Trending Communication on the Campus in Crisis: Social Media Best Practices in Higher Education Crisis Communications

by Mackenzie Alyce Hufty Dilbeck

B.A. in English, May 2009, Oklahoma Baptist University B.A. in Public Relations, May 2009, Oklahoma Baptist University

A Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of College of Professional Studies of the George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Professional Studies

May 19, 2013

Thesis directed by

David Ettinger Adjunct Professor, Graduate School of Political Management

Dedication

To Mary Maude Carter who first taught me how to communicate in times of trouble, and who breathed art and life into my child heart.

To my parents, Tom and Rhonda, the best communicators I know.

To my love, D.H. Thank you for always knowing how to speak to me, and for the gift of your unconditional commitment and love. You carry me.

To my Lord Jesus who communicates his love to me each and every day.

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Acknowledgments

This work and my efforts would simply not be possible without the support and challenge I have in former professors and mentors at Oklahoma Baptist University.

Thank you for teaching me how to write, research, question, and tirelessly integrate faith with knowledge. All truth is God’s truth.

I also wish to thank those professors I have had the opportunity to study with at

The George Washington University. Your professional insights have challenged me to consistently apply what I have learned in the classroom to my career.

Finally, I must give a great deal of credit to Professor David Ettinger, my thesis advisor who struck a perfect balance of support and challenge as I embarked on this project. I cannot exhaust my gratitude to you for your investment in improving my work.

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Table of Contents

Dedication ii

Acknowledgments iii

List of Figures v

List of Tables vi

Thesis Statement 1

Introduction 2

Chapter One: Literature Review 7

Chapter Two: Methodology 37

Chapter Three: University of Virginia President Sullivan Ouster and Reinstatement 40

Chapter Four: Florida A&M University Hazing Death Incident 52

Chapter Five: Case Study Summation Discussion 67

Chapter Six: Best Social Media Practices in Higher Education Crisis Communications 70

Chapter Seven: Conclusion 78

Bibliography 81

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List of Figures

Figure One: Crisis Communication Life Cycle 10

v

List of Tables

Table One: Timeline of Failed Ouster and Reinstatement of Teresa Sullivan 42

Table Two: University of Virginia Official Twitter Account Activity (6/10/2012 – 06/26/2012) 45

Table Three: University of Virginia Official Facebook Activity (06/10/2012 – 06/26/2012) 49

Table Four: Timeline of FAMU Hazing and the Fallout following Robert Champion’s Death 54

Table Five: FAMU Official Twitter Account Activity (11/19/2011 – 07/12/2012) 56

Table Six: FAMU’s Official Facebook Account Activity (11/19/2011 – 07/12/2012) 61

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Thesis Statement

Social media have increasingly become primary communication tools for colleges and universities to broadcast school events, recruit prospective students, and connect with alumni and donors. Through social media these schools have the opportunity to control messaging to all constituencies. Beyond the aforementioned uses, educational institutions can use online interactive platforms to disseminate information in times of campus conflict, unwanted scandal, or natural disaster. In the wake of such crises, schools articulate thoughtful responses, crisis protocols, and plans for next steps most quickly and effectively through social media platforms.

In a February 2012 study, Chris Syme of CKSyme.org partnered with the Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE) to investigate the presence of social media as tools in the face of higher education crises. The survey found forty-one percent of the study’s respondents with crisis communications plans do not include any social media response during crisis time.1 For those schools that do engage with constituencies online during crises, the question is how social media platforms are best utilized during critical scenarios that have the potential to compromise reputation and brand image. This thesis will explore that question and propose best practices for social media use in higher education crisis communications.

1 Chris Syme, “Using Social Media in a Crisis: Higher Education Results,” http://cksymedotorg.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/case-cksyme-higher-ed-2012-using-social-media-in-a- crisis.pdf, (February 2012): 1-34, (accessed August 4, 2012).

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Introduction

In the social media age public companies, private institutions, politicians, and celebrities have a direct line to stakeholders, constituents, citizens, and fans. Accessibility is at its peak for online users to participate in conversations with a multitude of groups and individuals from global corporations to movie stars. Social media platforms such as

Twitter and Facebook enable “followers” and “fans” to know instantly the successes and failures of their favorite airline, talk show host, or politician. In turn, those who utilize these platforms are presented with a unique opportunity to communicate directly with users, uninhibited and uncensored by the greater media.

In good times promoters on sites like Twitter and Facebook eagerly share success stories and positive news. In times of failure or crisis those same voices can go silent.

Yet, most users’ primary intent when using Twitter and Facebook is to gather information. Without hearing directly from a company or individual, users are unable to discern happenings and make decisions regarding their investment or allegiance to said company or individual.

Not all public voices on Twitter or Facebook which have faced trials have remained silent during times of crisis. In fact, many have gone public – using their social media platforms to communicate without a media filter – and have come away with stronger followings and increased credibility among the public. Still, there are also examples when crisis communications via social media has not been implemented with positive results.

While some groups and individuals may not prefer to implement crisis communications plans via social media, these online platforms are invaluable assets

2 during difficult times. Solely controlled by the account creators, Twitter and Facebook accounts present companies and groups with the chance to speak directly to their stakeholders and constituencies. By communicating through Twitter and Facebook no formal media outlet is able to manipulate, twist, or misinterpret intended messages because the message is disseminated from the source to the receiver in one action. This benefit is especially valuable during times of crisis as multiple interpretations of missteps and misdeeds are readily available to the public via traditional media outlets. With social media, the concept of controlled messaging becomes truly tangible.

Although crises vary among different industries and even within the same industry; all crises are unexpected and unplanned. They can be initiated by unethical business practices on by key personnel, propelled by environmental catastrophes, and even instigated by fatal acts of terror. The common tie throughout these varying classifications of crises is the sudden onset of intense, difficult times.

Many communication theorists such as Matthew Seeger argue that the practice of crisis communications should seek to reduce and contain harm.2 Today, communications professionals can reduce and contain harm in a more swift and precise way by relying on social media instead of traditional forms of media. In a time of intense difficulty, today’s communicator can alleviate fears, clarify actions, and apologize for wrongdoing with a simple tweet or post, effectively taking steps toward the reduction and containment of harm.

Just as publicly traded corporations and individual public figures face trials, so too do institutions of higher learning. Universities and colleges across the United States

2 Matthew Seeger, “Best Practices in Crisis Communication: An Expert Panel Process,” Journal of Applied Communication Research 34 (2006): 232.

3 have experienced campus shootings, personnel scandals, student protests, environmental catastrophes, and many more types of crises. The sanctuary of the classroom is no more protected from times of intense difficulty than Fortune 500 company executives. It is the primary intent of this thesis to focus upon higher education as an industry afflicted with crisis, and more specifically how communications professionals within the industry respond to crises via social media platforms. It is the responsibility of the University in times of crisis to keep its students, faculty, staff, administration, parents, prospective students, alumni, donors, board members, and local communities well-informed. If used properly and with a large enough network of followers and fans, platforms like Twitter and Facebook can fuel a school’s efforts to inform, persuade, and engage with its audiences in all circumstances, not just times of crisis. However, particularly in times of trouble, universities have and should continue to utilize Twitter and Facebook as a primary communications tool with all audiences.

In 2013, the tools of Twitter and Facebook are still evolving, and universities are still identifying how best to utilize the platforms for strategic initiatives. Schools typically do not have guidelines for appropriate use of social media in crisis situations. The analysis put forth in this thesis meets this need by providing a set of guidelines and best practices for using social media in higher education crisis communications. Seeger identifies best practices as “ … a general set of standards, guidelines, norms, reference points, or benchmarks that inform practice and are designed to improve performance.”3

Although some universities and colleges currently use Twitter and Facebook to communicate in crises, the best practices identified in this work support institutions of

3 Ibid., 233.

4 higher learning in their efforts to improve the performance of their crisis communications plans, just as Seeger suggests.

The scholarly literature on crisis communications presently lacks careful attention to proposals for social media crisis communication tailored specifically to institutions of higher learning. Many theorists and professionals have proposed best practices for general crisis communications; The implementation of these practices, however, becomes troublesome when attempting to apply to varying industries. The successful implementation of crisis communications best practices will vary greatly from the field of health care to industries like technology or education. The aim of this thesis is to propose best practices for social media in higher education crisis communications. The value of my analysis resides in its specificity and practical application. It is my hope that universities and colleges will look to my proposed set of specific benchmarks for social media in higher education crisis communications and integrate them into larger existing crisis communications plans.

It is important to note the variance found in higher education crises. The standards set forth within this thesis are specific to social media in higher education crisis communications, but they are also general enough to account for a wide variety of crises types (personnel, environmental, student-related, etc). While it is impossible to predict the variables in each case, this work provides a foundation for addressing and responding to a crisis via social media platforms.

The work begins with a detailed analysis of the existing literature on crisis communications as a public relations function, social media as a public relations tool, higher education crisis communications, and social media in crisis communications. After

5 the literature review two case studies are presented. Both focus on an isolated higher education crisis faced within the past two years. The case studies investigate the nature of the crisis and the university’s response via the social media platforms Twitter and

Facebook. The thesis concludes with a proposed set of social media best practices for higher education communications professionals to implement in times of crisis.

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Chapter One: Literature Review

Crisis Communications

The existing literature on crisis communications offers a range of information on the fundamental nature of the practice and on how best to communicate during trying situations. Communications theorists, educators, and professionals provide a variety of definitions, personal experiences, and suggestions for improvement in implementing crisis communications. There is a great deal of overlap found across the literature; In light of endless examples of crisis communications gone wrong, however, the redundancy is warranted.

Scholars have taken a particular interest in precisely defining “crisis” in the context of professional communications. Communication Studies professors Patty C.

Malone and William T. Coombs jointly posit “A crisis occurs when something unexpected and unpredictable occurs that poses a severe threat and demands an immediate response.”4 In the public relations field, a response to such an unexpected and unpredictable event is known as crisis communications.

Pamela Ferrante, president of JC Safety and Environmental, Inc., a Pennsylvania consulting firm, holds “Crisis communication encompasses those messages delivered to stakeholders during an emergency event that threatens them.”5 Ferrante’s definition, while accurate, fails to appreciate the complexity of crisis communications. Beyond crafting crisis messages to constituents, the practice demands behavior monitoring, media

4 Patty C. Malone and William T. Coombs, “Introduction to Special Issue on Crisis Communication,” Journal of Public Relations Research, 21 (2009): 121. 5 Pamela Ferrante, “Risk & Crisis Communication,” Professional Safety 55 (2010): 38.

7 relations, and evaluation. The purpose of crisis communications is to reduce and contain harm, while also repairing a reputation.6

During a disaster or scandal it is the communications professional’s responsibility to mediate, represent, and speak for the organization or individual facing crisis. Not only is the professional faced with the task of seemingly endless days of media fire, he or she must also come to terms with extremely high expectations as to how to communicate during the crisis.7

Peter Ruff and Khalid Aziz advise that a proactive crisis communications plan is key to maintaining control over an unfolding crisis. To produce a proactive plan the two argue for the performance of “risk audits,” in which organizations undergo regular and comprehensive audits pinpointed toward identifying potential risks that could catapult into larger crises. If any serious issues are revealed during a risk audit, “the crisis team can then get to work on neutralizing them before they become a full-blown emergency.”8

Preparing for crises in this way not only shortens response time for communicators, but it also involves the communications professional intimately with all aspects of his or her organization. At the end of a risk audit one should be comfortable dealing with all plausible challenges the organization could potentially face.

As the professional prepares for the unknown, it is imperative he or she has the elementary understanding of how a crisis forms, evolves, and resolves. Communication must take place throughout all stages of a crisis: Pre-crisis (prevention and preparation),

Intervention (while the circumstance unfolds), Post-crisis (when cause, blame, and

6 Leeanne M. Bell, “Crisis Communication: The Praxis of Response,” Review of Communication 10 (2010): 142-155. 7 Malone and Coombs, “Introduction to Special Issue on Crisis Communication,” 121. 8 Peter Ruff and Khalid Aziz, Managing Communications in a Crisis (Abingdon: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2004), 37.

8 responsibility are assessed), and Recovery (repair, rebuilding, and resolution).9 Malone and Coombs fail to identify evaluation as an essential phase within crisis management, a phase the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) does not omit. Although similar to

Malone’s and Coombs’ proposed crisis phases, the CDC’s Crisis Communication

Lifecycle brings the communications professional full circle, ending with evaluation and thereby re-entering the pre-crisis stage.10

Further equipping the communications professional, the CDC also offers a useful outline of specific tasks related to each crisis phase. The Pre-crisis phase calls for preparedness and test messages; the Initial phase recommends communicating empathy and establishing a credible spokesperson; the Maintenance phase constitutes listening to stakeholders and delivering information to affected parties; the Resolution phase promotes examination of missteps and persuasion of the public; and the Evaluation phase requires documentation of the crisis and a final assessment of how the situation was handled. For greater detail, see Figure One below: 11

9 Malone and Coombs, “Introduction to Special Issue on Crisis Communication,” 121. 10 Centers for Disease Control, “Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication,” http://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc/pdf/CERC-SEPT02.pdf, (2002): 5, (accessed December 28, 2012). 11 Ibid., 7.

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Figure One: Crisis Communication Life Cycle

Another critical step acknowledged within the Initial phase of the CDC’s Crisis

Communications Lifecycle is informing the public in uncomplicated terms. The crafting of crisis messages requires a great deal of precision. Using the wrong language could mean perpetuation of the crisis. Before beginning to craft a crisis message the communications professional must have a fundamental understanding of the public’s involvement in the crisis, as well as each constituency group’s level of investment, involvement, or interest in the present situation.12 Without a clear grasp of how the crisis specifically affects each group, a communicator cannot begin to create messages that will speak expressly to all parties and their questions.

Once a true assessment of implications surrounding the crisis has been established, the communicator must address constituent concerns with carefully crafted communications. Ferrante issues seven rules applicable to the process of creating crisis messages:

12 Ferrante, “Risk & Crisis Communication,” 41.

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1) Accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner; 2) Plan carefully and evaluate your efforts; 3) Listen to the public’s specific concerns; 4) Be honest, frank, and open; 5) Coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources; 6) Meet the needs of the media; and 7) Speak clearly and with compassion13

Conversely, Ferrante also proposes pitfalls to avoid in the same process. In addition to mentioning other mistakes, she asserts one should using jargon, blaming others, and putting forth guarantees or promises.14 Ferrante’s opportunities and pitfalls are practical and present a checklist of sorts for communications professionals to turn to when in the midst of a crisis.

