Russia's Military Reform: Progress and Hurdles
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CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 152, April 2014, Editor: Matthias Bieri Russia’s Military Reform: Progress and Hurdles Russia’s military reform is a keystone of the country’s great-power ambitions. Vladimir Putin’s ambition to build up modern armed forces is driven by political determination. Therefore, the notion of Russia’s military weakness should be reconsidered – not least in view of its high disposition towards military action, as demonstrated on Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula. By Jonas Grätz Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 has reinforced Western concerns about Russian foreign and security policy. Under President Vladimir Putin’s rule, Russia is once more pursuing ambitions to regain great-power status and extending a strategic challenge to the West (cf. CSS Analysis No. 136). Moscow is trying to push back against US influence in Europe and to enforce a sphere of influence in its own neighborhood. After the war in Geor- gia, the Crimean crisis has once more dem- onstrated that military challenges have re- turned to the European theater. The following provisional review of Russia’s ex- ceptionally ambitious reform to modernize its armed forces, launched in 2008, is time- ly and highly apt against this backdrop. Efforts at reforming the armed forces have Russia’s Armed Forces are being modernized. The reform focuses on three areas: organizational a long tradition in Russia, but they have of- structure, personnel, and weapons upgrades. S. Karpukhin / Reuters ten faltered due to lack of political prioriti- zation and insufficient determination. In the 1990s, the armed forces were success- fully returned to Russia from their Euro- Meanwhile, the political debate in Russia forces, which were largely a legacy of the pean bases with considerable Western as- was marked by the experience of Western Soviet era, Russia could no longer compete sistance. Force levels were reduced from military operations such as “Desert Storm” on equal terms in military conflicts with over 4.5 million to less than one million in Iraq in 1991, the Kosovo war in 1999, or the US and NATO; nor would it be able to troops. The organizational structure was the attack on Iraq in 2003, as well as by operate successfully in asymmetric con- simplified. However, genuine reforms – Russia’s own experiences in Chechnya. flicts. such as a full restructuring and reorganiza- Russian military theorists noted a techno- tion to meet new threats – failed due to re- logical trend towards highly technical, re- The 2008 war in Georgia was the decisive sistance from traditionalists in the military, mote-controlled “sixth-generation war- political impetus for renewed reform ef- lack of political determination, and insuf- fare”. There could be no doubt that without forts. It revealed significant problems in ficient funding. modernizing and restructuring its armed command structures as well as in the sol- © 2014 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 1 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 152, April 2014 Structure and Stationing of the Russian Armed Forces in 2013 tions, since the Georgian war revealed great difficulties in coordination. The Western, Southern, Central, and Eastern Military Districts largely correspond to the four strategic directions. However, the Central District is mainly conceived as providing support for the Western and Eastern Dis- tricts, while the Western District will also carry out missions in the Arctic. With 250’000 troops, the army is the larg- est service and is largely concentrated in the Eastern District, which hosts four armies, compared to two each in the other districts. Altogether, the army has 38 combat bri- gades and 41 combat support brigades. An- other 26 to 40 brigades are to be formed by 2020, including 14 new army aviation bri- gades, which will contribute about 90 com- bat and transport helicopters each to rein- force the infantry’s hitherto weak tactical air support and air mobility. About 16 per cent of the combat helicopters are of recent diers’ equipment and training. Initial prob- Structural Changes production. Additionally, new reconnais- lems with implementation were resolved The military reform announced by then de- sance and air defense brigades are to be through a massive increase of the defense fense minister Anatoliy Serdyukov in Oc- formed. While most of the armored vehi- budget, which in 2012 was expanded by 16 tober 2007 mainly concerns three areas: cles are functional, they are mainly of So- per cent compared to the previous year. Organizational structure, personnel, and viet vintage and are only gradually being Special programs worth USD 730 billion weapons upgrades. The basis of the new or- modernized. were introduced for improving equipment ganizational structure was a restructuring from 2011 to 2020. of the armed forces into a mainly profes- With its 150’000 troops, the