Carter's Presidential Directive-59, Habermas, and the Legitimation Of
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Democracy the Destroyer of Worlds: Carter’s Presidential Directive-59, Habermas, and the Legitimation of Nuclear Secrecy Marc Howard Rich B.A. Christopher Newport University, 2008 M.A. University of Colorado Boulder, 2010 A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado Boulder in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Communication Fall 2015 University of Colorado, Boulder This dissertation entitled: Democracy the Destroyer of Worlds: Carter’s Presidential Directive-59, Habermas, and the Legitimation of Nuclear Secrecy written by Marc Howard Rich has been approved for the Department of Communication ________________________________________ Robert T. Craig, Advisor Communication: Communication theory and discourse analysis ________________________________________ Peter D. Simonson Communication: Rhetoric ________________________________________ Leah Sprain Communication: Deliberation and democracy ________________________________________ Bryan C. Taylor Communication: Security studies and organizational communication ________________________________________ Benjamin S. Hale Philosophy: Ethics and environmental studies Date: Aug. 11, 2015 The final copy of this dissertation has been examined by the signatories, we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standard of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline. iii Rich, Marc H. (Ph.D., Communication) Democracy the Destroyer of Worlds: Carter’s Presidential Directive-59, Habermas, and the Legitimation of Nuclear Secrecy. Thesis directed by Professor Robert T. Craig with the significant assistance of Professor John P. Jackson. Abstract: On July 25, 1980 President Jimmy Carter signed Presidential Directive 59 (hereafter PD- 59). PD-59 was an attempt to operationalize the concept of limited nuclear options into United States nuclear weapons policy. This nuclear policy was unique in that the story of its existence was broken by the press and the Carter Administration lost control of the representations of PD- 59. In this study I analyze the events leading up to the creation of PD-59 and its subsequent debate in newspapers as well as secret policy meetings using Habermas’s theory of deliberative politics from a critical rhetorical perspective. This analysis unpacks the complex legitimizing process that functions to legitimize policy that is created outside of the public eye. iv Contents: Chapter 1, Introduction 1 Chapter summary 4 Chapter 2, Habermasian framework 9 Habermas’s corpus 10 Lifeworld and communicative action 16 Systems world 19 Argument and communicative competence 19 Truth and science 21 Discourse ethics 24 Deliberative politics 30 Public sphere and the political sphere 32 Debates on Habermas and rhetoric 37 Habermasian methodological framework 57 Chapter 3, Nuclear weapons and the rhetoric of nuclear policy 66 Literature 66 Deterrence 70 Nuclear weapons and communication 72 Chapter 4, The construction of PD-59 77 Rhetorical perspective of deterrence 77 Discourse of deterrence prior to PD-59 80 President Carter’s countervailing strategy 82 Documents in the construction of PD-59 83 v PD-18 88 Nuclear targeting policy review 94 SCC meeting 96 PD-59 97 Public discussion 103 Political discussion 111 Senate Hearing 119 Chapter 5, discursive politics 125 Initial policy discussions on deterrence 128 Deterrence in the documents 130 Normative claims 134 Public leak 143 Breaking the story 144 …”if deterrence fails”… 148 Procedural legitimacy 153 Post-leak political discussion 163 Senate hearing 167 Conclusion 180 Chapter 6, conclusion 181 Deterrence as discourse 181 Morality and ethics of nuclear deterrence 184 Democracy and PD-59 188 Theoretical implications 193 vi Major limitations 198 Author’s observations 200 PD-59 and the context of nuclear deterrence policy 203 Future studies 205 Bibliography 208 Appendix 1: Newspaper articles cited 223 Beecher, W. (1980, July 27) 223 Getler, M. (1980, Aug. 6) 227 Burt, R. (1980, Aug. 6) 230 Burt, R. (1980, Aug. 7) 235 Austin, A. (1980, Aug. 7) 238 Gwertzman, B. (1980, Aug. 9) 241 Burt, R. (1980, Aug. 11) 245 Gwertzman, B. (1980, Aug. 12) 249 Burt, R. (1980, Aug. 12) 252 Doder, D. (1980, Aug. 12) 256 Oberdorfer, D. (1980, Aug. 12) 259 Burt, R. (1980, Aug, 13) 262 Appendix 2: Beecher, W. (personal communication, 2015) 266 Marc Howard Rich to William Beecher, March 3, 2015 3:41pm. MST 266 William Beecher reply to Marc Howard Rich, March 4, 2015 10:43 am. MST 268 Marc Howard Rich reply to William Beecher, March 4, 2015 3:23 pm. MST 270 William Beecher reply to Marc Howard Rich, March 4, 2015 6:04 pm. MST 271 vii Marc Howard Rich reply to William Beecher March 4, 2015 6:23 pm. MST 272 William Beecher