Best Practices from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan
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Advising the Command Best Practices from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan Todd C. Helmus C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr949 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN: 978-0-8330-8891-8 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2015 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The purpose of this report is to identify best practices in operational- level advising from the special operations advisory mission in Afghani- stan. The report also identifies key recommendations that are intended to help address key challenges in operational-level partnering. Findings are drawn from an analysis of the Special Operations Advisory Groups (SOAGs), which are part of the NATO Special Operations Compo- nent Command–Afghanistan/Special Operations Joint Task Force– Afghanistan (NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A). SOAGs advise headquarter ele- ments of the Afghan Special Security Forces. This research was sponsored by NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A and con- ducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secre- tary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on the International Security and Defense Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp.html or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Summary ..........................................................................vii Acknowledgments ............................................................... xi CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Text Box 1.1. Summary Description of SOAGs and Partnered ASSF Units .................................................................... 2 Table 1.1. Rationale for Key Topics Studied in This Report ................. 6 CHAPTER TWO Rapport ............................................................................. 9 Language and Cultural Skills ...................................................11 Proximity ..........................................................................12 Text Box 2.1. Building Rapport on the Edges .................................13 Nontransactional Relationships .................................................13 Tour Lengths ......................................................................15 Summary ...........................................................................15 CHAPTER THREE The Advising Engagement ......................................................17 Work Off of Host-Nation Counterpart Goals .................................18 Use the Socratic Method ....................................................... 20 Give Options; Let Afghans Own the Solution .............................. 20 Text Box 3.1. Effectively Using Interpreters ...................................21 Summary .......................................................................... 22 v vi Best Practices for Special Operations Advisory Groups CHAPTER FOUR Integration of SOF Advisors .................................................. 23 Summary .......................................................................... 26 CHAPTER FIVE Integration of ASSF ............................................................ 27 Within-Unit Integration ........................................................ 27 Joint Coordination ................................................................29 Summary .......................................................................... 30 CHAPTER SIX Sustainability .....................................................................31 Summary .......................................................................... 34 CHAPTER SEVEN Pre-Deployment Training ......................................................35 Text Box 7.1. Selection of Advisors ............................................. 40 Summary ...........................................................................41 CHAPTER EIGHT Continuity of Operations ..................................................... 43 Increase Tour Lengths for Key Advisory Positions ........................... 43 Give Advance Notice on Deployments ........................................ 44 Ensure Proper Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) Periods .........................................................................45 Properly Organize and Maintain Computer Portals ..........................45 Prepare a Continuity Book ...................................................... 46 Harness Experienced Staff ...................................................... 46 Standardize Pre-Deployment Training .........................................47 Summary ...........................................................................47 CHAPTER NINE Conclusion ........................................................................49 Abbreviations .....................................................................51 Bibliography ......................................................................53 Summary This report presents the findings of in-depth interviews conducted with special operators advising headquarters elements of the Afghan Spe- cial Security Forces (ASSF). The research for this report was initially conducted to help enhance the capability of Special Operations Forces (SOF) advisory efforts and to help prepare incoming advisory staff. Hopefully, the report’s enduring value will be to inform the practices of U.S. and allied advisors who will undertake an array of partner capac- ity-building initiatives at the operational or headquarters level. Senior SOF commanders in Afghanistan created Special Opera- tions Advisory Groups (SOAGs) to train, advise, and assist headquar- ter elements of the ASSF. SOAGs are small formations of advisors who operate under NATO Special Operations Component Com- mand–Afghanistan/Special Operations Joint Task Force–Afghanistan (NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A). Each individual SOAG is aligned with a headquarters element of the ASSF, including General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU), the Afghan Local Police (ALP), Com- mandos, Ktah Khas, and Special Mission Wing (SMW). There is also a SOAG that works at both the Ministries of Defense and Interior and is referred to as the Ministry Advisory Group Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (MAG SOFLE). To conduct this study, RAND conducted interviews with staff representing SOAGs for the GCPSU, ALP, Commandos, Ktah Khas, SMW, and the MAG SOFLE. Interviews focused on a limited set of topics with cross-SOAG applicability. Accordingly, findings are pre- sented for the topics of rapport building, the advising engagement, vii viii Best Practices for Special Operations Advisory Groups integration, sustainability, pre-deployment training, and continuity of operations. Rapport Building. A strong rapport between advisor and coun- terpart can enhance information sharing, increase the likelihood that advice will be accepted, and reduce coalition force risk. Short tour lengths and limited engagement opportunities make rapport building difficult, so advisors must proactively build relationships with Afghan counterparts. Language/cultural sensitivity skills and proximity to partner offices can expedite the rapport-building process. Nontrans- actional relationships are especially crucial and are cultivated through personal conversations and shared meals. The Advising Engagement. Advising host-nation counterparts is a complex and nuanced task. There is a natural tendency for advi- sors to offer advice and solutions to their host-nation counterparts. But this advice can suffer from an overly Western perspective, fail to instill local buy-in, and represents a lost opportunity to develop host- nation problem-solving skills. The alternative is to advise with care- fully calibrated questions. Such questions should solicit and capitalize on the goals of the host-nation forces, help local officers think through problem sets, weigh pros and cons of various courses of action, and craft host-nation-centric solutions. As one advisor observed, “A better approach is to