formulate a typological framework of privatization. This exploratory research was done during July and August 2019, by identifying relevant literature, through semi-structured interviews to diverse stakeholders, and from reviewing documents such as academic papers, reports, media articles, and TV coverage. I then established different criteria that would help answer my research question, and identified three types that categorized privatization according to the rationale and process followed.

The second part was done through a case study analysis and aimed to understand the phenomenon more comprehensively. To do this, I selected a case study that embodies and illustrates each type. Through documents and media review, in-depth and semi-structured interviews, observations and photographic documentation, I collected qualitative information from each one. Interviews were made to diverse stakeholders, such as government institutions, residents, academics, and experts involved in the study of public spaces (Appendix 1). Through this research I collected diverse experiences and points of views, which have been synthetized in key findings and learnings that expose the motivations and processes of how privatization takes place, who are the actors involved, why it happens, and what impact and consequences it has.

Case Studies Selection

Three types of privatization of public spaces, with two variations each, were established in the typological framework. One case study was selected for each of the variations, which added up to six case studies. The selection process was based on five main criteria. As the research is applied to the city scale, the first criterion was to select case studies that were located geographically in different districts of the city. The second was to select districts that represent different income levels, municipal budgets, and quantity of green areas, in order to include a variety of socioeconomic factors in the analysis. The third criterion was to select cases of privatization that have taken place around a similar time frame. The fourth objective was to choose examples that were the most representative of the constructed typologies and which presented interesting elements to illustrate them. Finally, the fifth criterion was mainly logistical matters. Although many stakeholders involved in multiple case studies were contacted for this thesis, I finally selected the ones where I was able to get a response from and where I could establish a connection with the most stakeholders involved.

The six case studies are located in four different districts of Lima. A summary indicating each one and its corresponding typology and description is shown in Table 1. In addition, Figure 3 (Map of Green Area per Inhabitant per District) and Figure 4 (Map of Average Monthly Income per Capita per Household per District) show the specific geographic location of each of the case studies in the context of whole city.

Table 1 Case studies selection

Typology Description Variation of Case Study Location Time Frame Typology

1a. Transformation for Public space is rented to Primavera Park Comas 2017 – Today 1. private entities in the form Redevelopment of concessions with the Concession for excuse of bringing 1b. Partial Transfer for Development Castilla Park Lince 2016 – Today development and Commercial Uses improvement. 2a. Invasion for Lomas de Rímac 2013 – Today 2. Public space is informally Housing Amancaes appropriated to fulfill a Appropriation basic need such as housing 2b. Occupation for for Livelihood Gamarra La Victoria ~2015 – 2019 or a productive activity. Productive Activity

Public space is enclosed Zone 42, Santa 3. 3a. Fences for security La Victoria 1995 – Today and its access is restricted Catalina Enclosure for in order to provide safety 3b. Entry fee for Control or facilitate its Sinchi Roca Park Comas ~2000 – Today management. maintenance

Semi-structured interviews and site visits

A total of 17 semi-structured and in-depth interviews (with a duration of between one and two hours), and several short intercept interviews were conducted between December 2019 and January 2020 (Appendix 1). The objective was to learn from different perspectives and experiences from the various stakeholders involved in the case studies: from government authorities to evaluate the management perspective, to the residents who were supporting or affected by the privatization process. Additionally, semi-structured interviews were conducted to four planning experts involved in the study or promotion of public spaces.

The interviews conducted to government officials were intended to gather information about the specific cases of privatization, as well as their planning practices, processes and challenges. Residents’ interviews

aimed to learn about their experience in each case, mostly in their fight against privatization, and their current challenges and initiatives. Each of the privatized public space was visited in order to make on the ground observations, document the sites through photographs, and conduct short interviews to visitors and local managers to collect their different perspectives.

The interviews aimed to learn about each of the six case studies, but additional interviews were made regarding one other privatization case, in order to complement and help inform the research. This was Parque Manhattan in Comas, a case where the privatization process was stopped. It was included in the interviews to learn from the process and motivations behind, and also to understand the mechanisms that were implemented to prevent privatization. It was also the only case where I was able to conduct an interview with the private stakeholder involved in the process.

Figure 3 Map of Green Area per Inhabitant per District and Case Studies Location

Map elaborated by author. Source: SINIA (National System of Environmental Information, Ministry of the Environment), 2018.

Figure 4 Map of Average Monthly Income per Capita per Household per District and Case Studies Location

Map elaborated by author. Source: INEI (National Institute of Statistics and Informatics), 2016.

Limitations

The methodology described here aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the phenomenon of privatization in Lima. Nonetheless, this research presents some limitations. The selected case studies, located in four districts, do not cover the whole city’s geographic territory. This thesis tries to comprise governance and planning approaches that can be generalized to Lima, but not all the district municipalities have been included in the research. Moreover, most of the residents who were interviewed were opposed to the privatization of public spaces. Thus, the first-hand experience included in this thesis has been collected from people opposing privatization and authorities. It was very difficult and unsafe to contact directly and interview residents or other actors who were privatizing the public space, as some of the cases were connected to criminal activity. This is the reason why these stakeholders’ perspectives have been gathered from secondary sources of information such as reports, testimonies, news coverage and other investigations.

Furthermore, this thesis does not include any quantitative approach that exposes how large the issue of privatization is, and how much area has been privatized according to the different forms of privatization. It is difficult to determine if this phenomenon is substantially decreasing the amount of open public spaces at a city scale, and also evaluate how it has changed throughout time. The challenge, as explained before, is a data gathering issue but also a definition problem. This thesis provides a definition for public spaces and for privatization, in addition to identifying different typologies. Future work could focus on how to quantify the total amount of open public spaces in the city and operationalize privatization, in order to evaluate it in a quantitative way. Finally, I acknowledge that processes to recuperate open public spaces are also taking place in the city. This research does not focus on them, unless they are connected to the selected case studies, as the goal is to uncover privatization processes to inform how they can be stopped and prevented. Future work could also concentrate on evaluating if there are more privatization or recuperation processes occurring in Lima.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Public Spaces Theories

Definitions of Public Space

Public space is a complex concept, that can include many dimensions and can be defined in different ways. It is a concept that but encapsulates a variety of ideal qualities that provides a lens of analysis to examine the intersection and interaction between urban life and concrete open spaces. One way of defining it is by taking the legal ownership of the space. Under this lens, public space exists when the land property belongs to a public institution and thus is regulated and controlled by it (Borja, 2001). The definition can also be tied to the concepts of inclusivity and access. Akkar (2005) mentions that the level of inclusivity of a space can be defined by four qualities of access. These can happen at different levels, creating a continuum between an inclusive public space and its opposite, an exclusive private space. The first quality is physical access. The second is social or symbolic access, which considers if the activities and discussions that take place are accessible to all. This also evaluates if there are any elements — physical, social or regulatory — that suggest if someone is welcome or not to the space. The third is access to information, and examines if information about the space, such as its development, is available to all. The forth is access to resources, which refers to the ability of citizens to have a public arena where they can express their claims. Access is tied to the space’s ownership but is also established by its management. Thus, publicness and inclusivity can be constantly formulated and reformulated according to who sets the rules and how the space is controlled (Németh, 2009).

Other scholars define public spaces by considering the functionality or use of the space, and by the way the physical space is occupied (Grant & Curran, 2007; Purcell, 2002). A public space exists where social and political activities take place, it is defined by the ‘lived’ sense and not just by the legal aspect or ownership (Low & Smith, 2006; Marcuse, 2005; Worpole & Knox, 2007). In addition to accessibility and property, Kohn (2004) adds the component of intersubjectivity, which refers to how a public space fosters communication and interaction. Another variation considers how representative of the collective, rather than the individual or private, a space is, and if it is socially inclusive and neutral (Tiesdell & Oc, 1998). Moreover, Ludeña (2013) considers that public spaces are those that have an unrestricted, free, public use, which can be individual or collective. In addition, the use can be existing or potential, which means that a space that has not yet been designed or intervened, but that is open and government-owned, can be considered as a public space.

Furthermore, some scholars have gone beyond the definition and have created a set of indicators to try to measure publicness and compare different sites, including dimensions of control, functionality, and physical characteristics. Akkar and Oya (2015) elaborate a model to assess publicness considering four dimensions: design, management, control, and use of the space. Moreover, Németh and Schmidt (2007) develop an index to quantify social and behavioral control in publicly accessible urban spaces. They measured 20 different variables - half which indicated control and a half which indicated open use of the space - classified into four categories: laws and rules, surveillance and policing, design and image, and access and territoriality. Similarly, Varna and Tiesdell (2010) present a model that measures five dimensions of the

public space: ownership, which refers to the legal status of the space; control, which alludes to explicit control presence and policing; civility, which refers to how the public place is managed and maintained; physical configuration, which determines if the public can easily reach and enter the place; and animation, which measures how much the design of the space is aligned or responds to human needs in a public space.

The Role of Public Space

Public spaces play a central role in cities and democratic societies as they are neutral spaces that host encounters between all citizens. They are places for civic inculcation and political participation and where people with diverse points of view can coexist (Amin, 2008; Mitchell, 1995; Young, 2011). Jacobs (1961) highlights their social purpose and their centrality to the life of cities, and mentions how in public spaces individual actors come together in an aggregated whole. Similarly, Borja (2003) attributes public spaces as the arena for the declaration of an active citizenship and highlights its importance to establish a new urban life amidst the current negative vision of the city as a space full of social problems.

More recently, Alvares and Barbosa (2018) analyze diverse case studies of public spaces in Brasil to illustrate how the public engages in both individual and collective manifestations, symbolically appropriating the space. Their study seeks to show and reflect on how in public spaces all differences can be seen and dealt, and where individuals can engage in a ‘vita activa’. Furthermore, Varna and Tiesdell (2010) present three types of value that public space brings to the city. The first is political/democratic: it offers a stage for political representation, is neutral open to all, and is inclusive and pluralist. The second is social: it fosters social integration, information exchange, personal development, social learning and the development of tolerance. The last is symbolic: it is representative of the collective and sociability rather than individuality and privacy.

Evidently, the concept of public space is complex and cannot be described or contained in one single category. That is the reason why the literature normally defines it with multiple and interrelated characteristics. Kohn (2004) proposes that it should be treated as a cluster concept, which involves defining different possible criteria. The concept of public space might not represent a concrete reality, as the totality of its ideal qualities might not be achieved in practice. Nonetheless, these are valuable to help determine the degree to which the essence of these spaces is reduced from its ideal state (Tiesdell & Oc, 1998), and to help inform the type of cities we want to create.

Taking in account the described definitions and dimensions, this thesis defines public spaces considering four components: openness, ownership, accessibility, and function. Public spaces are those that are mostly open and have none or few building interventions, they are owned by the government, they are accessible without any restriction (physical, visual, economic, social, etc.), and are destined for a collective use one that provides a space for citizens’ encounters and which fosters diversity and inclusion, which means that its purpose is to serve to the whole city and not to specific groups.

2.2 Privatization Theories

Definition of Privatization

The word ‘private’ is commonly defined in relationship and contrast with the concept of ‘public’. The private sphere refers to the individualization of formerly social practices and is placed in the opposite spectrum of the public sphere (Arendt, 1958; Corcoran, 2012; Cheshire et al., 2018). The dichotomy between the public and the private can be attributed to the legal ownership and property of the space: the public is what belongs to the government and the private is what belongs to an individual or business (Díaz-

Albertini F., 2016). Thus, privatization can be a transfer in ownership. It is also related to the concept of exclusion, which can be explicit and justified by norms, political or proprietary arrangements; or implicit, based on social rules and relationships (Kim, 1987). Moreover, privatization is also referred to as a process where the growth of the private sector or entity is placed at the expense of the public — it is a retraction of the public sphere. Starr (1988, p. 3) declares that “privatization can also signify another kind of withdrawal from the whole to the part: an appropriation by an individual or a particular group of some good formerly available to the entire public or community. Like the withdrawal of involvement, privatization in the sense of private appropriation has obvious implications for the distribution of welfare”.

Taking these approaches, in this thesis I define privatization as the process by which government-owned open public spaces are dispossessed or taken away from the general public and citizens, and assigned a new type of ownership associated with an external non-governmental actor such as an individual, a group of individuals, or private entity. Thus, privatization is a process of transformation that also involves its access, function, and physical space. There is a decrease in access which can be physical or symbolic, together with a change in use that focuses not in the collective and public, but in the individual and private. This means that the actors who use the space or can potentially use it is altered and reduced. Finally, through the privatization process there is also a physical transformation of the space, in which its openness is restricted and diminished, and where exclusion is translated into the built environment.

Furthermore, the process of privatization can be attributed and rooted to different reasons. These may happen simultaneously or independently, and they are essential to understand why this phenomenon takes place. The first is the implementation and glorification of neoliberal economic models. Governance structures have shifted from a managerial model to an entrepreneurial model, where planning is led by the market and capital (Harvey, 2001). Alvares and Barbosa (2018) mention that while the public sphere is connected to a cultural production and citizen construction dimension, the private sphere is driven by market needs and demands, and thus associated uniquely to an economic dimension. Public interventions in urban governance have weakened, and cities have started to compete with each other to attract private investments in the form of real estate and private developments. Neoliberal policies have direct implications on public spaces, creating tensions between the public nature and the interest of encouraging capital accumulation based on the commoditization of public urban land (Kohn, 2004; Lozada Acosta, 2018; Narváez Muelas, 2019). Cities have created and encouraged new spaces of consumption, where individualization and fragmentation are fostered (de Mattos, 2009). In addition, Kohn (2004, p. 12) suggests that while privatization processes (such as a town square being replaced by a commercial space or theme park) could reflect a change in consumers’ preferences, these preferences might instead be driven and defined by the imposed economic structures.

A second reason that motivates privatization is efficiency, which happens when public authorities do not have the means or capacities to sustain public spaces. Efficiency can be related to the financing, development, and/or management of the public space. In cases where public authorities do not have the means to achieve any of these goals, partnering and collaborating with private entities appear as an adequate solution (De Magalhães & Freire Trigo, 2017; Grant & Curran, 2007). Evidently, private sector involvement can lead to an increase in the financial budget, but can at the same time constrain the open access to the public space.

Van Melik et al. (2009, p. 208) study this hypothesis by analyzing four privately redeveloped squares in different Dutch cities. Although they conclude that public access in these cases is not necessarily restricted, they acknowledge that this outcome cannot be generalized, since Netherlands' public spaces policies are strict and control that they should be 'used by and accessible to all'. Furthermore, De Magalhães & Freire Trigo (2017) study the private management of public spaces in the city of London and conclude that as long as there are clear and transparent accountability and decision-making processes that involve multiple stakeholders, the results do not necessarily affect negatively the level of publicness of the space. However,

they recognize that these spaces eventually privilege the involved constituencies’ interests, such as local residents, businesses, and landowners. Nonetheless, these processes might not have the same results in Latin America, as some studies indicate that private management does affect access and control to public spaces. For example, Narváez-Muelas (2019) study a case in Cali, Colombia, that took place in the 1990’s, where a private entity privatized a large green open public space in the city after building a new housing development adjacent to it. The authors highlight how the transferring rights of development projects play a key role in privatization processes.

A third reason why privatization takes place is an urgency for safety and control, which can lead to segregation and exclusion. Overly regulation in response to crime, disorder and insecurity can be a way of privatizing as it controls who is allowed to access a space, symbolically or explicitly (Barker, 2016; Bensús, 2012; Low et al., 2005). This is demonstrated in the new residential models such as private enclaves, gated communities, common interest housing developments, and private streets and roads. All these aim to provide an increase of perceived safety to a group of people who share a common space, but also delimit an area where they who share similar lifestyles, economic status and/or identities can differentiate from others (Grant & Curran, 2007; Low, 2003). The exclusion of determined groups also showcases the desire to hide from sources of discomfort and other unpleasant characteristics commonly present in the city that are consequences of a social system (Kohn, 2004). In Latin America the mechanisms to achieve these safety measures might not be institutionalized and formal, and many times take place after the neighborhood is developed and consolidated. These processes can demonstrate how a specific group is able to influence the local management of public spaces and change the built environment to their benefit (Palma, 2014). Moreover, privatization through control are implemented across all socio-economic sectors. Caldeira (2007) studies how, in Sao Paolo, processes of fortification that create monitored borders appear throughout the city, and end up segregating and promoting a sense of intolerance and fear between different social, economic and geographic sectors.

A fourth reason is clientelism and patrimonialism, which mostly appears in Latin America and responds to the political systems in place. The first is when authorities act on behalf of a specific sector of the population with an underlying motivation of getting votes and political support from them (Díaz-Albertini F., 2016; Velarde Herz, 2017). This can result in interventions in the physical space or in regulations that can benefit a specific sector of the population over others. At the same time, it creates short-term impact governance practices, as the interventions mostly last for as long as the authority is in charge. Finally, patrimonialism refers to the private appropriation of the public position, when authorities act or make a public intervention in the city for their own benefit.

Other Forms of Privatization

Although this thesis focuses in the privatization of open public spaces that are owned by the government, existing literature on this topic includes other manifestations of privatization. One type are the privately- owned public spaces. These refer to ones that although are a private entity’s property, they constitute of public access and thus are considered public. This can apply, for example, to an open plaza in the entrance of a shopping mall or an office building. A city where many of this type of spaces exist is New York City. In 1961, a new zoning resolution was established to help incorporate new public spaces to the city. It allowed new project developments to gain floor area bonuses in exchange of including a public space within their property, a policy that has been replicated in other cities to achieve the same goal. Although new open spaces have been added to the city, some studies suggest that the management regulations can limit their level of publicness (Kayden, 2000; Kiefer, 2001). Thus, if a private party owns a public space, it is in charge of determining the rules of who, when and how it can be used, possibly asserting exclusion through control (Armborst et al., 2017).

Moreover, privately-owned public spaces can also be spaces which, although are privately owned, have been appropriated by citizens as a public space. This might happen due to the neglect or lack of control established by the property owner. Mitchell (1995) studies a specific case where this took place in California: the People’s Park. The park was gained by the University of California (UC) through eminent domain to build students' dormitories in 1967. Nonetheless, UC did not move forward with the project, and the park was intervened, occupied, and used by local residents and homeless people for almost 24 years. After this time, the university decided to reclaim and redevelop it to complete its original use, displacing users and changing the character and use of the park. Although the legal property owner was the university, this process might still be considered some form of privatization.

Other ways of privatization and exclusion of public spaces are achieved by using specific regulations or design elements. Armborst et al. (2017) provide an extensive catalog revealing different mechanisms used in the United States by which private owners and authorities include and exclude people from public spaces. Likewise, another form of privatization is when local authorities regulate and commodify the surfaces of urban elements, such as walls, trash cans, electric wiring boxes, and others, for creative and cultural production, but with an economic interest behind (Treger, 2011).