It is worth noting that in addition to the above rules communicators should work to prepare messages for any number of crises prior to their occurrence. For instance, communicators should have prepared messages in response to the exposure of a politician’s extramarital affair, an executive’s unethical insider trading practices, or a mass shooting. If communicators have a stockpile of messages geared to specific known audiences, it will be easier for them to respond to crises quickly. Granted, not all pre- written statements will speak to the specificity of any given emergency. However, time is of the essence in crisis communications and the faster a statement can be released, the more quickly lost credibility can be restored.

The restoration of credibility is at the core of crisis communications. Swiss crisis communications consultant Ansgar Thiessen and Universität Fribourg professor Diana

Ingenhoff believe strongly in the influence thoughtful communications can have in restoring reputations: “From the viewpoint of corporate communication scholars,

13 Ibid., 42-43. 14 Ibid.

11 reputation is seen as a resource to be protected … Communication either has an impact on image restoration or the media agenda in which reputation is built in order to safeguard reputation in the long run.”15The amount of value Thiessen and Ingenhoff place on efficient communication during a crisis for its power to repair reputation must also be given to inefficient communication and its ability to perpetuate a crisis. Just as strong communication can save credibility, poor or weak communication can dissolve it.

Perhaps Thiessen and Ingenhoff’s greatest contribution is their discussion of and attention to internal and external audiences. The value of preparing internal audiences for a coming crisis cannot be underestimated. Establishing an internal culture of preparedness enables a communications team to stem rumors and gain genuine buy-in from those closest to the circumstances, while also “communicating the crisis coherently, because internal members of an organization are often the source for gossip and uncontrolled communication, which has consequences for external communication too.”16 Ensuring internal groups are adequately informed sets a strong foundation for the messages to extend beyond the closest affected groups.

After canvassing the current literature on crisis communications, and in an effort to improve organizational and professional practices, Matthew Seeger produced a set of ten best practices. Seeger’s list covers all but one of the crisis phases, introducing guidelines for Pre-crisis, Intervention, and Post-crisis stages, but omits proposed benchmarks for the Recovery stage. Seeger’s list is found below, classified into the appropriate crisis stages:

15 Ansgar Thiessen and Diana Ingenhoff, “Safeguarding Reputation through Strategic, Integrated and Situational Crisis Communication Management,” Corporate Communications 16 (2011): 18. 16 Ibid.

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Seeger’s Best Practices in Crisis Communication17 • Pre-crisis o Institute process approaches and policy development o Practice pre-event planning • Intervention o Create partnerships with the public o Listen to the public’s concerns and understand the audience o Speak with honesty, candor, and openness o Collaborate and coordinate with credible sources o Meet the needs of the media and remain accessible o Communicate with compassion, concern, and empathy o Accept uncertainty and ambiguity • Post-crisis o Issue messages of self-efficacy

Despite Seeger’s efforts to close the existing gap in crisis communications literature by proposing his set of best practices, he unwittingly widens it. The standards, while sensible, have no direct application to specific industries. What works for communicators in health care may not translate to technology or education. Seeger’s broad benchmarks are helpful in establishing an awareness of how to approach crisis communications, and would perhaps be best introduced in a classroom setting for communicators-in-training. However, real-world scenarios require real-world applications, and only specified, pointed best practices geared toward individual industries will hold lasting influence for the professional communicator.

Throughout the literature, theorists and scholars challenge today’s communicators to respond swiftly to crises with accuracy and empathy. The bulk of the material is instructional by nature, introducing and defining the function of crisis communications, validating its purpose, and setting up communicators for success with general guidelines for action. However, there are opportunities to expand by tailoring those guidelines to specific industries and mediums.

17 Seeger, “Best Practices in Crisis Communication: An Expert Panel Process,” 236-242.

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Higher Education Crisis Communications

As evidenced in the literature review of crisis communications, crises launch those involved into an unpredictable series of events that are inevitably trying and difficult to resolve. The institution of higher education is far from being exempt from the catastrophe and pain that crises can bring. The 1999 Texas A&M Aggie Bonfire, the

2011 University of Miami athletics scandal, and Hurricane Katrina’s impact on a number of schools in the New Orleans area in 2005 all speak to the complex chaos that come with a crisis. The most infamous tragedy higher education has faced in recent years took place on the campus of Virginia Tech University in April 2007, when a lone gunman killed thirty-two people and injured seventeen others.

All of the aforementioned scenarios forced the schools in question, and oftentimes institutions around the nation, to reconsider their approach to crisis management. Yet none is more prevalent in the literature of higher education crisis communications than the Virginia Tech Massacre. Scholars and professionals point to that tragic event as a watershed. Although the gravity of misfortune endured by the Virginia Tech community cannot be exhausted or overstated, it forced an evaluation of crisis management practices for many schools. What follows is a look at contemporary thoughts on higher education crisis communications – where it has been, where it is now, and where it must go.

Although the Virginia Tech tragedy stands as perhaps the most widely known crisis in higher education, the industry has faced a myriad of scandals and catastrophes at a number of schools. Shootings, personnel errors, and terrible environmental surprises all contribute to the growing list of higher education crises. In 2007, Louisiana State

University’s (LSU) head women’s basketball coach Pokey Chatman resigned in the

14 middle of the National College Association of Athletics (NCAA) tournament amid speculation of inappropriate behavior with former players. What ensued was a series of battles between Chatman’s and LSU’s attorneys.

LSU professor Tulika M. Varma puts forth a comprehensive study of the challenges faced by both Chatman and the University, but most notably pays attention to how the University responded and public reaction. After attempting to initially sidestep the situation, LSU, admitting its role in the crisis, assumed responsibility by launching an investigation into the allegations against Chatman.18 The scenario then forced LSU to work with Chatman and her lawyers in a very public sphere to negotiate her resignation.

Despite Varma’s survey research on public reaction that inevitably showed the news of inappropriate behavior did not affect LSU’s image, the University’s “lack of transparency and openness in the initial stages proved to be a setback.”19 Because LSU initially evaded responsibility and sought to separate itself from Chatman, the crisis was catapulted into the public domain, taking a significant amount of time to resolve.

Varma’s fault, however, is in her analysis of public reaction. She limited her research sample to the University community – a group of staunch LSU supporters – and essentially failed to depict a true reaction. Those surveyed thought the issue was not

“representative of LSU’s values,” and therefore dismissed the potentially negative affects on the University’s image.20 Although the Chatman case represents a different genre of higher education crisis communications than that faced by Virginia Tech, it is representative of a larger epidemic in higher education communicators – unpreparedness.

18 Tulika M. Varma, “Crisis Communication in Higher Education: The Use of ‘Negotiation’ as a Strategy to Manage Crisis,” Public Relations Review, 37 (November 2011): 373. 19 Ibid., 375. 20 Ibid., 375.

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The lessons put forth by LSU and Varma point to the greater question of why higher education professionals today are no more prepared for crisis than they were fifteen years ago. College basketball has been no stranger to controversy, as seen in

Bobby Knight’s dismissal from the University of Indiana in 2000 or the Baylor

University men’s basketball scandals in the early 2000s. So why did LSU not respond better in the initial days of its own impending crisis?

Libby Sander, a staff writer for the Chronicle of Higher Education, attributes a university’s lack of preparation for a crisis to the weight of bureaucratic processes: “a large institution just can’t react fast enough.”21 She argues that despite miscommunication and slow processes, colleges and universities have to treat every crisis with as much care and thought as a tragic security breach, planning and preparing for the unknown.22 Perhaps she asserts this because a poor response in the wake of any trying event would negatively impact the school in question. After raising such puzzling questions, Sander cites Ann J. Duffield, a higher education consultant, as saying “‘I haven’t seen a whole lot of universities really handle crises in a way I would call perfect.’”23 While no institution of higher learning should be held to unrealistic expectations of perfection, Duffield’s comment is a telling one. After years of mistakes and missteps at the university level, it is startling to observe one poorly handled crisis after another.

Offering an inside look into the higher education communicator’s world, Scott

Carlson – one of Sander’s co-workers – identifies what it is like when a crisis hits in a

21 Libby Sander, “In Scandals, Damage Control is Elusive,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 55 (October 2008): A4. 22 Quoted in Ibid. 23 Ibid.

16 post-Virginia Tech Massacre state, and how universities are now aiming to plan. Carlson recognizes the need for a concrete crisis communications plan; however, he warns against cultivating an inflexible staff unable to address a variety of crisis concerns that may not be included in the official university plan.24 He also calls for a relatively small crisis response team. Identifying such a team as part of the planning process is a practice shared by a number of universities.

Carlson’s ideal team is intimate, “limited to key players and administrators,” ideally cutting down on miscommunication, the effort needed to generate a response, and the spreading of misinformation.25 Carlson’s model answers Sander’s problem of maneuvering bureaucratic nonsense on the way to a conflict’s resolution. His attention to a swift and precise response is echoed by Duke University’s Senior Vice President John

F. Burress, whom Carlson cites as noting the value of the Internet and other technologies as tools to communicate with the media and public quickly. Not only do those tools meet constituencies where they look for information, but they also serve as “a record of a college’s statements and actions during a crisis.”26

Burress’ sentiment is part of a growing consensus on resources universities have at their disposal during trying times. This study builds upon the value Burress, Carlson, and others assign to technological advances in crisis communications. With his analysis,

Carlson proves that universities and colleges in the national spotlight for less than desirable reasons must have a prepared plan that helps communicators navigate the unknown. A great deal of that navigation rests in communicating to publics, including

24 Scott Carlson, “When a Campus is in the National Spotlight, Public-Relations Officers Feel the Heat,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 53 (April 2007): A17. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid.

17 those closest to the situation.

Just as Thiessen and Ingenhoff emphasize the role of internal communications in the larger public relations function of crisis communications, higher education communications must also grant adequate focus to internal audiences. Sally Ann Flecker suggests focusing equal attention to communicating with internal and external groups in the midst of a crisis: “Whether your crisis centers on the loss of lives or a governance scandal, communicating with faculty, staff, and students is just as vital as dealing with the media and outside publics.”27 Flecker also believes that when established positively in good times, internal relations can help predict, prevent, and prepare for crises.

Summarized below, Flecker’s alliterative framework outlines how partnering with internal audiences can lessen the negative impacts of campus crises.

Flecker’s Predict, Prevent, Prepare Model • Predict o Keep your ear to the ground o Develop good relations with student newspaper staff o Set up an issue-anticipation team • Prevent o Walk into the lion’s den (listen to opposing voices) o Convene a focus group o Bring opposing factions together before trouble erupts • Prepare o Identify internal audiences o Pinpoint the people responsible for communicating with key internal constituencies o Make a good-faith effort to inform internal audience first o Make your emergency plan widely available o In the end, evaluate28

Implementation for some of the above actions has seen a tremendous amount of growth in recent years. Communicating to all internal constituencies has evolved dramatically from word of mouth to instant text messages via cell phones. Prior to the

27 Sally Ann Flecker, “Getting Out the Inside Story,” CASE CURRENTS 16 (October 1990): 38-40. 28 Ibid., 40-43.

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Virginia Tech shooting less than five percent of higher education institutions included mobile phones as part of their emergency-notification system.29 Today, in light of the numerous text alerts university students receive about campus thefts, sexual assaults, and potential lockdowns, that statistic is surprising.

Before buy-in and solid internal crisis communication efforts can be initiated, any university or college in a state of emergency must have a firm and resolute leader – ideally the school president or chancellor – who can cast a resolving vision and carry his or her institution through the crisis. Paul Fain’s article, “Wanted: Crisis President,” emphasizes the invaluable role a strong leader can play during a campus crisis. Fain’s analysis is, as so many of his contemporaries’, written through a post-Virginia Tech

Massacre lens. He praises Charles Steger – then and current president of Virginia Tech – for his crisis performance, pointing other education leaders to Steger as the gold standard amongst university presidents in crisis:

… leaders of other colleges and universities are sure to look at Mr. Steger’s performance and question the readiness of presidents to act like corporate executives, take visible control of a campus in crisis, manage the onslaught of cameras and microphones, and strike the right tones of both grief and confidence.30

Fain says that in spite of the often unduly bureaucratic state of institutions of higher learning, a president has the responsibility “to circumvent the usual channels of committees and deliberation.” He goes on to say institutions of higher learning should move with as much swiftness as larger corporations or the military.31 With this in mind, it is easy to see why when searching for a new educator-in-chief, universities look at a candidate’s ability to answer the call of crisis, speak freely and with confidence to the

29 Mike Kennedy, “Crisis Communication,” American School & University 81 (2009): 16. 30 Paul Fain, “Wanted: Crisis President,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 53 (May 2007): A17. 31 Ibid.

19 media, and calm constituency groups.

When catastrophes strike, a campus community will look directly to the president or chancellor for answers and direction. Trinity Washington University President Patricia

McGuire knows first-hand the toll of a campus crisis on the position of the president.

Serving in the Washington D.C. school system during the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, an anthrax scare in the school’s mail system, the 2002 D.C. beltway sniper attacks, and 2003’s Hurricane Isabel gave McGuire quick on-the-job training for how to manage a college campus during crises. Drawing on her breadth of experience, McGuire wrote the 2007 cover story for a publication titled “Campus Communications in the Age of Crisis.”

McGuire emphasizes personal communication instead of an overreliance on often impersonal online formats, although she does recognize value in presidents using blogs.

While she notes “the means of communication have proliferated” on college campuses and it is no longer a reality to summon students to a common place for announcements,

McGuire is hesitant to meet the campus community online, with the exception of her blog.32

Despite being written only six years ago, McGuire’s thoughts on communicating via untraditional forms of media are dated. For her and her institution to have survived the amount of external crises they did, McGuire was unwilling to see the true value of instant messages and social networking sites that she identifies students prefer.33 At the time of her writing, McGuire could not foresee the potential of sites like Facebook and

Twitter as communications resources. Today, in addition to her favored blog, McGuire

32 Patricia McGuire, “Campus Communications in the Age of Crisis,” Presidency, 10 (Fall 2007): 18. 33 Ibid., 20.

20 also has an official Twitter account, @TRINITYPREZ, which she uses to advance her accessibility as university president. It can only be assumed that McGuire has come to see the value of social networking and other such devices to deliver messages to the university community.

