CEU eTD Collection Is Russia aConstitutional Democracy? Checks and In partialfulfilment oftherequirementsfordegree ofMasterArts inPolitical Balances in the Russian Constitutional System RussianConstitutional inthe Balances Supervisor: Professor Nenad Dimitrijevic Nenad Professor Supervisor: Department ofPoliticalScience Central EuropeanUniversity Aleksandra Shebaltseva Aleksandra Budapest, Hungary Submitted to Science 2008 By CEU eTD Collection domination of presidential power over others. of over domination presidential power for the conditions favourable and has created state of a democratic establishment for the basis the provided not has Constitution Russian the that is to come I conclusion The action”. investigation of the problem,and control ableFor to each other. the independent are sufficiently constitutional system I focus Russian in the on power of the branches all whether ask I analysisbalances. and checks of system the of of the “law in books” In andmy thesis Iexplore the problem of constitutionalthe democracy in Russia from “lawthe perspective in Abstract ii CEU eTD Collection would have been impossibleyou. without and people close me from to home for moral theirsupport. Thank you very much:my thesis TimarforEszter herinstructor good advice my and words; newencouraging atCEU friends invariably andmy attitude patience, my reaction to quick positive academic writing writings; help, invaluable his for Dimitrijevic Nenad supervisor my research to grateful very am I Acknowledgements iii CEU eTD Collection Bibliography...... 65 ...... 62 Conclusion the Perspective of the Principles of Constitutionalism (‘Law in Action’)...... 40 from Design, Constitutional of Russian the Implementation the of Practice 3-The Chapter Constitution ...... 17 (‘Law in Books’) 2 Chapter - Constitutional of Design Russianthe According Government, 1993 the to the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers...... 5 Chapter 1-Analysis ofConstitutionalism: BasicPrinciples of the for Theoretical Background Introduction...... 1 3.2 Checks and balances in the vertical division of powers...... 55 3.1 Checks and balances in the horizontal separation of powers...... 40 2.3 Vertical division of powers according to the 1993 Constitution...... 35 2.2 Horizontal separation of powers according ...... 24 to the 1993 Constitution 2.1 Peculiarities of the constitution-making in post-Soviet Russia...... 17 1.2 Controlling mechanisms of ensuring ...... 10 the separation of powers 1.1 Meaning of the separation of powers as a principle of constitutionalism...... 6 3.2.2 Center-periphery relations ...... 57 under Putin 3.2.1 Center-peripheral relations ...... 55 under Yeltsin 3.1.12 Constitutional adjudication under Putin...... 53 3.1.11 Constitutional adjudication under Yeltsin...... 52 3.1.10 Vote of non-confidence/Duma dissolution under Yeltsin Putin...... 52 3.1.9 Vote of non-confidence/Duma dissolution under Yeltsin...... 51 3.1.8 Ability to propose ...... 50 referenda 3.1.7 Cabinet formation/dissolution under Putin...... 50 3.1.6 Cabinet formation/dissolution ...... 48 under Boris Yeltsin 3.1.5 Impeachment...... 48 3.1.4 Decree power under ...... 47 Vladimir Putin 3.1.3 Decree power under Boris Yeltsin...... 45 3.1.2 Veto power under Vladimir Putin...... 43 3.1.1 Veto power under ...... 40 Boris Yeltsin 2.2.4 Constitutional Judiciary...... 34 2.2.3 Legislative power...... 31 ...... 30 2.2.2 The Government 2.2.1 Presidential power...... 25 1.2.2 External control (constitutional ...... 14 adjudication) 1.2.1 Internal (mutual control and dependence of all powers)...... 11 1.1.2 Vertical division of powers...... 9 1.1.1 Horizontal separation of powers...... 7 Table ofContents iv CEU eTD Collection strong patrimonial patterns of state-society main arethe weak inherited for patrimonial patterns of strong relations reasons state-society that affirms He Russia. in democracy to way the on constraint main the as state communist institutions in Russia. Thomas Remington, forinstance, pays much attentionlegacies to of the and situation political their tothe of analysis the have works Markov, anddevoted others AitalinaAzarova, Sergei Andrei Timothy J. Colton, Ryabov, McFaul,Petrov, Nikolai of transition from totalitarian to democratic state.balances. Scholars as Thomas and checks of of system the retrospect inthe has beendone little research since a law, Remington,constitutional and science political of view Michaelof point a theoretical from interesting and relevant is nowadays system constitutional Russian the of my research that believe I constitutionalism. of principles with complies it in balances and checks of system if the examine to and look atthecontemporary order political Russian to importantansweritis thesequestions, To other? each check to independent sufficiently bodies governmental Russian the Are Union? tendencies usurpation topower in Russian the governmental asitstructure was in Sovietthe any there Are state? constitutional the for foundation the laid initially elite political Russian Hadthe process? in democratic a difficult as apolitical atleast regime or state as ademocratic in beconsidered questions country power arise: can Russia strengtheningthis the presidential permitted it law; pluralisminternational to according freedoms and rights human entrenched it bodies; state new of opinions and activities.lasted for years, three struggles that newConstitution was passed in1993,establishing the However, even gravepolitical After the democracy. to for transition thebasis system as new constitutional today, when we can observe the endorsed leadership The new followed. Russian and structure processes state governing The system The system andbalancesin hasbeen inRussia checks of circumstances developed the in changes in independent 1991,dramatic December When becamean Russia country Introduction 1 CEU eTD Collection 1999 and 2000 3 Quarterly 2 from have could country the prevented tendencies authoritarian in bringing democracy,butcriticizes establish his “failureto constitutional safeguards” which in new framework efforts post-communistacknowledges Russia. constitutional Yeltsin’s He made in favour welfare, of achoice latter economic the and democracy again that legaciesSoviet playedtheir inpeople’s role mind,choosing who between formal institutions political not change did in significantly period. McFaulsumsup, Putin’s opposition parties political influence had theto opportunity the eventhoughthe politics, However, in Russian system political during Yeltsin’s term manylacked attributes of a liberal hisdemocracy. the opinion, that notes McFaul economy. in the improvements by latter the of popularity the explains the regime was definitely more democratic than Putin’s, since 1 politics. Russian in parties political of participation and activity NGOs rights, human to attitude reforms, political mostly recent the on They concentrate state. centralized strongly building “managed phenomenon attention toward to the of a and Putin’s democracy” course of few scholars who look at Russia through the prism of constitutional democracy. in system, Remington’s view,is mainthe forvalue condition establishing a democratic state old the from Liberation democracy. to a transition constituted not has USSR the of collapse the after institutions of state simple transformation that concludes Remington civil society and constitutional institutionsand system. electoral inthe post-1993 Thus, Timothy J. Coltonand Michael McFaul, Michael McFaul, “Lessons from Russia’s Protracted Transitionfrom Communist Rule”, Thomas F. Remington, Timothy inJ. Colton 2003 analyzes Yeltsin’s figure and his role in theestablishing Michael McFaul in 1999 compares Russia under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin and Many authors, like Michael McFaul, Aitalina Azarova, and Matthew Hyde, call much Vol. 114, 1 (Spring,no. 1999) : 114. , (Washington D.C.: Brookings InstitutionPress, 2003), 36. Politics in Russia , 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001), 15. Popular Choiceand Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 2 3 . Colton, probably,is the one 2 . 1 . Political Science CEU eTD Collection focusing on constitutional and some special laws as a foundation of the Russian constitutional specifically legislation, Russian 2) system; in constitutional establishment necessary their of reasons the on concentrating balances and andchecks powers of of separation the concepts governments. peripheral the and center governmental federal the between relationships addition, I will show properlyis notimplementedthat init because of domination the of presidential the In power. the same problem been presentofin the institutionalunbalanced design at the federal level, the system of checks and balances power has of powers of separation though principle since the democratic isnot distributionsystem constitutional exists Russian the In my Iwill argue that balances. thesis and doctrine of checks of inperspective the the of consequences from deviation the mentioned. constitutional the principles legalfrom estimate of to this design, of perspective the and political constitutionalism; implementation the of practice the examine to system; political Russian current the of design constitutional the analyse to balances; and checks and powers of separation of principles political science. make to Bymy andhope investigating acontribution political to books” research I practices. of perspective checks balances bymaking and the textual analysis of “law Russian the in provisions.constitutional in Inentrenched elite, mypolitical Russian the thesis of choice constitutional the of product I explore the Russian area events current casethe fact that the neglect they often mentality. However, Russian with the from the different perspective:itsfollowing andconnect third specific authoritarian authoritarianism, the tendencies way, and from democracy of crossroads the is on theRussia that conclusion the to come they Consequently, Three main sets of literature are used asa my for basis 1)theoretical literatureare of MA thesis: main sets Three the from democracy a constitutional is Russia whether is: question my research Thus, –the constitutionalism of principles analyse basic the goals to I setthe In my research 3 CEU eTD Collection how checks and balances have worked in the Russian constitutional system. constitutional Russian in the worked have balances and checks how show to in in make out “law in the words order action” legal or another practices, discover been the basis for building ademocratic state or not. In the third chapter of my thesis I will examine willnormative haveApplying thesehelpto they the whether theory documents to books”. in “law the of analysis the on significantly concentrate will I Union Soviet the has been system collapse of inRussiaafterthe identify of kind what established constitutional inin to it. of Then, of andorder separation conflictpowers of peculiarities the 1993, the second chapterIwill briefly analyse process of the constitution making in Russia in 1991- anddoctrine of theprincipleof separation the definepowers of andbalances. of Inthe checks which had asignificantimpact on establishmentthe of Russianthe constitutionalsystem. events reveal historical to in methods order tracing process narrative, and analytic method, historical used have I my research for literature of set first the handling While politics. in real whatfindit laid to andbalanceshow order kindworks system of checks out of down was in documents normative of analysis textual used have my I for research, necessary literature of with sets the work the During till nowadays. state independent an became Russia moment researchers. foreign and scientists political historical parallel in order, frameworks to with political analysis, order theoretical real the inRussia; practice 3) statistical data and analytical materials produced both by the Russian In the first chapter of my thesis I will review the theoretical frameworks of the i.e.from from investigation 2007, the The scopeof covers period1991 to the the 4 CEU eTD Collection Chapter 1 important tohaveimportant it in entrenched laws. constitutional of andshowwhyit keymethods is its control, extremely characterize principle, constitutional provide freedom. adjudication, internal can control mutual and dependency preventauthorities of abuse and together with the additional mechanisms of external control in the form of constitutional However,only other. each andbalance check which powers the of mutual accountability is the system control this of essence The organs. state the over control aneffective guarantee of achieving aconstitutional government. is of separation Thus, the powers twice. authority government’s canbe asameans considered of power between the center “vertical” division the about functionsinto butalso andagencies, three separation powers of and periphery“horizontal” the about only not speak to whatappropriate is it cases in some may Moreover, tyranny. allow to limit and controlfrom the theconcentration of powercentral in the hands of a single person or body, i.e. to secure from separation in powers of governmental design pursuestoguaranteehuman liberty and prevent the of Entrenchment constitutionalism. of system a comprises powers of separation the constitutional fororder. the governmental pillars thebasic is of one powers of separation of the doctrine the today theories, of a range sensesbe turn out to veryin different theirHaving effects. taken combined and ideasfrom the of theSeparation ofPowers Constitutionalism: TheoreticalBackground fortheDoctrine In this chapter Iwill reveal main aspects and problems of the separation of powers as a In order to avoidjunction of powers in one center, constitutional laws should withTogether principles rulelaw,fundamentalof of limited rights, government, etc., The notion of separation the isof powers open to many interpretations andits various - Analysisthe BasicPrinciples of of 5 CEU eTD Collection 1995) :24. ConstitutionalandPolicy Change in Europe 6 of Powers 5 Ashgate/Darmouth, 2005) : 258. Representative Democracy”, in Democracy”, Representative 4 functions“ideas andand principles”which basic of embodies a polity government of the which and and the formation encompasses “institutional devices procedures” determine to control itself separationthe through functionsof and their checkingeach other rather inmakingthan government the power and in protectionof powers, from but allthe of themtyranny agree that thewhich essence isemerges in prevention fromof the exercisethe ofconcentration arbitrary responsibility and representation of power, and of ideas the power, of abalance of idea the andfunctions), organs of separation in the is which of idea (the balances and ofchecks atheory government, limited idea of while purpose balanceof is the of social a which political power), ensuring groups exercising Franklin.has combined such overlapping theories It as mixedof (the a theory government Benjamin and Hamilton, Alexander Madison, James Montesquieu, Charles Locke, of John been modified. largely Modernidea of separation the of haspowers been shaped in works the inantiquity,inAristotle particular of writings andPolybius, time theyhave andsince that constitutionalism of asaprinciple ofpowers oftheseparation 1.1 Meaning limited by, devoted and protectionto the individual of rights” Donald P. Kommers and W. J. Thompson, “Fundamentals inthe Liberal Constitutional Tradition”, in Eric Barendt, “Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government,” in Government,” Constitutional and of Powers “Separation Barendt, Eric Richard Bellamy, “The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separationof Powers, Rights and There arealot themeaning concerning of viewsof andinterpretations separation the Some elements of the doctrine of the separation of powers were founded in the The essence of liberal constitutionalism is a government whichis “grounded in, , ed. Richarded. , Bellamy (Aldershot:Ashgate/Darmouth, 2005) : 278. The Ruleof Law Separationand theof Powers 4 . , ed. J. J. Hesse and N. Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, efficient. Thus, it is necessary to oblige the government the oblige to necessary is it Thus, efficient. 6 The ofRuleLaw Separationand the , ed. Richard Bellamy (Aldershot: 6 . Constitutionalism . 