Furthermore, existing research studies how public space is privately used by citizens for their individual benefit. Bruno et al. (2013) document different ways of how this happens through physical interventions in Seoul. They argue that, as citizens, we all use public spaces for our private benefit on different levels, depending on the intensity and how much time we spend there. How we privately occupy the space is a constant negotiation with the community that surrounds it. They state that although many times these appropriations are done illegally, these occupations should be seen as an opportunity more than a problem that needs to be completely eradicated. Similarly, Kamalipour and Peimani (2019) study street vending in different cities in Ecuador, Colombia, Thailand, and India. However, they declare that these informal collaborations can convert into a form of monopoly and collective privatization of public space.

Privatization of Public Spaces in Lima, Peru

There is an emergent body of literature that analyzes specific aspects of the privatization of public spaces in the city of Lima. Some scholars emphasize how the issue of fear of the “other” — those dissimilar to one self — and feeling of insecurity has generated the privatization of public spaces, process that can be led both by municipalities and citizens (La Rosa González, 2014; Takano & Tokeshi, 2007). Under this lens, Plöger (2006) studies and proposes a typology of distinct residential enclaves that exist in the city of Lima, categorized by the size, location, socio-economic status, quantity of amenities and services, and moment of privatization. He argues that this process includes the appropriation, control, and fortification of public spaces, and that these developments normally emerge from the surrounding residents.

Similarly, Díaz-Albertini (2016) presents three ways in which privatization takes place in Lima and argues that this process is mainly a response to the feeling of insecurity in the city. They are called the fief, the region, and the fair, and are grouped and distinguished exclusively according to the actors who privatize the spaces. The study does not focus solely in open public spaces but also considers privately-owned spaces. The first is executed legally by the government, the second is done illegally by citizens, and the third is the creation of shopping malls by private companies. He considers that the last ones consist in the new private- public spaces, as an increasing number of people feel safer and thus prefer to spend their time there instead of outside.

Moreover, other research highlights specific case studies where privatization of public spaces took place or almost happened. Lozada (2018) has presented two cases where she analyzes how existing planning regulations, which are ruled by predominant logics of capital investment promotion, influence the course

and outcome of public spaces. The role of citizen movements plays an important part in preventing privatization in a system that privileges the private sector and where public participation is not guaranteed. Moreover, there is a journalism report presented by Convoca.pe (Pérez Pinto, 2019) that investigates and quantifies the total area of public spaces in seven districts Lima that have been given in concession to private entities in the last 25 years. It finds that the total area is 569,700.65m2, which is equivalent to 79 soccer fields. Finally, ex-congresswoman Indira Huilca, together with CADNEP (Citizens Activating and Defending Our Public Spaces) (2019) — a citizen organization that promotes the protection of public spaces in Lima — have created a report that describes different cases of privatization of public spaces in the city and present different mechanisms and actionable recommendations that citizens or collectives can use to defend the public spaces in their communities.

2.3 Metropolitan Governance Theories

Governance Structures and Models

Metropolitan governance is the means by which the state regains control over the territory (Xu & Yeh, 2017) and acts as a framework for economic development, planning, and financing (Ortiz & Kamiya, 2017). Although different terms are applied to the approaches and practices, there is some consensus that it is “determined by the nature of the governance structures with relation to the levels of fragmentation or consolidation, the degree and level of control over urban functions, and the degree of formality or informality in the coordination of metropolitan area units” (Gómez-Alvarez et al., 2017).

Metropolitan areas can follow different governing structures and organizations, and these vary according to national and historical, cultural and political contexts (Birch, 2017). Bird and Slack (2007) have developed four models that describe different ways in which local governance and finance are structured: one-tier, two-tier, voluntary cooperation and special districts. The first takes place when there is a single local government that is in charge of providing all metropolitan services. In the second, there is an upper tier governing body that includes the larger metropolitan territory, and a lower tier or local municipalities that govern smaller jurisdictions, which are in charge of providing services in that specific area. In the third model, there is no official institution that governs the whole metropolitan area, but the existing units of the local governments cooperate voluntarily. The fourth model, special districts, is created for a single purpose, such as providing a service to multiple municipalities. The authors argue that all of them have pros and cons, and that choosing the best model highly depends on the specific context and challenges. They conclude that good government requires not only publicly elected and responsible mayors and councils, but also financial independence.

In addition, Sellers & Hoffmann-Martinot (2008) propose that governance institutions in metropolitan areas can be classified according to different dimensions. The first is spatial coverage, or the total area the jurisdiction is responsible for, which can be a fraction, the majority, or the entire metropolitan area. The second is institutional thickness, which refers to how much integration and collaboration exists across institutions, and ranges between inter-community co-operation and Metropolitan town. The third dimension is democratic intensity, which is determined by the degree of citizens’ role in the appointment and control of metropolitan authorities. The final dimension is the centrality and relationship between the metropolitan institution and the higher levels of policymaking. Institutions can be evaluated according to their level (low, moderate, high) in each dimension.

Moreover, the different adopted governance models and the way they are executed has a direct influence in the ability of local institutions to deliver public services. The lack of a metropolitan scale management can lead to urbanization and environmental problems, fragmentation of service delivery, traffic congestion, and other inefficiencies such as under-utilization of land (Ahrend et al., 2017; Andersson, 2017).

Additionally, the changing landscapes of diverse administrative structures can exacerbate local problems and challenges. It also misses opportunities that could help achieve valuable development across sectors, such as transportation, open space preservation, and equitable growth (Xu & Yeh, 2017).

In order to make urban places productive, there needs to be a multi-tiered, multi-stakeholder governance, which should be guided by decentralization principles (Birch, 2017). This means that there is a transfer of powers, from central or higher levels to local or lower levels of governance, which include smaller legally delimited geographic areas (Yuliani, 2004). Moreover, decentralization can take two forms: deconcentration and devolution. The first refers to an administrative decentralization and takes place when the local administration still depends and is accountable to the centralized government. Both have the same institutional identity and normally the person in charge of the local level is appointed by the higher level of government. Devolution refers to a shift of power from the central government to the local government. This creates semi-autonomous institutions whose authorities are normally elected by citizens (Ortiz & Kamiya, 2017; Yuliani, 2004; Zegras, 2017).

The Challenges of Effective Metropolitan Governance

Decentralization has been a world trend since the late 20th century. Since 1992, around 80% of the countries in the world started to experiment some form of decentralization (Faguet, 2012). In Latin America, after the 1980’s, when most authoritarian presidential regimes ended, the new democratic governments introduced reforms that transferred powers and financial capacities from the central to local governments. Nonetheless, the region is still highly centralized in the political, territorial and economic aspect. This is partly due because of the concentration of population in the metropolises and the social and territorial imbalances (Rosales & Valencia Carmona, 2008). Although decentralization aims to achieve institutional autonomy and better responses to local needs, in the Latin American region there have been many challenges in its implementation.

The first challenge is institutional fragmentation due to municipal heterogeneity. There is a geopolitical and horizontal fragmentation as each local government focuses in its own jurisdiction, and tries to adapt and respond to their local constituency. At the same time, there is vertical fragmentation with overlapping higher levels of government such as federal, state and local agencies (Feiock, 2009). This fragmentation is sometimes called atomization and is present at some degree in all of Latin America. Peru, for example, has more than 2000 provincial and district municipalities (Rosales & Valencia Carmona, 2008). A second challenge is the political aspect of governance. As local leaders are chosen by citizens, and in some areas can be reelected, there is a need of authorities to seek political support by answering to needs and demands of specific groups. Hence, most of the time final decisions depend on the political willingness of actors (Ahrend et al., 2017).

A third issue in the implementation of effective metropolitan governance is the level of limited financial autonomy and capacity. If local autonomy is not attached to the financial aspect, then policies and projects are much difficult to implement. Who has the money, who can spend it, where it comes from, and where it can be spent are crucial elements that determine how efficiently institutions work, their capacity to deliver public services and needs, and their ability to respond to longer-term issues (Bird & Slack, 2007; Gómez- Alvarez et al. 2017). Although the most important source of income for municipalities is property tax, their capacity to collect taxes is weak, and most of the time they are based on outdated property registers. In addition, most of the time these institutions do not have the power to determine, change or increase taxation, and they depend on the central government to get funds transfers. Furthermore, as territories are diverse and many times socio-economically segregated, there is a large contrast and unequal distribution of municipal wealth (Rosales & Valencia Carmona, 2008).

A fourth challenge is accessing and maintaining human resources. In most countries of Latin America, including Peru, there is not a civil service career or they are not well organized. In addition, most higher- level staff are chosen by the current administration, and so personnel is highly affected by political changes. The lack of incentives and the low level of value attributed to pursuing a public servant career, together with a very high staff rotation result in inefficient management.

Incorporating civic participation in governance processes is the fifth challenge. This can be due to the mentioned issues of having inadequate financial assets or staff to manage those processes. Nonetheless, it can also take place because these processes are not incorporated into national policies, or when they are, they are poorly adapted at the local scale. Another reason might be that institutions do not have the management capacity to reach and mobilize local communities. Moreover, as metropolises continue to grow, they also include very diverse public interests, and it is harder to respond to all of them. Still, some countries have created initiatives and mechanisms to better incorporate public participation and consultation, such as Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, and Uruguay (Rosales & Valencia Carmona, 2008).

Finally, another challenge is that there are none or poorly implemented official mechanisms to hold authorities accountable. Many times, these are created by external governmental actors such as citizens groups, NGOs, or private entities, but depend on different factors. Taylor-Robinson (2010) studies the capacity of the public to achieve government accountability, focusing in Honduras but generalizing to the Latin American context. She analyzes how officials respond differently to rich and poor constituencies, and their behavior determines the ability of people to hold them accountable. Accountability is harder to achieve for the poor because they lack the resources that middle class and elite groups have, such as connections, education and access to information. Institutions make it hard and costly for poor people to punish elected officials, thus this is not a highly pursued path. The author determines that the best option for this group is to look for clientelistic representation, so that authorities respond to their needs in exchange of political support.

Although several challenges to create effective decentralized governance structures have been presented, there are still successful cases. Tendler (1997) uncovers good governance examples in Brazil, focusing on the Northeast region and poorest one in the country. She challenges the existing larger body of literature that concentrates on critiquing bad government practices and solely proposes generic advice. Across her four case studies, she finds that civil servants were autonomous, very dedicated to their jobs, and carried out a variety of tasks that sometimes exceed their usual activities — all in order to better respond to citizens’ needs. The state government also plays an important role. It implemented an effective communication campaign that informed citizens about their rights and how public services worked. This incentivized people to demand a response to their needs and transparent processes, which helped hold authorities accountable.

Moreover, Faguet (2012) focuses on the decentralization reforms in Bolivia and studies two cases between 1987 and 2009. He finds that while one local government was very responsive to local needs, the other was corrupt and unresponsive. He investigates the causes of these different responses that take place under the same political reform. The author concludes that the governance accountability and effectiveness depend on the local social, economic, and political dynamics, which in turn are defined by three institutional relationships: voting (individual voters), lobbying (private firms), and civil society (collectives). Finally, McNulty (2011) studies specific governance practices in eight different regions of Peru, including Lima. She finds that although they follow the same regulations, the ones that implemented successful participatory practices and have better governance are regions with a strong leadership and an active and organized civil society that collaborates with the local government.

The described successful governance cases thus emphasize how each local institution was able to adapt to the local context and respond autonomously to the public they were serving, incorporating them in the discussion and decision-making process.

Chapter 3

Context

3.1 Lima’s Governance Structure and Challenges

Lima, located in the coastal desert of Peru and in the geographic center in the north-south dimension, has today a population of 10 million people in a country of almost 30 million. The capital city has an extension of 2,819 km2 and a population density of 3.33 habitants per km2. Lima’s governance structure is characterized for being a two-tier model, according to the types of metropolitan governance defined by Bird and Slack (2007). This means that there is an upper tier corresponding to a Metropolitan Government, led by the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima (MML), and a second tier corresponding to the local governments, led by the district municipalities. The city is formed by 43 districts in total, all with different sizes, population, and socio-demographic characteristics. In addition, the Constitutional Province of Callao, composed of seven more districts, is located adjacent to Lima. Although both are part of the same geographic territory, they are independent provinces and have different administrations.

The current Constitution, created in 1993, provided municipalities with higher levels of autonomy, and established the co-existence of local governments and a metropolitan structure. However, today the two tiers are not integrated functionally, as many roles overlap. In addition, there are 19 ministries at the national level that have roles that might focus on similar topics (e.g. culture, education, etc.) but that and are treated as isolated functions within their own sector. There is very little vertical and horizontal spillovers and collaboration across all government levels. In Lima, at the municipal level each institution governs on its own delimited district, developing a fragmented administration of the territory.

Furthermore, according to Article 195 of the Constitution, the public function of the district municipalities is to promote development and neighborhood economies, and provide public services, using national plans and policies to guide their processes. However, Peru does not have a general law regarding urban development nor an urban code that guides city planning. The only instrument we have at the national level is the Territorial Conditioning and Sustainable Urban Development Regulations (RADTUS). This document, developed by the Ministry of Housing and approved in 2016, establishes the city planning instruments to be used by local institutions. Nonetheless, it only presents the regulation codes and legal framework, and does not include any tools, design or planning guidelines that translate the framework into actual plans. Furthermore, Lima does not currently have a Metropolitan Development Plan for the whole city that acts as an urban development guide for each district. The last approved plan for Lima was the one created in 1990, designed to last until 2010 and using the 1979 Constitution, and is now obsolete.

The Metropolitan Municipality of Lima overviews scattered planning projects that affect larger areas of the city and normally involve multiple districts. Some examples are transportation infrastructure developments or design transformations on main streets that cross different jurisdictions (e.g. implementing a bike lane or changing the street design). Moreover, although district municipalities are in charge of creating urban development plans for their districts and establishing zoning regulations, the MML needs to approve those changes. Hence, the two-tier model creates a very bureaucratic process of approvals that not only take a long time to implement, but are also very political processes. In order for projects of these types to move forward, usually the district’s mayor and the Lima’s mayor have to have a good relationship, such as being

from the same political party. In cases where this does not happen, plans and projects might never get approved.

The political aspect of the planning governance also translates to the short-term planning vision that authorities embrace once they are in office. As the municipal period lasts four years and there is no reelection, most of the projects that are promoted and implemented are the ones that fit into this time period. Mayors seek to inaugurate and attach a plaque with their name to them. Moreover, if they belong to a different political party than the former mayor, sometimes they stop previously established programs or projects, trying to “erase” any past achievements. Additionally, they blame prior administrations for their current problems and challenges. The short-term vision results in a lack of sustainable management and of continuity of planning strategies. A clear example of this was the development of the 2035 Lima and Callao Metropolitan Plan of Urban Development (PLAM). It was developed under Lima’s Mayor Susana Villaran administration (2011-2014) but was not completed before her final year in office. On January 2015, Mayor Luis Castañeda Lossio, who was from an opposing political party, assumed for the second time MML’s administration. The change in leadership resulted in the abandonment of the development of the PLAM, which was never culminated and approved.

Furthermore, Lima’s fragmented and atomized governance structure translates to institutions’ competencies, authorities, and financial and human resources. Districts receive very disparate tax collection (according to the residents’ ability to pay them), they all have high administrative costs and low economies of scale in their service provision, and have very poor inter-institutional coordination (Lozada Acosta, 2018). As a result, the city planning function is left to each district to fulfill independently. They each work on their own projects and plans, creating a patchwork of urban developments that deepen and display urban inequalities across the whole city. Richer districts have more capacity to invest in improvement projects and plans and thus are in much better conditions than poorer districts.

The fact that residents elect their district’s mayor and pay taxes to that municipality has also contributed to the city’s fragmentation at the local government level. Residents living in each jurisdiction claim that authorities should meet their specific demands, and not necessarily plan their districts as part of a larger and integrated metropolitan area. This results in clientelism, as authorities fulfill these needs in exchange of political support, even though sometimes the responses contribute to increase urban fragmentation and segregation of those who do not live in that part of the city. The issue is that people do not only ‘live’ in the district where their residence is located, but move throughout the city and constantly cross jurisdictional boundaries. Nonetheless, each district is designed solely for and by its residents (even when they might not even spend most of their time there because they work elsewhere), and not for the totality of Lima’s citizens (Vega Centeno, 2017).

Moreover, at a district level, there is no instrument to strategically determine the implementation of public investment projects. There are no mechanisms to make a diagnosis and identify each district’s project priorities. In addition, even though some districts have already developed urban plans, these are not binding with the allocation of the public budget. This issue has been exposed in a recent study, where Espinoza and Fort (2017) reveal how infrastructure projects — such as containment walls and staircases built in urban settlements located on slopes — end up responding to specific clientelistic demands and to political negotiations between authorities and residents, and are not necessarily the ones that are most needed. At the end, this planning flaw causes that public money is spent on projects that are poorly prioritized, scattered, and disarticulated in the territory.

Finally, there is a legacy of having a lack of transparency in planning processes, that take place without public participation. Processes, projects, and negotiations are done behind closed doors and are carried out only by authorities and technical experts, without involving the citizens who will be affected. A clear example of this is that the three metropolitan plans developed during the time period where Lima

experienced its largest urban expansion (1949, 1967, and 1990) did not involve any kind of citizen participation, even though the one from 1990 established public engagement as a central element of the plan (Stiglich, 2012). Today, citizen participation depends much on each municipality and on the officials in charge of planning processes. In many cases, public engagement is done at a final communication stage or following a checklist procedure, not really involving the whole community nor incorporating their perspectives in the plans or projects. As a result, there is a generalized feeling of lack of trust from residents towards public authorities and institutions.

3.2 Lima’s Urban Transformation and the Role of Public Spaces

The walls of Lima were demolished in 1870, and subsequently, the city expanded following the direction of the new avenues created to connect the city center to the beach resorts, located in the periphery. At the end of the nineteenth century and start of the twentieth century, some large open public spaces were designed and incorporated into the city’s urban fabric. Large metropolitan parks such as Parque de la Exposición and Parque de la Reserva were built in the city center to provide a recreational space to Lima’s aristocracy. According to Vega Centeno (2017), at this time public spaces were designed for a dominant class of society, as circulation, civic, and recreational spaces.

Lima’s urban expansion started in the 1940’s with a large wave of internal migration. With the construction of new roads throughout the country in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the capital became accessible to rural areas that had been disconnected for a very long time. New economic policies and the growth and development of the capital city motivated people from the interior of the country to move to Lima in the search of new opportunities and the hope of modernization. During the second half of the twentieth century, urban transformation processes in the city were led by two logics: the consolidation of the formal city, and the invasions of the periphery known as the informal city. These dual logics have translated into city planning practices that have guided urban development, and into the production and role of open public spaces in Lima.

