Community-Based Natural Resource Management of the Jozani-Pete Mangrove Forest: Do They Have a Voice?

Community-based Natural Resource Management of the Jozani-Pete Mangrove Forest: Do They Have a Voice?

Linn Rabe and Fred Saunders

School of Life Sciences, Södertörn University, 141 89 Huddinge, Sweden.

Keywords: Community-based Natural Resource Management, CBNRM, public participation, common pool, mangroves, resources, Zanzibar

Abstract — Local participation, especially in natural resource management, has been promoted as a key strategy in the quest for sustainable development. Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is an approach that has generally been promoted as an institution that genuinely includes and empowers ‘local people' in natural resource use and management. This paper examines how local participation in conservation projects works in practice by drawing on concepts from institutional and actor-oriented theories and applying a case study approach to examine community-based mangrove management at Jozani-Pete, Zanzibar. Here CBNRM became embedded within a conservation agenda that resulted in conflict, resistance, frustration and uncertainty amongst community members. The paper offers insight into how exogenously initiated CBNRM projects have difficulty gaining traction unless they both address existing power relations and deliver on promises of material benefits. If they fail to do so the experience of the Jozani-Pete case study suggests that CBNRM may work to further marginalize already marginalized people.

INTRODUCTION concerns, with little regard given to community Community-based Nature Resource heterogeneity and their related diversity in Management (CBNRM) is an approach to aspirations (Li, 2002). This article contributes conservation that emphasises the participation to the polarized debate on CBNRM using and empowerment of ‘local people’. The a case study approach to examine whether aspiration of ‘genuine’ involvement by local the objectives of the project were realised in people in CBNRM is widely supported. practice. We hope to clarify how contingent However, the practice of CBNRM has been circumstances in the case study were reflected criticised for being driven by top-down in broader discussions.

Corresponding author: LR Email: [email protected] 134 L. Rabe and F. Saunders

The objective of the study was to elucidate circles, concerns raised by scholars regarding how local participation works in practice in indifferent outcomes in practice have begun CBNRM. Attention was given to the forces to call CBNRM into question as a model and actions that promoted or constrained for conservation/sustainable development local participation in a community-based (Blaike, 2006; Dressler et al., 2010; mangrove management project at Jozani- Shackleton et al., 2010; Saunders, 2014). Pete, Zanzibar. Concepts derived from critical In spite of these concerns, influential global discussion of common pool resource theory, actors with different motives have continued CBNRM experience and actor-oriented theory to focus on decentralized, participatory were drawn on to interrogate the Jozani- models for community resource management Pete CBNRM project to determine what in poorer rural parts of the world. conditions, strategies and actions constrained It has been argued that local involvement or facilitated local participation. This paper in natural resource management is important thus focuses on the dynamics of institutions in East Africa and elsewhere in the Global established to effect the goals of CBNRM South, since inhabitants’ daily lives are to projects while taking into consideration views a large extent embedded in the use of these on changing environmental conditions, given natural resources (Mohammed & Johnstone, that these are central to the social relations in 2002). Political and economic liberalization in CBNRM initiatives. Zanzibar and elsewhere in the 1980s created the space for decentralized governance shifts BACKGROUND in natural resource management, alongside a growth in tourism as a development strategy Various motives for conservation have been (Gössling & Schulz, 2005). However, it is presented throughout history, most of them only more recently that Zanzibar’s natural rationalizing the exclusion of indigenous values have been recognized by international and local people from sensitive, vulnerable conservation interests (Levine, 2007). or valuable habitats in the name of nature The rhetoric of CBNRM is closely conservation (Adams, 2001). This view was aligned with dominant populist narratives largely overturned in 1992 at the United on participation, which place emphasis on Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro the ‘local’ as a starting point for intervention (Adams et al., 2004). At this conference, it in the environment/development nexus was generally accepted that environmental (Vandergeest, 2006; Adams, 2001; Chambers, degradation and biodiversity loss went hand 1983). CBNRM is based on the premise that in hand with poverty and that these issues communities have the motivation, bonds of could and should be jointly tackled. The association and possess or can develop the link between basic human needs and natural skills and knowledge needed to undertake resources was emphasised even more during sustainable management of their local natural negotiations at the United Nations Millennium resources (Ribot, 2002). Summit on Millennium Development Goals An important, but often vague point in (MDG); particularly concerning the MGD CBNRM and policy-making is the target to halve world poverty by 2015 (Adams, group. Who is supposed to be participating 2001). The World Bank, UN and most donors and empowered by the process? What encourage decentralization as a means to constitutes ‘community’ has been described achieve these broader development goals to in various ways. Kumar (2002) argues increase efficiency, equity and democracy that viewing community definitively (Ribot, 2002). The trend is towards formal and idyllically is problematic as it is delegation of power to various decentralized characterised a priori as cooperative because institutions and CBNRM has been given a of presumed common understandings and prominent position in this regard. However, institutions and, therefore, its relationship despite the popularity of CBNRM in policy with resources is considered manageable. Community-based Natural Resource Management of the Jozani-Pete Mangrove Forest 135

People are expected to develop bonds of (JBCBA) is seen as a key project to advance commitment with each other through regular the fight against rural poverty in Zanzibar interaction in confined spatial domains and and has been widely touted as a successful through productive practices, which makes example of decentralized governance of the sum of community greater than its natural resources (McKenzie, 2007; Global individual parts. Under these circumstances, Environment Facility, 2006). community becomes the link between social As a departure point, this paper good and individual well-being, creating a takes the view that decision-making is a common positive attitude for long-term care complex and conflictual process involving of the society and its environment (De-Shalit, various institutions and concerns, usually 2000). The strength of community has been encompassing a wide variety of stakeholders given a central position in the discussion and views (Burns, 2003). Given the on CBNRM (Cleaver, 1999). Champions continuing optimism and popularity of community-driven development argue surrounding CBNRM in policy circles, and that “communities know their problems