5 . CEU eTD Collection 9 who staff these three agencies”, in other words it means the “separation of persons”, when the 8 European Perspectives interest” that will aninstitutional of power centers develop “autonomous by of creation the internally must bechecked government thatthe assumes in which a theory is an element essential therefore, of agencies,” “separation The other. from being distincteach condition of kept the branchesgovernment)under agencies (three of functions these of each execute solely should government the of branch each and of government”; acts andjudicial executive legislative, between distinction is Thefirst one of a“functional powers. of separation “pure” doctrine the the comprise powersseparation of 7 the between ofpowers 1.1.1 Horizontalseparation in federalism. embodied division, vertical i.e. territorial, andthe of powers, separation i.e. horizontal judicial, and executive, legislative, exercised effectively while respecting individual rights. problemthe institutionsof political organizing intheway isof ensuring thatpolitical power government inthe participate to members its allow Ibid Maurice J. C. Vile, Ulrich K. Preuss, “The Political Meaning of Constitutionalism”, in . The third component implies that there should be “no overlap amongst the personnel the amongst be “nooverlap shouldthere implies that component The third The second component isThe into componentsecond thethree correspondingsplitting upgovernment While studying problems modern of separation the of scholarspowers, distinguish into forms: separation the two cantake functions of governmental The separation “pure doctrinepowers”the separation of of Constitutionalism and theSeparation of Powers , ed. Richard Bellamy (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996): 12. ”. According to Maurice Vile, there are three main components which 7 7 . Thus, constitutionalism helps to solve to helps constitutionalism Thus, . (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1969), 8. Democracy andSovereignty: American and 9 . and the doctrine of the “ 8 . partial CEU eTD Collection 12 Ashgate/Darmouth, 2005) : 254. Representative Democracy”, in Democracy”, Representative 11 10 powers of separation of the ideas doctrine modifying the other of neededaccepting ontothe leads by approach, negative provided checking rule arbitrary tothe inadequacy of controls the in J.C.Vile’s aremore than presidential InMaurice ones. opinion, parliamentary systems the in separation power of extent the instance, for since, government, of form the on greatly depends of of powers separation practice. degree the into the put hasbeen Indeed, more rarely even and held been rarely has which form ideal an is powers of separation the of doctrine and functions.pure the itsdominate However, control exceed powers other the opportunity to nohas in its activity, restricted being power, Hence, each power. arbitrary of exercise on the check others the is to able power eachgovernmental then ensured are persons functions, and freedoms comprises the core of the doctrine of the separation of powers. hands of inevitablea single person ororgan leadstousurpation and diminishing of political bodies by different of laws areexecuted andenforcement” application interpretation, as“formulation, functions membership three branches of government are consisted of distinct groups of people, with no overlapping rule and the insurance that power is not concentrated in the hands of one branch though it is it though branch one of hands the in concentrated not is power that insurance the and rule why more often applied. Maurice J. C. Vile, Richard Bellamy, “The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Maurice J. C. Vile, 12 An important element in the doctrine is the idea that if separation within agencies, within if separation that idea is the doctrine in the element important An Thus, the separation of powers between the three branches aims toguarantee that such The partial (territorial) separation of functions also pursues the “avoidance of “avoidancearbitrary of pursues the functions also separation of The (territorial) partial . Specifically, the doctrine of a partial separation is more real to achieve and that is that achieve and to more real is separation a partial of doctrine the . Specifically, 10 . Constitutionalism and theSeparation of Powers Constitutionalism and theSeparation of Powers 11 . The denotement on the fact that junction of different powers in the The Ruleof Law Separationand theof Powers 8 (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1969), 32. (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1969), 24. , ed. Richard Bellamy (Aldershot: CEU eTD Collection 15 (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc.: 2002), 167. 14 of Powers 13 delimited territorially “only noted, has Friedrich J. Carl as Consequently, levels. both the of powers the limit to is possible it governments state and national the of power the balancing andinterestjoint need” some intenddivergentsubgroups govern to themselves in “all butafew select spheres of joint central local and must bea power drivingmotivation; when process federalizing starts the strugglein orderto againstthe division. means non-democratic division use of and the canfacilitate federations other democratically; beoperating while systems can successful can some federal be different: federal structures implementing of outcome the Thus, units. federal its throughout tendencies separatist with struggling continues who in Russia is acase it as secessions, to conduce also can federalism partial” “together diverse people who happen to end in happen up entity” who diverseto “together a single people political forframework governingvast and diverse federal help sincelinkcountries, structures to a Federalismeffectively can provide structure. countriesthe with governmental a federal ofpowers 1.1.2 Verticaldivision to return this point. will I Below implement. to is possible powers of balance and control mutual the overlapping such Through functions. of andallows overlapping separation of complete powers Ibid:196. Frank L. Wilson, L. Frank Eric Barendt, “Separationof Powers and Constitutional Government,” in That is why in creation of federalism the need for mutual control mutual is for federalism of the need andThat restraint the increation control of why 13 Vertical division of powers can be considered as an additional control mechanism for mechanism control additional an as considered be can powers of division Vertical , ed. Richarded. , Bellamy (Aldershot:Ashgate/Darmouth, 2005) : 284. . Unlike the pure separation of powers, the partial doctrine does not require does partial the Unlike of doctrine separation the . powers, pure the Concepts andIssues inComparativePolitics: An Introduction toComparative Analysis 15 . The restraint of power is the crucial objective. Through the 9 TheLaw Rule of Separationand the 14 . However, CEU eTD Collection Toward States' Rights? - Conclusion < 17 (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc.: 2002), 196. 16 far bein separation the extent. possible as the in to presented powers maintained of as order be mechanisms should controlling system of the separation, structural, personnel and ofpowers separation the ofensuring mechanisms 1.2 Controlling single group of men. of in hands a the power of the concentration the toprevent in order divisions center-periphery goals can be bestachieved by setting upfunctional, agency, and personnel separations and goals of liberty which are the protection of limitationand the Thesegovernmental of power. constitutionalimportant found basicsprinciple for to served governmental design, main the division” a functional than more effective Indeed, J.Friedrich in asCarl hasnoted, many “territorial situations islikely division be to restraint upon the abuse constituent modern part of federalof constitutionalism since as division an operates effective governmental powers by the central as well as local authorities. scale” limited a on operation joint and restraints mutual achieve to able been have communities (Waltham: Blaisdel, 1968), 226. canbeshared powers while other powers), (residual can exercise andis functions asetgovernment delegated of each and authority which government only this governments, andstate national the between and functions areallocated power government, of division of principle vertical Underthe local governments. layer of asecond creating 18 2008). Federalism - Checks and Balances, the Federalist Papers: The History of Federalism, Supreme Court Tilting Court Supreme ofFederalism, History The Papers: Federalist the Balances, and Checks - Federalism Frank L. Wilson, L. Frank Carl Carl J. Friedrich, 16 Since the partial separation of powers allows some deviation from the functional, In this section I have shown that the doctrine of the separation of powers is an Federal form Federalform aimsof government atrestricting power of national the by government . Constitutional Government andDemocracy: Theory andPractice in Europe and America Concepts andIssues inComparativePolitics: An Introduction toComparative Analysis http://law.jrank.org/pages/6819/Federalism.html 18 . 10 17 . Thus, federalism is a is federalism Thus, . > (Accessed: 8April, CEU eTD Collection 20 Ashgate/Darmouth, 2005) : 254. Representative Democracy”, in Democracy”, Representative 19 functions” other’s the of exercise control play “by althoughit over the others apart, in authorizing limited to only a part, the exercise of isit, toadegree eachbranch power given the put as RichardBellamy particular, exercising its constitutional functions, should be capable of controlling the other. In branch, while Each legislativeof andexecutive powers. dependency and accountability ofallpowers) dependence controland 1.2.1 Internal(mutual provided. be should powers the over control of mechanisms external and internal reason, this For that all that bodies shouldindependent be while exercising theirconstitutional functions is limited so is to“interfere” power only one, a the that here law andpractice, in constitutional preventconcentration of in powers Theone center. important point, which must be provided isto goal the government constitutional of form in any However, form. governmental the many governmental many isgovernmental structures it bicameral, also has checks on legislature–the the in branch legislative the Since legislative. the to addresses its deliver time-to-time, from must, President Moreover, others. and vetoes, Presidential overriding treaties, and appointments high givingon official impeachment, consentof executive through procedures the the on checks exercise may branch legislative instance, for system US in the like government, government, which abuse and provide liberty. allow one independentmutual can, somecontrol powers of to guarantee theprevention extent, the of branch to limit another. Thus, in presidential forms of Maurice J. C. Vile, Richard Bellamy, “The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and The essence of the internal control The essence of separation the internal over the iscontrol of inmutual powers Checks and balances refer to the different procedural Checks from formsand refertothedifferent balances procedural rules, varying the of Constitutionalism and theSeparation of Powers The Ruleof Law Separationand theof Powers 19 . The extent of such checking depends on the character of character the on depends checking such of extent The . 11 (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1969), 254. , ed. Richard Bellamy (Aldershot: 20 . Such CEU eTD Collection government, in turn, may dissolve the parliament. the againsta government; vote no-confidence a express to power a parliament’s exercise of Minister experiences Minister legislature, belong the same and areaskedthatthePrime questions to kind of they the also must members Cabinet The Parliament. of members the by her him or to put time to time from mustanswer questions Minister Prime the Besides, Parliament. to the accountable is directly she or he body, legislative the of member isa Minister Prime British since headby of government, the members from of legislature the among their number. own Thus, a Minister, Prime the the choosing through may operate balances and checks government, British the like system, a parliamentary In government. of form such for important power holds supreme the legislature the sharing”, and power based “legislative-executive are all they on separated: suspend the President from discharging his duties of officethe by Government the to possibility the in expressed be can branch executive the within control Internal etc. and recessing votes, emergency confidence Parliament, callinginto session of the appointments, 23 (Waltham: Blaisdel, 1968), 184. 21 other the of initiative legislative the on a veto put may them of each and Parliament; of houses haslegislative branch a lawdegree of must Thus, self-checking. drafts bepassed byboth 24 22 < < Ibid. Carl J. Friedrich, http://teacher.scholastic.com/researchtools/researchstarters/presidents/ http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_cnb.html 21 . Executive branch has got checks on the legislature also through the veto power, non- power, veto the through also legislature the on checks got has branch Executive . Checks and balances may also function under parliamentary systems through the through systems parliamentary under function also may balances and Checks In parliamentary systems powers between parliament and government are notclearly and government parliament between powers systems In parliamentary Constitutional Government andDemocracy: Theory andPractice in Europe and America 24 . 23 . That is why the system of checks and balances is extremely is balances and checks of system the why is That . > (Accessed: 7April, 2008). 12 > (Accessed: 23April, 2008). 22 . CEU eTD Collection 27 (New Jersey:Pearson Education, Inc., 2002), 166. 25 minority any of hands the into fall or hands its in power the all concentrate can national make government itthat inunlikely extremely legislation federal participate local that representatives andinsurance and periphery, center between the authority divided governmentthe and suppressingtheminority” from andpreventing controllingset upfor atotal any“factions of them gaining over control national and regional levels accompanied of government, with instrumentsthe of is checks, isgovernments additionalan check in Powerdivisiona governmental structure. between the indominate government. the and powerful too grow can branches of none that ensures balancing power simultaneous of initiative other the legislative of the which canoverrule law intime.readings law-making houses, So, must most process in drafts passtwo both each same the at houses both member of be a none can is that rule only from. The comes executive of overlowerhouse checkingthe power house,wherethe a the of control through upper the more providing allows systems in parliamentary Parliaments of most of structure bicameral losingof of the support majority the of a governmentparty. case in resign to is expected Minister a Prime Moreover, resign. should policy government’s membersmemberany oppose time, who andcabinet has therightacabinetat toretire 26 Donald S. Lutz, Donald < Frank L. Wilson, L. Frank http://teacher.scholastic.com/researchtools/researchstarters/presidents/ In federal systems the sharing of power between the local and the national the and local the between power of sharing the systems federal In Thus, system duetothe balances,of and checks governmental powers overlap, but checklegislative opportunity through Besides the veto, presidential to the power If talking about the internal control within the executive power, so, the Prime Minister Principles of Constitutional Design Concepts andIssues inComparativePolitics: An Introduction toComparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press,2006), 121. 13 26 . Such balances as regional autonomy, 25 . > (Accessed: 23April, 2008). 27 . CEU eTD Collection Chicago Press, 2000), 22. 30 29 28 unconstitutional” parties of one the that is a threat make, there to needed are anddecisions actions thecollective case if can the checks refuseand balances plays an important role, it is still insufficient, because, for instance, in to cooperate adjudication) (constitutional 1.2.2 Externalcontrol on the grounds of accusation the other of “being constitutional system, since he is often granted power over the other branches other the over power granted is often he since system, constitutional shouldagainst possible of arbitrary “guarantor” decisions be constitutional provided inthe protection Additionally,constitution. sufficient to accordance review lawsand confirm their the unconstitutional acts. Further, in different countries regular courts do not have the right to from prevent sanctions could use appropriate which to opportunity havethe branches other act corresponds to the constitutional law of this state or not or state this lawof constitutional tothe corresponds act inof power tocheck“solely”order and decide and“on constitutional the ifthelegal grounds” control. additional an provided.also institute as such the Thus, isof adjudication extremely important constitutional be must instruments controlling external additional work, often not does and shortcomings officials. Besides, highest of the impeachments and andreferenda validate elections international treaties; constitutional to laws decide maycorrespond whether also Thecourts asconstitutional. confirmed courts may deal with by adjudication anylegal norm adopted levels atall authorities the notis only voided or the “constitutionality” of parties and Herman Schwartz, Herman Ibid. Andras Sajo, Andras Although mutual Although mutual control power between legislature and exercised executive through The idea is that constitutional tribunals are given jurisdiction over different branches different over jurisdiction given are tribunals constitutional is that idea The have some of powers theseparation within control internal as themechanisms of So, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism 28 The Strugglefor Constitutional Justice inPost-Communist Europe . In case when one of the branches is authorized to act alone, none of alone, actthe is of none to authorized case when. In branches of one the 14 30 . In the process of constitutional of process the In . (Budapest: CEU Press, 1999), 225. (Chicago: University of 29 . CEU eTD Collection 32 Chicago Press, 2000), 22. 31 authorities” national different between or authorities lesser or “national between resolve disputes function of judiciary may be involved in lawscreation of andconstitutions,incompatible whichis with the unaccountable, and aredemocratically of representation wholacklegitimacy judges popular Further, workof which the formation courts. constitutional organize and procedures process they are, mostconstitutionalAlthough adjudication. constitutional bejustices aresupposed to independent, often, purely political appointees all above. someleastmentioned type,havejurisdiction of but at the which is a result of peculiarities of the checks is anyconstitution and setlimitations balances, able to on authority governmental the constitutional whole the which basis that comprises it since important is extremely constitution state’s system is founded on. Through the separation ofcontrol constitutional powers tribunal’s decisions should be obligatory. and thebe exercise in powerful andableto So,Ibelieve to control order powers. the over adequate system of functions of Advisory organs the responsible constitutional the for cannotensurean review procedures. adjudication theconstitutional validity of of question the raises recommendations, that in some states constitutional courts may make decisions only in form of Andras Sajo, Andras Herman Schwartz, Herman However, somelegitimacy and political dependency problemsmay arise in the case of In this chapter IhaveentrenchingIn shown chapter this principlein of the a separation that of power Conclusion There is also a problem of the real force of the constitutional courts’ acts. That fact, 31 Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism . The amount of itsof andfunctions. Theamount constitutional courtdepend power any on of The Strugglefor Constitutional Justice inPost-Communist Europe 32 . 