Indian Nuclear Forces 2012

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Indian Nuclear Forces 2012 Bulletin IT IS 5 MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT of the Atomic Scientists ® Nuclear notebook Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(4) 96–101 ! The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav Indian nuclear forces, 2012 DOI: 10.1177/0096340212451431 http://thebulletin.sagepub.com Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris Abstract In April 2012, India successfully test-launched the Agni V ballistic missileÑand though the missile needs more testing and is still several years away from operational deployment, the Agni V introduces a new dynamic to the already complex triangular security relationship among India, Pakistan, and China. India is estimated to have produced approximately 520 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, sufficient for 100”130 nuclear warheads; however, not all of the material has been converted into warheads. Based on available information about its nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, the authors estimate that India has produced 80”100 nuclear warheads. In this article, the authors explore how the country will need even more warheads to arm the new missiles it is currently developing. Keywords Agni V, fighter bomber, intercontinental ballistic missile, land based missiles, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, nuclear triad, submarine launched ballistic missile ndiaÕs drive to develop a nuclear triad among India, Pakistan, and China; proceeds apace, with New Delhi a week after IndiaÕs April test-launch, I developing or deploying several Pakistan (somewhat predictably) weapon systems to realize its goal of responded by test-firing its nuclear- achieving offensive nuclear forces on capable Shaheen-1A medium-range land, at sea, and in the air. India took a ballistic missile. significant step forward with the suc- India is estimated to have produced cessful test-launch of the Agni V ballistic approximately 520 kilograms of weap- missile on April 19, 2012. With a range ons-grade plutonium (IPFM, 2011), suffi- reportedly greater than 5,000 kilometers cient for 100”130 nuclear warheads; (3,107 miles), the Agni V can reach any however, not all of the material has target in China; however, the missile been converted into warheads. Based needs more testing and is still several on available information about its years away from operational deploy- nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, we ment. Nevertheless, the Agni V intro- estimate that India has produced duces a new dynamic to the already 80”100 nuclear warheads. It will need complex triangular security relationship more warheads to arm the new missiles Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on February 6, 2015 Kristensen and Norris 97 it is currently developing. In addition as $43 million per aircraft (Waldron, to the Dhruva plutonium production 2011). reactor near Mumbai, India plans to India has four operational squadrons construct a second reactor near of Jaguar IS/IB aircraft with approxi- Visakhapatnam, on the east coast. India mately 76 aircraft; two of the squadrons is building an unsafeguarded prototype may be assigned a secondary nuclear fast-breeder reactor at the Indira Gandhi strike mission. The Jaguar, designed Centre for Atomic Research near jointly by France and Britain, was Kalpakkam (about 1,000 kilometers or nuclear-capable when deployed by 620 miles south of Visakhapatnam), those countries. An upgrade of IndiaÕs which will significantly increase IndiaÕs Jaguar fleet is scheduled for completion plutonium production capacity once it in December 2017 (Government of India, becomes operational. 2012c); it has been reported that, in add- ition to new engines, the upgrade will Aircraft also include modernized avionics, night- time sensors, and integrated helmet India has the fourth-largest air force in sights (Defence Now, 2011). the world. Its fighter-bombers consti- The domestically manufactured, tute the backbone of IndiaÕs operational Soviet-origin MiG-27 Flogger fleet, nuclear strike force, and it likely assigns sometimes suspected of having a nuclear missions to Mirage 2000H, nuclear-strike mission, is also undergo- Jaguar IS/IB, and possibly MiG-27 ing an upgrade (Government of India, aircraft. 