and the contrasting concerns raised mostly by how to solve them better than any outsider scholars, it is important that the changing can” (NGO Resource Centre, 2006: 4). This social relations are examined within these view is convenient for 'outsiders' to adopt projects. We hope to make an incisive who wish to promote positive images of contribution to the ongoing discussion on cooperative and engaged communities with CBNRM by focusing on the case of Jozani- the motivation of building organisations Pete in Zanzibar. and social capital in support of projects (Cleaver 1999, 2000). However, we should THEORETICAL and be more circumspect about adopting these ANALYTICAL INSIGHTS harmonious assumptions, as noted by Levine (2007) when describing how local village The UN’s agreement on poverty reduction shed organizations and government tend to be light on the need for biodiversity conservation dominated by the more affluent and powerful strategies and local empowerment (Adams members of society who are channels for et al., 2004). CBNRM has been seen as an revenue and political resources for outside important governance arrangement to meet agencies, such as international NGOs. this challenge (Roe & Nelson 2009). It has The Government of Zanzibar (GOZ) has been defined as “a process by which groups adopted the decentralization paradigm and or communities organize themselves with recognized the connection between local varying degrees of outside support so as to empowerment and long-term environmental apply their skills and knowledge to the care protection in its Zanzibar Poverty Reduction of natural resources and environment while Plan (ZPRP), which was ratified in January satisfying livelihood needs” (Pretty & Guijt, 2002. This plan was a first step towards 1992: 22). Ribot (2002) defines effective eradicating poverty in society as outlined decentralization as “an inclusive local in the Zanzibar Development Vision 2020. process under local authorities empowered Empowerment of the people has become with discretionary decisions over resources a goal as well as a means for Zanzibar’s that are relevant to local people” (Ribot, strategy to reduce poverty. Community-based 2002: 4). Rights, representation and recourse projects, education and capacity building (as in local matters are institutional features well as improving health services, increasing required to enfranchise rural people as agriculture productivity and more efficient citizens. CBNRM creates a process whereby use of natural resources) are considered responsibilities and decision-making powers top priorities within the GOZ strategy to are delegated by government to local actors, decentralize governance (ZDRP-PTF, 2002). usually via the establishment of community- The Jozani - Chwaka Bay Conservation Area based organizations. It is argued that public 136 L. Rabe and F. Saunders participation is the primary reason why institutions without being challenged by CBNRM can achieve long-term results, external authorities; 5) monitoring systems where other management systems meet maintained by users’ 6) graduated sanction resistance (Ribot, 2002). systems; 7) accessible conflict resolution Common property scholarship, which has mechanisms; and 8) recognition by and been at the forefront of research on commons interconnection with management institutions over the past two decades, continues to provide at other decision-making levels. Furthermore, the bulk of theoretical support for participative Ostrom (1990) urges that these principles be forest conservation policy (Agrawal, 2007; contextualised to suit local conditions using Saunders, 2014). Prior to this, people were participatory processes. largely seen as an obstacle to efficient However, CPR is criticised for giving and rational conservation. This view was too much attention to purpose-built natural reinforced by Hardin (1968), where he warned resource institutions and too little attention to of the ‘tragedy of the commons’, asserting that the contextual factors affecting the countless common ownership of natural resources leads relationships involved in the analysis to a conflict of interest between group interest of common-pool resources (Sandström, and that of the individual, and it is the group 2008; Agrawal, 2005b; Saunders, 2011b; interest that suffers. Research on common pool Saunders, 2014). There are also claims that resource (CPR) institutions conducted during CBNRM is an extension of government the 1970s and '80s was key to dethroning the ambitions of social control by dispersing hegemonic discourse of the threat of in situ multiple points of political leverage, making communities to conservation interests, both them accessible to central decision-makers at the analytical and the practical level. This (Hadiz, 2004; Li, 2007; Agrawal, 2005b; showed that local people in many situations Kothari, 2001). Agrawal (2005a) stresses have developed enduring and adaptive that the transformation of knowledge/power, institutional arrangements that have enabled politics, institutions and subjectivities is them to manage their natural resources over crucial to achieve a successful participatory time. This work revealed that ‘communities’ management process. could sustainably manage resources using local Critics also argue that CPR theory does knowledge; that their management involved not provide a clear direction for meaningful institutionalized self-regulation of extractive consideration of local norms, values and use; and that local institutions could be interests. Participatory methods, often used crafted to realise sustainable use. Institutional to contextualize the design principles in arrangements for commons management have projects, rarely deal with values, preferences subsequently received significant attention as and interests of beneficiaries. In practice these the key variable in the efficacy of CBNRM techniques are more likely to be used to ‘map (Barrett et al., 2001; Saunders, 2014). local knowledge’ to achieve pre-conceived, Accordingly, much emphasis has been placed exogenously derived management goals on the identification of institutional principles (Saunders, 2011b). Cleaver (1999) challenges that support effective CBNRM (Ostrom, the idea of formalising community structure and 1990). Ostrom (1990) identified common interactive processes into technocratic systems. rules in use across a broad range of CPR user- Cleaver (1999) also describes how social communities with enduring institutions. These institutions are often difficult to detect and that rules were synthesised into the following they have to be carefully considered since they design principles 1) clearly defined boundaries are often embedded with norms and morals that of resource and membership; 2) congruence are not always suitable for local democracy among appropriation and provision rules or participation. Failure to address unequal and local conditions; 3) user participation power relations is also a common critique of in appropriation and provision rules; 4) CBNRM participation in practice (Cook and recognition of rights to organize their own Kothari, 2001). The discussion is ongoing and Community-based Natural Resource Management of the Jozani-Pete Mangrove Forest 137 researchers have argued that, for participation to Local participation has been interpreted be meaningful, it needs to be part of a broader in many different ways in management and more transformative process of development processes, but in many cases the vision is too (Hickey & Mohan, 2005; Nelson 2010). How ambitious and far from reality (IIED, 1994). In this is achieved in practice, however, still discussing levels of