15 (Budapest: CEU Press, 1999), 239. (Chicago: University of CEU eTD Collection this chapter with the real political practice in Russia. with practice real the political this chapter ininparallel put foundation to frameworks order Russian constitutional of theoretical order, a as laws special some and constitutional on focusing specifically legislation, Russian the at look reason andforI will this Constitution the accordinggovernment, Russianworking to government. of branches and levels the of each of power political the limit government of levels and branches with different concentrated powers and different areprovided separation power of the forms two that states invital itis federal Thus, legitimate government. ofa andpower, aguarantee the of accountability regime, constitutional of functioning thestable of questions arethe these my opinion In dominate. to powers the of one allowing not simultaneously issues, political make it possible government of levels and branches the to among power force of constraints the Thus, government. all powers to cooperate of the institutional constraints and because the of inthegovernment legislative ambitions and cope with political their their exercising fully from actors political differentlimiting allows adjudication constitutional positions and balances and on checks as measures provided constitutionally such of Combination functions. powers’ the of overlapping allows which powers of separation partial achieving the the all powers. Thatbranches in“pure” is its form not thebest option notsince it guaranteemutual does control of is why all elements of constitutional design rights. individual must be directedprotect to and level national local or the either on power of concentration prevent to in order towards In the next chapter of my thesis I will analyse the constitutional design of the Russian judicial and legislative, executive, the into separation the argue that to I havetried 16 CEU eTD Collection Sussex Academic Press, 1997), 7. 33 Chapter 2- August 1991 wasnotcompleted,August and this situationthe aggravated system. of a newdemocratic tothecreation andprocedures institutions, norms, rules, Soviet therelevanceof decisions. mainproblem old concerned Butthe legal and elite,incontradictory of uncertain often power expressed steps Russian the political This was bythestruggle for process political characterized development. and constitutional Russia inpost-Soviet constitution-making ofthe 2.1 Peculiarities Books’) Government, According tothe1993Constitution(‘Lawin Constitution heavily andConstitution and inconsistentbecame “internally was contradictory”, amended foruseful source astarting In point. periodthe between its validity 1978 1993, the until Russia. in process the constitution-making impacted greatly circumstances, besides other This fact, implementedleaders liberal usingreforms the oldnon-democratic governmental apparatus. was impossible, circumstances political current in the becauseregime old the with abruption full a but system, political of strong positions of conservative for anewbasis democratic institutional necessary havethe created might body legislative Parliament. Elections of anew formation andthe Soviet unlimited power. enjoyed almost period Thus, new Russian in forcewere when includingemerged USSRwasbroken the inthat parliament the up, the oldthe Federative RussianSoviet Socialistin Republic Constitution (RSFSR) (adopted 1978) G.D.G. Murrell, G.D.G. MurrellG.D.G. affirms thatthe“revolution” followed which the attempted coupin After the collapse of the USSR, Russia faced the problem of choosing anew course of At beginningthe 1990s of the actingthe 1978RSFSRConstitution was least the Russia’s Transition toDemocracy: An Internal Political History,1989-1996 ConstitutionalDesignoftheRussian 17 33 . The old institutions and institutions old The . (Brighton: CEU eTD Collection Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 37 Sussex Academic Press, 1997), 6. 36 35 hands in the power decision-making real concentrating by soviets the of role the diminishing as a major obstacle to the coursestruggle andnot case the of constitutional approval by parliament.the of reform. issue of political an became powers andlegislative executive between balance Thus, the Thus, Yeltsin’s dissolution end of Congressandtheconsequentthe of deputies. extensivethe powerof those first the to of lead would a newConstitution the adoption in version,interested since old the steps were were majority the anewof deputies prepare constitution. However, directed in to Commission order at serious tensions between the Russian Parliament and Russia’s first President, Boris Yeltsin to reforms,market contributed of overthe process ideological cleavages and policy sharp 34 legislature” the and executive of the powers therespective over raised“legal uncertainty legislative and powers between executive the relationship wouldregulate proceduresthat lack of presidency The was established. reform economic changeand constitutional inits composition conservatives and toblockinitiatives the was able executive’s for by dominated was legislature Russian powers. broad with bodies legislative supreme became Soviet with Union Supreme together Soviet break-upthe of whichbythe (CPD) wascreated, of the adoption of one supremeboth branches power executivegranting andthelegislative the of the constitutional amendments, a Congress of People’s Deputies Andrea Chandler, Andrea “Presidential Veto Post-CommunistPowerin Russia,1994-1998”, G.D.G. Murrell, Ibid:47. Richard Sakwa, In those conditions President Yeltsin and his team of young reformists saw legislature In Junefirst 1990the RussianCongress of setup People’s Deputies Constitutional the At the same time, without any reduction of the parliament’s power, the institute theinstitute of power, any parliament’s of the reduction samethe At without time, Russian Politics and Society Russia’s Transition toDemocracy: An Internal Political History,1989-1996 36 , 3ded.(London: Routledge,2002), 61. . The decision to create the presidency together with 35 . 18 Vol.34, no. 3 (September, 2001) : 493. 34 . In 1990, as a result Canadian Journalof (Brighton: 37 . CEU eTD Collection New York: Oxford University Press,2000), 141. 42 41 1 (Winter 1993) : 28. 40 Constitution. on referendum the until power decree Yeltsin’s extending allowed which 39 New York: Oxford University Press,2000), 128. program November 1991 till of December1992 of from that by act to decree President the CPDallowed reforms” economic of implementation during “Legal the reform” and on radical power timeof executive organization of the from attained CPDtemporary Initsthe extraordinary “The decisions two power. on 38 at a presidential system,President and the legislature were two different conceptions of the government.while Yeltsin aimed Ruslan the between Khasbulatov, debate the of At centre the Soviet. Supreme the of Chairman the and President a Chairmana struggleandbut deepenedfor executive by the the total of power, personal ambitions the the of the Russian parliament, Thecontact. crisis justof not astruggle1992-1993 was for dominance between legislature the andParliament governmentpursued separate political agendas with minimal co-operation or state became a presidential and to beaparliamentary republic additional broad Russiaceased hadacquired After Yeltsin powers, duringelections oneyear. call parliamentary to not President the CDP and between the itwas agreed In exchange branch. executive the of heads for elections local holding of instead governments local of also of president against thegovernmentandhimself eventually Presidentthe Parliament the placing elite political the apart drifted and society and economy Russian Graeme Graeme Gilland RogerD. Markwick, Thomas F. Remington, Alexander Blankenagel, “Where Has All the Power Gone?” Power the All Has “Where Blankenagel, Alexander compromise the to came they increased, President and CDP the between debate the when 1992 December In Graeme Graeme Gilland RogerD. Markwick, The implementation of Yeltsin’s economic reforms had dramatic impact on the 40 . Besides, appoint authority got the also Yeltsin not to only head the of central but 38 . In October 1991, Yeltsin, power, seeking strengthening 1991, . In October executive who was Politics in Russia Russia’s Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachevto Yeltsin Russia’s Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachevto Yeltsin , 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001), 48. 39 19 for implementation of his radical economic East European Constitutional Review 42 41 . The President, Vice-President, President, The . . , Vol. 2, no. (Oxford; (Oxford; CEU eTD Collection New York: Oxford University Press,2000), 160. 47 1 (Winter 1993) : 29. 46 Vol.2, no. 4(Fall 1993)/Vol.3, no. 1.(Winter 1994) : 122. 45 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997), 46. 44 New York: Oxford University Press,2000), 141. left with a system of separation of powers that contained little or even no separation at all was As a Russia result, role. amore symbolic presidency granting the Soviet, of Supreme the depriving Yeltsin of his special powers and placing the Council of Ministers under the control constitution and powers his andentrenching theminlegislature consolidating extraordinary anew 43 and Yeltsin CPD,while the Supremehe the Soviet hadstating dissolved also the that violated it. do authority to hehadnoconstitutional while Rutskoi, VicePresidentAleksander the existing having constitution, suspendedVice from President Shumeiko his office and firing the reputation of the state inmake economy action anydecisive to government’sdisability the institutions as a wholeled discredit to other to each andYeltsin’s attempts Khasbulatov’s legitimacy. institutional Yeltsindid but and President, the resolve inhiseconomic supported program, thecrisis not of spending public and Government of composition the control should Parliament and representatives, be elected mustthe to accountable Government insisting that government, authority the over form government of was seekingaparliamentary Graeme Graeme Gilland RogerD. Markwick, Alexander Blankenagel, “Where Has All the Powers Gone?” Powers All the Has “Where Blankenagel, Alexander Stephen Holmes Christianand Lucky,“Storm Over Compatibility”, StephenWhite, “Russia: Presidential Leadership underYeltsin”, in Graeme Graeme Gilland RogerD. Markwick, In fightinthefall this issuednew1992 theof Supreme Soviet abillsimultaneously The results of the April 1993 national referendum, which asked for confidence in The for April1993national confidence the which of referendum, asked results 44 . Yeltsin pursuing“hegemonic limitedof power was the presidency” with 45 . Russia’s Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachevto Yeltsin Russia’s Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachevto Yeltsin 20 47 43 . Yeltsin did not pay much respect to the to respect much pay not did Yeltsin . . The legislature was trying to restore its restore wastrying to legislature . The East European Constitutional Review Postcommunist Presidents, East European Constitutional Review and consequently harmed consequently and ed. Ray Taras, , Vol. 2, no. (Oxford; (Oxford; 46 . , CEU eTD Collection (Spring 1993) : 35. 50 powers legislative executiveand the between conflict conflictingitfailed adequatemechanisms presentthe sides,eventually, to of resolving Valery Zorkin resign. hadto Thus, though Constitutionalthe someCourt influence overthe by suspended of decree andforced work Chairman Constitutional the Court the Court’s 7,1993Yeltsin decision was made October in on with constitutional provisions, accordance concluded had thatYeltsin violated the constitution and couldbe impeached. Thoughthis Court legislature, Constitutional the the day next dismissed Yeltsin decrees. The after and legislativeexecutive restrict to right his and elections) parliamentary the until regime presidential acting powers byissuingconstitution thedecreeby he meantwhich declared “special the (that regime” on the groundsParticularly, inheld Constitutional March1993,the Court violated Yeltsin the that of contradictions of their acts to the presidential 49 Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 48 of rather it consensus,buta broad was by October victors through the the prepared approved entirety” its in law of rule the on trampled and judiciary the “marginalized legislature the and executive the between fight the however, decrees; presidential several overturning made an attemptIt hadeven power. branchesof other two the between conflict in the acompromise brokered to assert its authorityconstitution. new a of adoption the and branch executive the of invictory the with finished ultimately order had that 1993, 3 October, on conflict toviolent a into transformed was attainParliament the and President the save to constitution the “in country” order separationonly of powers by Robert Sharlet, “Chief Justice as a Judicial Politician”, Richard Sakwa, Chandler, Andrea “Presidential Veto Post-CommunistPowerin Russia,1994-1998”, The Constitutional establishedCourt, in July 1991,mighthave as acted anda mediator Unlike in many other post-communist countries, the Russian constitution was not was constitution Russian the countries, post-communist other many in Unlike Russian Politics and Society , 3ded.(London: Routledge,2002), 67. 21 48 Vol.34, no. 3 (September, 2001) : 487. East EuropeanConstitutional Review . As a result, the confrontation between the 50 . Canadian Journalof , Vol. 2, no. 2 49 . CEU eTD Collection Governance 53 Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov (Washington: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 2004), 58. of the executive branch from the power centre to from centre the local level.branch power of executive the the conflictbuildParliamentduringa “vertical andto 1992-1993executive-legislature the chain” regions the to concessions individuals” trusted appointmentsthe and of through broad regional the governors on reasonsforwere the “relying Yeltsin’s environment” economy hostile and apolitically inefficient “highly the exactly arguesthat Sperling state. a democratic for building framework constitutional of establishment of way the on obstacles were the recruitment rules of new of instead and policy competition “state patronage” of existing the Sperling’ opinion, in Valerie and, power, get total the to desire leaders, their political the of ambitions Personal influence). foreignadvisors’ political (i.e. factor ontheexternal a lesser extent, times, and, to presidential (see: Yeltsin’s) powerinfuture relying onauthoritarian legacies from Sovietthe Yeltsin’sconstitutionalby intention factors: protect choice the mightbeexplained to two in favor of presidentthe - and asuper-presidential governmental system. Inmy this opinion, the period of violent conflict between the president and the parliament. 52 possible falsifications about concerns serious of which raised results means official a referendum, of was by approved futurethe Constitution Yeltsin’sunder the supervision. Russia’s Moreover, 1993 Constitution Constitutional Assembly, established theApril after 1993 referendum, draftof preparedthe the politicians: the of desires the consideration into taken have should lawyers the of work the 51 init “the prize” became and, of eventually, struggle political the 1993 politicalConstitution-makingwas apart crisis. Valerie Sperling, ed., ViktorSheinis, “The Constitution”, in Richard Sakwa, The new Constitution created a new balance of political power in balance - the Russia power of political anewbalance created The newConstitution (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 70. Russian Politics and Society Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis andthe Quest forDemocratic 51 . So, the new constitution was prepared in the circumstances when in circumstances the was prepared new the constitution . So, 53 52 . Eventually, maintain aimed Yeltsin to his against support the . Nevertheless, the adoption of the constitution brought an end to Between Dictatorship and Democracy , 3ded.(London: Routledge,2002), 68. 22 , ed. Michael McFaul, Nikolai CEU eTD Collection New York: Oxford University Press,2000), 166. regime” his give thatshaped theConstitution informal structures to Yeltsinsanction “soughtto power powers andbroad republics.Markwickto the AsGraeme D. andRoger it, Gill through put the 1993 Russian minimalConstitution powerstotheParliament, powers strong President,to the 57 (Fall 1003)/Vol. 3, no.1 (Winter 1994) : 125. of November, 1993Boris Yeltsin, justify trying to his desire for presidentialthe republic said: 56 Governance 55 1993)/Vol. 3, no. 1 (Winter 1994) : 107. of Yeltsin assuch a figure leader byastrong andmasssupport governed shouldwas thatRussia be perceptions popular within the central government was granted far less attention. 54 and subjects federal central Russia’s government amongbe the allocated would power federalism, whereby newRussian of form creation a of elite in endof the of 1980s-beginning 1990s andweremostly ondecentralization focused and political Russian the consulting were who economists, and lawyers specialists, constitutional Graeme Graeme Gilland RogerD. Markwick, Stephen Holmes, “Superpresidentialism and its Problems”, Valerie Sperling, ed., Dwing Semler, “The End of the Russian Republic”, Russian of the End “The Semler, Dwing All these preconditions allowed Russian political elite to grant and embody in the quickly, and very possibly inParliament possibly very and quickly, found will be such I assureyou that a dictator demandadictator. will earlier, people or year a half In nihilism? legal wide-spread with and discipline executive low very where are normal groups, interests beinginnow only formed, parties with a country have notdoes inczars “leaders”, used that well or defined to acountry that country a in alone Parliament and Parliament on rely we can How expect? you do What deny I willnot in powers areconsiderable.of outlined the president that the draftthe Besides, Valerie Sperling considers, that also crucial to the strong presidency presidency strong the choice also crucial considers,Besides, Valeriethatto Sperling Additional “support” Additional “support” for super-presidentialism came from many Western 57 . (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 180. Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis andthe Quest forDemocratic 55 . In his interview to the Russian the . Inhisinterviewto newspaper Russia’s Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachevto Yeltsin 23 East EuropeanEast Constitutional Review 56 54 . . At the same time the distribution of power East European Constitutional Review Izvestia , Vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall , made on15th , Vol. 2, no. 4 (Oxford; CEU eTD Collection Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 59 1985-1996 the of Government the by isrepresented branch executive Assembly; Federal bicameral 58 enshrine” to claimed it “that constitutionalism of principles the undermines in turn which andbalances, constitution’s the above checks the havingplaced President balance of powers, while that might the principle of have lacksit separation of the beenupheld, the powers Constitution seems to be Russian In separation andthe thisof elections powers. regard, pluralism, competitive a liberal document. political state, the of neutrality ideological as such However,state-building democratic of principles the critics of the Constitution claim Constitution 1993 tothe according powers of separation 2.2 Horizontal strengthening presidential power. protect personal Yeltsin’s from to bodies presidency by the government other the desire and infuture legislature-executive deadlocks prevent to in the efforts and expressed were Constitution of new the content greatly on the impacted 1990s the of beginning atthe events visionnew and, a more order of consequently,for power themselves. to Thosedramatic political struggle between circumstances of profound economic andpolitical and changes was characterized bythe the different branches of power aiming at president Frenchthe system butwith stronger executive powerduetotheincreased independence of the Andrea Chandler, Andrea “Presidential Veto Post-CommunistPowerin Russia,1994-1998”, Robert B. Andieh, The Russian Constitution has entrenched world standards for human rights and basic and rights human for standards world entrenched has Constitution Russian The in the followed constitution Russian first the making of process the shown have I As Conclusion The Russian Constitution establishes a super-presidential system, formally resembling formally system, a super-presidential establishes Constitution Russian The (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 166. in tothecomparison French model Russia’s Constitutional Revolution: Legal Consciousness and the Transition to Democracy 24 Vol.34, no. 3 (September, 2001) : 488. 59 . Legislative power is exercised by isthe power exercised . Legislative the dominance of their of dominance the Canadian Journalof 58 . CEU eTD Collection 64 (Yonkers, N.Y.: Juris Pub., 2000), 145. 63 Constitutional Review, 62 61 60 may use conciliation resolveto disputes between the federal andgovernment governments of of branches government andjudicial executive legislative, among the arbiter” as “an act him to allow and government of main branches three the above President the place in which, extraordinary andWilliamBurnham, opinion the powers Gennady M. Danilenko of inand subvert beused could circumstances certain to the constitution. powers governmental other the among President the itadvantages since issue controversial power” state of of interaction organs the functioning and coordinated “ensurethe is supposedto who constitution” of the a“guarantor of capacity Russian Vice President, Aleksander Rutskoi, was not successful Constitution has provided not aVice President since post Yeltsin’s experience his with first meetings, he is not the head of the Russian Government. In Edward W. Walker’s opinion, thestate” of foreign thepolicy and and Supreme Commander-in-Chief the of state head is the term, for afour-year is directly who elected President, The system. governmental power 2.2.1 Presidential Court Superior of Arbitration and courts other of the Russian Federation. Russian judiciaryhasbeen Constitutional Federation; Supremeassigned tothe Court, Court, Ibid:147. Gennady WilliamM. Danilenko Burnham,and Edward W. Walker, “Politics of Blame and Presidential Powers in Russia’s New Constitution”, Constitution, (Article 80 (3). Constitutionof Russianthe Federation, 1993 (Articles 80 (1),81 (1), 87 (1). As “the guarantor of the Constitution” the President has been endowed with certain Article 80of 1993Constitutionthe certain inPresidenthis grants reserve powers The President of the Russian Federation holds primary power in the Russian Vol.2, no. 4(Fall 1993)/Vol.3, no. 1 (Winter 1994) : 116. 61 . Although the President may preside over Government over preside may President the Although . Law Legal System of Russianand the Federation 25 60 . He determines “guidelines for the domestic the for “guidelines He determines . 63 . This constitutional isprovision a 62 . 64 . The President East European , 2nded. CEU eTD Collection 12 (1), 24 (1). 70 69 32 (1). 68 67 (Yonkers, N.Y.: Juris Pub., 2000), 146. 66 65 activities of Government,the making important governmental dissolving appointments, or them over control and exercises power executive federal the of organs other and ministries of federal the thework directs Government determines for guidelines activity the the of and Governmentthe its organizes work These norms Federation”. Russian Governmentthe Law of “On the Constitutional and Federal the 24of tell that whilethese ministries, which actually contradicts Article 113 of the Constitution and theArticlesthe 12 Chairmansecurity, internal and foreign affairs of the GovernmentGovernment the President has a special authority over ministries dealing with defense, ofGovernmentis limited toestablishing guidelines, under 1997Constitutional the Law on the the Russian the of of activities the “direction” presidential in general While the its activities. directs Federation citizen” and being human the of freedoms and rights the violate or Federation, Russian the of obligations international the laws, federal Federation and of Russian the Constitution the contravene if acts such Federation mayPresident “the suspend actsof of organs powerof subjectsthe executive of Russian the court” appropriate if such conciliation of Federation the subjects and betweenthevarious Federation subjects the disputes fails to resolve the dispute, the President may refer the dispute to “the TheFederal Constitutional Law “On Government the of the Russian Federation”,18.12.1997 # 2-FCL (Article Constitution, (Article 113). TheFederalConstitutional Law Governmentthe “On of the Federation”,Russian 18.12.1997 # 2-FCL (Article Constitution, (Article 85 (2). Gennady WilliamM. Danilenko Burnham,and Constitution, (Article 85 (1). As a head of the state the President appoints the members of the Government and members of Government the the appoints Presidentthe As ahead state of the 66 . On the basis of decisions of the Supreme or Constitutional Courts, the 68 . Thus, the President directly controls the activities of 67 . Law Legal System of Russianand the Federation 26 70 . Through such mechanism of directing the directing of mechanism such Through . 65 . In case . In , 2nded. 69 , the , CEU eTD Collection 75 (Yonkers, N.Y.: Juris Pub., 2000), 148. 74 Communist Courts”, 73 (Yonkers, N.Y.: Juris Pub., 2000), 148. 72 If Presidentdeclinesthe thelaw,itmust be reexamined Duma bythe State and by the to sign reject by withina bill it of days fourteen passed for Parliament approval.receiving the legislation ordinary toveto power laws; constitutional a hehasonly the on interpose veto is to restricted President the However, branch. So, while the Parliament adopts federal laws, the bodies. President legislation while ignoring legislative has strong veto favorable making thepresident’s inof is thepossibility and danger branch their powers. legislative the of sphere the into intervention the as be considered may President the to given powers legislative legislation” presidential decrees firstsuspendlaws older having beenwithout delegated powerby the parliament,the and the 71 issue them to power President’s the on restrictions” “subject-matter impose any not Constitution does laws”,federal the Federation and Russian the of Constitution the contravene Federation Russian decrees which and orders executive are declared to be binding throughout the territory of the branch executive of power check the hasto opportunity the Presidentany the time, reorganizing at Governmentthe Ibid:156. Gennady WilliamM. Danilenko Burnham,and Erik S. Herron and Kirk A. Randazzo, “The Relationship between Independence and Judicial Review in Post- in Review Judicial and Independence between Relationship “The Randazzo, A. Kirk and Herron S. Erik Gennady WilliamM. Danilenko Burnham,and Egene Huskey, The Russian President has also been granted the authority to control the legislative the control to authority the granted been also has President Russian The One of the mostimportant powers of the Presidentis the power to issue normative 73 . Although. under Article 90 of the not “may Constitution, decrees presidential Presidential Power inRussia 72 The Journal of Politics . Decree power is based on the President’s authority makelaws or new. to authority the ison President’s Decree power based are issued at least insofar the “Parliament fails to reach certain areas with certain areas reach fails to “Parliament insofar the are issuedleast at 71 . 75 . According tothe Russian Constitution, the President may , Vol. 65, no. 2(May,2003) : 257. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe), 1999. Law Legal System of Russianand the Federation Law Legal System of Russianand the Federation 27 74 . Such quasi- , 2nded. , 2nded. CEU eTD Collection 79 78 (Yonkers, N.Y.: Juris Pub., 2000), 156. 77 (Fall 1993)/Vol. 3, no. 1 (Winter 1994):123. 76 Assembly of Federal the houses Federation Council. President’s veto can be overturned by a two-thirds majority of both vote of confidence requested by the Chairman of theGovernment of Chairman by the requested of vote confidence votes in the Government within three months of each other”forPresident Chairman “the Duma of (2) twonon-confidence State Government”, the adopts or (3) “the State Duma denies a Parliament only if (1)frame “the and State a number Duma of conditions.rejects1993 Constitution limits of the dissolve Presidentthe power to Duma the State time byastrict three Thus, successive the PresidentAssembly candidates- the Statemay Duma dismiss theproposed lower house by theof the Federal Assembly. uncontrolledbe since it overridden not byqualified can majorities both houses ofthe of is a veto.federal statues of is such rejecting Thus, such not power result, president’s rejection federal law”,asa and, “an adopted be considered not can grounds onprocedural law rejected a According the Court, meritstheir grounds. to conclusion onprocedural Constitutional the of of consideration” laws “without rejected has often President the that shows practice However, it.publish a statute andrefuseto hemay on procedural violated, grounds reject If were they of Constitution the requirements with in procedural the was adopted accordance Parliament dissolution of the Parliament are a particularly strong power in the hands of in of executive power hands the the strong aparticularly are Parliament the of dissolution Constitution, (Article 111 (4), 117 (3, 4). Ibid:153. Gennady WilliamM. Danilenko Burnham,and Stephen Holmes, “Superpresidentialism and its Problems”, Finally, the Russian President has the power to dissolve the lower house of the Federal The President also has the right to determine whether a statute approved by the 78 . At the same time in the interests of parliamentary stability, the stability, parliamentary of interests in the time same At the . 76 . Law Legal System of Russianand the Federation 28 East European Constitutional Review, 79 . Last two grounds for Vol. 2, no. 4 , 2nded. 77 . CEU eTD Collection 1998) :77. 83 82 81 80 confidence votes withindenial ofthree a confidence months voteof each requested other by the Chairman Duma State any the moment. at of the Government a confidence by vote are able andthe request President branch, to or Government becausethe for two non- months preceding the expiration of the President’s term of office emergency or martial law. The President can not also dissolvedissolve the State Duma within the six if the State Duma has filed a criminal charge against him or during a state of Constitutional Assembly approves the necessity of the amendments the of necessity the approves Assembly Constitutional constitution Orthe besubjects. amendedby referendum can the after popular the thirds allfederation’ the bythetwo of members, Federation fourths of andthen Council the since they must be approved at least by the two thirds of the State Duma deputies, by the three enact, to difficult extremely amendments make provisions Constitution’s The amendment. entrenched amount of presidential (read:Yeltsin’s)power by mechanismsthe of constitution supported by supported qualifiedthe majority of deputies failed because it not this However, attemptrepublic into aparliamentary was republic. presidential the transform whichcould Russianconstitution, tothe pass amendments to the by replacements in 1998theDuma madeYeltsin 1998 and1999.In October anattempt even of aseries after governmental powers and government’s parliamentary the while increasing diminishamend proposals and,consequently, to constitution the to power presidential the Alexey K. Pushkov, “Constitutional Reform”, Constitution, (Article 135). Constitution, (Article 110 (1). Constitution, (Article 109). Further, the President cannotdissolve the State Duma for one year after its election for Besides the other constitutional devices, Yeltsin has protected the constitutionally East European Constitutional Review 29 83 . 80 . The President also has no power to has nopower also President . The 81 . 82 . There were a lot a of were . There , Vol. 7, no. 4 (Fall CEU eTD Collection 90 36). 89 Constitutional Review, 88 87 11 (1). 86 24 (1). 85 84 legislatures and hold any positions of the other organs of the governmental power the members of the that Government rule in the is expressed branch executive the within cannot powers of separation the of be principle the members of any federal and regional ministers” federal Russian the and chairmen deputy Government, the of “Chairman the of is composed Federation, Russian in the power executive exercises which Ministers), of Council (the Federation 2.2.2 The Government Government canissue withoutlegislativeGovernment approval rulings the and President the Parliament, by left gaps legislative in the filling by simply Thus, decrees President’s lawsand federal of Constitution, the implementation ensure the to orders decrees and the right tomake proposals on amendments and revision of constitutional provisions andloans, federal expenses concerningis them,make also endowed and to bills remarkstothe dealing with taxes, state the amending power over the pending bills, can direct to the Parliament official references Russian Federation before the State Duma by the Chairman of the Government may be may Government the of Chairman the by Duma State the before Federation Russian Constitution, (Article 134). TheFederalConstitutional Law Governmentthe “On of the Federation”,Russian 18.12.1997 # 2-FCL (Article Edward W. Walker, “Politics of Blame and Presidential Powers in Russia’s New Constitution”, Constitution, (Article 115 (1). TheFederalConstitutional Law Governmentthe “On of the Federation”,Russian 18.12.1997 # 2-FCL (Article TheFederalConstitutional Law Governmentthe “On of the Federation”,Russian 18.12.1997 # 2-FCL (Article Constitution, (Article 111 (1). According to ArticleAccording to 110(1)of Constitution,the Government the of Russian the According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Government can issue can Government the Federation, Russian the of Constitution the to According The opportunity The opportunity the question putting of confidence intheGovernmentof of the 84 87 Vol.2, no. 4(Fall 1993)/Vol.3, no. 1 (Winter 1994) : 117. . The Chairman of the Government is the head of the executive the of head is the Government the of Chairman The . . Such government’s powers are close to the President’s rule by decree. rule President’s tothe close are powers . Such government’s 89 . The Constitution Article 134 grants the Council of Ministers 30 88 . Moreover, the Government has Government the Moreover, . 86 East European . 90 . 85 . The . CEU eTD Collection Russian Federation, the Chairman of the Central Bank, the Procurator General and the and General Procurator the Bank, Central the of Chairman the Federation, Russian the of Government the of Chairman the of appointment the for Federation Russian the of President the to consent granting emergency; of a state and law martial of introduction the Federal Assembly; giving approval to the decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the of houses both by Federation Russian the of President the of addresses the hearing through in its turn, may override the rejection by a two-thirds vote consent tothem Duma by andgiving adopted laws State reviewing the Council’s the of of Federation the its Parliament that the same person may not simultaneously be a deputy to the both chambers of the 95 94 93 92 91 subject Federation from each authority) of state bodies from executive the andone representative deputies, and Federation Council is the comprised deputies (onefrom two of the Council Federation the 2.2.3 Legislativepower such procedureallows influencing Parliament the by Government. the Anyway, by legislative executive. the the checking mechanismof risky asarather considered Constitution, (Article 105 (5). Constitution, (Article 104, 105 (3). Constitution, (Article 97 (2). Constitution, (Article 95 (1, 2). Constitution, (Article 95 (1). 92 The legislative branch may check the presidential power of the Russian Federation Russian the of power presidential the check may branch legislative The Internal checks and balances within the legislative power work through through work procedure the power balances legislative within the Internal checks and The legislature FederalThe and Duma -the separate Assembly houses: -consists State of two the . The principle of separation of powers within the legislative is expressed in rule the is expressed thelegislative within powers of ofseparation principle . The 93 . 