air force is ad- sional volunteer army in a permanent state ministratively subdivided into two func- At the same time, the military threat per- of readiness. Also, due to these changes, the tionally distinct staffs – the strategic Long- ception broadened. Two aspects in particu- share of conscripts will be reduced from its Range Aviation Command and the lar were crucial in this context: First of all, current level of 50 per cent to 20 per cent. Military Transport Aviation Command – the US, and thus NATO, have moved pro- At the end of the decade, according to these and, at the tactical level, into four territo- gressively closer to Russia’s borders, and plans, conscripts will no longer take part in rial air force and air defense staffs. Sta- have been identified as the main threat in combat operations. At the same time – un- tioned in six main bases, the Long-Range the Russian foreign policy whitebook of like in European professional armed forces Aviation Command constitutes the air- 2008 and in the current military doctrine – the personnel strength of the military will borne component of the nuclear triad. It of 2010. Previously, the Western military be raised from the current de-facto level of has around 140 Soviet-era long- and me- alliance had no longer been listed as a pri- 700’000 to one million soldiers. dium range bombers at its disposal. Devel- mary threat in post-Soviet Russia. Sec- opment of a new stealth bomber with vari- ondly, the threshold between military and The core of this reform is the abolition of able-sweep wings is underway. Although non-military threats has been eliminated. the division (up to 13’000 troops) as the the Military Transport Aviation Command Thus, challenges that could have been primary organizing formation, to be re- leads a niche existence, it is to be equipped dealt with as non-military issues attained placed completely by brigades military relevance for Russia. In response (4’000 troops). The aim is to in- The US, and thus NATO, have to the “color revolutions” of 2003 and 2004 crease mobility and to facilitate in Georgia and Ukraine, the “destabiliza- smaller-scale operations of au- been identified as the main tion” of neighboring countries was ranked tonomous units. Due to the va- threat in the current military as the second-highest danger. Domestic riety of challenges in various challenges, on the other hand, were ac- parts of the country, there has doctrine. cordingly downgraded. Conversely, the been considerable resistance to doctrine now indicates a willingness to use this uniform approach, which is why trials with 260 heavy transport aircraft by 2020, military force for the protection of Russian of the various structures are still ongoing. thus increasing the strategic flexibility of citizens abroad. The operations in Georgia the army. The tactical air force has 580 and Crimea confirm that Russia is indeed One innovation in the organization of war- fighter jets, 12 per cent of which are of re- willing to do so, irrespective of interna- fare has been the introduction of four mili- cent design. Every year, four to five per cent tional law. Furthermore, in the case of tary districts, with each of which having a of the fleet are replaced. A fifth-generation, Ukraine, it is apparent that the notions of joint operational staff. These staffs, -pat stealth-capable fighter jet is currently un- “citizenship” and “threat” are extremely terned on the US model of regional com- dergoing trials and is supposed to be com- malleable. mands, will be tasked with directing opera- missioned by the end of the decade. How- © 2014 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 2 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 152, April 2014 ever, Russia has no significant unmanned thermore, a Cyber-Warfare Command is Russian Demographics aerial vehicle assets. expected to be created in 2014. Of the various military services, Russia’s Problems with Professionalization navy faces the greatest problems. Its Among the core elements of the reform as 130’000 seamen are distributed among it relates to personnel are professionaliza- four fleets (the Northern Fleet, the Pacific tion, more autonomous leadership, and a Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Baltic tighter organizational culture. The Russian Fleet) and a flotilla (Caspian Sea). Apart military has traditionally had a surfeit of from the nuclear-powered ballistic-missile officers. Under Serdyukov, the and attack submarines, there has been little 335’000-strong officer corps was initially investment in naval assets. After decades of downsized, but then expanded once more development, two new strategic subma- after resistance and difficulties. He also rines have been commissioned, with a third eliminated the rank of praporshchik (war- still undergoing trials. However, due to rant officer), but it was brought back in problems with the Bulava intercontinental 2012 by the new Defense Minister Sergey ballistic missile (ICBM), they have not yet Shoigu due to organizational problems.