participation, the literature remains unclear, but is surely linked to ensuring often uses terminology and value judgements that democratising processes are firmly linked to that express high levels of participation as a broader political reforms, notions of citizenship desirable goal (Bruns, 2003). Participation and distributive justice. seems to have an intrinsic value and, in Whereas CPR theory focuses on the cases where the benefits of participation are formal aspects of institutional design and considered, local involvement is said to create functionality, actor-oriented theory is more a more committed and equitable process likely concerned with examining what happens in to result in a more sustainable outcome (Ribot, institutional practice. This view takes account 2002). A low level of participation may be of the changing recursive relationships seen as a result of governmental manipulation between actors and formal institutions with and restriction of the locals (Burns, 2003) or conservation interventions. Long (1992) resistance within the government hierarchy argues that it is in this way that struggles to transfer and decentralise appropriate and shape institutional structure. Actor-oriented sufficient power (Ribot, 2002; Ribot et al., theory sees actors as social agents who 2006). Without a secure means of transferring process information and strategize in their decision-rights to local authorities, they may dealings with others (Long, 1992). Human find themselves trapped in situations where agency and social interaction processes are they become subjects of higher authority, seen as ‘context dependent’, with a wide and easily lose insecure privileges given to range of institutions playing a key role in them (Ribot, 2002). As will be seen in the shaping and enabling possibilities. According empirical presentation, the construction of to Long (2001), elucidation of the workings of aforementioned the Jozani - Chwaka Bay governance arrangements in practice requires Conservation Area (JBCBA) project in that the trajectory of these arrangements be Zanzibar has been riddled with conflicting traced from inception to realization through interests and power negotiations, shaping the the experiences of variously placed and process and outcome. affected social actors. This approach involves The foregoing theoretical discussion has capturing textured details of key events and been used to direct the collection of data at assessing perceptions of respondents about Jozani-Pete, as well as a heuristic device for these events (Mosse & Lewis, 2006). An the analysis and discussion. We do not seek to examination of how CBNRM initiatives rigidly apply the above theoretical concepts, realign, supplement or sometimes conflict but rather to use them as a means to analyse with existing networks and relations then and discuss our case study data. Ostrom’s becomes critical to reveal how CBNRM works (1990) design principles have been used to in practice. In elaborating this, it is important structure the process and identify key-events to reveal how particular groups create space that have been of interest in the investigation for themselves to pursue their agendas, which with an actor-oriented approach. may run parallel to or challenge interests and aspirations of other parties, including CBNRM STUDY SITE and METHODS planners. Actor-oriented theory emphasizes the governing social processes and techniques The village of Jozani-Pete is located in rather than the structural outcomes (unlike rural southern Unguja, 24 km south-east CPR theory) and acknowledges that social of Stone Town, and is the central point of action always takes place within networks of Jozani-Pete Shehia. Shehias are the smallest relations (Saunders, 2011b). administrative unit in Zanzibar and the local 138 L. Rabe and F. Saunders administrative leader, the Sheha, is appointed and/or were motivated, to participate in by the government. The Shehia of Jozani- the CBNRM project; and how conflict has Pete has 1,435 inhabitants according to the affected the CBNRM project and relatedly, local census undertaken in March 2008. The social relations at Jozani-Pete. Shehia is approximately 1,250 ha in area and incorporates several habitat types including CBNRM PRACTICE AT grassland, terrestrial forest, and 360 ha of JOZANI-PETE mangrove forest. The local dependence on natural resources is high, despite the The following empirical data, presented in development of tourism associated with the narrative form, reflect the results obtained Jozani-Chawka Bay National Park (Saunders, from interviews and PRA exercises obtained 2011a). There is a widely held view, supported during the fieldwork. by a previous study (Othman et al., 2007), that resource use and biodiversity values in these Setting up the CBNRM Project mangrove forests have declined in the early The establishment of the Jozani-Pete 2000s due to over-exploitation. CBNRM initiative was seen by many of the Fieldwork for the Jozani-Pete study was Jozani-Pete villagers as an attempt to solve carried out with the assistance of a village ongoing nature resource management conflict field guide and translator during February- between the locals and the government. The April 2008 and March-April 2009. Data villagers claimed that the process started were collected using a combination of with the GOZ’s idea of protecting the natural participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods habitat for the endemic and endangered red (such as transect walks, participatory colobus monkey (Procolobus kirkii). The mapping, focus groups, SWOT-analysis Jozani Forest, (adjacent to the Jozani-Pete and problem ranking) and semi-structured village) was formally part of the existing interviews with villagers (N=24). Forest Reserve with some loose restrictions, The participatory techniques employed in but the GOZ started a process that would see this study encompassed key actor groupings in it become part of the fifty-square kilometre the Jozani-Pete village (including fishermen, Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park. A small farmers, charcoal producers, butterfly farmers, part of the area also includes mangrove football players and the elderly). Discussions and wetland forest. The Department of with key informants early on in the fieldwork Commercial Crops, Fruits and Forestry identified these social clusters and vocational (DCCFF) initiated Village Conservation groupings as important in the village. This Committees (VCC) in an attempt to increase information was used to develop a sampling the awareness of conservation goals and strategy that also considered characteristics such improve the relationship with the villages as occupation, age, sex, origin and position in around the proposed National Park. The various village-based institutional arrangements DCCFF was advised and supported by (e.g. Village Conservation Committee, Village CARE International in the VCC initiative. Development Committee and the Sheha We were told that many members of the Advisory Group). Informants were approached VCCs were appointed by the Sheha and they as individuals, but often saw themselves as were established in several villages located representatives of social and vocational groups in the proposed park’s buffer zone. In accord that they identified with, as described above. with the National Forest Policy and Forest All interviews addressed three central Resource Management and Conservation themes using open-ended questions in Act No.10 of 1996, the duties of the VCCs semi-structured interviews. The interviews were to help develop, maintain and fulfil addressed the informants’ relationship