In their article, “Keeping Your Cool,” Kay Miller and Michael J. Baxter frame an approach to campus crisis strategy much like best practices, however, the guidelines they provide are less theoretical and more practical. Holding that a “good crisis strategy can do much to keep a difficult situation from becoming impossible,” Miller and Baxter posit the following:

Crisis Rules for Education Communicators • Make sure the staff speaks one language • Review with officials what can and cannot be said • Help reporters out • Treat reporters fairly • Be accessible • Avoid the words “no comment” • Pounce on misinformation immediately • Never lie • Beware of the “other media” (tabloid sensationalism) • Don’t forget the public34

Adhering to the above rules, Miller and Baxter claim, will lead higher education communications professionals toward successful crisis management.

The majority of material reviewed addresses the communicator in a post-Virginia

Tech world. Perhaps this is because the tragedy in Blacksburg was so great and at a time when more could have potentially been done to alert the campus community. Sadly, it was not until after this great misfortune that true reform and evaluation of campus crisis plans took place. While the inevitable reassessment was at the expense of the Virginia

Tech community, others benefited from the opportunity and learned how best to

34 Kay Miller and Michael J. Baxter, “Keeping Your Cool,” CASE CURRENTS, 3 (Nov./Dec. 1987): 24-25.

21 communicate during difficult scenarios.

The lingering gap in the higher education communications literature remains its omission of social media as effective ways to speak directly to audiences. The next section introduces and reviews social media in today’s context, identifying how the tools have evolved for the online user and how they can be used for the business professional.

For the purposes of this thesis, the literature is restricted to two primary social media platforms: Facebook and Twitter.

Social Media

The landscape of literature on social media has grown exponentially in recent years. With the early launch of sites like MySpace and the later explosion of Facebook,

Twitter, and Pinterest, writers have become increasingly interested in the phenomenon of

Web 2.0 and the world of online collaboration it brings. Today, social media infiltrate nearly every major entertainment event, sports game, nightly newscast, and, particularly, reality television shows. Online users engage with others by live-tweeting awards shows via Twitter, liking favorite musicians on Facebook, and pinning unique ways to decorate living rooms on Pinterest.

Communications scholars laud social media as opportunities for online interaction and community, both personal and professional. Social media scholar Montalvo E.

Roberto argues, “Social media are fundamentally scalable communications technologies that turn Internet-based communications into an interactive dialogue platform.”35 Above all, social media play a critical role in the continued shift of the Internet from Web 1.0 to

Web 2.0. Identified for its collaborative nature, “Web 2.0 is the second evolutionary stage

35 Robert E. Montalvo, “Social Media Management,” International Journal of Management & Information Systems, 15 (Third Quarter 2011): 91.

22 of the World Wide Web that harnesses the collective intelligence of its users.”36 Without

Web 2.0, social media would not exist. Unlike Web 1.0, Web 2.0 focuses on the online user’s experience, participation, and interaction rather than the Web developer’s creation.

Founded in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg and a close cohort of Harvard University classmates, Facebook is the world’s largest social networking site with over one billion registered users. The social network cites its mission “is to make the world more open and connected.”37 The social media giant encourages a culture of online community where users can muse about their everyday life, post photos from a recent trip or concert, and share birthday greetings with friends by writing on their “timeline.” Other elements offered such as instant messaging and “liking” – the ability to show approval or support for statuses, posts, and photos – enable users to connect uniquely with each of their online friends.

The popular site is an international phenomenon with approximately 81% of users located outside the United States and Canada.38 After years of steady increased growth,

The Wall Street Journal reported in June 2012 that Facebook’s rates of expansion had slowed. The article cited just a five percent increase of United States users in April 2012 from the previous year.39 Despite any slowing in the United States, Facebook continues to have a large growing presence abroad. In fact, recent statistics show that worldwide, one out of every seven minutes spent online is on Facebook, 500 million “likes” are distributed per day, and 140 billion friend connections are made on a daily basis.40 With

36 Ibid. 37 Facebook, “Key Facts,” Facebook, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (accessed January 4, 2013). 38 Ibid. 39 Shayndi Raice, “Days of Wild User Growth Over at Facebook,” The Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2012. 40 Shea Bennett, “100 Amazing Social Media Statistics, Facts and Figures [INFOGRAPHIC],” Media Bistro, http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/100-social-media-stats_b33696 (accessed January 13, 2013).

23 statistics like these, it is easy to see why corporations, educational institutions, politicians, and celebrities flock to create Facebook pages for users to “like.”

Created just two years after Facebook, Twitter was unusual to those users most familiar with Facebook. For those accustomed to sharing verbose status updates,

Twitter’s staple rule of limiting information shared to 140 characters in what is known as a “tweet” was an adjustment. When creating the new social media platform, Twitter founder Jack Dorsey sought to create a outlet for online users to briefly share what was happening and relevant to them at the moment.

In its own words, “Twitter is a real-time information network that connects you to the latest stories, ideas, opinions, and news about what you find interesting. Simply find the accounts you find most compelling and follow the conversations.”41 The platform’s unique positioning that distinguishes it from all other social media sites lies in providing and sharing an immense amount of information with brevity suited for the modern day information age.

From its origins, Twitter exploded into a news information sharing resource.

Users can stay updated on breaking news by becoming “followers” of news outlets such as CNN or The New York Times. Many have found this useful when following breaking stories like the Summer 2012 London Olympics (150 million tweets), the 2012 United

States Presidential Election (327,452 tweets per minute on Election night), or the fall

2012 Superstorm Sandy (over 20 million tweets in a five-day period).42 Such events are organized and categorized with hashtags, for instance #London2012, #Election2012, and

#SuperstormSandy.

41 Twitter, “About,” Twitter, http://www.twitter.com/about (accessed January 4, 2013). 42 Twitter, “2012 Year on Twitter,” Twitter, https://2012.twitter.com/ (accessed January 4, 2013).

24

With 517 million registered users and as the second largest social media site,

Twitter lays claim to a staggering set of statistics. A recent study found that 340 million tweets are sent each day, one million new accounts are created daily, and the site’s projected advertising revenue for 2012 was $259 million.43 While it may have taken some getting used to, Twitter’s abbreviated version of connecting has resonated with the online social media world.

Both Facebook and Twitter have dramatically evolved in recent years to the point that businesses, politicians, and celebrities have created accounts on these platforms to connect with consumers, constituents, and fans. The platforms infiltrate today’s media, consumer markets, and entertainment industries leaving the public inundated with “Like” buttons and hashtagged phrases. Facebook allows businesses and individuals to market themselves as well as provides a space for “fans” of the business to interact with the business or individual and each other.44 Known as “the world’s largest cocktail party,”

Twitter facilitates “conversations ranging from the banal to the esoteric, from social niceties, to the beginnings of business deals.”45 The power of social media will surely continue to grow, demanding higher involvement and investment from groups or individuals who wish to communicate and connect with their followers and fans.

Social media professional Karen Altes lauds collaboration as one of the fundamental strengths of sites like Facebook and Twitter. Recognizing that the Internet age has brought with it easily accessible user reviews for a myriad of products, and, thereby, user-oriented ownership of online content, Altes encourages businesses and brands to take advantage of online communication with their audiences. Using

43 Bennett, “100 Amazing Social Media Statistics, Facts and Figures [INFOGRAPHIC],” Media Bistro. 44 Karen Altes, “Social Media,” Journal of Property Management, 74 (2009): 44-47. 45 Ibid., 46.

25 relationship building as the primary trigger to persuade such groups to engage on social media sites, Altes argues that once an official presence is established, active conversations allow organizations to respond to constituent concerns and shape perceptions.46 David Lee King, a professional librarian and scholar, agrees:

Social media is called ‘social’ for a reason. It enables communication. Using social media tools through the acts of friending and following gives your organization direct access to your customers. This is HUGE. If people choose to follow you, it’s because they like your organization and they want to stay updated.47

Director of Social Media for Disney Parks Tom Smith shares perhaps the most striking truth about social media: “This social revolution is being felt all around us, even if you are not actively involved in social media. Today if you search for a product, the results are dominated by user content and opinion – this shapes all online users’ opinions.”48 Smith is right. The reality of today’s world is that no one escapes the omnipresence of social media, even those who choose not to officially engage by creating personal accounts. By using search engines that lead to blog entries, watching television shows with hashtagged phrases, or visiting websites that have “Find us on Facebook” buttons, the average media consumer is inundated with social options.

By Smith’s qualification, it is clear to see how pervasive social media has become

– it is now large enough to constitute an individual’s entire career. Social media management has evolved into a field all its own with application across multiple industries and disciplines. An online job search for “social media manger” conducted in

April 2011 on www.monster.com, a leading employment website, returned an excess of

46 Karen Altes, “Social Media,” Journal of Property Management, 74 (2009): 44-47. 47 David Lee King, “Social Media,” Library Technology Reports, 48 (2012): 23. 48 Tom Smith, “The Social Media Revolution,” International Journal of Market Research, 51 (2009): 559.

26

1,000 results.49

Montalvo defines social media management in the business sphere as “the collaborative process of using Web 2.0 platforms and tools to accomplish desired organizational objectives.”50 Monitoring and contributing to social media sites with the explicit intention to achieve strategic goals for organizations, businesses, or public figures is an increasingly prevalent element of any comprehensive communications plan.

Because social media are active and constantly updating, a committed employee resource dedicated to the supply of content and monitoring of platforms is essential to meeting communications or marketing-centric objectives.

Scholars and professionals posit a range of practical tips and best practices for approaching the task of social media management. Nearly every set of advice begins by tasking the newfound social media professionals with defining the overall goal or mission of the social media account. Typically the goal is simple – to reach and communicate with consumers and publics on a relatable and accessible level. After establishing the purpose of the account, it is up to the account manager to identify his or her audience.

Once an audience is identified, it is in the social media professional’s best interest to listen to what those audiences are saying on the platforms so that he or she can react and respond appropriately. Listening to audiences will enable the social media professional to equip himself or herself with the necessary tools to proactively engage those groups in specified and unique ways.

So how does an institution listen to what constituencies are saying on social media platforms? King recommends establishing Google Alerts (email updates of

49 Montalvo, “Social Media Management,” 92. 50 Ibid., 91.

27 relevant Google searches) and Twitter searches centered on the organization. Doing so will reveal what consumers are saying about the brand in question, as well as how they currently interact with the brand.51 This will lead to genuine interactions between the brand and its audiences. Establishing other rules – like setting frequency of posts, using appropriate and accessible language, instituting a monitoring policy, and determining the privacy settings or accessibility of the accounts for interaction – will provide a great deal of clarity for the social media manager.

A final best practice adopted by many social media professionals is the employment of an official social media policy.52 The policy should ultimately encompass all of the aforementioned recommendations. As a living document, the policy guides the social media professional as to the best way to engage with and market to audiences via social media platforms. In addition to entailing broad rules and regulations for social media strategy, the policy should speak to the implementation for multiple platforms

(Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc). In all, a policy must address how the social media manager is to monitor progress and promote initiatives.

While the literature reviewed is fairly comprehensive in defining social media, it is clear there is much to develop in terms of analysis and best practices. As social media continue to develop, there will surely be further evolution and additional opportunities for fresh analysis. With such intense growth over the past nine years, social media’s permeation of modern culture captivated billions. As a result of the accessibility, user- generated content, and unique user-ownership social media offers, the Web 2.0 facilitators are a convenient way to keep in touch with friends, family, and co-workers. In

51 David Lee King, “Social Media,” 25. 52 Ibid, 27.

28 addition, social media are now necessary vehicles for brands, politicians, and celebrities to communicate to consumers, constituents, and fans directly without the intervention of traditional media. Today such groups have little choice as to whether or not they choose to have a social media presence. The culture and the users demand it.

Institutions of higher learning are not immune to this demand. In fact, it is uncommon for a college or university to not have a Facebook or Twitter account; many have several for athletics teams, specific colleges or disciplines, school publications, and even official leadership handles or pages for deans and presidents. As such, it is appropriate to review literature on social media in higher education, specifically how schools are integrating Web 2.0 facilitators in their efforts to build and maintain their brands and ultimately communicate with all constituencies.

Social Media in Higher Education

Unlike the current literature available on social media, that on social media in higher education is limited. For some institutions social media are still an unknown factor and their use or function is not wholly valued. Although many schools have social media presences, there is little information on why schools use social media, their purpose, and how to efficiently implement social media strategy as part of a larger communications plan.

As seen above, social media are increasingly prevalent in today’s society. The roles Facebook and Twitter play are growing to an almost obnoxious obsession and both platforms show little sign of relenting. So what does this mean for higher education and particularly for communicators within the field? Ultimately, it means schools must take full advantage of the opportunities social media afford, especially when it comes to

29 communicating. Mark Blankenship puts it this way: “What might be the most inescapable truth about social media in education: No matter what we think of them, they aren’t going away. Now, we need to accept that and start empowering ourselves to use social media well.”53

In their book, Why Social Media Matters, Kitty Porterfield and Meg Carnes agree.

In some form or another social media will remain prominent in the educational society.

Porterfield and Carnes argue that as technologies emerge, new social media platforms will evolve. At those times, it is the educator’s responsibility to find the social media tools that specifically reach their target audiences. The two also attribute social media’s promise of longevity to the need it fulfills: “ … to feel connected, to be in touch.”54 This truth should resonate with universities seeking to recruit and retain students, engage alumni, and promote their brands.

As an industry with thousands of competitors in the United States alone, higher education institutions can benefit greatly from the power of social media. The value for schools found in social media is multi-faceted. First, a Facebook or Twitter account provides a university presence on one of the two most popular social networking sites in the world. Second, in using the platforms well a university can recruit prospective students, retain current students, inform the school community of relevant news and events, connect with alumni and donors, and perhaps best of all, promote its brand. Third,

Facebook and Twitter provide an outlet for a university to tell its story. And fourth, social media grants a coveted gift to universities: controlled messaging.