The city experienced a population explosion between 1940 and 1990, and the government was not able to adapt to this this massive migration. The slums or “barriadas” emerged as informal settlements that people built to satisfy their housing need. In many cases, these processes were allowed and endorsed by the government as a solution to their lack of capacity to provide housing to thousands of people who arrived every day and did not have a place to settle (Velarde Herz, 2017). Informal settlements expanded towards the periphery without any presence from the government, where the population lived in precarious conditions and lacked basic services. By 1967, the housing deficit in Lima was of 29,115 units (Ortega, 2006), a serious problem which led two years to the creation of the Ministry of Housing and Construction — though not so large compared to today, which is more than twenty times more. It was also during this time that a Metropolitan Development Plan for Lima was introduced (to last until 1980). It included the creation of the Zonal Parks, located in the outskirts and still unoccupied areas of the city, which aimed to provide large recreational spaces to rural immigrants. In 32 years, between 1940 and 1972, the population of the capital city increased in 500%, from 650,000 to 3.5 million, and the percentage of population living in informal settlements grew from 1% to 25% (Kahatt, 2011).

Furthermore, between 1980 and 1992, the country faced a deep economic crisis marked with hyperinflation, which was accompanied by a period of internal conflict with the emergence of terrorist groups such as the Shining Path and Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). The city of Lima suffered numerous attacks and experienced a period of constant fear. At a national and city level, this led to public safety policies such as the establishment of night curfew. At an individual or family level, the response was the self-enclosing of homes by lifting walls and gates around them.

In 1990, in the middle of this economic and political crisis, Alberto Fujimori assumed the presidency. In 1992, he implemented neoliberal economic shock reforms, embodied in the Structural Adjustment Program, that aimed to alleviate the profound economic crisis. It was also during this year that the most important terrorist leaders were captured. The economic reforms were a response to government failures that were seen as limitations to the market. These were characterized by the promotion of private investment through a decrease of control and regulations, and labor de-regularization. In 1993, the new Constitution was created in order to incorporate this economic model, which is the one that governs today. In it, the market becomes responsible for the distribution of resources, while the state merely acts as a regulator (Parodi, 2000).

The new policies dismantled and weakened the role of state institutions in the function of city planning, which was guided by economic initiatives and private investment frameworks. Cities focused in attracting businesses and ended up acting themselves as private companies, creating policies that are designed for clients and consumers, and not for citizens. Urban development regulations were reduced, and the government assumed exclusively an administrative role of providing basic services’ infrastructure and land titles to informal settlements (Velarde Herz, 2017), instead of delivering a holistic solution to the housing problem. The intention was to help these families by allowing them to extract or gain economic value from their property and thus enter the market, providing them with an opportunity for development.

The demand for the state’s setback was rendered in the Lima and Callao Metropolitan Development Plan 1990-2010. It blamed the government for its prior restrictive and controlling approach, and proposed that to facilitate urban development, it should instead promote and incentivize private initiatives. The plan also allowed the Special Regulatory Zoning — created in 1970 to regularize informal settlements — to be applied to areas in the city where private companies could develop specific projects through the legal instrument of “private initiatives”, promoted by the new economic policies (Stiglich, 2012).

The shift towards a neoliberal ideology was replicated in many other countries in Latin America, and resulted in the restructuration of governance and implementation of projects through an inequitable distribution throughout the territory (Hidalgo & Janoschka, 2014). Although in Peru these reforms resulted in a restored macroeconomic stability, it also deepened social inequalities and spatial fragmentation. In Lima, at the same time the informal city was growing and expanding, the formal production of the city was left to the private sector, that created new commercial and real estate projects, and service infrastructure — especially transportation projects. The promotion of private capital investment was also represented with the embodiment of modernity and progress, an approach that is still present today (Lozada Acosta, 2018).

3.3 Lima’s Public Spaces and their Governance

The horizontal, disperse, atomized and fragmented urbanism of Lima, together with the implementation of the neoliberal economic model, has contributed to the loss and decline of public spaces. The last time large open spaces were designed and incorporated into the city-wide plans was in the beginning of the twentieth century. Although today both the formal and informal aspects of the city merge and intertwine, all planning regulations regarding open spaces have alluded to the ones that have been formally created by public entities. Nonetheless, many of the public spaces that exist in Lima today have been built by communities in informal settlements, and have been collectively designed and created to fulfill a recreational and meeting function that they could not otherwise find or have access to.

Moreover, the private domain has expanded and taken over the public domain across the city. On one hand, public spaces seem to be deprioritized from other important needs, such as housing and basic services provision, and their role refers only to its recreational character instead of an opportunity for social integration. On the other hand, the prevalence of the private sector’s role has boosted the role of real estate

businesses in the city design and urban development. In addition, the feeling of unsafety that begun in the period of terrorism is still present today. 82.2% of the population in Lima considers public unsafety to be the most important problem that affects the quality of life in the city (Lima Como Vamos, 2019a). All these factors boomed the development of residential enclaves, contributing to the socio-economic fragmentation and segregation practices that are still present today. Public spaces are replaced by internal community spaces of new residential complexes, which are considered to be safe and exclusive (Vega Centeno, 2017). Additionally, streets and sidewalks that were part of the public domain are conceded and prioritized for vehicles and not for citizens. This has weakened the popular conception and possibility of having an active urban public life (Ludeña Urquizo et al., 2013).

Furthermore, the planning challenges that result from Lima’s fragmented governance also apply to the governance of public spaces. The country does not have a legal framework that determines the role and definition of public spaces nor establishes guidelines for their administration. The regulations that dominate these spaces overlap and are dispersed through different independent institutions at the national, metropolitan, and district level. Nonetheless, they are ultimately managed by the district municipality they are located in. Thus, their creation, maintenance, and recuperation correspond to each institution’s capacities and resources. This is the reason why the socio-economic fragmentation in Lima is also reflected in the quantity and quality of open public spaces.

There are only some laws (N° 26664 and N° 28611), and some Metropolitan ordinances (N° 1852, N° 525, N° 1016) that consider them at some extent, but refer to green areas exclusively. These include green and natural historical monuments, parks, gardens, plazas, boulevards, and boardwalks. Moreover, one of the efforts to remedy the local governments’ lack of ability to manage and maintain their parks is a legal municipal instrument called the Park Committees, which allows residents to take over those responsibilities. These are social organizations that are officially registered in the district municipality, comprised by elected residents who live around the park. They are the park representatives and are in charge of managing their construction, conservation and/or maintenance. However, to achieve this there needs to be an organized community that is aligned and committed to fulfill those tasks, which does not always happen.

Moreover, the fact that only green spaces are regulated expands to how public spaces are measured in the city, only considering the total green area per district. Nonetheless, there are several limitations in these measurements. Green areas are calculated based on a municipality self-reported survey, the National Registry of Municipalities (RENAMU), implemented by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI). Under the 5th module, titled “Local public services, environmental sanitation, and health”, each municipality reports the amount of green areas in their district that have been through conservation works, according to the different types of spaces: plazas, parks, zonal parks and zoos, gardens and roundabouts, berms, and boulevards. However, as the data is self-reported, there are several issues regarding its accuracy. There is no standardized methodology to respond the survey and measure these areas, leaving it to each municipality’s criteria and capacities. Many times, some spaces that appear as green in the district plan are in reality not covered in vegetation (mostly due to lack of maintenance) but are included in the metric anyway. Additionally, spaces that only have a percentage of green area might be considered as green spaces in their whole extension.

Furthermore, official data of green areas per district and per inhabitant are not published by the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima, who should be in charge of doing so. In my personal intent to obtain these metrics, I made an official request to this institution, but they responded that they did not have the information. The only public available data regarding green areas has been published by the National System of Environmental Information (SINIA), which belongs to the Ministry of Environment. In theory, and according to their metadata, they use the information from the RENAMU survey. Nonetheless, when I tried to replicate the calculations using the survey’s publicly available data and compare the results, these did not match. This shows that even in what appears to be official results, the data might not be accurate.

This experience, together with the lack of official public metrics, evidences Lima’s fragmented metropolitan governance and reflects how public space competencies can overlap between different institutions that work independently.

Finally, the neoliberal economic policies have consolidated laws and regulations that promote private investments and infrastructure development, allowing private entities and municipalities to privatize open public spaces. Specifically, there are four regulations that authorize this process, both at the national and metropolitan level. Article 73 of the Constitution establishes that public domain assets can be granted to public initiatives for their economic use. In addition, the Organic Law of Municipalities (LOM) (Law N° 27972 approved in 2003) defines that green public spaces are under district municipalities administration, and so can be conceded to private initiatives. Additionally, the National Legislative Decree 1224 (approved in 2015), and the Metropolitan Ordinance N° 2046 (approved in 2017) establishes the legal framework for Public Private Associations and Active Projects, which allows municipalities to promote private investments in their districts (Lozada Acosta, 2018). All these regulations superpose to the lack of policies that promote, defend, and regulate public spaces, and thus contribute to the weakening of their governance and protection.

Chapter 4

Types of Privatization and Case Studies

4.1 Building a Typology of Privatization

Although the term and definition of privatization used in this thesis encapsulates one single phenomenon, it is important to understand that it happens in different ways. Evidencing and distinguishing them allows one to see how the processes, motivations, and manifestations by which privatization happens are diverse, as are its consequences. To categorize them, I have established different criteria, which also provide further detail of each one. I have identified three types, with two variations for each, characterized according to the rationale and process followed.

Criteria to Classify Types

1. Management of space Defines what public institution is in charge of managing and maintaining the open public space. 2. Change of use Describes the new condition and use of the open public space after the process of privatization. 3. Degree of physical presence This is related to the physical transformation of the space after it is privatized. It can vary according to the following dimensions:

• Scale: how large the intervention is (partial or total), that can also be measured as the percentage of the total area of the public space that is privatized.

• Physical footprint and porosity: how 'heavy' and opaque, or permeable the intervention is, according to the design and materials used.

• Perception of permanency or flexibility: how permanent the intervention feels like, if is it fixed and static or can be moved. The three are interrelated, as normally the larger the scale, the less porous and more permanent the intervention. There is a spectrum between a new building construction, which is normally bigger and has a higher sense of permanency due to the materials used and the economic investment it represents; smaller- scale interventions (e.g., a wooden kiosk, or hut) that are more porous and have an aspect of being more temporary or removable; and barrier-like interventions (such as fences or walls) that are two-dimensional and can have a porous or impermeable character, and can also have an entrance that can be opened or closed. 4. Process and mechanisms This indicates the process by which privatization happens and the mechanisms and instruments used to achieve it. Some processes are implemented under established laws or municipal regulations, others are not and take place mostly because of a lack of control or under-regulation. The main mechanisms are:

• Concession: the act of lending or renting all or part of the publicly owned space to a private external entity.

• Invasion: the act of appropriating a space, mostly illegally and informally.

• Fencing: the act of enclosing a space with some kind of barrier, to limit or control the access.

• Charging (for use): the act of requiring a payment or fee in order to provide physical access to a space. 5. Legality This determines the legality of the mechanisms used for privatization, which can be:

• Legal: the instruments to achieve privatization are within the Peruvian legal framework.

• Illegal: the mechanisms by how privatization is achieved are not legal. 6. Actors a) Promoter: Actor(s) who proposes and leads the process of privatization. b) Beneficiary: Actor(s) who benefits from the space and uses it after its privatization. c) Dispossessed: Actor(s) who are negatively affected by privatization. 7. Underlying motivations This pinpoints the goals and motives behind the process of privatization of the open public space. They are evaluated from the point of view of the actor who proposes and/or implements the privatization and include:

• Economic extraction (incentivized by the market): the need for capturing capital value from the land where open public space sits on.

• Security: the fear of crime and delinquency, of the unknown “other”, of being at risk or exposed, and the need or desire of self-protection.

• Segregation: the desire to live surrounded by people who share similar socioeconomic class, race, lifestyle, etc., and separate from those that are do not share the same characteristics.

• Clientelism: when authorities act on behalf of a specific sector of the population with an underlying motivation of getting political support from them.

• Livelihood: the response to satisfy a basic necessity e.g., the need for housing, or to perform an economic activity (job).

• Efficiency: when public authorities do not have the means or capacity to maintain or manage the public space. 8. Consequences This characterizes the effects and the changes in the area and its surroundings after privatizing the open public space.

4.2 Privatization Types

This section describes the three privatization types and their variations, along with the case study that will be used for each. A summary of the typology can be found in Table 2 and a summary of the case studies in Table 3.

31 Table 2 Privatization types summary table

1. Concession for Development 2. Appropriation for Livelihood 3. Enclosure for Control Criteria of 1a. Transformation for 1b. Partial Transfer for 2a. Invasion for 2b. Occupation for 3a. Fences for 3b. Entry Fee for Analysis Redevelopment Commercial Uses Housing Productive Activity Security Maintenance Type of open District/local/residential District/local/residential Natural ecosystem Street Street Zonal park public space public space (e.g. park, (e.g. park, plaza) plaza) Management District Municipality District Municipality Metropolitan Municipality District Municipality or District Municipality or Serpar (Lima’s Park of the space of Lima (MML) MML MML Services) – MML Change of use Shopping mall, restaurants, New commercial uses but Housing Commerce, street vending Partial: private garden or Club instead of park (cost parking lots, football courts, focused on recreational extended entrance. for admission and offering housing complexes, activities (arcade games, Total: used for parking and of other amenities inside). amusement parks, etc. sport courts, etc.). other residents' private uses. Degree of High - Large scale, Medium - Medium scale High- Construction of new Low - Smaller scale and Medium - Scale varies High - Large scale. physical transformation of most of and financial investment. houses. Smaller scale as physically permeable. between partial and total Enclosure of the whole presence the public space. High Enclosure of partial areas independent units but add Temporary occupation by a privatization. Enclosure space with brick wall, low financial investment to but visually permeable. to a large conglomerate. No vendor, their products, and with different degrees of permeability (physical and build a new opaque and Construction of new permeability. Materials other equipment. permeability (visually, or if visual), and permanent. permanent construction. infrastructure that seems used can imply removable gates are closed or open), permanent. interventions. but permanent. Process and Concession contract Concession contract Permanent invasion Temporal occupation Fencing Charging for access and for mechanisms between Municipality and between Municipality and uses inside. private entity, approved by private entity, approved by Municipal Council Municipal Council Degree of Legal Legal Illegal Illegal Legal/illegal Legal legality Promoter Private company allowed by Private company allowed by Land traffickers Street traffickers Residents Public institution that local Municipality local Municipality manages the public space. Beneficiary People who prefer the new People who want the new Residents who buy lots as a Street vendors Residents People who can afford the use instead of a public use and can afford it form of investment or to entry fee. space, and who can afford (determined by purchasing build their houses. it. power). Dispossessed Residents and users who Residents and users who Residents in lower areas of Pedestrians, residents, and Non-residents People who cannot afford to used the space for free oppose to the new uses or hills, residents and visitors first-floor store sellers. enter the park or pay for the recreational purposes. are negatively affected by who frequent the lomas as a services inside. them. recreational space. Underlying Economic extraction (profit Economic extraction (profit Economic extraction (sale) Economic extraction (rent Security, segregation. Economic extraction (profit motivations for private entity and rent for private entity and rent but taking advantage of the or extorsion if there are Clientelism (from the for maintenance) and for municipality) and for municipality) and housing necessity and land street traffickers) but taking authority's perspective that efficiency (security and efficiency (for maintenance). efficiency (for maintenance). speculation. advantage of job necessity. authorizes the control). privatization). Consequences Elimination of an open, Alteration of the space with Lost and damage of natural Obstruction of the street, Exclusion and restriction of Exclusion and restriction of free, recreational space. new infrastructure, ecosystem (environmental exposure to risks. access to non-residents and access to people who cannot Increase in built area and reduction of visibility and effects). Security risks (due to emergency vehicles. afford the entrance fee. reduction of green spaces. porosity, reduction of green Exposure to risk (collapse, connection with criminal Decrease in access, and area and total available area oversaturation of current activities) control is conceded to the for free collective service infrastructure). private. Function is limited recreational purposes. Security risks (due to to commercial and connection with criminal consuming purposes. activities)

Type 1: Concession for Development

This first type is characterized by the process in which an open public spaced that is owned and managed by a district Municipality, is given to a private business to transform it into a commercial use. This process is facilitated by existing laws that promote private investments and infrastructure development. The mechanism used for this process is based on a legal framework, the Organic Law of Municipalities, that allows these institutions to give out a publicly managed space to private entities for a determined period of time in the form of concession contracts. This is done with the excuse that it will bring improvement and development to the area, by providing a new amenity. Moreover, the negotiation processes between authorities and private stakeholders are usually kept confidential until the decision has already been made, due to anonymity regulations that protect the company. The contract, in theory, needs to establish the total time the concession will take place (determining how long the space will be rented or conceded to the private entity), the total intervened area, the economic benefits for stakeholders, and the responsibilities of each of the parts. Municipalities support the partnership and the new commercial initiative either because they benefit from the financial profit through rent, or because they lack the capacity to maintain the space and this responsibility is passed on to the private entity. In some cases, corruption and connections between the company and the public authorities appear to be the trigger for the privatization process to happen.

1a. Transformation for Redevelopment

In this variation, a large portion of the total space is changed and turned into a new construction to accommodate the new use, such as a shopping mall, parking lots, sports courts, housing complexes, amusement parks, etc. This sub-type is the one that involves the greatest scale and physical transformation, and so the highest degree of physical presence. Private companies are motivated by having access to an exclusive and available “empty” space (which is of the size and scale they need and which is ready to be built on), access to the surrounding potential market, and getting a convenient rental price for the large area. In this type, the dispossessed are residents who oppose to privatization because they usually use the space and they want it to remain untouched, open, and for free recreational purposes. Additionally, after the intervention and change of use, their access to the space is restricted to commercial and consuming purposes only, so those who do not want to perform that activity or who do not have sufficient means, are not able to enter and use it.

Case Study: Parque Primavera, Comas

Parque Primavera is a park located in Pampa de Comas, in the district of Comas. Its design included a park, with grass and sidewalks, of 1466m2 and a concrete football court beside it, of 763m2. Although it is the Municipality’s responsibility to maintain the parks in the district, this space had been neglected for some years, it was not taken care of or kept cleaned, the green areas were not watered and the grass had dried and turned into bare soil. In the year 2017, residents were surprised by a group of people bringing construction materials to the park, who started to destroy the existing sidewalks, take out the benches, and move lightning posts in order to build a private synthetic grass football court. The Municipality signed an agreement with the company More Grass E.I.R.L to implement this new use, valid between 2017 and 2022. The intention and excuse behind this transformation was to recuperate and renew the neglected park. In addition to building the court, the company agreed to improve the existing green areas and provide children games.

Figure 5 Primavera Park before and after privatization

Top: Before and after the park’s privatization. Source: Google Earth, annotations by author. Bottom left: Photo of the Primavera Park. Source: Google Maps (image from May 2014). Bottom right: Synthetic grass football court. Source: Photo by author in 2020.