reply to Marc Howard Rich March 5, 2015 2:57 am. MST 272 Chapter 1, Introduction 1 What is not generally appreciated is that these arcane documents have a power of their own to drive budgets, to create both the appetite and the justification for new weapon systems and on occasion to provide the martial drum to lead a nation. As arcane and antiseptic as these documents may seem to be, these studies and papers can be enormously important. ~Hon. Frank Church (Senate, 1980, p. 1) Chapter 1, Introduction On July 25, 1980 President Jimmy Carter signed Presidential Directive 59 (hereafter PD- 59) “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy” that was a secret policy document intended to give the United States more flexibility in the deployment of nuclear weapons. PD-59 set up the conditions where limited nuclear options could be developed alongside the already established Single Integrated Operational Plan (hereafter SIOP). The doctrine of limited nuclear options that was contained within PD-59 became “one of the most controversial nuclear policy directives of the Cold War” after a journalist named William Beecher broke the story and then portions of the document were leaked to the public by the Carter administration (Burr, 2012). In my study I explore the rhetorical situation that produced PD-59 and the subsequent controversy over the legitimation of the policy. This exploration addresses the broad question of how does government secrecy legitimately operate within a pluralistic democratic society with a focus on the question of how does the public make sense of and legitimate nuclear policy? This study will focus on how the actual practice of government secrecy can inform normative conceptions of democracy. This question is specifically applied to a Habermasian framework that is typically skeptical of anything that will allow government operations outside of the public eye. PD-59 came from and extended a debate over the nature of nuclear deterrence policy. There are several different ways to approach the idea of deterrence; as a military strategy, Chapter 1, Introduction 2 international relations issue, or even a rational claim, however I approach deterrence from a rhetorical perspective grounded in a Habermasian view of language. Using this perspective, nuclear deterrence policy becomes a series of discourses that shape military strategy and international relations by invoking a variety of debates regarding nuclear issues. For this study deterrence policy will be conceptualized as a discourse that is concerned with Habermas’s criticizable validity claims; which are claims of truth, claims of sincerity, and claims for normative rightness. In the discourse of deterrence, various actors use this opportunity to invoke and defend their view of the scientific properties of nuclear weapons, the morality of nuclear weapons, and the sincerity of actors and relations of the nations involved in deterrence. This concept of deterrence as a discourse fits within Habermas’s view of discursive politics, and becomes the foundation for constructing an understanding of how government secrecy may be legitimated democratically. This legitimation occurs through the process of interrogating the validity claims as well as following a procedurally normative communicative process. I use a Habermasian view of democracy as both its analytical structure as well as its normative foundation. Habermas’s theories are particularly well suited for this study because he offers a very complex understanding of society, developed over the course of 50 years of literature. Those theories account for the multiple types of arguments that operate within nuclear discourse and offer a critical methodology for dealing with scientific discourse, moral discussion, notions of power, questions of sincerity, and the democratic process. Habermas’s political theory rests on the assumptions of radical democracy which are; that the citizenry have a voice in the laws that they live under, that there is some institutionalized process that allows the citizenry to have a voice in those laws, and that coercive governmental power is legitimated strictly through the public opinion created in the institutionalized form (Habermas, 2014). These basic procedural Chapter 1, Introduction 3 standards allow for a normative conception of democracy whereby the public is the final authority for government action. From here Habermas’s theory operates through a communicative lens that establishes a postmetaphysical procedural framework for rationality. This normative framework allows for an understanding of legitimacy grounded in correct procedure rather than a particular worldview or historically situated forms of knowledge. A political discussion can be analyzed though this framework to see how a public specifically