Russia's Military Reform: Progress and Hurdles

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 152, April 2014, Editor: Matthias Bieri

Russia’s Military Reform: Progress and Hurdles Russia’s military reform is a keystone of the country’s great-power ambitions. Vladimir Putin’s ambition to build up modern armed forces is driven by political determination. Therefore, the notion of Russia’s military weakness should be reconsidered – not least in view of its high disposition towards military action, as demonstrated on Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.

By Jonas Grätz

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 has reinforced Western concerns about Russian foreign and security policy. Under President Vladimir Putin’s rule, Russia is once more pursuing ambitions to regain great-power status and extending a strategic challenge to the West (cf. CSS Analysis No. 136). Moscow is trying to push back against US influence in Europe and to enforce a sphere of influence in its own neighborhood. After the war in Geor- gia, the Crimean crisis has once more demonstrated that military challenges have returned to the European theater. The following provisional review of Russia’s ex- ceptionally ambitious reform to modernize its armed forces, launched in 2008, is time- ly and highly apt against this backdrop.

Efforts at reforming the armed forces have Russia’s Armed Forces are being modernized. The reform focuses on three areas: organizational a long tradition in Russia, but they have of- structure, personnel, and weapons upgrades. S. Karpukhin / Reuters ten faltered due to lack of political prioriti- zation and insufficient determination. In the 1990s, the armed forces were successfully returned to Russia from their Euro- Meanwhile, the political debate in Russia forces, which were largely a legacy of the pean bases with considerable Western as- was marked by the experience of Western Soviet era, Russia could no longer compete sistance. Force levels were reduced from military operations such as “Desert Storm” on equal terms in military conflicts with over 4.5 million to less than one million in Iraq in 1991, the Kosovo war in 1999, or the US and NATO; nor would it be able to troops. The organizational structure was the attack on Iraq in 2003, as well as by operate successfully in asymmetric con- simplified. However, genuine reforms – Russia’s own experiences in Chechnya. flicts. such as a full restructuring and reorganiza- Russian military theorists noted a techno- tion to meet new threats – failed due to re- logical trend towards highly technical, re- The 2008 war in Georgia was the decisive sistance from traditionalists in the military, mote-controlled “sixth-generation war- political impetus for renewed reform ef- lack of political determination, and insuf- fare”. There could be no doubt that without forts. It revealed significant problems in ficient funding. modernizing and restructuring its armed command structures as well as in the sol-

Structure and Stationing of the Russian Armed Forces in 2013 tions, since the Georgian war revealed great difficulties in coordination. The Western, Southern, Central, and Eastern Military Districts largely correspond to the four strategic directions. However, the Central District is mainly conceived as providing support for the Western and Eastern Dis- tricts, while the Western District will also carry out missions in the Arctic.

With 250’000 troops, the army is the largest service and is largely concentrated in the Eastern District, which hosts four armies, compared to two each in the other districts. Altogether, the army has 38 combat brigades and 41 combat support brigades. An- other 26 to 40 brigades are to be formed by 2020, including 14 new army aviation brigades, which will contribute about 90 combat and transport helicopters each to rein- force the infantry’s hitherto weak tactical air support and air mobility. About 16 per cent of the combat helicopters are of recent diers’ equipment and training. Initial prob- Structural Changes production. Additionally, new reconnais- lems with implementation were resolved The military reform announced by then de- sance and air defense brigades are to be through a massive increase of the defense fense minister Anatoliy Serdyukov in Oc- formed. While most of the armored vehi- budget, which in 2012 was expanded by 16 tober 2007 mainly concerns three areas: cles are functional, they are mainly of So- per cent compared to the previous year. Organizational structure, personnel, and viet vintage and are only gradually being Special programs worth USD 730 billion weapons upgrades. The basis of the new or- modernized. were introduced for improving equipment ganizational structure was a restructuring from 2011 to 2020. of the armed forces into a mainly profes- With its 150’000 troops, the air force is ad- sional volunteer army in a permanent state ministratively subdivided into two func- At the same time, the military threat per- of readiness. Also, due to these changes, the tionally distinct staffs – the strategic Long- ception broadened. Two aspects in particu- share of conscripts will be reduced from its Range Aviation Command and the lar were crucial in this context: First of all, current level of 50 per cent to 20 per cent. Military Transport Aviation Command – the US, and thus NATO, have moved pro- At the end of the decade, according to these and, at the tactical level, into four territo- gressively closer to Russia’s borders, and plans, conscripts will no longer take part in rial air force and air defense staffs. Sta- have been identified as the main threat in combat operations. At the same time – un- tioned in six main bases, the Long-Range the Russian foreign policy whitebook of like in European professional armed forces Aviation Command constitutes the air- 2008 and in the current military doctrine – the personnel strength of the military will borne component of the nuclear triad. It of 2010. Previously, the Western military be raised from the current de-facto level of has around 140 Soviet-era long- and me- alliance had no longer been listed as a pri- 700’000 to one million soldiers. dium range bombers at its disposal. Devel- mary threat in post-Soviet Russia. Sec- opment of a new stealth bomber with vari- ondly, the threshold between military and The core of this reform is the abolition of able-sweep wings is underway. Although non-military threats has been eliminated. the division (up to 13’000 troops) as the the Military Transport Aviation Command Thus, challenges that could have been primary organizing formation, to be re- leads a niche existence, it is to be equipped dealt with as non-military issues attained placed completely by brigades military relevance for Russia. In response (4’000 troops). The aim is to in- The US, and thus NATO, have to the “color revolutions” of 2003 and 2004 crease mobility and to facilitate in Georgia and Ukraine, the “destabiliza- smaller-scale operations of au- been identified as the main tion” of neighboring countries was ranked tonomous units. Due to the va- threat in the current military as the second-highest danger. Domestic riety of challenges in various challenges, on the other hand, were ac- parts of the country, there has doctrine. cordingly downgraded. Conversely, the been considerable resistance to doctrine now indicates a willingness to use this uniform approach, which is why trials with 260 heavy transport aircraft by 2020, military force for the protection of Russian of the various structures are still ongoing. thus increasing the strategic flexibility of citizens abroad. The operations in Georgia the army. The tactical air force has 580 and Crimea confirm that Russia is indeed One innovation in the organization of war- fighter jets, 12 per cent of which are of re- willing to do so, irrespective of interna- fare has been the introduction of four mili- cent design. Every year, four to five per cent tional law. Furthermore, in the case of tary districts, with each of which having a of the fleet are replaced. A fifth-generation, Ukraine, it is apparent that the notions of joint operational staff. These staffs, -pat stealth-capable fighter jet is currently un- “citizenship” and “threat” are extremely terned on the US model of regional com- dergoing trials and is supposed to be com- malleable. mands, will be tasked with directing opera- missioned by the end of the decade. How-