Social media specialist Michael Gross warns universities against “losing touch”

53 Mark Blankenship, “How Social Media Can and Should Impact Higher Education,” The Education Digest, 76 (2011): 42. 54 Kitty Porterfield and Meg Carnes, Why Social Media Matters (Bloomington: Solution Tree Press), 21.

30 with their key demographics by ignoring social media. Gross advocates for schools to fully embrace social media and calls attention to what doing so will accomplish: “The effort to communicate with constituents through their chosen communication channels has led to a full-scale overhaul of the college’s communications plan from a traditional approach to a web-centric one.”55

A school’s web-centric communications approach is certainly not limited to

Facebook or Twitter. In addition to those two social media platforms the term web- centric also applies to the school’s official website, online marketing, and search engine optimization. As high school seniors increasingly search for colleges and universities online, higher education professionals have adopted Google Adwords, a service for advertisers to pinpoint audiences by designing advertising campaigns based upon Google search keywords.56 Facebook also provides advertising options for schools with the option to pinpoint prospective students by their age, interests, and geographic location.

Not only have these proved to be effective marketing tactics, they are also inexpensive and flexible advertising options for schools. Higher learning advertisers can choose to pay for advertisement impressions or actual clicks and can dictate and adjust a campaign’s budget. Creating an entirely web-centric communications plan may have seemed risky even five years ago; today, now cost-cutting measures and innovative ways to share a school’s story online have demanded a creative approach to communicating.

At a time when social media critics argue the platforms make the world more disconnected and reliant on technological devices, educational researcher Sally Chapman

Cameron posits such platforms have the power to truly create community, particularly on

55 Michael Gross, “Staying on Message: How the Right Tools Can Make or Break Your College’s Communications Strategy,” Community College Journal, 81 (2010): 20. 56 Ibid.,16-20.

31 a college campus. For Cameron schools should see social media, particularly Facebook and Twitter, as communications tools no different than a community newsletter or other external publication.57 The platforms enable universities and colleges to illustrate what is happening on campus, not only for current students, but also for prospective students and alumni. The growth of a campus community can then be furthered by student engagement through the liking of posts on Facebook or retweets on Twitter. Moreover, whereas an e- newsletter or quarterly magazine is time sensitive and only released on a specific schedule, social media accounts give schools a megaphone to project news, events, and announcements whenever they see fit. It is then up to the followers or fans to determine how involved in the school community they wish to be.

It is easy to see how an institution’s social media presence could not only impact the growth of a school community literally within its own geographic location, but also extend to other states and countries where alumni, former faculty, and other constituencies are scattered. Cameron’s greatest secret to creating community via social media is honesty and truth telling. Authenticity is a sought-after commodity in social media and the more a school shares its story with truth and credibility, the more likely it is to grow as a community.58

While having a Facebook or Twitter account – or in many cases, both – is in a school’s best interest for engaging with audiences, it is not enough. Higher education communicators must make social media part of their larger communications plan. As part of reorienting a school’s approach to communicating toward web-centric efforts, policies must be created for appropriate implementation and application.

57 Sally Chapman Cameron, “8 Ways to Build Community with Social Media,” Community College Journal, 81 (2010): 23. 58 Ibid., 25.

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Pam Cox-Otto, a higher education social media consultant, says social media content should be seventy-five percent entertainment and twenty-five percent information, arguing “‘To become the go-to destination, it’s important to keep your audience engaged and amused; this is how … you ensure they are still around when you have something important to say.’”59 The communications staff should designate a staff member for social media management or perhaps create an account maintenance schedule for all staff to participate in monitoring the school’s social media efforts. Just as in any other industry, a school’s social media policy should address frequency of posts, privacy settings, and account accessibility, among other items.

Despite the limited, and in some ways incomplete, literature on social media in higher education, it is noteworthy to acknowledge the recent growth of the practice. It is safe to assume many schools are simply still discovering how best to wield social media to communicate with audiences. Undoubtedly, with the passing of time and the development of new social media offerings more scholarly analysis on higher education’s use of social media will surface. In the meantime, Anne Sroka of Holyoke Community

College, offers the following challenge:

To thrive, campus communicators must expand our role beyond traditional storytellers. We must also become multimedia facilitators for other storytellers, commentators, critics, pundits, and reporters. We must be prepared to facilitate others in telling our story, which fundamentally changes our role.60

59 Quoted in Ibid., 25. 60 Gross, “Staying on Message: How the Right Tools Can Make or Break Your College’s Communications Strategy,” 20.

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Social Media in Higher Education Crisis Communications

What role do social media play in higher education crisis communications? Do they have a role, and should they? Surprisingly, more valuable literature and thought is readily available on social media as crisis communications resources in higher education than the simple presence of the Web 2.0 applications in an institution’s communications plan.

Higher education communications professional Billy Liggett argues the importance of communication during a campus crisis has not changed; rather, what has is the way in which we communicate, particularly in reference to social media.61 A striking truth evident in most scholarly thought on social media in higher education is the necessity of establishing an authentic, credible, and lasting presence on a platform as the primary way to gain trust from constituent groups. The amount of preparation involved in creating online credibility takes a great deal of effort and time, however, working toward that end is necessary if a school aims to be a valued and trusted voice to share information. Essentially, if schools set a precedent for having an active and authentic presence on Facebook or Twitter, their constituents will naturally gravitate to those locations for information on the school community.

Vice President for Public Relations and Communications at DePaul University

Cindy Lawson has seen her fair share of crises, most notably the 1999 Texas A&M Aggie

Bonfire, when she was the executive director of university relations. Social media did not exist then as it does today, thereby limiting Lawson’s communications response to the tragedy, however, she did lead the university response by turning to the school website,

61 Billy Liggett, “Fast, Broad, and Frequent: Campus Crisis Communications Today Demand Social Media.” CASE CURRENTS, 38 (2012): 26-28.

34 posting regular updates.

Today, Lawson advocates a strong social media presence prior to a crisis developing: “For these channels to be effective, you will need to proactively cultivate a following, and position your institution’s website and social media channels as the go-to place for information about the school.”62 Establishing effective channels prior to a crisis will lead constituents to the school’s social media sites for information during a crisis and it will help the communications team remain in control of messaging without the interference of traditional media outlets.

Posting information on social media platforms during a crisis must be strategic.

Underutilizing or misusing Facebook or Twitter in an emergency could become an added complication or secondary crisis. Liggett calls for universities to act quickly and avoid the bureaucratic delay before posting an initial comment on a social media platform post- crisis.63 Waiting too long can compromise a school’s credibility and can also confuse constituents about where to search for information. Providing regular updates, responding to comments and concerns, and monitoring Google Alerts, Twitter searches, and other traditional media outlets are all necessary elements of a successful social media crisis campaign.

CKSyme.org, a crisis and reputation communications practice specializing in education, recently partnered with the Council for Advancement and Support of

Education (CASE) in producing an analysis of the use of social media in higher education crisis communications. The first of its kind, the study found that in the 12 months prior to

62 Quoted in Daniel Fusch, “Including Social Media in Your Crisis Communications Plan.” Academic Impressions, http://www.academicimpressions.com/news/including-social-media-your-crisis- communications-plan, (accessed August 16, 2012). 63 Liggett, “Fast, Broad, and Frequent: Campus Crisis Communications Today Demand Social Media,” 27.

35 the survey, 65 percent of all respondents experienced at least one event with the potential to damage the institution’s reputation, and nearly all of those cases were discussed on social media channels.64 Of those surveyed, 100 percent had official Facebook accounts and 94 percent had an official Twitter account, but only 59 percent stated addressing social media in their crisis communications plans.65 In fact, less than half of four-year institutions surveyed had an actual social media policy outside of crisis communications implementation. The results analysis and conclusion centered on what the data suggested:

“ … many educational institutions are inadequately prepared to deploy multiple communication channels, including social media, as needed in a crisis.”66

What is needed is an improved set of guidelines and benchmarks. The application of crisis communications in the higher education setting is complicated enough, let alone with the added integration of social media as response tools. Today, a good portion of colleges and universities are ill equipped to respond to crises via Web 2.0 applications.

Some, however, when faced with difficult circumstances, have risen to the occasion and communicated extraordinarily well via social media. The next section will discuss how two different universities facing different crises have done so.

64 Syme, “Using Social Media in a Crisis: Higher Education Results,” 5. 65 Ibid., 7. 66 Ibid., 10.

36

Chapter Two: Methodology

A staple of public relations research, case studies canvas situational circumstances in an effort to answer posited questions. Typically, a case study will provide a situation analysis or summary of the given circumstance, identify what elements related to the circumstance will be researched, define the research method, issue results, and conclude with analysis. Co-authors Dawson R. Hancock and Bob Algozzine argue there are a few fundamental components of case studies. First, the research typically centers on an individual organization or phenomenon. Second, the subject being researched is studied in its natural context, limited by space and time. Third, research is illustrated through descriptive statistics and findings. Lastly, case studies are generally more exploratory than other traditional forms of research like scientific experiments, which seek to test hypotheses and put forth confirmations.67

The same characteristics outlined by Hancock and Algozzine are represented in the following case studies. Each study adopts a specific design tailored to its circumstantial elements. The studies’ orientations are historical in nature, analyzing specific and restricted moments in time. The cases are also classified as collective, as they attempt to address an issue while also contributing to a larger foundation of literature in an effort to conceptualize theories. Further, the designs for the studies are descriptive, partnering with the historical orientation to put forth a full account of a phenomenon within its context.68

The subsequent two case studies are indicative of a growing trend to communicate via social media outlets during times of campus crises. The cases provide a look into the

67 Dawson R. Hancock and Bob Algozzine, Doing Case Study Research: A Practical Guide for Beginning Researchers (New York: Teachers College Press), 35-38. 68 Ibid., 63.

37 circumstances in which social media were utilized as crisis communications tools. The forthcoming analysis seeks to uncover what is effective and what is not effective in the sphere of social media in higher education crisis communications. By approaching both scenarios historically, collectively, and descriptively, this thesis will reveal how social media communications vehicles are used as university mouthpieces in tumultuous times.

The significance in analyzing the coming scenarios lies primarily in the attempt to provide clear and practical applications for social media higher education professionals when facing crises. The cases of the University of Virginia and Florida A&M University provide a sample of potential crises and the institutions’ responses via social media. The analysis will culminate in a set of best practices for implementing social media as part of a greater crisis communications plan.

Research Method

Two institutions of higher learning that have recently faced a national crisis were selected. The schools and their applicable crises are: The University of Virginia’s Board of Visitors failed attempt to oust current President Teresa A. Sullivan and Florida A&M

University’s Marching 100 hazing death incident. Each crisis, independent in nature, provides a broad look at separate types of crises, specifically board governance, personnel oversight error, and student wrongdoing. While these are not comprehensive examples of the state of crises in higher education today, they are representative of recent trends as seen in other scenarios at the University of Oregon and University of the

District of Columbia (president firings), the University of Iowa and University of North

Carolina at Chapel Hill (personnel misconduct), and Oklahoma State University and

Amherst College (student wrongdoings).

38

By identifying those areas in which universities face crises, the case studies offer examples of how national level institutions handled times of difficulty on social media platforms. The analysis centers on two primary social media platforms: Twitter and

Facebook. Each university’s case will include a synopsis of how it used these outlets to communicate during its crisis. Investigation of each school’s crisis social media activity centers on the following:

• Total number of tweets/posts within the identified timeframe • Number of retweets/shares within the identified timeframe • Number of crisis-related tweets/posts within the identified timeframe • Number of non-crisis-related tweets/posts within the identified timeframe • Amount and types of crisis-related multimedia used within the identified timeframe • Number of conversations/responses to user-generated tweets/posts • Twitter hashtags used • Nature of tweet/post content

After extensively examining the schools’ use of social media, each case will conclude with a brief summation followed by an assessment. For the sake of brevity, the following abbreviations will be used when referring to the schools in question: University of

Virginia (U.Va.) and Florida A&M University (FAMU).

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Chapter Three: Ouster and Reinstatement of University of Virginia President Sullivan

Notoriously known as “17 Days in June,” the failed attempt by U.Va.’s Board of

Visitors to fire the University’s eighth president, Teresa A. Sullivan, thrust the school into the national spotlight. Located in Charlottesville, Va. and founded by the United

States’ third president, U.Va. – referenced as a hobby of Thomas Jefferson’s old age – embodies the Jeffersonian ideals of honor, civility, and transparency. The University’s first female president, Teresa A. Sullivan, was only in office one year and ten months before a small coup led by Board of Visitors Rector Helen Dragas forced her to resign in

June 2012 and, arguably, overturned Jefferson’s aim for honor, civility, and transparency in higher education.

Despite the unexpected nature of the events in June 2012, U.Va. is no stranger to crisis or controversy. Just two years earlier the school witnessed the nationally publicized death of lacrosse athlete and student, Yeardley Love. Love was murdered by former boyfriend and fellow lacrosse player George Hugely on May 3, 2010. Less than three months later, President Teresa A. Sullivan was welcomed to her new post with another tragic crisis. Kevin Morrissey, managing editor at the Virginia Quarterly Review – a magazine published by the University – committed suicide near campus grounds, blaming workplace bullying by his boss, Ted Genoways, in a suicide note.

Notably, neither of these events made splashes on U.Va.’s social media presences in the way Sullivan’s removal and reinstatement did. The University’s Facebook page presented only two posts in the wake of Love’s death, while making no mention of

Morrissey’s suicide. U.Va.’s official Twitter account could not be mined back far enough

40 to determine if either incident was referenced via tweet, however, based on the scant information issued on Facebook, it can be assumed that little to nothing was mentioned.

To be sure, what made the Sullivan crisis so prevalent across social media platforms was the University community’s involvement. Scores of students, faculty members, and alumni rallied together and put forth protest after protest online and on campus. The University’s engagement with its diverse set of audiences is chronicled and analyzed here.