94 . In the case of the bill rejection by the Federation Council, the State Duma, State the Council, Federation by the bill rejection caseof the . In the 91 . The State Duma, directly elected to four-year terms, consists of of 450 consists four-year. terms, to Duma,directly The State elected 31 95 . CEU eTD Collection Impeachable offenses are limited by the Constitution to treason treason andhigh crimeslimitedby to areConstitution Impeachable the offenses impeach. to difficult very is President Russian the Parliament, the by impeached almost being of experience the Yeltsin’s Again, after Federation. Russian of the the President over law. the sign two-thirds majority the process Parliamentcan also balancethepresident through of overturningthe by his veto a both houseslaw-making in the Finally, it. reject may ofbalances, and checks the of mechanisms the Federalexercising Assembly, thus obliging the PresidentPresident. the check to than rather government the of chairman tofor nominee unpopular an approve to force legislature the to President for the opportunity the creates norm, eventually, this that is evident It new elections. call and Parliament, the of lower chamber the dissolve Government, the of Chairman the appoint must President the thrice, post Government of for the Chairman the nominee President’s Dumathe rejects in ifthe State case However, 100 99 Constitutional Review, 98 97 96 Council within three months of the filing of the charge by the Duma in Duma, required State vote in requiresthe atwo-thirdsremoval while actual Federation the havebeenfollowedin bringing thecharge Supreme Court State Duma”, and that ofcharge the president must in fromturn officebe confirmed requires theas an“filing impeachable of a charge offenseof treason by orthe high crime by the Arbitration, andCourt of etc Supreme Court, the Court, membersConstitutional of Constitution, (Article 93 (1). Edward W. Walker, “Politics of Blame and Presidential Powers in Russia’s New Constitution”, Constitution, (Article 93 (1). Constitution, (Article 100, 102 (1b,c), 103 (1a). Constitution, (Article 93 (2), 92(2), 93 (3). The institute of the impeachment is an important instrument of parliament’s control parliament’s of instrument important is an impeachment the of institute The while Parliament, the initiative, legislative to right the has President the Since 98 . Then the Constitutional Court must rule that the appropriate procedures appropriate the rulemust that Court Constitutional . Then the Vol.2, no. 4(Fall 1993)/Vol.3, no. 1 (Winter 1994) : 117. 99 32 . For filing the charge, a two-thirds vote isvote . Forfilingtwo-thirds a the charge, 100 . East European 97 . Removal 96 . CEU eTD Collection 105 104 (Articles 38, 39). 103 (Article 36). 102 101 internal affairs by the State Duma well as throughthe approval of ministersall government exceptdefense,foreign and affairs, as Government; the of initiative legislative the of rejection Parliament’s the through branch 106 European Constitutional Review, Federation ofArbitration Russian of Russian the SupremeCourt the Federation, and judgesof of Constitutional the Court of Russianthe Federation, Supreme the of the Court appointment of the RussianFederation, the Court hearing addressesof Constitutional the the all at the government, and there is a question why a device to issue a vote of non-confidence exists Edward W. Walker, who noted, that it seems with thatagree theI Thus, Sate Duma. Duma the hasdismiss or no power Government tothe bring dissolve down either may President non-confidenceininexpressing caseof the Governmenttwice months, within the three curious and makes no sense itsof existence as a parliamentary check over the executive, since Federation Russian of the Government inthe on confidence Ministers answer questions the andthe requests of legislature’the members implementation to the State Duma examination Edward W. Walker, “Politics of Blame and Presidential Powers in Russia’s New Constitution”, Constitution, (Article 103 (1b). TheFederal ConstitutionalLaw “On Government the of theRussianFederation”, 18.12.1997 # 2-FCL TheFederal ConstitutionalLaw “On Government the of theRussianFederation”, 18.12.1997 # 2-FCL Constitution, (Article 83 (d), 83(f). Constitution, (Article 100, 102 (1g). 105 The executive power of the Russian Federation may be controlled by the legislative the by controlled be may Federation Russian the of power executive The The legislative may check the judicial power of the Russian Federation through the through RussianFederation of the power judicial may the check The legislative . Finally, Duma jurisdiction the of State the includesthe make possibility to decisions isbringThe to Government of inthefederal budget obliged its the report and Vol.2, no. 4 (Fall 1993)/Vol.3, no. 1(Winter 1994): 118. 101 . 33 102 . Further, members of the Council of 104 . This provision is rather 103 . East 106 . CEU eTD Collection balances works only for the president. He may veto legislation and dissolve the Parliament, deny Parliament, the dissolve and legislation veto may He president. the for only works balances constitutionally,it lacks balanced separation of powers. Itseems that the system of checks and been established has of powers of separation the thesystem judiciary. Though the and legislature, the government, the presidency, the state: federal the for power of branches strong rolein of President the system and governmental the formally establishes four misbehavior ofits justices and the decisions of the other judges. the on control of mechanism internal an got has Court Constitutional the addition, Federation bodies of Russian the of subjects supremestate between Federation; state bodies of bodies;the between state between federal the the overthe jurisdiction resolve disputes duty the to Russian Federationconstitutionality importantrole an and having plays with inpowers’ conflicts, been endowed and the state bodies of the subjects Federation oftheRussian Constitution the interpret of the Russian 109 108 107 Russian Federation the of Government the and Parliament, the of chambers both President, the of acts normative about “compliance Judiciary 2.2.4 Constitutional with Court. the Supreme and Court Constitution Constitutional the of initiative legislative the reject also may Parliament of the Russian Federation” of federal laws, Constitution, (Article 125 (3). Constitution, (Article 125 (5). Constitution, (Article 125 (2). In have section this 1993“Yeltsin’s”I shown the that the Constitution emphasizes Conclusion The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation is the final arbiter of the The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation is authorized to resolve cases isto Federation authorized of Russian the Court The Constitutional 107 . Moreover, the Constitutional Court has been granted the power to power the granted been has Court Constitutional the Moreover, . 34 108 . 109 . In CEU eTD Collection federal and de facto unitary federal anddefacto Union Soviet second level federalof division and are subject to the federal laws (firstlevel) arethe subjects federal theautonomy. The degree of different they possess sametime at the upperchamber in Russian the parliament; of expressedthe intheirequal representation rights federal haveequal These subjects oblasts). asthe status same the with significance federal citiesof and oblasts, autonomous krays, oblasts, of okrugs, autonomous republics, status the Constitution 1993 tothe according powers of division 2.3 Vertical Court. Constitutional parliament. Thus, it comesdissolve the to bythreatening in pressure the hisexercising caseof Presidentthe counter that the only state body, capable to check the presidency, is the 111 4 (Fall 1993)/Vol. 3, no. 1(Winter1994) : 123. 110 directives. strong regions able ignoreto central legislation and weak imposecenter unable itsto “as take led Eventually, much as theycouldsovereignty swallow”. situation to the this the of began at a disadvantage, because of the famous Yeltsin’s offer to the all Russia’s regions to by turn dissolution legislature’s the may Government the to non-confidence express to attempt hearings, any and parliamentary at officials government on call to power no has blockdecrees, cannot itPresident’s the however functions, have does control certain authority. It its lackof weakbecause of oversight rather the acts of the executive and dismiss the Government. At the same time the Russia Parliamentis 112 April, 2008). < StephenHolmes, “Superpresidentialism and its Problems”, Ibid. http://www.answers.com/topic/federal-subjects-of-russia?cat=travel#wp-_note-Constitution Russian federal system started its development federal Russian system thestarted against backgroundjure of de The Russian Federation of federalconsists (including84 subjects ethnic enclaves with 110 . The Parliament does not have enough checks’ power to power checks’ enough have not does Parliament . The 112 35 . The structuring of a new federal system also East European Constitutional Review, 111 > (Accessed: 3 (Accessed: > . Vol. 2, no. CEU eTD Collection and parties; appointments of presidential representatives and federal andfederal of taxation officials; presidential andrepresentatives appointments parties; (through the control over the local economy and resources; local media and electoral blocks their of regions interests the forward carry to powers substantial obtained governors the balances and checks of system this In balances. and checks thecenter-periphery of a system create to aresult, as and, relations federal-states redefine unilaterally to republics the allowed of It federal the thepower center. whilediminishing elites political strengthening regional the federalism” policy (which I will in Chapterthe discuss III)by Yeltsin in resulted federal government to set clear rules of the game strikes” and protests lostmore to had days and sovereignty declared federation who units those subsidies,tax breaks,credits softlarge and to and andplaced“disproportionately regions, Yeltsin allowedby republics of autonomous adoption sovereignty declarations of Russian the federation. the of regions different the to powers of amount different hadgranted The Treaty Federation subjects. and Russian the Government federal the between of distribution powers Publishers, 2006), 265. Politics inCentral andEastern Europe, 113 Constitution” existing itselffederal and“incorporated Treaty matters, intothe then- the Constitution regarding Treaty Congressof the People’sthe Deputies amended almost all norms of 1978RSFSRthe been defined bytheFederal of Treaty Russian1992 andthe Constitution of 1993. By the 115 114 (Yonkers,N.Y.: Juris Pub., 2000) ,163. Gennady and WilliamM. Danilenko Burnham, Aitalina Azarova, “Formal Institutions and Informal Politics inRussia”, in Ibid. However, though formal hierarchical relations were set, it was notin the interest of the The basic distribution of powers between the central government and its sub-units has sub-units its and government central the between powers of distribution basic The 114 . 113 . As aresult, 1992Treaty the significantbrought in changes the ed. GerdMeyer(Opladenand Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Law Legal System oftheand Russian Federation 36 115 . The exercise of “contractual of exercise the . The Formal Institutions and Informal , 2nded. CEU eTD Collection organization of the system of organs of state andlocal self-government” state power of organs of system the organization of establish of “general it to principles gave thefederation the Federation; power the 119 Peace Research Russian Federation units for all the equality of constitutional was recognizingfederal principle the 1992 arrangement the to made Constitution the that changes significant most the states, Alexseev A. Mikhail sametime, as the At contradictions. create hand,often other the on and, forces political inbemake interpreted thempossibleto ways different dependingontheline-upthe of ontheonehand, vague, what, aretoo set-up federal the concerning itssubjects; provisions their political autonomy. bargaining cooperation, model the mostof economically when regions successful enhanced has deepened as federalism asymmetry the in Simultaneously, federation. form RussianFederation of the the a result of the of further existence and endangeredthe parts, its constituent over rule tocontrol and power shortcomings of federal legislationenergy supplies and transportation state-controlledthrough monopolies, natural etc.) and the dominancechallenging orignoring regional laws that contradicted the Constitution; of setting the costs of allocations amongbudget and regions; donor recipient local official’s appointments; leverage developedregional also the over heads 118 117 Report 116 strategies; andimplementation of the privatization program, and etc.) Constitution, (Article 72m). Mikhail A. Alexseev, “Decentralization versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia’s Endurance,” Russia’s Explaining Collapse: State versus “Decentralization Alexseev, A. Mikhail Ibid. Line”, in Governors Elected Even Keep to Tools Many Has “Kremlin Orttung, Robert Vol. 5,No. 8(March, 2000b). The 1993 Constitution granted the extensive power to the federal government andfederalits to the government extensive the power The 1993Constitution granted federal the of disability theapparent ledto decentralization hand,such On other the Vol. 38, No. 1 (January, 2001) : 102. 118 . Moreover, the Constitution the Constitution . Moreover, of expanded the powers 37 (through fiscal resource (through policies; transfer 116 . Conversely, Kremlin Russian Regional 117 Journal of 119 . . The . CEU eTD Collection deputy deputy Chairman of Accountingthe Chamber and half its staffof its auditors of and the appointment to office and the removal from officejudges of and the Constitutional the SupremeArbitration, Supreme the Court, Court, Court of of the Prosecutor-General of appointment andthe for the responsible also is Council Federation The Federation. Russian the of impeachmentof President the Federation; Russian of territory the Federation the outside emergency; making decisions on the possibility of the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian President’s the Russian Federation; decrees on introduction the martial lawof andastate of of the thesubjects between of borders of changes approval the through federal power the 121 120 jointcompetence spheres of defined Federation tothe as beenor delegated have in not that power” areas all expressly division isof basedpower onthe principle that the subjects of Federationthe “enjoy full state This power. state of organs andsubjects’ power state the of organs federal the between Federal Treaty and provided that in case of their conflict, the Constitution dominates the of provisions inconsistent the over force legal superior its proclaimed has Constitution 122 (Yonkers, N.Y.: Juris Pub., 2000), 165. laws federal contradict not may jurisdiction joint or Federation the of jurisdiction exclusive the within inareas “subjects” of the legal acts normative other the lawsand the imply that which jurisdiction,federal and the joint exclusivesubjects, of government, the competencies the 123 Quarterly Gennady and WilliamM. Danilenko Burnham, Constitution, (Part II, Article 1). Michael McFaul, “Lessons from Russia’s Protracted Transition from Communist Rule”, Constitution, (Article 102 (1). 122 . At the same time the federal units in the face of the Federation Council may balance may Council Federation ofthe intheface units federal same the Atthe time According to the 1993 Constitution, state power isof 1993Constitution, RussianFederation the According the divided state to Vol. 114, 1 (Spring,no. 1999) : 121. 121 . The Constitution enumerates the jurisdiction of the federal the of jurisdiction the enumerates Constitution The . Law Legal System oftheand RussianFederation 38 123 Political Science . 120 , 2nded. . CEU eTD Collection central central levelsand centre-periphery madein this chapter. atthe of powers distribution the inferences concerning rejectprovethe or to in action”,order in “law the make out to words in another or legal practices, discover try to Iwill my thesis of III itself. Chapter the tocontrol In power branchesof allowing other the not arbiter, central presidential is the power given dominant place wherebyit among the others, asa performs The government. central the within powers of checks the with situation same the not of betweenpowers federal the government andits subdivisions isin “lawkept it inbooks”, is periphery powers is being broken. In the Chapter III I will talk about this in details. thecentre- of less balance more or the a result In andpolitics. attitude Council Federation the federal reforms, wherebyPutin’s recent the President to due Councilformation Federation inpeculiarities of the the the central government isdisadvantage rooted agreat of However, Federation. the subjects by but federal organs the in the face of the Presidentnot by out federal mostlaws arecarried factthat considering that interests, their presenting may influence of tool important an is laws federal of enactment the in participation direct subject’s the Thus, Federation. of the and administration in legislation the Council Federation the through participate As subjects units. the aresult, federal organs the of executive legislative and federal by of enactment legislation. Themembers of Council Federation the are appointed the influence being in the Council, onthefederal direct Federation the represented through state, forby thisformulate their policy,compensate powerto theirown much they autonomous Thus, lookingThus, Russian wecan at the Constitution seethatwhilethebalance1993, of Conclusion notfederation do have subjects Constitution, Russian Besides, while,according tothe 39 CEU eTD Collection 124 Chapter 3- (Accessed: 18May 2008).. 