Although the agreement with the Municipality is a legal instrument, there were informal and illegal elements in the process. The initiative to build the new football court was initially requested by the Park Committee, comprised by 5 residents who indicated that the project had been reviewed and approved by the community. Nonetheless, according to a group of residents who fight for the recuperation of the park, they never communicated this plan to them. Additionally, the company’s owners were connected to the committee, and also to the Deputy Mayor of the previous administration (who was in office when they signed the contract), conditions that facilitated the agreement to take place. Residents argue that the people who are in control of the park today hold criminal records, and are also constantly threatening those who are trying to advocate for the recuperation of the park. Moreover, the agreement does not indicate any economic benefits that More Grass E.I.R.L has to provide to the local Municipality. They are not paying rent or any fee although they are making a profit out of the free use of the park.

According to the park residents, those who want to make use of it have to pay S/.60 (about $18) per hour, or sign up for one of the twelve hours that are offered for free during each month, established as part of the agreement. The new football court duplicates an existing use (as the concrete football court still exists next to it), and occupies 68% of the total area of what used to be the park, which is surrounded by a mesh that prevents people from entering, and has left only a small area for free use (Figure 6).

The park has converted into a paid space that excludes people who do not want to play football – especially women, children and elderly. Furthermore, the physical transformation included moving the existing public lighting posts to the court’s perimeter in order to benefit from the free provision of a public service. There are also illegal connections to electric, water, and sanitation infrastructure to support complementary uses such as restrooms. Additionally, the company has not fulfilled their part of the agreement: what is left of the park is still neglected, the few trees that are left are not watered, and the small children games that were to be installed were not completed and its current conditions even represent a potential danger to children who might use them (Figure 7). Although the specific use of a football court and restrooms were approved in the contract, the company has added a small shop. Moreover, at night and during weekends the park becomes a space where the company owners and associated persons gather in motorcycles to drink alcohol and play loud music, and sometimes improvise a restaurant.

Residents opposing to the privatization demand that the Municipality regain the management of the public space and opens it to everyone. Not only the community lost their park; they are also exposed to an unsafe environment, especially for women and children. After complaints and demands from residents, the Office of the Comptroller General presented a report in March of 2019 that identified several irregularities in the process. However, the Municipality of Comas has not yet taken any action. Today, and since 2017, access to Parque Primavera has not only been restricted because of a new imposed financial cost, but also because of social control exerted by an external group of people who has privatized the space and decides who can enter or not.

(Interview 1, Interview 5, Interview 16)

Figure 6 Primavera Park and its Surroundings

View of Primavera Park from above. Source: Photo by author in 2020.

Figure 7 Neglected Area Next to the Football Court

Image showing the unwatered trees, the unfinished children’s games, and a fragment of the park’s sidewalk from before its privatization (bottom right of the photo). Source: Photo by author in 2020.

1b. Partial Transfer for Commercial Uses

This variation happens when Municipalities give out smaller areas or sections of a particular open public space to a private company to implement a new use. This mainly manifests as enclaves of commercial activities that are still related to the ‘recreational’ spirit of the public space, such as mechanical games, sports courts, the use of boats in artificial lakes, and others. In this case, the public space is partially enclosed through physical elements in order to delimit the area that is managed by the private actor, and where access and use is only provided if a fee is paid. Most of the times, the space is still visually permeable because the elements used are porous gates or short fences. Nonetheless, the implementation of these new commercial uses involves other built interventions, which can be at a higher or lower degree of physical presence (e.g. building an artificial lake, changing grass into hard flooring, etc.). Through the concession contract, the Municipality and private entity establish the responsibilities of each part, and define the total area of intervention, specify the commercial activity that will take place, and determine the costs for users (sometimes, the costs for district’s residents can vary). These privatizations can be permanent as long as the contract is valid, which can be for many years, depending also on how long it will take the private stakeholder to recover the financial investment. In this typology, the dispossessed are also residents and park users who do not want the public space to be altered and to change its character to a profit-making and commercial space, or who oppose to the specific new uses that are being implemented.

Case Study: Parque Castilla, Lince

Parque Castilla is located in Lince, in the central area of Metropolitan Lima. It was created in 1953 and it is the largest park of this district. It has a total area of 106,314m2, and is divided by a street (Av. Cesar Vallejo) into two sectors. Throughout the years, it has undergone different changes and interventions, but still preserving its public essence, such as the implementation of new open sports courts, amphitheaters, children’s playgrounds courts, lighting, and paths. Nonetheless, during the first decade of 2000, new private uses were introduced. Some of the trees were cut down and the Municipality built a restaurant and an artificial lagoon with the intention to give them to a private company to manage, and thus activate the area economically and provide more amenities to residents and visitors. However, the lagoon was too expensive to maintain and the public entity could not take care of it. The lagoon was drained but was not cleaned, becoming an unhealthy spot in the park. The restaurant was then taken over by the Municipality and turned into a health center and later into a public children’s library, which is still in operation today.

In the last four years, however, three new private uses have been installed in portions of the park, all in the north sector. In the year 2016, a public-private association was established between the Municipality and the company Aqualab to build a swimming pool inside the park. The enclosed pool operates as a swimming academy, where users have to pay to attend swimming lessons. The premise is managed and maintained by

Figure 8 Maps and Photos of Castilla Park

Top: Before and after the park’s privatization. Source: Google Earth, annotations by author. Bottom: Private enclaves inside the park. Source: Photos by author in 2020.

Aqualab, which also owns two other pools in other districts of Lima. In the year 2018, under the same administration, other areas of the park were given in concession to another company, Family Park. One was an area with paved flooring that was used by young people to practice hip hop and break dance. The private company installed games such as an arcade and mechanical carts which are still operating today. The other was the artificial lagoon, that was cleaned and filled with water again, and where the company currently offers boat rides. Both services charge S/.5 ($1.50) for regular users, and S/.4 ($1.20) for Lince residents. These areas are enclosed with fences to prevent people from entering if they have not paid the fee Figure 9). In this concession contract, it is established that Family Park is in charge of operating the services and the Municipality of Lince is responsible of maintaining the lagoon and green areas around the games.

A total of 3339m2 is privatized today, and although it consists of 6.9% of the north sector of the park, these different interventions have formed private enclaves within the public space, transforming its open character, creating internal boundaries, and limiting the access to the totality of the park. The games have occupied spaces that were previously used for free by dance groups, who have had to move elsewhere. In addition, several trees were cut down to build the lagoon and what used to be the restaurant. The lagoon and games are visually permeable because their limits are defined with low metallic fences, but only the one who pays can enter. However, the swimming pool is enclosed with a brick wall, and consists of a larger scale building that creates visual barriers as it is located on the edge of the park.

The mechanisms for privatization in this case study are all legal instruments, and the process is promoted both by the Municipality of Lince, and the private entities. A group of residents, Friends of Castilla Park, have been fighting against the implementation of these new private uses, as they advocate for the public and free use of the park. Moreover, the new administration, which started in 2018, reported some irregularities in the contract with Family Park. They indicated that the document did not specify the characteristics of the implemented infrastructure, such as boats and games, and the exact occupied area.

Figure 9 Ticket Booths Inside the Park

Ticket booths to enter the artificial lagoon (left) and to use the mechanical games (right). Source: Photos by author in 2020

Also, it did not define the service fees, which indicates that the pricing was not regulated by the Municipality and was left for the private company to decide. According to the Municipality, the agreement is under evaluation to determine if the contract will be cancelled. Although there are some people who benefit from these new uses — those who enjoy and can afford these amenities — there are groups of residents who are currently advocating for the removal of the private commercial activities. They believe that the park should preserve its public essence and that no private company should be profiting from a public park.

(Interview 2, Interview 6, Interview 13)

Type 2: Appropriation for Livelihood

This second type of privatization is characterized by public land that gets appropriated by citizens, in order to use that area for a personal necessity. The open public land can be of different types, such as natural ecosystems or streets, and thus be managed by different governmental institutions. This type of privatization is motivated to accomplish a basic need, such as housing or to use it as a space to work. The mechanism for appropriation is illegal and accomplished informally, but as there is a lack of government control and occupations are not removed, these privatizations easily become permanent. Moreover, in most cases the process of invasion and appropriation is facilitated by third actors, the land traffickers, who take advantage of that individual or family need, normally a disadvantaged sector of the population, in order to profit from it. Even though they do not have ownership of that space, they manage to exercise possession over it through illegal mechanisms such as extorsions and corruption, and are able to charge users a determined price or fee for that subdivided public area.

2a. Invasion for Housing

This sub-type happens specifically when open public space is invaded to build homes. The space usually used for this is an area that is not conditioned for housing and so presents an urban risk to the population that occupies it. Normally, this sub-type of privatization takes place in the outskirts of the city and close to natural borders, such as on the slopes of the hills that surround Lima, natural and government reserved areas, and next or on top of coastal plains. These are areas that do not have basic services infrastructure such as water or electricity, but are just past the frontiers of the urban expansions that do have them.

One of the natural ecosystems and public spaces that is suffering the most from this type of privatization are the coastal lomas. These are located in the periphery of Lima and host a variety of flora and fauna and, due to the high humidity levels, during the winter and autumn months they get covered in green vegetation in the otherwise desert territory of Lima. They cover almost 20,000 acres of total surface area, distributed in nineteen districts of the city. The lomas provide multiple advantages and benefits for the city of Lima. They have recreational and educational purposes, which in recent years have been incentivized by local groups of residents who have created paths and organized guided tours. They also act as a green border that helps prevent urban risks such as rocks collapsing or landslides, while limiting and controlling the informal and disorganized urban growth.

The National Forest and Wildlife Service (SERFOR), entity attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, designated the lomas as Fragile Ecosystems in 2013. This means that they have high biodiversity and environmental value but are under risk due to the human activities that take place in and around them. Nonetheless, this designation is not effective for their legal protection, which is why since the end of 2019, the lomas were recategorized as part of a new independent Regional Conservation Area (ACR), known as the “System of Lomas in Lima”, which is now legally protected by the National Government.

The lomas exist on the top of the hills, and although the lower areas have already consolidated settlements, new occupations are advancing upwards, occupying the protected areas. The invasions are facilitated by land traffickers’ mafias, who subdivide the space and sell independent lots to families. This sub-type is unique in the phenomenon of privatization as it is the only one where the land is sold, even though the one who sells it is not the owner. The price corresponds mostly to the facilitation process and setting the space for the new construction. The mechanism of invasions is not new. Lima’s urban explosion started in the 1940’s and the city grew from the appropriation of public land. In this time, the government facilitated it by providing ownership certificates in their desperate intention to solve the housing problem in the city. Nonetheless, in recent years, the invasions for housing have shifted and are not led necessarily by people with very few resources and who do not have a place to live. Instead, recent studies have shown that those who buy a lot and build a house on the higher parts of the hill most of the time already own a house in the lower parts, or are the sons or daughters of those residents. The invasion responds to a land speculation process encouraged by land traffickers, where lots are bought with the expectation of being sold at a higher price in the future (Ledgard & García, n.d.).

After the lot is subdivided, there is an immediate appropriation of the space by installing physical elements and building modest huts. Slowly, and depending on the available materials, it can be transformed to a small room or house. Moreover, although each independent lot and building is not very large, the sum of all create a large conglomerate and high degree of physical presence, one that affects and destroys the natural ecosystem and biodiversity that lives there, while also preventing others from accessing and enjoying it.

Although this mechanism is not legal, there is a lack of control and deregulation to avoid it. In addition, there are still legal mechanisms by which an individual, after a certain period occupying that land, can potentially obtain a land title. The first instrument to achieve this is getting a possession certificate, a requirement needed to request the installation of basic services such as water, sewage, and electricity. This certificate is given out by the district municipality only if residents and the location they have invaded meet specific requirements. Some examples are that they need to prove that they have lived in that lot for 10 years (which is difficult to achieve as there are no legal documents to prove that in the first place) or are not occupying government’s reserved area (destined for public services, defense purposes, mining, etc.), archeological or cultural patrimony sites, or Protected Natural Areas (ANP). Nonetheless, sometimes land traffickers have connections with local authorities who facilitate this process even though they do not meet the requirements.

In this sub-type of privatization, the promoters are the land traffickers and the beneficiaries the individuals who build their house and use that land. The dispossessed are residents who are exposed to risk due to invasions. This is because there are new illegal connections to current infrastructure, such as water systems, that are not designed for the additional capacity, and can produce damages and flooding. Also, the new occupations on the slopes exert pressure on the land and increase the risk of collapse over the families located in the lower areas of the hills. Moreover, some residents and people from other parts of the city visit the lomas and use it as a recreational space, as a way to be close to nature and disconnect from the city.

Case Study: Lomas de Amancaes, Comas

Lomas de Amancaes is part of the ecological system of the lomas, located in the district of Comas2. They exist over 400m above sea level, and have a total extension of approximately 340 acres. This area holds an important history, as it has been included in early chronicles which describe the city of Lima, dating from the 1600’s. The name is attributed to the flower of Amancaes, that used to grow wildly in this area, covering

2 Lomas de Amancaes extends to three jurisdictions: Comas, Independencia, and San Juan de Lurigancho. However, for this case study, I have focused on the area that is located in the district of Comas.

the hills completely. Historical archives have demonstrated that the lomas were used as a public space, where different socio-economic classes gathered to enjoy nature. Nonetheless, through time, Lima has followed urban expansion patterns towards the higher parts of the hills, where the lomas de Amancaes are located.

In December 2013, the invasions started in the area, which have continued degrading and reducing this ecosystem. In this time, a group of residents started an initiative to protect it, by getting training and learning about the species that grow there, and planting and watering them. Their purpose was to give value to this unique space and recover its use as a recreational and public space, and as a way to prevent further invasions. They consolidated their association in 2016, creating PAFLA (Environmental Protectors of the Flower and Lomas de Amancaes). They also partnered with other organizations and built paths that allowed them to access the higher parts without negatively affecting the environment, and started to organize guided tours to promote ecological tourism both for the local residents and other people in the city.

Nonetheless, they have continuously been fighting residents who want to occupy the land through invasions. This process of privatization is facilitated by land traffickers, who are current or former local community leaders and hold strong connections and political power. The process starts by subdividing the land and placing poles that define the perimeters of each lot. These are then sold for S/.3000 - S/. 6000 ($900 - $1800) usually to the residents of the lower areas. The space is used to build a house for the residents’ sons Figure 10 Lomas de Amancaes

Top: Before and after the loma’s privatization. Source: Google Earth, annotations by author. Bottom left: View of the lomas during the dry season. Source: Photo by author in 2020. Bottom right: View of the lomas during the wet season. Source: Photo by author in 2019.

and daughters who are starting a new family, as manufacturing spaces to produce garment or shoes, or to sell them to other potential residents for a higher price.

After the subdivision of the lots, the occupation process lasts two days. On the first, the larger rocks located on the hills are broken down either with explosives or by producing high temperatures by burning tires. This then allows to flatten the lot and prepare it for construction. The next day, wooden and metallic poles and plates are used to build a small hut. Although at first the physical footprint is small and seems ephemeral and temporal, the buildings are slowly consolidated either by increasing their size or using new materials. The invasions quickly become permanent as there is no control whatsoever over the land that force people to leave and help them relocate.

The illegal privatization of lomas is motivated by the latent need to access land in order to satisfy people’s livelihood. It responds to the lack of government’s capacity to provide housing in other areas of the city, and to regulate and limit the occupation of these reserved spaces. The Municipality of Comas blames this disorganized growth to the lack of a land use plan for the district. It also attributes this problem to the lack of clear control and relocation procedures provided by other governmental institutions, such as the Ministry of Environment or the Ministry of Housing. Moreover, possession certificates have been given out to lomas settlers during previous Municipal administrations — as a valid document to request the installation of basic services — even though they are located in a protected and risk area. Once they get electricity, water and sanitation infrastructure, the invasion is endorsed by the government and becomes permanent.

Along with PAFLA, there are other organizations that help protect the lomas in other parts of Lima. This has led to the recent creation of the Regional Conservation Area (ACR) of lomas, in December 2019. It includes 13,500 acres of five different lomas of Lima: Ancón, Carabayllo 1 and 2, Lomas de Amancaes, and

Figure 11 Invasions on Lomas de Amancaes

Housing occupations on the lomas. Source: Photo by author in 2019.

Lomas de Villa María. The designation was proposed by the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima and approved by Supreme Decree. The document defines the exact areas and boundaries of the lomas that will be protected and regulated. In addition, a new designated department to deal exclusively with the lomas will be created within the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima. This will consist of a unified authority that controls and protects the natural ecosystem across jurisdictions, and thus does not leave the responsibility to each independent district. Nonetheless, PAFLA has manifested that the document has many limitations. One is that it has not included all the lomas in Lima. Another one is that in Lomas de Amancaes, the official map has left out some areas that were part of the ecosystem, but are now invaded by housing. This means that the Government will not take any action in these sectors, thus endorsing and excusing those occupations. Moreover, as the ACR has a very slow process of implementation, invasions continue to take place on a daily basis.

PAFLA still plays an important role by educating people about the benefits of the lomas. They also fight and patrol invasions frequently. Every time they see invasions-related activity, they call the Municipality of Comas, who sometimes sends the local police to encourage people to leave and stop the illegal occupations. Nonetheless, no strict or sustainable action is taken. When the police decide not to come, the invasions take place and quickly become permanent. Furthermore, the land traffickers are organized in mafias, and threaten residents who take any actions against them, including PAFLA members. As a result of having some residents being scared and passive about the illegal privatization, and others endorsing it because they benefit from it, PAFLA’s endless fight has very few local supporters.

2b. Occupation for Productive Activity

Another form of privatization happens when street space aimed for pedestrians is occupied temporarily to perform a commercial activity as source of income. Although street vending is allowed only in some designated areas of the city and take place under very strict regulations and requirements, there are still spaces that are illegally occupied for a different use than they are expected to serve. This intervention is done by using small furniture or equipment such as carts, boxes, tables, bags, that serve as storage and as a selling stand. The scale of intervention is smaller than in the Invasion for Housing sub-type since the streets are only occupied by the person selling and their products. The physical presence of this form of privatization is thus more permeable than others, as they leave space in between occupations, as well as more temporary. Although sometimes some objects are left permanently on the street, the vendors themselves leave at night and come back every morning to occupy a portion of the street. Similar to the previous sub-type, there also exist street traffickers that illegally charge a fee to allow this use, a form of extortions. When these exist, they are the promoters of the privatization process, taking advantage of the vendors’ necessity to work, who are the beneficiaries.

Sometimes, the local government such as the district municipality step in and remove vendors from the street and take away their merchandise with the excuse that it is illegal. Nonetheless, this usually happens when vendors are few and isolated. Still, there are areas in the city with less government control and high commercial activity that can turn into an almost permanent and dense occupation of vendors. Although the space is activated by the economic activity, there are also negative consequences. The circulatory use of the space is affected: as more people are standing selling objects, they are blocking it and there is less space for pedestrians to walk through. This can present a security risk if there is an emergency, as the space is not prepared to support that type of activity or that capacity of people. Moreover, the merchants who have a commercial space in the adjacent buildings can be negatively affected either by reducing their visibility or having more competition, and thus reducing their sales. Finally, residents who live in the surrounding area can also be affected by being exposed to the risk of other illegal activities, such as delinquency, happening due to the congestion of people and lack of control from authorities.