Crisis Synopsis

On June 10, 2012, with an abruptness that shocked an entire network of U.Va. constituencies, Rector of the Board of Visitors Helen Dragas gathered university vice presidents and deans to announce on behalf of the Board and Sullivan that the two had

“agreed that she will step down as President of the University on August 15th.”69 The news, issued on a quiet summer Sunday afternoon, initiated an uproar among faculty, staff, alumni, and students. Dragas’ statement was followed by a brief press conference that revealed little more information. Only days before, Dragas and another member of the Board of Visitors had engaged in negotiations with a Washington D.C. based public relations firm to mitigate the impending crisis. The fallout that ensued captivated national attention and launched a series of events that are still unfolding in 2013, well beyond the roughly two-week crisis.

The timeline below was adapted from the University’s quarterly magazine and outlines the details of Sullivan’s forced resignation and reinstatement.70 A review of this

69 Carol S. Wood, “Rector Dragas' Remarks to VPs and Deans,” University of Virginia, http://news.virginia.edu/node/18791?id=18791 (accessed January 4, 2013). 70 “Timeline: Teresa Sullivan’s Resignation and Reinstatement,” The University of Virginia Magazine, July 18, 2012.

41 timeline is necessary for later analysis of U.Va.’s social media activity on particular days of the crisis. For the sake of brevity, Board of Visitors will be referenced as “BOV.”

Table One: Timeline of Failed Ouster and Reinstatement of Teresa Sullivan

Date Brief Description of Event 06/08/2012 BOV Rector Helen Dragas and Vice Rector Mark Kington asked for Teresa Sullivan's Resignation, giving her 24 hours to decide. 06/09/2012 Sullivan agreed to resign. 06/10/2012 Dragas delivered remarks to U.Va. VPs and Deans and the official announcement was made by press conference and email to the University community. 06/11/2012 U.Va. deans sent emails to U.Va. community issuing a resolve to endure the transition of leadership. U.Va. Faculty Senate led by George Cohen released its first statement condemning the decision and “unsatisfactory” reasoning for Sullivan’s removal. 06/12/2012 U.Va.’s College of Arts & Sciences department chairs released a statement in protest requesting clarification from the BOV. An email from Peter Kiernan, the chair of U.Va.’s Darden School Foundation Board of Trustees was leaked. The email sent to fellow board members revealed he worked with Dragas on the “project” of planning Sullivan’s resignation. 06/13/2012 “Students, Family, & Friends United to Reinstate President Sullivan” Facebook group was created. An online petition to reinstate Sullivan reached 5,206 signatures before it was closed. 06/14/2012 Dragas responded to the Faculty Senate saying the employment matter was confidential and will remain so. U.Va. Provost John Simon and COO Michael Strine issued a statement to the University community noting the resolve of the BOV’s decision and the School’s obligation to move forward. Kiernan resigned from Darden board and denied any official tie between the business school and Sullivan’s forced resignation. The Faculty Senate declared lack of confidence in the BOV. 06/15/2012 U.Va.’s Alumni Association solicited comments from alumni in support of Sullivan. 06/17/2012 Major donor stated she would withhold funds until changes to the BOV are made. Another major donor, Paul Tudor Jones published an op-ed in support of the BOV. U.Va.’s Faculty Senate held an emergency meeting where Simon spoke out against the BOV’s actions. 06/18/2012 BOV held a special meeting to select an interim president while 2,000 people gathered on the University Lawn in support of Sullivan. 06/19/2012 BOV named Dean of the McIntire School of Commerce, Carl P. Zeithaml as interim president. Vice Rector Mark Kington resigned from the Board of Visitors. The University’s student newspaper retrieved and tweets emails between Dragas and Kington. 06/20/2012 Zeithaml held a press conference to discuss his interim presidency. Faculty held a silent vigil on the Lawn with 1,000 attendees in support of Sullivan. 06/21/2012 Sullivan sent email to U.Va. community calling for civility. University Deans asked the BOV to reinstate Sullivan. Dragas issued a statement outlining 10 strategic issues U.Va. faces. News broke via Twitter that the BOV planned to meet on June 26 to discuss possible changes to Sullivan’s employment contract. 06/22/2012 Zeithaml suspended his interim presidency negotiations. Virginia Governor McDonnell sent a letter to the BOV calling for final action or he

42

would demand the resignation of the entire Board. Alumni Association delivered over 5,500 alumni comments to the BOV. 06/24/2012 Thousands turned out for the “Rally For Honor” on the U.Va. Lawn in support of Sullivan’s reinstatement. 06/25/2012 Cohen emailed U.Va. community and asked them to “Fill the Lawn with Grace and Dignity” in support of Sullivan the following day during the Board meeting. 06/26/2012 The BOV voted unanimously to reinstate Sullivan. Governor McDonnell made a statement in support of the reversed decision. Source: U.Va. Magazine. Timeline: Teresa Sullivan’s Resignation and Reinstatement

Over the course of 17 days, national media outlets including The New York Times and Washington Post covered the unfolding events in Charlottesville, Va. National education leaders such as the American Association of University Professors made public statements in support of reinstating Sullivan. As seen in the national attention paid to the situation, it is easy to see the crisis was widespread, impacting the greater institution of higher education and board governance. Yet despite the amount of coverage, many point to the presence of social media as playing a significant role in Sullivan’s reinstatement.

With a mobilizing power, social media platforms Facebook and Twitter encouraged thousands in the U.Va. community, including students, faculty, staff, alumni, and Charlottesville area constituents, to come together and organize a pointed campaign to reinstate Sullivan. As seen in the timeline above, U.Va. constituents physically rallied, held silent vigils, drafted petitions, and created online spaces of support for Sullivan.

Accomplishing these efforts was made possible by social media.

In July 2012, less than a month after the crisis resolution, U.Va. Magazine published an online article centered on the role social media played in reinstating

Sullivan as the University’s eighth president. In it, U.Va. communications staff detail specific tweets that the campus community and local media posted during the crisis. The undisclosed writer argues:

The strengths of social media – a way to follow breaking news, a forum for discussion and expressing opinions, and a mechanism for mobilizing grassroots

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support and organizing gatherings – all combined to have a dramatic effect on the University community and on the outcome of a series of event involving Sullivan and the Board of Visitors.71

The article – and others – barely identifies the University’s own involvement in the social media storm and fails to go into detail about how the U.Va.’s communications via social media contributed to the overall sensationalism over Sullivan’s reinstatement. Its role in orchestrating the social media movement is analyzed below. For the purposes of this thesis, only the activity on U.Va.’s official University Twitter and Facebook accounts will be analyzed.

Social Media in Use During Crisis

Communications personnel were not willing to share the University’s social media policy as a point of reference in analyzing the forthcoming data. Notwithstanding, the study attempts to examine the case with circumspect analysis, offering a reasonable critique of the University’s performance throughout the crisis on social media platforms.

Traditionally U.Va.’s official Twitter and Facebook accounts have been used to disseminate news, attract prospective students, and promote the University brand. In times of difficulty or unfortunate circumstances, the platforms have been occasionally used to broadcast official University statements or condolences. What began on June 10,

2012 as an official statement broadcast, detailing the announcement of President

Sullivan’s resignation, quickly became a near-daily reoccurrence of crisis updates, newly released statements from a number of figures related to the crisis, and a subtly subversive grassroots organizing effort.

Over the course of 17 days, U.Va.’s Twitter account released a total of 190

71 “How Social Media Helped Change University History,” The University of Virginia Magazine, July 18, 2012.

44 tweets. A breakdown of those tweets is given below:

Table Two: University of Virginia Official Twitter Account Activity (6/10/2012 – 06/26/2012)72

Total Number of Tweets 190 Average Number of Tweets/Day 11.2 Number of Crisis-Related Tweets 141 Number of Non-Crisis-Related Tweets 49 Number of Retweets Related to the Crisis 15 Number of Conversations Related to the Crisis 29 Multimedia Used in Crisis-Related Tweets 8 (Video/Audio) Multimedia Used in Crisis-Related Tweets (Images) 9 Number of Tweets Covering Meetings and Press 36 Conferences (Tweeting Direct Quotes) Crisis-Related Hashtags Used #UVa, #BOV, #breakingnews Source: University of Virginia Official Twitter Account (www.twitter.com/uva)

While an average of 11.2 tweets per day for any given organization is not necessarily extensive, that many tweets focused toward the same subject is noteworthy.

This figure does not indicate the specific days in which more information was shared from U.Va.’s official account versus those where news was less forthcoming. In fact, a daily count shows that the largest volume of tweets posted by U.Va. came on June 26, the day the Board of Visitors reversed its decision and reinstated Sullivan. Coming in second for largest number of tweets in a day was June 22, the day Carl Zeithaml suspended interim presidency negotiations.

With only one tweet disseminated on June 13 – the same day the first Facebook group in support of Sullivan was formed and the online petition to reinstate her was created – it is clear that in the early days in the crisis little information was shared. Of the

72 A retweet is a tweet published by the University that is repeated by another Twitter user. A conversation consists of a response by the University directly to another Twitter user’s tweet. A hashtag visually resembles the # symbol and is used by Twitter users to categorize and qualify tweet comments as related to specific situations, events, or people.

45

190 total tweets, 16 percent came before June 18, a watershed point of the crisis when the

Board of Visitors moved forward by naming an interim president. Of that 16 percent, over half were not related to the crisis at all. Ultimately, this data suggests that in the beginning stages of the crisis U.Va.’s response via Twitter was either unorganized due to a lack of information or because the University had yet to determine how it should react to the crisis.

Between June 10 and 17, U.Va.’s communications team had yet to define an appropriate response to the crisis. The staff was likely given little notice of the Board of

Visitors’ decision and could not predict the fallout would produce such an overwhelming supportive cohort of constituencies, particularly for a president in the youth of her tenure.

It is likely the communications staff determined they could handle the crisis similarly to

Yeardly Love’s murder or Kevin Morrissey’s suicide – with respect and limited coverage. However beginning June 18 with the Board of Visitors’ appointment of an interim president and the presence of over 2,000 people rallying outside the meeting, the

U.Va. communications staff adapted its approach. The University’s coverage of the crisis on Twitter met the masses where they wished to communicate and organize, ultimately providing a legitimate online platform for Sullivan’s support, ultimately resulting in her reinstatement.

The impact and complicity of the communications staff in the matter of Sullivan’s reinstatement can further be determined by reviewing the nature of their tweets’ content.

To analyze the tweet content over the course of the crisis, special attention is paid to the volume of pointedly opinionated tweets and retweets made by U.Va.

With well over 20,000 followers, U.Va.’s Twitter account had the influence

46 necessary to support a mobilization effort in support of Sullivan. Between June 10 and

17, without a clear plan how to respond, communications staff tread lightly and did little to contribute to the lively debate between the Board of Visitors and its dissenters. Yet, after the University’s own audiences crafted their grassroots campaign, the communications team was free to use its own official platform as a subtly subversive support system for Sullivan’s camp.

Of the 141 crisis-related tweets distributed by U.Va. only three were found to be subjective and unashamedly in support of Sullivan’s reinstatement.

• @UVA #UVa roll call: SULLIVAN REINSTATED 15-0! • @UVA RT@jamiedailey: I hugged President Sullivan! It’s a good day to be a Wahoo! #UVa http://bit.ly/MobYyr • @UVA RT @Bob_Bruner: My thanks to #UVa Board of Visitors for their reinstatement of Terry Sullivan. Let the healing begin & building of UVA resume.73

The team’s ability to remain focused and, for the most part, objective throughout the crisis speaks to the credibility of its operations. Moreover, in addition to the few subjective tweets after Sullivan’s reinstatement, the team also practiced balance as seen here:

• @UVA RT @UVADeanGroves: Thoughtful people change direction when error is detected. The BOV and Rector deserve great credit for today’s action. #UVa74

Ultimately though, U.Va.’s tweet content can better be judged by its accessibility to followers.

The nature of tweets issued by U.Va. transitioned from stilted to conversational.

In the beginning, University tweeters were just stating the facts as they knew them. As time and circumstances evolved, the tweets became more editorial and lighthearted. The

73 University of Virginia, Twitter post, 26 June 2012, http://www.twitter.com/UVA. 74 Ibid.

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Board of Visitors’ meeting to name an interim president lasted from 3:00 p.m. to roughly

2:30 a.m. the next day. U.Va. responded in pithy fashion:

• @UVA Best tweet ever. RT @opendna: @UVA it’s time for the #BOV to wrap it up. It’s morning time in Europe. • @UVA Wish we had a West Coast tweeter to take over… been a very very long day. #UVa • @UVA Apparently the 15 minute warning was a tad optimistic. #UVa75

Generally speaking, U.Va.’s tweets were accessible and diverse. The communications staff in charge of tweeting made an effort to communicate with individual followers, engaging in nearly 30 different conversations. Based upon its interactions with media and University constituencies, the @UVA Twitter handle was perceived largely as a participant in the crisis, not just as an official voice representing the School, but a voice representing the entire University community. Perhaps U.Va.’s greatest contribution to the social media frenzy via Twitter was its leadership in establishing #UVa as a hashtag. As a result, the campus crisis was a trending topic on

Twitter June 18 and June 26, the scenario’s two most pivotal days.

U.Va.’s crisis engagement on Facebook is far less exciting in terms of volume. In contrast to its performance on Twitter, U.Va.’s official Facebook account only released a total of 17 posts. A breakdown of those posts is detailed below:

75 Ibid., 19 June 2012.

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Table Three: University of Virginia Official Facebook Activity (06/10/2012 – 06/26/2012)76

Total Number of Posts 17 Average Number of Posts/Day 1 Number of Crisis-Related Posts 17 Number of Non-Crisis-Related Posts 0 Number of Shares Related to the Crisis (Directed to U.Va. News 12 Stories) Number of Responses to User-Generated Posts Related to the Crisis 3 Total Number of User Likes (on crisis-related posts) 4,342 Average Number of User Likes/Crisis-Related Post 255.4 Total Number of User Comments (on crisis-related posts) 648 Average Number of User Comments/Crisis-Related Post 38.1 Total Number of User Shares (on crisis-related posts) 1,002 Average Number of User Shares/Crisis-Related Post 58.9 Multimedia Used in Crisis-Related Posts (Video/Audio) 3 Multimedia Used in Crisis-Related Posts (Images) 0 Source: University of Virginia Official Facebook Account (www.facebook.com/UniversityofVirginia)

Unlike its response via Twitter, U.Va.’s activity on Facebook was fairly consistent. Whereas U.Va.’s tweets were sparse in the beginning and plentiful near the end, its Facebook posts averaged one per day. In this regard it seems that while the

Twitter response strategy adapted and evolved based upon public reaction, Facebook’s crisis response strategy remained reliably straightforward. In doing so, U.Va. held onto strict journalistic coverage of the crisis and ultimately boosted its own credibility.

