The Peopling of New York City and the Civic Engagement of Their

Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 1

The Peopling of New York City and the

Civic Engagement of their Religions Shintoism / Taoism / Torii Gate Taiji Macaulay Seminar #2 Professor: Glen Milstein, Ph.D. Department of Psychology

Confucianism/ Wicca / Water Pentacle

Bahai / Jainism / Ahimsa Nine-Pointed Star

Buddhism / Christianity / Judaism / Islam / Hinduism / Wheel of Dharma The Cross Menorah Allah Om Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 2

Culture, Human Development, Civic Engagement

Three Astronauts On July 23, 1969, the last night before splashdown, the three Apollo 11 astronauts made a television broadcast in which

Collins commented, Civic Engagement " . . . The Saturn V rocket which put us in orbit is an incredibly complicated piece of machinery, every piece of which worked flawlessly . . . We have always had confidence that this equipment will work properly. All this is possible only through the blood, sweat, and tears of a number of a people . . . All you see is the three of us, but beneath the surface are thousands and thousands of others, and to all of those, I would like to say, 'Thank you very much.'" (A very efficient rocket built by thousands of people.) – Preoperational

Aldrin added, Culture "This has been far more than three men on a mission to the Moon; more, still, than the efforts of a government and industry team; more, even, than the efforts of one nation. We feel that this stands as a symbol of the insatiable curiosity of all mankind to explore the unknown . . . Personally, in reflecting on the events of the past several days, a verse from Psalms comes to mind. 'When I consider the heavens, the work of Thy fingers, the Moon and the stars, which Thou hast ordained; What is man that Thou art mindful of him?'" (Ineffable Relationship of Creator and Creations) – Formal Operational

Armstrong concluded, Human Development "The responsibility for this flight lies first with history and with the giants of science who have preceded this effort; next with the American people, who have, through their will, indicated their desire; next with four administrations and their Congresses, for implementing that will; and then, with the agency and industry teams that built our spacecraft, the Saturn, the Columbia, the Eagle, and the little EMU, the spacesuit and backpack that was our small spacecraft out on the lunar surface. We would like to give special thanks to all those Americans who built the spacecraft; who did the construction, design, the tests, and put their hearts and all their abilities into those craft. To those people tonight, we give a special thank you, and to all the other people that are listening and watching tonight, God bless you. Good night from Apollo 11."[43] (History & Legacy) – Concrete Operational

Michael Collins: Speaking for the Documentary, “In the Shadow of the Moon” in 2008 “After the flight of Apollo 11 the three of us went on an around the world trip. Wherever we went, people instead of saying, ‘Well you Americans did it.’, everywhere they said, ‘We did it!’ We Humankind. We the Human Race. We people did it. And, uh, I had never heard of people in different countries use this word, ‘we. We. WE!’ as emphatically as we were hearing from Europeans, Asians, Africans, wherever we went it was, ‘We finally did it.’ I thought that was a really wonderful thing. Ephemeral but wonderful.”

1 ProfessorCivic EngagementMilstein of Religions 3

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D CE NT F l\IA I ' AND

J3y HARLES DARWIN, M.A., F.R.S., &v.

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1 71.

fundamentally identical with the social instinct ; and in the raso of tl10 lower 11ni1itls it would be aUtJnrclto speak of th • e in ti.nets as having been dev I peel from seHHm , or for the happin s of the community. They have, however, c rtainly b en de eloped £ r th general go cl of the comm mity. The t rm ..,.eneral good, may bS·ed wi. 111' of the communit · will hn, uuturolly intiuen

© Darwin Online htt p://darwln·onlln e.orq.uk/ ProfessorCivic Engagement Milstein of Religions 5 11.l.P. Ill. 00 foction which every animal feels when it follow its prop, ,. iurtiucts, and lhe di a · faction felt ,, hen pre vented,. bu (·allcd scll'h-ih. Th expr . .ion of the wibl1cs and jadgru.eut f the memhers of the am community, at first by oral and afterward· by writt n Jaugn ge rve , as ju t re m: rkc•l, as a most important secondary guitlo f cuntlu,·t, in iiid of the social instinct , but sometimes in opposition to them. 'rh.is latter fad is well exem· plifietl by th Law of Honoitr, that is the lttw of ilie opinion of our qual ·, ltnd not of all our country Ill n. Tile bre,wlt of this Jnw, even when the breach i:. kn wn to be strictly accordant with tmo mo· r 1lity ha can ed many a man more agony than o. real crime. \Ve recogui~(' th · uuo i.nflnen •e in tho burn ing ense of shame which mo't of us l1ave felt o,-en after the int 1,al of ye1trs, when calling to mind some accidental bL"cach of tt trifling though fu ed rule of eti quette. The judgment of the community will generally be guided by 80llle rueO thi!i in tho horror felt by 11 Hindoo who break hi' caste in the ha.me of a Maho mctau woman who expo es h r face, and in innumerable other in. tauces. It would he

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10 THE DE •. E T OF :u_.u-. • J'ART L

qunrters of tho world, so deeply impres, 0d on th mind nf men ; liut. it i. wortLy of rcmarl- that a beli f cou- tantly incnlcat cl cluriug the early years of life; whilst the brain i~ impr .!4sible,nppcani to acquire almost tho nature of nu in tinct; and the very e nee of an in • tinct i hat it i followed irnl<>pndently of 1· 1u;on. •ither c·nn we u,ywhy c rtain n.dmirablovirtues, such a· the lm o of truth, ar much morc, hi!:chly nppre cialed b) ome s nige tribe. than Ly thers; 33 nor, agu.in, why simihu· differences pr vail .vcn amonO'st cfrili eel nation . J{nowing how firmly fixed many ltango customs nnd supPr,titions ha,e liecom , we ncud fep] uo !!Ill'prise that the s ,lf-regr1rding virtues should now appe.ir to us o natur l, uppo1-ted n they are by r u. on, a to be thought innate although they wm:o not vnlucd y man iu his early condition . ...-otwi h tandiu.., many ourc< of nerally n.nd r •udily clistingui'h between th higher anrl low 1· inoml rules. 'rlte higher are f nndcd on the . ocial in:tiucts antl relat to th WPlfur of otbcr . They ar uppor od by b approbation of our frllow men uud by reason. 'l'h lower rnles, though orn(l of them "l11•n implying- elf- ·1crifi harcll • de'ervr• to be culled lowol', reluto r:hiolly to s It', nrnJ'owe their origin to public opiu.iou, when matur cl by expn·ience au

" Good iuofanc 'H l\l'C gh·011 by ;\[r. Wnllnce in' dentin• 011!nion' , pt. 15, J 1;!1; and 111urefall~ iu Lis 'Contribution t.othe 'l'hoory of .: alnrnl -,el lion,' I ;o, p. :!53.

11 '!,,nny ou. • Trlyll. of the lGng.' p. 24~. ' 'TLe ThungLl.zlof the Emperor L Aure:Jin Antrn1it111~,'J<:ng. l.r,rn.,lnt., 21111,,,lit., 18(i!I, JJ· 11~. Mnl'tll~ AmdinH was lJoru A.D. l~I. 1' J ...tter io lllr. :.Uill in Buiu ·~ ')lcntnl und rtfornl t-cieuee,' 18() , p. ii~~

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© Darwin Online http://darwln-onlin e.org.uk/ ProfessorCivic Engagement Milstein of Religions 9 CH.!.P,III. MORAL SENSE. 103 sessing such virtues, having succeeded best in the struggle for lire. My chief source of doubt with respect t.o any such illheritanccJ is that senseless ull.$toms,super stitions, and tastes, such as the horror of a llintloo for 1111cleanfood, ought on the same principle to be trans mitted. Although this in itself is perhaps not less pro baulo than that animals should acquire inherited tastes for certain kinds of food or fear of certain foes, I have not met with any evidence in support of tho trans mission of superstitions customs or senseless habits.

Finally, the social instincts which no doubt were acquired by man, as by the lower animals, for the good of the community, will from the first have given to him some wish to aid his fellows, and some feeling of sym pathy. Such impulses will have served him at a very early period as a rude rule of right and wrong. But as man gradually advanced in intellectual power and was enabl ed to trace the more remote consequences of his actions; as ho acquired sufficient knowledge to 1·eject baneful customs and superstitions; as he regarded more and more not only the welfare but the happi ness of his fellow-men; as from habit, following on beneficial experience, instruction, and example, his sympathies became more tender and widely diffu.sed, so as to extend to the men of all races, to the im becile, the maimed, and other useless members of society, and finally to the lower animals,-so would the standard of his morality rise higher and higher. And it is admitted by moralists of tho derivative school and by some intuitionistil, that the standard of morality bas risen since an early period in the history of man. 37 As a struggle may sometimes be seen going on

a, A wril.or in the '~01·th British lteview' (July, 1869, p. ii::11),well oopo.bloof forming a sound j ut.lgruont,e xpresses himself strongly to this

Lf:ltw n tho vari 11sinstinct of th • lower animals, it is - not snrpri'ing that there .Jmulrl he a strug"'lP in mR,n bet w cu his . oci. 1 in ·tincts, with their deriv d vil{u and hi lower, tbmwl1 at the morn •nl, trong r in puli;::es or «lt~ires. 'l'Li!I, 11 l\[r. Galton sR hns renun·hcl is 1.111 th l •,i smprisiug, s man has merged from a state of bi t·uu.rim withii1 n compamtiw1 l'ecent pcriu,1. ter h viuµ- yield to ,ome temptntion we f el of di " tisfa.ction, nn tl o-ou to t Lat fi 1t from oth r aatbfir·d instiu t , c•alled in thl n con <"icmrt1;for we cannot prevent ptvt imnges antl impressions eontimmlly passing through our rniuds, anrl the ·e in th ir \ · nkcned tatc we cornp1u with tho ovor-present ociru in ti.nets, 01· ,dth habit 1-,'

ummary of lite tiu~olast Olwplcrs.-There c·,n b no doubt hnt the diffor •nee betwe n the mind of the lowe · mon and that o[' t.lt highest oni innl is imm n . An nnthr pomorplton ope, if h' (' nld take lL

cil'c t )[r. T,ocky ( 1 H i6L. of :Uornb,' 1·01. l. p. 143) eeemij to a cerlnin ext.Hitto ('(lincidP. , ~ his rwmrk11hl • work on I li, re litllry Geniu,,' l li9, p. 319. 'l'h llukc of ,\ Tf:') II (' Prirnrntl )Inn,' 1 ti!l, p. l ) ho ~01110 good remnrl-. on the coukHt iu man's nature betwt'llu1-ig-ht and m- ng.

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·uch a love memory ntt eutiu111 curio·ity, irnitatiou, re. ·on, ec., of whi h mnu Lou t , lllay be fouml in uo iii ipi ,nt, or e\·cn s wotim s in a well-de,elop ·

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ERIK ERIKSON (1902 – 1994) by Dr. C. George Boeree

Among the Oglala Dakota (or Sioux), it was the tradition for an adolescent boy to go off on his own, weaponless and wearing nothing but a loincloth and moccasins, on a dream quest. Hungry, thirsty, and bone- tired, the boy would expect to have a dream on the fourth day which would reveal to him his life's path. Returning home, he would relate his dream to the tribal elders, who would interpret it according to ancient practice. And his dream would tell him whether he was destined to be a good hunter, or a great warrior, or expert at the art of horse-stealing, or perhaps to become specialized in the making of weapons, or a spiritual leader, priest, or medicine man. In some cases, the dream would lead him into the realm of controlled deviations among the Oglala. A dream involving the thunderbird might lead a boy to go through a period of time as a heyoka, which involved acting like a clown or a crazy man. Or a vision of the moon or a white buffalo could lead one to a life as a berdache, a man who dresses and behaves as if he were a woman. In any case, the number of roles one could play in life was extremely limited for men, and even more so for women. Most people were generalists; very few could afford to be specialists. And you learned these roles by simply being around the other people in your family and community. You learned them by living. By the time the Oglala Dakota were visited by Erik Erikson, things had changed quite a bit. They had been herded onto a large but barren reservation through a series of wars and unhappy treaties. The main source of food, clothing, shelter, and just about everything else -- the buffalo -- had long since been hunted into near- extinction. Worst of all, the patterns of their lives had been taken from them, not by white soldiers, but by the quiet efforts of government bureaucrats to turn the Dakota into Americans! Children were made to stay at boarding schools much of the year, in the sincere belief that civilization and prosperity comes with education. At boarding schools they learned many things that contradicted what they learned at home: They were taught white standards of cleanliness and beauty, some of which contradicted Dakota standards of modesty. They were taught to compete, which contradicted Dakota traditions of egalitarianism. They were told to speak up, when their upbringing told them to be still. In other words, their white teachers found them quite impossible to work with, and their parents found them quite corrupted by an alien culture. As time went by, their original culture disappeared, but the new culture didn't provide the necessary substitutions. There were no more dream quests, but then what roles were there left for adolescents to dream themselves into? Erikson was moved by the difficulties faced by the Dakota children and adolescents he talked to and observed. But growing up and finding one's place in the world isn't easy for many other Americans, either. African-Americans struggle to piece together an identity out of forgotten African roots, the culture of powerlessness and poverty, and the culture of the surrounding white majority. Asian-Americans are similarly stretched between Asian and American traditions. Rural Americans find that the cultures of childhood won't cut it in the larger society. And the great majority of European-Americans have, in fact, little left of their own cultural identities other than wearing green on St. Patrick's Day or a recipe for marinara sauce from grandma! American culture, because it is everybody's, is in some senses nobody's. Like Native Americans, other Americans have also lost many of the rituals that once guided us through life. At what point are you an adult? When you go through puberty? Have your confirmation or bar mitzvah? Your first sexual experience? Sweet sixteen party? Your learner's permit? Your driver's license? High school graduation? Voting in your first election? First job? Legal drinking age? College graduation? When exactly is it that everyone treats you like an adult? Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 14

Consider some of the contradictions: You may be old enough to be entrusted with a two-ton hunk of speeding metal, yet not be allowed to vote; You may be old enough to die for your country in war, yet not be permitted to order a beer; As a college student, you may be trusted with thousands of dollars of student loans, yet not be permitted to choose your own classes. In traditional societies (even our own only 50 or 100 years ago), a young man or woman looked up to his or her parents, relations, neighbors, and teachers. They were decent, hard-working people (most of them) and we wanted to be just like them. Unfortunately, most children today look to the mass media, especially T.V. [and the internet], for role models. It is easy to understand why: The people on T.V. are prettier, richer, smarter, wittier, healthier, and happier than anybody in our own neighborhoods! Unfortunately, they aren't real. I'm always astounded at how many new college students are quickly disappointed to discover that their chosen field actually requires a lot of work and study. It doesn't on T.V. Later, many people are equally surprised that the jobs they worked so hard to get aren't as creative and glorious and fulfilling as they expected. Again, that isn't how it is on T.V. It shouldn't surprise us that so many young people look to the short-cuts that crime seems to offer, or the fantasy life that drugs promise. Some of you may see this as an exaggeration or a stereotype of modern adolescence. I certainly hope that your passage from childhood to adulthood was a smooth one. But a lot of people – myself and Erikson included – could have used a dream quest.

Biography Erik Erikson was born in Frankfurt, Germany, on June 15, 1902. There is a little mystery about his heritage: His biological father was an unnamed Danish man who abandoned Erik's mother before he was born. His mother, Karla Abrahamsen, was a young Jewish woman who raised him alone for the first three years of his life. She then married Dr. Theodor Homberger, who was Erik's pediatrician, and moved to Karlsruhe in southern Germany. We cannot pass over this little piece of biography without some comment: The development of identity seems to have been one of his greatest concerns in Erikson's own life as well as in his theory. During his childhood, and his early adulthood, he was Erik Homberger, and his parents kept the details of his birth a secret. So here he was, a tall, blond, blue-eyed boy who was also Jewish. At temple school, the kids teased him for being Nordic; at grammar school, they teased him for being Jewish. After graduating high school, Erik focused on becoming an artist. When not taking art classes, he wandered around Europe, visiting museums and sleeping under bridges. He was living the life of the carefree rebel, long before it became "the thing to do." When he was 25, his friend Peter Blos – a fellow artist and, later, psychoanalyst – suggested he apply for a teaching position at an experimental school for American students run by Dorothy Burlingham, a friend of Anna Freud. Besides teaching art, he gathered a certificate in Montessori education and one from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. He was psychoanalyzed by Anna Freud herself. While there, he also met Joan Serson, a Canadian dance teacher at the school. They went on to have three children, one of whom became a sociologist himself. With the Nazis coming into power, they left Vienna, first for Copenhagen, then to Boston. Erikson was offered a position at the Harvard Medical School and practiced child psychoanalysis privately. During this time, he met psychologists like Henry Murray and Kurt Lewin, and anthropologists like Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Gregory Bateson. I think it can be safely said that these anthropologists had nearly as great an effect on Erikson as Sigmund and Anna Freud! He later taught at Yale, and later still at the University of California at Berkeley. It was during this period of time that he did his famous studies of modern life among the Dakota and the Yurok.

2 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 15 When he became an American citizen, he officially changed his name to Erik Erikson. No-one seems to know where he got the name! In 1950, he wrote Childhood and Society, which contained summaries of his studies among the native Americans, analyses of Maxim Gorky and Adolph Hitler, a discussion of the "American personality," and the basic outline of his version of Freudian theory. These themes – the influence of culture on personality and the analysis of historical figures – were repeated in other works, one of which, Gandhi's Truth, won him the Pulitzer Prize and the national Book Award. In 1950, during Senator Joseph McCarthy's reign of terror, Erikson left Berkeley when professors there were asked to sign "loyalty oaths." He spent ten years working and teaching at a clinic in Massachusetts, and ten years more back at Harvard. Since retiring in 1970, he wrote and did research with his wife. He died in 1994.

Theory Erikson is a Freudian ego-psychologist. This means that he accepts Freud's ideas as basically correct, including the more debatable ideas such as the Oedipal complex, and accepts as well the ideas about the ego that were added by other Freudian loyalists such as Heinz Hartmann and, of, course, Anna Freud. However, Erikson is much more society and culture-oriented than most Freudians, as you might expect from someone with his anthropological interests, and he often pushes the instincts and the unconscious practically out of the picture. Perhaps because of this, Erikson is popular among Freudians and non-Freudians alike! The Epigenetic Principle He is most famous for his work in refining and expanding Freud's theory of stages. Development, he says, functions by the epigenetic principle. This principle says that we develop through a predetermined unfolding of our personalities in eight stages. Our progress through each stage is in part determined by our success, or lack of success, in all the previous stages. A little like the unfolding of a rose bud, each petal opens up at a certain time, in a certain order, which nature, through its genetics, has determined. If we interfere in the natural order of development by pulling a petal forward prematurely or out of order, we ruin the development of the entire flower. Each stage involves certain developmental tasks that are psychosocial in nature. Although he follows Freudian tradition by calling them crises, they are more drawn out and less specific than that term implies. The child in grammar school, for example, has to learn to be industrious during that period of his or her life, and that industriousness is learned through the complex social interactions of school and family. The various tasks are referred to by two terms. The infant's task, for example, is called "trust-mistrust." At first, it might seem obvious that the infant must learn trust and not mistrust. But Erikson made it clear that there it is a balance we must learn: Certainly, we need to learn mostly trust; but we also need to learn a little mistrust, so as not to grow up to become gullible fools! Each stage has a certain optimal time as well. It is no use trying to rush children into adulthood, as is so common among people who are obsessed with success. Neither is it possible to slow the pace or to try to protect our children from the demands of life. There is a time for each task. If a stage is managed well, we carry away a certain virtue or psychosocial strength which will help us through the rest of the stages of our lives. On the other hand, if we don't do so well, we may develop maladaptations and malignancies, as well as endanger all our future development. A malignancy is the worse of the two, and involves too little of the positive and too much of the negative aspect of the task, such as a person who can't trust others. A maladaptation is not quite as bad and involves too much of the positive and too little of the negative, such as a person who trusts too much. Children and Adults Perhaps Erikson's greatest innovation was to postulate not five stages, as Freud had done, but eight. Erikson elaborated Freud's genital stage into adolescence plus three stages of adulthood. We certainly don't stop developing -- especially psychologically -- after our twelfth or thirteenth birthdays; it seems only right to extend any theory of stages to cover later development!

3 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 16

Erikson also had some things to say about the interaction of generations, which he called mutuality. Freud had made it abundantly clear that a child's parents influence his or her development dramatically. Erikson pointed out that children influence their parents' development as well. The arrival of children, for example, into a couple's life, changes that life considerably, and moves the new parents along their developmental paths. It is even appropriate to add a third (and in some cases, a fourth) generation to the picture: Many of us have been influenced by our grandparents, and they by us. A particularly clear example of mutuality can be seen in the problems of the teenage mother. Although the mother and her child may have a fine life together, often the mother is still involved in the tasks of adolescence, that is, in finding out who she is and how she fits into the larger society. The relationship she has or had with the child's father may have been immature on one or both sides, and if they don't marry, she will have to deal with the problems of finding and developing a relationship as well. The infant, on the other hand, has the simple, straight-forward needs that infants have, and the most important of these is a mother with the mature abilities and social support a mother should have. If the mother's parents step in to help, as one would expect, then they, too, are thrown off of their developmental tracks, back into a life-style they thought they had passed, and which they might find terribly demanding. And so on.... The ways in which our lives intermesh are terribly complex and very frustrating to the theorist. But ignoring them is to ignore something vitally important about our development and our personalities. I The First Stage Infancy The first stage, infancy or the oral-sensory stage, is approximately the first year or year and a half of life. The task is to develop trust without completely eliminating the capacity for mistrust. If mom and dad can give the newborn a degree of familiarity, consistency, and continuity, then the child will develop the feeling that the world – especially the social world – is a safe place to be, that people are reliable and loving. Through the parents' responses, the child also learns to trust his or her own body and the biological urges that go with it. If the parents are unreliable and inadequate, if they reject the infant or harm it, if other interests cause both parents to turn away from the infants needs to satisfy their own instead, then the infant will develop mistrust. He or she will be apprehensive and suspicious around people. Please understand that this doesn't mean that the parents have to be perfect. In fact, parents who are overly protective of the child, are there the minute the first cry comes out, will lead that child into the maladaptive tendency Erikson calls sensory maladjustment: Overly trusting, even gullible, this person cannot believe anyone would mean them harm, and will use all the defenses at their command to retain their Pollyanna perspective. Worse, of course, is the child whose balance is tipped way over on the mistrust side: They will develop the malignant tendency of withdrawal, characterized by depression, paranoia, and possibly psychosis. If the proper balance is achieved, the child will develop the virtue hope, the strong belief that, even when things are not going well, they will work out well in the end. One of the signs that a child is doing well in the first stage is when the child isn't overly upset by the need to wait a moment for the satisfaction of his or her needs: Mom or dad don't have to be perfect; I trust them enough to believe that, if they can't be here immediately, they will be here soon; Things may be tough now, but they will work out. This is the same ability that, in later life, gets us through disappointments in love, our careers, and many other domains of life.

4 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 17

Psychosocial Significant Psychosocial Psychosocial Maladaptations & Stage ( age) ≈ Crisis Relations Modalities Virtues Malignancies I (0-1.5) – to get, to give in sensory distortion – trust vs mistrust mother hope, faith infant return withdrawal autonomy vs II (1.5-3) – to hold on, to let will, impulsivity – shame and parents toddler go determination compulsion doubt III (3-6) – initiative vs purpose, ruthlessness – family to go after, to play preschooler guilt courage inhibition IV (6-12 or so) to complete, to – industry vs neighborhood narrow virtuosity – make things competence school-age inferiority and school inertia together child V (12-20 or ego-identity vs peer groups, to be oneself, to fanaticism – so) – fidelity, loyalty role-confusion role models share oneself repudiation adolescence to lose and find VI (20 to 30) – intimacy vs partners, promiscuity – oneself in a love young adult isolation friends exclusivity another VII (30 to 65) generativity vs household, to make be, to take overextension -- care – middle adult self-absorption workmates care of rejectivity VIII (65 and to be, through integrity vs mankind or presumption – beyond) – having been, to wisdom despair “my kind” despair old adult face not being

II Stage Two Early Childhood The second stage is the anal-muscular stage of early childhood, from about eighteen months to three or four years old. The task is to achieve a degree of autonomy while minimizing shame and doubt. If mom and dad (and the other care-takers who often come into the picture at this point) permit the child, now a toddler, to explore and manipulate his or her environment, the child will develop a sense of autonomy or independence. The parents should not discourage the child, but neither should they push. A balance is required. People often advise new parents to be "firm but tolerant" at this stage, and the advice is good. This way, the child will develop both self-control and self-esteem. On the other hand, it is rather easy for the child to develop instead a sense of shame and doubt. If the parents come down hard on any attempt to explore and be independent, the child will soon give up with the assumption that cannot and should not act on their own. We should keep in mind that even something as innocent as laughing at the toddler's efforts can lead the child to feel deeply ashamed, and to doubt his or her abilities. And there are other ways to lead children to shame and doubt: If you give children unrestricted freedom and no sense of limits, or if you try to help children do what they should learn to do for themselves, you will also give them the impression that they are not good for much. If you aren't patient enough to wait for your child to tie his or her shoe-laces, your child will never learn to tie them, and will assume that this is too difficult to learn!

5 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 18 Nevertheless, a little "shame and doubt" is not only inevitable, but beneficial. Without it, you will develop the maladaptive tendency Erikson calls impulsiveness, a sort of shameless willfulness that leads you, in later childhood and even adulthood, to jump into things without proper consideration of your abilities. Worse, of course, is too much shame and doubt, which leads to the malignancy Erikson calls compulsiveness. The compulsive person feels as if their entire being rides on everything they do, and so everything must be done perfectly. Following all the rules precisely keeps you from mistakes, and mistakes must be avoided at all costs. Many of you know how it feels to always be ashamed and always doubt yourself. A little more patience and tolerance with your own children may help them avoid your path. And give yourself a little slack, too! If you get the proper, positive balance of autonomy and shame and doubt, you will develop the virtue of willpower or determination. One of the most admirable – and frustrating – thing about two- and three-year- olds is their determination. "Can do" is their motto. If we can preserve that "can do" attitude (with appropriate modesty to balance it) we are much better off as adults. III Stage Three Play Age Stage three is the genital-locomotor stage or play age. From three or four to five or six, the task confronting every child is to learn initiative without too much guilt. Initiative means a positive response to the world's challenges, taking on responsibilities, learning new skills, feeling purposeful. Parents can encourage initiative by encouraging children to try out their ideas. We should accept and encourage fantasy and curiosity and imagination. This is a time for play, not for formal education. The child is now capable, as never before, of imagining a future situation, one that isn't a reality right now. Initiative is the attempt to make that non-reality a reality. But if children can imagine the future, if they can plan, then they can be responsible as well, and guilty. If my two-year-old flushes my watch down the toilet, I can safely assume that there were no "evil intentions." It was just a matter of a shiny object going round and round and down. What fun! But if my five year old does the same thing . . . well, she should know what's going to happen to the watch, what's going to happen to daddy's temper, and what's going to happen to her! She can be guilty of the act, and she can begin to feel guilty as well. The capacity for moral judgment has arrived. Erikson is, of course, a Freudian, and as such, he includes the Oedipal experience in this stage. From his perspective, the Oedipal crisis involves the reluctance a child feels in relinquishing his or her closeness to the opposite sex parent. A parent has the responsibility, socially, to encourage the child to "grow up – you're not a baby anymore!" But if this process is done too harshly and too abruptly, the child learns to feel guilty about his or her feelings. Too much initiative and too little guilt means a maladaptive tendency Erikson calls ruthlessness. The ruthless person takes the initiative alright; they have their plans, whether it's a matter of school or romance or politics or career. It's just that they don't care who they step on to achieve their goals. The goals are everything, and guilty feelings are for the weak. The extreme form of ruthlessness is sociopathy. Ruthlessness is bad for others, but actually relatively easy on the ruthless person. Harder on the person is the malignancy of too much guilt, which Erikson calls inhibition. The inhibited person will not try things because "nothing ventured, nothing lost" and, particularly, nothing to feel guilty about. On the sexual, Oedipal, side, the inhibited person may be impotent or frigid. A good balance leads to the psychosocial strength of purpose. A sense of purpose is something many people crave in their lives, yet many do not realize that they themselves make their purposes, through imagination and initiative. I think an even better word for this virtue would have been courage, the capacity for action despite a clear understanding of your limitations and past failings.