126 the presidential influence into the federal legislature and to form a strong pro-presidential majority in it. 125 (Accessed: 18May 2008). power of The party Russia) of Party andthe Democratic Federation, Russian the of Party Republican and the Federation, Russian of Party the Social Democratic the (New Democracy), Union Democratic Christian Russian the of coalition the and Russia, of Party Agrarian the Federation, Russian Duma (distributed amongthe Communistinwas 31.33% Party of the 1993-1995State the of the frequent use of the presidential veto in Russia. The overall amount of oppositionvoices reasons werethe powers andlegislative between executive the Exactly continued tensions the in power veto the laws of President’s the the political course. case passing defeat whichcould Yeltsin 3.1.1 VetopowerunderBoris powers of separation horizontal the in balances and 3.1 Checks checks andbalances worked. see placein particular how whether and to took in1993-2007 of order which potential crises events will the I trace chapter this In andregions. federal center the between powers balanced less or more and level federal the at presidency the of favor in powers governmental of endowed broad competencehaving Presidentthe with entrenched consequently theimbalance Principles ofConstitutionalism (‘Law in Action’) Russian ConstitutionalDesign, from thePerspectiveof gained 14.67% of the seats against 42.44% attained by opposition against attained gained seats the 42.44% byopposition parties Communist 14.67%of (the State Duma the situationConsent was worse gained for the 23.78%party of power,of seats the Ourin Homethe islower Russia, chamber who of Parliament Official website of the Institute “Public expertise” < Official website of the Institute “Public expertise” < The party of poweris the party of political and administrative establishment, whose main goal is to channel Analysis of the legislation period of 1993-1999 denotes that the President resorted to resorted President that the denotes 1993-1999 legislation of period the Analysis of As I have shown in the previous chapter of my thesis, the Russian Constitution ThePractice oftheImplementation ofthe 125 , the Choice of Russia, with its ally the Party of Russian Unity and 40 http://www.freepress.ru/publish/publish029.shtml http://www.freepress.ru/publish/publish029.shtml 126 . In . In 1995-1999 the 124 >, >, . CEU eTD Collection resorted), is a significant shortcoming of the Russian constitutional legislation constitutional Russian the of shortcoming a significant is resorted), to counterbalance the President. However, again, Yeltsin vetoed legislation, when it when legislation, vetoed Yeltsin again, However, President. the counterbalance to attempts Duma’s the caused which clearly process, in law-making the issue areal become has legislature. from laws, the of coming the objection arbitrary President’s the to led sometimes and transparent less law-making made has distinction clear a such of between a veto distinction because of policy differences” of policy because laws simply arevetoed defy wisdom that that and opacity conventional the unpredictability legislation in process “the elementsveto showed Russia in1994-1998, useof the of toblockwhile hisAs Chandlerhas the attempts noted economic reforms. Andrea discussing the obviousPresidentusing hisvetoes clamped downonany thatthrough Parliament’s of most was it policies, economic of implementing the concerning views in their Parliament Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique < Federation” be cannot it so veto, equal not does overrode by examination the qualifiedwithout majority return of votesThe inlegislature. procedures. (Marat Baglai,of law-making “Constitutional violation Law of the Russian 131 Parliament. 130 129 Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 127 legislation” vetoes of popular to negative publicity possible of the for “because example elections, during moments for President, the inless used not favorable was power veto the Besides, byParliament. billsveto initiated likely to was more President “Yabloko”) Democratic Party andthe Russian Federation Russian Party the of 132 128 (Accessed: 18May 2008). Inthe Russianlegal practice return without examination isqualified as decline of abill on the ground of the Veto is a decline of billa which can be overriden by the qualified majority of votes in two chambers of Ibid:508. Official website of the Institute “Public expertise” < Andrea Chandler, “Presidential Veto PowerPost-Communistin Russia, 1994-1998”, Andrea Chandler, “Presidential Veto PowerPost-Communistin Russia, 1994-1998”, From From Dumawhen its1995, role State the in activated vetopassing thelegislation, In the period of Yeltsin’s presidential term, when he was still the opponent to http://www.in1.com.ua/book/10341/7269/index.html 130 and return without examination without and return 129 . In her view, the absence of the constitutionally fixed constitutionally the of absence the view, her . In 41 Vol.34, no. 3 (September, 2001) : 497. Vol.34, no. 3 (September, 2001) : 502. http://www.freepress.ru/publish/publish029.shtml >, (Accessed: 27May, 2008). 131 (to which Yeltsin frequently 128 . Canadian Journal of Canadian Journal of 132 . The absence 127 . Thus, the Thus, . >, CEU eTD Collection Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 135 (Summer 1997) : 30. 134 Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 133 law the sign veto. Only after the examination of this case by the Constitutional Court, did President Yeltsin presidential the had overrode of Parliament chambers both evenafter procedures”, legislative “Trophy bill,Art” Yeltsin again tosign which declined on groundsof the “violation the the of them in anunconstitutional The exampleprocedure. of wasthefamousthis case of the passed Parliament that laws time, asserting asecond vetoed he sometimes of constitution”, the “defense the of label the under So, Parliament. from coming bills the on power veto his used power executive the topasslawsconcerning init competence was not Parliament’s the argued, veto, which could limitits use, was declined by Yeltsin on “constitutional grounds”, i.e., as he threatened todelimit presidentialthe Specifically,power. in law 1997, a onthe presidential unity, its opportunity reduced which overrideto the presidential vetoes. ideological internal of lack the of problem the faced presidency Yeltsin’s during Parliament 1994-1999 approximately 25-30 percentof all laws were by vetoed President the during Statistics saythat by statistics. isthe proved also adoption the 1993Constitution the of the system of checks and balances in Russia. potential This in importanceof ofinstitute case tellsstabilizing about Court Constitutional the Parliament. of chambers both in constitutionally passed been had that bill any examination Andrea Chandler, “Presidential Veto PowerPost-Communistin Russia, 1994-1998”, “Constitutional Watch”, Andrea Chandler, “Presidential Veto PowerPost-Communistin Russia, 1994-1998”, 133 In cases when it was not legally permitted, Yeltsin, in order to blockin undesired Yeltsin,laws, legally it to In was not order cases permitted, when The degree of BorisYeltsinafter President between the The degreeof confrontation and Parliament . 134 . Since that very moment the President was not allowed to return without return to allowed not was President the moment very that . Since East European Constitutional Review 42 Vol.34, no. 3 (September, 2001) : 493. Vol.34, no. 3 (September, 2001) : 494. , Vol. 6, no. 2 (Spring 1997)/Vol. 2 6, no.3 6, no. , Vol. Canadian Journal of Canadian Journal of 135 . Besides, . CEU eTD Collection 138 137 Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov (Washington: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 2004), 112. 136 in isit of President case different with Parliament relations by hisdeteriorating characterized cooperation. term WhileYeltsin’s was by legislature-President degreeof difference the Yeltsin with case in than lower largely is which laws, of cent per Putin underVladimir 3.1.2 Vetopower branch, and president, in particular faction. As a result, lower incentives houseof non-partisanRussian parliament for created join and a deputies to internal in actors the leaders became the strong andparty parties therules existing members. to Due Duma’s unity controlmade it a powerfulover factions), to party between proportionally were divided chairs Committee Council (since speaking opponent toParty factions privilegesthe in its turn were givenexecutive the right to form the Duma’s agenda through the Duma’s party faction,it, whileindependentdeputies collectingwere abletodo thirty-five members on the floor, form list a more to fivepercentof party popularthe which on ballot, than the vote received and to allocateit parties, for was possible Specifically, in the President. and presented balance legislature the staffprevented the establishment of a strongto party system, yet allowedindividual different parties to be mixed majoritarian-proportional system electoral during presidency, Yeltsin’s though factionlaws greatly its with political period,parties on composition. Incomparison Putin’s and on legislation.itseems Besides, thethat checks balancesand usedby Parliamentdepended Russian of development slow the to greatly contributed consequently and Parliament May, 2008). Official website of the State Duma of the RussianFederation, < Ibid: 112. Michael McFaul, “Political Parties”, in According to the same statistics in 2000-2007 President Vladimir Putin vetoed just vetoed 0.4 Vladimir Putin in President 2000-2007 samestatistics the According to of role legislative the diminished Yeltsin by power veto the of use active the Overall, 137 Between Dictatorship andDemocracy . 43 www.duma.gov.ru/lawstat/ , ed. Michael McFaul, Nikolai 138 . I can explain such a >, (Accessed: 10 (Accessed: >, 136 . CEU eTD Collection opposition movements to consolidate, and they privilege the parties already represented in represented already parties the privilege and they consolidate, to movements opposition for limitfrom below. opportunities They of the parties formation suppressingpractically the new parties, of emergence restrict the regulations Asaresult these movements. opposition the prohibition forming blocksFurthermore, electoral on hasbeena for setback serious proportional insteadrepresentation,has been threshold and etc. of raised (7% 5%), eliminated and all have been only elected deputies from lists party inlinewith thesystem of 139 centper only the got 11.6 whileRussian Federation of opposition Communistthe party the Party only percent a result theUnited 64.3 gained of 2007parliamentary Russia of the seats, elections Motherland) the and Federation Russian the of Party Communist (the forces opposition Federation), Russian the of Party Democratic Liberal its(the ally with Russia) United (the of power while only 19.33 Dumain basis. percent of In theparty particular, belonged 2003-2007State the seats 75.34 to per cent politicalof the Duma’sfield and does formation the the a newmodel of in party system whereone Russia, party dominates of seats not allow were other gotfor all conditions created have authorities see that politicalwe can And today activity. parties’ political by the parties coalition to concerning several political reforms strengthencompete implemented andof to “party the power” withof itself course the took ruling elite term, Russian AtPutin’s beginningon the of vetoes. President’s the the equal body, an independent governmental presidential powerby capablechecking the overruling of branch. legislative the with contend to need not did simply Duma, dominance “party Putin: inthe United of duetothe State the power” he the Russia of 140 (Accessed: 18May 2008). Official website of the Institute “Public expertise” < < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_legislative_election,_2007 According to the 2003 electoral reform law, single-mandate seats in the Duma in were Duma seats the law, single-mandate reform 2003electoral the to According As for Putin’s period, since he came to power, the Federal Assembly has not acted as power, has Assembly As forFederal Putin’s hecame the not since to period, 140 . 44 http://www.freepress.ru/publish/publish029.shtml >, (Accessed: 18May 2008). 139 . As . >, CEU eTD Collection 144 Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov (Washington: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 2004), 67. 142 Publishers, 2006), 256. Politics inCentral andEastern Europe, 143 Studies 141 policies issuinglevels “appointments various decrees at the and on initiating new of government” through politics influence can President Russian the laws, existing implementing at directed medals,“awardingin andpardons”) honorary administration titles androutine executive significant number of the presidential decrees deal with ceremonial issues (which are reflected goals by hisattainingestablishing policies without parliamentary approval.a Though Yeltsin 3.1.3 DecreepowerunderBoris initiatives. Parliament bejust seems an“appendage” to of executivethe branch,supportingits any of Thus, today due to dominationthe of Unitedthe Russiain Duma, State the Russian its in majority secure basically pro-Kremlin the Dumaposition Duma, enabling the to Security Service) troops permitted in permitted situations such Security Service) troops instead of Affairs)Chechnya conflict and MVD FSS (Federal the of (Ministry Internal it of confirmation parliamentary and state of thedeclaration emergency of a decreepresidential without by thesecret in in 1994 Chechnya war the started norm Yeltsin this of advantage having taken particular, overusing the constitutionally given status of “guarantor” of the Russian Constitution. In directly involved into the law-making process and makeshim an uncontrolled legislator. “Constitutional Watch”, Oleh Protsyk, with “Ruling Decrees: Presidential Decree Making in Russiaand Ukraine”, ViktorSheinis, “The Constitution”, in Aitalina Azarova, “Formal Institutions and Informal Politics inRussia”, in , Vol. 56,No. 5, (July 2004) : 638. The right to issue decrees is a strong power, which allows the President to achievehis to President the which allows power, is astrong issue decrees to The right President Yeltsin was sometimes inclined to arbitrarily use thepower, President inclinedtoarbitrarily Yeltsin wassometimes decree use 142 . Together with veto power, decree power gives the President an opportunity to be to opportunity an President the gives power decree power, veto with Together . East European Constitutional Review 143 . Moreover, this decree allowed to use regular army inthe army use regular to allowed this decree . Moreover, ed. GerdMeyer(Opladenand Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Between Dictatorship and Democracy 45 144 , Vol. 4, no. 1 (Winter1995) : 23. . Considering the presidential power to Formal Institutions and Informal , ed. Michael McFaul, Nikolai McFaul, Michael ed. , Europe-Asia 141 . CEU eTD Collection 145 is significant, of number such decrees the that wecanimagine However, employees). state of categories certain for benefits social and suspects, criminal of wiretapping of use the Kaliningrad, city theclosed of status the concerned they example, (for use only” Presidents, since there are also unpublished secret decrees, which are classified as “for official “rule rule by the replaced of law” Parliamentary, decree and between Yeltsin of confrontation period assessing the noted, Kubicek rightly branches, control from underissueeven sideof adequate other the not to presidential decreeswas the power if the judicialit sphere Thus, seems legislature. that the whichbelonged to of on issuedtaxes, decrees some power Augustthe 1998Russian financial crisis, again Yeltsin violatedtheConstitution, having could sometimesThe Courtresolved constitutional in thisissueinspring of favor of ButafterParliament. 1996 influence revisedelections, the fixedelectoral timetable, inthelaw, he which had signed previously it. examplehappenedin issued fall local having Yeltsin, adecree,regulatingof 1995, when the As a Another decree. same the result, issued having Parliament overbalanced President the Nevertheless, as Paul the declarationinitiatives. In Decemberfor example, 1994, Duma the rejectedYeltsin’s proposal regarding of legislative his pass to the refused Duma the if decrees presidential with day Parliament threaten of adoptionpolitical of the Russian goals Constitution were clampedto influence the President in the Chechnyaas case. able a not was stateParliament downMinister, Interior the and Defense the of Minister the holidayappoint bysolely law-makers. It was a Yeltsin’s usual practice to 146 Vol 147 “Constitutional Watch”, “Constitutional Watch”, Paul Kubicek, “Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine,” and Russia in Democracy “Delegative Kubicek, Paul . 27, no. 4 (December1994): 430. Overall, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of decrees signed by the Russian bythe signed decrees of number estimate exact the to is difficult itOverall, implementhis opportunities when Moreover, to usedother Yeltsin decreepower the East European Constitutional Review East European Constitutional Review 46 , Vol. 4, no. 1 (Winter1995) : 28. , Vol.4, , no. 4(Fall 1995) : 28. 147 . Communist andPost-Communist Studies, 146 145 . . CEU eTD Collection 150 Review, butit obvious thathishas involvement been considerable. by indecrees governingthe of differentspheres of policy public hisduring presidential term, Studies 149 Review, in with his accordance plans andhispower system rebuild the aimto to with Putin’s coming decrees, whichwasconnected more than 900 to peaked decrees unpublished numberof in2000 the Particularly, already relied largelyon issuingunpublisheddecreesthethe numberofwhich significantly. rose thePutin in However, contrast, Duma). State the through initiatives his legislative passed have could Putin power, of party by dominated the Parliament, the“pocket” existence of becauseof the (probably, issuedof decrees number having sufficiently the power, decreased 148 power. presidential the andaccountability of transparency concern aboutthe serious issue decrees,which because for grounds be “secret” opportunity to provides the dangerous of can power Finally, decree the power. legislative with the theParliament endowed constitution law-making,makes of theRussianpresidency primary veto source although the 2000 1993 to issuedfrom yearstatistics, Presidents more than decreeseach theRussian 500 unpublished “secret” decrees and3528 published 1,544 decrees, available the considering Oleh Protsyk, with “Ruling Decrees: Presidential Decree Making in Russiaand Ukraine”, Thomas F. Remington, “The Evolutionof Executive-Legislative Relations inRussia since 1993”, Thomas F. Remington, “The Evolutionof Executive-Legislative Relations inRussia since 1993”, , Vol. 56,No. 5, (July 2004) : 641. Vol.59, No. 3,(Autumn 2000) : 508. Vol.59, No. 3,(Autumn 2000) : 509. In comparison with thenewYeltsin’ Putinintroduced period, of pattern using decree Putin underVladimir 3.1.4 Decreepower Thus, the facts confirm that presidential decree power together with the presidential the together with power decree presidential that facts confirm Thus, the 149 . data. In the period from 1994 to October 1996, there were issued were there 1996, October to from 1994 Inthe period data. 150 . Thus, it is difficult to estimate the real impact Putin hasPutin realimpactestimate the made it . Thus,to is difficult 47 148 . According to Thomas F. Remington’s Europe-Asia Slavic Slavic CEU eTD Collection through through Additionally, yearthe 1998-1999. has theopportunity President refuse the to “to times three them changed having Ministers, Prime the appoint to power his justification, proper use broadly, hamper often itwithout not and Council. Yeltsin to did However, somebe arerequired high appointments legislative approvedby power, to Federation the formopportunity to and thebranch. executive dissolve tobe In order by balanced the BorisYeltsin under 3.1.6 Cabinetformation/dissolution attemptsPutin’s toimpeach term explains zero him. Review, 152 151 deputies by whocouldbenewproposing MPs)tothe Sergei accepted most Prime Minister Stepashin, shadow bargaining, promising benefits material and political concessionsinstance, (for and the attempt to impeachChechnya was subject itconsidered, however,gain did not requiredmajority the in theDuma, Yeltsin failed. Russianimplementing economic people by since reforms disastrous In1992 order to attain thisillegal inwar in Chechnya 1994, destruction Russianof the military, and of genocide the result, Yeltsin resorteddissolution of in SovietUnion illegalthe coupagainstin Supreme 1991, the Soviet 1993, to 1998 animpeachmentof on case initiated grounds the illegal was fivethe circumstances: andinitiatedDuma.in in supported State was the once autumn Specifically, such procedure lower chamber of the Parliament raised the question of the President’s impeachment, but only 3.1.5 Impeachment Thomas F. Remington, “The Evolutionof Executive-Legislative Relations inRussia since 1993”, “Constitutional Watch”, Vol.59, No. 3,(Autumn 2000) : 515. The power to appoint dismissThe highpower to or the governmental thePresidentofficials gives It seems that the fact that Parliament has been dominated by the party powerof during There were several occasions in post-Soviet period of Russia when the deputies inthe deputies of when the period Russia inpost-Soviet occasions There wereseveral 152 . East European Constitutional Review 48 , Vol.8, , no. 3(Summer 1999) :29. 