to the established Resource Use Management and use of the mangrove forests as a local Agreement (RUMA), enforce the security of resource; whether they had opportunities, Community-based Natural Resource Management of the Jozani-Pete Mangrove Forest 139 the protected area, encourage tree planting The villagers claim that they found and support the local people in finding viable it difficult to support themselves as their alternative income-generating activities. economic opportunities dwindled. Locals had The DCCFF’s invitation to establish been using the mangrove forest to produce VCCs was understood by the villagers as charcoal, collect firewood, fish, harvest a “polite order” given by the government. seafood and medicinal plants in addition to People were asked to volunteer for positions using the inland coral rag forest – the area and a few people with positive attitudes was considered to be part of the village's towards 'environmental issues’ responded. customary land. When sensitising the locals The villagers claimed to have been hesitant for the proposed National Park and after to get involved in the VCC, arguing that they the imposition of the resource restrictions, were unwilling to assume responsibility for the production of charcoal, which was enforcement and monitoring of the RUMA. previously undertaken in the dry-land coral To solve the situation, the Sheha eventually rag forest (now off-limits because it became nominated villagers to fill the remaining part of the National Park), shifted to the VCC seats. An umbrella organisation called mangrove forest. Mangrove wood produces the Jozani Environmental Conservation high quality charcoal. This grade of charcoal Association (JECA) was also established is in high demand on Zanzibar and sellers to support and coordinate participation of get premium prices. These factors combined the VCCs from the eight villages bordering caused a rapid expansion in rapidly expanding the National Park in the national park its production. Jozani-Pete developed a arrangement. The national park and the reputation for good quality charcoal and, in surrounding community-regulated buffer consequence, customers came all the way zone were to incorporate essential parts of from Stone Town. The business blossomed the Jozani-Pete village wood harvesting and and the village production expanded to meet farming areas and they would no longer be demand, resulting in significant cutting of available for such use. The villagers expressed the mangrove forest. An elderly woman, who concern that they were given little opportunity previously worked as a charcoal producer, to influence the park establishment process made the point during a focus group meeting or the RUMA. Timber harvesting, a cross- that: “The forest was called ‘the bank’, it cutting practice affecting all identified groups, was our treasure. We were used to make was particularly restricted. Due to protests, withdrawal whenever we needed it”. Another the DCCFF softened its position and an villager stated that: “In 2000, the sound of agreement was brokered, allowing continued machetes chopping the red stem of mangrove access for collection of dried branches and trees could be heard all day long”. dead logs for firewood. As the Jozani-Pete charcoal business Unfortunately the truce between the reached its climax, the government formally DCCFF and the villagers did not last long. established the Jozani-Pete VCC. Shortly The villagers started to notice an increased after regulations were introduced through presence of red colobus monkeys and the RUMA, illicit cutting incidents in rumours circulated that individuals from conservation and no-take zones were reported. other populations were being relocated to the Whether the cutting should be interpreted National Park area. The perceived increased as a protest, the continuation of business as presence of “indecent crop thieves” (as the usual or an act of desperation is unclear, but informants called the monkeys) and the the DCCFF answered with increased security lack of compensation for increased crop and with further restrictions on forest product damage caused by the monkeys, along with collection times and areas open to harvesting. resource use restrictions, caused immense Feeling disadvantaged by the JCBCA, frustration among the villagers (supported Jozani-Pete villagers used the national media by Saunders, 2011a). to air their concerns. As a negotiation point, 140 L. Rabe and F. Saunders and to manage the escalating situation, the medium to disseminate GOZ decisions of this VCC suggested that Jozani-Pete be given kind. It is also used to channel and broadcast management responsibility and formalised local resistance efforts. Decisions of less harvest rights and access to the nearby magnitude are transmitted through meetings mangrove forest. In accordance with the aims organized by the VCC or by spreading the of the ZPRP, the Government agreed to extend word from house to house. There is no formal the RUMA arrangements to the mangrove structure for information-sharing and, even forest. In these governance arrangements the years later, the locals state that they are Jozani-Pete VCC, rather than the DCCFF, unsure how to express opinions and make would be the local management authority. suggestions in local fora. The VCC claim The DCCFF started to become concerned that they have meetings for this purpose, but that massive harvesting would rapidly reduce few people attend them. Many respondents and severely degrade the structure and quality told us that they only heard of VCC meetings of the mangrove forest. It is important to after they were held, or that household duties note that mangrove forests supply important prevented them from attending. An elderly ecosystem services to the island of Zanzibar, farmer complained that she has never received such as a nursery function for fish and marine a formal invitation to meetings and felt that it animals; protection from storms, floods, would be impolite to intrude. erosion and seawater intrusion; pollution Despite this turmoil, the CBNRM project purification and the provision of fresh water was initiated as part of the Jozani-Chawka (Ronnback, 2002). The DCCFF thus called Bay National Park project. The VCC task of for an increased level of protection in the mobilising villagers in support of conservation mangrove forest in 2002. However, it did was made easier by the involvement of CARE not seek to reclaim responsibility for its International. During the initial process of management from the Jozani-Pete VCC. assuming management responsibility, many The boundaries and level of protection of the Jozani-Pete villagers did attend meetings mangrove forest were decided in consultation and were given various types of training (e.g. with the VCC and discussed with the Jozani- bookkeeping for micro-finance banks) by the Pete villagers at an open meeting. The DCCFF and CARE International. The VCC villagers demanded continued access to the organized tree-planting events and raised mangroves for charcoal production. Several the profile of the activity by inviting groups 'strong voices' spoke during the meeting in and school children from all over the island favour of an unregulated harvesting approach, to join in the activity. But after a couple of but the villagers were generally divided and years, CARE International reduced its efforts the situation amongst them became quite and, simultaneously, compensation funds tense. Our informants claim that the villagers ceased. This was a pivotal stage in making requested more time to discuss the situation many of the villagers' antagonistic towards and