However, as a result, the reporting was less personal and relatable than its Twitter counterpart.

Of the 17 posts created during the crisis, 12 linked directly to official U.Va. news stories detailing the events of the crisis. News story links included directs to the official news release detailing Sullivan’s resignation, the announcement of Carl Zeithaml as

76 A share by the University is typically a link to an external site, in this case to the University’s news releases. A user like represents a fan’s approval of a post. A user comment is the written representation of a fan’s response to a post. A user share occurs when a fan reposts the information for all of their Facebook contacts to see.

49 interim president, and statements from University officials, among others. Most notable was the response received by U.Va.’s nearly 77,000 fans on Facebook.

With 4,342 likes for its total 17 posts, U.Va. averaged 255.4 likes per post. Each post averaged 648 comments and 58.9 shares. In its most popular post, announcing the official reinstatement of President Sullivan, U.Va. received 1,345 likes and 240 shares.

Generating the most conversation in a single post was the June 19 announcement of

Zeithaml as interim president, resulting in 103 comments.

U.Va.’s Facebook activity was noticeably less interactive than on Twitter. Direct communication with the University community only happened three times on Facebook in comparison to 29 via Twitter. However, the University did use its Facebook page to broadcast the June 26 Board of Visitors meeting in which Sullivan was reinstated.

The major observation that can be drawn from analyzing U.Va.’s performance on

Twitter and Facebook is its commitment to providing information. If there was ever information to be shared with University constituencies over the course of those 17 days, it was shared via a medium that was relatable and accessible to a multitude of groups.

Pulling from the data and identifying the reach the University had as a result of its social media platforms, it is clear U.Va. was successful in reaching its target audiences and communicating essential information. However, there are a number of ways in which its efforts could have been improved.

The number one weakness in U.Va.’s social media crisis response strategy was inconsistency across platforms. The University’s crisis reaction approach varied dramatically between Twitter’s relatable accessibility and Facebook’s stilted journalistic style. The emotion seen in some of U.Va.’s tweets was nonexistent on its Facebook

50 platform. Clearly both strategies were effective, so it is hard to determine which was preferable.

A second observation is U.Va.’s unpreparedness as evidenced in its tweets in the early days of the crisis. It was not until day nine that a clear directive seemed to have been given to tweet early and often on all things related to the Sullivan ouster. As soon as the theoretical directive was given however, the communications staff followed the story well and in a professional and approachable manner.

Today, U.Va. is still reeling from the failed ouster. In response to the crisis, The

Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges – U.Va.’s accrediting body – accused the governance leadership of “compromising the university’s integrity, not having a formal policy for involving faculty in making decisions and not following its governance requirements, which forbid a small number of members from controlling the board.”77 As a result of the reprimand, the Commission placed U.Va. “on warning” for one year with plans to visit Charlottesville and review the situation in early

2013.78

Despite countless calls for her resignation immediately following the crisis, Helen

Dragas was reappointed to the Board of Visitors in late January 2013. Just over a month later The Washington Post released the email correspondence between Sullivan and

Dragas, revealing continued difficulties and tension between U.Va.’s administration and governing board.79

77 Jenna Johnson, “U-Va. Receives Warning from Accreditors after Failed Ouster of President in June,” The Washington Post, December 11, 2012. 78 Ibid. 79 Jenna Johnson, “At U-Va., tensions persist between Sullivan and Dragas,” The Washington Post, March 1, 2013.

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Chapter Four: Florida A&M University Hazing Death Incident

Ranked as the number one public HBCU (historically black colleges and universities) in the 2012 U.S. News and World Report, Florida A&M University (FAMU) was founded in 1887. The University is the self-proclaimed premier HBCU in the nation with nearly 12,000 students and over 550 faculty members.80 Located in Tallahassee,

FAMU has served as the nation’s leading HBCU, with a nearly 90 percent African-

American population.

Set apart as one of the most reputable collegiate marching bands in the United

States, FAMU’s Marching 100 has performed for numerous statesmen including

President Barack Obama and former First Lady, U.S. Senator, and Secretary of State,

Hillary Clinton; at five Super Bowl games, as well as several other sporting events and parades; and at the Grammy Awards with musical artists, Kanye West and Jamie Foxx.81

In recent years, the band’s membership has grown to over 420 members, a significant departure from its beginnings in 1892 with only 16 musicians.82 The band lays claim to prestige and honor as the leading collegiate marching band in the United States.

Assuming responsibility for multiple techniques and practices that other marching bands have adopted, the Marching 100 self-appoints itself as the forefront leader in innovative marching band music.

In addition to its many successes and accolades, the Marching 100 is also widely known for its history of ritualistic hazing of its band members. Hazing dates back to

80 Florida A&M University, “About,” Florida A&M University, http://www.famu.edu/index.cfm?AboutFAMU&Overview (accessed February 7, 2013). 81 Florida A&M University, “Marching 100 History and Timeline,” Florida A&M University, http://www.famu.edu/index.cfm?marching100&HistoryTimeLine (accessed February 7, 2013). 82 Florida A&M University, “About the Band,” http://www.famu.edu/index.cfm?a=marching100 (accessed February 7, 2013).

52 tenures of earlier band directors and culminated in hospital visits for victimized students.

Just three days before crisis struck in November 2011, an administrative group gathered to discuss recent hazing allegations within the band.83 Those in attendance included Director of Bands Julian White, Provost Cynthia Hughes Harris, Vice President

William Hudson Jr., University Police Chief Calvin Ross, University Police Lieutenant

Angela Kirkland, and Dean of Students Henry Kirby. Recommendations for suspension of the Marching 100 were overruled; instead White, Ross, and Kirby were to address the band about the dangers of hazing.

Crisis Synopsis

On Saturday, November 19, 2011 after the FAMU Marching 100 performed at the annual Florida Classic football game, members participated in a band hazing ritual known as “Crossing Bus C.” Robert Champion, a 26 year-old drum major, had yet to undergo the infamous rite and was reportedly tired of being prodded to do so. After the game, Champion and others boarded Bus C, the percussion section’s bus, and were hazed. To cross Bus C, an individual was required to make his or her way from the front of the 45-foot bus to the back while being beaten repeatedly by fellow band members.

After sustaining several blunt trauma blows to his body, Champion made it to the back of the bus and immediately collapsed. He subsequently died from the injuries he sustained. The official University statement following Champion’s death stated that after arriving at the band’s hotel following the game, Champion vomited in the parking lot and claimed he was having difficulty breathing. After life-saving measures proved unsuccessful, Champion was pronounced dead at a local hospital. In its statement, the

83 George Howell and Marion Castillo, “Recommendations for Suspension Preceded FAMU Band Death” CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/06/us/florida-famu-hazing (accessed February 8, 2013).

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University claimed, “This is an ongoing investigation. There is no sign of foul play at this time.”84 The medical examiner’s autopsy report soon revealed Champion’s cause of death was related to “extensive contusions of his chest, arms, shoulder and back," and

"evidence of crushing of areas of subcutaneous fat.”85 Director of Bands Julian White expressed his sorrow in the University’s official statement and shared he had planned to promote Champion to head drum major the following year.86

The following timeline was adapted from the student newspaper, The FAMUan, and outlines the details of hazing at the University and the events following Robert

Champion’s untimely death.87

Table Four: Timeline of FAMU Hazing and the Fallout following Robert Champion’s Death

Date Brief Description of Event 11/08- Director of Bands Julian White suspended 30 Marching 100 band members suspected in 10/2011 hazing incidents. Suspended students were notified via a letter from White. 11/13/2011 Police of Chief Calvin Ross received a call from someone reporting the performance of hazing activities by Marching 100 band members at an off-campus residence. 11/16/2011 Senior FAMU administrators met with University Police Chief Calvin Ross to discuss the allegations and report of events held November 13, 2011. Ross recommended the band be suspended, but it was not. 11/19/2011 FAMU Drum Major Robert Champion was killed in a hazing ritual known as “Crossing Bus C.” 11/23/2011 FAMU President James Ammons fired White insisting he was responsible for Champion’s death. 12/07/2011 Pending its investigation, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement put a halt to all administrative action by the University, thereby reinstating White. 01/30/2012 Ammons announced that membership to organizations will be closed for spring of 2012. 05/02/2012 Ten members of the Marching 100 were charged with third-degree felony hazing for their involvement in Champion’s death. 05/03/2012 Eight of the 10 people charged turned themselves in. 05/10/2012 White announced his retirement. 05/14/2012 Ammons announced the Marching 100 was suspended for the 2012-2013 school year.

84 “Family Mourns Death of a Student Drum Major,” Florida A&M University, http://www.famu.edu/index.cfm?a=headlines&p=display&news=2511, (accessed February 5, 2013). 85 George Howell and Marion Castillo, “Recommendations for Suspension Preceded FAMU Band Death” CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/06/us/florida-famu-hazing (accessed February 8, 2013). 86 “Family Mourns Death of a Student Drum Major,” Florida A&M University, http://www.famu.edu/index.cfm?a=headlines&p=display&news=2511, (accessed February 5, 2013). 87 Bridget Pittman, “Timeline of Hazing at Florida A&M,” The FAMUan, http://www.thefamuanonline.com/news/timeline-of-hazing-at-florida-a-m-1.2747208#.UTT95I4UPd5 (accessed February 8, 2013).

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05/31/2012 Florida Rep. Frederica Wilson introduced framework for her anti-hazing legislation. 06/06/2012 FAMU’s governing board passed a vote of no-confidence in Ammons for his handling of the crisis. Ammons vowed to stay on as president. 07/11/2012 Champion’s parents filed a lawsuit against FAMU. Ammons resigned his presidency in a letter to the University’s governing board. Source: The FAMUan. Timeline of Hazing at Florida A&M

Social Media in Use During Crisis

When beginning the research for this case study in early 2013, a formal and official social media policy was requested from FAMU’s communications office. The

University’s Director of Media Relations, Pamela Tolson, responded to the request amicably, but stated that the institution did not have an official policy approved by their governing board to share. She said the policy was under development at the time. Based upon Ms. Tolson’s response, it can only be assumed that the University was without an official social media policy throughout the crisis.

Like other schools its size, FAMU’s official Twitter and Facebook accounts disseminate news, attract prospective students, and promote the University brand. With an incredibly loyal alumni base, the University has over 11,700 Twitter followers and nearly 46,000 likes on Facebook. In times of difficulty or unfortunate circumstances, the platforms have been occasionally used to broadcast official University statements or condolences. However, it appears the University’s primary purpose in utilizing its social media platforms is to create community within its constituencies. Operators of the accounts frequently interact with online users, encouraging them to serve as a positive voice in support of FAMU.

Over the course of 34 weeks, FAMU’s Twitter account released a total of 358 tweets. A breakdown of those tweets is detailed below:

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Table Five: FAMU’s Official Twitter Account Activity (11/19/2011 – 07/12/2012)

Total Number of Tweets 358 Average Number of Tweets/Week 10.5 Number of Crisis-Related Tweets 24 Number of Retweets Related to the Crisis 8 Number of Conversations Related to the Crisis 3 Number of Non-Crisis-Related Tweets 334 Multimedia Used in Crisis-Related Tweets 0 (Video/Audio) Multimedia Used in Crisis-Related Tweets (Images) 3 Number of Tweets Covering Meetings and Press 0 Conferences (Tweeting Direct Quotes) Crisis-Related Hashtags Used #FAMU, #M100, #FallenRattler, #WeAreFAMU, #IBelieveInFAMU Source: Florida A&M University Official Twitter Account (www.twitter.com/FAMU_1887)

As seen in the above chart, the University’s attention to the hazing incident on its Twitter platform was less than one percent of its total activity between the time of Champion’s death and Ammons’ resignation. Since FAMU had no working social media policy designed to guide its communications team through the crisis, it is clear it distributed so little information.

Without analyzing the content of the tweets, because only 24 crisis-related posts were published over the course of 34 weeks, it is clear FAMU had little to share regarding the unfortunate circumstances. After initially announcing Champion’s death, the content of FAMU’s crisis-related tweets was limited to providing memorial and funeral details, as well as calling for followers to share their favorite memories of

Champion. The official announcement, linking to a news story on FAMU’s website, was not tweeted until November 21 – two days after Champion’s death. The delayed Twitter response came at least a full day after the story was already national news.

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Following the late announcement of Champion’s death, the University’s Twitter account (@FAMU_1887) published a series of five tweets on November 21, 2011, providing information for a memorial service to be held in Champion’s honor. The tweets contained incorrect details and resulted in a follower’s public correction of the

University’s distributed information. All five of these tweets are counted towards the 24 total related to the crisis, once again proving that FAMU provided extremely limited information via Twitter.

With the exception of a tweet announcing a mandatory anti-hazing forum slated for December 2, 2011, the majority of FAMU’s crisis-related tweet content was intended to mobilize public support for the University amid the controversy. The hashtag

#WeAreFAMU was used almost as a rallying cry, signaling extreme support for the

University in its present trial. FAMU called for support and allegiance from all

University constituencies on November 29 with the following tweets:

• @FAMU_1887 Rattlers: Please remember that you are the strongest voices for #FAMU. You know our achievements & greatness #WeAreFAMU • @FAMU_1887 What makes you proud to be a Rattler? #WeAreFAMU • @FAMU_1887 Rattlers: Please remember that you are the strongest voices for #FAMU. #WeAreFAMU88

The call to action was followed by several retweets of alumni, students, and other audiences advocating for FAMU’s integrity as an institution of higher learning. These rallying cries on behalf of the University were intended to empower Twitter followers to speak out in support of FAMU, whatever the circumstances. As evidenced in its retweet responses below, FAMU’s tactic worked:

• @FAMU_1887 RT @VinceEvans: Believe me when I say that FAMU's best and brightest days are still ahead of it. @FAMU_1887 #WeAreFAMU • @FAMU_1887 RT @AmbitiousGrlQua What makes you proud to be a Rattler?