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IV Stage Four School Age Stage four is the latency stage, or the school-age child from about six to twelve. The task is to develop a capacity for industry while avoiding an excessive sense of inferiority. Children must "tame the imagination" and dedicate themselves to education and to learning the social skills their society requires of them. There is a much broader social sphere at work now: The parents and other family members are joined by teachers and peers and other members of the community at large. They all contribute: Parents must encourage, teachers must care, peers must accept. Children must learn that there is pleasure not only in conceiving a plan, but in carrying it out. They must learn the feeling of success, whether it is in school or on the playground, academic or social. A good way to tell the difference between a child in the third stage and one in the fourth stage is to look at the way they play games. Four-year-olds may love games, but they will have only a vague understanding of the rules, may change them several times during the course of the game, and be very unlikely to actually finish the game, unless it is by throwing the pieces at their opponents. A seven-year-old, on the other hand, is dedicated to the rules, considers them pretty much sacred, and is more likely to get upset if the game is not allowed to come to its required conclusion. If the child is allowed too little success, because of harsh teachers or rejecting peers, for example, then he or she will develop instead a sense of inferiority or incompetence. An additional source of inferiority Erikson mentions is racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination: If a child believes that success is related to who you are rather than to how hard you try, then why try? Too much industry leads to the maladaptive tendency called narrow virtuosity. We see this in children who aren't allowed to "be children," the ones that parents or teachers push into one area of competence, without allowing the development of broader interests. These are the kids without a life: child actors, child athletes, child musicians, child prodigies of all sorts. We all admire their industry, but if we look a little closer, it's all that stands in the way of an empty life. Much more common is the malignancy called inertia. This includes all of us who suffer from the "inferiority complexes" Alfred Adler talked about. If at first you don't succeed, don't ever try again! Many of us didn't do well in mathematics, for example, so we'd die before we took another math class. Others were humiliated instead in the gym class, so we never try out for a sport or play a game of racquetball. Others never developed social skills – the most important skills of all – and so we never go out in public. We become inert. A happier thing is to develop the right balance of industry and inferiority – that is, mostly industry with just a touch of inferiority to keep us sensibly humble. Then we have the virtue called competence. V Stage Five Adolescence Stage five is adolescence, beginning with puberty and ending around 18 or 20 years old. The task during adolescence is to achieve ego identity and avoid role confusion. It was adolescence that interested Erikson first and most, and the patterns he saw here were the bases for his thinking about all the other stages. Ego identity means knowing who you are and how you fit in to the rest of society. It requires that you take all you've learned about life and yourself and mold it into a unified self-image, one that your community finds meaningful. There are a number of things that make things easier: First, we should have a mainstream adult culture that is worthy of the adolescent's respect, one with good adult role models and open lines of communication. Further, society should provide clear rites of passage, certain accomplishments and rituals that help to distinguish the adult from the child. In primitive and traditional societies, an adolescent boy may be asked to leave the village for a period of time to live on his own, hunt some symbolic animal, or seek an inspirational vision. Boys and girls may be required to go through certain tests of endurance, symbolic ceremonies, or educational events. In one way or another, the distinction between the powerless, but irresponsible, time of childhood and the powerful and responsible time of adulthood, is made clear.

7 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 20 Without these things, we are likely to see role confusion, meaning an uncertainty about one's place in society and the world. When an adolescent is confronted by role confusion, Erikson says he or she is suffering from an identity crisis. In fact, a common question adolescents in our society ask is a straightforward question of identity: "Who am I?" One of Erikson's suggestions for adolescence in our society is the psychosocial moratorium. He suggests you take a little "time out." If you have money, go to Europe. If you don't, bum around the U.S. Quit school and get a job. Quit your job and go to school. Take a break, smell the roses, get to know yourself. We tend to want to get to "success" as fast as possible, and yet few of us have ever taken the time to figure out what success means to us. A little like the young Oglala Dakota, perhaps we need to dream a little. There is such a thing as too much "ego identity," where a person is so involved in a particular role in a particular society or subculture that there is no room left for tolerance. Erikson calls this maladaptive tendency fanaticism. A fanatic believes that his way is the only way. Adolescents are, of course, known for their idealism, and for their tendency to see things in black-and-white. These people will gather others around them and promote their beliefs and life-styles without regard to others' rights to disagree. The lack of identity is perhaps more difficult still, and Erikson refers to the malignant tendency here as repudiation. They repudiate their membership in the world of adults and, even more, they repudiate their need for an identity. Some adolescents allow themselves to "fuse" with a group, especially the kind of group that is particularly eager to provide the details of your identity: religious cults, militaristic organizations, groups founded on hatred, groups that have divorced themselves from the painful demands of mainstream society. They may become involved in destructive activities, drugs, or alcohol, or you may withdraw into their own psychotic fantasies. After all, being "bad" or being "nobody" is better than not knowing who you are! If you successfully negotiate this stage, you will have the virtue Erikson called fidelity. Fidelity means loyalty, the ability to live by societies standards despite their imperfections and incompleteness and inconsistencies. We are not talking about blind loyalty, and we are not talking about accepting the imperfections. After all, if you love your community, you will want to see it become the best it can be. But fidelity means that you have found a place in that community, a place that will allow you to contribute. VI Stage Six Young Adulthood If you have made it this far, you are in the stage of Young Adulthood, which lasts from about 18 to about 30. The ages in the adult stages are much fuzzier than in the childhood stages, and people may differ dramatically. The task is to achieve some degree of intimacy, as opposed to remaining in isolation. Intimacy is the ability to be close to others, as a lover, a friend, and as a participant in society. Because you have a clear sense of who you are, you no longer need to fear "losing" yourself, as many adolescents do. The "fear of commitment" some people seem to exhibit is an example of immaturity in this stage. This fear isn't always so obvious. Many people today are always putting off the progress of their relationships: I'll get married (or have a family, or get involved in important social issues) as soon as I finish school, as soon as I have a job, as soon as I have a house, as soon a s . . . If you've been engaged for the last ten years, what's holding you back? Neither should the young adult need to prove him- or herself anymore. A teenage relationship is often a matter of trying to establish identity through "couple-hood." Who am I? I'm her boy-friend. The young adult relationship should be a matter of two independent egos wanting to create something larger than themselves. We intuitively recognize this when we frown on a relationship between a young adult and a teenager: We see the potential for manipulation of the younger member of the party by the older. Our society hasn't done much for young adults, either. The emphasis on careers, the isolation of urban living, the splitting apart of relationships because of our need for mobility, and the general impersonal nature of modern life prevent people from naturally developing their intimate relationships. I am typical of many people in having moved dozens of times in my life. I haven't the faintest idea what has happened to the kids I grew up with, or even my college buddies. My oldest friend lives a thousand miles away. I live where I do out of career necessity and feel no real sense of community.

8 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 21 Before I get too depressing, let me mention that many of you may not have had these experiences. If you grew up and stayed in your community, and especially if your community is a rural one, you are much more likely to have deep, long-lasting friendships, to have married your high school sweetheart, and to feel a great love for your community. But this style of life is quickly becoming an anachronism. Erikson calls the maladaptive form promiscuity, referring particularly to the tendency to become intimate too freely, too easily, and without any depth to your intimacy. This can be true of your relationships with friends and neighbors and your whole community as well as with lovers. The malignancy he calls exclusion, which refers to the tendency to isolate oneself from love, friendship, and community, and to develop a certain hatefulness in compensation for one's loneliness. If you successfully negotiate this stage, you will instead carry with you for the rest of your life the virtue or psychosocial strength Erikson calls love. Love, in the context of his theory, means being able to put aside differences and antagonisms through "mutuality of mature devotion." It includes not only the love we find in a good marriage, but the love between friends and the love of one's neighbor, co-worker, and compatriot as well. VII Stage Seven Adulthood The seventh stage is that of Adulthood. It is hard to pin a time to it, but it would include the period during which we are actively involved in raising children. For most people in our society, this would put it somewhere between the middle twenties and the late fifties. The task here is to cultivate the proper balance of generativity and stagnation. Generativity is an extension of love into the future. It is a concern for the next generation and all future generations. As such, it is considerably less "selfish" than the intimacy of the previous stage: Intimacy, the love between lovers or friends, is a love between equals, and it is necessarily reciprocal. Oh, of course we love each other unselfishly, but the reality is such that, if the love is not returned, we don't consider it a true love. With generativity, that implicit expectation of reciprocity isn't there, at least not as strongly. Few parents expect a "return on their investment" from their children; if they do, we don't think of them as very good parents! Although the majority of people practice generativity by having and raising children, there are many other ways as well. Erikson considers teaching, writing, invention, the arts and sciences, social activism, and generally contributing to the welfare of future generations to be generativity as well -- anything, in fact, that satisfies that old "need to be needed." Stagnation, on the other hand, is self-absorption, caring for no one. The stagnant person ceases to be a productive member of society. It is perhaps hard to imagine that we should have any "stagnation" in our lives, but the maladaptive tendency Erikson calls overextension illustrates the problem: Some people try to be so generative that they no longer allow time for themselves, for rest and relaxation. The person who is overextended no longer contributes well. I'm sure we all know someone who belongs to so many clubs, or is devoted to so many causes, or tries to take so many classes or hold so many jobs that they no longer have time for any of them! More obvious, of course, is the malignant tendency of rejectivity. Too little generativity and too much stagnation and you are no longer participating in or contributing to society. And much of what we call "the meaning of life" is a matter of how we participate and what we contribute. This is the stage of the "midlife crisis." Sometimes men and women take a look at their lives and ask that big, bad question "what am I doing for?" Notice the question carefully: Because their focus is on themselves, they ask what, rather than whom, they are doing it for. In their panic at getting older and not having experienced or accomplished what they imagined they would when they were younger, they try to recapture their youth. Men are often the most flamboyant examples: They leave their long-suffering wives, quit their humdrum jobs, buy some "hip" new clothes, and start hanging around singles bars. Of course, they seldom find what they are looking for, because they are looking for the wrong thing! But if you are successful at this stage, you will have a capacity for caring that will serve you through the rest of your life.

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VIII Stage Eight Old Age This last stage, referred to delicately as late adulthood or maturity, or less delicately as old age, begins sometime around retirement, after the kids have gone, say somewhere around 60. Some older folks will protest and say it only starts when you feel old and so on, but that's an effect of our youth-worshipping culture, which has even old people avoiding any acknowledgement of age. In Erikson's theory, reaching this stage is a good thing, and not reaching it suggests that earlier problems retarded your development! The task is to develop ego integrity with a minimal amount of despair. This stage, especially from the perspective of youth, seems like the most difficult of all. First comes a detachment from society, from a sense of usefulness, for most people in our culture. Some retire from jobs they've held for years; others find their duties as parents coming to a close; most find that their input is no longer requested or required. Then there is a sense of biological uselessness, as the body no longer does everything it used to. Women go through a sometimes dramatic menopause; Men often find they can no longer "rise to the occasion." Then there are the illnesses of old age, such as arthritis, diabetes, heart problems, concerns about breast and ovarian and prostrate cancers. There come fears about things that one was never afraid of before -- the flu, for example, or just falling down. Along with the illnesses come concerns of death. Friends die. Relatives die. One's spouse dies. It is, of course, certain that you, too, will have your turn. Faced with all this, it might seem like everyone would feel despair. In response to this despair, some older people become preoccupied with the past. After all, that's where things were better. Some become preoccupied with their failures, the bad decisions they made, and regret that (unlike some in the previous stage) they really don't have the time or energy to reverse them. We find some older people become depressed, spiteful, paranoid, hypochondriacal, or developing the patterns of senility with or without physical bases. Ego integrity means coming to terms with your life, and thereby coming to terms with the end of life. If you are able to look back and accept the course of events, the choices made, your life as you lived it, as being necessary, then you needn't fear death. Although most of you are not at this point in life, perhaps you can still sympathize by considering your life up to now. We've all made mistakes, some of them pretty nasty ones; yet, if you hadn't made these mistakes, you wouldn't be who you are. If you had been very fortunate, or if you had played it safe and made very few mistakes, your life would not have been as rich as is. The maladaptive tendency in stage eight is called presumption. This is what happens when a person "presumes" ego integrity without actually facing the difficulties of old age. The malignant tendency is called disdain, by which Erikson means a contempt of life, one's own or anyone's. Someone who approaches death without fear has the strength Erikson calls wisdom. He calls it a gift to children, because "healthy children will not fear life if their elders have integrity enough not to fear death." He suggests that a person must be somewhat gifted to be truly wise, but I would like to suggest that you understand "gifted" in as broad a fashion as possible: I have found that there are people of very modest gifts who have taught me a great deal, not by their wise words, but by their simple and gentle approach to life and death, by their "generosity of spirit."

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Discussion I can't think of anyone, other than Jean Piaget, who has promoted the stage approach to development more than Erik Erikson. And yet stages are not at all a popular concept among personality theorists. Of the people reviewed in this text, only Sigmund and Anna Freud fully share his convictions. Most theorists prefer an incremental or gradual approach to development, and speak of "phases" or "transitions" rather than of clearly marked stages. But there are certain segments of life that are fairly easy to identify, that do have the necessary quality of biologically determined timing. Adolescence is "preprogrammed" to occur when it occurs, as is birth and, very possibly, natural death. The first year of life has some special, fetus-like qualities, and the last year of life includes certain "catastrophic" qualities. If we stretch the meaning of stages to include certain logical sequences, i.e. things that happen in a certain order, not because they are biologically so programmed, but because they don't make sense any other way, we can make an even better case: weaning and potty training have to precede the independence from mother required by schooling; one is normally sexually mature before finding a lover, normally finds a lover before having children, and necessarily has children before enjoying their leaving! And if we stretch the meaning of stages even further to include social "programming" as well as biological, we can include periods of dependence and schooling and work and retirement as well. So stretched, it is no longer a difficult matter to come up with seven or eight stages; Only now, of course, you'd be hard pressed to call them stages, rather than "phases" or something equally vague. It is, in fact, hard to defend Erikson's eight stages if we accept the demands of his understanding of what stages are. In different cultures, even within cultures, the timing can be quite different: In some countries, babies are weaned at six months and potty trained at nine months; in others, they still get the breast at five and potty training involves little more than taking it outside. At one time in our own culture, people were married at thirteen and had their first child by fifteen. Today, we tend to postpone marriage until thirty and rush to have our one and only child before forty. We look forward to many years of retirement; in other times and other places, retirement is unknown. And yet Erikson's stages do seem to give us a framework. We can talk about our culture as compared with others', or today as compared with a few centuries ago, by looking at the ways in which we differ relative to the "standard" his theory provides. Erikson and other researchers have found that the general pattern does in fact hold across cultures and times, and most of us find it quite familiar. In other words, his theory meets one of the most important standards of personality theory, a standard sometimes more important than "truth:" It is useful. It also offers us insights we might not have noticed otherwise. For example, you may tend to think of his eight stages as a series of tasks that don't follow any particularly logical course. But if you divide the lifespan into two sequences of four stages, you can see a real pattern, with a child development half and an adult development half. In stage I, the infant must learn that "it" (meaning the world, especially as represented by mom and dad and itself) is "okay." In stage II, the toddler learns "I can do," in the here-and-now. In stage III, the preschooler learns "I can plan," and project him or herself into the future. In stage IV, the school-age child learns "I can finish" these projections. In going through these four stages, the child develops a competent ego, ready for the larger world. In the adult half of the scheme, we expand beyond the ego. Stage V, is concerned with establishing something very similar to "it is okay:" The adolescent must learn that "I am okay," a conclusion predicated on successful negotiation of the preceding four stages. In stage VI, the young adult must learn to love, which is a sort of social "I can do," in the here-and-now. In stage VII, the adult must learn to extend that love into the future, as caring. And in stage VIII, the old person must learn to "finish" him- or herself as an ego, and establish a new and broader identity. We could borrow Jung's term, and say that the second half of life is devoted to realizing one's self.

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Readings Erikson is an excellent writer and will capture your imagination whether you are convinced by his Freudian side or not. The two books that lay out his theory are Childhood and Society and Identity: Youth and Crisis. These are more like collections of essays on subjects as varied as Native American tribes, famous people like William James and Adolph Hitler, nationality, race, and gender. His most famous books are two studies in "Psychohistory," Young Man Luther on Martin Luther, and Ghandi's Truth. His work has inspired many others, and we now have a journal called The Journal of Psychohistory, which contains fascinating articles not only about famous people but about the child-rearing practices and developmental rites of every part of this globe and every era of history.

Boeree, C.G. (1997). Erik Erikson, 1902 – 1994. Retrieved August 13, 2010, from http://www.ship.edu/%7Ecgboeree/erikson.html

12 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 25 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy

The Iroquois Constitution Before Revolutionary patriots put pen to paper to draft the U.S. Constitution in 1787, Colonial leaders such as Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin studied other systems of government, including an example flourishing close to home: the Iroquois Confederacy. This political group had what Jefferson and Franklin were searching for—a constitution infused with the basic principles of democracy and federalism. The Iroquois Confederacy, also known as the League of Five Nations, was a union of the Senecas, Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas, and Mohawks (the Tuscaroras joined later). Around 1500, so the legend goes, a Mohawk visionary named Dekanawida convinced the nations to unite in order to establish peace and to protect “life, property, and liberty.” Thanks to the constitution they created, the confederacy became a formidable power. By 1750, it numbered about fifteen thousand people, and Iroquois hunters and warriors ranged over one million square miles. Because the constitution was originally not written but only shared orally, the exact date of its origination is unknown. Most scholars agree to a date of 1451. However, Seneca’s oral history mentions that the Iroquois Great Law of Peace was adopted shortly after a total eclipse of the sun. Scholarship indicates that such an eclipse occurred on August 13, 1142.

The oldest living constitution The Iroquois Constitution, which still governs the Iroquois today, is regarded as the world’s oldest living constitution. It gives member peoples equal voice in the nations’ affairs, spells out a system of checks and balances, and guarantees political and religious freedom. Most amazing by European standards of that time, the Iroquois Constitution grants extensive political power to women, who hold the right to nominate and impeach chiefs.

The strength of five arrows. The Iroquois Constitution survives as a brilliant American political and literary work, filled with rich symbolism. Dekanawida had envisioned a huge evergreen “Tree of Peace” whose spreading roots represented the five nations of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois). After unification of the nations, a symbolic tree was planted. An eagle atop the Tree of Peace, clutching five arrows, symbolizes the Iroquois Confederacy—and it’s the image we see pictured on the back of the U.S. quarter. In 1988, to mark the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, Congress passed a joint resolution stating that “the confederation of the original Thirteen Colonies into one republic was influenced by the political system developed by the Iroquois Confederacy, as were many of the democratic principles which were incorporated into the Constitution itself.” Like five arrows bound together, the Iroquois political and literary legacy is entwined forever with the ideals that continue to shape American life. https://ca01001129.schoolwires.net/cms/lib7/ca01001129/centricity/domain/221/the_iroquois_constitution.pdf

1 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 26 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy

The Great Binding Law Gayanashagowa • Kaianeraserakowa

1. I am Dekanawidah and with the Five Nations' Confederate Lords I plant the Tree of Great Peace. I plant it in your territory, Adodarhoh, and the Onondaga Nation, in the territory of you who are Firekeepers. I name the tree the Tree of the Great Long Leaves. Under the shade of this Tree of the Great Peace we spread the soft white feathery down of the globe thistle as seats for you, Adodarhoh, and your cousin Lords. We place you upon those seats, spread soft with the feathery down of the globe thistle, there beneath the shade of the spreading branches of the Tree of Peace. There shall you sit and watch the Council Fire of the Confederacy of the Five Nations, and all the affairs of the Five Nations shall be transacted at this place before you, Adodarhoh, and your cousin Lords, by the Confederate Lords of the Five Nations. 2. Roots have spread out from the Tree of the Great Peace, one to the north, one to the east, one to the south and one to the west. The name of these roots is The Great White Roots and their nature is Peace and Strength. If any man or any nation outside the Five Nations shall obey the laws of the Great Peace and make known their disposition to the Lords of the Confederacy, they may trace the Roots to the Tree and if their minds are clean and they are obedient and promise to obey the wishes of the Confederate Council, they shall be welcomed to take shelter beneath the Tree of the Long Leaves. We place at the top of the Tree of the Long Leaves an Eagle who is able to see afar. If he sees in the distance any evil approaching or any danger threatening he will at once warn the people of the Confederacy. 3. To you Adodarhoh, the Onondaga cousin Lords, I and the other Confederate Lords have entrusted the caretaking and the watching of the Five Nations Council Fire. When there is any business to be transacted and the Confederate Council is not in session, a messenger shall be dispatched either to Adodarhoh, Hononwirehtonh or Skanawatih, Fire Keepers, or to their War Chiefs with a full statement of the case desired to be considered. Then shall Adodarhoh call his cousin (associate) Lords together and consider whether or not the case is of sufficient importance to demand the attention of the Confederate Council. If so, Adodarhoh shall dispatch messengers to summon all the Confederate Lords to assemble beneath the Tree of the Long Leaves. When the Lords are assembled the Council Fire shall be kindled, but not with chestnut wood, and Adodarhoh shall formally open the Council. [ ed note: chestnut wood throws out sparks in burning, thereby creating a disturbance in the council ] Then shall Adodarhoh and his cousin Lords, the Fire Keepers, announce the subject for discussion. The Smoke of the Confederate Council Fire shall ever ascend and pierce the sky so that other nations who may be allies may see the Council Fire of the Great Peace. Adodarhoh and his cousin Lords are entrusted with the Keeping of the Council Fire.

2 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 27 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy 4. You, Adodarhoh, and your thirteen cousin Lords, shall faithfully keep the space about the Council Fire clean and you shall allow neither dust nor dirt to accumulate. I lay a Long Wing before you as a broom. As a weapon against a crawling creature I lay a staff with you so that you may thrust it away from the Council Fire. If you fail to cast it out then call the rest of the United Lords to your aid. 5. The Council of the Mohawk shall be divided into three parties as follows: Tekarihoken, Ayonhwhathah and Shadekariwade are the first party; Sharenhowaneh, Deyoenhegwenh and Oghrenghrehgowah are the second party, and Dehennakrineh, Aghstawenserenthah and Shoskoharowaneh are the third party. The third party is to listen only to the discussion of the first and second parties and if an error is made or the proceeding is irregular they are to call attention to it, and when the case is right and properly decided by the two parties they shall confirm the decision of the two parties and refer the case to the Seneca Lords for their decision. When the Seneca Lords have decided in accord with the Mohawk Lords, the case or question shall be referred to the Cayuga and Oneida Lords on the opposite side of the house. 6. I, Dekanawidah, appoint the Mohawk Lords the heads and the leaders of the Five Nations Confederacy. The Mohawk Lords are the foundation of the Great Peace and it shall, therefore, be against the Great Binding Law to pass measures in the Confederate Council after the Mohawk Lords have protested against them. No council of the Confederate Lords shall be legal unless all the Mohawk Lords are present. 7. Whenever the Confederate Lords shall assemble for the purpose of holding a council, the Onondaga Lords shall open it by expressing their gratitude to their cousin Lords and greeting them, and they shall make an address and offer thanks to the earth where men dwell, to the streams of water, the pools, the springs and the lakes, to the maize and the fruits, to the medicinal herbs and trees, to the forest trees for their usefulness, to the animals that serve as food and give their pelts for clothing, to the great winds and the lesser winds, to the Thunderers, to the Sun, the mighty warrior, to the moon, to the messengers of the Creator who reveal his wishes and to the Great Creator who dwells in the heavens above, who gives all the things useful to men, and who is the source and the ruler of health and life. Then shall the Onondaga Lords declare the council open. The council shall not sit after darkness has set in. 8. The Firekeepers shall formally open and close all councils of the Confederate Lords, and they shall pass upon all matters deliberated upon by the two sides and render their decision. Every Onondaga Lord (or his deputy) must be present at every Confederate Council and must agree with the majority without unwarrantable dissent, so that a unanimous decision may be rendered. If Adodarhoh or any of his cousin Lords are absent from a Confederate Council, any other Firekeeper may open and close the Council, but the Firekeepers present may not give any decisions, unless the matter is of small importance. 9. All the business of the Five Nations Confederate Council shall be conducted by the two combined bodies of Confederate Lords. First the question shall be passed upon by the Mohawk and Seneca Lords, then it shall be discussed and passed by the Oneida and Cayuga Lords. Their decisions shall then be referred to the Onondaga Lords, (Fire Keepers) for final judgment. The same process shall obtain when a question is brought before the council by an individual or a War Chief. 10. In all cases the procedure must be as follows: when the Mohawk and Seneca Lords have unanimously agreed upon a question, they shall report their decision to the Cayuga and Oneida Lords who shall deliberate upon the question and report a unanimous decision to the Mohawk Lords. The Mohawk Lords will then report the standing of the case to the Firekeepers, who shall render a decision as they see fit in case of a disagreement by the two bodies, or confirm the decisions of the two bodies if they

3 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 28 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy are identical. The Fire Keepers shall then report their decision to the Mohawk Lords who shall announce it to the open council. 11. If through any misunderstanding or obstinacy on the part of the Fire Keepers, they render a decision at variance with that of the Two Sides, the Two Sides shall reconsider the matter and if their decisions are jointly the same as before they shall report to the Fire Keepers who are then compelled to confirm their joint decision. 12. When a case comes before the Onondaga Lords (Fire Keepers) for discussion and decision, Adodarho shall introduce the matter to his comrade Lords who shall then discuss it in their two bodies. Every Onondaga Lord except Hononwiretonh shall deliberate and he shall listen only. When a unanimous decision shall have been reached by the two bodies of Fire Keepers, Adodarho shall notify Hononwiretonh of the fact when he shall confirm it. He shall refuse to confirm a decision if it is not unanimously agreed upon by both sides of the Fire Keepers. 13. No Lord shall ask a question of the body of Confederate Lords when they are discussing a case, question or proposition. He may only deliberate in a low tone with the separate body of which he is a member. 14. When the Council of the Five Nation Lords shall convene they shall appoint a speaker for the day. He shall be a Lord of either the Mohawk, Onondaga or Seneca Nation. The next day the Council shall appoint another speaker, but the first speaker may be reappointed if there is no objection, but a speaker's term shall not be regarded more than for the day. 15. No individual or foreign nation interested in a case, question or proposition shall have any voice in the Confederate Council except to answer a question put to him or them by the speaker for the Lords. 16. If the conditions which shall arise at any future time call for an addition to or change of this law, the case shall be carefully considered and if a new beam seems necessary or beneficial, the proposed change shall be voted upon and if adopted it shall be called, "Added to the Rafters". • Rights, Duties and Qualifications of Lords 17. A bunch of a certain number of shell (wampum) strings each two spans in length shall be given to each of the female families in which the Lordship titles are vested. The right of bestowing the title shall be hereditary in the family of the females legally possessing the bunch of shell strings and the strings shall be the token that the females of the family have the proprietary right to the Lordship title for all time to come, subject to certain restrictions hereinafter mentioned. 18. If any Confederate Lord neglects or refuses to attend the Confederate Council, the other Lords of the Nation of which he is a member shall require their War Chief to request the female sponsors of the Lord so guilty of defection to demand his attendance of the Council. If he refuses, the women holding the title shall immediately select another candidate for the title. No Lord shall be asked more than once to attend the Confederate Council. 19. If at any time it shall be manifest that a Confederate Lord has not in mind the welfare of the people or disobeys the rules of this Great Law, the men or women of the Confederacy, or both jointly, shall come to the Council and upbraid the erring Lord through his War Chief. If the complaint of the people through the War Chief is not heeded the first time it shall be uttered again and then if no attention is given a third complaint and warning shall be given. If the Lord is contumacious the matter shall go to the council of War Chiefs. The War Chiefs shall then divest the erring Lord of his title by order of the women in whom the titleship is vested. When the Lord is deposed the women shall notify the Confederate Lords through their War Chief, and the Confederate Lords shall sanction the act. The women will then select another of their sons as a candidate and the Lords shall elect him. Then shall the chosen one be installed by the Installation Ceremony.

4 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 29 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy When a Lord is to be deposed, his War Chief shall address him as follows: "So you, ______, disregard and set at naught the warnings of your women relatives. So you fling the warnings over your shoulder to cast them behind you. "Behold the brightness of the Sun and in the brightness of the Sun's light I depose you of your title and remove the sacred emblem of your Lordship title. I remove from your brow the deer's antlers, which was the emblem of your position and token of your nobility. I now depose you and return the antlers to the women whose heritage they are." The War Chief shall now address the women of the deposed Lord and say: "Mothers, as I have now deposed your Lord, I now return to you the emblem and the title of Lordship, therefore repossess them." Again addressing himself to the deposed Lord he shall say: "As I have now deposed and discharged you so you are now no longer Lord. You shall now go your way alone, the rest of the people of the Confederacy will not go with you, for we know not the kind of mind that possesses you. As the Creator has nothing to do with wrong so he will not come to rescue you from the precipice of destruction in which you have cast yourself. You shall never be restored to the position which you once occupied." Then shall the War Chief address himself to the Lords of the Nation to which the deposed Lord belongs and say: "Know you, my Lords, that I have taken the deer's antlers from the brow of ______, the emblem of his position and token of his greatness." The Lords of the Confederacy shall then have no other alternative than to sanction the discharge of the offending Lord. 20. If a Lord of the Confederacy of the Five Nations should commit murder the other Lords of the Nation shall assemble at the place where the corpse lies and prepare to depose the criminal Lord. If it is impossible to meet at the scene of the crime the Lords shall discuss the matter at the next Council of their Nation and request their War Chief to depose the Lord guilty of crime, to "bury" his women relatives and to transfer the Lordship title to a sister family. The War Chief shall address the Lord guilty of murder and say: "So you, ______(giving his name) did kill ______(naming the slain man), with your own hands! You have comitted a grave sin in the eyes of the Creator. Behold the bright light of the Sun, and in the brightness of the Sun's light I depose you of your title and remove the horns, the sacred emblems of your Lordship title. I remove from your brow the deer's antlers, which was the emblem of your position and token of your nobility. I now depose you and expel you and you shall depart at once from the territory of the Five Nations Confederacy and nevermore return again. We, the Five Nations Confederacy, moreover, bury your women relatives because the ancient Lordship title was never intended to have any union with bloodshed. Henceforth it shall not be their heritage. By the evil deed that you have done they have forfeited it forever." The War Chief shall then hand the title to a sister family and he shall address it and say: "Our mothers, ______, listen attentively while I address you on a solemn and important subject. I hereby transfer to you an ancient Lordship title for a great calamity has befallen it in the hands of the family of a former Lord. We trust that you, our mothers, will always guard it, and that you will warn your Lord always to be dutiful and to advise his people to ever live in love, poeace and harmony that a great calamity may never happen again." 21. Certain physical defects in a Confederate Lord make him ineligible to sit in the Confederate Council. Such defects are infancy, idiocy, blindness, deafness, dumbness and impotency. When a Confederate Lord is restricted by any of these condition, a deputy shall be appointed by his sponsors to act for him, but in case of extreme necessity the restricted Lord may exercise his rights.