Case Study: Gamarra, La Victoria

Gamarra is located in the district of La Victoria, and is known because it is the largest and most active commercial and manufacturing area for the garment industry. It receives thousands of visitors every day, and has the highest real estate price in all the city. One can find factories that produce clothing and stores that sell all kinds of materials and finished products. The area comprises a total of 30 blocks and is enclosed with gates as only pedestrians are allowed to enter. The wide streets, which were closed to allow for the daily movement of large amounts of people, in the last years were transformed into a commercial extension of the buildings, as they were occupied by street vendors.

In 2018, the newly elected municipal administration of La Victoria uncovered a corrupt and criminal mafia that operated in Gamarra by renting the street space to vendors. In recent years, different bands organized and took over the territory, distributing the “ownership” of different blocks. They subdivided the public streets into spaces of 1.00m by 1.00m, and offered them to different vendors in exchange of a monthly cost of S/. 1500 – S/. 2000 ($450 - $600). All vendors who wanted to occupy the streets were obliged to pay or else there were threatened. The cost included the protection from authorities and the guarantee that they were not going to be evicted. This was possible because the band leaders were connected to the Municipal authorities, who all received a cut of this payment.

The illegal mechanism of privatization operated as rent and extorsion, taking advantage of the people who needed to make a living by selling their products in the street. Visitors of Gamarra were exposed to a larger offering of products but in a very disorganized and crowded space, turning it into an unsafe place. First- floor store owners were also affected as they had more competition, and their entrances and products were blocked due to the congestion in the street.

The independent and individual footprints of vendors initially created a permeable, flexible, and temporary form of privatization. However, it quickly expanded as they added other equipment and infrastructure that facilitated their economic activity. Kiosks, tables, chairs, and structures to exhibit their products were incorporated and left in the street every night, chained to lighting posts and fire hydrants. The temporality of street vending in Gamarra soon became permanent, and generated physical obstacles that prevented an open and free use of the public street.

Nonetheless, in 2019, the Municipality of La Victoria started a process to recuperate the illegally occupied streets. They worked with the Police Department first to identify the band leaders, who were later captured. During one night of March 2019 they entered Gamarra, accompanied by 3000 police officers. As there were no vendors, they started to clean the streets, removing all the furniture that was left permanent. The next day, all the gates were closed and the entrance was limited only to the few residents who still live in the area. For three days, this important commercial sector of Lima did not operate, as all businesses remained closed. The Municipality’s Economic Development sector started a process to relocate vendors in available commercial spaces throughout the area. Around 1500 people have been relocated, and the rest have moved somewhere else. In order to receive help from the Municipality, vendors have to formalize, which is a challenge for most of the people who work as street vendors.

For the following months of 2019, there was daily policing to control that no vendors take over the street again. However, during January 2020, there were a few vendors selling their products on the streets of Gamarra. As this is still a high-traffic commercial area, it is convenient for street vendors to locate there. When the Municipality is not present they can take their products out and easily move around to sell them, or leave whenever an authority arrives. Nonetheless, visitors and store merchants support the recuperation process as they believe that there is more open space to walk around and the area feels safer.

(Interview 4, Interview 8)

Figure 12 Gamarra

Top left: Area comprised by Gamarra. Source: Google Earth, annotations by author. Top right: Street vendors in Gamarra. Source: rpp.com, 2019. Bottom: Photos of Gamarra after its recuperation. Source: Photos by author, 2020.

Type 3: Enclosure for Control

This third type of privatization is characterized by the process in which any open public space or part of it is enclosed to exert control over it. The promoters can vary from residents who enclose a street to a public institution that manages the space. They privatize for security or surveillance, to restrict the use to specific people, or to be more efficient in its management. The degree of transformation of the space depends on how much area is restricted, and on how its use and character changes after it is privatized. This process can be either legal or illegal. It is achieved by building a physical boundary — such as fence, a gate, or a wall — around the desired area and creating certain regulations that restrict the entrance. The physical footprint of this intervention might be smaller as it is only two dimensional. However, the scale varies according to the total area of public space that is enclosed. Moreover, although the elements for enclosure are permanent, some might be able to open or close (such as gates) and have different degrees of permeability according to the type of barrier used. The dispossessed in Enclosure for Control are the ones that are not allowed to enter the space.

3a. Fences for Security

This sub- type happens when a public street or part of it is enclosed in order to control for security. Peru’s armed conflict, which took place in the 80’s, started a wave of violence and conflict. Since then, the perception of insecurity and crime has been latent in all cities, including Lima. As a consequence, there is an increase in mistrust and fear of the “other”: a person who is considered different due to racial or socioeconomic characteristics, or simply because they do not live in the neighborhood. This has led residents to enclose and privatize spaces by using fences, gates, and walls. This form of privatization can happen at two scales: partial or total. In the first, a family encloses a space in front of their house with fences or walls to create a private garden, to gain more space for their entrance, or to protect their home. In the second, at a larger scale, a whole sector of streets can be closed with gates by the residents, who are concerned about the safety in their neighborhood and feel that the issue is not addressed or controlled by local authorities. In both cases, the enclosed area is attached to a residential use, and consists in a space that solely facilitates an exclusive access to people who live there. This sub-type happens in every district of Lima, even in areas that have developed informally, and does not correspond to a determined socio-economic sector of the population (Vega Centeno, 2017). Results in the Perception Report of Quality of Life 2018 of Lima Como Vamos (citizen observatory) indicates that 41.9% of population approves that in Lima residents should be allowed to install gates for safety reasons. This number does not differ significantly between socioeconomic sectors A/B (43.6%), C (40.4%), and D/E (41.1%) (Lima Como Vamos, 2018). Moreover, the same report of 2019, indicates that 87.8% of the population in Lima believe that public safety is the top problem in the city, and 63.2% of the total population feels unsafe (Lima Como Vamos, 2019a).

Furthermore, there is a legal mechanism for installing gates in Lima. A city ordinance approved in 2004 authorizes them when certain procedures and requirements are met. For example, the group of residents have to be part of an organized and registered Neighborhood Committee. Every citizen should be allowed to enter, because restricting free movement is unconstitutional. To allow this, the gate should always be open unless there is a security guard available to open and close it every time a person or a vehicle wants to enter. However, not all the gates in Lima have an authorization. The most recent study, dated from 2010, looked at 18 districts throughout Lima and indicated that there were 1263 gates in total, from which 91% did not have a legal authorization (ASPEC, 2010). In 2015, a statement from the person in charge of the study indicated that this percentage had increased to 93%, showing that the issue has not improved (Capital, 2015). The problem is that many times the district municipalities endorse the installation of gates by not obliging residents to keep them open or request a formal authorization. One of the municipal authorities who was interviewed indicated that this was because they are aware that they lack the capacity and funds to undertake public safety in a holistic way, and at the end of the day they cannot blame residents for trying to address this issue themselves.

Even though some gates have an authorization, many are not meeting the established requirements. Many times, the residents’ organization is the one that has total control over the portion of the city they enclose, creating their own rules and establishing schedules for opening the gates. The dispossessed in this case are pedestrians who are not residents and whose entrance is denied, or who are required to show identification in order to enter. This access restriction also applies to vehicles, accentuating congestion around these enclosed areas. Additionally, the unregulated privatization has led to major security issues, such as firefighters or ambulances not being able to reach an incident because they could not open a gate. Finally, although this sub-type of privatization provides the perception of greater security, it has not been proven that criminality actually decreases in enclosed areas.

Case Study: Santa Catalina, La Victoria

Santa Catalina is a neighborhood located in the district of La Victoria. It is subdivided into different sectors, all characterized for being enclosed with gates. Zone 42 is one of them, composed of ten blocks of residential buildings and two parks. It has nine gates in total, one for each entrance. They all have two pedestrian doors, one at each side and over the sidewalk, and one door for vehicles over the street. Residents installed the gates around 25 years ago, as a response to recurrent armed robberies they were experiencing in the neighborhood.

The zone has been organized with a neighborhood committee, in that time led by one president, who promoted the enclosure of the streets. The majority of residents were in favor of the gates, and each household paid S/. 50 ($15) to manufacture and install them. They also established the rules and schedules for opening and closing them, which are maintained today. One of the pedestrian doors of each gate is open 24/7. Additionally, only two vehicle accesses are open during the day, one of which is closed during nights and weekends. The rest are permanently closed with a chain and a lock. Out of the other seven locked gates, only two have security guards, which is part of the Municipal requirements to authorize the gates in the first place. The guards hold the key to open it in the case of any emergency. However, they are only hired during the day, so at night the gates are closed for everyone, including residents.

Although the area is enclosed in a single zone, the community is now subdivided and organized by block. Each has a president, who is responsible of taking care of the gate at their end of the street. The group of residents in each block pay for its maintenance and for a security guard. Nonetheless, the reality is that not all residents agree, or have the means to pay for this. This is the reason why not all gates in Zone 42 are in the same condition. Some are well conserved, while others are falling apart by corrosion and lack of maintenance. Moreover, in those two streets that have security guards, not all households pay for them. In Manuel Arrisueño Street, for example, 21 out of 30 households pay the fee of between S/.20 and S/. 50 ($6 - $15) per month.

This form of privatization of streets by the installation of gates has increased the residents’ feeling of security. However, criminality has not been completely reduced. A resident that has lived in the area since before the gates where installed indicated that although car assaults reduced at first, they later experienced home

Figure 13 Location of Gates in Zone 42, Santa Catalina

Left: Map of Zone 42, Santa Catalina. Source: Google Earth, annotations by author. Right: Photo of one of the gates. Source: Photo by author, 2020.

burglaries. This is the reason why six years ago they decided to hire a security guard. They are now facing robberies in motorcycles, which then escape easily through the pedestrian doors. She mentioned that the community is thinking on installing a hinge that has a mechanism to close the door automatically, in order to prevent more crimes. As a result, this form of street privatization has slowly increased the residents’ ownership and control over the public space, restricting the access to outsiders.

(Interview 4, Interview 9)

Figure 14 Entrance Gate in Santa Catalina

Stop signs on one of the gates, currently in bad conditions. Source: Photo by Musuk Nolte..

3b. Entry Fee for Maintenance

This sub-type is characterized by the process in which a fee is charged to the user in order to enter and access the public space. In this case, the space is owned by a public institution that manages it, who is also the promoter of this process. The motivation is to collect the necessary funds to maintain and manage the space. This type of privatization takes place in the Zonal Parks of Lima, large parks located in some of the peripheric districts of Lima. 27 parks were created in 1971 by the military government of President Velasco, who expropriated these lands to provide open public spaces in the outskirts of the city. As Lima grew, they became embedded as part of the urban fabric. Today, only 10 Zonal Parks are left.

Under the Ministry of Housing, Serpar (Lima's Park Services) was created in 1969 to plan, build, and manage metropolitan, zonal, botanical and zoo parks. It was not until 1983 that this institution was transferred as a decentralized entity within the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima. There was an effort to recuperate these parks and conserve them as open public spaces that people living in the periphery and who did not have much access to well-maintained public spaces could access. In the first administration of Mayor Luis Castañeda (2003 – 2006), the parks were renamed and branded as “Zonal Clubs”, to associate them with the private clubs that higher socioeconomic sectors of the population attend. He argued that the lower socio-economic sectors of the population should also have access to exclusive clubs. A series of services and

infrastructure were built inside the parks to offer visitors a new experience, that includes restaurants, swimming pools, mechanical games, picnic and barbeque areas, sports courts, bike lane, mini zoo, among others. Although improving and maintaining the green areas and providing new recreational spaces is beneficial for all users, access to some of them is limited to those who can pay an additional fee.

In this sub-type, the enclosure is done by building a brick wall surrounding the park, limiting not only the physical access, but also the visual access. In some cases, some parts of the borders have a more permeable tall fence instead of walls. There is an ongoing debate in Lima about whether charging an entrance fee is wrong or right. On one side, public space should be accessed by everyone. On the other, public authorities do not have the means to maintain them and believe that making its users pay a fee is an incentive to take care of it. The dispossessed actors are those who cannot afford the entrance fee to physically access the park, and also those who live around it who instead of being able to see the green and recreational areas inside, see a wall.

Case Study: Parque Sinchi Roca, Comas

Sinchi Roca Park, a Zonal Club located in the district of Comas, has a total area of 54 acres and is the largest one in the city. It was established as reserved green space since around 1963, with the objective to serve the urban expansion in the north of Lima. When the park was created, it was enclosed with walls to prevent it from being invaded, as Lima continued to grow and spread outwards. Today, it is one of the most important parks in the North of the city. Almost 50 years after its creation, it is still enclosed by walls and managed by Serpar. It is open from 8:00am to 6:00pm and the admission is conditioned to a fee of S/.3 (Mondays – Saturdays) and S/.4 (Sundays and holidays), with the exception of adults older than 60 and children younger than 4 years old. The wall serves as a mechanism for delimiting the park and its ownership, facilitating its management and opening times, but also as a way of assuring that whoever want to get in, pays the fee.

Along some sections, the wall has been opened up to install fences which allows some permeability and visual access to the park. Although the inside is well maintained and represents a green oasis in the district, the area outside its walls has been completely abandoned. The borders lack sidewalks and appropriate public lighting, and some have become dumps. Overall, it has become an unsafe and neglected continuous border of 3300 meters long. Nonetheless, the park visitors support the fact that the park is enclosed. They believe that this makes it an exclusive and safe space, especially because it is surrounded by areas that are considered unsafe, especially for children and women.

Furthermore, people who can afford the entry fee don’t mind paying for it because they have access to a very well-maintained park, full of vegetation and trees. Compared to the other parks of Comas which are managed by the Municipality, this one is in outstanding conditions. Outside, areas that are supposed to be green have not been watered for years, and have become dusty and abandoned spaces. Moreover, Serpar considers that the entry fee is an important income for the maintenance of their parks, as it would be impossible to take care of them only by using the city’s public funds.

Inside the park, there are numerous recreational amenities and services, some of which are for free (some sports courts, picnic areas, mini zoo) and some of which users have to pay for (games for children, barbeque area, some sports infrastructure, train ride, food kiosks, and the largest swimming pool complex of the country). The ones that are paid are operated by private companies that pay Serpar a fee, and so consist in another important source of profit. The park is fulfilling its role to operate as a club, where families spend money to enjoy its use as a recreational space. This supposedly open public space has geared towards a more private space that encourages consuming and spending, similarly to a mall. Nonetheless the small entry fee, there are still many who cannot afford to pay it, even worse accessing the rest of the paid services.

Furthermore, Sinchi Roca Zonal Club has not only been affected by Type 3 of privatization, Enclosing for Control. It has also been affected by Type 1, Concession for Development. In 2009, a new bus parking space was habilitated in a 7.5 acres area for the Metropolitano, the BRT line of Lima. This was achieved because Serpar signed a contract to rent the space to the companies that manage the Metropolitano. In order to implement this project, hundreds of trees were cut down and the plant nursery was destroyed. Additionally, all the debris from the construction was dumped in the north sector of the park, which was not being used at the time, and was never removed so it is still present today. Moreover, the companies promised the surrounding residents that they would improve the border of the parking space, by adding street furniture and lightning. However, more than ten years later, this project has not yet been implemented.

In December 2019, a new project was announced by the mayor of Lima. This entailed building a switchyard for the Metropolitano buses, needed because the BRT line will be extended. However, there is a Municipal Ordinance from 2014 that indicates that only 15% of the total area of Zonal Parks in Lima can be destined to other uses. With this new project, the area would add up to 10 acres, which consists of 18% of the total park. The plan is to occupy the sector where the debris, which was never removed, is located. The City is using the excuse that this area is underutilized, and that the project will bring transportation and public Figure 15 Sinchi Roca Zonal Club

Top: Aerial view of before and after the Metropolitano’s interventions, and location of the potential new project. Source: Google Earth, annotations by author. Bottom left: Picnic on one of the gardens of the park. Source: Photo by author, 2020. Bottom right: The park’s swimming pools enclosed by fences. Source: Photo by author, 2020.

benefits to the city. As a response, a group of Comas’ residents have created the Sinchi Roca Park Defense Board. They argue that the park should not be transformed for other uses, and are currently fighting against the project. They have indicated that the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima has another area reserved for a switchyard further north of the district. When they have addressed this issue, authorities have expressed that it would be too expensive and would take a longer to implement the project there. This way, Sinchi Roca Park will potentially be privatized with the excuse that it is cheaper and more convenient, mutilating one of the few large parks that are left in the city.

Figure 16 Enclosed entrances in Sinchi Roca Park

Top: Entrance to Sinchi Roca Park. Bottom: Ticket booth to enter the swimming pool area. Source: Photos by author, 2020. This chapter has described three types of privatization, characterized according to the rationale and process followed. Additionally, a case study has been identified to exemplify and explore each one in further detail. The privatization typology raises questions about the reasons why so different ways of privatizing open public space take place in the city of Lima, and how these processes can be stopped and prevented — topics that will be explored in the following chapter.