2012c). Last year, New Delhi approved an In January 2012, the Indian govern- upgrade for the Indian Air ForceÕs 51 ment announced that it planned to buy Mirage 2000H aircraftÑan update for 126 Rafale fighter-bombers from France, which the single-seat, multi-role which uses its Rafale jets in a nuclear fighter-bomber is long overdueÑwhich strike role (George, 2012). India intends is scheduled for completion by mid-2021 to take delivery of 18 of the jets in ready- (Government of India, 2012c; Waldron, to-fly condition and to build the rest 2012). The aircraft are deployed at through Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., a Maharajpur (Gwalior) Air Force state-owned company (George, 2012). Station with Squadrons 1 and 7 of the The contract has not yet been finalized, 40th Wing; we estimate that one of the but the cost is estimated at between $10 squadrons has a secondary nuclear mis- billion and $15 billion. sion. In early 2012, two of the fighters crashed in separate incidents, reducing Land-based missiles the Mirage 2000H force to 49. One of the aircraft crashed during a February 24 India has three types of land-based mis- training flight near Bhind, approxi- siles that may be operational: the short- mately 60 kilometers (37 miles) north- range Prithvi I, the short-range Agni I, east of Gwalior; the other crashed on and the medium-range Agni II. The March 5 (Government of India, 2012a). Prithvi I has been deployed for almost Neither accident was fatal. The cost of 15 years, but the Agni I and II, despite the Mirage upgrade has been reported being declared operational, both have Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on February 6, 2015 98 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(4) reliability issues that have delayed their May 19, 2010 and September 30, 2011, full operational service. were successful, demonstrating some India has been busy growing its missile progress toward making the Agni II program, with four more Agni versions in fully operational. A 2010 test-launch of progress: an Agni IIþ was test-launched an extended-range Agni II, known as in 2010 but failed; the longer-range Agni the Agni IIþ, failed. III, after at least four flight-tests, remains Still under development is IndiaÕs rail- under development; and the Agni IV may mobile Agni III, a two-stage, solid-fuel be a technology bridge to the newest missile with a range of more than 3,000 type, the long-range Agni V, which kilometers (1,864 miles). Several years had its first test-launch in April. Some ago, an army spokesperson remarked, of these Agni programs may serve as ÒWith this missile, India can even technology-development platforms for strike ShanghaiÓ (India Today, 2008). longer-range versions. To do so, however, would require the The bulk of the Indian ballistic missile missile to be launched from the very force is comprised of three versions of northeastern corner of India. After the Prithvi missiles, but only one of these fourth Agni III test-launch in February versions, the armyÕs Prithvi I, has a 2010, defense officials said that the mis- nuclear role. Given its small size sile was Òdeclared operationalÓ (9 meters long and 1 meter in diameter), (Chakravarty, 2010), but before the mis- the Prithvi I is difficult to spot on satel- sile can become operational with the lite images, and therefore little is known army, it will need additional flight- about its deployment locations. The testing. Prithvi I is a short-range missile (up to The Agni IVÕs first flight-test, on 150 kilometers or 93 miles) and is the November 15, 2011, was a success. mainstay of the Strategic Forces According to scientists at the Defense Command, IndiaÕs designated nuclear Research and Development weapons service. Organization, the missile, designed to In December 2011, India successfully fly up to 3,500 kilometers (2,175 miles) test-launched its two-stage Agni I missile, and carry up to 1,000 kilograms, Òhas which has a range of 700 kilometers opened a new eraÓ for Indian missiles (435 miles), for the eighth timeÑ (Subramanian, 2011). The Agni IV might suggesting that the missile might finally be a Òtechnology demonstratorÓ have become fully operational. But a between the Agni III and V missiles, ninth test-launch scheduled for early meaning that India is using it as a step May 2012 was postponed due to a tech- toward creating the Agni V and that it nical glitch. will never be deployed. The road- or rail-launched Agni II, an India test-launched the Agni V for the improvement on the Agni I, can fly up to first time on April 19, 2012 at a range of 2,000 kilometers (1,243 miles) and can approximately 5,000 kilometers (3,107 carry a 1,000-kilogram payload, and it miles). Although widely referred to as takes just 15 minutes for the missile to an intercontinental ballistic missile be readied for firing. The missile has (ICBM), a range of 5,000 kilometers been test-fired eight times with several does not quite meet the internationally failures, but more recent test-flights, on accepted definition of an ICBM as Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on February 6, 2015 Kristensen and Norris 99 having a range of at least 5,500 kilo- missile with MIRVs. These were expen- meters (3,418 miles). Still, the Indian gov- sive programs fueled by the Cold War, a ernment stated that the missile had a security environment very different from range of Òmore than 5,000 kilometersÓ the one that faces India. Moreover, (Government of India, 2012b). The Agni deploying missiles with multiple war- V needs several additional test-flights, heads would invite serious questions but once it is deployed it will enable about the credibility of IndiaÕs mini- the Indian military to hold Beijing at mum-deterrent doctrine; using MIRVs risk for the first time.
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