to reach consensus, but the DCCFF the conservation intervention. rushed the process and made hasty decisions. Many of the Jozani-Pete residents had not A respondent recalls the open meeting saying: realized that protection of the mangroves was a “It was like they got tired of us.” long-term objective. The villagers claimed that New restrictions on use of the mangrove they had been told that the mangrove forest forest were imposed by the DCCFF and would be able to recover quickly, allowing a broadcast over the radio. However, many renewal of commercial charcoal production villagers felt that the formal restrictions within no longer than five years. Realising hardly mattered, since the lack of mature that they would not be able to resume former trees suitable for charcoal production at this production levels within such a short time- time meant that use of these resources at an frame, if at all, new levels of frustration economically meaningful scale had already and unease emerged. Concern over their ceased. The radio was usually used as the livelihoods also divided the Jozani-Pete village Community-based Natural Resource Management of the Jozani-Pete Mangrove Forest 141 into conflicting interest groups. The struggle Chwaka Bay National Park, tourists paying a over limited resources was not only apparent $10 entrance fee with $2 going to the Jozani- in the village, but also between Jozani-Pete Pete Boardwalk project. The income from the and the surrounding villages that were seeking Boardwalk was to be shared among Jozani- compensation for loss of forest revenues. Pete villagers, the JECA, a newly established local farmer organization called Umojawa The Jozani-Pete Mangrove Wenye Mashamba Jozani2 (Uwemajo) and Boardwalk and villager distrust the Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park. and resentment However, Uwemajo felt the agreement was unfair and acted against JECA by protesting According to informants, there was no that they should receive a larger share given coincidence that Jozani-Pete was the stakeholder the economic loss that their members would group most actively demonstrating against bear as a result of enclosure of agricultural the Jozani–Chwaka Bay National Park. They land within the National Park. Uwemajo felt that Jozani-Pete was the least developed managed to harness the support of the media village in the JCBCA and they risked the most in their struggle and eventually took JECA to in the project. However, the GOZ argued that court in an attempt to obtain a greater share the National Park was an opportunity for the of the Boardwalk revenue. A new agreement village to connect with Zanzibar’s dominant resulted in a reduction in Jozani-Pete’s share development strategy – tourism. A private and an increase in Uwemajo’s share. Neither 1 donation gave Jozani-Pete the opportunity Jozani-Pete nor Uwemajo, however, were of developing a tourism-related, income- satisfied with the agreement and the villagers generating alternative, the Jozani-Pete Mangrove argued that they were steam-rolled by other Boardwalk. This facility would offer guided more powerful organisations in the process. A tours in the mangrove forest, and be packaged Jozani-Pete Village Development Committee with a red colobus monkey viewing experience (VDC) was appointed to administer the and other tourism-related activities associated Boardwalk funding and manage community with the JCBCA. This project was overseen development in Jozani-Pete. The income by the DCCFF, with the idea that the revenue from the Boardwalk was directed to generated from the attraction would support village infrastructure development, such as the development of village infrastructure. The reconstructing a school and a mosque, but initial idea was that the ‘boardwalk tours’ would strife continued as the villagers felt they were be managed through the VCC and undertaken not directly or personally (at a household by Jozani-Pete villagers. However, the DCCFF level) benefiting from the project. became concerned about the VCC's capacity Management of the revenue from park to operate such an eco-tourism activity (this is activities has also been an issue of internal discussed further below). As a result the DCCFF disagreement among Jozani-Pete villagers. withdrew the responsibility of management of As a fisherman put it: “There is always the Jozani-Pete Mangrove Boardwalk and took friction when money is involved. Before it upon themselves to administer and deliver the the (Jozani-Pete Mangrove) Boardwalk Boardwalk tours. there were, in fact, no major conflicts”. The entrance fee to the Jozani-Pete According to informants, a lot of doubts Mangrove Boardwalk was eventually have been expressed about the Jozani-Pete included in the admission price of Jozani- Village Development Committee’s financial management and rumours have circulated 1 A number of informants claim that a wealthy business man from Stone Town heard about the about misuse of funds and power within Jozani-Pete situation on the radio and took pity upon the VCC, and at times also in the VDC. the villagers. He consulted with the DCCFF about an eco-tourism concept and donated founding for 2 An association of farmers whose land has been fully, the Jozani-Pete Mangrove Boardwalk. or to a large extent, embedded in the National Park. 142 L. Rabe and F. Saunders

Some villagers interviewed maintained suggestions or statements, making many that VCC Committee members have been of the informants draw the conclusion that accused of embezzling funds, but none the VCC did not represent their interests. of these allegations have been pursued VCC members claimed, on the other hand, legally. During this time, friction between that they “take everything on, even things the villagers and the various committees of they hear outside of the meetings” and that Jozani-Pete was seen as the cause of many the villagers were making unnecessary problems within the village. Many of the complains. respondents thought that potential economic The VCC, VCD and Shehia share opportunities for villagers from the Jozani- formal responsibility for forwarding ideas, Pete Mangrove Boardwalk had been wasted. complaints and opinions from the people to Open village meetings with members from government representatives, but since there the various village institutions were held to is no clear means to do so, it is hard for both resolve the situation, but tensions around committee members and others to establish expenditure were still present at the time how much information is transmitted in of the fieldwork in 2008 and 2009. This either direction, let alone any resultant action. situation, as well as disappointment with A majority of the informants suggested the percentage share of revenue from the that the VCC should initiate small group Boardwalks tours and compensation for loss discussions or VCC representatives should of land from the government, has, according walk house to house to get a better feel for to many of the villagers’ point of view, not attitudes amongst the community. A middle- yet been resolved. There is still no strategy aged farmer was of the view that face-to-face to deal with conflict between different parties contact is the best way to spread information. involved in and affected by events related to She also thought that more residents would the DCCFF's intervention at Jozani-Pete. attend meetings if they were combined with We were told that, in the past, conflict and theatrical or musical performances. Another disagreement on most matters were usually respondent, a football player/butterfly resolved through discussion between the farmer, argued that compensation