51 Table 3 Case studies summary table

1. Concession for Development 2. Appropriation for Livelihood 3. Enclosure for Control Characteristics 1a. Transformation 1b. Partial Transfer for 2a. Invasion for 2b. Occupation for 3a. Fences for 3b. Entry Fee for for Redevelopment Commercial Uses Housing Productive Activity Security Maintenance Case study name Primavera Park Castilla Park Lomas de Amancaes Gamarra Zone 42 - Santa Catalina Sinchi Roca Park Location Comas Lince Rimac La Victoria La Victoria Comas Type of public Neighborhood Park District Park Lomas natural ecosystem Streets Streets Zonal Park space Management of Municipality of Comas Municipality of Lince Metropolitan Municipality of Municipality of La Victoria Municipality of La Victoria Serpar (Lima's Park Services), the space Lima (MML) MML Change of use Synthetic grass football Swimming pool, arcade Housing and manufacturing. Street vending Change from a regular street Club with paid swimming court. games, artificial lagoon with to a restricted access street. pool, barbeque area, arcade, boat rides. horse riding, playground, train ride, food kiosks. Active Active Active Space was recuperated but Active Active State of 2017 - 2022 Games and boat rides: 2018 2013 – Today some vendors are still present ~1995 – Today ~2000 – Today Privatization – 2022 / Swimming pool: ~2015 – 2019 2016 - 2036 S/. 60 per hour of use. Games: S/. 4 for visitors, S/. 3000 - S/.6000 for a lot S/. 1500 – S/. 2000 for 1m2. S/.50 per household for the S/. 3 (Monday - Saturday) S/.3 for Lince residents / of 16m2 approximately installation of the gate. S/. 4 (Sunday and Holidays) Cost involved Swimming Pool: S/.140 (4 S/.20 - S/.50 for a day-time Other services vary from classes per month) - S/.270 security guard. S/.3.50 (swimming pool) to (24 classes per a month). S/.15 (picnic and barbeque). Promoter More Grass E.I.R.L Family Park (games and boat Land traffickers (current or Street traffickers (criminal Residents Serpar (in charge of rides). former community leaders). bands). managing the park) Aqualab (swimming pool). Beneficiary Football court users (who Municipality of Lince Residents who buy lots as a Street vendors Residents Users from all over the city afford to pay S/.60 per (through rent). form of investment (reselling), who can afford the entry fee. hour) Users that want to access and or to build a home or a pay for the new services. manufacturing space. Dispossessed Residents who cannot Friends of Parque Castilla PAFLA (Environmental Visitors and costumers, Non-residents and vehicles. People who cannot afford to afford to use the court, (Community Organization) Protectors of the Flower and residents, and first-floor store enter the park or pay for the whose access to the park is Residents and users who Lomas de Amancaes). sellers. services inside. restricted, and who believe oppose to the new paid Residents and people from all they have lost a commercial uses and over the city who visit the community public space. transformations of the park. lomas. Underlying Economic extraction and Economic extraction and Economic extraction Economic extraction Security Economic extraction (for motivations efficiency (for efficiency (for maintenance). Livelihood Livelihood Segregation maintenance) and efficiency maintenance). (security and control). Consequences Access to the park is Paid amenities are enclosed Reduction of the lomas, Pedestrian congestion, safety Exclusion and restriction of Exclusion, restriction of restricted, area has by fences and walls, affecting damage of the unique species risks, decrease in sales for access to non-residents and access to people who cannot become unsafe, park is not and restricting the access to that live there (flora and non-street vendors. vehicles. Safety risk if afford the fee. maintained or watered. the park, both physically and fauna) and exposure to risk emergency vehicles need to visually. (collapse, flooding). enter.

Chapter 5

Findings: Who, Why, How?

5.1 Who privatizes open public spaces?

As described in the typology framework, privatization can be promoted and carried out by different actors, such as private companies, street or land traffickers, residents, or public institutions. Thus, this process takes place both top-down and bottom-up. Type 1, Concession for Development, is a top-down process, as it is promoted by the government in partnership with private entities. Type 2, Appropriation for Livelihood, is bottom-up as it is led by citizens and residents who respond to a need in the absence of the state to fulfill it. Finally, Type 3, Enclosure for Control can be either bottom-up (sub-type Fencing for Security, led by residents) or top-down (sub-type Entry Fee for Maintenance, promoted by a governmental institution).

Every person in the city can be or become a promoter, as this phenomenon is not led by a unique actor. Nonetheless, all types of privatization do have a cross-cutting governmental institution that facilitates these processes: district municipalities. These play an important role and are accountable for privatization. In Type 1, their role is to actively promote privatization through investment and interventions from private companies. In Type 2, their absent behavior facilitates privatization by failing to control or regulate invasions. In Type 3, their passive behavior endorses and justifies the installation of gates and walls to achieve safety and a more efficient management. Finally, the role that district municipalities play — and what they do or decide not to do — directly influences what happens to open public spaces.

5.2 Why are open public spaces privatized?

Privatization of open public spaces can happen for multiple reasons. Nonetheless, in Lima there are some structural conditions at a city scale that act as the foundation and enable this phenomenon to happen. These include having a fragmented governance of open public spaces in the city, which leads to an indifferent state of authority and lack of control. Likewise, there is a conflict between policies that promote private developments and investments and a lack of those that protect open public spaces, which leads to their neglect and abandonment. In addition to these conditions, there is also an external motivation that encourages actors to privatize: the need or desire for economic extraction and to make a profit out of this process (Figure 17).

Figure 17 Reasons why open public spaces are privatized

Indifferent State of Authority and Lack of Control

Governance in the city of Lima is atomized and decentralized to different districts and institutions. The administration of open public spaces also reflects this fragmentation, as it is left to different public entities. Most of the time, municipalities or other institutions in charge do not have the economic means and technical capacities to manage and maintain public spaces. This lead, on one hand, to an indifferent and weak state of authority. As their range of action is limited, they do not take responsibility or accountability on not being able to fulfill that role. When the government is not present, residents see the opportunity or need to fend for themselves in order to meet their demands however they think is appropriate. This applies to the invasion and enclosing of open public spaces: if the government is responsible but unable to provide housing, economic development, or safety, privatization of open public spaces is a logical means to address those issues. In addition, if public institutions are incapable of maintaining public spaces, they sometimes retreat and relegate this responsibility to private companies through concession contracts.

The indifferent state of authority towards open public spaces reveals that public institutions such as municipalities may prefer to focus on other challenges, such as road maintenance or diminishing delinquency. However, there is one that seems to be the most important: collecting taxes. It is well known that not all residents pay their taxes, and that this number is higher in districts with lower socioeconomic status. In response, administrations offer and highly advertise discounts or postpone deadlines to encourage contributions. In the district of Rimac, for example, only 35%-40% of the district’s population pay their taxes, and there are some residents that have not paid them for more than 10 years (Interview 3). Although this is certainly an issue that affects the capacity of public institutions to deliver on what they are supposed to — such as taking care of open public spaces — officials often blame their planning gaps and challenges solely on lack of funding due to people in their jurisdiction not paying their taxes. Nonetheless, this is a manifestation of the more structural challenge of having an atomized institutional governance that also

translates in financial fragmentation. As a result, richer districts can afford to have better and well- maintained open public spaces, and poorer ones end up suffering the consequences.

Moreover, sometimes there is not a clear governance structure of open public spaces that have a metropolitan character (e.g., lomas, metropolitan parks, main streets, etc.). Public institutions act as if the management, control, and maintenance of these spaces are not part of their responsibilities, mostly because there are blurred jurisdictional boundaries or overlaps in the sense of ownership. They all assume, conveniently, that it is someone else’s responsibility, and enter a blame game where at the end no one takes any action or control. A representative case where this happens is Lomas de Amancaes. Before being designated a Regional Conservation Area (ACR) in 2019, the lomas officially belonged to the National Superintendence of State Assets (SBN), which meant that it was a public space owned by the government. The biodiversity and preservation of species in these areas was sometimes managed by sub institutions of the Ministry of Environment, such as SERFOR (National Forest and Wildlife Service). In addition, Lomas de Amancaes extends across three different districts’ jurisdictions: Rimac, San Juan de Lurigancho, and Independencia. In theory, all public entities, including municipalities, have to safeguard the government’s properties that are located in their jurisdiction, as they are public sector representatives. Nonetheless, when interviewed, an official of Rimac Municipality stated that the reason why they could not take any action against invasions in the lomas is that they were not entitled to do so. To him, it was not clear who was in charge of the administration of this open public space and natural ecosystem, so that if they took any action there could be negative reprisals against the institution (Interview 3).

On the other hand, and as a consequence of the indifferent state of authority, there is also a lack of control from the public sector. This enables promoters to accomplish all types of privatization. As there is little or no official supervision of these open public spaces, privatizations take place in the eyes of residents and authorities who do not do anything about it. In the case of Primavera Park, for example, residents mentioned that the private company More Grass E.I.R.L arrived unexpectedly one day to transform their neighborhood park. The new construction did not comply to any procedural regulations and permits, which would have included being carried out by certified construction workers, wearing a specific protection uniform, and taking other safety measures. The intervention was improvised and unannounced, and happened just nine blocks away from the Comas Municipality building (Interview 6).

Furthermore, in cases where groups of residents enclose their streets with unauthorized gates, authorities usually do not take any action to take them out, although most of the times they are aware that this is happening. For example, when interviewing the Comas Municipality official, he acknowledged that in some areas of the district, some portions of streets and pedestrian passages had been added to people’s property and were used as an extension of their private home. During the interview, he showed me images of this on Google Street View, demonstrating that he knew exactly where this was happening, but mentioned that is was very hard for the municipality to control it (Interview 1) (Figure 18). Moreover, when interviewed, the Rimac Municipality official recognized how residents in the more consolidated neighborhoods of the district had enclosed complete streets with gates. He mentioned that although they were not regulated and authorized, the municipality had to accept that they were doing it to protect themselves, as he acknowledged that they did not have enough resources to allocate to public safety (Interview 3).

Another issue related to the lack of control of open public spaces is that privatization efforts become permanent very easily. Whatever apparent innocent physical intervention that can seem small, ephemeral or temporary — a pole, a bench, a hut, a tent, a fence, etc. — will extend, take hold, and become permanent in a very short time. An interview with the former Oversight Manager of La Victoria revealed that it just takes one day for street vendors in Gamarra to arrive and stay. The control and supervision need to be constant and on a daily basis: as soon as it stops, vendors find the time and space to occupy, leave any physical elements, and privatize the space (Interview 4).

Figure 18 Google Street View in Av. El Retablo, Comas

Source: Google Maps (images from April 2014).

In addition, there is a popular perception and mindset to accept that whatever is already in place in the public space cannot be removed or changed, even if it is illegal or goes against the norms. This is the reason why cases of stoppage or recuperation of privatized public spaces are very hard to find or achieve. Promoters and beneficiaries who privatize believe and act as if they have the right to stay once they have settled. Evidently, because privatization is the result of the lack of government’s capacity to provide a solution to basic needs, this applies to illegal processes such as appropriation or enclosing. However, it also applies to legal concessions. Even though some irregularities have been reported in the contracts of Castilla Park and Primavera Park case studies, the private entities involved continue to operate because they hide behind a legal instrument as a mechanism of privatization. Moreover, the perception of permanency also comes from public authorities who should be controlling privatization. In my interviews with municipality officials, they acknowledged how it is almost impossible to remove and relocate people who have invaded open public space, eliminate gates that residents have installed and invested on (and whenever they would take any action, they would just break the lock and encourage residents to keep them open), or dismiss companies that have a contract that allows them to operate in the public space (Interview 1, Interview 2, Interview 3).

Promotion of Private Developments and the Neglect Towards Open Public Spaces

The indifferent state of authority and lack of control illustrate how taking care of open public spaces is not a high priority for public entities. The role of these spaces and their definition is not clear or consistent across institutions or citizens — another main reason why privatization happens. On one hand, there is a lack of policies that promote or protect these spaces, and on the other, there are several that aim to promote private developments and investment, even when it happens in public spaces. Current regulations — included at the national and metropolitan levels — indicate that public domain properties can be conceded to private entities for their economic use, and as a matter of fact this happens with no control on how much area or in the way this process takes place. One popularly used model is the Public Private Association, that allows the government to partner with a private entity to develop and manage a project that is needed for the public. The problem is that this process is dominated by a market logic, determining the projects and conditions according to profitability, and not necessarily prioritizing the most important public needs.

Policies that promote private investments have resulted from the neoliberal economic reforms and the Constitution of 1993, where the state changed its role and merely became a regulator. Its role in city planning weakened, and is currently guided and defined by private investment frameworks. The private sector is thus seen as the solution and enabler to promote city development — which is always seen as economic growth — as public institutions do not find the technical and financial resources to achieve so. City governance focuses on attracting businesses that are willing to invest, and with this goal, the public

policies that govern are designed to serve consumers and not citizens. As a consequence, the conception of what is private dominates and is more valued that what is public.

In contrast, at a policy and legislative level, there are no laws or ordinances that explicitly define the role of local governments in managing open public spaces; these focus solely on green spaces. The result is that public spaces are not always maintained and thus are neglected. Of course, this is worst in poorer neighborhoods where municipalities have a smaller budget to invest on them. As a consequence, public spaces that are abandoned end up being considered as “empty” and residual spaces. This provides the perfect excuse for privatization: if public spaces cannot be maintained, then they should be used or have the potential of becoming something else. In all three types, the processes of privatization are embraced as a solution for improving a public space that was neglected by the institution that manages it.

In Type 1, Concession for Development, interviews with different resident groups and organizations revealed how, when local municipalities support and want to negotiate with a private entity the development of a project in an open public space, authorities intentionally abandon it. They stop watering and pruning the plants, picking up the garbage, and cleaning it. As a consequence, the space becomes unattractive and sometimes even dangerous. This then becomes the perfect setting to propose the new development, since that will bring a solution to the neglected space and relieve the municipality of spending their public budget on the maintenance or recovery (Interview 6, Interview 12, Interview 16, Interview 17). In some cases, mostly when there is a certain level of organization within the community, residents take care of the public space by their own means, by watering the plants with water from their home, pruning the trees, picking up garbage and cleaning up, or even building furniture.

In Type 2, Invasion for Livelihood, the neglect of the open public spaces turns them into no-one’s land, and hence are considered as empty spaces that are not currently in use. In the case of the lomas, invasions happen mostly during summer because it is their dry season and the vegetation disappears completely leaving slopes of bare earth. In contrast to the winter season when everything is covered in dense vegetation, this geography facilitates the invasion and subdivision of the cleared land. Additionally, as the lomas’ boundaries were just recently defined — with their designation as a Regional Conservation Area (ACR) — they are not yet physically delimited, and promoters can argue that they did not know that it belongs to a natural ecosystem and thus should not occupy them. They consider it to be residual land that is available and needed by them to build a home. Although invasions happen because of neglected public spaces, they are certainly also a result of the lack of housing policies and government’s capacity to provide a fair solution for this need. In the case of Gamarra, the occupation of streets for vending arises from a lack of policies that promote economic development, job creation or ultimately provide street vendors with a safe space to work. Finally, in Type 3, Enclosing for Control, the open public space is neglected in the sense of public safety and efficient maintenance, prompting promoters to respond by installing a physical boundary and privatizing the space.

Privatization for Economic Extraction

As mentioned before, privatization takes place due to the structural conditions at a city scale that act as the foundation and enable this process. Furthermore, although all types happen in response to a specific necessity that the promoter identifies, there is one underlying motivation that is cross-cutting to all. This is achieving economic extraction or receiving a monetary benefit from privatization, at an individual or enterprise scale. In this process, a capital value and a sense of a more “productive” use is assigned to the privatized land that is supposed to be open, public, and free. In addition, privatization is always associated with a cost that the beneficiary has to pay in order to use that space. This logic applies to every type, no matter if it involves a legal or illegal process. Nor does it matter who the promoter is: the public sector, a private entity, or an individual or community.

In Type 1, the government considers privatization as a means to increase their economic profit, by receiving tax contributions and/or renting the public space. Sometimes, the agreement does not even establish a direct economic gain. Nonetheless, the public entity supports and facilitates the process as it is relieved from spending public money on the maintenance of the open public space or the provision of new services, transferring these responsibilities to the private entity. In a context where municipalities have a low budget and where usually not all the population in the district pay their taxes, privatization provides a solution.

In addition, privatization is done with the excuse that it will bring improvement and new services to the area, which could not otherwise be provided if it was not done by a private company. However, the newly offered amenities are not free: they always imply that beneficiaries will have to pay to access them. The case of Primavera Park is a clear example of this, where the contract between the Municipality of Comas and the company More Grass E.I.R.L. is titled as the “Agreement for the Revitalization of the Primavera Park”. Despite this, the beneficiaries of the football court and supposed improvement of the park have not received what was established in the agreement. Instead of the revitalization, the consequences of privatization have included decline, unsafe conditions, additional costs, and exclusion from the park.

Furthermore, when a private company wants to build a new development project in an open public space, there are usually alternatives of available land for the construction, such as a regular private lot in front of the public space. Nonetheless, privatizing a neglected and “empty” space appears as the most convenient and profitable solution, as it provides a source of revenue to both promoters and facilitators such as district municipalities. In the case of Manhattan Park, for example, — to be described in greater detail later — a new commercial project was about to be built on the park, even though there were private lots in front of it with the adequate size and zoning required for the development. However, privatizing it resulted as an easier solution to the private company for two reasons. First, the land was empty and ready to be built, implying that no money or time would be spent in demolitions. Second, it was more profitable, because after negotiations, the rental cost they were going to pay was much lower than the market price of buying or renting another lot next to the park. For the Comas Municipality, it was also a convenient option because they would receive an extra monthly revenue source. Certainly, in this type of privatization private entities are the ones that benefit the most from the process. They earn money by offering and operating their services in an advantaged location, and they gain larger profit margins by paying only a small or even nonexistent rent for the public space they privatize.

In the second type of privatization, the actors who take the land and privatize it take advantage and respond to a need that people cannot otherwise fulfill, such as housing or developing an economic activity. The promoters, both land and street traffickers, benefit economically from this process and act in a similar way to the private companies in Type 1. A portion of the public space is sold or rented following the processes of real estate markets. Beneficiaries have to pay the price for their ability and opportunity to access and occupy the space. In this case, there is no responsibility from promoters towards the community — such as assuming the maintenance of the public space and its surroundings — or a rental payment to municipalities. They are able to make a profit for free, by exploiting and illegally invading and subdividing open public spaces that they do not own.

In the third type of privatization, establishing safety measures and increasing control and segregation is also seen as an improvement to the area that will lead to an economic benefit. A safer or more exclusive neighborhood will become a more enjoyable and desirable place to live, and will ultimately increase the value of the land and real estate prices. In the interview with a Santa Catalina resident, she mentioned how in recent years more office spaces and businesses have moved to the area now that it feels safer — a proxy for showing that the neighborhood has become more attractive compared to previous years. (Interview 10). In this type there is also a cost assigned to the use of the privatized space, which can be by paying an entrance fee, a monthly quota for a security guard, or for installing a new gate.

In all types of privatization, the promoters are the primary beneficiaries. They extract economic value from the open public space while taking advantage of others’ needs. Additionally, paying for the use or occupying a public space in order to achieve that need gets normalized in everyday life. This applies to all beneficiaries: residents wanting to access amenities that would not otherwise be installed or offered by the local municipality; people needing housing or a space to work; residents attempting to improve public safety; and, in the case of Zonal Parks, residents and citizens wanting to access a green and well-maintained space that they cannot find elsewhere and use for free. The structural problem is evidently that, on one hand, both citizens and institutions are assigning an economic value and lucrative role to a space that should be open and free-of-charge to use. On the other hand, users, as beneficiaries, have become consumers that are willing to pay in order to use and access open public spaces. This raises the larger question of who should benefit: these spaces should instead be valued for their social, environmental, cultural, and health benefits — not only to the surrounding community, but to the whole city.

5.3 How is Privatization Stopped?

As described in the previous section, there are structural conditions and motivations that allow privatization to happen and lead to the possibility of anyone turning into a promoter. Top-down efforts to stop privatization that have been led by the government have normally addressed types of privatization that are bottom-up, such as Invasion for Livelihood and some forms of Enclosing for Control. However, these have not been effective or have not lasted long before new initiatives of privatization emerged. They have been unsustainable, one-time solutions that have not focused on the root cause. They have been mostly done by displacement and enforcement, instead of providing an alternative to promoters and beneficiaries such as people who do not have a home or a place to work. As a result, as soon as the control and state of authority relaxes and diminishes, promoters return to privatize the open public space. Only recently, there have been efforts to address this phenomenon in a more holistic way, with projects such as the creation of the Regional Conservation Area (ACR) that protects the lomas, and two bills presented in 2016 that aim to establish guidelines for the management and concessions of open public spaces.