5 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 30 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy 22. If a Confederate Lord desires to resign his title he shall notify the Lords of the Nation of which he is a member of his intention. If his coactive Lords refuse to accept his resignation he may not resign his title. A Lord in proposing to resign may recommend any proper candidate which recommendation shall be received by the Lords, but unless confirmed and nominated by the women who hold the title the candidate so named shall not be considered. 23. Any Lord of the Five Nations Confederacy may construct shell strings (or wampum belts) of any size or length as pledges or records of matters of national or international importance. When it is necessary to dispatch a shell string by a War Chief or other messenger as the token of a summons, the messenger shall recite the contents of the string to the party to whom it is sent. That party shall repeat the message and return the shell string and if there has been a sumons he shall make ready for the journey. Any of the people of the Five Nations may use shells (or wampum) as the record of a pledge, contract or an agreement entered into and the same shall be binding as soon as shell strings shall have been exchanged by both parties. 24. The Lords of the Confederacy of the Five Nations shall be mentors of the people for all time. The thickness of their skin shall be seven spans -- which is to say that they shall be proof against anger, offensive actions and criticism. Their hearts shall be full of peace and good will and their minds filled with a yearning for the welfare of the people of the Confederacy. With endless patience they shall carry out their duty and their firmness shall be tempered with a tenderness for their people. Neither anger nor fury shall find lodgement in their minds and all their words and actions shall be marked by calm deliberation. 25. If a Lord of the Confederacy should seek to establish any authority independent of the jurisdiction of the Confederacy of the Great Peace, which is the Five Nations, he shall be warned three times in open council, first by the women relatives, second by the men relatives and finally by the Lords of the Confederacy of the Nation to which he belongs. If the offending Lord is still obdurate he shall be dismissed by the War Chief of his nation for refusing to conform to the laws of the Great Peace. His nation shall then install the candidate nominated by the female name holders of his family. 26. It shall be the duty of all of the Five Nations Confederate Lords, from time to time as occasion demands, to act as mentors and spiritual guides of their people and remind them of their Creator's will and words. They shall say: "Hearken, that peace may continue unto future days!"Always listen to the words of the Great Creator, for he has spoken."United people, let not evil find lodging in your minds."For the Great Creator has spoken and the cause of Peace shall not become old."The cause of peace shall not die if you remember the Great Creator." Every Confederate Lord shall speak words such as these to promote peace. 27. All Lords of the Five Nations Confederacy must be honest in all things. They must not idle or gossip, but be men possessing those honorable qualities that make true royaneh. It shall be a serious wrong for anyone to lead a Lord into trivial affairs, for the people must ever hold their Lords high in estimation out of respect to their honorable positions. 28. When a candidate Lord is to be installed he shall furnish four strings of shells (or wampum) one span in length bound together at one end. Such will constitute the evidence of his pledge to the Confederate Lords that he will live according to the constitution of the Great Peace and exercise justice in all affairs.When the pledge is furnished the Speaker of the Council must hold the shell

6 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 31 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy strings in his hand and address the opposite side of the Council Fire and he shall commence his address saying: "Now behold him. He has now become a Confederate Lord. See how splendid he looks." An address may then follow. At the end of it he shall send the bunch of shell strings to the oposite side and they shall be received as evidence of the pledge. Then shall the opposite side say: "We now do crown you with the sacred emblem of the deer's antlers, the emblem of your Lordship. You shall now become a mentor of the people of the Five Nations. The thickness of your skin shall be seven spans -- which is to say that you shall be proof against anger, offensive actions and criticism. Your heart shall be filled with peace and good will and your mind filled with a yearning for the welfare of the people of the Confederacy. With endless patience you shall carry out your duty and your firmness shall be tempered with tenderness for your people. Neither anger nor fury shall find lodgement in your mind and all your words and actions shall be marked with calm deliberation. In all of your deliberations in the Confederate Council, in your efforts at law making, in all your official acts, self interest shall be cast into oblivion. Cast not over your shoulder behind you the warnings of the nephews and nieces should they chide you for any error or wrong you may do, but return to the way of the Great Law which is just and right. Look and listen for the welfare of the whole people and have always in view not only the present but also the coming generations, even those whose faces are yet beneath the surface of the ground -- the unborn of the future Nation." 29. When a Lordship title is to be conferred, the candidate Lord shall furnish the cooked venison, the corn bread and the corn soup, together with other necessary things and the labor for the Conferring of Titles Festival. 30. The Lords of the Confederacy may confer the Lordship title upon a candidate whenever the Great Law is recited, if there be a candidate, for the Great Law speaks all the rules. 31. If a Lord of the Confederacy should become seriously ill and be thought near death, the women who are heirs of his title shall go to his house and lift his crown of deer antlers, the emblem of his Lordship, and place them at one side. If the Creator spares him and he rises from his bed of sickness he may rise with the antlers on his brow. The following words shall be used to temporarily remove the antlers: "Now our comrade Lord (or our relative Lord) the time has come when we must approach you in your illness. We remove for a time the deer's antlers from your brow, we remove the emblem of your Lordship title. The Great Law has decreed that no Lord should end his life with the antlers on his brow. We therefore lay them aside in the room. If the Creator spares you and you recover from your illness you shall rise from your bed with the antlers on your brow as before and you shall resume your duties as Lord of the Confederacy and you may labor again for the Confederate people." 32. If a Lord of the Confederacy should die while the Council of the Five Nations is in session the Council shall adjourn for ten days. No Confederate Council shall sit within ten days of the death of a Lord of the Confederacy. If the Three Brothers (the Mohawk, the Onondaga and the Seneca) should lose one of their Lords by death, the Younger Brothers (the Oneida and the Cayuga) shall come to the surviving Lords of the Three Brothers on the tenth day and console them. If the Younger Brothers lose one of their Lords then the Three Brothers shall come to them and console them. And the consolation shall be the reading of the contents of the thirteen shell (wampum) strings of Ayonhwhathah. At the termination of this rite a successor shall be appointed, to be appointed by the women heirs of the Lordship title. If the women are not yet ready to place their nominee before the Lords the Speaker shall say, "Come let us go out." All shall leave the Council or the place of gathering. The installation shall then wait until such a time as the women are ready. The Speaker shall lead the way from the house by saying, "Let us depart to the edge of the woods and lie in waiting on our bellies."

7 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 32 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy When the women title holders shall have chosen one of their sons the Confederate Lords will assemble in two places, the Younger Brothers in one place and the Three Older Brothers in another. The Lords who are to console the mourning Lords shall choose one of their number to sing the Pacification Hymn as they journey to the sorrowing Lords. The singer shall lead the way and the Lords and the people shall follow. When they reach the sorrowing Lords they shall hail the candidate Lord and perform the rite of Conferring the Lordship Title. 33. When a Confederate Lord dies, the surviving relatives shall immediately dispatch a messenger, a member of another clan, to the Lords in another locality. When the runner comes within hailing distance of the locality he shall utter a sad wail, thus: "Kwa-ah, Kwa-ah, Kwa-ah!" The sound shall be repeated three times and then again and again at intervals as many times as the distance may require. When the runner arrives at the settlement the people shall assemble and one must ask him the nature of his sad message. He shall then say, "Let us consider." Then he shall tell them of the death of the Lord. He shall deliver to them a string of shells (wampum) and say "Here is the testimony, you have heard the message." He may then return home. It now becomes the duty of the Lords of the locality to send runners to other localities and each locality shall send other messengers until all Lords are notified. Runners shall travel day and night. 34. If a Lord dies and there is no candidate qualified for the office in the family of the women title holders, the Lords of the Nation shall give the title into the hands of a sister family in the clan until such a time as the original family produces a candidate, when the title shall be restored to the rightful owners. No Lordship title may be carried into the grave. The Lords of the Confederacy may dispossess a dead Lord of his title even at the grave. • Election of Pine Tree Chiefs 35. Should any man of the Nation assist with special ability or show great interest in the affairs of the Nation, if he proves himself wise, honest and worthy of confidence, the Confederate Lords may elect him to a seat with them and he may sit in the Confederate Council. He shall be proclaimed a 'Pine Tree sprung up for the Nation' and shall be installed as such at the next assembly for the installation of Lords. Should he ever do anything contrary to the rules of the Great Peace, he may not be deposed from office -- no one shall cut him down -- but thereafter everyone shall be deaf to his voice and his advice. Should he resign his seat and title no one shall prevent him. A Pine Tree chief has no authority to name a successor nor is his title hereditary. • Names, Duties and Rights of War Chiefs 36. The title names of the Chief Confederate Lords' War Chiefs shall be: Ayonwaehs, War Chief under Lord Takarihoken (Mohawk)Kahonwahdironh, War Chief under Lord Odatshedeh (Oneida)Ayendes, War Chief under Lord Adodarhoh (Onondaga)Wenenhs, War Chief under Lord Dekaenyonh (Cayuga)Shoneradowaneh, War Chief under Lord Skanyadariyo (Seneca) The women heirs of each head Lord's title shall be the heirs of the War Chief's title of their respective Lord. The War Chiefs shall be selected from the eligible sons of the female families holding the head Lordship titles. 37. There shall be one War Chief for each Nation and their duties shall be to carry messages for their Lords and to take up the arms of war in case of emergency. They shall not participate in the proceedings of the Confederate Council but shall watch its progress and in case of an erroneous action by a Lord they shall receive the complaints of the people and convey the warnings of the women to him. The people who wish to convey messages to the Lords in the Confederate Council shall do so through the War Chief of their Nation. It shall ever be his duty to lay the cases, questions and propositions of the people before the Confederate Council.

8 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 33 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy 38. When a War Chief dies another shall be installed by the same rite as that by which a Lord is installed. 39. If a War Chief acts contrary to instructions or against the provisions of the Laws of the Great Peace, doing so in the capacity of his office, he shall be deposed by his women relatives and by his men relatives. Either the women or the men alone or jointly may act in such a case. The women title holders shall then choose another candidate. 40. When the Lords of the Confederacy take occasion to dispatch a messenger in behalf of the Confederate Council, they shall wrap up any matter they may send and instruct the messenger to remember his errand, to turn not aside but to proceed faithfully to his destination and deliver his message according to every instruction. 41. If a message borne by a runner is the warning of an invasion he shall whoop, "Kwa-ah, Kwa-ah," twice and repeat at short intervals; then again at a longer interval. If a human being is found dead, the finder shall not touch the body but return home immediately shouting at short intervals, "Koo-weh!" • Clans and Consanguinity 42. Among the Five Nations and their posterity there shall be the following original clans: Great Name Bearer, Ancient Name Bearer, Great Bear, Ancient Bear, Turtle, Painted Turtle, Standing Rock, Large Plover, Deer, Pigeon Hawk, Eel, Ball, Opposite-Side-of-the-Hand, and Wild Potatoes. These clans distributed through their respective Nations, shall be the sole owners and holders of the soil of the country and in them is it vested as a birthright. 43. People of the Five Nations members of a certain clan shall recognize every other member of that clan, irrespective of the Nation, as relatives. Men and women, therefore, members of the same clan are forbidden to marry. 44. The lineal descent of the people of the Five Nations shall run in the female line. Women shall be considered the progenitors of the Nation. They shall own the land and the soil. Men and women shall follow the status of the mother. 45. The women heirs of the Confederated Lordship titles shall be called Royaneh (Noble) for all time to come. 46. The women of the Forty Eight (now fifty) Royaneh families shall be the heirs of the Authorized Names for all time to come. When an infant of the Five Nations is given an Authorized Name at the Midwinter Festival or at the Ripe Corn Festival, one in the cousinhood of which the infant is a member shall be appointed a speaker. He shall then announce to the opposite cousinhood the names of the father and the mother of the child together with the clan of the mother. Then the speaker shall announce the child's name twice. The uncle of the child shall then take the child in his arms and walking up and down the room shall sing: "My head is firm, I am of the Confederacy." As he sings the opposite cousinhood shall respond by chanting, "Hyenh, Hyenh, Hyenh, Hyenh," until the song is ended. 47. If the female heirs of a Confederate Lord's title become extinct, the title right shall be given by the Lords of the Confederacy to the sister family whom they shall elect and that family shall hold the name and transmit it to their (female) heirs, but they shall not appoint any of their sons as a candidate for a title until all the eligible men of the former family shall have died or otherwise have become ineligible. 48. If all the heirs of a Lordship title become extinct, and all the families in the clan, then the title shall be given by the Lords of the Confederacy to the family in a sister clan whom they shall elect. 49. If any of the Royaneh women, heirs of a titleship, shall willfully withhold a Lordship or other title and

9 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 34 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy refuse to bestow it, or if such heirs abandon, forsake or despise their heritage, then shall such women be deemed buried and their family extinct. The titleship shall then revert to a sister family or clan upon application and complaint. The Lords of the Confederacy shall elect the family or clan which shall in future hold the title. 50. The Royaneh women of the Confederacy heirs of the Lordship titles shall elect two women of their family as cooks for the Lord when the people shall assemble at his house for business or other purposes.It is not good nor honorable for a Confederate Lord to allow his people whom he has called to go hungry. 51. When a Lord holds a conference in his home, his wife, if she wishes, may prepare the food for the Union Lords who assemble with him. This is an honorable right which she may exercise and an expression of her esteem. 52. The Royaneh women, heirs of the Lordship titles, shall, should it be necessary, correct and admonish the holders of their titles. Those only who attend the Council may do this and those who do not shall not object to what has been said nor strive to undo the action. 53. When the Royaneh women, holders of a Lordship title, select one of their sons as a candidate, they shall select one who is trustworthy, of good character, of honest disposition, one who manages his own affairs, supports his own family, if any, and who has proven a faithful man to his Nation. 54. When a Lordship title becomes vacant through death or other cause, the Royaneh women of the clan in which the title is hereditary shall hold a council and shall choose one from among their sons to fill the office made vacant. Such a candidate shall not be the father of any Confederate Lord. If the choice is unanimous the name is referred to the men relatives of the clan. If they should disapprove it shall be their duty to select a candidate from among their own number. If then the men and women are unable to decide which of the two candidates shall be named, then the matter shall be referred to the Confederate Lords in the Clan. They shall decide which candidate shall be named. If the men and the women agree to a candidate his name shall be referred to the sister clans for confirmation. If the sister clans confirm the choice, they shall refer their action to their Confederate Lords who shall ratify the choice and present it to their cousin Lords, and if the cousin Lords confirm the name then the candidate shall be installed by the proper ceremony for the conferring of Lordship titles. • Official Symbolism 55. A large bunch of shell strings, in the making of which the Five Nations Confederate Lords have equally contributed, shall symbolize the completeness of the union and certify the pledge of the nations represented by the Confederate Lords of the Mohawk, the Oneida, the Onondaga, the Cayuga and the Senecca, that all are united and formed into one body or union called the Union of the Great Law, which they have established. A bunch of shell strings is to be the symbol of the council fire of the Five Nations Confederacy. And the Lord whom the council of Fire Keepers shall appoint to speak for them in opening the council shall hold the strands of shells in his hands when speaking. When he finishes speaking he shall deposit the strings on an elevated place (or pole) so that all the assembled Lords and the people may see it and know that the council is open and in progress. When the council adjourns the Lord who has been appointed by his comrade Lords to close it shall take the strands of shells in his hands and address the assembled Lords. Thus will the council adjourn until such time and place as appointed by the council. Then shall the shell strings be placed in a place for safekeeping. Every five years the Five Nations Confederate Lords and the people shall assemble together and shall ask one another if their minds are still in the same spirit of unity for the Great Binding Law and if any of the Five Nations shall not pledge continuance and steadfastness to the pledge of unity then the Great Binding Law shall dissolve.

10 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 35 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy 56. Five strings of shell tied together as one shall represent the Five Nations. Each string shall represent one territory and the whole a completely united territory known as the Five Nations Confederate territory. 57. Five arrows shall be bound together very strong and each arrow shall represent one nation. As the five arrows are strongly bound this shall symbolize the complete union of the nations. Thus are the Five Nations united completely and enfolded together, united into one head, one body and one mind. Therefore they shall labor, legislate and council together for the interest of future generations. The Lords of the Confederacy shall eat together from one bowl the feast of cooked beaver's tail. While they are eating they are to use no sharp utensils for if they should they might accidentally cut one another and bloodshed would follow. All measures must be taken to prevent the spilling of blood in any way. 58. There are now the Five Nations Confederate Lords standing with joined hands in a circle. This signifies and provides that should any one of the Confederate Lords leave the council and this Confederacy his crown of deer's horns, the emblem of his Lordship title, together with his birthright, shall lodge on the arms of the Union Lords whose hands are so joined. He forfeits his title and the crown falls from his brow but it shall remain in the Confederacy. A further meaning of this is that if any time any one of the Confederate Lords choose to submit to the law of a foreign people he is no longer in but out of the Confederacy, and persons of this class shall be called "They have alienated themselves." Likewise such persons who submit to laws of foreign nations shall forfeit all birthrights and claims on the Five Nations Confederacy and territory. You, the Five Nations Confederate Lords, be firm so that if a tree falls on your joined arms it shall not separate or weaken your hold. So shall the strength of the union be preserved. 59. A bunch of wampum shells on strings, three spans of the hand in length, the upper half of the bunch being white and the lower half black, and formed from equal contributions of the men of the Five Nations, shall be a token that the men have combined themselves into one head, one body and one thought, and it shall also symbolize their ratification of the peace pact of the Confederacy, whereby the Lords of the Five Nations have established the Great Peace. The white portion of the shell strings represent the women and the black portion the men. The black portion, furthermore, is a token of power and authority vested in the men of the Five Nations. This string of wampum vests the people with the right to correct their erring Lords. In case a part or all the Lords pursue a course not vouched for by the people and heed not the third warning of their women relatives, then the matter shall be taken to the General Council of the women of the Five Nations. If the Lords notified and warned three times fail to heed, then the case falls into the hands of the men of the Five Nations. The War Chiefs shall then, by right of such power and authority, enter the open council to warn the Lord or Lords to return from the wrong course. If the Lords heed the warning they shall say, "we will reply tomorrow." If then an answer is returned in favor of justice and in accord with this Great Law, then the Lords shall individually pledge themselves again by again furnishing the necessary shells for the pledge. Then shall the War Chief or Chiefs exhort the Lords urging them to be just and true. Should it happen that the Lords refuse to heed the third warning, then two courses are open: either the men may decide in their council to depose the Lord or Lords or to club them to death with war clubs. Should they in their council decide to take the first course the War Chief shall address the Lord or Lords, saying: "Since you the Lords of the Five Nations have refused to return to the procedure of the Constitution, we now declare your seats vacant, we take off your horns, the token of your Lordship, and others shall be chosen and installed in your seats, therefore vacate your seats."

11 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 36 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy Should the men in their council adopt the second course, the War Chief shall order his men to enter the council, to take positions beside the Lords, sitting bewteen them wherever possible. When this is accomplished the War Chief holding in his outstretched hand a bunch of black wampum strings shall say to the erring Lords: "So now, Lords of the Five United Nations, harken to these last words from your men. You have not heeded the warnings of the women relatives, you have not heeded the warnings of the General Council of women and you have not heeded the warnings of the men of the nations, all urging you to return to the right course of action. Since you are determined to resist and to withhold justice from your people there is only one course for us to adopt." At this point the War Chief shall let drop the bunch of black wampum and the men shall spring to their feet and club the erring Lords to death. Any erring Lord may submit before the War Chief lets fall the black wampum. Then his execution is withheld. The black wampum here used symbolizes that the power to execute is buried but that it may be raised up again by the men. It is buried but when occasion arises they may pull it up and derive their power and authority to act as here described. 60. A broad dark belt of wampum of thirty-eight rows, having a white heart in the center, on either side of which are two white squares all connected with the heart by white rows of beads shall be the emblem of the unity of the Five Nations. [ ed note: This is the Hiawatha Belt, now in the Congressional Library. ] The first of the squares on the left represents the Mohawk nation and its territory; the second square on the left and the one near the heart, represents the Oneida nation and its territory; the white heart in the middle represents the Onondaga nation and its territory, and it also means that the heart of the Five Nations is single in its loyalty to the Great Peace, that the Great Peace is lodged in the heart (meaning the Onondaga Lords), and that the Council Fire is to burn there for the Five Nations, and further, it means that the authority is given to advance the cause of peace whereby hostile nations out of the Confederacy shall cease warfare; the white square to the right of the heart represents the Cayuga nation and its territory and the fourth and last white square represents the Seneca nation and its territory. White shall here symbolize that no evil or jealous thoughts shall creep into the minds of the Lords while in Council under the Great Peace. White, the emblem of peace, love, charity and equity surrounds and guards the Five Nations. 61. Should a great calamity threaten the generations rising and living of the Five United Nations, then he who is able to climb to the top of the Tree of the Great Long Leaves may do so. When, then, he reaches the top of the tree he shall look about in all directions, and, should he see that evil things indeed are approaching, then he shall call to the people of the Five United Nations assembled beneath the Tree of the Great Long Leaves and say: "A calamity threatens your happiness." Then shall the Lords convene in council and discuss the impending evil. When all the truths relating to the trouble shall be fully known and found to be truths, then shall the people seek out a Tree of Ka-hon-ka-ah-go-nah, [ a great swamp Elm ], and when they shall find it they shall assemble their heads together and lodge for a time between its roots. Then, their labors being finished, they may hope for happiness for many days after. 62. When the Confederate Council of the Five Nations declares for a reading of the belts of shell calling to mind these laws, they shall provide for the reader a specially made mat woven of the fibers of wild hemp. The mat shall not be used again, for such formality is called the honoring of the importance of the law. 63. Should two sons of opposite sides of the council fire agree in a desire to hear the reciting of the laws

12 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 37 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy of the Great Peace and so refresh their memories in the way ordained by the founder of the Confederacy, they shall notify Adodarho. He then shall consult with five of his coactive Lords and they in turn shall consult with their eight brethren. Then should they decide to accede to the request of the two sons from opposite sides of the Council Fire, Adodarho shall send messengers to notify the Chief Lords of each of the Five Nations. Then they shall dispatch their War Chiefs to notify their brother and cousin Lords of the meeting and its time and place. When all have come and have assembled, Adodarhoh, in conjunction with his cousin Lords, shall appoint one Lord who shall repeat the laws of the Great Peace. Then shall they announce who they have chosen to repeat the laws of the Great Peace to the two sons. Then shall the chosen one repeat the laws of the Great Peace. 64. At the ceremony of the installation of Lords if there is only one expert speaker and singer of the law and the Pacification Hymn to stand at the council fire, then when this speaker and singer has finished addressing one side of the fire he shall go to the opposite side and reply to his own speech and song. He shall thus act for both sides of the fire until the entire ceremony has been completed. Such a speaker and singer shall be termed the "Two Faced" because he speaks and sings for both sides of the fire. 65. I, Dekanawida, and the Union Lords, now uproot the tallest pine tree and into the cavity thereby made we cast all weapons of war. Into the depths of the earth, down into the deep underearth currents of water flowing to unknown regions we cast all the weapons of strife. We bury them from sight and we plant again the tree. Thus shall the Great Peace be established and hostilities shall no longer be known between the Five Nations but peace to the United People. • Laws of Adoption 66. The father of a child of great comliness, learning, ability or specially loved because of some circumstance may, at the will of the child's clan, select a name from his own (the father's) clan and bestow it by ceremony, such as is provided. This naming shall be only temporary and shall be called, "A name hung about the neck." 67. Should any person, a member of the Five Nations' Confederacy, specially esteem a man or woman of another clan or of a foreign nation, he may choose a name and bestow it upon that person so esteemed. The naming shall be in accord with the ceremony of bestowing names. Such a name is only a temporary one and shall be called "A name hung about the neck." A short string of shells shall be delivered with the name as a record and a pledge. 68. Should any member of the Five Nations, a family or person belonging to a foreign nation submit a proposal for adoption into a clan of one of the Five Nations, he or they shall furnish a string of shells, a span in length, as a pledge to the clan into which he or they wish to be adopted. The Lords of the nation shall then consider the proposal and submit a decision. 69. Any member of the Five Nations who through esteem or other feeling wishes to adopt an individual, a family or number of families may offer adoption to him or them and if accepted the matter shall be brought to the attention of the Lords for confirmation and the Lords must confirm adoption. 70. When the adoption of anyone shall have been confirmed by the Lords of the Nation, the Lords shall address the people of their nation and say: "Now you of our nation, be informed that such a person, such a family or such families have ceased forever to bear their birth nation's name and have buried it in the depths of the earth. Henceforth let no one of our nation ever mention the original name or nation of their birth. To do so will be to hasten the end of our peace.

13 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 38 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy • Laws of Emigration 71. When any person or family belonging to the Five Nations desires to abandon their birth nation and the territory of the Five Nations, they shall inform the Lords of their nation and the Confederate Council of the Five Nations shall take cognizance of it. 72. When any person or any of the people of the Five Nations emigrate and reside in a region distant from the territory of the Five Nations Confederacy, the Lords of the Five Nations at will may send a messenger carrying a broad belt of black shells and when the messenger arrives he shall call the people together or address them personally displaying the belt of shells and they shall know that this is an order for them to return to their original homes and to their council fires. • Rights of Foreign Nations 73. The soil of the earth from one end of the land to the other is the property of the people who inhabit it. By birthright the Ongwehonweh (Original beings) are the owners of the soil which they own and occupy and none other may hold it. The same law has been held from the oldest times. The Great Creator has made us of the one blood and of the same soil he made us and as only different tongues constitute different nations he established different hunting grounds and territories and made boundary lines between them. 74. When any alien nation or individual is admitted into the Five Nations the admission shall be understood only to be a temporary one. Should the person or nation create loss, do wrong or cause suffering of any kind to endanger the peace of the Confederacy, the Confederate Lords shall order one of their war chiefs to reprimand him or them and if a similar offence is again committed the offending party or parties shall be expelled from the territory of the Five United Nations. 75. When a member of an alien nation comes to the territory of the Five Nations and seeks refuge and permanent residence, the Lords of the Nation to which he comes shall extend hospitality and make him a member of the nation. Then shall he be accorded equal rights and privileges in all matters except as after mentioned. 76. No body of alien people who have been adopted temporarily shall have a vote in the council of the Lords of the Confederacy, for only they who have been invested with Lordship titles may vote in the Council. Aliens have nothing by blood to make claim to a vote and should they have it, not knowing all the traditions of the Confederacy, might go against its Great Peace. In this manner the Great Peace would be endangered and perhaps be destroyed. 77. When the Lords of the Confederacy decide to admit a foreign nation and an adoption is made, the Lords shall inform the adopted nation that its admission is only temporary. They shall also say to the nation that it must never try to control, to interfere with or to injure the Five Nations nor disregard the Great Peace or any of its rules or customs. That in no way should they cause disturbance or injury. Then should the adopted nation disregard these injunctions, their adoption shall be annuled and they shall be expelled. The expulsion shall be in the following manner: The council shall appoint one of their War Chiefs to convey the message of annulment and he shall say, "You (naming the nation) listen to me while I speak. I am here to inform you again of the will of the Five Nations' Council. It was clearly made known to you at a former time. Now the Lords of the Five Nations have decided to expel you and cast you out. We disown you now and annul your adoption. Therefore you must look for a path in which to go and lead away all your people. It was you, not we, who committed wrong and caused this sentence of annulment. So then go your way and depart from the territory of the Five Nations and from the Confederacy."

14 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 39 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy 78. Whenever a foreign nation enters the Confederacy or accepts the Great Peace, the Five Nations and the foreign nation shall enter into an agreement and compact by which the foreign nation shall endeavor to pursuade other nations to accept the Great Peace. • Rights and Powers of War 79. Skanawatih shall be vested with a double office, duty and with double authority. One-half of his being shall hold the Lordship title and the other half shall hold the title of War Chief. In the event of war he shall notify the five War Chiefs of the Confederacy and command them to prepare for war and have their men ready at the appointed time and place for engagement with the enemy of the Great Peace. 80. When the Confederate Council of the Five Nations has for its object the establishment of the Great Peace among the people of an outside nation and that nation refuses to accept the Great Peace, then by such refusal they bring a declaration of war upon themselves from the Five Nations. Then shall the Five Nations seek to establish the Great Peace by a conquest of the rebellious nation. 81. When the men of the Five Nations, now called forth to become warriors, are ready for battle with an obstinate opposing nation that has refused to accept the Great Peace, then one of the five War Chiefs shall be chosen by the warriors of the Five Nations to lead the army into battle. It shall be the duty of the War Chief so chosen to come before his warriors and address them. His aim shall be to impress upon them the necessity of good behavior and strict obedience to all the commands of the War Chiefs. He shall deliver an oration exhorting them with great zeal to be brave and courageous and never to be guilty of cowardice. At the conclusion of his oration he shall march forward and commence the War Song and he shall sing: Now I am greatly surprised And, therefore I shall use it --The powerr of my War Song. I am of the Five Nations And I shall make supplication To the Almighty Creator. He has furnished this army. My warriors shall be mighty In the strength of the Creator. Between him and my song they are For it was he who gave the song This war song that I sing! 82. When the warriors of the Five Nations are on an expedition against an enemy, the War Chief shall sing the War Song as he approaches the country of the enemy and not cease until his scouts have reported that the army is near the enemies' lines when the War Chief shall approach with great caution and prepare for the attack. 83. When peace shall have been established by the termination of the war against a foreign nation, then the War Chief shall cause all the weapons of war to be taken from the nation. Then shall the Great Peace be established and that nation shall observe all the rules of the Great Peace for all time to come. 84. Whenever a foreign nation is conquered or has by their own will accepted the Great Peace their own system of internal government may continue, but they must cease all warfare against other nations. 85. Whenever a war against a foreign nation is pushed until that nation is about exterminated because of its refusal to accept the Great Peace and if that nation shall by its obstinacy become exterminated, all their rights, property and territory shall become the property of the Five Nations. 86. Whenever a foreign nation is conquered and the survivors are brought into the territory of the Five Nations' Confederacy and placed under the Great Peace the two shall be known as the Conqueror and the Conquered. A symbolic relationship shall be devised and be placed in some symbolic position. The conquered nation shall have no voice in the councils of the Confederacy in the body of the Lords. 87. When the War of the Five Nations on a foreign rebellious nation is ended, peace shall be restored to that nation by a withdrawal of all their weapons of war by the War Chief of the Five Nations. When all the terms of peace shall have been agreed upon a state of friendship shall be established.