88 Florida A&M University, Twitter post, 29 November 2011, http://www.twitter.com/FAMU_1887.

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#WeAreFAMU <-- My job I got 5 days after Graduation GLORY!!! • @FAMU_1887 RT@GoBeGreat I've never felt the urge to rock @FAMU_1887 gear more than I do now... • @FAMU_1887 RT @TuskegeeU We support a legacy and tradition of all HBCUs and we must uphold a standard in education. We pray for you and love you @FAMU_1887 God Bless89

After nearly a month and a half of motivating mobilization efforts, FAMU’s

Twitter account issued no crisis-related tweets for the entire month of January. It can be assumed much behind-the-scenes work was being done throughout January to answer the

University’s critics, as on February 1 @FAMU_1887 broke its silence with a crisis- related tweet. It was on that day that then President Ammons announced the Marching

100 band would immediately be suspended until further notice. Following this announcement, the Twitter account went into another period of silence regarding the incident and fallout. It is not until May 14, 2012 that another crisis-related comment was released:

• @FAMU_1887 #FAMU BAND TO REMAIN SUSPENDED FOR 2012-13 ACADEMIC YEAR #M100 #HBCU http://www.facebook.com/notes/florida-am- university/famu-band-to-remain-suspended-for-2012-13-academic- year/10150826157421705 … 90

Immediately following that announcement, another round of uplifting mobilization tweets filled FAMU’s Twitter feed, including:

• @FAMU_1887 RT @TheeSongstress #FAMU TODAY, FAMU TOMORROW... FAMU FOREVER!91

Another month and a half passed without the University releasing any

information, which is difficult to understand, particularly as May and June were full of events that would

89 Ibid. 90 Florida A&M University, Twitter post, 14 May 2012, http://www.twitter.com/FAMU_1887. 91 Ibid.

58 seem to demand a response from FAMU: ten students were charged with third degree hazing felonies for their involvement in Champion’s death; Julian White resigned amid further speculation as to his complicity in band hazing activities; Congresswoman

Frederica Wilson introduced anti-hazing legislation on Capitol Hill; and the FAMU

Board of Trustees issued a vote of no-confidence in Ammons. Not a single one of these developments was documented on FAMU’s Twitter account.

It is unclear why the University would fail to recognize the Board of Trustees’ vote of no-confidence in Ammons and his leadership. To be sure, such an announcement is not one that public relations professionals representing the University would be eager to share, however, a reluctance to broadcast valuable and relevant information is no excuse for actually not sharing it. With instances as internal as closed-door Board of

Trustees meetings, the University had the opportunity to share the information first, thereby having greater control over the story. Yet, it appears that FAMU’s communications staff did not draft any release related to the no-confidence vote; its central web page for crisis news updates makes no mention of the vote, nor does a site- wide search.92 The news also did not appear anywhere on FAMU’s Facebook page.

Aside from a tweet announcing the official search for a new Director of Bands to replace retired Julian White, it was not until July 11, 2012 that @FAMU_1887 tweeted again regarding the crisis. Amid an escalating court case between Champion’s family and the University, Ammons had submitted his letter of resignation. The news was initially received from constituencies and covered by the University on its social media platforms.

Perhaps the most powerful – and likely most retweeted – comment made by the

92 Florida A&M University, “FAMU Band Update,” Florida A&M University, http://www.famu.edu/index.cfm?OfficeOfCommunications&FAMUBandUpdate (accessed February 8, 2013).

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University comes from the institution’s school chant, or “Rattler Charge.” It ultimately reinforces the idea that FAMU primarily uses its Twitter account as a rallying cheerleader, intent on mobilizing and uplifting constituencies:

• @FAMU_1887 Even When The Dark Clouds Gather — #IBelieveInFAMU93

While FAMU’s content and preparedness in communicating via Twitter left something to be desired, it should be noted how successful the account was in mobilizing followers. Its uplifting rhetoric diverted attention from the reality of a student homicide.

Conversely, there was little conviction in the tone of content produced by FAMU’s

Twitter account. Initially, there was sorrow expressed for Champion’s death and one or two tweets memorializing him. However, as Twitter is a public mode of communication, one that transcends internal constituencies, it would have benefitted the University from an external affairs perspective if it had taken greater pause at Champion’s death and issued a statement of anti-hazing initiatives taken by the institution following the crisis.

Instead, the announcements of mandatory anti-hazing forums and other related matters were reported objectively without an air of true support.

FAMU’s crisis engagement on Facebook is significantly different than its presence on Twitter. The nature of Facebook mechanisms makes it easier to quantify how constituencies reacted to the University’s message during a time of crisis. Likes, comments, and shares are concrete examples of the public’s reaction. However, as will be discussed below, FAMU implemented its Facebook strategy inconsistently and put the

University at a disadvantage in terms of releasing information.

While the number of crisis-related Facebook posts is close in number to the

93 Florida A&M University, Twitter post, 11 July 2012, http://www.twitter.com/FAMU_1887.

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University’s crisis-related tweets, the way in which FAMU circulated the information via

Facebook is unimpressive and, unfortunately, harmful to its efforts to contain and limit harm. More on this failure of implementation will follow in the Facebook analysis.

Between November 19, 2011 and July 12, 2012, FAMU’s official Facebook account published a total of 162 posts. A breakdown of those posts can be found below:

Table Six: FAMU’s Official Facebook Account Activity (11/19/2011 – 07/12/2012)

Total Number of Posts 162 Average Number of Posts/Week 4.8 Number of Crisis-Related Posts 21 Number of Non-Crisis-Related Posts 141 Total Number of Notes (included in total number of posts above) 105 Number of Crisis-Related Notes 12 Number of Non-Crisis-related Notes 93 Number of Shares Related to the Crisis (Directed to FAMU News 0 Stories) Number of Responses to User-Generated Posts Related to the Crisis 2 Total Number of User Likes (on crisis-related posts) 4,180 Average Number of User Likes/Crisis-Related Post 199.04 Total Number of User Comments (on crisis-related posts) 475 Average Number of User Comments/Crisis-Related Post 22.6 Total Number of User Shares (on crisis-related posts) 352 Average Number of User Shares/Crisis-Related Post 16.8 Multimedia Used in Crisis-Related Posts (Video/Audio) 0 Multimedia Used in Crisis-Related Posts (Images) 5 Source: Florida A&M University Official Facebook Account (www.facebook.com/FAMU1887)

Of the total 162 Facebook posts, only 57 of them – 35 percent – appeared on the

University’s Facebook timeline, the most user-accessible area for content to be posted.

The remaining 65 percent of posts were published as notes, the majority of which are accessible only by clicking through to the University’s note page within its larger

Facebook account. FAMU’s use of the Facebook notes function is typically as a news manager. Instead of linking news stories directly to the FAMU website from the

University’s Facebook timeline, the communications staff drafted press releases within

61 the notes portal. Unfortunately, these published news release notes were not always accessible on the Facebook timeline, thereby limiting the University’s ability to ensure its messages were reaching external constituencies. For instance, the first crisis-related post announcing Champion’s death was published as a note and did appear on the main

FAMU timeline. It received 179 user likes, 77 user comments, and 61 user shares. In comparison, the note published February 10, 2012 introducing FAMU’s research initiative on hazing, and the following note dated February 13, 2012, announcing the formation of an anti-hazing committee received a combined 4 likes, 1 comment and 0 shares. Neither of the latter notes appeared on FAMU’s Facebook timeline.

With such a disparity in audience response numbers it is obvious that FAMU’s reach through the notes application was extremely limited and restricted. Such a challenge breeds inconsistency in message distribution. Unfortunately, because only 1 of the 12 crisis-related notes appeared on the actual timeline, it seems as if the University intentionally hid crisis news from its constituencies. One can only speculate, of course, if this was actually the case. Still, the inconsistencies of FAMU’s crisis communications efforts are apparent.

There is a function for each published Facebook post that offers the author the opportunity to “hide” the information from its timeline. It is impossible to determine if specific crisis-related notes were intentionally hid from the timeline or if FAMU was subject to a glitch within Facebook’s system and was unaware the majority of its crisis messages would not appear on its timeline. What is unmistakable is that the responses found on non-timeline notes, measured in user likes, comments, and shares, were nowhere near the magnitude of those posts which were published directly on the

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University’s Facebook timeline. Thus, FAMU compromised the integrity and credibility of its crisis communications strategy by not sharing crisis-related news as publicly as possible.

Aside from message accessibility, FAMU’s Facebook activity throughout the crisis was, at times, similar in tone to its Twitter content. While the notice of President

Ammons’ resignation was nowhere to be found on its timeline – it was published as a note – immediately following the news FAMU changed its primary cover photo to the one below, receiving 283 likes, 14 comments, and 85 shares:

The page quickly followed the photo change with the status update:

Even When The Dark Clouds Gather — I STILL Believe in FAMU!94

The school chant line – used the same day by FAMU’s Twitter account – received 2,414 likes, the highest number of any crisis-related post. On the same day, shortly after the photo change and status update, FAMU posted a promotional marketing video that asked the question “What has FAMU taught you?” All three of these posts emulate the motivational spirit seen in so many FAMU tweets. However, beyond the similarity in tone, Facebook differed from Twitter in terms of the volume of crisis-related news it shared.

Because of the notes function within Facebook and FAMU’s choice to use it as an online newsroom, Facebook published more crisis-related information than Twitter.

94 Florida A&M University, Facebook post, 12 July 2012, http://www.facebook.com/FAMU_1887.

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Occasionally the University’s Twitter linked to one of its Facebook notes, but this was limited to less than three instances. It seems that because of the functionality made available by Facebook with nearly limitless opportunity for sharing information, FAMU was more willing to publish crisis-related information there than on Twitter, which limits tweets to 140 characters.

In all, FAMU’s Facebook performance throughout the crisis is somewhat underwhelming. The results would surely be different had the remaining 11 crisis-related notes been accessible on the University’s timeline. By doing so, more information would have been shared reaching more people, dashing the illusion that FAMU was obstructing crisis details, and ultimately increasing the University’s credibility.

Although this thesis focuses on official school presence on social media platforms, as the Marching 100 has both Twitter and Facebook accounts, it is worth commenting on their activity during the crisis. The band’s Twitter account

(@THEMARCHING100) has 1,980 followers and its Facebook account has just over

6,500 fans.

In the days following Champion’s death, @THEMARCHING100 first tweeted on

November 28, 2011 after Julian White had been fired. Its tweet read:

• @THEMARCHING100 #IAmChampion #SaveOurStaff #BringBackDoc95

Interestingly, in the crisis aftermath, the Marching 100 account published condolence tweets to many families and individuals who had recently lost a loved one, including

NFL star Chad Ochocinco for the loss of his father, but the group never tweeted condolences to Robert Champion’s family. In fact, the Marching 100 band’s Twitter

95 The Marching 100, Twitter post, 28 November 2012, http://www.twitter.com/MARCHING100.

64 account had little crisis-related activity, and its chosen times, like the above November

28, 2011 tweet, seemed inopportune. The band’s Facebook page showed no activity since

June 2011. It is noteworthy how poorly the group in crisis responded to its social media audiences.

FAMU’s communications team’s performance in communicating throughout the crisis via official University social media platforms gives pause when determining what tactics are the most effective in Web 2.0 crisis communications. As FAMU continues to develop a social media policy, it will be crucial for the communications team to review its performance and identify weaknesses and strengths.

With a lack of cohesion and consistency across platforms, it appears FAMU’s greatest area for improvement when creating its policy is to ensure a unified approach between both Twitter and Facebook. If news is deemed notable for one platform, it should be shared on the other; FAMU cannot assume its followers or fans access both platforms, particularly as there is such a disparity in numbers of constituencies following each outlet (11,700+ Twitter followers and 45,000+ Facebook fans).96

A new social media policy for FAMU should also focus on preparedness. Making official statements days after the news has already gone viral should not be acceptable.

Controlling the message and the story from the beginning, or at least being prepared to do so, is essential. Finally, the University’s policy must also look to avoid scenarios in which information is not readily accessible to all online users. Notes, posts, and tweets of all kinds must be organized intuitively so that audiences have a full picture of the crisis happenings.

96 Florida A&M University, http://www.twitter.com/FAMU_1887 and http://www.facebook.com/FAMU_1887 (accessed March 20, 2013).

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Just over a year after Champion’s death, FAMU’s primary accrediting agency,

The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACS), placed the University on probation.97 This is the same measure the accrediting entity took with the University of Virginia following its leadership crisis. While the catalyst for the one-year probation is the series of events leading to Champion’s death and the mismanagement that followed, the SACS also charged FAMU for “failing to meet basic educational standards when it comes to finances, student safety, operational ‘integrity’ and leadership.”98 FAMU followed the unwelcome sanction by announcing a new senior staff administrator position dedicated to anti-hazing.99

In early March 2013, twelve former band members were charged with manslaughter for their involvement in Champion’s death, ten of whom were previously charged with third-degree felony hazing in May 2012.100 Those charged could face up to

15 years in prison if convicted. The famed Marching 100 remained suspended throughout the 2012-2013 academic year. As of March 2013, no decision had been made to reinstate the group, nor had a new Director of Bands been hired.

97 Ordway, Denise-Marie, “FAMU placed on probation by accrediting agency: Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Launched Probe after Hazing Death,” Orlando Sentinel, December 11, 2012. 98 Ibid. 99 Sharon Saunders, “FAMU Announces Hiring of Anti-Hazing Administrator,” Florida A&M University, http://www.famu.edu/OfficeofCommunications/Special%20Asst.%20for%20Hazing.pdf (accessed February 9, 2013). 100 Joe Sutton, “Manslaughter Charges Added in FAMU Hazing Case,” CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/04/justice/florida-famu-hazing/index.html (accessed March 6, 2013).

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Chapter Five: Case Study Summation Discussion

The two University case studies illustrate there is promising potential for the use of social media in higher education communications. Both cases also demonstrate the tremendous opportunity for improvement when it comes to communicating on Web 2.0 platforms during crises. Due to the unexpected nature of each institution’s crisis, it is understandable that both had a learning curve when it came to implementing effective social media strategy. All crises are unexpected – the difference in implementation is how well prepared Universities are for the unexpected.