151 . Onlythe Slavic CEU eTD Collection 154 156 dismisses the Central Bank Chairman. 155 157 153 mismanagement” of“financial grounds the Council, on Federation the were members of who representatives presidential power the balance could legislative situationswhen of rare the the Yeltsin’s nominees for the Court’ judges, the case was not initiated. As a result,it became one rejected had recently Council Federation the factthat Only tothe due Court. Constitutional by could beresolved decline,debate the the Duma’s repeated again, the candidate after ground of not acceptingthen offered another candidatefor the this post. In its turn, the Duma declinedremoval this nominee on the of the former Duma’s Gerashchenkoby havingavoided State approval Bank Viktor the decree, the Chairman. Yeltsingovernment tried to advance itsCabinet, showing Chernomyrdin that Chairman wasjustViktor asymbolicthisin figure the in the dismissals and replacements of a series implemented unilaterally practically crisis, inIlyushenko 1994, toappointan “acting” official without been approved by Parliament come up with the nominees”, and, as it was in case with the Attorney General Alexei him fear foronly ofleaving the Presidentalone,ruling with decrees andhis changing the inMinister spring 1997.Having rejected twice Kirienko’snomination, Duma the for voted approveyoungof inexperienced SergeiKirienkoasPrime its theappointment refusal to status of the Federation Council members, and they did not resign. “Constitutional Watch”, “Constitutional Watch”, According to Article 103 of theConstitution, Duma withthe presidential recommendationappoints and “Constitutional Watch”, Alexey Alyushin, “Russia”, In winter 1995-1996 Yeltsin even tried to dismiss In some and to winter 1995-1996Yeltsingovernors even presidential tried In late 1994-beginning 1995Yeltsin,following the Chechnya warand economic Again, Yeltsin resorted to non-legal means, threatening dismissto the Duma in case of 154 . In October 1994 Yeltsin accepted the resignation of Chairman of the Central the of Chairman of resignation the accepted Yeltsin 1994 October In . 157 . The President was notentitled doto so in accordance with the law on the East European Constitutional Review East European Constitutional Review East European Constitutional Review East European Constitutional Review 49 , Vol.4, , no. 1(Winter, 1995) :23. , Vol.4, , no. 1(Winter, 1995) :23. , Vol. 5, no. 1 (Winter1996) : 21. , Vol. 4, no. 2, (Spring 1995) : 66. 156 . 155 153 , and , . CEU eTD Collection Review, 159 158 faces sameconstraint the branch also legislative constitutionin the entrenched few checks the which of one be can norm This provision. preventconstitutional the President referendum andhold her block his either own areferendum or a positive authority on or from bypassing Parliament. At the same time, the MPs from the next term in the Parliament electoral (eliminationproportional-representation the of current system),rules preventing 3.1.8 Abilitytoproposereferenda Ministerof 2007-2008actingthe Government. been asafirstVice-Prime Medvedevhad appointed elected inMarch of 2008 Dmitry Chairman Councilof the Ministers. Further, inSeptemberof Russian2007 future President Primein Minister 2004-2007Governmentthe Mikhail Fradkov was as appointed an acting anddetermine to politicians who could be figureskey in future. Specifically, in 2004 future campaigns animate electoral to by hiscan be desire explained that Councilof the Ministers), evethe inpresidential (in of election 2004and 2007 resignation the accepted 2007 Putin of on twice: only Government the dissolve to power his used Putin President. the by dismissals Putin under 3.1.7 Cabinetformation/dissolution legislative law. by checksprovided and executive this President the government, freely abusedit, ignoring often law the constitutional and Thomas F. Remington, “The Evolutionof Executive-Legislative Relations inRussia since 1993”, “Constitutional Watch”, Vol.59, No. 3,(Autumn 2000) : 507. I consider thelegal inability Russianthe of submit to President issue a national an to Putin’s Government has been quite stable and has not been undergone by frequentbeenhas not been Putin’s Government undergone has stablequite and form it Thus,havingthe been endowedwith seemsand powerto the dismiss that East European Constitutional Review 158 . 50 159 . , Vol.7, , no. 7(Spring 1998) :27. Slavic CEU eTD Collection 160 it for required votes of majority collectfaced non-confidence, didthe not was government butdeputies threatof with the attempts were resolved infavor of executive.the 1994Chernomyrdin’s InOctober these of most However, government. the to non-confidence express to attempts several underYeltsin dissolution 3.1.9 Voteofnon-confidence/Duma Perspectives 161 Duma the dissolve to intention Prime Ministers in March 1998 and September 1998respectively facedalso President’s the initial toconfirm rejections Kirienko’s Viktor Chernomyrdin’sSergei and as appointments Duma’s The reforms. economic Government’s the pass to failed if it Parliament of chamber and achievehis Particularly, ends. in 1997,he hinted thathe would dissolvethelower legislature the impact to in and meansorder blackmail threats of to the resorted Yeltsin often confidence. failed the onamotionvote 1995 Duma requestthat government’s as of aswell counter the required majority majority required deputies. among State the Duma during Yeltsin’s presidency has neverin succeeded itsget efforts to the reason, for this believe, exactly I government. the andnot dissolve Parliament, to readiness President’s the faced always it voting, non-confidence of mechanism by the crisis the resolve to tried Parliament while that evident also is it However, constant. not if frequent, quite was powers legislative executive and the between confrontation political that shows Government “Constitutional Watch”, Padma Desai, “RussianRetrospectives onReforms from Yeltsin to Putin”, In its post-1993 history in moments of political crisis the Russian Parliament made Parliament Russian the crisis political of inmoments history post-1993 its In Presuming that the President eventually has the power to dismiss the State Duma, State the dismiss to power hasthe eventually President the that Presuming Thus, the periodicity of the Duma’s attempts to express Thus, non-confidence periodicity tothe the Duma’sattempts the of , Vol. 19,No.1, (Winter 2005):102. East European Constitutional Review 161 . 160 . Another attempt to state non-confidence in summer of 51 , Vol. 4, no. 1 (Winter1995) : 23. The Journal of Economic CEU eTD Collection Putin theacting President. became Putin Prime Minister. It is as VladimirPutin andappointed his successor determined Yeltsin after case exactly over, was known that in the few It isimportantmonths note to thisthat issuehadbeen not solved forseveral years,previous the but after these eventsPresident,dismiss Duma thoughlacking power to State the the andamendtheconstitution Yeltsin resigned acting an becomes Minister Prime decision,the Court’s the to this case, according In govern. and incapacity to temporary of president’s inthe case authority presidential of the execution itfailed but again was undertaken, Government 162 region injudge declined invasion concerningof the presidential the federal to the decrees troops 1995 Chechnyain case, which Yeltsin’s influence wassound, Constitutional the Court in the instance, For justices. “presidential” and “parliamentary” of number the on conditional were often made bytheCourt show, the decisions in chapter this facts Astraced system. the governmental Russian in the power of branches other the from independent and be strong to seemed hasnot sometimes Court the this for However, reason, other. canbalance each powers Yeltsin under adjudication 3.1.11 Constitutional Duma inthe parties supported by not other whichwasthe non-confidencein thevote of initiated the Government, made by party. opposition the March 2001 In Communistthe Party Federation Russian the of underYeltsinPutin dissolution 3.1.10 Voteofnon-confidence/Duma 163 164 165 “Constitutional Watch”, “Constitutional Watch, “Constitutional Watch”, “Constitutional Watch”, 164 Through the peculiarities of the Constitutional Court formation legislative and judicial and legislative formation Court Constitutional the of peculiarities the Through were Government in non-confidence for vote to attempts two term Putin’s During . In . In summer finally Constitutional resolved 1999the Court the the debateabout 162 East European Constitutional Review East European Constitutional Review East European Constitutional Review East European Constitutional Review . In June 2003 an attempt to express anon-confidence to . In June2003anattempt tothe 52 163 . , Vol. 12, no. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2003) : 45. : 2003) (Spring/Summer 2/3 no. 12, Vol. , , Vol.10, , no. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001) : 40. , Vol. 6, no. 1 (Winter1997) : 26. , Vol.8, , no. 4(Fall 1999) : 42. 165 . CEU eTD Collection 166 dissolved be can they requirements, the fulfil to refusal their of case In law. by fixed executives legal in bringshould their acts with in federal accordance the a constitution time and legislatures regional moment that since it, to According 2001. in summer implemented establishment mechanisms of impose allowing to the Constitutional decisionsCourt was Putin under adjudication 3.1.12 Constitutional itsimpose authority legallyto clamp down on violations.the to unable was it constitution, federal the with accordance in not them found and constitutions review constitutional just avoidedthe they regions, ingrievances from toprevent other in order kept of Because some secrete were them made andsubjects’ issue bythecentral government bilateral administrations. of treaties, time some imposed limits on use the of presidential veto. first the for probably Court Constitutional the when case, art” “Trophy the recall yet should I President. Russian the became Putin after formation Council Federation the regarding formation just for a while.Nevertheless, In the next sectionlegislative and governors heads elected of popularly havethe should consisted of this chapter I Council its the interpretation, of to formation. According Federation Council the procedure willthis talk about casethe changes havingConstitutional interpreted Court, normsthe Constitution,of the determined the helped of Constitution,the rather than solvingto political conflicts.in Thus, fall 1995 the to solve the debate about Parliament’s upper chamber 167 168 Review “Constitutional Watch”, “Constitutional Watch”, Alexey Trochev, Implementing Russian Constitutional CourtDecisions, , Vol. 11, , Vol. no. 1/2 (Winter/Spring 2002) : 97. A revision of Federal the LawConstitutional onConstitutional Courtconcerning the In Yeltsin’ the couldConstitutional period, playCourt not importantits role inthe During Yeltsin’srole presidency, often interpretation Court’s the restricted wasto the East European Constitutional Review East European Constitutional Review 167 . Even when the Court examined the republic’s the examined Court the when Even . 53 , Vol.4, , no. 4(Fall 1995) : 28. , Vol. 5, no. 1 (Winter1996) : 25. East European Constitutional 168 . This . 166 . CEU eTD Collection (Article 79). 169 return, In consent. Parliament’s without Government the appoint to and dismiss to refuse a result, thePresidentsigned several billsinitially whichhe was inclined putveto to on, or As representatives. committee and faction parliamentary and President’s between the “pacts” branchescooperatetwo todiscussingthrough andcompacting meetings paraconstitutional made of that 1993, similarto breakdown avoid desire constitutional the the to conflict, serious balance could of a lead Sometimes, powers absenceof the the adequate when and to threats. some President, of informal use the resolvedthem of through mechanisms of bargaining were were solvedpowers by mechanisms of checks andmore balances, in often favor of the legislative and executive the between conflicts many While government. the over control the tense for bythestruggle and been haveand often characterized Parliament Russia’s President power. executive seem it not beindependentlegislativeis does now; to by and the weak isdominated the Constitution Only havenot worked. judicial couldhavethe power balance but presidency,the imbalance infavor of powers presidency.the of Most checksprovidedthe bythe incan adopted founded system, constitutional the 1993, I arrangements that conclude the directly notand do require any confirmation by bodies state other immediately decisions Court’s arefinal, appealable not effect the Constitutional Court, andtake after their Law on the 79of Article the to According in Russia. judiciary constitutional role of announcement. power infavorreform rebalancing state of allowed enhancedthe federalgovernmentand the Besides, decisions of the Constitutional Court act TheFederal ConstitutionalLaw “On Government the of theRussianFederation”, 18.12.1997 # 2-FCL The show Ihaveduringevents that traced Yeltsin’s presidency between relations Conclusion havingIn short, thechecks above examined in and balances theRussian governmental 54 169 . CEU eTD Collection 171 Review, 170 whichpresidential in according to decrees 1994-1998, republicsgained specificthe privileges President impeach the or inthe Government express non-confidence to the not agreed Parliament during Yeltsin’s period visits” and negotiations between thepresidential side and regionalcommonly governors, used a“policy of included federalism” “contractual of notion The federalism”. “constitutional replacing thereby each contradicted other, and regional – which systems –federal legislation led existence the two of 1990s, the to beginningthe of federalism” at “contractual within legal Federation, adopted Russian other of the territory politics Yeltsin’s of acts underYeltsin 3.2.1 Center-peripheralrelations on politicalthe behavior by chosen central the authority. that Iwill inshow political thischapter this depending balancehaschanged practices discuss However, of federal units. the and power the power thecentral between balance the extent powers of division vertical inthe balances and 3.2 Checks such through checks asimpeachmentandvote of non-confidence. President the balance to disable branch legislative the made and formation, government and process legislative the over control an additional hasexercised executive the 2007, Ibid. Thomas F. Remington, “The Evolutionof Executive-Legislative Relations inRussia since 1993”, Vol.59, No. 3,(Autumn 2000) : 505. Although the Russian Constitution has proclaimed its superior legal force over the over force legal superior its proclaimed has Constitution Russian the Although some has provided to theConstitution previous chapter, As Ihaveconcludedin the Since Putin’s United Russia gained Duma majority in State the in 2003 and again in 170 . 171 . These negotiationsin resulted signingbilateral treaties and special 55 Slavic CEU eTD Collection export economic assets export access material Russian to the companiesgot raw beprivate privatized), to industries soon oligarchic groupsfinanced Yeltsin’s election incampaign exchange for sharesinstate-owned politicalloans-for-shares elites.of deals 1996-1998,asaconsequence During the (when onregional military officials of local because material dependence the of structures military violations. enough todefend strong federal the against constitution becoming more independent from federal control. Finally, the implementation of foreign of implementation the Finally, control. federal from independent more becoming were also governors local networks, information and communication provincial center) (from the “independent” the created Having has been diminished. greatly within periphery the constitution the contradicted 2000 approximately legislativedeviated from acts regional 70% of federallaws,and34% the center was unable to impose weak the and constitutions; federal the with conflicted which constitutions, their created its directives. According to the General Procurator’s report, in < 173 Reform: AStudy Regions,”of Four Europe-Asia Studies,Vol. 55,No. 4(June, 2003) : 508. 172 andaweakcenter regions strong with power center-periphery of imbalance create the to and federal relations state practically they further,by taken regions the allowed to constitution, and, re- unilaterally the 1998, 42individual hadtreaties been signed with 46 subjects of federationthe By infor by autonomy mid- support expressed Yeltsin’s in governors. exchangethe greater 36, No. 3 (May, 1999): 261. 