for lost disputing parties. The Shehia traditionally work time was the only way to get people had a central position in conflict management to attend the meetings and, furthermore that but, in the case of Jozani-Pete conservation people felt that they needed to be encouraged project, he had been advised by relatives and to participate. A number of villagers across the village elite to keep out of the discussion all social and vocational strata felt that they since the situation had become too complex were not welcome to participate in VCC or and his intervention could affect his public DCCFF activities. support. A lot of discontent over conservation was expressed in our interviews. Illegal mangrove Coordination, communication and harvesting and a failure to act collectively public exclusion to protect local resources from within and without has created a circle of resignation and We were told in unequivocal terms that mistrust. We were told by several respondents Jozani-Pete villagers were tired of meetings. that a group of people had loudly voiced their They did not consider attending meetings as disappointment with the leadership of the part of a ‘proper day’s work’. Furthermore, VCC and asked them to step down (however, they said that they rarely dared to express the informants were all very careful not to opinions at meetings since they did not feel provide the names of this opposition). Even themselves “to be of special importance, so though this protest group never got its way, why would anyone listen to me”. Many of the they managed to create a negative atmosphere villagers felt unable to influence decisions concerning the conservation intervention. It and they did not receive any feedback on Community-based Natural Resource Management of the Jozani-Pete Mangrove Forest 143 appeared that the VCC has also experienced One of the main issues with the internal conflict concerning transparency and institutional arrangements according to power sharing. A majority of the informants the villagers was a lack of capacity and, maintained that conflict within the VCC and some argue, even will, to monitor and had become the last straw for the local enforce infringements in the mangrove forest. management institution. At the time the According to the accounts of the villagers, the fieldwork was undertaken, the VCC had been VCC has never formally punished anyone, dormant for several months and the regular even though we were told there have been monthly village meetings had been cancelled. blatant infringements of resource use rules. Most of the village respondents claimed The informants argued that the reason for this that everyone, or at least “everyone else”, is that the perpetrators always have a kinship cut mangroves regularly. This even extended or social relationship with a VCC member. to VCC members. Many fear that nothing The sanction for illegal harvesting within will prevent people from illegal harvesting the boundaries of the Jozani–Chwaka Bay of mangroves if the economic situation in National Park is 300,000 Tanzanian shillings3, Jozani-Pete becomes even more difficult; regardless of the type of infringement, with a personal needs will exceed the motivation first violation incurring a 15,000 Tanzanian to pursue the common good. A repeated shilling4 fine and confiscation, monitored by statement from a number of informants the VCC with support of the DCCFF. A second- was that “people are crying while they time violator ought to be arrested by the are destroying”. Villagers claim that the police for trial. Originally, a number of guards illegal cutting was driven by concerns for from the village were employed to patrol the short-term needs. People with monitoring mangrove forest boundary but the DCCFF responsibilities felt threatened by those with was dissatisfied with their work and dismissed economic interests in continued harvesting all but two guards and replaced the others of wood for charcoal. Many blamed the VCC with DCCFF employees. One the two original for leading the village into this miserable guards has subsequently been found guilty of situation. Upset villagers told VCC members taking a bribe from illegal woodcutters. He that they would “come and eat in your house, confessed and was penalised but retained his since you keep me from getting food of my position as a guard. Informants argued that the own.” Despite this, several respondents said DCCFF, by this act, proved to be more capable that they were sympathetic with the VCC. than the VCC at enforcing the harvesting Differences in opinion regarding the rules. Some thought it would be more VCC among the villagers were striking. Most efficient if the GOZ took full responsibility villagers were of the view that the VCC was not for the management of the mangrove forest serious and were “playing like children” and and communicated directly with the locals, using their positions to their own advantage. instead of using the VCC and JECA. Others However, a minority thought they were doing a said that the GOZ “has already failed with difficult job well. That said, the clear majority their management of the mangrove forest” of informants were in agreement that the VCC and no longer had the political legitimacy is dysfunctional. Both members and non- to take the responsibility back. According to members of the VCC expressed the need for the many disgruntled villagers, opportunities for VCC to become better respected and legitimate more consistent and systematic participation in the eyes of the Jozani-Pete community. A and discussion in various fora would create a fisherman argued that the Jozani-Pete villagers better management system with more satisfied have difficulty in distinguishing between the and engaged inhabitants. VCC members’ role as community members on a day to day basis and their responsibilities 3 Equivalent to $300. 1000TZS was worth and duties as members of the VCC. approximately 1 USD at the time of the fieldwork. 4 Approximately $15. 144 L. Rabe and F. Saunders

ANALYSIS and DISCUSSION monkey and changing the restrictions on resource use. Further actions followed that Ostrom's design principles impoverished execution of the project. During the initial period, a core number of This section will begin by using Ostrom's villagers, motivated by the possibility of getting (1990) principles to examine how the compensation, mobilised to oppose institutions CBNRM institution is functioning at Jozani- that they thought would reduce their resource Pete. Ostrom's principles are not particularly use, namely the GOZ represented through the useful for examining the social relations and DCCFF. Their demand for fair compensation conflicts that affect CBNRM institutional for expropriation of land and loss of income functioning, so we have also drawn on actor- caused the project proponents (DCCFF and oriented theory to give an account of the CARE International) to increase structural power relations among the actors involved opportunities for participation. To this end, the and affected by the CBNRM project. JECA was established to represent the locals in Management of the Jozani-Pete the management process of the JCBCA. Even mangrove forest runs parallel with the other though the JECA enabled a level of collaboration institutions in the village. The institutional between communities situated elsewhere around boundaries for different village functions the National Park and the DCCFF, the weak bonds seem unclear and local committees appear between 'community' and those representing its to have a tumultuous relationship with each interests complicated the Jozani-Pete situation. other. Challenging situations have