Nonetheless, as all types of privatization processes are somehow supported, ignored, or endorsed by public entities, the cases of stoppage have mostly been bottom-up, emerging as a reaction from residents or citizens who up rise and fight against privatization. In the three types described, there are cases where community groups respond in protest, and self-organize to try and stop these processes. Nonetheless, there are numerous challenges they face in this battle, which makes the defense of open public spaces very hard to accomplish. As a result, the cases of privatization far outnumber the cases where it has been stopped.

Stopping Privatization and its Challenges

One of the reasons why privatization is difficult to stop is that the groups and communities that fight against it lack support, guidance, and access to information about what can be done to achieve their goal. The groups emerge as a reaction to a problem and an injustice they experience, and in order to try to stop it, they have to invest their time and money as activists. This is a big challenge in contexts where residents have fewer resources and need to work extra hours to make a living. Similar to public entities, when they assess their life priorities, fighting against privatization does not rise to the top for most of them.

Furthermore, there is a lack of transparency in the processes followed to achieve privatization and a lack of citizen awareness about which interventions are authorized or not (given that illegal or informal processes are often allowed simply because they are not controlled or punished). In the middle of bureaucratic processes and normalized corruption practices, citizens do not know what possibilities and legal mechanisms are available to stop privatization processes. They lack access to resources that can help them build their case and direct their demands to the adequate institutions.

Moreover, there is a popular sense that even if they protest, nothing will happen. This is based in the lack of trust in public institutions and on their own past experiences of not being heard and helped by the government. Sometimes, NGOs support communities in their fight against privatization by helping them access resources and guide them in their legal actions. Additionally, all of the interviewed groups attested to ways that social media could be a useful tool to communicate and share their case and claims — but that it was not enough. In some cases, such as Manhattan Park, the fights are made visible because they are shared in local media, which helps to create awareness and add pressure to local institutions.

Furthermore, most of the times the community groups fighting privatization start with the support from a large number of people, but it soon reduces as the work and actions needed increase. In the case studies where these groups exist, they are comprised of between six and eleven active members. When interviewing two members of PAFLA (Environmental Protectors of the Flower and Lomas de Amancaes), they described how many of the community members watch them do the conservation work in the lomas, and they thank them and verbally show support. However, when a time comes when they are needed to go and help out in these activities, they all present an excuse for not being able to attend (Interview 8). Unfortunately, being represented by a small group contributes to the perception of being a weak collective, and they are easily dismissed and ignored by public institutions.

Sometimes, the groups are small because they exist within a fragmented community, where part of it supports privatization and another opposes it. This takes place mostly because there is not a strong community organization or structure. Opinions are divided, residents are uninterested in taking part of it, and as a result there is not a cohesive representation throughout the community. In all types of privatization, the beneficiaries approve of the initiative because they are the ones who use the transformed and privatized open public space. In the sub-type of Type 2 (Appropriation for Livelihood), Invasion for Housing, the land traffickers (promoters) and people who build their home in the lomas (beneficiaries) are also the residents who live around the area — this is why groups such as PAFLA have a hard time finding substantial support.

In Type 1, Concession for Development, a similar issue arises in the two case studies. In Castilla Park, although there is an active group defending and promoting the conservation of the park, there are many residents who use the privatized services and benefit from them. Thus, they do not join the fight against privatization. In the case of Primavera Park, there are only two residents who have presented formal complaints for the irregularities found in the contract between More Grass E.I.R.L and the Municipality of Comas. However, there are some residents who live right next to the park that are connected to the private company and who use the space, and believe that having it in the current condition is better than having an abandoned and arid park.

Similarly, in other cases residents encourage privatization as an exchange of favors: the private company can intervene in their public space, but in exchange the privatizers have to improve it and keep it in good conditions. In a context where municipalities do not maintain the neighborhood’s public spaces, this acts as a convenient measure for communities that prefer to give away part of the space rather than keep the whole of it in a neglected state. This has happened in many spaces throughout Lima, where new paid football courts have appeared or where telecommunications antennae have been installed in the middle of a park or plaza, with the support of the local community, in exchange of the company keeping the park green and clean (Interview 17).

In the Entry Fee for Maintenance variant of Type 3, users of Sinchi Roca Park support the fact that it has become a “club” and that it is surrounded by a wall. In the interview with a former Serpar (Lima’s Park Services) official, she mentioned how in the participatory process of redesigning the Zonal Parks of Lima, users opposed the idea of opening up the borders and removing the walls. Since those parks were located in unsafe neighborhoods, they valued the way their enclosure allowed them and their families to feel safer

and enjoy a better maintained space (Interview 5). In all types of privatization, the community is somehow polarized in their position towards privatization, and so the fight against this process is harder to achieve.

An additional challenge for stopping privatization is that often informality and criminality hide behind the apparent legality of the mechanisms used for privatizing open public spaces. These processes can rely on a legal instrument such as a law, regulation, or document that supports the concession, invasion, or enclosure, but sometimes the processes to achieve them are informal. There is a lack of thoroughness to ensure community participation and decision making about whether they support or resist the privately-initiated intervention. In the case of Manhattan Park, for example, representatives of the private entity that proposed the project maintained that there were some representatives of neighborhood councils participating in the negotiation meetings led by the Municipality of Comas. However, when the protests started, the company realized that they did not actually represent the overall neighborhood voice, and that the rest of the community was not aware of the project or of those meetings (Interview 13).

Additionally, even though sometimes the privatization processes include irregularities that are reported by residents or another governmental institution, municipalities still do not take immediate action. This is based on the fact or excuse that they have signed and approved a legal contract, which is complex to terminate and takes a long time to solve. This happened in Castilla Park, where in March 2019 the new administration presented a document indicating flaws in the agreement, but at the time of this writing the company Family Park is still in operation.

In other cases, there might be corruption or illicit connections with local authorities, or other types of crimes such as extortion. Linkage to any type of criminal activity does more than facilitate the process of privatization. It also discourages the fight from community members and enables the lack of control from the government. Sometimes promoters are part of criminal bands or mafias who threaten residents or activists fighting privatization. As a result, many people who would be against it decide not to take any action because they fear that they or their families will be harmed. This happened in the case of Primavera Park, which has only two active members fighting against its privatization. Many other residents decided not to take part because they have received multiple threats by people connected to the football court managers. The case of Gamarra also delimited community control because the street traffickers’ bands were connected to officials at all levels of La Victoria Municipality. This not only encouraged the illegal rent of the public streets (as they all received a cut), but also facilitated the lack of monitoring by the local police.

Case Study of Bottom-up Stoppage: Manhattan Park and CADNEP

Manhattan Park, already briefly described, is located in the San Felipe neighborhood in the district of Comas. It has a total open area of 19,864 m2 and contains different recreational amenities such as football and basketball courts, a running track, a children’s playground, and green spaces. In 2003, the municipality reduced the park by enclosing part of it with walls, in order to create a new municipal swimming pool. Nonetheless, it was not able to maintain it and the area was permanently closed for numerous years. In 2016, the park had already been neglected by the public institution in charge, which had not watered the plants for multiple months, and much of the infrastructure maintenance had needed to be implemented by the residents who lived around it.

This year, a Park Committee was created through residents’ elections, and was recognized by the Comas Municipality as the co-managers of the park. In the same year, the municipality started negotiations with InRetail Properties, a private company that owns many businesses in the country, including supermarkets, cinemas, shopping malls, among others. The intention was to build a new supermarket and commercial complex, occupying 7,667m2 of the park, equivalent to 38.6%. of the space. To accommodate this, part of the track, two football courts, and around 60 trees were going to be destroyed. This was promoted both by the private company and the municipality with the excuse of providing new commercial services to San

Felipe neighborhood. The company would contribute a monthly rent to the Municipality of Comas, and pay almost 3 millions of soles to be destined to the renovation and maintenance of the park. Additionally, the football courts were going to be replicated on the supermarket’s rooftop. The concession contract would last for 40 years.

These negotiations were done behind closed doors, and according to residents, they were not involved in public meetings or any participation processes. On September 2016, the new development was declared of public interest. This term is applied to a case when a municipality is interested in developing a project in partnership with a private entity. After internal negotiations and approval from the municipal council, local governments publish this declaration in the official governmental newspaper; outlining the motivation to carry out the project and the responsibilities and agreement from both parts. Then, there is a period of 120 days in which any citizen can formulate an observation or complaint. If none is received, the project moves forward.

Figure 19 Maps and photos of Manhattan Park

Top: Images of Manhattan Park and the area destined to the new commercial project. Source: Google Earth, annotations by author. Bottom left: Park activation and interventions in 2016. Source: Photo by Ocupa Tu Calle, 2016. Bottom right: Current state of the park. Source: Photo by author, 2020.

In the case of Parque Manhattan, on the second week after the publication, they had already received two complaints. There had been some rumors about the project, but when municipal officials were asked about it, they denied knowledge. The community disapproved of the lack of transparency and public involvement in the process, but most of all they complained that their neighborhood park was going to be transformed into a shopping mall. In my interviews with them, they stated that they did not oppose the opportunity to access new commercial amenities. They were against the fact that a private entity was going to build on top and destroy their park, when there was other available land around that could be designated for this use. When residents protested against the private initiative, the municipality declared invalid their official title as Park Committee, taking away their legal representation and diminishing their power to complain. Nonetheless, this group emerged as the Let’s Save Manhattan Park collective, and carried out a series of actions to help defend their park and stop the privatization process. One of the reasons for their success was their strong organizational capacity and their ability to gain support from a large number of residents who lived around the park, and others who lived nearby but used the park regularly.

From the private company’s point of view, the rejection of the project was mainly due to a lack of communication and community engagement during the process. In an interview, they argued that residents attacked them during the visits they made to the park to present the project. According to them, people misinterpreted the design layout and model, and assumed that a larger portion of the park was going to be intervened upon, even though only part of it was going to be transformed. In their communication strategy, the promoters used photos of totally abandoned sectors of the park, seeming thereby to generalize that all of it was an empty wasteland, and that their intervention will bring improvement (Figure 20). In addition, they contended that residents should welcome the project, as it would increase the land and property values and benefit them economically. Nonetheless, there was a clear disconnect: these were not the community’s priorities. They were fighting a greater cause.

Figure 20 Advertisement of the new project, by the Municipality of Comas

Source: Lozada Acosta, 2018.

In February 2018, the collective succeeded in rejecting the privatization process and project. One of the municipal councilors ended up supporting their actions and brought the issue to the Office of the Comptroller General. It produced a report indicating a series of irregularities in the process, and denied the concession for two main reasons. First, although the park was managed by the Municipality of Comas,

the land where the park was located did not have the legal and physical titling and had not been registered in the Public Records. Because of this, it could not be legally owned by the municipality, and so it was not able to give it in concession. Additionally, they found that the rental cost of the public space was valued much lower than what the company would have paid if they rented another lot around the park. The negotiation determined a cost of $1.75 per square meter, when the real estate price around the neighborhood was actually $100 per square meter. Nonetheless, residents argued that the final decision to withdraw the negotiations was more political than legal, as the Comas mayor at that time was initiating his reelection campaign, and public opposition to the project would not favor him.

According to representatives of the Let’s Save Manhattan Park collective, their success was due to an effective defense strategy that was based on three elements: activation, legal defense, and media coverage. The first was done in response to the municipality and private company that argued that the park was abandoned and in a bad condition. Community members organized to clean the space, plant new trees, build furniture, encouraged groups to use the space to practice dance and play sports, and organized activities such as outdoors movies, theatre plays, and fairs. The intention was to show that the park was being used and that it had great potential to offer the whole neighborhood. The second aimed to achieve successful stoppage through legal mechanisms that uncovered and reported irregularities in the process. Finally, they aimed to press stakeholders by mobilizing external voices. They were able to broadcast their fight and transmit it to popular opinion beyond San Felipe neighborhood and Comas district. They did so successfully, as many local media became interested in this case and supported the fight by disseminating their story. Additionally, the collective was supported by Ocupa Tu Calle, an NGO that intervenes and recuperates public spaces in Lima, which added an extra layer of exposure.

The popularity of this case of privatization prevention also served to start conversations about the defense of open public spaces throughout the city. It allowed other groups, acting independently, to reveal their similar efforts and learn from the Manhattan Park experience. Some groups started to meet regularly to help and support each other, which led in 2017 to their consolidation as a citizen collective. It is now called CADNEP (Citizens Activating and Defending Our Public Spaces), and is formed by eight community groups that experienced or are currently experiencing a fight of some sort to protect open public spaces in five different districts in Lima. Their objective is “to create consciousness about the lack and loss of open public spaces, in their quality and quantity” (Huilca & CADNEP, 2019, p. 4) and in this effort they aim to share their experiences and help guide other groups in stopping privatization.

(Interview 1, Interview 12, Interview 13, Interview 16)

An Attempt at Top-down Stoppage: Bill in Defense of Public Spaces

Recently, some attempts to stop privatization processes and highlight the value that open public spaces have in the city have been implemented from government institutions. As mentioned before, many of them address types of privatization that are bottom-up, where the processes are led by residents or communities and not by private entities or institutions. Two examples are the creation of the Regional Conservation Area (ACR) of the lomas, or the recuperation of the streets of Gamarra, both described in the case studies. Nonetheless, since these are very recent, it will take some time before their success can be evaluated.

Nonetheless, there are currently two national bills that aim to regulate the management of public spaces and protect them from privatization. Both were proposed by two congresswomen who have been involved with citizen collectives that fight privatization, such as CADNEP. The two bills, N° 1311/2016 and N°1312/2016, were created in 2016 after a series of workshops and discussions with more than 20 organizations. The first is titled “Law for the management of public spaces” and establishes the principles and rules for the administration of public spaces using mechanisms such as plans (at the province and district levels), inventories, and registration records. The second is titled “Law for the protection of public spaces”

and establishes a regulatory framework to protect public spaces from concessions. It also creates mechanisms for the processes to be more transparent and involve public participation. The bill stipulates that concessions cannot change the public use or restrict citizen access. Instead, concessions need to complement the recreational use of the spaces. Moreover, the profit gained by this privatization process must be directly reinvested in the maintenance and improvement of the public space.

In addition, a maximum of 15% of the space is allowed to be given in concession, and the intervention should be dispersed and not concentrated in one single area. The intention is to promote smaller and more ephemeral physical interventions that do not affect and change the essence of the public space. In conversations with some organizations, some people expressed a more wholesale opposition to any possibility of concession, arguing that open public spaces should remain as such in their totality. However, concessions are allowed by the current Peruvian Constitution, and the bill could not propose something that was against it as it would be unconstitutional. Therefore, as there is a legal mechanism that allows private companies to potentially intervene public spaces however they want, these bills aim to establish a maximum area of intervention and set guidelines that help control it.

The proposed bills and reports were approved by the Congress’ Decentralization Commission in May 2018, and supported by other institutions such as the Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of Environment. It awaited a vote in the plenary session, but in September of 2019 President Martin Vizcarra dissolved the Congress due to political conflicts (but following constitutional measures). In March 2020, the new Congress initiated their duties, and is expected to vote for these bills during the current Congressional period. Finally, the goal is not only to legally control the first type of privatization, Concession for Development, but also to advocate for the importance of open public spaces as a part of the public agenda, and to provide citizens with a powerful tool to demand their conservation.

This chapter has discussed the findings from the research and interviews, and examined the actors involved in privatization processes and the reasons for why this phenomenon persists. I have also explored efforts to curtail it, revealing both challenges and lessons. Although three types of privatization can be defined as distinct, this section has also demonstrated just how many of the answers to these questions are cross-cutting to all of them. In the next concluding chapter, I will reflect on why the phenomenon of privatization is critical, who is most affected by it, and what planning recommendations can help alleviate it.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

The objective of this thesis has been to find under what conditions and in what ways open public spaces are privatized. Three different types — Concession for Development, Appropriation for Livelihood, and Enclosure for Control — have been identified according to the rationales that are followed, uncovering the different processes, mechanisms, motivations, and actors involved in each one. As final conclusions, I want to address why all types of privatization should be considered as part of the same phenomenon, but reflect on how and why all types are not equally detrimental. Although the phenomenon happens at the city level and throughout different socioeconomic sectors and geographic areas, not all neighborhoods and constituencies are equally affected by it. Finally, I will provide some recommendations that aim to alleviate and stop privatization processes, in order to increase the quality and quantity of open public spaces in Lima.

6.1 Privatization as One Phenomenon: The Effects and Consequences at the City Scale

There are three reasons why the all types of privatization studied need to be considered as part of the same phenomenon, and thus need to be captured by the same term. First, they can all be encompassed by the same definition. Second, the reasons why this process takes place cross-cut all three types; and third, all have similar consequences at the city scale.

From the point of view of definition, privatization is the process in which an open public space — defined as areas in the city that are open, government owned, free and accessible to all, and for collective purposes and functions — is dispossessed from all citizens. This dispossession takes place when an open public space is transformed and the concepts that make up its definition are altered. Privatization transforms its openness by building on top of previously-open space, its ownership if it is conceded to another private actor (even temporarily), its accessibility if it restricts the ability of people to enter in any way, and its function if there is a change of use that alters its purpose of being a space that fosters inclusion and interaction between the collective of all citizens.

Moreover, there is no doubt that privatization is a consequence of systemic and structural conditions that act as foundations and facilitate this process. On one hand, there is a fragmented metropolitan governance of open spaces in Lima that leads to an indifferent state of authority and a lack of control from the government. Additionally, there is a conflict between the lack of public policies that protect public spaces and those that promote private developments and investments. On the other hand, individuals have an external motivation to benefit from economic extraction by the exploitation of the public space that is privatized.

Furthermore, the overall consequences at the city scale are also similar to all types of privatization. From a more tangible point of view, one consequence is that it ultimately reduces the quantity of open public space that all citizens, no matter where they live, have available and access to. Moreover, privatization increases spatial fragmentation and social segregation, building virtual and physical boundaries between groups and areas. This deepens existing urban inequalities, and impinges not only upon the definition of public spaces, but also on their role and importance. Ultimately, public spaces are vital for democratic societies and cities,

and should constitute as safe spaces for interactions, encounters, and leisure, where active citizenship is encouraged, diversity is fostered, and differences are conciliated.

As a city-scale phenomenon, a vicious cycle is generated between privatization and its consequences (See Figure 21). Viewed in one direction (from the phenomenon to its consequences), as more spaces are privatized, or the phenomenon is facilitated and enabled, there is an increase in the lack of awareness of the importance and role of public spaces as areas to foster citizenship and diversity, both at the theoretical level and through the citizen’s lived experience. The importance and the value attributed to the public sphere is reduced as people living in the city become consumers and clients of private spaces and services, willing and accepting to pay for them, and move away from the concept of being citizens. Moving in the other direction (from consequences to phenomenon), the reduction of public spaces and the city’s social and spatial fragmentation contribute to thinking that public spaces can be dispossessed from the public to benefit some people economically at an individual level. Additionally, it feeds on the idea and need of being protected from the “other” and the desire to separate from those dissimilar to one self, leading to exclusion, segregation, and privatization.