ever, Russia has no significant unmanned thermore, a Cyber-Warfare Command is Russian Demographics aerial vehicle assets. expected to be created in 2014.

Of the various military services, Russia’s Problems with Professionalization navy faces the greatest problems. Its Among the core elements of the reform as 130’000 seamen are distributed among it relates to personnel are professionaliza- four fleets (the Northern Fleet, the Pacific tion, more autonomous leadership, and a Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Baltic tighter organizational culture. The Russian Fleet) and a flotilla (Caspian Sea). Apart military has traditionally had a surfeit of from the nuclear-powered ballistic-missile officers. Under Serdyukov, the and attack submarines, there has been little 335’000-strong officer corps was initially investment in naval assets. After decades of downsized, but then expanded once more development, two new strategic subma- after resistance and difficulties. He also rines have been commissioned, with a third eliminated the rank of praporshchik (war- still undergoing trials. However, due to rant officer), but it was brought back in problems with the Bulava intercontinental 2012 by the new Defense Minister Sergey ballistic missile (ICBM), they have not yet Shoigu due to organizational problems. been equipped with nuclear arms. Russia has only one aircraft carrier, which has These developments reflect difficulties in been beset with failures. It also has one the transition from a mainly conscript heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser; its army to the new armed forces, which rely sister ships are to be modernized and re- mainly on volunteer soldiers. By 2020, it is commissioned over the course of this dec- envisaged that professional soldiers and gions. It is important to note another prob- ade, which would considerably enhance the NCOs will constitute the backbone (50 per lem in this context – the dominance of eth- navy’s capabilities. Otherwise, moderniza- cent) of the armed forces. Although the in- nic Slavs in the military. Many Muslim tion efforts are focused on frigates and tegration of contract soldiers is making applicants have already been turned back. rapid progress – the plan was, at Russia has a security apparatus least nominally, nearly fulfilled Moreover, the military continues to com- in 2013 with 60’000 new en- pete with many other state security organs, proportionally more than twice trants and a total of 205’000 to such as the Interior Ministry, which also the size of that of the US. 220’000 professionals – many has paramilitary units, or the intelligence problems remain: In 2013, services. Two per cent of the population 35’000 contract soldiers left the work directly for a state security organ. Mistral-class helicopter carriers ordered armed forces again. This indicates that Russia thus has a security apparatus pro- from France. These efforts will increase the many signed up for a three-year career portionally more than twice the size of that ability to project power. mainly because of the better pay. Many of the US. commanders also deplore the bad health, Besides the army, the air force, and the lack of motivation, and rampant alcohol- Stepping Up Procurement navy, there are four other independent ism among contract soldiers. Currently, Thanks to state procurement programs, the branches of the armed forces. The first of many brigades are only at 60 to 80 per cent lion’s share of military expenditures – about these are the Strategic Rocket Forces, of their nominal strength. 60 per cent in 2013 – are spent not on per- which control the land-based nuclear sonnel, but on procurement. By 2020, it is ICBMs. The second are the elite Airborne Culturally, too, the military is not prepared envisaged, 70 per cent of the troops will be Troops, which serve as a rapid deployment for its role as employer. Contract soldiers equipped with “modern” weapons systems; force. The approximately 45’000-strong have more rights than conscripts – officers currently, only 19 per cent are. “Modern” in force is structured into four air assault divi- cannot subject them to the usual harsh this context refers to weapons that are no sions and four air assault brigades as well as treatment. While contract soldiers are ex- more than ten years old. To this end, the an airborne reconnaissance regiment. pected to take on increasingly demanding armaments program for 2010 – 2011 was Third, up to ten brigades of special forces leadership tasks, their pay and living condi- increased to a volume of USD 630 billion. units were raised in 2013. These three ser- tions are considerably worse than those of Another USD 100 billion are earmarked for vice branches are directly subordinated to career officers. The concept of engaging developing the military-industrial complex. the president rather than the operational soldiers on short-service contracts has thus staffs. This increases their aptitude for flex- not been a success so far, placing a question The Kremlin’s massive armaments program ible deployments, as can currently be seen mark on the professionalization of the mil- and its reform of the military-industrial on the Crimean Peninsula, where, accord- itary. complex also has significance in terms of ing to reports, regiments of the 76th Guards industrial and social policy. The military in- Air Assault Division and the 31st Guards The demographics also indicate a negative dustry employs two million workers; five Air Assault Brigade have been deployed. trend. By 2024, the working population per cent of the Russian population depend Fourth, the Aerospace Defense Forces op- will decline by at least 10 million. The on it for their livelihood. In this way, the erate early-warning radar systems and sat- numbers of 18- to 27-year-olds in particu- Kremlin is “solving” an issue in Soviet style: ellite systems for identification of hostile lar will decline by 2023. While the birth Funding for the military is once more tak- missile launches. They are expected to be rate in Russia is currently increasing, that is ing on a central role in society. It is hoped significantly expanded in the future. Fur- mainly due to the Muslim non-Slavic re- that this will boost innovation and global