15 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 40 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy 88. When the proposition to establish the Great Peace is made to a foreign nation it shall be done in mutual council. The foreign nation is to be persuaded by reason and urged to come into the Great Peace. If the Five Nations fail to obtain the consent of the nation at the first council a second council shall be held and upon a second failure a third council shall be held and this third council shall end the peaceful methods of persuasion. At the third council the War Chief of the Five nations shall address the Chief of the foreign nation and request him three times to accept the Great Peace. If refusal steadfastly follows the War Chief shall let the bunch of white lake shells drop from his outstretched hand to the ground and shall bound quickly forward and club the offending chief to death. War shall thereby be declared and the War Chief shall have his warriors at his back to meet any emergency. War must continue until the contest is won by the Five Nations. 89. When the Lords of the Five Nations propose to meet in conference with a foreign nation with proposals for an acceptance of the Great Peace, a large band of warriors shall conceal themselves in a secure place safe from the espionage of the foreign nation but as near at hand as possible. Two warriors shall accompany the Union Lord who carries the proposals and these warriors shall be especially cunning. Should the Lord be attacked, these warriors shall hasten back to the army of warriors with the news of the calamity which fell through the treachery of the foreign nation. 90. When the Five Nations' Council declares war any Lord of the Confederacy may enlist with the warriors by temporarily renouncing his sacred Lordship title which he holds through the election of his women relatives. The title then reverts to them and they may bestow it upon another temporarily until the war is over when the Lord, if living, may resume his title and seat in the Council. 91. A certain wampum belt of black beads shall be the emblem of the authority of the Five War Chiefs to take up the weapons of war and with their men to resist invasion. This shall be called a war in defense of the territory. • Treason or Secession of a Nation 92. If a nation, part of a nation, or more than one nation within the Five Nations should in any way endeavor to destroy the Great Peace by neglect or violating its laws and resolve to dissolve the Confederacy, such a nation or such nations shall be deemed guilty of treason and called enemies of the Confederacy and the Great Peace. It shall then be the duty of the Lords of the Confederacy who remain faithful to resolve to warn the offending people. They shall be warned once and if a second warning is necessary they shall be driven from the territory of the Confederacy by the War Chiefs and his men.

16 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 41 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy

• Rights of the People of the Five Nations 93. Whenever a specially important matter or a great emergency is presented before the Confederate Council and the nature of the matter affects the entire body of the Five Nations, threatening their utter ruin, then the Lords of the Confederacy must submit the matter to the decision of their people and the decision of the people shall affect the decision of the Confederate Council. This decision shall be a confirmation of the voice of the people. 94. The men of every clan of the Five Nations shall have a Council Fire ever burning in readiness for a council of the clan. When it seems necessary for a council to be held to discuss the welfare of the clans, then the men may gather about the fire. This council shall have the same rights as the council of the women. 95. The women of every clan of the Five Nations shall have a Council Fire ever burning in readiness for a council of the clan. When in their opinion it seems necessary for the interest of the people they shall hold a council and their decisions and recommendations shall be introduced before the Council of the Lords by the War Chief for its consideration. 96. All the Clan council fires of a nation or of the Five Nations may unite into one general council fire, or delegates from all the council fires may be appointed to unite in a general council for discussing the interests of the people. The people shall have the right to make appointments and to delegate their power to others of their number. When their council shall have come to a conclusion on any matter, their decision shall be reported to the Council of the Nation or to the Confederate Council (as the case may require) by the War Chief or the War Chiefs. 97. Before the real people united their nations, each nation had its council fires. Before the Great Peace their councils were held. The five Council Fires shall continue to burn as before and they are not quenched. The Lords of each nation in future shall settle their nation's affairs at this council fire governed always by the laws and rules of the council of the Confederacy and by the Great Peace. 98. If either a nephew or a niece see an irregularity in the performance of the functions of the Great Peace and its laws, in the Confederate Council or in the conferring of Lordship titles in an improper way, through their War Chief they may demand that such actions become subject to correction and that the matter conform to the ways prescribed by the laws of the Great Peace. • Religious Ceremonies Protected 99. The rites and festivals of each nation shall remain undisturbed and shall continue as before because they were given by the people of old times as useful and necessary for the good of men. 100. It shall be the duty of the Lords of each brotherhood to confer at the approach of the time of the Midwinter Thanksgiving and to notify their people of the approaching festival. They shall hold a council over the matter and arrange its details and begin the Thanksgiving five days after the moon of Dis-ko-nah is new. The people shall assemble at the appointed place and the nephews shall notify the people of the time and place. From the beginning to the end the Lords shall preside over the Thanksgiving and address the people from time to time. 101. It shall be the duty of the appointed managers of the Thanksgiving festivals to do all that is needed for carrying out the duties of the occasions. The recognized festivals of Thanksgiving shall be the Midwinter Thanksgiving, the Maple or Sugar-making Thanksgiving, the Raspberry Thanksgiving, the Strawberry Thanksgiving, the Cornplanting Thanksgiving, the Corn Hoeing Thanksgiving, the Little Festival of Green Corn, the Great Festival of Ripe Corn and the complete Thanksgiving for the Harvest.

17 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 42 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy • Each nation's festivals shall be held in their Long Houses. 102. When the Thansgiving for the Green Corn comes the special managers, both the men and women, shall give it careful attention and do their duties properly. 103. When the Ripe Corn Thanksgiving is celebrated the Lords of the Nation must give it the same attention as they give to the Midwinter Thanksgiving. 104. Whenever any man proves himself by his good life and his knowledge of good things, naturally fitted as a teacher of good things, he shall be recognized by the Lords as a teacher of peace and religion and the people shall hear him. • The Installation Song 105. The song used in installing the new Lord of the Confederacy shall be sung by Adodarhoh and it shall be: "Haii, haii Agwah wi-yoh" " A-kon-he-watha" " Ska-we-ye-se-go-wah" " Yon-gwa-wih" " Ya-kon-he-wa-tha Haii, haii It is good indeed" " (That) a broom, --" " A great wing," " It is given me" " For a sweeping instrument." 106. Whenever a person properly entitled desires to learn the Pacification Song he is privileged to do so but he must prepare a feast at which his teachers may sit with him and sing. The feast is provided that no misfortune may befall them for singing the song on an occasion when no chief is installed. • Protection of the House 107. A certain sign shall be known to all the people of the Five Nations which shall denote that the owner or occupant of a house is absent. A stick or pole in a slanting or leaning position shall indicate this and be the sign. Every person not entitled to enter the house by right of living within it upon seeing such a sign shall not approach the house either by day or by night but shall keep as far away as his business will permit. • Funeral Addresses 108. At the funeral of a Lord of the Confederacy, say: “Now we become reconciled as you start away. You were once a Lord of the Five Nations' Confederacy and the United People trusted you. Now we release you for it is true that it is no longer possible for us to walk about together on the earth. Now, therefore, we lay it (the body) here. Here we lay it away. Now then we say to you, 'Persevere onward to the place where the Creator dwells in peace. Let not the things of the earth hinder you. Let nothing that transpired while yet you lived hinder you. In hunting you once took delight; in the game of Lacrosse you once took delight and in the feasts and pleasant occasions your mind was amused, but now do not allow thoughts of these things to give you trouble. Let not your relatives hinder you and also let not your friends and associates trouble your mind. Regard none of these things.' "Now then, in turn, you here present who were related to this man and you who were his friends and associates, behold the path that is yours also! Soon we ourselves will be left in that place. For this reason hold yourselves in restraint as you go from place to place. In your actions and in your conversation do no idle thing. Speak not idle talk neither gossip. Be careful of this and speak not and do not give way to evil behavior. One year is the time that you must abstain from unseemly levity but if you can not do this for ceremony, ten days is the time to regard these things for respect." 109. At the funeral of a War Chief, say: "Now we become reconciled as you start away. You were once a War Chief of the Five Nations' Confederacy and the United People trusted you as their guard from the enemy." (The remainder is the same as the address at the funeral of a Lord). 110. At the funeral of a Warrior, say:

18 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 43 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy "Now we become reconciled as you start away. Once you were a devoted provider and protector of your family and you were ever ready to take part in battles for the Five Nations' Confederacy. The United People trusted you." (The remainder is the same as the address at the funeral of a Lord). 111. At the funeral of a young man, say: "Now we become reconciled as you start away. In the beginning of your career you are taken away and the flower of your life is withered away." (The remainder is the same as the address at the funeral of a Lord). 112. At the funeral of a chief woman, say: "Now we become reconciled as you start away. You were once a chief woman in the Five Nations' Confederacy. You once were a mother of the nations. Now we release you for it is true that it is no longer possible for us to walk about together on the earth. Now, therefore, we lay it (the body) here. Here we lay it away. Now then we say to you, 'Persevere onward to the place where the Creator dwells in peace. Let not the things of the earth hinder you. Let nothing that transpired while you lived hinder you. Looking after your family was a sacred duty and you were faithful. You were one of the many joint heirs of the Lordship titles. Feastings were yours and you had pleasant occasions. . ." (The remainder is the same as the address at the funeral of a Lord). 113. At the funeral of a woman of the people, say: "Now we become reconciled as you start away. You were once a woman in the flower of life and the bloom is now withered away. You once held a sacred position as a mother of the nation. (Etc.) Looking after your family was a sacred duty and you were faithful. Feastings . . . (etc.)" (The remainder is the same as the address at the funeral of a Lord). 114. At the funeral of an infant or young woman, say: "Now we become reconciled as you start away. You were a tender bud and gladdened our hearts for only a few days. Now the bloom has withered away . . . (etc.) Let none of the things that transpired on earth hinder you. Let nothing that happened while you lived hinder you." (The remainder is the same as the address at the funeral of a Lord). [ Editors note: the above ellipses and 'etc.' remarks are transcribed directly from the text I copied. ] 115. When an infant dies within three days, mourning shall continue only five days. Then shall you gather the little boys and girls at the house of mourning and at the funeral feast a speaker shall address the children and bid them be happy once more, though by a death, gloom has been cast over them. Then shall the black clouds roll away and the sky shall show blue once more. Then shall the children be again in sunshine. 116. When a dead person is brought to the burial place, the speaker on the opposite side of the Council Fire shall bid the bereaved family cheer their minds once again and rekindle their hearth fires in peace, to put their house in order and once again be in brightness for darkness has covered them. He shall say that the black clouds shall roll away and that the bright blue sky is visible once more. Therefore shall they be in peace in the sunshine again. 117. Three strings of shell one span in length shall be employed in addressing the assemblage at the burial of the dead. The speaker shall say: "Hearken you who are here, this body is to be covered. Assemble in this place again ten days hence for it is the decree of the Creator that mourning shall cease when ten days have expired. Then shall a feast be made." Then at the expiration of ten days the speaker shall say:"Continue to listen you who are here. The ten days of mourning have expired and your minds must now be freed of sorrow as before the loss of a relative. The relatives have decided to make a little compensation to those who have assisted at the funeral. It is a mere expression of thanks. This is to the one who did the cooking while the body was lying in the house. Let her come forward and receive this gift and be dismissed from the task." In substance this shall be repeated for every one who assisted in any way until all have been remembered.

19 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 44 Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace – Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy

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Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 45 Commentary

Abstract Cross-cultural psychology involves both the cultural understandings of behaviour and the comparative analysis of these understandings. The emic and etic approaches proposed by Pike were seen by him as complementary, rather than alternative, or even conﬂicting, ways of achieving these understandings. With Pike’s original conception as a basis, the cultural and the comparative aspects of the ﬁeld are viewed as symbiotic, allowing for ecological and cultural explorations of the development of human behaviour, both within and across settings. Key Words cross-cultural, emic, etic J.W. Berry Queen’s University, Canada

Emics and Etics: A Symbiotic Conception

The article by Hede Helfrich (1999) is a bold and comprehensive attempt to deal with a set of fundamental issues facing the ﬁeld of cross-cultural psychology. Since space is limited, I propose to focus my comments on her understanding and presentation of these issues, more than on her resolution of them. In taking this approach, I present my own, somewhat different, understanding of the basic issues, and hence arrive at a different resolution. For ease of linking my commentary to the original article, I have organized my material to parallel the original.

The Goals of Cross-Cultural Psychology In earlier considerations of this topic I (Berry, 1969, 1989; Berry & Dasen, 1974) proposed three goals for cross-cultural psychology. In order to understand human behaviour in its cultural context, a three- step process was suggested. First is to transport and test our current psychological knowledge and perspectives by using them in other cultures in order to learn if they are valid; second is to explore and discover new aspects of the phenomenon being studied in local cultural terms; and third is to integrate what has been learned from these ﬁrst two approaches in order to generate a more nearly universal psychol-

Culture & Psychology Copyright ȯ 1999 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) Vol. 5(2): 165–171 [1354–067X(199906)5:2;165–171;008109]

Downloaded from http://cap.sagepub.com at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on March 7, 2010 Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 46 Culture & Psychology 5(2) ogy, one that has pan-human validity. The existence of universals in other disciplines (e.g. biology, linguistics, sociology, anthropology) provided some basis for the assumption that we would be able to work our way through to this third goal with some success. In this overall sequence, the increasing emphasis on a ‘cultural’ perspective in psychology can be seen as corresponding to the second step, following the ﬁrst phase of comparative studies; eventually the ‘cultural’ and the ‘comparative’ goals will be viewed as complementary, and, taken together, will produce a ‘cross-cultural psychology’. This process is dynamic, sequential and continuous, in which arrival at the third goal becomes the starting point for the next phase of research on a particular topic. These three goals have their counterparts in the emic/etic terminology. My initial (and still current) view is that both approaches are necessary to the developing ﬁeld: local knowledge and interpretations (the emic approach) are essential, but more than one study is required in order to be able to relate variations in cultural context to variations in behaviour (the etic approach). These two notions became elaborated. First was the notion of imposed etic (Berry, 1969), which served as the starting point for comparative research (cf. the ‘transport and test’ goal), since it was obvious that all psychologists necessarily carry their own culturally based perspectives with them when studying other cultures; these perspectives were initial sources of bias (usually Euro- american), to be confronted and reduced as work progressed in the other culture(s). Second was the need for emic exploration of psychological phenomena, and for understanding them in local cultural terms (cf. the second goal); this provided the important culturally based meanings that were most probably missed when making the initial imposed etic approach to psychological phenomena in various cultures. Third was the derived etic, which might possibly be discerned following extensive use of emic approaches in a number of cultures; it was expected that some similarities in psychological phenomena might be derived by the comparative examination of behaviour in various cultures (cf. the third goal, possibly leading to ‘universals’).

The Etic and Emic Approaches Having drawn these terms into the presentation, it is important to consider their origins and fundamental meanings. While there is a ‘tension’ between them, it is clear that Pike (1967) did not consider them to pose a ‘dilemma’ (both of these terms are used in the title of Helfrich’s article), nor did he view them as opposites (as suggested in

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Downloaded from http://cap.sagepub.com at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on March 7, 2010 Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 47 Berry Emics and Etics the phrase ‘etic vs emic approaches’ in the list of key words for her article). On the contrary, Pike (1967) saw the distinction between the two terms as ‘partially arbitrary’, and considered that the results of their use ‘shade into one another’: It proves convenient—though partially arbitrary—to describe behavior from two different standpoints, which lead to results which shade into one another. The etic viewpoint studies behavior as from outside of a particular system, and as an essential initial approach to an alien system. The emic viewpoint results from studying behavior as from inside the system. (I coined the words etic and emic from the words phonetic and phonemic, following the conventional linguistic usage of these latter terms. The short terms are used in an analogous manner, but for more general purposes.) (p. 37) Moreover, Pike (1967, p. 40) was very clear about two further aspects that underpin their relationship. One is that both the etic and emic approaches are of value; neither is more important than the other. The value of the etic approach is fourfold: first, it provides a broad perspective and training about differing events around the world, so that similarities and differences can be recognized; second, techniques for recording differing phenomena can be acquired; third, an etic approach is the only point of entry, since there is ‘no other way to begin an analysis than by starting with a rough, tentative (and inaccurate) etic description of it’ (p. 40); and, fourth, an etic comparison of selected cultures may allow a researcher to meet practical demands, such as financial limitations or time pressures. The value of the emic approach is threefold: first, it permits an understanding of the way in which a language or culture is constructed, ‘not as a series of miscellaneous parts, but as a working whole’ (p. 41); second, it helps one to understand individuals in their daily lives, including their attitudes, motives, interests and personality (note the particular relevance here to psychological interests); and, third, the emic approach ‘provides the only basis upon which a predictive science of behavior can be expected to make some of its greatest progress, since even statistical predictive studies will in many instances prove invalid’ (p. 41) (note the relevance of this claim to the idiographic-nomothetic distinction in psychology). The second additional point Pike made was that emic and etic standpoints do not form a dichotomy. He likens them to the two perspectives in a stereographic picture: superficially they look alike, on closer inspection they are notably different, but taken together ‘this added perception is startling indeed’ (p. 41).

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Through the etic ‘lens’ the analyst views the data in tacit reference to a perspective oriented to all comparable events (whether sounds, ceremonies, activities), of all peoples, of all parts of the earth; through the other lens, the emic one, he views the same events in that particular culture, as it and it alone is structured. The result is a kind of ‘tri-dimensional understanding’ of human behavior instead of a ‘ﬂat’ etic one. (Pike, 1967, p. 41) In other words, ‘emic and etic data do not constitute a rigid dichotomy of data, but often present the same data from two points of view. (p. 41) In sum, I understand Pike’s view of the relationship between the emic and etic approaches as symbiotic, rather than posing a dilemma or as being opposites. Given this different understanding of the basic issue, I have a different view of how they might be used in constructing theoretical and operational frameworks for cross-cultural psychology.

Context, Development and Performance In order to understand human development and performance, it is essential to understand the contexts in which development took place, and in which it now occurs. My own view of context–behaviour relationship has evolved over the years (Berry, 1976; Berry et al., 1986; Mishra, Sinha, & Berry, 1996), and was the topic of an earlier ‘commentary’ in this journal (Berry, 1995). As in the proposal by Helfrich, my own framework incorporates aspects of context (primarily ecological and socio-political habitats), cultural (and biological) adaptations to these contexts, and individual behaviours (both competence and performance aspects) in adaptation to contextual and cultural settings. This framework has been used in empirical studies both within and across cultures over the years. It has been extended in a supplementary framework by a further analysis of how individuals develop in their particular ecological and cultural settings (Berry, 1980). Taken together, they address a number of themes taken up by Helfrich, including ‘indigenous’ psychological approaches (e.g. Kim & Berry, 1993) and how one might move from the ‘indigenous’ to the ‘universal’ (Berry & Kim, 1993). These frameworks also deal with culture (and ecology) both as treatment and as organismic variables. For me, ecological and cultural factors constitute ‘treatments’ when they pre-exist the developing individual, and are thus largely beyond their inﬂuence or control; in a sense, they are ‘lying in wait’ for the developing organism, and hence are likely to inﬂuence, to nurture and to shape it. However, just as clearly, the consequences of these organism–environment interactions

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Downloaded from http://cap.sagepub.com at Mina Rees Library/CUNY Graduate Center on March 7, 2010 Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 49 Berry Emics and Etics become incorporated into the repertoire of the individual, and thus also become organismic factors. To expand on the first point, the two ecological frameworks mentioned above (Berry, 1976, 1980) posit the prior existence of physical (e.g. climate, habitat), socio-cultural (e.g. population density, social stratification) and transmission (e.g. values and styles of socialization and enculturation) variables. These contextual settings arise and persist over generations as relatively stable features of populations into which neonates are inserted. It is in this sense they ‘lie in wait’ for individuals who enter the culture. While individuals have an interactive relationship with them, in my view they are substantially unmoved by particular individuals: cultures exist before any one individual participates in them (see Kroeber, 1917). To expand on the second point, over the course of development, individuals incorporate major features of their culture into their behavioural repertoire; in this sense they become their culture to a large extent as a result of prolonged enculturation. In the first case, one can claim that ecological and cultural contexts are ‘independent’ of a particular individual, since they are in place prior to, and apart from, the individual. In the second case, since culture becomes incorporated into the individual during development, some aspects are no longer ‘independent’. Hence, ‘culture’ cannot unambiguously be taken as an ‘independent’ variable; it may sometimes approach this status, but rarely does it completely achieve it. Furthermore, and following from this, comparative studies of human development and behaviour can never be ‘quasi-experimental’ (as suggested by Helfrich). In our conception of cross-cultural research designs (see Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992, Table 9.1), research within these frameworks can approach this status, but not attain it. This perspective is most concretely expressed in the ecological (context–organism–behaviour) framework (Berry, 1980), which is based loosely on Brunswick’s (1957) transactional functionalism. Briefly, in my version, individuals, while born into an established ecological and cultural matrix of potential experiences, are differentially exposed to features of this matrix for many reasons (such as age, gender, family status, temperament, aptitudes, etc). As a result, differential repertoires (competencies) are developed across individuals within cultures, which then have the status of organismic variables. Contextual factors continue to play the role of independent variables; however, they now serve to ‘set the stage’ (Berland, 1983), to make it appropriate for a particular competency to become a performance.

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Conclusion If one starts with a symbiotic conception of the emic and etic approaches to understanding human development and behaviour within and across cultures, frameworks can be developed that build upon their interplay. However, if they are viewed being opposed in some way, then one becomes drawn unnecessarily into attempts to resolve their putative differences.

References Berland, J. (1983). Dress rehearsals for psychological performance. In S. Irvine & J.W. Berry (Eds.), Human assessment and cultural factors (pp. 139–154). New York: Plenum. Berry, J.W. (1969). On cross-cultural comparability. International Journal of Psychology, 4 , 119–128. Berry, J.W. (1976). Human ecology and cognitive style: Comparative studies in cultural and psychological adaptation. New York: Sage/Halsted. Berry, J.W. (1980). Ecological analyses for cross-cultural psychology. In N. Warren (Ed.), Studies in cross-cultural psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 157–189). London: Academic Press. Berry, J.W. (1989). Imposed etics, emics and derived etics: The operationalization of a compelling idea. International Journal of Psychology, 24, 721–735. Berry, J.W. (1995). The descendants of a model. Culture & Psychology, 1, 311–318. Berry, J.W., & Dasen, P.R. (Eds.). (1974). Culture and cognition. London: Methuen Berry, J.W., & Kim, U. (1993).The way ahead: From indigenous psychologies to a universal psychology. In U. Kim & J.W. Berry (Eds.), Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context (pp. 277–280). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Berry, J.W., Poortinga, Y., Segall, M., & Dasen, P. (1992). Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications. New York: Cambridge University Press. Berry, J.W. , van de Koppel, J.M.H., Senechal, C., Annis, R.C., Bahuchet, S., Cavilia-Sforza, L.L., & Witkin, H.A. (1986). On the edge of the forest: Cultural adaptation and cognitive development in Central Africa. Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger. Brunswick, E. (1957). Perception and the representative design of psychological experiments. Berkeley: University of California Press. Helfrich, H. (1999). Beyond the dilemma of cross-cultural psychology: Resolving the tension between etic and emic approaches. Culture & Psychology, 5(2), 131–153. Kim, U., & Berry, J.W. (Eds.) (1993). Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context . Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Kroeber, A. (1917). The superorganic. American Anthropologist, 19 , 163–213.

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Mishra, R.C., Sinha, D., & Berry, J.W. (1996). Ecology, acculturation and psychological adaptation: A study of Adivasis in Bihar. Delhi: Sage. Pike, K.L. (1967). Language in relation to a uniﬁed theory of the structure of human behavior. The Hague: Mouton.

Biography J.W. BERRY is a Professor of Psychology at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario. He received his B.A. from Sir George Williams University (Montreal) in 1963, and his Ph.D. from the University of Edinburgh in 1966. He has been a lecturer at the University of Sydney for three years, a Fellow of The Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study and a visiting Professor at the Université de Nice and the Université de Genève. He is a past president of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology, and has been an Associate Editor of the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. He is the author or editor of 25 books in the areas of cross-cultural, social and cognitive psychology, and is particularly interested in the application of cross-cultural psychology to public policy and programmes in the areas of acculturation, multiculturalism, immigration, health and education. He is the 1998 winner of the D.O. Hebb Award from the Canadian Psychological Association for contributions to psychology as a science. ADDRESS: John W. Berry, Psychology Department, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7L 3N6. [email: [email protected]]

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• • CHAPTER TWO •

Folk Psychology as an Instrument of Culture

N THE FIRST CHAPTER I recounted how the cognitive revolution had been diverted from its originating impulse by the computational metaphor, and I argued in favor of a renewal and refreshment of the original revolution, a revolu tion inspired by the conviction that the central concept of a hwnan psychology is meaning and the processes and transac tions involved in the construction of meanings. This conviction is based upon two connected arguments. The first is that to understand man you must understand how his experiences and his acts are shaped by his intentional states, and the second is that the form of these intentional states is realized only through participation in the symbolic systems of the culture. Indeed, the very shape of our lives the rough and perpetually changing draft of our autobiography that we carry in our minds-is understandable to ourselves and to • ( others only by virtue of those culrural systems of interpreta

; tion. But culrure is also constirutive of mind. By virtue of this ; • acrualization in culture, meaning achieves a form that is public '• I and conunnnal rather than private and autistic. Only by replac

. ing this transactional model of mind with an isolating individ l

I ualistic one have Anglo-American philosophers been able to I

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• - ' • Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 54

• Acts of Meaning •

make Other Minds seem so opaque and impenetrable. When we enter human life, it is as if we walk on stage into a play

whose enacanent is already ,in progress a play whose somewhat open plot determines what parts we may play and toward what denouements we may be heading. Others on stage already have a sense of what the play is about, enough of a sense to make negotiation with a newcomer possible. The view I am proposing· reverses the traditional relation of biology and culture with respect to human nature. It is the character of man's biological inheritance, I asserted, that it does not direct or shape human action and experience, does not serve as the universal cause. Rather, it imposes constraints on action, constraints whose effects are modifiable. Cultures characteristically devise ''prosthetic devices', that permit us to transcend ''raw'' biological limits for example, the limits on 'I . memory capacity or the limits on our auditory range. The ' . I reverse view I am proposing is that it is culture, not biology, that shapes human life and the human mind, that gives mean . f. ing to action by situating its nnderlying intentional states in !, : . ." . I• • an interpretive system. It does this by imposing the patterns ,::·. . . inherent in the culture's symbolic systems its language and i : ..: . ., '· .! discourse modes, the forms of logical and narrative explica .'' ' . .' . I • • I . . .• tion, and the patterns of mutually dependent communal life. I· , Indeed, neuroscientists and physical anthopologists are com t: : I.. • ing increasingly to the view that cultural requirements and :; . ,.i •. t' I : opportunities played a critical role in selecting neural charac .I :,r.. : teristics in the evolution of man a view most recently es i; : .. .:i . poused by Gerald Edelman on neuroanatomical grounds, by ,. Vernon Reynolds on the basis of physical anthropological evi • dence, and by Roger Lewin and Nicholas Humphrey with reference to primate evolutionary data. 1

• 34 '

• l'.... J : Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 55

• Folk Psychology as an Instrument of Culture •

Those are the bare bones of the argument in favor of what I have called a "culruraP' psychology an effort to recapture not only the originating impulse of the C.Ognitive Revolution but also the program that Dilthey a centuiy ago called the Geisteswissenschaften,the sciences of mental life.2 In this chap ter, we shall be principally concerned with one crucial fearure of rultural psychology. I have called it "folk psychology," or you may prefer "folk social science" or even, simply, "common sense." All atltures have as one of their most powerful consri rutive instruments a folk psychology, a set of more or less connected, more or less normative descriptions about how human beings "tick," what our own and other minds are like, what one can expect situated action to be like., what are possi· ble modes of life, how one conunits oneself to them, and so on. We learn our culrure's folk psychology early, learn it as we learn to use the very language we acquire and to conduct the interpersonal transactions required in communal life. Let me give you the bare bones of the argument I shall develop. I want first to explain what I mean by "folk psychol ogy,, as a system by which people organize their experience in, knowledge about, and transactions with the social world. I shall hive to say a little about the history of the idea to make clearer its role in a rulrural psychology. Then I shall turn to some of the crucial constituents of folk psychology.,and that will eventually lead me to consider what kind of a cognitive ; system is a folk psychology. Since its organizing principle is narrative rather than conceprual, I shall have to consider the nature of narrative and how it is built aroood established or

! canonical expectations and the mental management of devia tions from such expectations. Thus armed., we shall look more closely at how narrative organizes experience, using human • 35

... Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 56

• Acts of Meaning ·� memory ouras exapfo.m And finally,I sh� want to cxpli�te · the '�meaning.;.makiilg'' process in the light ofthe foregoing. • Notes to Pages 19-28 ProfessorCivicNotes Engagement Milstein to Pages of 28 Religions 57 34 • 38. See Debra an an 26. John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Word!- (Cambridge, Friedm d Mic h ae1 Hechter, of Rational Ch "The Contribution Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962). o1ce. T heory to Macrosociological . Research ,, 27. For a particularly searching and well-informedview of this same lo . al ( o : Th ory � l988):�0l-218, for a discussio ; c�:ili � n of th� ap� terrain, see Michael Cole, "Cultural Psychology," in Nebraska ty o rational choice theory to generally. social decision makin Symposium: 1989 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, forth g coming). 39. I am indebted to Richard Herrnstein forproviding th. . Jar example an is particu- 28. G. A. Miller, "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: of a "rational omaly,, 40. Taylor, o Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information," S urces ofthe Self. - o 41. Edward Sapir Psych logicalReview 63 (1956):81-97. ' "Culture, G enume and Spurious - n n " in C l - -29:-Elaifie-Scatry;-TheBody-in Pain: The Making and Ilnmaking of - - L guage a d erson_ality e - _ ':_ 1!._ :" Sele�'!- � ssays, ed. David G. M::::��- o (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). efey: Druvers1ty of the W rld :�� = CaliforruaPress� 1956); 7S.:l an an o 42. . J er, n -19. - - 30. H s Peter Rickm , Wilhelm Dilthey: Pioneer f the Humm, Beyo d Freedum n · l i A· Kn a d Dignity (New York· Afred Studies (Berkeley: University of Calfornia Press, 1979). Wil op£, 1972). o n n 43. Wolfg�g �ohler, helm Dilthey, DescriptivePsych logy a d Historical, U derstanding The n Place ofValue i a World (N cw (1911), trans. Richard M. Zaner and Kenneth L. Heiges (Th York: L1venght, 1938). ofPacts 44. J. Kirk Hague: Nijhoff, 1977). T. Varnedoe, "Introduction,, arn in V d ed., o 31. See Goodman, n n for a well-argu Portraits: The Self n ers Of Mi d a d Other Matters, a d Oth (New York-· Col:::,1a Umvers1ty Departmc n t 0 fArt H. � � statement of the philosophical foundations of this position. . istory and Archaeology ' ·1976) an an 45. Adrienne 32. Carol Fleisher Feldm , "Thought from L guage: The Lin Rich. ' "Inv1s1 · ·b l ·li· ty m· . Academe ,, u o t d Renat? guistic Construction of Cognitive Representations," in Jero Rosaldo, Culture n a d Truth: The Remak.inigq o o an n (Boston: Beacon . f ; Anci::; mys,s Bruner d Helen Haste, eds., Maki g Sense: The Child's Cm Pres. s , 1989) 'lX. struction of the World (London: Methuen, 1987). 33. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972-19 2. Foll< Psychology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). as an Instrument of Culture an 1. raid M. 34. Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, d Irrationalism," Edelman, Neural n -- - - : . Darwi ism: The Theory ofNeuro n Consequences of-Pragmatism--:Quotations frem p. 162ff. - -- 'O}!P e e n (New York: -al------P.a S l ctw_ _ ��i�_»Qq__�_l28_7)_. o n o Int elman, _G_er_al.d_M. 35. Howard Gardner, Frames fMi d: The Theory fMultiple . The Remembered Presen 'l!J: n t: A Biolo ical The of Con - gences (New York: Basic Books, 1983). scwus ess (New York-· Basic B ooks, ory - . 1990)· Vernon Reynolds , 36. James Clifford, n o n The B to· lo ?8Y,r O; H n n The Predicame t f Culture: Twe tieth-Gen uma Actw , 2nd ed. (San Francisco· n Freeman, W H Ethnography, Literature, a d Art (Cambridge, Mass.: Harv 1980). Roger Lewin, n Huma Evo n n ll tra edln n lutio · A I us. University Press, 1988). � troductio , 2nd ed. (Boston: Blackwell tifi an cations, Scie� c Publi - 37. See, forexample, S dor Ferenczi, Thmassa:A Theoryo fGenit, 1989). Nicholas Hump hrey, an Faber The Inner Eye (Boston: ity, tr s. Henry A. Bunker (New York:W. W. Norton, 196 ) and Faber, 1986).