Figure 21 Privatization, its consequences, and side effects

Furthermore, this cycle does not only apply at an individual level, but it is also reflected at an institutional and governance level. The lack of awareness of the importance of public spaces, the loss of citizenship, the motivation of economic extraction, and need to segregate are also present in public institutions that are in charge of the city’s planning and urban development. It is not surprising then that the government lacks a legal framework, public policies and planning practices that help alleviate and stop privatization process, and — to the contrary — promotes, enables or ignores this phenomenon.

6.2 The Different Scales of Impact of Privatization

It is important to acknowledge that privatization is a complex phenomenon, and that although it has similar negative impacts and consequences at a city scale, its specific manifestations do not have the same scale of impact. The effects depend on different aspects that are specific to the way privatization takes place. First, there is the degree of physical presence, that considers the scale, physical footprint and porosity, and the perception of permanency or flexibility. It is not the same when almost an entire public space is intervened with a new building construction, to a case when the intervention is smaller, more porous, movable, and

temporary. Second, it depends in the process of how it is carried out: who is included or not in the decision- making process. In all case studies, most of the processes followed are one-sided and led by the promoters of privatization, and do not incorporate all constituencies (residents, citizens, institutions) who are affected or dispossessed from the public space. Third, it matters who promotes privatization. It is not the same if a private company privatizes a public space to receive economic profit as it is if a poor family buys a lot from a land trafficker in order to build a home because they otherwise cannot have access to one. Finally, the degree of how detrimental privatization is depends on where this process takes place and who are the most affected.

Although privatization happens in all neighborhoods, in the end poorer neighborhoods and their constituencies are certainly the most affected. From the institutional side, it is in these areas where local governments have less capacities and funding to manage public spaces. Thus, there is less control and more indifference from public authorities because they have other problems and priorities to serve. Additionally, there is less investment and hence further neglect towards open public spaces. This leads to the inability of residents to access public spaces that are in good condition. Simultaneously, there is a potential larger motivation for local authorities to privatize these spaces following Type 1 (Concession for Development), as it would allow them to increase their profit and/or facilitate their administration. Moreover, it is in poorer neighborhoods where Type 2 (Appropriation for Livelihood) is most common. First, this happens because these are often located in the periphery of the city, which is also where open public land such as the lomas are located. Second, it happens because it is people with fewer resources who need to invade for housing or occupy a street to work as informal vendors. Furthermore, poorer people can also be more exposed to this phenomenon as they have less ability to stop and fight privatization, because they have less power, and lack access to information and resources that enable them to achieve so.

By contrast, in Type 3 (Enclosing for Control) it is most common that groups with higher incomes enclose their communities to separate from outsiders and exclude people with lower incomes. This is because living in an enclosed area — either being a designed residential enclave or one that has been gated afterwards — implies that people have enough purchasing power to invest in a more “exclusive” property or in the installation of the gates. Thus, although this type happens across the city and in diverse neighborhoods with different socio-economic sectors, there is always a difference between who encloses and who is excluded.

Additionally, it is in richer neighborhoods of the city that local governments have more capacities, both human and financial, to control and regulate their jurisdiction (and thus reduce the possibilities of other types privatization taking place). They also have more resources to invest in creating and maintaining public spaces, which means that they have higher quantity and quality of these, and there are less probabilities of neglect. Moreover, residents in these districts that normally belong to higher socio-economic sectors have greater economic power, public influence, and are more informed and well-educated. Hence, they can exert greater pressure in influencing local authorities in order to achieve their demands and needs, such as protecting their public spaces from privatization.

Thus, poorer neighborhoods and their constituencies are the most affected and disadvantaged by this phenomenon. Not only because it is in their neighborhoods where privatization is most likely to happen, but also because they are the ones who already suffer from a low quantity and quality of public spaces. With privatization, their opportunity to access these spaces is reduced even more, deepening social and spatial inequalities.

6.3 Recommendations

This thesis has uncovered the ways and the conditions under which privatization of open public spaces takes place. I have concluded that this phenomenon has profound negative consequences for the city and that it mostly affects the disadvantaged. Given this, what can be done to prevent this phenomenon and help preserve these spaces in Lima? The following section provides some recommendations that can help public authorities answer this question in three dimensions: the national policy level, the metropolitan governance structure, and the multi-level planning processes.

Legal Framework at a National Policy Level

In order to prevent privatization processes from happening, it is crucial that the definition and role of public spaces is established at a national policy level. As explained, one of the main reasons why privatization takes place is because there is no legal framework that helps prevent and control these processes or support the defense of these spaces. A clear point of view should be established from the national government perspective, which can be used to guide all policies that are consequently created by other institutions such as municipalities. Fortunately, the two proposed bills N° 1311/2016, “Law for the management of public spaces”, and N°1312/2016, “Law for the protection of public spaces”, have already started this discussion and included some definitions. Hopefully, their approval by the new Congress will establish a new era regarding the management and protection of open public spaces, for Lima and the rest of cities in the country.

Nonetheless, these bills mostly focus on the prevention of Type 1 of privatization, and it is important to create new regulations and legal frameworks that adapt and control all types. In order to allow this to move forward, it is important to transform and improve the current structures and practices applied to the governance of public spaces.

A New Governance Institution: Lima’s Public Space Authority

The currently fragmented metropolitan governance and the lack of clear and effective accountability mechanisms lead to regulatory loopholes that prevent institutions from fulfilling an efficient function in the governance of public spaces, and at the same time facilitate privatization processes. The Metropolitan Municipality of Lima (MML) should have a more important role in the management and protection of public spaces in the whole city. Their present job of managing specific large metropolitan parks and overviewing dispersed urban development projects (such as transportation infrastructure) is certainly not enough to prevent privatization.

In this context, the main recommendation is to establish a new unified governance entity under MML that is in charge of overviewing the management, creation, protection, and monitoring of open public spaces in the Lima. It could be called Lima’s Public Space Authority (LPSA), and its end goal would be to help reduce urban inequalities. This would be achieved by building open public spaces that are inclusive, accessible, and used by all citizens in Lima, by stopping and protecting them from privatization, and thus by improving their quantity and quality throughout the city. This entity would identify the most pressing needs and projects that need to be implemented regarding public spaces in the whole city and at all scales, and define the policies, regulations and stoppage strategies that deal with their privatization. LPSA would also make a more equitable and efficient use of the resources that are invested in these spaces across Lima, benefitting the most disadvantaged districts that do not have the capacities and resources to provide and manage them within their jurisdictions. Having a metropolitan centralized institution will introduce a more holistic and integrated vision into the new public space policies, alleviating the existing atomization and spatial fragmentation.

Another benefit of creating LPSA within MML — the highest authority of the city — is that it would elevate and broadcast the importance given to public spaces. This will raise the awareness of their critical role within all sectors of society, from national to local governments, private sector, non-profit sector, and citizens. Other cities such as Bogota, Mexico City, Barcelona, and Singapore have created similar institutions that focus on the development of public spaces throughout their metropolitan areas. Although they might face some challenges — such as achieving effective legal frameworks and continuous collaboration across multiple institutional levels and sectors — their creation has helped to establish guidelines for the design, implementation, and management of these spaces with a unified vision of the city, and where jurisdictional boundaries are dissolved.

The creation of LPSA and new policies would need to be accompanied with the restructuring of existing planning processes that govern public spaces, which are currently inefficient and disconnected from communities. The following section provides the roles, responsibilities, and practices that Lima’s Public Space Authority should incorporate in order to be successful.

Inter-institutional Collaboration and Data Consolidation

Certainly, Lima’s Public Space Authority would not on its own be able to take care of the totality of public spaces in the city. This task should be done in constant and close collaboration with the local governments and other institutions that deal with these spaces throughout the city. District municipalities would still have a role in their management and maintenance, which would need to be evaluated and clearly defined. LPSA would need to provide guidelines and establish processes that facilitate inter-institutional collaboration, define the responsibilities of both metropolitan and local public entities, and incorporate accountability measures to assure that the tasks are carried out. One way that these responsibilities could be distributed is by specific characteristics of public spaces, such as the type and size, or by the capacities and resources of each district.

Moreover, it is important to leverage the ability of municipalities to gather information about the conditions and needs of their own districts and neighborhoods. LPSA could establish mechanisms, standardized methods, and train public officials so local municipalities can measure and gather different types of data — both quantitative and qualitative — regarding public spaces within their jurisdictions. The process to achieve this could build on the current National Registry of Municipalities (RENAMU) self-reported survey done by National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI), but would include other questions beyond the maintenance of green areas. Some elements to include would be the evaluation of the different types of spaces, physical conditions, built interventions, maintenance, safety perception, current and desired use, total area, etc. The collected information would then be centralized by LPSA in order to evaluate and establish the overall city’s priorities and potential projects. This process would also provide new granular data about all the different public spaces in Lima, allowing to measure their quantity and quality in ways that are not possible today.

Establishing New Finance and Management Models

Centralizing the main functions, resources and human capacities in one institution in charge of public spaces would also help achieve economies of scale in their service provision, and reduce the total costs that are now unevenly spent on this regard. It would also help create, improve, and develop public spaces in districts with fewer resources. New financial models should be established to guarantee that LPSA has enough resources to take on this important task. One way this could be done is to have each local municipality pay a percentage of its total budget or income to LPSA, which could be based on what they currently allocate to public spaces. This would allow all municipalities to contribute according to how much they collect, and centralize and redistribute funds and services according to the local needs. Furthermore, MML should

provide additional resources, which could come from their current tax collection or by creating a mechanism of economic land value capture. One idea would be that all the construction projects that take place in the city pay a fee that goes to LPSA, justified on the basis that improving public spaces throughout Lima would also benefit all development projects.

Moreover, new management models would need to be established. One institution will not be able to fulfill the tasks of designing, building, managing and maintaining all public spaces in Lima. Alternative management models could include NGOs and civic organizations to take care of the spaces. Their inclusion in this role would also be very relevant when defining the uses and designing the activities that take place in public spaces. Ideally, the role of management would not only involve the maintenance of the space, but also their programming, which would adapt to the local context and constituencies served.

Additionally, the private sector could be included in the management task. Private entities could be allowed to manage and/or finance the maintenance of public spaces with well-established regulations, mechanisms of control, guidelines, and participatory processes. This would allow the participation of the private sector in a way that will benefit the city, moving away from the current mechanisms of concessions that lead to privatization. According to Kim (1987), some possible models for the private involvement in open space provision include: 1) the public sector as producer and the private as supporter; 2) the private sector as producer and the public sector as facilitator/regulator; 3) the community as producer/provider; and 4) public and private sectors as joint producers and providers. Although the model would need to be evaluated according to each case, providing different management options and allowing for different stakeholders to involve would help alleviate the existing financial burden and also promote a more inclusive planning process. In all cases, policies and regulations should be established so the roles and responsibilities between stakeholders are clear. Overall, having diverse funding and management models that are supervised by one centralized entity could achieve a more equitable distribution of resources, where the quantity and quality of public spaces would not be established according to the district’s wealth.

Incorporating Citizen Participation and Engagement Processes

Lima’s Public Space Authority should also incorporate citizen participation and engagement in their planning processes to help prioritize and inform their actions and projects. In addition to promoting collaboration between public entities, other organizations such as community groups and NGOs should be involved in the planning of public spaces. It is important to acknowledge and recognize all the organizations that currently invest their time and resources in their protection, management and maintenance, which mainly takes place in areas where local municipalities are not present and have neglected them. LPSA should build on the existing organizations’ efforts and partner with them to carry out management, maintenance, and programming tasks, and to collect information that might not be mapped out by district municipalities. Involving public participation would guarantee that local communities are included in the decision-making processes, that their needs are implemented, and that privatization processes are avoided. Additionally, incorporating more transparency in the processes and communicating projects and actions would help establish new accountability and control measures between citizens and public institutions.

Defending Public Spaces from Privatization

Lima’s Public Space Authority would also have the important role to serve as an institution that centralizes all efforts to control privatization processes and defend and protect public spaces. It would be responsible of creating tools and mechanisms that enable local communities and other organizations report any case or intent of privatization that they see or experience. LPSA should carry out socialization campaigns that enable different constituencies to clarify the nature and extent of citizens’ rights and describe the processes they have available to defend and protect public spaces in the city. Centralizing all the cases of privatization

that take place in the city would help the institution control them and learn from them. It would help create customized and localized stoppage efforts and inform new public policies that continue to improve the task of defending, creating, and managing open public spaces in Lima.

Localizing and Customizing Privatization Stoppage Strategies

In order to stop privatization processes, its definition and different types should be acknowledged and incorporated into new public policies. LPSA should elaborate localized and customized strategies and policies, according to each type and place, that help control this phenomenon. These should be co-created, coordinated, and implemented in collaboration with other institutions and sectors, as they respond to different motivations, needs, and actors involved.

For example, Type 1, Concession for Development, is a form of privatization that benefits primarily private companies. Most of the time it is facilitated and supported by legal frameworks and policies, and by the local government. This type should be stopped by introducing new mechanisms that regulate how much power private entities have in the transformation, intervention, and economic extraction of open public spaces. Establishing new models that allow them to co-manage or finance these spaces could be a middle ground where they have an important role in the development of public spaces, but with well-established guidelines and control systems. Additionally, informing and including citizens in the decision-making processes would allow them to have a voice in the approval of private and public actions, and will empower them to inform LPSA if processes are not followed with transparency.

Type 2, Appropriation for Livelihood, should have a different approach because in this case the actors who promote it and benefit are people with fewer resources and who cannot access housing or a place to work. In order to address this type, the solution is not a stoppage strategy that removes those who are privatizing the space. Here, there is a social equity issue that goes beyond the public space provision that needs to be tackled and alleviated. For the sub-type Invasion for Housing, it would be crucial to work together with the Ministry of Housing to propose new national policies that allow people with lower resources to access public and affordable housing. As long as these policies and solutions are not in place, public space will continue to be privatized since invasion occurs to satisfy a basic need. Additionally, the established Regional Conservation Area (ACR), managed by the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima, should start taking action on the protection of the lomas and establishing protocols for their control, such as defining and installing limits and visual signs that indicate the boundaries of the reserved areas. Furthermore, to stop the sub-type Occupation for Productive Activity, LPSA should work with municipalities to create economic development plans that offer citizens multiple opportunities to develop economic activities. For example, they could provide affordable commercial spaces and offer skill-development programs. Additionally, street vending should be regulated in a way that vendors are provided with a designated area where they are allowed to work — because they activate and complement public spaces — while still controlling this in ways that make sure their interventions do not turn into safety risks to pedestrians, and that street trafficker mafias are not developed.

Type 3, Enclosing for Control, is more complex because it combines different promoters of privatization — both bottom-up and top-down — so each subtype should have different responses as well. For the sub-type Fences for Security, it is imperative to address public safety and delinquency in the whole city, and not just independently within each district. Although this research has demonstrated the ways that it is difficult for municipalities to prevent illegal or unauthorized fences, it is important that together with the implementation of public safety strategies, fencing regulations are enforced. Each municipality should monitor this more closely to be sure that gates are always open and that public access is not restricted. Moreover, new studies should be carried out to determine whether or not enclosure and fences actually help reduce crime rates, in order to change or create new policies around this issue. For example, existing regulations could be revised so that fences and gates are not encouraged and they are only allowed in

extraordinary circumstances. Furthermore, for sub-type Entry Fee for Maintenance, the new financing and management models would potentially allow Zonal Parks to be of free access. This would provide all citizens, no matter their purchasing power, with the opportunity to use and enjoy them. Concessions inside these parks would also need to be better regulated according to the new policies that control private developments inside public spaces. Finally, Zonal Clubs should be rebranded and should go back to being called parks, taking away the resentment of these as being private and exclusive spaces.

In sum, the solutions to stop privatization are complex. Stoppage will not be accomplished if strategies focus exclusively in removing the people who are privatizing, because the actors involved and reasons behind it are very different. The responses for stopping privatization need to evaluate who is benefitting from this process and who is dispossessed, and provide a solution that favors the public and not individual or private interests. At the end, preventing privatization and protecting open public spaces in the city will be achieved by creating holistic strategies that respond to the specific types and motivations of privatization, by establishing new legal frameworks and governance structures, and by changing existing planning processes.

Appendix 1 List of Interviews

N° Interview Organization Date Case Study Government Officials 1 Community Participation Manager Municipality of Comas 01/16/20 Primavera Park, Sinchi Roca Park, Manhattan Park 2 Urban Development Manager Municipality of Lince 01/17/19 Castilla Park 3 Urban Development Manager Municipality of Rimac 12/20/19 Lomas de Amancaes 4 Former Oversight Manager Municipality of La Victoria 01/23/20 Gamarra, Zone 42 - Santa Catalina 5 Former Serpar official Serpar (Lima’s Park Services) 01/15/20 Resident / Community Group 6 Residents of Primavera Park Primavera Park defense group and members of CADNEP 01/16/20 Primavera Park 7 Luis Perez, Resident of Castilla Park Friends of Castilla Park collective 12/27/19 Castilla Park 8 Residents of Lomas de Amancaes PAFLA (Environmental Protectors of the Flower and Lomas de Amancaes) 01/17/20 Lomas de Amancaes 9 First-floor store vendors (short interviews) - 01/09/20 Gamarra 10 Resident of Santa Catalina Community president of Zone 42 01/15/20 Zone 42 - Santa Catalina 11 Representatives of Sinchi Roca Park defense Sinchi Roca Park Defense Board 01/16/20 Sinchi Roca Park 12 Residents of Manhattan Park Let’s Save Manhattan Park collective and members of CADNEP 01/16/20 Manhattan Park Private Company 13 Real Estate Assistant Manager and InRetail Properties 12/19/19 Manhattan Park Architectural Design Manager

14 Concessions’ staff (short interviews) Family Park 12/27/19 Castilla Park Expert Interviews 15 Solangel Fernandez Urban Innovation and Economic Development, Municipality of San Borja. 01/17/20 Former Urban Planning Manager, Municipality of San Isidro. 16 Mariana Alegre Urbanist and Executive Director of Lima Como Vamos, citizen observatory 01/07/20 Manhattan Park and research center. 17 Laura Lozada Former Urban Planning Advisor to congressman Indira Huilca, who 01/09/20 Primavera Park, proposed a bill promoting the protection of public spaces. Lomas de Amancaes 18 Willey Ludeña Urban Planning scholar who focuses in public spaces in Lima. 01/20/20 19 Sofia García City Planner, former official at Municipality of San Isidro. 01/14/20

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