Military Expenditure, 1994 – 2012 organizational culture; and demographic problems are also still an issue. Moreover, the lagging economic output will exacer- bate conflicts of objective between social and defense policy. Russia is very unlikely to achieve its aim of building a million- strong military that is capable of flexible deployment by 2020.

Within the framework of modernization, Russia is advancing the establishment of small, flexible elite units for deployment on its borders – as in the current crisis in Ukraine. These capabilities will allow it to exploit crisis in the region and to pursue further-reaching strategic goals. As the reform progresses and equipment is im- proved, the ability to win regional wars will competitiveness. Russia is already the sec- Another problem is the monopolistic struc- also be enhanced. Only when it comes to ond-largest arms exporter after the US, ture of the industry, which is further aggra- the global projection of conventional mili- which it aims to overtake. vated by lack of transparency in procure- tary power will Russia still be lacking suf- ment. Critics assume that at least 20 per ficient means. While Russia does have strong develop- cent of expenditures in procurement are ment programs for tactical missiles, subma- used for other than the intended purposes. Modernization will bring about consider- rines, and tactical aircraft (helicopters and Bringing prototypes to serial production is able improvements of Russian military ca- fighter jets) and is a leader in air defense frequently fraught with difficulties. High- pabilities. The country can use its new- systems, it has significant shortcomings in tech components cannot be produced at found military clout both for enforcing other areas, including crucial deficits re- consistent quality levels. Recurrent failures interests in its European neighborhood garding information technology, radar in complex weapons systems can be attrib- and to position itself as an attractive part- technology, and high-precision weapons uted to fluctuations in production quality ner for new alliances in Asia, as indicated systems. In these areas, Russia depends on rather than to design flaws. Furthermore, by closer cooperation and the augmenta- purchasing components, espionage, and there are bottlenecks in production capaci- tion of exercises between Russia and China technology transfers from Western compa- ty, for example in aircraft production and as well as India. Modernization is accom- nies. Under Defense Minister Shoigu, pro- shipbuilding. The plans to enhance military panied by an expansion of the categories of curement was re-nationalized: Simple pur- transport aviation can only be realized if challenges that may be legitimately be re- chases of weapons systems from the West capacity is expanded rapidly. Russia also solved by military force. For politicians in were stopped. At the same time, it was de- depends on cooperation with Ukraine: So the West, the question is how to deal with cided that no more Western machine tools far, many motors for helicopters and air- this new assertive stance and Russia’s im- would be used for the arms industry due to craft as well as rockets have been produced proved military capabilities. concerns over cyberattacks on the electron- in Ukraine. Russia lacks the know-how for ics. Instead, the technology transfer will be producing many of the parts required. The stepped up through cooperation with current conflict is putting a strain on this Western arms companies, and collabora- cooperation and necessitates import substi- tion with emerging countries like India will tutes, which entail great cost and delays. be increased. This policy will push up costs and will not lead to the military being The Effects of Remilitarization equipped with the best armaments prod- Under Vladimir Putin, the modernization ucts. For instances, there are significant de- of Russia’s armed forces has become a pri- Jonas Grätz is a Senior Researcher in the lays in the delivery of a modern communi- ority for the first time since 1991. For sev- “Global Security” think-tank team at the Center cations and reconnaissance system. Thus, eral years, considerable sums have been ex- for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich. His most Russia will continue to have deficits in pended on this reform. However, challenges recent publication is “Russia as Challenger of waging “sixth-generation warfare”. remain when it comes to technology and the West” (2014).

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