144 145 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 58 COUNSELLING AND SPIRITUALITY ( 31-1) 2012 g

(ulture ontogeny : Lifespandevelopment of religion and the ethics of spiritual counselling

Glen Milstein 1 and Amy Manierre~ The City College of the City University of New York New York, New York

Abstract The counsellor has an ethical obligation to treat the whole person. Humans are cultural beings and the foundation of most cultures is religion . Religion and culture are received from our early relation, ships and modified through later relationships across the lifespan. The paper introduces the term "culture ontogeny" to emphasize that this is a biological process wherein abstract ideas of culture and religion become material in the de\'eloping neurophysiology of each brain. A framework and methods are offered to examine the changing roles of religion in clients' emotional self,structure, inclusive of those who describe themselves as spiritual, not religious. A case study is reviewed examining the effects of dissonance between early developmental Glen Milstein, PhD is an associate professor of psychology at the City College of New York. The foundation of his work is the srudy of how beliefs are imbued in people through their cultural milieus. The focus of his bilingual research is on responses to emotional distress and mental disorders by clergy and religious congregations, as well as responses to religiosity by clinical professionals. His most recent work is with veterans. He is a licensed clinical psychologist. Correspondence can be sent to: [email protected]. .., Amy Manierre holds a Master of Di\'inity from New York Theological Seminary and a Master of Social Work from the Unh·ersity of Houston. She is an ordained American Baptist minister, and certified by the Association of Professional Chaplains as a hospital chaplain. Re\'erend Manierre's area of interest is the interface between religious belief systems and psychological processes. She works to educate clergy regarding mental illness, co foster continuity of care between clinicians and clergy. She also volunteers as a hospital chaplain. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 59 COUNSELLING A.NO SPIRITUALITY

God Image and later God Concept on adult functioning, with an example of assessment and treatment to improve mental health. Assessment of this dissonance is recommended to understand and treat the traumatic spiritual disruptions experienced by veterans.

Ontogenie culturelle: Developpement rellgieux, tout au long de la vie, et ethique, en counselling spirituel

Resume Le conseiller a une obligation ethique de traiter la personne dans son entierete. Les humains sont des etres culturels et le fondement de toute culture est la religion. La religion et la culture nous sont transmises via nos premieres relations signi, fi.antes, en bas age, et les relations survenant tout au long de notre vie. Nous suggerons le terme « culture ontogenique » pour souligner qu'il s'agit d'un processus biologique ou des idees abstraites des mots « culture » et « religion » se concretisent clans la neurophysiologie developpementale cerebrale. Nous presentons un cadre d'analyse et des methodes pour examiner les roles changeants de la religion au niveau de la structu re de soi emotionnelle du client, que celui,ci se decrive comme etant spirituel ou non,religieux. Nous presentons une etude de cas qui examine les effets de dissonance entre les premieres images de Oieu et le concept de Oieu, developpe ulterieurement, sur le fonccionnemenc adulte. Nous donnons aussi un exemple d'eva, luation et de traitement visant a ameliorer la sante mentale. Nous recommandons !'evaluation de cette dissonance pour comprendre et traiter les perturbations spirituelles traumati, ques que vivent les veterans.

" . .. a belief constantly inculcated during the early years of life, whilst the brain is impressible , appears to acquire almost the nature of an instinct; and the very essence of an instinct is that it is followed independently of reason." - Charles Darwin (1879) Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 60 CULTURE ONTOGENY

Consider sea turtles: they begin lifeemerging from their eggs and crawl, ing with their siblings, unguided , to the sea. They can grow to 1,000 pounds, swim thousands of kilometers each year.and live to 80 years old; all without a single day of parenting. Humans are not sea turtles. In order to survive, develop and thrive through our individual lived experience, our ontogeny, we require relationships with individuals through whom we will learn the moral expectations of our communities of culture (Erikson & Erikson, 1997). Culture is those beliefs, values and norms that are shared by the com, munity and become the interpretive system of the individual(Bruner, 1990; Geertz, 1973, 2000). At the foundation of, and integrated within, most cultures is a religion.Thus culture is the filter chat moderates our thoughts and feelings in social environments and functions as a frame, work for behaviour (Freud, 1930; Hughes, 1993).The earlier we receive cultural knowledge and the greater the emotional attachment we have to the individuals from whom we receive it, the more robust will be the influence of the memory. With adolescence and young adulthood we may find our own voice. Some persons change spiritual paths, some disaffiliate. In adulthood, as our developmental tasks include working to improve the lives of the next generations, we pass along our own moral rules and values(Erikson & Erikson, 1997; Fowler, 1981; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998). The counsellor has an ethical obligation to treat the whole person. To know the role of religion in the lives of our adult clients requires that we assess current beliefs and practices , as well as those beliefs and practices integrated during the client's early development, middle childhood and adolescence. The purpose of this paper is to provide a lifespan devel opment framework that supporrs chis ethical imperative and suggests methods for counsellors to examine the roles of religion in clients' emotional self,structure , even those who are currently unaffiliated with religion, or who may consider themselves spiritual not religious. Given the amount of instinctual knowledge with which other species begin life, it is astonishing that our human brains are born void of the cultural rules that mediate human survival: at birth we speak no lan, guage, we know no social expectations , we have no group loyalty and no religion. We are born ready to receive. Each healthy human brain born today could be nurtured into any culture, learn any language, receive any religion.The language(s) we learn, and the culture(s) we integrate are mediated by the relationships with individuals through whom we receive culture (Berry, 1989; Bonner, 1961; Pike, 1967; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 61 COUNSELLINGAND SPIRITUALITY

12 Another astonishment is the fragility of the continuity of human cul, ture. Without adults who teach, or when children are unable or unwill, ing co receive, a culture of 1,000 years can disappear in one generation (Harrison, 2008). Therefore , just as children have a developmental imperative to receive culture, adults have a developmental imperative to transmit the values of the community to the next generation in order to perpetuate their way of life, to survive (Erikson & Erikson, 1997; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998; Milstein & Lucic, 2004) Erik Erikson, the developmental psychologist, described lifespan psy, chological maturation through social interactions across eight stages (Erikson, 1950; Erikson & Erikson, 1997). At each stage he posited a task or psychosocial crisis to be resolved by the individual in response to the moral values and expectations of those individuals with whom we interact. Erikson calls the influential persons with whom we form developmental relationships: counterpla.yers.These counterplayers nur, ture (or impede) us physically, emotionally and spiritually, which scaf, folds each person's identity formation. Most families are members of a religious congregation and for most persons their development of values is moderated by religion (Association of Religion Data Archives, 2000; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2008). The circle of counterplayers expands as we grow older and move through our developmental stages, our first counterplayer is the "mater, nal person"; the circle then includes our parents, our family, our school community and in adolescence our close friends whose influence often supersedes the views of our parents (Steinberg & Lerner, 2004). Later, we will seek intimate partners with whom to make a home of integrated values that are then passed on to the next generation. As summarized in Figure 1, adapted from the work ofJames Fowler (1981, 1996), with each developmental stage there is the possibility for an increasingly complex and relational sense of God. As we grow older the lifespan development of our organic, initially un, reflective personal quest for meaning may then expand in self,reflective complexity(Baker, 2011; Fowler, 1981).A reason for these stepped stages is found in neurodevelopmental anatomy. The middle child, hood brain of age 6 to 12 is more capable of learning and maintaining rules than is the early childhood brain and less capable of abstract ma, nipulation than is the adolescent (Campbell, 2011). As Fowler ( 1996) observed, in the quest for meaning the adolescent is more directed to group cohesion and ideas that fit with others than individual spiritual questing, which for some will be found in later life. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 62 (UL TURE ONTOGENY 13 There are academic and clinical vocabularies to externally describe common themes across religious rituals, celebrations and sanctitica, tions. These descriptions do not capture the individual's personal and specific lived experience, nor the rich traditions practiced across one's developmental stages. Lived culture and religion weave a neurological network of memory and emotion and meaning into the language of each person's developing brain (Neville, Mayr, Awh, & Keele, 2005). The interaction of counterplayer relationships, community values and developmental neurological change, leads to emotional self-structure and identity formation. Our term for this biological process is: culture ontogeny. Where phylogeny describes the record of genetic change leading to the development of separate species, ontogeny is the developmental history of an individual organism within a species. Culture is thehuman inter, pretive system and framework for behaviour, received from our family and community. We introduce the term culture ontogeny to emphasize that receiving culture and religion from councerplayers is a biological actuality. The abstract ideas that are culture and religion become mate rial in the developing neurophysiology of each human brain. Culture ontogeny begins with the interactions of children with their primary caregivers in the family home , through which they acquire ba, sic interpersonal skills allowing them to function within their society. The social context expands when children enter formal education and start forming associations in their school environment. In this context parents and teachers interact to determine the roles and norms of the child. A developmental task of adulthood is then to pass our cultural knowledge from our brains to the brains of individuals in the next generation through interpersonal interaction. For the child this is a developmental experiential process wherein external symbol becomes intemal, personal neuroanatomy. Each of us has a unique brain. Therefore , each develops a personal spir itual identity, begun in infancy with early family bonding and modified by additional counterplayer relationships and experiences across the lifespan (Fowler, 1981). Table 1 describes religion changes across the lifespan. Through early culture ontogeny, we develop an emotional understanding of God (God Image). One's God Image is an intrapsy chicdynamic understanding that influences the psychological life of the individual (Rizzuto, 1979). This is distinguished from one's intellectual ideas about God (God Concept) that form one's conscious expression of spirituality and religion (Hoffman, 2004; Moriarty, Hoffman, & Grimes, 2007; Rizzuto, 1979). Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 63 COUNSELLING AND SPIRITUALITY

Table1. AdaptedTable of Fowler'sStages of Faithand Selfhood Fowler'sStages of Faith & Selfhood 3

Stage Description

Pre-Language disposition of Basic Trust and Hope developed through Primal Faith parents' responsiveness to needs and Infancy anxieties of the infant. The counter lncorporativeSelf player's and infant's mutuality pro vide the emotional foundation for the person's God Image.

Parent and society inculcate pre-school children through proteccive&threateningstories mixing Stage 1 Intuitive fantasy&reality, perception&{eeling. Projective Early This process of culture ontogeny Childhood ImpulsiveSelf provides the content for the child's internalized emotional experiences of the parent, which develop into the early God Image.

At school-age, children start to un derstand the world in logical pat Stage 2 terns of cau ality, space, time. They Mythic-Literal understand the meanings of srories Middle ImperialSelf cold co chem by their faith commu Childhood nity in literal ways, which develops their God Concept as the arbiter of personal rule for behaviour.

3 Adapted and Ime~rated from: Baker, M. (2011 ).Chart of James Fowler's Stagesof Faith. Retrieved 31 March, 2012, fromhcn,:/Jwww.usetulcharrs .com/psycholo2YLiames-fowler-sca2es-of-faith.html Erikson, E. H., & Erikson, J. M. ( 1997).Thelife c! ·clecompleted (Extended/ ed.). New York: W.W. Norton. Fowler, J. W. (1996). Pluralismand Oneness in ReligiousExperience: William James, Faith-DevelopmencTheor::, · and Clinical Praccice.InE. P. Shafranske (Ed.), Religion and che clinical pracoce of ps-)"cholo~.(pp. 165-1 6): American Psychological Association. Rizzuto, A. M. (1979). The Birth of the Living God: A Ps·ychoanalyticStud)'. Chica.go:University Of Chica.goPress. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 64 (uL TUIH ONTOGENY 15

At this cage, life has grown to in, elude several different social circles and there is a need to integrate di, verse self,images in order to devel, Synthetic, Stage 3 op a coherent identity, which can Conventional expand the developmentally early, Adolescence InterpersonalSelf emocional God Image. One's God Concept is now based on the self ,af, firming authority of one's affiliative group. Persons don't recognize that they are « inside» a belief system.

People start seeing outside the box and realize that there are other «boxes». They begin to critically examine their beliefs on their own Stage 4 lndividuacive, and may become disillusioned with Reflective Young their former faith. Now, authority is Adulthood InstitutionalSelf internalized. The individual makes explicit choices of ideology and life, style, through synthesis of the emo, tional core of one's God Image with this reexamined God Concept.

This is the point when people begin to realize the limits of logic and start to accept the paradoxes in life. In later adulthood people see life as a Conjunctive Stage 5 mystery and often return to sacred Faith stories and symbols but this time Late I merindii,idual unbounded by a single theological Adulthood Self structure, and with an emotionally expansive GodImage. This stage is a secondor willedna'ivete, wherein the God Conceptis determined through the individual' choice process.

Beyond paradox and polarities. Individuals live their lives to the Stage 6 Universalizing full in service of others: one's God Late Midlife Faith Image and God Concept are yn thesized and de oted to overcoming division. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 65 COUNSELLING AND SPIRITUALITY 16 While God Image begins in infancy with issues of trust and mistrust (Erikson & Erikson, 1997), God Concept does not begin until middle childhood acting as a mediator of rules for behaviour. Com ing from different developmental stages and ever widening circles of influence God Imageand Concept may not be synchronized,causing dissonance between the two. This dissonance between early unconscious beliefs and later espoused beliefs and behaviours may affect ones mental health and function and be necessary to assessfor counselling the whole person (Rizzuto, 1979). D.W. Winnicott's ( 1971) theory of transitional objects and transitional phenomena are helpful to understanding God Image development and in later stages the joining of God Concept with God Image. 4 Winnicott refers to an "intermediary 11 space where items or other sources of com, fort (ie. a familiar lullaby) are found and used to stand in for the mater nal presence when the parent or caregiver is absent . This transitional item, however, is more than a maternal symbol. The transitional item is the stuff of baby blankets and the earliest favorite stuffed animals. If lost this is the source of great despair for both child and parent. Winnicott suggests chat chis transitional item is "outside, inside and at the border 11 (Winnicott, 1953, p. 2) . It has the soothing quality of affectionate as, sociation of inter-psychic counter player representations and real items of familiarity. These items are consecrated by child and parent, being agreed upon to have special meaning and power. Further there is a dynamic quality to the transitional phenomena re, fleeting the "infant's capacity to create, think up, devise, originate [and] produce an object" (Winnicott, 1971, p. 2). It is the phenomena of an in between place, a type of holding environment between psyche and reality where Winnicott places art, culture and religion. This theory is of particular interest because of its impact on how we perceive God. This is not about the transformative supranatural God, but rather the God Image and Concept formed by regular psychologi, cal processes important to therapeutic exchange. In the psychic space of transitional phenomeona, play, creative expression and imagina; tion reside, offering dynamism to culture and religion. This continues through all life stages.

i While these ideas come from Object Relations theory, we concur with Erikson that although the word object may be technically useful, it is a very unforrunace term co represent che most passionacelyloved persons our ln our lives. Therefore, in this discussion, we substitute "counterplayer" for the person who is internalized as the objectof the libidoand "item" for external transitional objects like blankets and scuffed animals (see Erikson & Erikson, 1997, pg 44). Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 66 (ULTURE ONTOGENY 17 In infancy the young child may both cuddle and mutilate thetransi, tional item. Later in middle childhood it may appear in stories full of emotion and descriptions serving as various family characters from mother, to sibling to outsider. By adolescence it may sit on a shelf - not allowed to be stored away, but no longer regularly relied upon. Finally it may be lost without being mourned and later may be found in an attic, retrieved and given to the next generation. Anna Rizzuto writing about the God image says that, "throughout life God remains a transitional item at the service of gaining leverage with oneself, with others and with life itself. This is so, not because God is God, but because, like the teddy bear, [God] has obtained a good half of the stuffing from the pri, mary [counterplayers] the child has 'found' in life. The other half of God's stuffing comes from the child's capacity to 'create'God according to {the child's] needs." (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 179) An example of this "stuffing" process is seen in a case study (Hoffman, 2010) in which a 31 year old female client presented with "loneli, ness, depression and spiritual disconnection." In therapy the patient described growing up in a household where 'emotion and conflict' was frowned upon. This early developmental experience of parental figures was easily transferred to other authority figures including her emotional God Image. As she grew and attended confirmation classes in her early teens, she began to form a God Concept that openly questioned the religious understandings put forward by her pastor, challenging the God Concept of her childhood. She approached her pastor and trusted youth leader with questions. Both leaders were concerned about her "doubts" referring to them as "dangerous" and something to "get under control." This response to the client's newer God Concept was consistent with her early God Image and formed a strong belief that God could not tol, erate the conflict that serious theological questions would bring. This relational disconnect between her God Image of an unquestionable, emotionally judgmental God was now at odds with her developing God Concept that found God more complex and subtle and inconsistent than she had been taught. She chose to shut down her questioning to avoid disapproval. This was mirrored in her other relationships. She felt herself an "imposter", in spite of having friends and being religiously ac, tive. When she entered therapy she avoided conflict with her therapist and was protective of her parents, others and her God Concept. It was only her "issues" that were at fault. The therapist notes that this resist~ ance was protective, keeping her from deep relationships with others for psychic protection. Only after the therapist established a strong Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 67 COUNSELLING AND SPIRITUALITY ,a

therapeutic alliance with the client was he able to deconstruct some of her resistance around early counter players, however any dissonance between her God Image and God Concept was still defended. Later in therapy addressing her relationship with God became prominent. Ultimately she acknowledged feeling God was disappointed in her, and that she was disappointed in God. The therapist notes that during this time her depressive symptoms again increased. The client's relationship to God, preserved in a developmentally young state like the relation, ship with her parents, was addressed with care, allowing the client to express honest feelings toward God. With this accomplished there was a "lightness" expressed by the client, and an understanding that her God Image and God Concept were framed by her early counter players, both parental and church leaders. As the client became more integrated and authentic she felt less lonely, was able to have more meaningful relationships and to recognize that she was not at fault if others, like her father, were not able to change the way they related to her. Noteworthy in this case is the therapist 's assessment of the faith com, munity where the client attended. The counsellor assessed whether the patient's questions about God would be respected by her current faith community. In order to confirm with the client that the congregation was comfortable with her questioning, the counsellor suggested that the client speak about her evolving God Concept with her pastor. She found that the congregation was open to her questioning God. The therapist notes that such confirmation by a client's pastor in the com, munity often leads to more open communication of the God Image and Concept in therapy. This collaboration by clinicians with community clergy in expert dialogue (Milstein, 2003) is important for two reasons. First it allows the clergy to engage with their congregant in a deeper rheological discussion helping the congregant develop a more examined belief structure and, with a pos, sibility of deepened faith and relationship in the faith community (see Table 1). Second, this allows the therapist to remain theologically neutral and maintain the "holding environment" of the therapeutic alliance to which we are ethically bound, and let the community clergy serve as the spiritual guide (Gonsiorek, 2009; Milstein & Manierre, 2009). Rizzuto ( 1979) writes that when the counsellor examines the client 's God Image and Concept, they are explored in the therapeutic dyad. Meisner (2009) adds to Rizzuto's formulation describing God Image, "as a transitional conceptualization" that, "leaves open the questions of reality and exist, ence, but does not stipulate it" (p. 225 ). Once counselling has helped restore clients' self,effi.cacy,they will then each determine the path of their spiritual journey within their chosen spiritual community. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 68 CULTURE ONTOGENY 19 In the case example the therapist was able to acknowledge troubling relational issues from different developmental stages brought forth by the client, both familial and spiritual. In the experience of these au, thors, reviewing the developmental history inclusive of God Image and God Concept is salient for best practice in counselling even for those patients indicating they are spiritual but not religious because of the vestiges of religious teaching and God Image inculcated through early culture ontogeny (Rizzuto, 1996). As described in the case history above, God Image is a developmental result of culture ontogeny, which may be consonant or dissonant with one's spiritual practices. Early formalized religious symbols and rituals hark back to times where families shared pews, births were celebrated, hymns were sung, and lives lost were memorialized according to the tra, ditions of one's counterplayers. All of these carry "esthetic impressions" (Rizzuto, 1996) that have strong affective imprints through the process of culture ontogeny. In Fowler's stages of faith, people's own agency over ritual choice increases across the lifespan, leading to a person's chang, ing God Concept (Figure 1). A person might now describe oneself as spiritual but not religious, seeking an internal divine experience with, out organizational membership. One task of the counsellor is to assess if this new God Concept is consonant with the person's emotional God Image from early development. As the case example showed, to suc cessfully integrate a new God Concept, one may need to revisit, revise and adapt one's early God Image (Hoffman, 2010).

Religionand Spirituality: Apartand Together It is not uncommon for persons to describe themselves as spiritual not religious (Hill et al., 2000). This ability to articulate a distinction be, tween institutional religions and human spirituality as separable paths of human expression was described and discussed by William James at the beginning of the last century. In his lectures on "The Religion of Healthy ..Mindedness" James described the "New Thought" movement, which had grown from a combination of biblical texts, Emersonianism and the new science of evolut ionism (James, 1902). In his lectures, James predicts chat a separation will grow between traditional religions from which one learns the values to which one adheres, as distinct from spiritual paths of discoYery that strive toward a universal and divine essence of meaning. One study of religion and spiritualit y (Hyman & Handal , 2006) - which found both unity and separateness - asked a sample of clergy from diverse religions to engage in two tasks to explore this distinction between religion and spirituality. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 69 COUNSELLING ANO SPIRITUALITY

In one task they were to evaluate individual items from five measures of religion and spirituality. For each item clergy rated the extent to which it measured religion as well as how it measured spirituality. In a separate

task1 the clergy wrote their own definitions of religion and spirituality. In the first task clergy ratings did not differentiate the survey items into separate religion or spirituality factors, rather the data revealed one combined religion/spirituality factor. In the second task of writing their own definitions, content analysis found religion defined as objective, external, with ritual or organizational practices chat one performs in a group setting and that guide one's behaviour. Spirituality was defined

as internal 1 subjective, and divine experience or direct relationship with God. This distinction provides a guideline for counsellors. The above definitions place spirituality discussions well within the realm of counselling, and locate religious practice ourside of the office and into the community (Milstein, 2003; Milstein, Manierre, & Yali, 2010; Richards, 2009). This private spirituality versus public religion dichotomy is not new. James (1902) suggested that rather than being separate paths, different choices may have distinct utility at different stages of our psychologi cal development. Therefore - as Fowler (1981) has discussed - what looks like a change of path, may be a single path that is - across the lifespan -inclusive of religion and spirituality as one integrated lifelong journey. This variability of lifespan religiosity was further investigated with, interviews of 129 adults over 64 years old (Ingersoll-Dayton, Krause, & Morgan, 2002). These persons described changes in their religiosity over their life course. Some described little change, some increased, some decreased. Ochers described a curvilinear path of involvement: they grew up in religious homes and then moved away from congrega tional involvement. Then when they started families, or as they grew older and sought places of familiar contemplation and community, they returned co the religious practice of their youth. Most persons born in the United States are affiliated with a religious congregation, and grow up within one religion (Association of Religion Data Archives, 2000). Therefore, while it is not .uncommon for persons in the United States to change religions, or to disaffiliate from religion, their subsequent religion choices and strivings will include, at minimum, an internal dialogue with the first religion of their psychosocial development (Erikson & Erikson, 1997; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2008; Rizzuto, 1979). Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 70 (UL TURE ONTOGENY

When counsellors understand religious identity development from the perspective of deep networked physiology in the human brain, we can appreciate the importance to acknowledge the distinct depth that is connected to a specific religion, as lived by each client we counsel. Therefore, it is an ethical imperative that we seek a lifespan under, standing of each client's individual religious experience. This requires assessment of the client's religious developmental history and at times could be aided by consultation with denominational clergy, or the di, ent's own religious leader (Milstein et al., 2010).

The EthicalImperative for Assessment acrossthe Trajectoryof LivedReligion For most persons religion is an early and profoundly integrated aspect of the developmental journey toward identity formation that is specific to the culture ontogeny of the individual who seeks counsel (Fowler, 1996; Meissner, 2009). While few of us remember our transition from crawling to walking, we do retain the memories of how to crawl and to walk. Just as the mother tongue of our infancy enters our brains without conscious awareness, so too does our culture of origin, so too does our family's religion . Just as the counsellor listens to the language of the client for both common and unique meaning, it is an ethical imperative that the counsellor assess the religious and spiritual beliefs of the person seeking care, both as lived in the present and as a legacy of childhood and adolescence - of early culture ontogeny. There are many assessment tools available to clinicians with greatly varying complexity and thoroughness . Richards and Bergin (2005) review several assessment protocols and rationales for assessing the sali, ence of spirituality and religion. Pargamenc (2007) describes a multi, faceted assessment that grows in depth over time with the client. Some common elements include questions of general spiritual concepts such as peace, forgiveness, legacy, regret, and gratitude (Griffith & Griffith, 2002). Pargament also examines five aspects of the role of spirituality in the clients' individual developmental trajectories: problems, pathways and destinations , critical life events, larger context, degree to which lives are well integrated (pg 201 ). Pargament provides several implicit and explicit spirituality assessment tools in his chapters. He also em, phasizes that the goal is to understand spirituality from the perspective of the client and determine how or if to integrate spirituality into the counselling. Like much of counselling, this assessment will follow a spiral that grows more complex, with greater depth as the therapeutic relationship evolves. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 71 COUNSELLINGAND SPIRITUALITY 22

Fowler ( 1981) also published a detailed "Faith Development Interview" that he has used in his research. The four-part, thirty-four question assessment covers one's life history, one's current values as well as re ligiosity, and seeks to identify significant events or transitions in the individual's spiritual and religious lifespan of experiences. In Table 2, we provide an adapted example of one very brief assessment that has been recommended as part of an overall cultural evaluation (Lim, 2006). The FICA Spiritual Assessment in Clinical Practice (Borneman, Ferrell, Otis-Green, Baird & Puchalski, 2010; Puchalski, 2006; Puchalski & Romer, 2000) provides a four;part guide: Faith, Importance, Community, and Action. There is also a website with training modules for FICA (Puchalski, 2010). The adapted guide that we present here directs the clinician's assessment with clients concern; ing the salience of their religious and spiritual beliefs and practices, both in the past and now. The assessment reflects how clients would like their counsellors to address these topics in their counselling, as well as provides descriptions of community resources that could be adjunc; tive to counselling and structurally helpful to recovery. This is a brief assessment that can be augmented or replaced by the more thorough assessments of Pargament (2007) or Fowler (1981), or those reviewed by Richards and Bergin (2005).