Due to its position representing the University and supporting its chief leader,

U.Va.’s communications team had difficulty launching its social media crisis strategy.

Beginning as a stoic voice, uncertain if it could speak out against its governing board,

U.Va.’s Twitter and Facebook accounts evolved into a subtly subversive grassroots mobilization machine, carefully documenting the historic crisis all the while. This evolution took the official platforms from a formal tone to a more conversational one, ultimately losing consistency in the University’s voice.

However, it was the inconsistency across platforms that was U.Va.’s primary failure. The University’s crisis reaction approach differed between Twitter’s relatable tone and Facebook’s stilted journalistic style. While both strategies proved to be effective in terms of reach and engagement, the variance had the potential to confuse constituencies and compromise credibility. With the two separate approaches, it appeared as if the University had two distinct communications teams disseminating messages on two detached platforms. The beauty of social media is its potential for integration, and without a consistent voice U.Va. risked the loss of a unified front.

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Conversely, U.Va.’s coverage of its crisis was unmistakably committed. The communications staff demonstrated resolve and a willing obligation to capture and document every minute of the continuing saga, even when it meant staying awake until 3 a.m. Based upon its output of information, U.Va. was acutely aware of where its constituencies sought crisis information. The University’s awareness and flexible adaptation of strategy to funnel every update through Twitter and Facebook resulted in a community-wide movement.

Without an apparent social media policy, FAMU struggled to put forth a successful strategy. Laden with inconsistencies and a lack of cohesion across platforms,

FAMU’s crisis communications performance on Twitter and Facebook were underwhelming with little to lay claim to in terms of credibility. The University’s lack of preparedness was evident right away, its first Twitter crisis message after Champion’s death coming two days later, a full day after the news had already attracted national attention. FAMU’s indecisive choices to share some crisis messages on Twitter and not on Facebook, and vice versa, resulted in dramatically different results in terms of audience reach and reaction. In times of crisis, all constituencies must have an equal opportunity to gather information from any external medium FAMU has to broadcast news. Finally, in its Facebook implementation, FAMU’s unorganized approach resulted in key messages not being distributed to its full audience base, thereby limiting its own ability to communicate.

To its credit, FAMU’s ability to mobilize and rally its followers and fans on both

Twitter and Facebook was impressive. The platforms were flooded with tweets, retweets,

68 posts, and comments supporting the University and its leaders throughout the crisis. It is apparent that FAMU’s credibility was not lost on its most ardent supporters.

In both of these cases there were more errors than successes in implementation, particularly for FAMU. Now with the bulk of each crisis behind them, both institutions would be well served to perform an internal audit of its crisis communications strategy on social media. After doing so, a list or set of guidelines should be compiled so that in the future the Universities are better prepared to react online at a tumultuous time. What follows is precisely that – a set of social media best practices for institutions of higher learning to consider when crafting their overall crisis communications plan.

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Chapter Six: Social Media Best Practices in Higher Education Crisis Communications

For any institution of higher learning to achieve effective crisis communications on social media platforms the first step is to have an established general social media policy. Without a clear understanding of how the mediums are best used, colleges and universities will fail to reach their target audiences. By having a clearly defined social media policy schools can create a known foundation of how to communicate online with a variety of constituencies. Such an established foundation will undoubtedly aid those same schools when they face crises, which will invariably force them to communicate to those constituency groups.

If colleges and universities have not already created their social media accounts as vital places of information on their institution, they should not expect those accounts to automatically be perceived by external audiences as hubs of information during crises. A social media policy is necessary for any institution aiming to establish credibility and a proven track record of authenticity. It should be assumed that many, if not all, of the following proposed best practices would be incorporated within an official social media policy or greater crisis communications plan.

Of course, crises faced in higher education greatly vary, and each case is unique to its players and circumstances. While such variance is understood and recognized, the following proposed set of best practices are specific to social media in higher education crisis communications, but they are also general enough to account for a wide variety of crisis types. It is impossible to predict the variables each crisis will bring, however, the best practices put forth below aim to mitigate the potential harm inherent in any crisis.

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Best Practices101

1. Be honest, transparent, and authentic.

For communicators in any field or industry credibility is a priceless

commodity. Without it, communications professionals are hard-pressed to find

trustworthy audiences or steady work for that matter. Credibility holds a

significant amount of importance during a crisis. Audiences are less likely to

believe a university when it denies wrongdoing if the university has a record of

withholding or obstructing accurate information.

In the digital age where news is shared instantaneously as truth and

inaccuracies are exploited, online authenticity is important. Honesty and

transparency on platforms like Twitter and Facebook enable institutions to

positively impact the effects of an unfolding crisis. Social media platforms give

colleges and universities an unfettered outlet to communicate without the

obstructions of traditional media and to take advantage of such freedom by

broadcasting inauthentic and inaccurate messages would be a violation of

audience trust and a compromising of institutional credibility.

2. Designate staff members with social media responsibilities.

If resources allow, hiring a staff member within a university relations

office purely for the sake of social media management is well worth the

investment. Not only is the presence of a Web 2.0 staffer beneficial to the overall

comprehensiveness of a university communications office, it is invaluable during

101 A similar and more abbreviated set of best practice takeaways is present in the CASE/CKSyme.org report, “Using Social Media in a Crisis: Higher Education Results.”

71 times of crisis. Whether or not social media management is a staffer’s primary responsibility or if the duty is split between two to three employees who have other jobs, it is important that a limited group has access to and authority over the institution’s official social media platforms. Ideally, however, every college or university relations department should have a chief staff member tasked solely with social media oversight and implementation. Isolating the responsibility guarantees constancy and also amplifies the significance of communicating to audiences via social media.

During crises unity of voice and message is essential for any communications team. Higher education crisis communications is no different.

The more voices active on social media accounts, the less clarity there is present in communication. Limiting access to official social media accounts protects the university from inconsistent messaging and tone, avoids confusion between staffers about responsibility to update tweets or posts, and ensures that one unified voice will be heard by all external publics.

Those with responsibility for and access to official institution accounts during crises should be the university relations department head, the social media manager, and one other trusted mid-level associate with social media experience.

The implementation group should be limited to those three, while a larger strategic team comprised of others in the university relations office and senior university leadership should have input to message creation and crisis communications mitigation.

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3. Create staff buy-in.

It is necessary to create a culture within a university relations office that

accepts and appreciates appropriate crisis communications on social media

accounts. Without a respectful and almost reverent understanding of the power of

social media and its effects the institution’s efforts could be undermined. This

type of buy-in is, of course, most important for the few commissioned with the

responsibility of tirelessly monitoring and updating the university accounts.

However, all university staff involved with crafting crisis messages should

appreciate the value of what those official university platforms can accomplish for

the school’s interests.

4. Standardize information dissemination.

In some instances, as the case studies show, crises can be swift and short-

lived, lasting only a matter of weeks. Other times a crisis can rage on for months

and sometimes years. Controlling the messaging throughout the crisis’ entirety

and aftermath is of utmost concern to any higher education communications

professional. Depending upon the nature of the crisis, the method of information

dissemination may be accelerated or steadier. Whatever the case, intervals of

information broadcasting should be defined and adhered to. For example, once a

quick-moving crisis has been initiated – a campus shooting for instance – updates

should be posted to social media sites hourly during the first 24 hour period,

followed by updates every two hours, then two to three times a day, then daily

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until the crisis is manageable and no immediate instructions or information is

crucial.

A schedule like this one demands that information appropriate for the

public be available on a timely basis. However, the primary idea is for the social

media management team to commit to a schedule of information dissemination

and stick to it. In an effort to enhance preparedness, universities should have basic

information dissemination schedules for different types of crisis ready before they

are needed.

5. Provide and preserve key leadership’s accessibility and transparence.

Increasingly, presidents of colleges and universities have their own social

media presence. Many school constituencies, including students, families, faculty

and staff, and alumni, follow the president on the chosen platform. As the school

president is the official spokesperson, colleges and universities can expect their

key audiences to look to the president’s Twitter or Facebook page for a crisis

response or message.

Schools should not rely solely on their official social media accounts

during crises, as constituencies will undoubtedly search out what their chief leader

has to say. Oftentimes a president’s Twitter or Facebook is monitored and

updated by university relations personnel. Such should certainly be the case

during crises. In fact, the identified social media management team responsible

for regular updates on official accounts should be the same team tasked with

updating and monitoring the president’s accounts. Tweets and posts must remain

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consistent with the president’s voice and sound like he or she had posted the

content.

6. Create and continue consistency across all platforms.

A lack of consistency across social media platforms breeds confusion and

compromises credibility and reliability in a university’s ability to report and

communicate during a crisis. Consistency for social media crisis communications

is two-fold. First, tone and voice must remain constant whether a message is

being distributed on Twitter or Facebook. The platforms do not dictate how

informal or stilted a communicator’s tone is. It is the job of the communicator to

determine if the university voice will be conversational, formal, or informative.

Once a choice is made, there can be no variance from Twitter to Facebook.

Selecting a limited group of people to be in charge of social media management

contributes to a consistent voice.

Second, consistency in social media crisis communications applies to the

content being distributed. If information related to the crisis is newsworthy

enough for Twitter, it should be shared on Facebook as well. Universities cannot

assume that all of their constituencies follow its preferred method of social media

communication. Instead, in an effort to meet all audiences where they seek

information institutions must canvas each of their official university platforms

issuing pertinent information in a timely manner.

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7. Monitor crisis-related activity on all social media mediums.

Institutions must not assume that social media conversations concerning

its crises are limited to its own website or platforms. Twitter hashtags are

available for use by any Twitter account and specialized Facebook pages and

groups are rampant. When a crisis strikes, these functions are utilized by public

constituencies to freely comment on the school’s state and handling of the

circumstances.

Because the value of information in crises is priceless and as there is great

potential for the spread of falsities by others on social media, it is imperative

colleges and universities monitor all crisis-related activity on those platforms.

Both Twitter and Facebook have user-friendly search functions that allow

institutions to see what is being said about them or if there have been groups or

pages created. Not only can instituting a monitoring system aid the higher

education communicator in gaining perspective on external audiences’

perceptions of the crisis, it can also present opportunities for the university to

correct, amend, or repudiate any falsehoods being circulated. Understanding the

public’s perception can also aid the university in crafting its crisis messages.

8. Create and implement a post-crisis evaluation of communication efforts on social

media platforms.

Once a crisis has passed, it is in the institution’s best interest to pause and

evaluate its overall performance, particularly when it comes to communicating.

Just as social media should be valued as communication tools employed by the

76 school, all platform performance should also be evaluated for efficacy. Practicing evaluation demands meticulous scrutiny, however, the end result should ultimately benefit the institution in its planning for future crises.

Performing an internal audit of a university’s performance on Web 2.0 tools will require a careful analysis of many elements related to the school’s communication efforts including the social media management team’s overall strategy implementation; user engagement based upon a calculation of user likes, comments, shares, and conversations related to the crisis; content analysis of information shared and its effect on the crisis outcome; a critique of consistency across platforms; effectiveness of the information dissemination model; and a general and comprehensive assessment of how well crisis messages were received via social media.

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Chapter Seven: Conclusion

A university’s messages matter. Stories of success, memos of missteps, and community celebrations matter tremendously to university constituencies. Social media provide unique and engaging platforms for the distribution of those messages. As this is the case, it is only natural to have a basic and fundamental set of guidelines directed towards effectively communicating on Web 2.0 platforms.

Those who invest in institutions of higher learning – students, faculty, staff, alumni, and donors – expect precision of information whatever the circumstances. Just as others invest in the institution, so too should the institution invest in its messaging strategy; this is particularly true in times of crisis. Audiences flock to the Internet for information and news, and if they choose to engage in social media they are also likely to look there for updates and happenings. What constituency groups find on those pages and feeds in terms of content, consistency, and credibility is up to the institution.

Without an agreed upon, cohesive, and comprehensive set of practices to adhere to, institutions’ crisis efforts on social media are likely to flounder in numerous discrepancies and challenged credibility. During crises the higher education communicator must exist to serve and inform institutional constituencies in intentional and consistent ways.

Days before the completion of this thesis, the University of Central Florida (UCF) barely avoided its own campus tragedy. A former student was found dead of a self- inflicted gunshot wound with access to an assault weapon, homemade IEDs, and a plan of attack. While little is publicly known about the former student’s intentions, it is clear that the school narrowly escaped further tragic loss.

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In the midst of the crisis, UCF’s Twitter and Facebook accounts were closely monitored and updated. Information was readily shared and content was consistent across both platforms. The school posted 26 updates within the first 24 hours of the crisis.102 Not only were platforms in sync, the information shared was produced and disseminated in a timely manner. The final crisis post directed followers to a UCF web page that will continue to provide further updates, thereby setting the expectation that the crisis would no longer be covered on social media unless warranted. The post received 558 likes, 4 shares, and 13 comments, each of which was filled with overwhelming gratitude and praise for UCF’s crisis response and social media updates.103

Although UCF’s published social media best practices are not specialized for crisis use, they still provide a strong foundation from which staff was able to draw in their effort to successfully communicate throughout the chaos. Simple guidelines such as

“Use your best judgment,” and “Add value, not noise or clutter,” aided UCF’s communicators in issuing clear and appropriate messages on social media.104 Their constituencies thanked them for it.

Ultimately, social media should only be one element of a university’s larger crisis communications strategy. Institutions must continue to invest in traditional and other online media to enhance their overall communications plan. The point is to not forget about social media as crisis tools and especially not to misuse the readily available and user-friendly platforms. The best practices put forth here exist not only to reduce and contain harm, but to also maximize efficacy in crisis communications. Colleges and

102 University of Central Florida, http://www.twitter.com/UCF and http://www.facebook.com/UCF (accessed March 20, 2013). 103 University of Central Florida. Facebook post. 20 March 2013, http://www.facebook.com/UCF 104 University of Central Florida Marketing, “Social Media Best Practices,” University of Central Florida, http://www.umark.ucf.edu/socialmedia/ (accessed March 20, 2013).

79 universities will continue to succeed and fail at social media implementation. The aim of these guidelines is to aid institutions in mitigating and avoiding the perpetuation of those failures.

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