175 Asia Studies 174 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200404/ai_n9376563/ JamesAlexander,"Federal Reforms Russia:in Putin’s Challenge to the Republics". LynnD. Nelsonand Iryna Y.Kuzes, “Political and Economic Coordination inRussia’s Federal District Graeme P. Herd, “Russia: Systemic Transformation or Federal Collapse?” Federal or Transformation Systemic “Russia: Herd, P. Graeme Matthew Hyde, “Putin’s Federal Reforms and Their Implications forPresidential Powerin Russia,” The decrease of federal power was also expressed in the regionalization of federal in federal of wasalsoexpressed regionalization the The decreaseof power These treaties basically returned to the republics some of whichhad been some powers the of republics tothe basically returned These treaties Vol. 53,No.5 (July,2001) : 731. 175 . As a result, federal economic control of the profitable sectors 173 . The strong regions just ignored the central legislation, having legislation, central the ignored just regions strong . The 174 . Neither the Procurator nor the Constitutional Court was Court Constitutional the nor Procurator the Neither . 56 > (Accessed: 04April, 2008). Journal of Peace Research 172 . Europe- Vol. CEU eTD Collection existing military districts administrative division into seven federal districts headed by headed districts federal seven into division administrative districts military existing the raising the federal share of regional tax revenues up to the common level after federal the authorities on dependent became of taxes, percentage regions, less successful Besides, all wealthy the whichregions, topay used a disproportional,in comparisonwith the in legal be had level. and federal with brought to acts constitutions other accordance the enjoyed bysome regions. The system bilateral of treaties was abolished andregional presidential countrywide, reduce implemented andpolicies privileges the consequently, to make to in order power of chain vertical the strengthen to were reforms President’s new the of aims main The power. restoring to directed been have government central underPutin relations 3.2.2 Center-periphery Sakha, and oblast) Sverdlovsk Republicof of Bashkortostan, Republic Tatarstan, Republicof theperiphery (e.g. throughout tendencies ledsecessionist to also but periphery, and thecenter between balance of power Asia Studies 178 177 36, No. 3 (May, 1999): 263. 176 law) international the Sverdlovsk Region; Sverdlovskthe Regional law status about the of regionthe asubjectas of the for Relations Economic Foreign and International of Minister the of appointment the and Ukraine; and Tatarstan between agreement the example, (for countries foreign with the periphery. The regions initiatives by economic hasfurther strengthened policy some autonomy within federal units were already international actors, being able to sign agreements Matthew Hyde, “Putin’s Federal Reforms and Their Implications forPresidential Powerin Russia,” Ibid. Collapse?” Federal or Transformation Systemic “Russia: Herd, P. Graeme In May 2000 a federal territorial reform was initiated, established on the base of establishedthe on initiated, was federal territorial reform In May 2000 a Since the beginning of power, of all beginning Since Putin after the to of 2000,directly efforts the came Vol. 53,No.5 (July,2001) : 719. 176 . All these circumstances, asa result,not only broke the constitutional 177 . 57 Journal of Peace Research 178 . Europe- Vol. CEU eTD Collection Publishers, 2006), 267. Politics inCentral andEastern Europe, 179 appointed directly by whoare (envoys), Presidential Representatives President the through the personal meetings. The President of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, and the oblast andthe Shaimiev, Mintimer of Tatarstan, meetings. President The personal the through before Presidentthe 2005 expressed got loyalty holdingsupport to their theirand posts for seeking were who governors cases other In oblast). Ivanovo to (appointed Men Michail and Kaliningrad (appointed to oblast), GeorgyBoos Nizhniioblast), to (appointed Novgorod Shantsev Valery team Mayor Moscow the of members former three example, (for regions those to ties any have not did who governors regional new of a third about appointed Putin in 2005 illustration, an As vertical. power “obedient” build to and periphery the over control Putin continued informal using negotiations with regional elite strengthen in to order his by cuttinginweaken it. informal the elitehand, within order to Onthe other regional ties characterized was course regional Putin’s hand, one the On is obvious. President) the of face the (in power federal the of favor in imbalance power the dismissed, being of threat the upon by legislatures regional rejected the whoareonly approved or regional governors, nominate Considering Council. Federation in the thebasis full-time and fact aprofessional on serving for representative that the reformtheir sent have each legislatures and has executives regional the time that endowedSince Council. the President with and which implied removing governors from local the Parliaments’ Federation speakers the the exclusive right to him removingallowed them from control the of local leaders. and subordination Presidentlevel to accountability to the new and their supra-regional direct the at Representatives Presidential the of location The laws. federal the with actions subjects’ federal of the accordance the overseeing havecomprised envoys federal districts’ duties of the Aitalina Azarova, “Formal Institutions and Informal Politics inRussia”, in Putin Putin initiated the also reform theformation regarding Council,of Federation the ed. GerdMeyer(Opladenand Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich 58 Formal Institutions and Informal 179 . The . CEU eTD Collection 181 Uncertain, 180 by federal andregional be initiated the can leading governor’s dismissal the to procedure a crime of governors the suspecting or them by rights civil or legislation federal the of violation repeated of case in assemblies legislative regional and governors elected dismiss twice, to candidate nominated the rejecting after assemblies the regional dissolve to right the has President the Now speakers. and governors local remove to power the with President viaPresidentin impeachment Assembly, theupperchamber having of Federal the entitled the President. the and other each balance and position independent their express effectively cannot be of houses loyalseem Parliament and course two second. Today tothe presidential to forces in the Statebills Duma in the firstappointments was implemented)2007 Federationthe to Council has declined only 193 period and dominationDuma,infrom while period Putin’sthe 2000 (when reform regarding the governor’s of the party term (from 1999) 1996 to Federationthe Council has declined 401billsfrom coming State the of power in presidential Yeltsin’s instance,in the second by statistics. For be proved can President that the United Russia members example, For of inpower. Council thereare112 168delegates actingFederation among the andnumber of high other regional governors inRussiabecame membersof officials party the in of werereappointed such informal procedure resultthe Stroev leader Yegor 182 183 May, 2008). Official website of the United Russia < Nikolai Petrov and Darrel Slider, “Putin and the Regions”, in Official website of the State Duma of the RussianFederation, < “Constitutional Watch”, 182 . The difference in the numbers can be explained by the existence of by be. The strong opposition in numberscan of explained existence the difference the At the same time, the 2000 reform balanced the regional leader’s power toremove the power leader’s same balanced 2000reform regional the At the the time, the to compliant body a become to seems Parliament of house upper the result a As ed. Dale R. Herspring (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 89. East European Constitutional Review 181 . http://www.er.ru/news.html?rid=3076 59 , Vol.9, , no. 3(Summer 2000) :35. www.duma.gov.ru/lawstat/ Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect,Future >, (Accessed: 30May, 2008). 180 >, (Accessed: 10 (Accessed: >, . Moreover, a 183 . The . CEU eTD Collection 184 on. fully judiciary werewas dependent inonebody,which conjoined powers and legislative moreconstitutional system andmorereminds when Sovietpolitical executive organization, mechanisms notprovide effective the it does democratic, since is not system Russianconstitutional the that of powers’ checks anddismissed will make the regional authorities loyal to any of the President’s courses.balancesbe fearto the exactly level, federal atthe relationships legislature-executive case with overseem beto completely powerless and dependent on the President. Inmy opinion, asit was the each governorsother. and dissolution may President control regions the procedures through the of appointments and firing its Thus, of its legislatures,per ledwhich then power to aggregationthe in favorof While federal Russian the the presidency. se the Russianregionsimbalanceexisting in in way center-periphery federal the powers increasing of the power, in face of the Federation Council initiated by the Chairman of the Federation Council,it has been never implemented. way the havemustAs of thegovernors they appointed them.recalling theprocedure befirst in before) hadthey done often (and that senators to recall their by their right were deprived bodies regional time same At the acts. government’s federal the for legal basis became the contributed to some extent tothe elevation of the Constitutional Court’s role, whose decisions andIngushetia Bashkortostan, of Tatarstan, governments President’sissuing the for warningsGeneral tothe the approval requested Vladimir Ustinov control over the governors. In following April 2001, newlegal Procurator opportunities, office, procurator’s increases by orthe theParliaments, federal state which the government, “Constitutional Watch”, To sum To have in thatlegal shown up, I this chapter hypothesis the confirm practices Conclusion Overall,it reforms, thatthe seems implemented during Putin’s fixedpresidency, the East European Constitutional Review 60 , Vol.10, , no. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001) : 40. 184 . Thus, the reform’ novelties reform’ the Thus, . CEU eTD Collection constitutional state and are dangerous in their inability to prevent usurpation. prevent to inability intheir dangerous are and state constitutional system Federation and the of existence of the checks andbalancesprovided threaten the Soviet Union. Thus, Ishouldemphasize current distribution thatthe in powers of Russian authorities greatly unitary diminished,reminding, defactothe again, republic the within federal the on influence their been and reduced have elite of regional powers the the a result, As reforms. Putin’s the implementation of level the due to federal at the concentration power the to bargainingYeltsin’s politics) due to was possible (that local from authorities yearsthe twenty last the during moved has center power the that show above traced legal practices formation. of Court’s the of because conditions the autonomous be seem to not italso does enforcement, constitution’ the incontrolling powers important presidency at all. recentlythough Constitutional the Even has been moreCourt granted seems have the federal independenceto President’s legislature from appointees, nothe the State Duma is composed of the party of power and the in Federationmajority the Councilwhen consists today, of the Especially checks. legal the overpass just or accountability the of for cabinet couldformation,negotiate washinghands since or initiatives, their the Presidents legislative its vetoing impeachment, through presidency the control to able been not has Parliament shows, sametime, aspractice the At Assembly. of Federal the power law-making the and diminishing andpowers, decree veto through their legislators as practically acting power, unlimited have practically enjoyed Presidents level the at federal the We seethat can As for the distribution of power between the center government and the regions, the 61 CEU eTD Collection control Parliamentarbiter, not allowing throughpresidential power isthe given the dominant place among others, wherebyother it performs as a central branchesthe mechanismsofsystem power tothe controlcreated and power of branches other the of over priority power it.presidential the checks granted ofThe Russianveto Presidentfavorablepower may and his for right the Presidentto process of constitution-makingcreate a and allowed to superpresidential republic. dissolve authoritarianasthe a “guarantor strong forthe massdemand like regime old from the legacies Besides, Constitution. rulerof thebodies were crucialin the designing new system political and wereembodied inanew andConstitution”. Yeltsin’sYeltsin’s personal desire tomake thepresidencyfrom independent government other the policy Thesuch of deadlockspatronage governmentalfuture and ledstructure toan open Theintentionconflict. in prevent futureto betweenplayedof the theirstrongthe struggle personal The particular. in headsbalances two and checks of system and significant system of constitutional branchesthese branches for of Russian the establishment total greatly impacted on the the1990s of atthe beginning of powers role powerpower wasin expressed bythe strengthening in their preferences in not a constitutional democracyone from the perspective of the doctrine of checks and balances. of themanswer inhave research the in Introduction I question the raised following the way:Russia is and influenced by a range of formal and informal factors. As a result of my investigation I can has not finished and 1990s the of beginning the at started development Its with phenomenon. complex isa system the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation being still The analysis of the “law in books” I made proves my hypothesis that the Constitution the that hypothesis my proves I made books” in “law the of analysis The executive and legislative the between confrontation violent the shown, have I As thethat Russianconstitutional have demonstrates inmythesis The done I analysis Conclusion 62 CEU eTD Collection the balance between federal and regional governmental powers. The federation subjects may The federation federal balancethe subjects between and regional powers. governmental Russian the governmental havesystem conjoined. in legislative powers and it executive that seems formation. Hence, inthe Court’s participate Parliament and President because be autonomous seem to not itdoes powers, control more granted recently been has Court Constitutional the though Moreover, confidence. non- of vote and impeachment as checks such through President the balance to unable branch legislative the made has and process, legislative the over control additional an exercises isconcludeit executive to the of consists appropriate presidential that the appointees, that the lower house ofallowedimplement him his to policiesany without genuine opposition. Today due tothe fact Parliament is occupied by that dominated existenceloyal of power party the Putin enjoyed the Parliament of a by the party of power informalthe means of legislativebranch.resolving contradictions with President the Vladimir and the upper house to and Parliamentresorted powersinorder to overpass veto Boris decreeand Yeltsinoverused impossiblecontrol. almosthave President to Presidents Russian been also proves the that foundation forthe building ademocratic state. not and,consequently, was of powers imbalance governmental the Constitution established checkopportunity thepresidency,to is Thus, theConstitutional 1993Russian Court. the the has who body, state only the books” in “law the to According appointments. governmental andcannot effectivelyauthority oversight the block any President’s initiative like decrees and executive power, form and dismiss the Government. At the same time, Russian Parliamentlacks dissolve Parliament. andthreats to his decreepower through andchecks bypassthe parliamentary legislature, The President of the Russian Federation may also annul the acts of the As for the vertical division of powers, the constitutional arrangements have entrenched have arrangements constitutional the powers, of division vertical the for As of powers separation horizontal the to in regards in action” “law the of The analysis 63 CEU eTD Collection with the principles of constitutionalism. of principles the with notcomply in andand do usurpation body power a single of concentration forthe favorable distribution of powers current the Hence, presidency. overthe control in adequate the and powers of separation the Russian Federation does not provide balances theeffectivemechanisms checks and vertical inhorizontal of and and the system of checks and balances are balances. and checks of tools powerful no have they since President, the on dependent and regions the areweak andlegislatures, anddissolution its governors of its appointments firing may procedures of the regionsthe through Russian exercisecontrol over President way the inincreasing and, Whilethe federal particular, the of presidential of power power. brought by Putin, demonstrates that the balance of the center-periphery powers has changedin the disability of and ofregions independence factual the ledtothe thatYeltsin’s policies shows legal the practices center to controlgovernment, which is supposed to preventthem. the overlapping of their authorities. The analysis of central On and regions the between the competence exclusive of contrary,a distribution is there Parliament; the tracing influence the central power participationthrough in law-makingof in process Russian recent reforms Thus, I can affirm, that the Russian constitutional system is not democratic, since it since democratic, not is system constitutional Russian the that affirm, can I Thus, 64 CEU eTD Collection Blankenagel, Alexander. “Where Has All the Powers Gone?” “WhereAll Has Powers the Alexander. Blankenagel, Russian Federation.” of the Law “Constitutional Baglai, Marat. In in Russia.” Politics Informal and Institutions “Formal Aitalina. Azarova, B. Robert Andieh, of Russian 18.12.1997 the Government The Federal the Federation”, Law “On Constitutional Constitution of RussianFederation,the 1993. 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