Table 2. The FICA©Tool for TakingS piritualHist ory (Puchalski, 2006)

The FICA ~ Spiritual Assessment in Clinical Practice

F Faith, Belief and Meaning • Do you consider yourself spiritual or religious? • Do you have spiritual beliefs that help you cope with stress? • What gives your life meaning? • How have these beliefs changed or adapted since childhood?

I Importance and Influence • What importance does your faith or belief have in your life? • Have your beliefs influenced you in how you handle stress? • Do you have specific beliefs that might influence your healthcare decisions? • How have the influences of these beliefs changed since your childhood? Note: Assess for both positive and negative religiosity & .,;;nirit11~1itv. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 72 (ULTURE ONTOGENY 23 C - Community Trajectory • Were you ever part of a spiritual or religious community or congregation? • Was this of support to you? How? • Are you now part of a spiritual or religious community or congregation? • ls this of support to you? How? Note: A ess for both positive and negative relationships.

A - Action / Address in Care • How would you like me, your counsellor, to address these is sues in your care? Note: This may include referral to-or consultation with- chaplains, pastoral counsellors, or the patients' own clergy. © 2010 Christina Puchalski, MD, MS

There may be times when clinical assessment indicates that religion is the source of negative experiences and even trauma (Exline, Yali, & Sanderson, 2000; Goodstein, 2003; Pargament, Desai, McConnell, Calhoun, & Tedeschi, 2006). This will be a delicate and important focus of counsel as one helps the client understand the complexity of religion that had been a source of comfort and has become a source of despair (Farrell & Taylor, 2000).

As the goal of coun elling is to bolster persons' healthy functioning, one assessment option would be to use the adapted FICA (Table 2) to iden, cify activities available co the client in che community. As discussed above, although most persons grow up affiliated with "mainline" reli gious congregations, some may have disaffiliated and dissociated from religion. Other persons who consider themselves disaffiliated, also de scribe themselves as spiritual but not part of an organized religion (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2008; Shafranske & Malony, 1990). Does this mean that they have no religious or spiritual community as part of their network of support? This can be evaluated with the FICA or other assessment tools(Fowler, 1981; Pargament, 2007; Richards & Bergin, 2005 ). If as e menc identifies chat che client is active or simply has membership in a religious congregation, this congregational activity could be useful for the client's continuity of care (Milstein, Manierre, Susman, & Bruce, 2008; Milstein et al., 2010). Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 73 COUNSELLING ANO SPIRITUALITY 24 In the context of religious communities, positive values, such as hope, perseverance, wisdom, and self-control, can be nurtured and sustained

(Dahlsgaard 1 Peterson, & Seligman, 2005). Individuals can strive to improve the well-being of future generations through sharing religious beliefs and values, as well as through activities like volunteering, mentoring, and promoting social justice. Erikson ( 1997) termed this

adulthood developmental task, Generativicy 1 which he defined as, "productivity and creativity in the service of the generations,, (p. 53 ). These beliefs and activities, in tum, are psychologically beneficial to us (Borgonovi, 2008; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998). Congregat ions are also a source of spiritual and social support in times of stress (Gottlieb, 1983; Krause, 1998; Milstein & Manierre, 2009). One example of a significant stressor that is responded to by religious com munities would be after the death of a loved one. Congregations enact faith-based rituals of mourning to provide the congregants with spiritual coherence (Jacobs, 1992). Congregations' members visit people in their homes and provide spiritual support, social support, and instrumental support (financial help). Weekly worship and educational programs offer ongoing support to the bereaved, and some mourners will meet individu ally with their clergy for spiritual guidance and prayer. The spiritual coherence and social support of these rituals can be sufficient to return persons to functioning (Krause, 2002). This congregational assistance occurs without the professional services of clinicians. One place where spirituality is not social is in the context of psycho therapy and counselling. In this therapeutic context the counsellors seek to engage their clients' spiritual points of view separate from reli, gious practice. As with the case reviewed above(Hoffman, 2010), the counsellor examines the client's stages of faith toreach an understand, ing of the consonance or dissonance between rhe client's God Image and God Concept. Then, as the clients emerge from counselling and seek to rejoin more community activity, they will have a more inte grated religion identity when they reconnect to spiritual and religious lives outside of counselling.

Conclusion Unlike sea turtles, we begin our lives as recipients of language and culture. For most, this culture ontogeny includes religion. With ado lescence and young adulthood we find our own voice. Some persons change spiritual paths, some disaffiliate. Then in adulthood, as our de, velopmental tasks include generativity to improve the lives of the next generations, we pass along our early stories as well as our transitional items of comfort. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 74 CULTURE ONTOGENY 25

The counsellor has an ethical obligation to treat the whole person. To know the role of religion in the lives of our clients requires both that we assess current beliefs and practices, as well as those beliefs and practices integrated during the client's early development which inform the interplay and synthesis of God Image and God Concept across the lifespan. One group of persons who struggle with a profound disconnect between their early God Image and current God Concept are veterans from the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The unconventional warfare in these countries forced service members to confront ethical challenges and to experience events that transgressed deeply held moral beliefs, thus heightening the risk for mental health problems (Drescher, Smith, & Foy, 2007). These problems can include spiritual suffering, guilt , moral distress, disrupted meaning and purpose in life (Litz et al., 2009). Therefore one would assess early cultural development to determine if it would be helpful to incorporate spirituality when counselling veteran s (Tanielian & Jaycox., 2008). The counselling journey begins with a full assessment and completes as the client feels personally more emotionally healthy and with strong ties and relationships in a community of choice . This may result in a curvilinear return to the religion of childhood, left behind during young adult years, or to a path never before explored. Counselling is one step across a lifespan of journeys.

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Darwin, C. (1879/2004). The Descentof Man, and Selectionin RelationtO Sex. London: Penguin. Drescher, K. 0., Smith, M. W., & Foy, D. W. (2007). Spirituality and Readjustment Following War-Zone Experiences. In C.R. Figley & W. P.Nash (Eds.), Combat StressInjury: Theory, Research,and Management(pp. 295-310). New York: Routledge . Erikson, E. H. (1950). Childhoodand sociery. New York, NY: Norton & Co, Inc. Erikson, E. H., & Erikson, J. M. (1997). The life cycle completed(Exte nded / ed.). New York: W.W. Norton. Exline, J. L Yali, A. M., & Sanderson, W. C. (2000). Guile, discord, and alienation: The role of religious strain in depression and suicidality. Journalof ClinicalPsychology, 56(12), 1481,1496. Farrell, D. P., & Taylor, M. (2000). Silenced by God , an examination of unique characteristics within sexual abuse by clergy. CounsellingPsychology Review, 15(1), 22-31. Fowler, J. W. ( 1981). Stagesof Faith:The Psychologyof Human Developmentand the Quest far Meaning. New York: Harper & Row. Fowler, J. W. ( 1996). Pluralism and Oneness in Religious Experience: William James, Faith-Development Theory, and Clinical Practice. In E. P. Shafranske (Ed.), Religionand the clinicalpractice of psychology.(pp. 165,186): American Psychological Association. Freud, S. (1930). Civilization and its Discontents (p. 144). London: Hogarth Press. Geertz, C. (1973, 2000). Religion as a Cultural System. In C. Geertz (Ed.), The Interpretationof Cultures:Selected Essays (pp. 87-125). New York: Basic Books. Gonsiorek, J. C. (2009). Ethical Challenges Incorporating Spirituality and Religion Into Psychotherapy. ProfessionalPsychology: Research and Practice, 40(4), 385-389. Goodstein, L. (2003, January 12). Decades Of Damage; Trail of Pain in Church Crisis Leads to Nearly Every Diocese, New Yark Times, p. l. Gottlieb, B. H. (1983). Social suppon as a focus for integrative research in psychology. American Psychologist. 38 (3), 278,287. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 76 CULTURE ONTOGENY

Griffith, J.L., & Griffith, M. E. (2002). Encounteringthe sacred in psychotherapy: How to talk with peopleabout their spirituallives. New York, NY US: Guilford Press. Harrison, K. D. (2008). When LanguagesDie: The Extinctionof rhe World's lAnguagesand the Erosion of Human Knowledge.USA: Oxford University Press. Hill, P. C., Pargament, K. I., Hood, R. W. J., McCullough, M. E., Swyers, J. P., Larson, D. B., & Zinnbauer, B. J. (2000). Conceptualizing religion and spirituality: Points of commonality, points of departure. Journalfor the Theory of SocialBehaviour, 30(1), 51,77. Hoffman, L. ( 2004). Culmral constructionsof the God imageand God concept: Implicationsfor culture, psychology,and religion.Paper presented at the joint meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion and Religious Research Association, Kansas City, MO. Hoffman, L. (2010). Working with the God image in therapy: An experiential approach. Journalof Psychologyand Christianity,29(3 ), 268,271. Hughes, C. C. (1993). Culture in Clinical Psychiatry. In A. C. Gaw (Ed.), Culture, ethnidty, and mencalillness (pp. 3,31). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press. Hyman, C., & Handal, P. (2006). Definitions and Evaluation of Religion and Spirituality Items by Religious Professionals: A Pilot Study. Journalof Religion and Health,45(2), 264,282. doi: 10.1007/s10943,006,9015,z Ingersoll,Dayton, B., Krause, N., & Morgan, D. (2002). Religious trajectories and transitions over the life course. The Intemational]oumalof Agi.ng& Human Development. 55 (1), 51, 70. Jacobs, J. L. (1992). Relgious Ritual and Mental Health. In J. F. Schumaker (Ed.), Religionand mental health(pp. 291,299). NY: Oxford University Press. James, W. (1958 /1902). The Varietiesof ReligiousExperience. New York: Mentor,New American Library,Penguin. Krause, N. ( 1998). Stressors in highly valued roles, religious coping, and mor, tality. PsycholAgi.ng , 13(2), 242,255. Krause, N. (2002). Church,based social support and health in old age: explor, ing variations by race. J GerontolB Psycho[Sci Soc Sci, 57(6), S332,347. Lim, R. F. (2006). Clinical manual of culturalpsychiatry. Arlington, VA US: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc. Litz, B. T., Stein, N., Delaney, E., Lebowit:, L., Nash, W. P., Silva, C., & Maguen, S. (2009). Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: A pre, liminary model and intervention strategy. ClinicalPsychology Ret•iew, 29(8), 695,706. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2009.07.003 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 77 COUNSELLING ANO SPIRITUALITY 28 McAdams, D. P., & de St. Aubin, E. (1998). Generacivityand adult develop, menc: How and why we carefar the next generation:American Psychological Association. Meissner, W. W. (2009). The God question in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Psychology,26(2), 210,233. doi: 10.1037/0736,9735.26.2.210 Milstein, G. (2003 ). Clergy and Psychiatrists: Opportunities for Expert Dialogue. PsychiatricTimes, 20(3), 36,39. Milstein, G., & Luci, L. ( 2004). Young Immigrants: A Psychosocial Development Perspective. ENCOUNTER: Educationfor Meaning and SocialJustice, 17(3), 24,29. Milstein, G., & Manierre, A. (2009). Normative and Diagnostic Reactions to Disaster: Clergy and Clinician Collaboration to Facilitate a Continuum of Care. In G. H. Brenner, D. H. Bush & J. Moses (Eds.), CreatingSpiritual and PsychologicalResilience: Integrating Care in DisasterRelief Work (pp. 219,226). New York: Routledge. Milstein, G., Manierre, A., Susman, V., & Bruce, M. L. (2008). Implementation of a Program to Improve the Continuity of Mental Health Care through Clergy Outreach and Professional Engagement (C.O.P.E.). ProfessionalPsychology: Researchand Practice,39(2), 218,228. Milstein, G., Manierre, A., & Yali, A. M. (2010). Psychological care for per, sons of diverse religions: A collaborative continuum. ProfessionalPsychology: Researchand Practice.41 ( 5), 371,381. Moriarty, G. L., Hoffman, L., & Grimes, C. (2007). Understanding the God Image Through Attachment Theory: Theory, Research, and Practice. [Article]. Jou.ma.Iof Spirituality in Mental Health, 9(2), 43. doi: 10.1300/]515v09n02 • 04 Neville, H.J ., Mayr, U., Awh, E., & Keele, S. W. (2005) . Development and Plasticity of Human Cognition Developingindividuality in the human brain:A tributetO MichaelI. Posner. (pp. 209,235). Washington, DC US: American Psychological Association. Pargament, K. I. (2007). Spirituallyintegrated psychotherapy : Understandingand addressingthe sacred.New York, NY US: Guilford Press. Pargament, K. I., Desai, K. M., McConnell, K. M., Calhoun, L. G., & Tedeschi, R. G. (2006). Spirituality: A Pathway to Posttraumatic Growth or Decline? Handbookof posttraumancgrowth: Research & practice.(pp. 121,137). Mahwah, NJ US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. (2008). U.S.Religious Landscape Survey Retrieved from http://reli2ions.pewforum.ori/pdf/report,reli2ious,landscape, study,full.pdf Pike, K. L. ( 1967). Languagein relationco a unifiedtheory of thesmteture of human behaviour.The Hague: Mouton. Puchalski, C. (2006). Spiritual Assessment in Clinical Practice. Psychiatric Annals, 36(3), 150,155. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 78 CULTURE ONTOGENY 29

Puchalski, C. (2010). Spiritual Assessment in Clinical Praccice. Retrieved February 28, 2010, from http://www.gwumc.edu/gwish/ficacourse/our/main. html Puchalski, C., & Romer, A. L. (2000). Taking a Spiritual History Allows Clinicians to Understand Patients More Fully. Journalof Palliatit1e Medicine, 3(1), 129-137 . Richards, P. S. (2009). Toward Religious and Spiritual Competence for Psychologists : Some Reflections and Recommendations. Professional Psychology:Research and Practice,4 0(4), 389-391. Richards, P. S., & Bergin, A. E. (2005). Religious and Spiritual Assessment. In P. S. Richards & A. E. Bergin (Eds.), A spiritualstrategy for counseling and psychotherapy, 2nded. (pp. 219-249). Washington, DC US: American Psychological Associati on. Rizzuto, A. M. ( 1979). The Birth of the Living God: A Psychoanalytic Study. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. Rizzuto, A. M. ( 1996). Psychoanalytic Treatment and the Religious Person. In E. P. Shafranske (Ed.), Religionand cheClinical Practice of Psychology(pp. 409-431).Washington , DC: American Psychological Association. Shafranske, E. P., & Malony, H. N. ( 1990). Clinical psychologists' religious and spiritual orientations and their practice of psychotherapy. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training,27(1), 72-78. Steinberg, L., & Lerner, R. M. ( 2004). The Scientific Study of Adolescence: A Brief History . . Journalof EarlyAdolescence, 24(1), 45-54. Tanielian, T., & Jaycox., L. H. (Eds.). (2008). Invisible wounds of war : psy, chologicaland cognitive injuries,their consequences, and servicesco assistrecovery. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation. Triandis, H. C., & Suh, E. M. (2002). Cultural influences on personality. Annual Review of Psychology,53(1), 133. Winnicott, D. W. (1953). Transitional objects and transitional phenom ena; a srudy of the nrst not-me possession. The InternationalJournal of Psychoanalysis, 34, 89,97. Winnicott, D. W. (1971 ). Playingand reality.Oxford England: Penguin. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 79 Fowler's Stages of Faith & Selfhood * ≈ Age Stage Description Image Pre-Language disposition of Basic Trust and Hope Primal / developed through parents’ responsiveness to needs and Undifferentiated Infancy anxieties of the infant. The counterplayers’ and infant’s Faith mutuality provide the emotional foundation for the Incorporative Self person’s God Image. Numinous ! Hope Parents and society enculturate pre-school children Stage 1 through protective & threatening stories mixing fantasy & Early Intuitive- reality, perception & feeling. This process of Culture Childhood Projective Ontogeny provides the content for the child’s Impulsive Self internalized emotional experiences of the parent, which develop into the early God Image. At school-age, children start to understand the world in Stage 2 logical patterns of causality, space, time. Middle Mythic- They understand the meanings of stories told to them by Childhood Literal their faith community in literal ways, which develops their Imperial Self God Concept as the arbiter of personal rules for behavior. Technical ! Competence At this stage, life has grown to include several different social circles and there is a need to integrate diverse self- Stage 3 images in order to develop a coherent identity, which Synthetic- expands the developmentally early, emotional God Adolescence Conventional Image. One’s God Concept is now based on the Interpersonal Self self-affirming authority of one’s Affiliative group. Persons don't recognize that they are "inside" a belief system. Ideological ! Fidelity People start seeing outside the box and realize that there are other "boxes". They begin to critically examine their Stage 4 beliefs on their own and may become disillusioned with Young Individuative- their former faith. Now, authority is internalized. Adulthood Reflective The individual makes explicit choices of ideology and Institutional Self lifestyle, through synthesis of the pre-verbal and adolescent emotional core of one’s God Image with the reexamined God Concept. This is the point when people begin to realize the limits of logic and start to accept the paradoxes in life. In later Stage 5 adulthood people see life as a mystery and often return to Late Conjunctive sacred stories and symbols but this time unbounded by a Adulthood Faith single theological structure, and with an emotionally expansive Interindividual Self God Image. This stage is a second or willed naïveté, wherein the God Concept is determined through the individual’s choice process. Ethical ! Generativity

Beyond paradox and polarities. Individuals live their Stage 6 lives to the full in service of others without any real Late Midlife Universalizing worries or doubts: one’s God Image and God Concept Faith are devoted to overcoming division.

Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 80

* Taxonomy Adapted and Integrated from: Baker, M. (2011). Chart of James Fowler's Stages of Faith. Retrieved 31 March, 2012, from http://www.usefulcharts.com/psychology/james-fowler-stages-of-faith.html Erikson, E. H., & Erikson, J. M. (1997). The life cycle completed (Extended / ed.). New York: W.W. Norton. Fowler, J. W. (1981). Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning. New York: Harper & Row. Fowler, J. W. (1996). Pluralism and Oneness in Religious Experience: William James, Faith-Development Theory, and Clinical Practice. In E. P. Shafranske (Ed.), Religion and the clinical practice of psychology. (pp. 165-186): American Psychological Association. Milstein, G., & Manierre, A. (2012). Culture ontogeny: Lifespan development of religion and the ethics of spiritual counselling. Counselling and Spirituality, 31(1), 9-30. Rizzuto, A. M. (1979). The Birth of the Living God: A Psychoanalytic Study. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 81

Benjamin Franklin to Peter Collinson (1753)

Philadelphia, May 9th 1753 Sir, I received your Favour of the 29th August last and thank you for the kind and judicious remarks you have made on my little Piece. Whatever further occurs to you on the same subject, you will much oblige me in communicating it. I have often observed with wonder, that Temper of the poor English Manufacturers and day Labourers which you mention, and acknowledge it to be pretty general. When any of them happen to come here, where Labour is much better paid than in England, their Industry seems to diminish in equal proportion. But it is not so with the German Labourers; They retain the habitual Industry and Frugality they bring with them, and now receiving higher Wages an accumulation arises that makes them all rich. When I consider, that the English are the Offspring of Germans, that the Climate they live in is much of the same Temperature; when I can see nothing in Nature that should create this Difference, I am apt to suspect it must arise from Institution, and I have sometimes doubted, whether the Laws peculiar to England which compel the Rich to maintain the Poor, have not given the latter, a Dependance that very much lessens the care of providing against the wants of old Age. I have heard it remarked that the Poor in Protestant Countries on the Continent of Europe, are generally more industrious than those of Popish Countries, may not the more numerous foundations in the latter for the relief of the poor have some effect towards rendering them less provident. To relieve the misfortunes of our fellow creatures is concurring with the Deity, 'tis Godlike, but if we provide encouragements for Laziness, and supports for Folly, may it not be found fighting against the order of God and Nature, which perhaps has appointed Want and Misery as the proper Punishments for, and Cautions against as well as necessary consequences of Idleness and Extravagancy. Whenever we attempt to mend the scheme of Providence and to interfere in the Government of the World, we had need be very circumspect lest we do more harm than Good. In New England they once thought Black- birds useless and mischievous to their corn, they made Laws to destroy them, the consequence was, the Black- birds were diminished but a kind of Worms which devoured their Grass, and which the Black-birds had been used to feed on encreased prodigiously; Then finding their Loss in Grass much greater than their saving in corn they wished again for their Black-birds. We had here some years since a Transylvanian Tartar, who had travelled much in the East, and came hither merely to see the West, intending to go home thro' the spanish West Indies, China &c. He asked me one day what I thought might be the Reason that so many and such numerous nations, as the Tartars in Europe and Asia, the Indians in America, and the Negroes in Africa, continued a wandring careless Life, and refused to live in Cities, and to cultivate the arts they saw practiced by the civilized part of Mankind. While I was considering what answer to make him; I'll tell you, says he in his broken English, God make man for Paradise, he make him for to live lazy; man make God angry, God turn him out of Paradise, and bid him work; man no love work; he want to go to Paradise again, he want to live lazy; so all mankind love lazy. Howe'er this may be it seems certain, that the hope of becoming at some time of Life free from the necessity of care and Labour, together with fear of penury, are the main-springs of most peoples industry.

1 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 82 To those indeed who have been educated in elegant plenty, even the provision made for the poor may appear misery, but to those who have scarce ever been better provided for, such provision may seem quite good and sufficient, these latter have then nothing to fear worse than their present Conditions, and scarce hope for any thing better than a Parish maintainance; so that there is only the difficulty of getting that maintainance allowed while they are able to work, or a little shame they suppose attending it, that can induce them to work at all, and what they do will only be from hand to mouth. The proneness of human Nature to a life of ease, of freedom from care and labour appears strongly in the little success that has hitherto attended every attempt to civilize our American Indians, in their present way of living, almost all their Wants are supplied by the spontaneous Productions of Nature, with the addition of very little labour, if hunting and fishing may indeed be called labour when Game is so plenty, they visit us frequently, and see the advantages that Arts, Sciences, and compact Society procure us, they are not deficient in natural understanding and yet they have never shewn any Inclination to change their manner of life for ours, or to learn any of our Arts; When an Indian Child has been brought up among us, taught our language and habituated to our Customs, yet if he goes to see his relations and make one Indian Ramble with them, there is no perswading him ever to return, and that this is not natural to them merely as Indians, but as men, is plain from this, that when white persons of either sex have been taken prisoners young by the Indians, and lived a while among them, tho' ransomed by their Friends, and treated with all imaginable tenderness to prevail with them to stay among the English, yet in a Short time they become disgusted with our manner of life, and the care and pains that are necessary to support it, and take the first good Opportunity of escaping again into the Woods, from whence there is no reclaiming them. One instance I remember to have heard, where the person was brought home to possess a good Estate; but finding some care necessary to keep it together, he relinquished it to a younger Brother, reserving to himself nothing but a gun and a match-Coat, with which he took his way again to the Wilderness. Though they have few but natural wants and those easily supplied. But with us are infinite Artificial wants, no less craving than those of Nature, and much more difficult to satisfy; so that I am apt to imagine that close Societies subsisting by Labour and Arts, arose first not from choice, but from necessity: When numbers being driven by war from their hunting grounds and prevented by seas or by other nations were crowded together into some narrow Territories, which without labour would not afford them Food. However as matters now stand with us, care and industry seem absolutely necessary to our well being; they should therefore have every Encouragement we can invent, and not one Motive to diligence be subtracted, and the support of the Poor should not be by maintaining them in Idleness, But by employing them in some kind of labour suited to their Abilities of body &c. as I am informed of late begins to be the practice in many parts of England, where work houses are erected for that purpose. If these were general I should think the Poor would be more careful and work voluntarily and lay up something for themselves against a rainy day, rather than run the risque of being obliged to work at the pleasure of others for a bare subsistence and that too under confinement. The little value Indians set on what we prize so highly under the name of Learning appears from a pleasant passage that happened some years since at a Treaty between one of our Colonies and the Six Nations; when every thing had been settled to the Satisfaction of both sides, and nothing remained but a mutual exchange of civilities, the English Commissioners told the Indians, they had in their Country a College for the instruction of Youth who were there taught various languages, Arts, and Sciences; that there was a particular foundation in favour of the

2 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 83 Indians to defray the expense of the Education of any of their sons who should desire to take the Benefit of it. And now if the Indians would accept of the Offer, the English would take half a dozen of their brightest lads and bring them up in the Best manner; The Indians after consulting on the proposal replied that it was remembered some of their Youths had formerly been educated in that College, but it had been observed that for a long time after they returned to their Friends, they were absolutely good for nothing being neither acquainted with the true methods of killing deer, catching Beaver or surprizing an enemy. The Proposition however, they looked on as a mark of the kindness and good will of the English to the Indian Nations which merited a grateful return; and therefore if the English Gentlemen would send a dozen or two of their Children to Onondago the great Council would take care of their Education, bring them up in really what was the best manner and make men of them. I am perfectly of your mind, that measures of great Temper are necessary with the Germans: and am not without Apprehensions, that thro' their indiscretion or Ours, or both, great disorders and inconveniences may one day arise among us; Those who come hither are generally of the most ignorant Stupid Sort of their own Nation, and as Ignorance is often attended with Credulity when Knavery would mislead it, and with Suspicion when Honesty would set it right; and as few of the English understand the German Language, and so cannot address them either from the Press or Pulpit, 'tis almost impossible to remove any prejudices they once entertain. Their own Clergy have very little influence over the people; who seem to take an uncommon pleasure in abusing and discharging the Minister on every trivial occasion. Not being used to Liberty, they know not how to make a modest use of it; and as Kolben says of the young Hottentots, that they are not esteemed men till they have shewn their manhood by beating their mothers, so these seem to think themselves not free, till they can feel their liberty in abusing and insulting their Teachers. Thus they are under no restraint of Ecclesiastical Government; They behave, however, submissively enough at present to the Civil Government which I wish they may continue to do: For I remember when they modestly declined intermeddling in our Elections, but now they come in droves, and carry all before them, except in one or two Counties; Few of their children in the Country learn English; they import many Books from Germany; and of the six printing houses in the Province, two are entirely German, two half German half English, and but two entirely English; They have one German News-paper, and one half German. Advertisements intended to be general are now printed in Dutch and English; the Signs in our Streets have inscriptions in both languages, and in some places only German: They begin of late to make all their Bonds nad other legal Writings in their own Language, which (though I think it ought not to be) are allowed good in our Courts, where the German Business so encreases that there is continual need of Interpreters; and I suppose in a few years they will be also necessary in the Assembly, to tell one half of our Legislators what the other half say; In short unless the stream of their importation could be turned from this to other colonies, as you very judiciously propose, they will soon so out number us, that all the advantages we have will not in My Opinion be able to preserve our language, and even our Government will become precarious. The French who watch all advantages, are now themselves making a German settlement back of us in the Ilinoes Country, and by means of those Germans they may in time come to an understanding with ours, and indeed in the last war our Germans shewed a general disposition that seems to bode us no good; for when the English who were not Quakers, alarmed by the danger arising from the defenceless state of our Country entered unanimously into an Association within this Government and the lower Countries raised armed and Disciplined near 10,000 men, the Germans except a very few in proportion to their numbers refused to engage in it, giving out one among

3 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 84 another, and even in print, that if they were quiet the French should they take the Country would not molest them; at the same time abusing the Philadelphians for fitting out Privateers against the Enemy; and representing the trouble hazard and Expence of defending the Province, as a greater inconvenience than any that might be expected from a change of Government. Yet I am not for refusing entirely to admit them into our Colonies: all that seems to be necessary is, to distribute them more equally, mix them with the English, establish English Schools where they are now too thick settled, and take some care to prevent the practice lately fallen into by some of the Ship Owners, of sweeping the German Goals to make up the number of their Passengers. I say I am not against the Admission of Germans in general, for they have their Virtues, their industry and frugality is exemplary; They are excellent husbandmen and contribute greatly to the improvement of a Country. I pray God long to preserve to Great Britain the English Laws, Manners, Liberties and Religion notwithstanding the complaints so frequent in Your public papers, of the prevailing corruption and degeneracy of your People; I know you have a great deal of Virtue still subsisting among you, and I hope the Constitution is not so near a dissolution, as some seem to apprehend; I do not think you are generally become such Slaves to your Vices, as to draw down that Justice Milton speaks of when he says that ------sometimes Nations will descend so low From reason, which is virtue, that no Wrong, But Justice, and some fatal curse annex'd Deprives them of their outward liberty, Their inward lost. Parad: lost. In history we find that Piety, Public Spirit and military Prowess have their Flows, as well as their ebbs, in every nation, and that the Tide is never so low but it may rise again; But should this dreaded fatal change happen in my time, how should I even in the midst of the Affliction rejoice, if we have been able to preserve those invaluable treasures, and can invite the good among you to come and partake of them! O let not Britain seek to oppress us, but like an affectionate parent endeavour to secure freedom to her children; they may be able one day to assist her in defending her own -- Whereas a Mortification begun in the Foot may spread upwards to the destruction of the nobler parts of the Body. I fear I have already extended this rambling letter beyond your patience, and therefore conclude with requesting your acceptance of the inclosed Pamphlet from Sir Your most humble servant

- Benjamin Franklin

http://www.historycarper.com/resources/twobf2/letter18.htm http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=4&page=477a Copy: New York Public Library; also copies: Public Record Office, American Philosophical Society, and (part only) British Museum

4 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 85

Young Immigrants A Psychosocial Development Perspective

Glen Milstein and Luka Luci

e reside in New York City, which is currently Young immigrants are Wexperiencing a wave of immigration not seen since the beginning of the last century. Ac- caught between parents who cording to the 2000 Census, 36% of New York City’s communicate the enculturative population is foreign born (Buckner 2003; Kinetz 2002). This percentage is even higher in some parts of message of their homeland, the city. For example, 46% of Queens, one of New York’s five boroughs, is foreign born, and 56% and teachers who communicate speaks English less than “very well” (U.S. Census the acculturative message of the Bureau 2004). In New York City schools, 48% of all students come from immigrant-headed households receiving society. (Landale and Oropesa 1995). The pattern of immigration is similar across the nation. Currently the population of the United States includes 32.5 million people who are foreign born, representing 11.5% of the population (Schmidley 2003). One in five of all school age children in the United States are immigrants (Hernandez 1999), and these numbers are likely to increase in the near future. Teachers and parents do not always share the same values and views about priorities for children’s education. The potential grounds for conflict include disciplinary rules, gender roles, racial stereotypes, work habits, and occupational choices; all of which can be exacerbated by cross-cultural misunderstanding and miscommunication. It is therefore essential to address the questions which arise from the increasing cultural diversity in our public schools, brought about through immigration Readers are invited to download a study guide for this article at (Phinney et al. 2001). .