arisen Resultant extensive deforestation of the mangrove due to kinship and social relationships, with forest prompted the GOZ to reassert top-down the same people holding positions in several control. The inhabitants of Jozani-Pete felt that different village committees. Dependency they were once again disconnected from their on forest resources for economic survival main source of income with no voice to influence and identity remains strong in the village, resource use. even if legal access to these resources has Since the VCC no longer had practical been constrained (Saunders 2011a). The management issues left to deal with, the importance of the Jozani-Pete coral rag and responsibility of the VCC shifted towards mangrove forests leads to simple assumptions patrolling the terrestrial forest area around the about the willingness among local people National Park. Incidents where the VCC failed to become involved in decision-making to fulfil their responsibilities and cases of guard processes; instead the opposite has occurred corruption weakened respect for the local legal and passiveness fuelled by mistrust seems system amongst the community. Many villagers’ to have inhibited the potential for collective pointed out that the members of the VCC were action for conservation. There are several not democratically elected but appointed by the possible reasons for this, starting with the top- Sheha. Contrastingly, the VCCs’ representative down communication from the government in role is fully recognized by the higher authority. the announcement stage of the Jozani-Chwaka Their relationship with JECA and the DCCFF Bay National Park. Spontaneous protests is well established and in line with the broader were caused by the information being ‘forced’ Jozani-Chawka Bay National Park interests. upon the Jozani-Pete community by the GOZ Even though the strength of the initial without wide consultation. Some locals were resistance to increased restrictions on resource able to negotiate some compensation for use waned, the issues of compensation and loss of land and use of resources within this alternative income remained high on the locals' narrow space for active participation. The agenda. Many of the villagers did not feel that GOZ deviated from the original agreement the GOZ5 has taken its full responsibility in and further increased uncertainty concerning community entitlements by increasing the 5 In this context the informants seemed to identify the protection measures for the red colobus DCCFF, JECA as well as the VCC with the GOZ. Community-based Natural Resource Management of the Jozani-Pete Mangrove Forest 145 the situation, considering that conservation Community attitudes and power intervention has “taken our source of struggle income, leaving us less well off”. There was a widely view that the so-called community Why has the Jozani-Pete CBNRM project representative groups had been co-opted by faced so many challenges? A key element broader government and international NGO in community mobilisation is to create interests in support of the National Park. This a network of support, sensitization and led to the conflict over governance and financial increased awareness about an issue, as well management of the Jozani-Pete Mangrove as to mobilise resources, such as money, Boardwalk Project. The formal institutional time, information and the expertise needed to design of CBNRM projects may appear to achieve the desired objectives (NGO Resource support meaningful involvement, by giving Centre, 2006). The aims of a project need to the appearance of participation, but this did not be relevant and beneficial so that community reflect the obvious underlying social tension and members put their minds and energy into it, conflict among the villagers. Disappointment, and the results need to be sustainable. For a anger and cynicism regarding participation are project to gain enduring community support common reactions in such situations (see e.g. it needs to benefit (at least potentially) most Cook and Kothari, 2001) and were evident in of the community members for a longer the case of the Jozani-Pete CBNRM Project. period than just the initial phase, particularly Our results suggest that a number of if expectations of future benefit were the Ostrom’s design principles, although formally primary motivating force (NGO Resource institutionalized, are not being practiced. While Centre, 2006). The Jozani-Pete villagers saw the boundaries of community involvement a long-term financial gain in preserving the and resources seem to have been defined and forest, but had difficulties in engaging in the mapped, facilitating participation of a broad project when community mobilisation was representation of the Jozani-Pete community not aimed in the direction envisaged by the appears to have been more challenging. Origin, project proponents. Cleaver (1999) found it vocation and age were parameters that either too simplistic to assume that communities included or excluded villagers from the process. can be structured into an organization, There was no congruence between appropriation especially for a cause such as conservation and provision rules and local conditions, that has been exogenously initiated. The as there was no systemic monitoring of the CBNRM experience at Jozani-Pete supports environmental conditions by either the DCCFF the view that projects rarely take into account or the VCC. It was clear from our interviews or acknowledge the complexities at target that many of the villagers did not think they sites (people and their relationship with each have had a meaningful opportunity to participate other and their environment) and that these in collective-choice arrangements, either in circumstances are contextually dependent. terms of deciding the rules of resource use or In the case of Jozani-Pete, the deciding who should make decisions about institutional arrangements run parallel with these rules. Furthermore, the mangrove forest the existing local administration system. The is being managed without any enforcement CBNRM institution does not seem to have or sanctioning powers, at least as described been embedded into the existing community by Ostrom (1990). Finally, Ostroms’s last institutions in any meaningful way, although principle is the recognition of a community’s some village elite were enrolled in its cause rights to organize their own institution without and, as a result, it has been confronted with being challenged by external authorities. Our legitimacy issues. informants argued strongly that the CBNRM It is also highly questionable whether was not designed by the locals, but was initiated many Jozani-Pete residents have the desire to and promoted by exogenous actors linked to the be organized as a community around natural undemocratically appointed local elite. resource management. All informants (except 146 L. Rabe and F. Saunders an over 70-year old widower) declared during encountered were based on individual economic interviews that they were more or less fully interests. Many informants emphasised a sense independent and in no need of the community of autonomy and independence from the village in their day-to-day lives; they minded their society, which raises the question as to whether own business without interfering with their the villagers could develop a relationship with co-villagers. Inhabitants who have moved to the community to manage resources collectively, Jozani-Pete from other parts of the island, creating the link between common good and Pemba or the mainland, found it quite strange their own well-being as argued by, e.g. de-Shalit how infrequently