GLEN MILSTEIN is Assistant Professor of Psy- LUKA LUCIC is a first year graduate student chology at the City College of the City Uni- at the City University of New York’s doc- versity of New York. Trained in clinical toral program in developmental psychol- psychology, Dr. Milstein studies the role of ogy. Luka, who came to the United States community and ritual in meeting people’s from Serbia at the age of 16, is interested emotional needs. in the developmental and social aspects of the immigrant experience. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 86

Volume 17, Number 3 (Autumn 2004) 25

One way to understand these conflicts is as a dis- Through common themes that we heard from ruption engendered by the disparate developmental CCNY students, we became interested in the inter- processes of enculturation and acculturation. Encul- play of personal and social forces, which can lead to a turation describes the process whereby we acquire relatively easy adjustment for some immigrants, but the values, norms, and skills that enable us to func- cause enormous hurdles and impediments for oth- tion within our own cultural groups (Ho 1995). Each ers. Using the stage theory of Erik Erikson as a con- culture is unique, specific, and adapted to function ceptual framework to guide our efforts, we chose to within its own community, which results in differ- examine how the disruptions of migration might in- ences of customs, communal organizations, educa- terfere with the psychosocial development of mi- tional systems, and the distribution of economic re- grants to the United States. We asked which develop- sources. Enculturation is mediated through interac- mental stages are more vulnerable to these disrup- tion with one’s significant relations, whom Erik tions than others. Erikson calls “counterplayers” (e.g., parents, family, teachers, friends, progeny) (Erikson and Erikson Erikson’s Contributions 1997, 48-49). Acculturation, in contrast, refers to the process of acquiring the values and behaviors appro- Erik Erikson was a student of Sigmund and Anna priate to a new culture (Redfield, Linton, and Freud. He developed his theory of psychosocial de- Herskovits 1936, 149). velopment by extending the Freudian theory of psychosexual development with its emphasis on the Migration and relocation disrupt the developmen- internal processes of libidinization of primary body tal processes being engendered from within one’s zones to include the corresponding ego modes as own culture, as the immigrant necessarily accultu- well as environmental and interpersonal influences, rates to the usually very different mores of the receiv- resulting in his theory of psychosocial development ing society. Upon entering the public school system, (Crain 2000). Erikson’s theory follows an epigenetic the immigrant child becomes exposed to a whole principle that states that “anything that grows has a new set of cultural rules, roles, norms, and demands ground plan, and that out of this ground plan the that represent the acculturative messages of the re- parts arise, each part having its time of special ascen- ceiving society. When young immigrants’ processes dancy, until all parts have arisen to form a function- of enculturation and acculturation are neither in con- ing whole.” (Erikson 1968, 52). cert nor complementary—but rather clash with each Across our lifespan we ascend through eight other—there is a potential that this conflict will hin- stages of psychosocial development, one invariably der the development of immigrant children. following another. Within each stage we encounter a We became interested in the psychology of immi- novel and unique developmental crisis or task. The gration—particularly in the adaptation and adjust- outcomes of the eight crises result in strengths and ment of immigrants within the context of their host deficits, which in turn influence subsequent devel- society—because of the community where we live opment. The stages themselves, according to Erik- and work. Students at our school, The City College of son, are universal, but each culture organizes the ex- The City University of New York (CCNY), come perience of its members. Therefore, the development from 147 countries and speak 91 different languages of the individual is a function of psychological matu- (Silverman 2004). Enveloped in such a diverse envi- ration through social interactions. These interactions ronment and surrounded by many personal tales of involve an expanding radius of influential counter- immigrant experience, we became aware of the wide players. It begins with the maternal person and at array of outcomes that follow the immigration pro- each successive stage expands to include a new seg- cess. Some immigrants adjusted relatively easily, ment of society, which the maturing person encoun- while others struggled to learn rules, roles, and ters while moving from one stage to the next. At each norms as they internalized the moral and social rules stage, the circle includes the persons or groups of of conduct that governed their new society. people who can provide the necessary interactions Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 87

26 ENCOUNTER: Education for Meaning and Social Justice for the successful resolution of each specific develop- At the same time, there is the potential for feel- mental crisis/task. ings of inferiority. Erikson warns about the societal prejudices that, if rooted deeply in the structure of Birth to 6 Years: the society, can create a hostile environment for Infancy, Early Childhood, and Play Age children of these ages, both immigrant and non-immigrant alike. He points out that there is In the first three stages of psychosocial develop- “the danger threatening individual and society ment, from birth to age six (Evans 1967), the growing where the schoolchild begins to feel that the color child is passing through the developmental crises of of his skin, the background of his parents, or the Trust vs. Mistrust; Autonomy vs. Shame, Doubt; Initia- fashion of his clothes rather than his wish and his tive vs. Guilt. The most significant relationships in a will to learn will decide his worth as an appren- young child’s world are those within the nuclear tice” (Erikson 1963, 260). family, beginning with the maternal and parental persons and then the basic family. Parents at this time Adolescence assume a primary role within the child’s social life and become a platform from which all subsequent re- During the stage of Identity vs. Identity Confu- lationships will have an opportunity to emerge. Even sion, the task of adolescence is to integrate the iden- in the first stage of life, that of Trust vs. Mistrust, the tifications and skills from early childhood with society of the parents matters. Erikson says parents growing expectations of what the future may hold create a sense of trust in their children by a kind of and what the adolescent wants to be and become. “administration which in its quality combines sensi- From successful integration and incorporation of tive care of the baby’s individual needs and a firm the future expectations into one’s scheme of self, sense of personal trustworthiness within the trusted an adolescent will acquire the basic sense of iden- framework of their community’s lifestyle” (Erikson tity. Although the child needs to receive behavioral 1968). In these early stages it is the child’s family that and emotional guidance, the adolescent instead provides cultural guidance for social functioning seeks out models of behavior to contemplate as within their shared community. possible choices for self-identification. The avail- ability and type of models the adolescent encoun- Age 6 to 12: School Age ters can influence whether this stage is resolved through formation of an independent identity or During the stage of Industry vs. Inferiority, the ra- results in identity confusion. dius of counterplayers expands to include not only The majority of role models necessary for the de- the basic family but also same age playmates—as velopment of identity are found within the radius of well as adults outside the family—from their neigh- social interactions, which in early adolescence pri- borhood and school. Immigrant children might be- marily includes peer groups and out-groups. Ado- come integrated within the social context of this par- lescents are eager to be affirmed by rituals through ticular age group because children at this age are the relations within peer groups and to separate via open to interdependent functioning. As Erikson the negative identity of the out-group. Erikson (1963, 245) notes, (1968, 132) warns that at this stage “young people On the whole, it can be said that American can become remarkably clannish, and cruel in their schools successfully meet the challenge of train- exclusion of all those who are ‘different’, in skin ing children of play-school age and of elemen- color or cultural background, in taste and gifts, and tary grades in a spirit of self-reliance and enter- often in entirely petty aspects of dress and gesture prise. Children of these ages seem remarkably arbitrarily selected as the sign of an in-grouper or free of prejudice and apprehension, preoccu- out-grouper.” Later, as the next stage of young pied as they still are with growing and learning adulthood encroaches, the adolescent looks for and with the new pleasures of association out- adult models of leadership to emulate (e.g., rela- side their families. (p. 245) tives, coaches, clergy). Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 88

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Our Study Century, computers in the 21st Century). In addition to learning the technical skills of tool use (including At what developmental stage, if any, might young literacy and other academic skills), children learn immigrants experience the greatest difficulties? In new rules and expectations for social competence order to gain information about this question, we and collaboration. The potential problem of a lack of conducted a preliminary study in the introductory mastery leading to a sense of inferiority is real. psychology classes at CCNY. We asked 179 foreign-born college students to fill out surveys that asked at what age they migrated to the United States. chool-age immigrant children They then answered questions from three scales de- Smay have a more difficult signed to measure their current sense of self-esteem, personal anxiety and social anxiety. time because their need to learn We had reason to believe that the children and from adult counterplayers their parents could have experienced difficulties during any of the three age groups we described above. introduces potentially The children who came to the U.S. prior to the age of conflicting cultural influences. six—during the stages when they were more exclusively dependent on their parents—might have more The role of counterplayers is also very important. acutely experienced their parents’ difficulties with Both parents and teachers—who are typically in the adjusting to a new society. Those students who mi- Adulthood Stage of Generativity vs. Stagnation—have grated during the latency stage, from ages 6 to 12, a developmental task of transmitting the social rules might have had fewer problems. According to tradi- of culture (Erikson 1964; Huxley 1964; Fromm 1992). tional Freudian theory, the children are in the latency From whom will the children learn societal rules? stage, a period of relative stability (Freud 1949). Still, Which culture’s rules will be taught? The answers to Erikson notes that children of this stage can experi- these questions may underlie the emotional com- ence the pains of inferiority with respect to learning plexities of School Age stage for immigrant children. and the adjustment to school society. Adolescence would also seem to be a time of particular difficulty Upon entering school the child enters a time of for immigrant youngsters because they are undergo- rapid developmental transformation. The social ing a quest for models to emulate in the formation of learning environment changes as the radius of sig- their psychosocial identity. nificant counterplayers has its greatest expansion. Although we are still in the process of analyzing Whereas the years of early childhood development our data, preliminary inspection of the results indi- were mediated by parents and extended family in cates a clear pattern. Somewhat to our surprise, the the context of the home and with an emphasis on college students’ data indicate that, in terms of current learning through play, now the insular home is sup- levels of anxiety and self-esteem, those who had mi- plemented by learning at school. The child now be- grated to the U.S. between six and twelve—during the comes an interactive member of the larger society, School Age stage—had worse outcomes. The results which accentuates structured education that is con- prompted us to revisit the literature on that stage. strained by societal norms. The parents, who until yesterday occupied the dominant role in educating Immigrant School Age Children the child and were the main connection to larger so- And their Counterplayers cial currents, must now share this role, and gradually From ages 6 to 12, children enter and pass through be superseded by school teachers and school chums the School Age stage and seek to resolve the crisis/ as the primary counterplayers during most of the task of Industry vs Inferiority. This stage requires that child’s day. The parent needs to feel comfortable that the child learn to use the technological tools neces- the development that began at home will continue sary to advance within a particular society at that through the teacher and in the school environment. particular moment in history (e.g., swords in the 1st While this would be a large and complex change for Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 89

28 ENCOUNTER: Education for Meaning and Social Justice any family, the results of our study suggest that hand- though she did not speak any English when she en- ing over the child to the school may be particularly tered school in the United States, Mei mastered the fraught with confusion and conflict for immigrant language of her new nation very quickly and ex- parents and their children. celled in all of her classes. Ahousing model she made It may be that those immigrants who arrive during was so creative that Mei’s teacher encouraged her to the years of early childhood have a relatively easy participate in the SimCity urban planning competi- time during the transition because they are, at the tion to be held in Washington D.C. Mei was really ex- time, interacting mainly with their parents who are cited about the prospect of going to the SimCity com- communicating only the enculturative messages of petition and discussed with her peers her dream of their homeland to them. However, school-age immi- being an architect when she grew up. When Mei grant children may have a more difficult time be- tried to explain this exciting opportunity to her par- cause their need to learn from adult counterplayers ents, they were perplexed. Her parents did not un- introduces potential conflicting cultural influences. derstand why a teacher would encourage a young On one side are the parents communicating the girl to develop an interest in a field in which she had enculturative message of their homeland, and on the no prospects for the future because in their experi- other is the teacher who is communicating the ence engineering was a strictly male profession. In acculturative message of the receiving society. the end, Mei’s parents decided that she would not at- Another aspect of the conflict created by the sepa- tend the SimCity urban planning competition, be- ration of School Age children from their parents is cause it would cause unnecessary distraction from that even 6, 7, and 8-year-olds are often the parents’ her regular studies. essential helpers. Because the kids typically speak Female immigrants, in particular, might experi- English so much better than the parents, the parents ence a hindrance in their development because some depend on them enormously. The parents feel help- immigrant communities demand that girls preserve less when the children aren’t home, and the children their cultural mores even more than boys. In such feel very guilty leaving the parents so helpless and cases, the enculturative messages communicated by alone. This helplessness may be worsened by the the parents will be considerably different from those parents’ recognition that, due to deficits of language communicated by the school, causing the young and cultural fluency, they are unable to fulfill their girls like Mei to experience a significantly larger adult counterplayer role. amount of distress (Dion and Dion 2001). In contrast, immigrants who arrive during their Lessons adolescence may have a relatively easy time adjusting to the United States, because the young adoles- When thinking about ways we can structure new cent seeking to resolve the crisis of Identity vs. Identity school programs—and modify existing ones—to Confusion is no longer looking to adult counter- meet the needs of new immigrants and their schools, players for guidance. As parents grow distant in we must keep in mind Erikson’s insight that person- their role as counterplayers to the adolescent immi- ality develops according to an epigenetic principle. grants, the adolescent is less receptive to guidance That is, as a person grows and matures, different as- based on the mores of their homeland. This stage is pects of personality arise, each having its specific mediated through their peer counterplayers; from time of ascendancy. If the child is to develop fully, peers they can seek a single acculturative message of each new personal potential must be supported American society. within a context of significant relationships. An example of the clash of enculturation and ac- With these considerations in mind, educators and culturation forces, and their potential to hinder de- parents must carefully consider how the potential velopment within the social context, is seen in a con- clashes between the processes of enculturation and flict experienced by a sixth grader named Mei. Mei acculturation can cause deficits in the development immigrated to the United States from China two of immigrant children. One of the steps that we years ago with her parents and a younger sister. Al- could take to minimize these negative effects would Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 90

Volume 17, Number 3 (Autumn 2004) 29 be to facilitate a public dialogue between parents and Freud, Sigmund. 1949. An outline of psychoanalysis. New York: Norton. teachers, which would address the potential areas of Fromm, E. 1992. The influence of social factors in child devel- conflict. Discussions of this sort could provide us opment. In Yearbook of the International Erich Fromm Society. valuable insight into the developmental priorities of Munster: LIT- Verlag. Originally published 1958. teachers and parents, which, if they were in conflict, Hernandez, D. J. 1999, April. Children of immigrants, one-fifth of America’s children and growing: Their cir- could be potentially damaging to the development of cumstances, prospects, and welfare reform. Paper read at all children, immigrant and non-immigrant alike, biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child De- since they together share their learning environment. velopment at Albuquerque, New Mexico. Ho, David Y. F. 1995. Internalized culture, culturocentrism, Erikson in his book Insight and Responsibility (1964) and transcendence. Counseling Psychologist 23 (1): 4-24. provides us with a potential guide to our efforts. He Huxley, Julian Sorell. 1964. Essays of a humanist. New York: observed that Bernard Shaw warned us not to abide Harper & Row. by the golden rule in its traditional form—that is, “do Kinetz, Erika. 2002, November 3. Where the wounds don’t show. New York Times. (or do not) unto another what you wish him to do (or Landale, N. S., and R. S. Oropesa. 1995. Immigrant children not to do) unto you”—because it is impossible to ful- and the children of immigrants: Inter- and intra-ethnic fill. How do we know what another wants or does group differences in the United States. Population Re- search Group (PRG), Research Paper 95-2. East Lansing, not want to be done to him? MI: Institute for Public Policy and Social Research. How do we promote those psychological pro- Phinney, Jean S., Gabriel Horenczyk, Karmela Liebkind, and cesses that will help rather than hinder people from Paul Vedder. 2001. Ethnic identity, immigration, and well-being: An interactional perspective. Journal of Social different cultures at different stages of their develop- Issues 57(3): 493-510. ment? Erikson (1964, 233) suggests that the golden Redfield, R.T, R. Linton, and M Herskovits. 1936. Memoran- rule be amended to state that “truly worthwhile acts dum on the study of acculturation. American Anthropologist enhance a mutuality between the doer and the 38: 149-152. Schmidley, Dianne. 2003. The foreign-born population in the other—a mutuality which strengthens the doer even United States: March 2002. U.S. Census Bureau; Current as it strengthens the other.” Understood in this way, Population Reports, P20-539 2003 [cited May 17 2005]. the Rule would say, “Do to another what will Available from http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/ p20-539.pdf strengthen you even as it will strengthen him—that Silverman, Ed. 2004. City facts 2003-2004. New York: The City is, what will develop his best potentialities even as it College of the City University of New York, Office of Insti- develops your own.” tutional Research. U.S. Census Bureau. 2004. New York quickFacts. Queens References County, New York. Author 2004 [cited May 17 2004]. Avail- able from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/ Buckner, Stephen. 2003. Miami-Dade leads nation in percentage 36081.html. of foreign-born latest results show 33 million nationwide; large presence in California and New York. U.S. Census Bureau 2003 [cited May 17 2004]. Available from http:// www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2003/ cb03cn66.html. Crain, William C. 2000. Theories of development: Concepts and applications (4th ed.). New York: Prentice-Hall. Dion, Karen K., and Kenneth L. Dion. 2001. Gender and cultural adaptation in immigrant families. Journal of Social Is- sues 57(3): 511-521. Erikson, Erik H., and Joan M. Erikson. 1997. The life cycle completed. Extended ed. New York: Norton. Erikson, Erik Homburger. 1963. Childhood and society.2ded. New York: Norton. Erikson, Erik Homburger. 1964. Insight and responsibility: Lec- tures on the ethical implications of psychoanalytic insight. 1st ed. New York: Norton. Erikson, Erik Homburger. 1968. Identity, youth, and crisis. 1st ed. New York: Norton. Evans, Richard I. 1967. Dialogue with Erik Erikson: Harper & Row. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 91

Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2001, pp. 615–631

A Psychology of Immigration

J. W. Berry* Queen’s University

The discipline of psychology has much to contribute to our understanding of immigrants and the process of immigration. A framework is proposed that lays out two complementary domains of psychological research, both rooted in contextual factors, and both leading to policy and program development. The first (acculturation) stems from research in anthropology and is now a central part of cross- cultural psychology; the second (intergroup relations) stems from sociology and is now a core feature of social psychology. Both domains are concerned with two fundamental issues that face immigrants and the society of settlement: maintenance of group characteristics and contact between groups. The intersection of these issues creates an intercultural space, within which members of both groups develop their cultural boundaries and social relationships. A case is made for the benefits of integration as a strategy for immigrants and for multiculturalism as a policy for the larger society. The articles in this issue are then discussed in relation to these conceptual frameworks and empirical findings.

The study of immigrants and immigration is rooted in many disciplines: Anthropology, demography, economics, political science, and sociology have all predominated, whereas psychology has lagged somewhat behind. There is a clear role for psychology to play in this field, however, just as there is for the broader domain of ethnic and intercultural studies more generally. In claiming such a role, I have previously argued (Berry, 1990a) that there are two broad areas of potential contribution by psychology: acculturation and intergroup relations. The former has come into psychology from anthropology and has become a major focus of cross-cultural psychology (Berry, 1990b; Liebkind, 2000; Ward, 1996). The latter had its origins in sociology and has taken a central position in social psychology

*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to J. W. Berry, Psychology Depart- ment, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6 [e-mail: [email protected]]. The author wishes to thank Rudy Kalin for his comments on this article and for his long-term collaboration in the study of intercultural relations in Canada. 615

616 Berry

(Brewer & Brown, 1998; Brown & Gaertner, 2001). Both are now contributing policy-relevant findings for the management of group relations in culturally plural societies (Aboud & Levy, 1999; Berry, 1999a; Berry & Kalin, 2000). Articles in this issue can be seen as substantiating this claim by contributing to these two domains: Some are concerned with acculturation, and some with intergroup relations; moreover, some have policy implications that flow from work in these two domains. My task in this final article is to develop a framework for understanding a “psychology of immigration,” to place the various articles in such a framework, to discern common themes among them, and to draw out their theoretical and policy import.

A Framework

Figure 1 illustrates these cultural, social, and policy components of immigration phenomena (modified from Berry, 1990a, 1999a), and places them in relation to their broad social science contexts. Distinctions and possible linkages are portrayed, using terms that are generally known in psychology. Other schemas, employed in cognate disciplines (e.g., Banton, 2000; Kymlicka, 1998; Portes, 1997), emphasize other components and terminology; they serve to coordinate their perspectives and concerns, but they often overlap with those of psychology.

Acculturation

On the left side of Figure 1 is the domain of acculturation, a process that entails contact between two cultural groups, which results in numerous cultural changes in both parties (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1936). Graves (1967) later proposed that individuals who are members of cultures in contact will experience various psychological changes, coining the term psychological acculturation to refer to this individual level. Acculturation is a process involving two or more groups, with consequences for both; in effect, however, the contact experiences have much greater impact on the nondominant group and its members. For this reason, much of the research on acculturation has focused on such nondominant peoples (such as immigrants and indigenous peoples), tending to ignore the impact on the dominant population. It is obvious, however, that immigrant-receiving societies and their native-born populations have been massively transformed in the past decades. Recent trends in acculturation research have come to focus more on the process of mutual change (Berry, 1997; Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997), involving both groups in contact. For more than 30 years, psychologists have focused on some fundamental aspects of these phenomena, particularly people’s attitudes toward the process, their overt behaviors (continuity or change), and their internal cultural identities. All are rooted in two basic aspects of intercultural contact that have been described Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 93

Psychology of Immigration 617

Fig. 1. A framework for understanding psychology of immigration, linking acculturation and intergroup relations research to background context variables and outcomes. by anthropologists and sociologists: (1) the degree of actual contact and the resultant participation of each group with the other, and (2) the degree of cultural maintenance manifested by each group. That is, in any intercultural situation, a group can penetrate (or ignore) the other, and groups can remain culturally distinct from (or merge with) each other. The distinction between these two group-level phenomena is critical for understanding the process of both cultural and psychological acculturation. If it is assumed that high contact always and inevitably leads to low cultural maintenance, then the only possible outcome of intercultural contact is the absorption of one group into the other, with the melding of the two into a blended culture, leading to the disappearance of distinct cultural groups. The persistence of indigenous peoples in Africa and the Americas following European migration, however, and the continuity of French and Spanish immigrant societies in North America attest to the viability of alternatives to such cultural demise. At the psychological level, virtually everyone in an intercultural contact arena holds attitudes toward the two fundamental aspects (intercultural contact and Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 94

618 Berry cultural maintenance) noted above. When examined among immigrant (or other nondominant) individuals, these have become known as acculturation attitudes. Here, the issues are: To what extent do people wish to have contact with (or avoid) others outside their group, and to what extent do people wish to maintain (or give up) their cultural attributes? When examined among the population at large (often representing the dominant receiving society), views about these issues have been termed multicultural ideology (Berry, Kalin, & Taylor, 1977) and are illustrated on the right of Figure 1, as a counterpart to acculturation attitudes. In this case, the focus is on how one group thinks that others (e.g., immigrants, ethnocultural groups, indigenous peoples) should acculturate (i.e., acculturation expectations). One way of illustrating these distinctions (between the two dimensions, and between the views of dominant and nondominant groups) is presented in Figure 2. The two basic dimensions are portrayed as independent of each other (orthogo- nally), first for the nondominant (or immigrant) groups on the left, and then for the dominant group (or receiving society) on the right. For each issue, a dimension is shown, with a positive orientation at one end and a negative one at the other. For immigrants, the main question is “How shall we deal with these two issues?” whereas for the receiving society it is “How should they deal with them?” In practice, however, each group must also concern itself with the views and practices of the other. For members of the former, their choices may be constrained by the orientations of the receiving society, whereas for members of the latter, the receiving society needs to consider how to change in order to accommodate immigrants. Thus, for both groups in contact, there is necessarily a mutual process, involving one’s own attitudes and behaviors and a perception of those of the other groups.

Fig. 2. Varieties of intercultural stategies in immigrant groups and in the receiving society. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 95

Psychology of Immigration 619

These two issues define an intercultural contact space (the circle) within which individuals occupy a preferred attitudinal position. Each sector of the circles in Figure 2 carries a name that has a long-standing usage in acculturation studies. From the point of view of immigrant groups (on the left of Figure 2), when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural heritage and seek daily interaction with other cultures, the assimilation strategy is defined. In contrast, when immigrants place a value on holding on to their original culture and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others, then the separation alternative is defined. When there is an interest in both maintaining one’s original culture and engaging in daily interactions with other groups, integration is the option; here, some degree of cultural integrity is maintained, while at the same time immigrants seek, as a member of an ethnocultural group, to participate as an integral part of the larger society. Finally, when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance (often for reasons of enforced cultural loss) and little interest in having relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination), then marginalization is defined. This presentation of attitudinal positions is based on the assumption that immigrant groups and their individual members have the freedom to choose how they want to engage in intercultural relations. This, of course, is not always the case (Berry, 1974). When the receiving society enforces certain kinds of relations or constrains the choices of immigrants, then other terms need to be used. This is most clearly so in the case of integration, which can only be chosen and successfully pursued by immigrants when the receiving society is open and inclusive in its orientation toward cultural diversity (Berry, 2000). Thus a mutual accommodation is required for integration to be attained, involving the acceptance by both dominant and nondominant groups of the right of all groups to live as culturally different peoples within the same society. This strategy requires immigrants to adopt the basic values of the receiving society, and at the same time the receiving society must be prepared to adapt national institutions (e.g., education, health, justice, labor) to better meet the needs of all groups now living together in the larger plural society. Obviously, the integration strategy can be pursued only in societies that are explicitly multicultural, in which certain psychological preconditions are established (Berry & Kalin, 1995). These preconditions are the widespread acceptance of the value to a society of cultural diversity (i.e., the presence of a multicultural ideology), and of low levels of prejudice and discrimination; positive mutual attitudes among ethnocultural groups (i.e., no specific intergroup hatreds); and a sense of attachment to, or identification with, the larger society by all individuals and groups (Kalin & Berry, 1995). These conditions will be considered below in relation to the integroup relations side of Figure 1. Just as obviously, integration (and separation) can be pursued only when other members of one’s immigrant group share in the wish, and have the vitality, to maintain the group’s cultural heritage. Other constraints on one’s choice of intercultural strategy have also been noted. For example, those whose physical Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 96

620 Berry features set them apart from the receiving society (e.g., Turks in Germany) may experience prejudice and discrimination and thus be reluctant to pursue assimilation in order to avoid being rejected (Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989; Piontkowski, Florack, Hoelker, & Obdrzalek, 2000). These two basic issues have so far been presented from the point of view of the nondominant immigrant groups only (on the left side of Figure 2). The original definitions of acculturation, however, clearly established that both groups in contact would become acculturated. Hence, a third dimension is required: that of the powerful role played by the dominant group in influencing the way in which mutual acculturation would take place (Berry, 1974). The addition of this third dimension produces a duplicate framework (right side of Figure 2). Assimilation when sought by the dominant group can be termed the “melting pot” (and when strongly enforced, it becomes a “pressure cooker”!). When separation is demanded and enforced by the dominant group, it is “segregation.” For marginalization, when imposed by the dominant group it is a form of “exclusion” (Bourhis et al., 1997). Finally for integration, when cultural diversity is an objective of the larger society as a whole, it represents the strategy of mutual accommodation now widely called “multiculturalism” (Berry, 1984). As noted above these orientations toward the process of acculturation have been assessed frequently, using various methods (reviewed by Berry, 1997; Berry et al., 1989). The most common of these is to select a number of domains relevant to intercultural relations (e.g., language use, food preference, parent-child relations) and then create four statements for the various domains, one for each of the four attitude sectors (e.g., Van de Vijver, Helms-Lorenz, & Feltzer, 1999). Another is to create two statements for a particular domain, one for each of the two underlying dimensions (e.g., Ryder, Alden, & Paulus, 2000). In most studies, attitudes in the acculturation space can be sampled successfully and usually reveal evidence for the validity of the bidimensional conception portrayed in Figure 2. A parallel approach to understanding acculturation strategies uses the concept of cultural identity. This notion refers to a complex set of beliefs and attitudes that people have about themselves in relation to their culture group membership; usually these come to the fore when people are in contact with another culture, rather than when they live entirely within a single culture (Berry, 1996b; Phinney, 1990). Just as the notion of acculturation strategies is based on two underlying dimensions (own cultural maintenance and involvement with other cultures), there is now a consensus that how one thinks of oneself is also constructed along two dimensions. The first of these dimensions is identification with one’s heritage or ethnocultural group, and the second is identification with the larger or dominant society. These two aspects of cultural identity have been referred to in various ways, for example, as ethnic identity and civic identity (Kalin & Berry, 1995). Moreover (as for the acculturation dimensions) these dimensions are usually independent of each other (in the sense that they are not negatively correlated or that Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 97

Psychology of Immigration 621 more of one does not imply less of the other), and they are nested (in the sense that one’s heritage identity may be contained within a larger national identity; for example, one can be an Italian Australian). Using these two identity dimensions, strategies emerge that have clear similarities to the four acculturation strategies: When both identities are asserted, this resembles the integration strategy; when one feels attached to neither, then there is a sense of marginalization; and when one is strongly emphasized over the other, then one exhibits either the assimilation or separation strategy. The final term on the left of Figure 1 is behavioral shifts (Berry, 1980). This refers to the core phenomenon of acculturation, that of psychological change resulting from cultural contact. Virtually every behavior in a person’s repertoire is a candidate for change following one’s involvement with other cultures. In most cases, there is a rather easy transition involving both “culture shedding” and “culture learning”: Individuals change the way they dress, what they eat, their greeting procedures, even their values by reducing (suppressing, forgetting) one way of daily living and taking on replacements. The pace and extent of individual change is clearly related to the degree of cultural maintenance in one’s own group, which in turn is linked to the relative demographic, economic, and political situation of the groups in contact. Although there are many behavioral shifts to be understood, a great deal of attention has been paid to that of language knowledge and use (Bourhis, 1994; Clément & Noels, 1992) and its relation to acculturation attitudes (Masgoret & Gardner, 1999). Substantial empirical relationships have now been established between these acculturation phenomena and the creation of a supportive policy and program climate for positive intercultural relations following migration (see bottom of Figure 1). Outcomes can range from conflictual and stressful contacts and relationships to those in which mutual accommodations are achieved. These linkages will be sur- veyed following a parallel consideration of the intergroup relations (right-hand) side of Figure 2.