Jozani-Pete residents (2000). interacted with each other. To some extent, Both the National Park and the protection this gave the impression that Jozani-Pete was of the mangrove forest are first and foremost a fragmented village with sub-communities conservation initiatives, which, during the process, anchored both in and outside of the village. have incorporated some democratic aspects and The strong identification with community poverty reduction initiatives (to reduce pressure assumed in participatory approaches to on the local natural resources and build project development does not seem to be present at legitimacy). The creation of local institutions has Jozani-Pete. the potential to create positive synergistic effects A farmer and charcoal producer between socio-economic and conservation goals complained that the Jozani-Pete Mangrove (as described by Cleaver, 1999), but this certainly Boardwalk has added to fragmentation has not occurred at Jozani-Pete. The Jozani-Pete of the village and its common interests: CBNRM, in conjunction with local government, “Before, I contributed, like everyone else, would need help with leadership training, strategic to the village's prosperity by raising funds or planning, enterprise training and development of a performing physical work, such as when we well-functioning local democratic system to meet built the school. We saw the common good. the high expectations of the ZPRP. Perceived Now, everything shall come from Jozani-Pete widespread illegal mangrove harvesting needs Mangrove Boardwalk and I do not contribute to be viewed within the greater context of any more. I feel less a part of the community”. formal restrictions on resource use, widespread According to de-Shalit (2000), social and feelings of disenfranchisement, expropriation economic circumstances, such as the Jozani- of private and village land, and little or no Pete Mangrove Boardwalk conflict, can affect compensation or benefit from tourism. At a more people's attitude towards communitarian practical level, there is also an inherent tension behaviour and thus can result in socio- between sustainable use/conservation goals, environmental alienation, as indicated by some local development aspirations and democratic of the informants views. Furthermore, De- processes (Saunders, 2011b), which was often Shalit (2000) claims that socio-environmental glossed over in the CBNRM project design and alienation is exacerbated when communities its implementation, with dire consequences at are affected by human-induced environmental Jozani-Pete. disasters, such as the local deforestation of the CBNRM at Jozani-Pete seems to be Jozani-Pete mangroves. facing a number of power-related issues, Social responsibility and an interest in internally within the village and with the community development are the most significant external actors/authorities. In a bottom-up motivations for participation suggested in the initiated management approach, a crucial literature. Cleaver (1999) questions the idealistic point is for the community to be recognized imagery which De-Shalit (2000), amongst others, by relevant authorities and become legalized argues is the main motivation behind public as a stakeholder in the national/regional participation in resource management processes. management structure (Bruns, 2003). In There are altruistic rationalists amongst the the Jozani-Pete CBNRM, the challenge villagers, but the most common and strongest seems to be rather that of an institution not arguments for involvement in the project we fully recognized as legitimate by the core Community-based Natural Resource Management of the Jozani-Pete Mangrove Forest 147 stakeholders. Both the VCC members and the CONCLUSION other villagers tend to withhold information from each other due to the lack of trust There is much written in the CBNRM between them. Informants argued that the literature about opportunities for communities VCC has adopted techniques to silence and to organize around the management of natural shame inquisitive and/or critical voices during resources. Often this is described as simply open meetings – perhaps in an attempt to designing and implementing Ostrom’s (1990) maintain their fragile power. This behaviour institutional design principles and adapting has resulted in even less commitment and them to local conditions. This assumes participation by the locals. It also highlights that institutional design corresponds to a tension between the project’s democratic behavioural change in practice, and this is an aspirations and further entrenchment of power overly simplistic view that tends to overlook by the village elite as they harness the new the struggles over power and influence that symbolic and material power of conservation. comes with CBNRM projects. Whether this CBNRM's aspirations of deliberative is an implementation deficit or related to democracy, whether in a stronger or weaker problems with the assumptions of CPR theory form, should be based on the development is subject to an ongoing debate (Cleaver, of the preferences of local actors through 2012; Saunders, 2014). public discussion, and the transformation of Multiple interests are always at play in their decisions into action (Dryzek, 2000). CBNRM projects. The implementation of It is a moot question as to how much scope CBNRM projects that are able to successfully or potential there is for this sort of decision- trade-off conflicting interests and activities, making in a situation such as that described while delivering socio-environmental project above, where the project goals were largely goals, is an extremely challenging assignment. pre-determined by outsiders, and where the At Jozani-Pete, this sort of success has not local elite are the project mediators. been achieved. Few of the factors required If a community is to manage its resources, for public participation have been fulfilled it needs public space and a forum that supports and villagers are generally resentful of the open and transparent discussion amongst its conservation initiatives and are feeling members, with authorities that provide their worse off. Arguably, this CBNRM initiative support. Information-sharing systems need at a minimum would have required the to be developed, as well as open channels secure transfer of power and an accountable, for exchange and negotiation. Feedback on representative local institution, engaged with suggestions, proposals and ideas is crucial the interests of its members, for its success in order to create feelings of being heard and (Ribot 2002). listened to (Glasson et al., 2005). There also In this case, the ‘agency of poor people’ was needs to be more than just the potential for largely constrained by a pre-determined project material benefit from project involvement. agenda and a project focus on building consent Individual and collective costs associated through the co-option of village elite. This had with time spent in setting up and participating the effect of reaffirming and reconstituting in new conservation institutions, coupled with stratification rather than challenging existing the implications of resource constraints, need relations of power and authority, as the project to be manifestly off-set by appropriate levels rhetoric would have it. This case study thus of remuneration from other activities that clearly illustrates the difficulty of setting-up are promoted as being conservation-friendly, exogenous CBNRM institutions to restrict such as tourism. resource use without further marginalising already marginalised people. 148 L. Rabe and F. Saunders

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