Intergroup Relations

The phenomena discussed here are probably better known to psychologists, since they constitute the core of the social psychological study of intergroup relations. Although it may be difficult to distinguish this domain of immigration research from the large general literature on the topic, there are a few differentiat- ing features: First, the groups are usually culturally defined (including specific features of language, religion, status, and “race”), more than is the case for intergroup relations generally (where the focus is often on “minorities” or other generic categories, such as “Asians”). Second, immigrants are typically less familiar to the resident population, making more salient the well-established relationship between familiarity and attraction. For example, when holding specific cultural Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 98

622 Berry background constant, immigrants (compared to those born and raised in a particular country) are usually rated less favorably (e.g., Berry & Kalin, 1995; Kalin, 1996). And third, immigrants are typically less similar to the resident population, making more salient the similarity-attraction relationships. In keeping with this, those who seek to assimilate and who undergo greater behavioral shifts (toward receiving society norms) may experience less discrimination (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Ethnic stereotyping, ethnic attitudes, and ethnic prejudice can be studied with respect to both the receiving society and immigrants. Thus, as for studies of acculturation, mutual or reciprocal views need to be taken into account. Just as acculturation research tends to focus only on nondominant groups, however, intergroup relations research has been largely concerned with studying only dominant groups. In ethnic stereotype research there is a tradition of considering dominant groups’ views of others (heterostereotypes) and sometimes of themselves (autostereotypes); few studies, however, have examined the auto- and heterostereotypes held by the numerous nondominant groups in a reciprocal way. Brewer and Campbell (1976) did so, revealing a pattern of complex relationships, including universal ingroup favoritism, a widely shared hierarchy of outgroup acceptance, and “balance” in dyadic attitudes (see also Berry & Kalin, 1979; Kalin & Berry, 1996). Such multigroup designs are of special importance in immigrant studies for two reasons. First, there is often competition among immigrant groups for favor and status in the receiving society; hence a complex network of attitudes is the essential research focus in such situations. Second, many countries now compete to attract immigrants; hence immigrants’ attitudes toward the receiving society are an essential counterpart to the attitudes held by the larger society toward them. Ethnic prejudice (and its variants, based on language, religion, or “race”) is, of course, at the core of intergroup relations research, because it seeks a broader and deeper psychological basis for outgroup rejection (including immigrant rejection). Whether theoretically based on ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, or social dominance (to mention the main current constructs), the core concern is for why some people harbor a deep-seated, generalized rejection of “the other,” beyond variations in attitudes to, and stereotypes about, specific groups. One characteristic is now clear: Ethnic prejudice is universal (i.e., all groups and all individuals evidence it), but it is highly variable across groups and individuals (i.e., there are large group and individual differences). The task is thus to explain both its universality and its variability (Duckitt, 2000). As a counterpart to acculturation attitudes (on the left of Figure 1) there is the construct of multicultural ideology (introduced by Berry et al., 1977). This concept attempts to encompass the general and fundamental view that cultural diversity is good for a society and its individual members (i.e., high value on cultural maintenance) and that such diversity should be shared and accommodated in an equitable Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 99

Psychology of Immigration 623 way (i.e., high value on contact and participation). In various studies, this ideology has been assessed using a scale that loaded integration items positively and assimilation, segregation, and marginalization items negatively. Our results generally support its construct validity (e.g., Berry et al., 1977; Berry & Kalin, 1995), and others have also found that integrationist views usually contrast with the other three attitudes (e.g., van de Vijver et al., 1999). Multicultural ideology has close empirical links to ethnic attitudes and prejudice but is more patently related to policy options for managing intergroup relations in culturally plural immigrant societies. Also closely related to this attitude-ideology cluster is the idea that has been referred to as the multicultural assumption (Berry et al., 1977). Drawn from the Canadian multiculturalism policy (Government of Canada, 1971; see also Berry, 1984), it asserts that only when people are secure in their own cultural identity will they be able to accept those who differ from themselves. Numerous concepts have been proposed, and empirical studies have now been carried out, that establish the essential validity of this assumption (e.g., Stephan, Stephan, & Gudykunst, 1999). Whether the relationship is phrased in positive terms (security is a prerequisite for tolerance of diversity) or in negative terms (threats to, or anxiety about, one’s cultural identity and cultural rights underpins prejudice), there is little doubt that there are intimate links between being accepted by others and accepting others (cf. the need for the study of mutual or reciprocal attitudes noted above). Finally, overt acts of discrimination are usually what have the greatest impact on immigrants and others who live in nondominant communities (Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994).

Policy and Program Implications

Research on the acculturation of immigrants, and on intergroup relations among them and their descendents, has amassed a large empirical basis for policy development and program action. Unfortunately, those who develop policy and take action do not often attend to the research findings. Instead, personal preferences (possibly prejudices) and political pressures seem to dominate the field. However, the claim being made (at the bottom of Figure 1) is that all the knowledge rooted in the two research approaches can inform policy and program development. Specifically, these approaches can help to shape human relations so that they avoid intergroup conflict and acculturative stress and approach those that are characterized by mutual accommodation and positive adaptation (Berry, 1999a). A case has been made for integration as the most positive individual and group acculturation strategy and for multiculturalism as the most positive public policy (Berry, 1997). This entails the acceptance of cultural diversity by, and the equitable participation of, all groups in the larger society. Space prohibits the detailing of this case here; however, the alternatives (of assimilation, involving loss; of segregation, Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 100

624 Berry involving rejection; and of marginalization, involving both) appear to have no support either in the research literature or indeed in real life (Berry, 2000).

The Articles in Relation to the Framework

The three groups of articles in this issue map onto the framework (in Figure 1) rather neatly: the first group focuses on orientations in the larger society; the second on adaptations of immigrants; and the third on various interactions between the two. In some of the articles, various antecedents in cognate social sciences are made explicit, whereas in others, policy issues are made salient. Considering articles in the first section, the existing literature on orientations to immigration in the receiving society clearly supports both the role of contextual factors (top of Figure 1) and psychological factors (Duckitt, 2000). For example, Palmer (1996) shows that attitudes in Canada toward the numbers of immigrants closely tracks the unemployment rate, year after year from 1975 to 1995. In addition to this economic factor, political factors also play a role: Immigrants from politically allied countries (and refugees from politically despised countries) are often preferred over others. In this pair of observations about contextual influences lies the root of a psychological distinction: views about immigration per se (e.g., the need for and level of immigration) and the kinds of people to be allowed in. Although there is crossover between these two aspects, the former often corresponds closely to contextual factors, such as demographic and economic issues (e.g., desired population level, unemployment) and historical/policy ones (e.g., the role of immigration in nation-building). The latter often corresponds more to psychological factors, such as prejudice and security (threat). The articles in the first section deal minimally with these background contextual factors. Their strength lies in the analysis and interpretation of psychological facets. The first article after the introduction and overview article (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong) highlights the immigration dilemma: On the one hand, many people pride themselves on their openness, equity, and tolerance; on the other, they fear immigrants because of their perceived threat to the economic well-being and social cohesion of their society. Esses and her colleagues propose that such perceived threat is rooted in a general “zero-sum” view of life (especially of limited resources) and that this results in an increased sense of competition for these limited resources. The resources, however, vary: For some immigrants social services are used, and there are perceived tax costs to the resident population; for others, jobs are obtained, and there are perceived losses of employment opportunities for those already in the workforce. Because in both cases the resources are seen as limited, it is this zero-sum view (along with other factors) that underpins anti-immigrant attitudes. There is now considerable evidence for such a complex network of relationships. For example, in a national survey in Canada (Berry et al., 1977), ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and willingness to discriminate against Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 101

Psychology of Immigration 625 immigrants were strongly intercorrelated and were all related to negative perceived consequences (mainly economic) of immigration and to the rejection of various kinds of immigrants; moreover (related to the first article), multicultural ideology was a core element in this network: that is, lack of perceived a threat from, and willingness to accept, immigrants were predicted by integrationist/multicultural views. The next article (Pratto & Lemieux) similarly focuses on the duality of immigration and shows that different approaches are needed for different people in order to increase support for immigration policies. On the one hand, it is very likely that an inclusive and low ethnocentric orientation can serve to enhance the acceptance of immigration policies by appealing to one’s humanitarian view of society. On the other hand (and less self-evident), those who feel threatened by immigration can be approached successfully by appealing to their need to control and dominate immigrants. It would be interesting to assess these two groups’ multicultural ideology to reveal their views about how immigrants should live following their settlement. It is likely that once immigrants are “in,” with such differential strategies having been used to appeal to the two groups to facilitate their admission, assimilationist (or segregationist) views among those high on social dominance would clash with the more integrationist views of those low in dominance, as well as with the preferences of immigrants themselves. There is preliminary evidence (Berry, Bourhis, & Kalin, 1999) that these relationships and contrasts do indeed exist and may enhance stress and conflict between the groups. The article by Jackson, Brown, Brown, and Marks addresses the question of what accounts for immigration attitudes in Europe. Using concepts and measures derived largely from research in the United States, Jackson et al. found support for many of the expected factors, especially perceived threat (a sense of encroach- ment) and self-reported racism (cf. the multicultural assumption). In this research, however, the predicted variable (attitudes toward immigration) was limited to one aspect: willingness to send immigrants back to their country of origin, which is an extreme form of exclusion. Beyond this one aspect, there are other orientations to immigration, both positive (integration) and negative (segregation and assimilation), that tap important views about immigration and settlement issues and deserve attention, Moreover, there are other dimensions to immigration attitudes beyond these orientations: immigration per se (allowing immigrants into the country at all, rather than seeking their deportation), acceptable levels of immigration (from zero to unlimited), and the kinds of people who are acceptable or unaccept- able. An important question to address in future studies is whether the predictors used in this study work in trying to account for immigration attitudes when attitudes are conceived and assessed in a more comprehensive way. The article by Mullen uses a number of immigrant group characteristics to account for ethnophaulisms (ethnic slurs). Mullen notes that such features of the group are less often studied in intergroup relations research than characteristics of the perceiver. To some extent, this imbalance may be due to the wish to avoid the Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 102

626 Berry implication that there is “something about them” that leads others to dislike them (cf. “blaming the victim”). Decades of anthropological research, however, have revealed that groups of people (“cultures”) actually do have a shared set of characteristic customs and attributes. And Campbell (1967) has reminded us that the greater these “real differences” are between two groups, the greater the likelihood that each will appear in the other’s stereotypes. So social psychology should not be shy about accepting the existence of such differences and asking whether they contribute to intergroup relations. Previous studies have considered how familiarity, perceived similarity, and actual group size (e.g., Kalin, 1996) may relate to intergroup attitudes and stereotypes. Beyond these variables, Mullen has considered specific group features (such as language and complexion) that are essentially derived from the disciplines identified at the top of Figure 1. Others, such as religion, gender relations, and parent-child relations, could also serve as salient group features. In the second set of articles in the issue, the focus switches to the left-hand side of Figure 1: How do people decide to migrate, how do they settle, how do they think of themselves, and what kinds of experiences do they have following migration? These characteristics of migrants themselves have usually received more attention from sociologists than from psychologists. The first article of this section (Boneva & Frieze) goes beyond economic factors to consider the values and other motivations of individuals who want to emigrate. Based on their own and other research, Boneva and Frieze suggest that individuals who want to emigrate possess a specific constellation of personality characteristics. In particular, those who want to emigrate are higher in work centrality and are higher in achievement and power motivation compared to those who do not want to emigrate, who tend to be higher in family centrality and affiliation motivation. The emigration and immigration of individuals with specific personality characteristics has obvious implications for both the sending and receiving society. Possibly because so much immigration has been rooted in sociopolitical conflicts (which have usually been studied by sociology and psychiatry), the literature has overemphasized the problematic nature of the migration experience. In contrast to this usual orientation, some researchers are now focusing on the more positive aspects: After all, most immigrants settle well, find jobs, feel good about themselves, and speak positively about the experience. In keeping with the newer orientation, the ICSEY1 study (see Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind, & Vedder) has been turning up evidence that immigrant youth are doing rather well in the 10 countries involved in that study. Drawing on the traditions of research on cultural identity and acculturation attitudes, the ICSEY study asks the question: Which

1For truth in advertising, the author declares his participation (and hence, self-interest) in the ICSEY study. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 103

Psychology of Immigration 627 cultural orientations are more supportive of adolescents (psychologically and academically) as they arrange their lives between the heritage culture of their parents and the national (often multinational) culture(s) of their peers? Using the two-dimensional conception (e.g., as portrayed in Figure 2), the ICSEY project has assessed both cultural identity and acculturation attitudes, as well as adaptation outcomes. With respect to identity, Phinney et al. found that the two dimensions of identity were indeed generally independent (uncorrelated) but varied by society and particular immigrant group; they attributed these variations to policies and practices in the receiving society as well as to the unique history of each group. With respect to adaptation, bicultural identities and integrationist attitudes predicted better psychological adaptation and school adjustment, with separated and marginalized identities being associated with least favorable outcomes. This pattern is now so widely found in the literature (reviewed by Berry, 1997) that it can plausibly form a basis for policy development supporting bicultural identities, integrationist attitudes, and, more generally, multicultural institutions in plural societies (Berry, 2000). In an examination of gender and adaptation in immigrant families, Karen Dion and Kenneth Dion discuss findings demonstrating the importance of gender in understanding immigrants’ experiences of immigration and adaptation in the receiving society. For example, social structural factors and values pertaining to family relationships may lead to very different experiences for men and women. In the process of immigration and adaptation to a new society, expectations and responsibilities related to family roles may be renegotiated. One interesting issue raised is how ethnic identity may differ between women and men because of such factors as gender-related socialization pressures. Although “discrimination” appears on the intergroup relations side of Figure 1, it is clear that the “perception of discrimination” is a characteristic of immigrant and acculturating groups and affects their adaptation (Noh, Besier, Kaspar, Hou, & Rummens, 1999). There is an important link, however, between the two: When variations in ethnic attitudes toward, and willingness to discriminate against, various groups correspond to variations in the perception of such negative treatment, then we can claim a degree of cross-validation. For example, in a previous study by Kenneth Dion (Dion & Kawakami, 1996) the ordering of perceived employment discrimination by groups in Toronto closely paralleled the rank attitudes toward the same ethnic groups in a national survey in Canada (Berry & Kalin, 1995). In addition to employment, discrimination in housing has become a serious barrier to positive settlement. In the last article in this section, Kenneth Dion examines how three immigrant groups in Toronto experience general discrimination and specific discrimination in their “housing careers” (the movement over time—up, down, or laterally in costs—in owning or renting housing). Evidence of both personal discrimination in a number of areas (e.g., income, accent, religion) and discrimination against the participants’ immigrant group was sought; both were Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 104

628 Berry reported to be higher by the two “visible minority” groups. For housing discrimination, a similar result was obtained. This raises the possibility that there is a “generic rejection” across a broad front and/or that there is a “generic perception” of discrimination regardless of the interaction domain. The first possibility is bolstered by the observation (made above) that perceived discrimination and public attitudes tend to correspond and hence validate each other; there may well be such a generic rejection of groups, with variability that establishes a relatively stable hierarchy in plural societies. The second possibility is bolstered by the findings (also mentioned above) that intergroup perceptions and attitudes tend to be reciprocated; thus a negative symbiotic relationship may become self-sustaining. Such interactions are explicitly examined in the issue’s third group of articles. Zick, Wagner, van Dick, and Petzel study the acculturation attitudes (actually the acculturation expectations or multicultural ideology) and the ethnic attitudes of members of the dominant society in a country (Germany) that has no official immigration policy. As in earlier studies with multicultural ideology in Canada, integrationist items tend to stand in psychological contrast to the three attitudinal alternatives and to correlate substantially with measures of ethnic prejudice (e.g., Berry et al., 1977; Berry & Kalin, 1995). They further found that such a network of attitudes predicts behavioral intentions to discriminate, with integrationist views most strongly (and negatively) related to discrimination. These findings in a country that differs so much in immigration experience from Canada suggest that trans- national generalization may be warranted: Multicultural policy can be successful only when ethnic prejudice and discrimination are low and multicultural ideology (integration vs. assimilation and segregation) is high. Clément, Noels, and Deneault focus on communication between ethnocultural groups and the larger Canadian society and how this contributes to identity and adaptation. Essentially, their article reveals a complex set of relationships that are more context-dependent than had been previously thought. This trend toward increased complexity should not be surprising, given that the situation in Canada involves multiple dimensions of difference: official versus heritage languages (giving rise to differential language status), traditional versus “visible” immigrant groups (giving rise to more opportunity for those who are prejudiced to exhibit it), and variation in regional patterns of settlement (with intergroup and acculturation dynamics in a few metropoles that are vastly different from those found elsewhere). The final article (Reitz) moves the discourse away from the psychological level up to the social and economic context variables portrayed at the top of Figure 1. Using census data over a 20-year period, Reitz finds evidence for social structural variables that limit the employment opportunity of immigrants in the “knowledge economy.” In contrast to the benefits that one might expect to be reaped from the high technical and educational qualifications of immigrants, neither the immigrants themselves nor the larger society seem to find a structural match that allows immigrants to contribute and gain from their expertise. One possible reason for this Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 105

Psychology of Immigration 629 problem, however, is dismissed: Ethnic prejudice and discrimination are seen as unlikely; rather, Reitz identifies the structure of economic institutions, which is predisposed to exclude immigrant qualifications in this area of employment. In a sense, this article brings us full circle, drawing our attention to the fundamental importance of those social contextual factors that set the stage for psychological factors to play their role.

Conclusion

Articles in this issue appear to form a coherent set of empirical findings when placed in a framework that seeks to comprehend a “psychology of immigration.” Rather than being disparate studies of unrelated aspects of immigration, they come together to illustrate a central role for psychology in this burgeoning field. Although rooted in a variety of concepts, these studies converge on some key issues, particularly the acculturation and identity strategies employed by immigrants and their counterparts in the receiving society (especially attitudes toward immigrants and toward the resultant cultural diversity). Although significant first steps have been taken here, much remains to be done. Future research could draw together, within a single project, they key elements identified in Figures 1 and 2. Such research should include both contextual and psychological variables, examined in both immigrant and receiving society populations, and be carried out across a number of countries. Only in this way will we be able to link behavior to the broader setting in which it develops and occurs, understand the reciprocal nature of attitudes and behaviors that characterize immigrant and receiving societies, and increase our awareness of the limits to generalizability that constrain the policy implications of our work. If this issue stimulates such further research and application in the psychology of immigration, then those following may well identify it as the starting point of their own journeys across disciplinary borders and into unknown territories.

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Berry, J. W. (1990b). Psychology of acculturation. In J. Berman (Ed.), Cross-cultural perspectives (Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Vol. 37, pp. 201–234). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Berry, J. W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation and adaptation. Applied Psychology, 46, 5–68. Berry, J. W. (1999a). Intercultural relations in plural societies. Canadian Psychology, 40, 1–9. Berry, J. W. (1999b). Aboriginal cultural identity. Canadian Journal of Native Studies, 19, 1–36. Berry, J. W. (2000). Sociopyschological costs and benefits of multiculturalism. In J. Dacyl & C. Westin (Eds.), Governance of cultural diversity (pp. 297–354). Stockholm: Centre for Research in In- ternational Migration and Ethnic Relations. Berry, J. W., Bourhis, R., & Kalin, R. (1999, November). International study of attitudes towards immigration and settlement (ISATIS). Workshop presented at Metropolis Conference, Washington, DC. Berry, J. W., & Kalin, R. (1979). Reciprocity of inter-ethnic attitudes in a multicultural society. Inter- national Journal of Intercultural Relations, 3, 99–112. Berry, J. W., & Kalin, R. (1995). Multicultural and ethnic attitudes in Canada: Overview of the 1991 survey. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 27, 301–320. Berry, J. W., & Kalin, R. (2000). Multicultural policy and social psychology: The Canadian experience. In S. Renshon & J. Duckitt (Eds.), Political psychology in cross-cultural perspective (pp. 263–284). New York: Macmillan. Berry, J. W., Kalin, R., & Taylor, D. (1977). Multiculturalism and ethnic attitudes in Canada. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Supply and Services. Berry, J. W., Kim, U., Power, S., Young, M., & Bujaki, M. (1989). Acculturation attitudes in plural societies. Applied Psychology, 38, 185–206. Bourhis, R. (1994). Ethnic and language attitudes in Québec. In J. W. Berry & J. Laponce (Eds.), Eth- nicity and culture in Canada: That research landscape (pp. 322–360). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Bourhis, R., Moise, C., Perreault, S., & Senecal, S. (1997). Towards an interactive acculturation model: A social psychological approach. International Journal of Psychology, 32, 369–386. Brewer, M., & Brown, R. (1998). Intergroup relations. In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (Vol 2, pp. 554–594). New York: Oxford University Press. Brewer, M., & Campbell, D. T. (1976). Ethnocentrism and intergroup attitudes. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Brown, R., & Gaertner, S. (Eds.). (2001). Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Vol. 3. Intergroup processes. Oxford: Blackwell. Campbell, D. T. (1967). Stereotypes and the perception of group differences. American Psychologist, 22, 812–829. Clément, R., & Noels, K. (1992). Towards a situated approach to ethnolinguistic identity. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 11, 202–232. Dion, K. L., & Kawakami, K. (1996). Ethnicity and perceived discrimination in Toronto. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 28, 203–213. Duckitt, J. (2000). Culture, personality, and prejudice. In S. Renshon & J. Duckitt (Eds.), Political psychology: Cultural and cross-cultural foundations (pp. 89–107). London: Macmillan. Government of Canada. (1971). Multicultural policy: Statement to House of Commons. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Hansard. Graves, T. (1967). Psychological acculturation in a tri-ethnic community. South-Western Journal of Anthropology, 23, 337–350. Kalin, R. (1996). Ethnic attitudes as a function of ethnic presence. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 28, 171–179. Kalin, R., & Berry, J. W. (1995). Ethnic and civic self-identity in Canada: Analyses of 1974 and 1991 national surveys. Canadian Ethnic Studies, 27, 1–15. Kalin, R., & Berry, J. W. (1996). Interethnic attitudes in Canada: Ethnocentrism, consensual hierarchy and reciprocity. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 28, 253–261. Kymlicka, W. (1998). Finding our way: Rethinking ethnocultural relations in Canada. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press. Liebkind, K. (2000). Acculturation. In R. Brown & S. Gaertner (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Vol. 3. Intergroup processes (pp. 386–404). Oxford: Blackwell. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 107

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JOHN BERRY is professor emeritus of psychology at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario. He received his BA from Sir George Williams University (Montreal) in 1963 and his PhD from the University of Edinburgh in 1966. He has been a lecturer at the University of Sydney for three years, a fellow of Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study and a visiting professor at the Unviersité de Nice and the Université de Genève. He is a past president of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology and has been an associate editor of the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. He is the author or editor of more than 20 books in the areas of cross-cultural, social, and cognitive psychology and is particularly interested in the application of cross-cultural psychology to public policy and programs in the areas of acculturation, multiculturalism, immigration, health, and education. He is the 1998 winner of the D. O. Hebb Award from the Canadian Psychological Association for contributions to psychology as a science, and he has been awarded Doctor Honoris Causa from the University of Athens and from the University of Geneva in 2001. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 108 Enculturation, Immigration, Acculturation Acculturation Definitions (via Berry, 2001) Professor Milstein

Is it considered to be of value for the immigrant to: Maintain Cultural Heritage and/or Develop Inter-Group Relations? Strategies of Migrants Attitudes of the Receiving Society

Yes Yes

ASSIMILATION INTEGRATION MELTING POT MULTICULTURALISM Pressure Cooker Group Relations? Group R elations? Group - -

MARGINALIZATION SEPARATION EXCLUSION SEGREGATION Develop Inter Develop Inter Develop No Yes No Yes Maintain Cultural Heritage? Maintain Cultural Heritage?

Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 109 Identity Formation across Cultural Frontiers Acculturation Category Definitions (via Berry, 2001) Professor Milstein

The Acculturation Outcomes of Interaction between Maintenance of Cultural Heritage & Development of Inter-Group Relations

Strategies of Migrant Groups Attitudes of the Receiving Society

What shall we do? • What shall we adopt? What must they do? • Will we adapt? Assimilation: Relinquishing own ethnic Melting Pot: Expectation that the identity and adopting that of the migrant group will dominant society. Assimilate. If Strong: Pressure Cooker Integration: Incorporating dominant culture Multiculturalism: Acceptance of the value to while maintaining own cultural a society of cultural identity. diversity. Separation: Self-withdrawal from the Segregation: Separation of ethnic groups dominant society into one’s own enforced by dominant ethnic groups. group. Marginalization: Loss of contact with own Exclusion: Marginalization imposed cultural group without adopting by the dominant group. the culture of the dominant group.

Revised: 25 January 2015 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 110

July 3, 2007

Op-Ed Contributor The Founding Immigrants By Kenneth C. Davis

Dorset, Vt.

A PROMINENT American once said, about immigrants, “Few of their children in the country learn English . . . The signs in our streets have inscriptions in both languages . . . Unless the stream of their importation could be turned they will soon so outnumber us that all the advantages we have will not be able to preserve our language, and even our government will become precarious.” This sentiment did not emerge from the rancorous debate over the immigration bill defeated last week in the Senate. It was not the lament of some guest of Lou Dobbs or a Republican candidate intent on wooing bedrock conservative votes. Guess again. Voicing this grievance was Benjamin Franklin. And the language so vexing to him was the German spoken by new arrivals to Pennsylvania in the 1750s, a wave of immigrants whom Franklin viewed as the “most stupid of their nation.” About the same time, a Lutheran minister named Henry Muhlenberg, himself a recent arrival from Germany, worried that “the whole country is being flooded with ordinary, extraordinary and unprecedented wickedness and crimes. ... Oh, what a fearful thing it is to have so many thousands of unruly and brazen sinners come into this free air and unfenced country.” These German masses yearning to breathe free were not the only targets of colonial fear and loathing. Echoing the opinions of colonial editors and legislators, Ben Franklin was also troubled by the British practice of dumping its felons on America. With typical Franklin wit, he proposed sending rattlesnakes to Britain in return. (This did not, however, preclude numerous colonists from purchasing these convicts as indentured servants.) And still earlier in Pennsylvania, the Scotch-Irish had bred discontent, as their penchant for squatting on choice real estate ran headlong against the colony’s founders, the Penn family, and their genteel notions about who should own what. Often, the disdain for the foreign was inflamed by religion. Boston’s Puritans hanged several Friends after a Bay Colony ban on Quakerism. In Virginia, the Anglicans arrested Baptists. But the greatest scorn was generally reserved for Catholics — usually meaning Irish, French, Spanish and Italians. Generations of white American Protestants resented newly arriving “Papists,” and even in colonial Maryland, a supposed haven for them, Roman Catholics were nonetheless forbidden to vote and hold public office.

1 Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 111

Once independent, the new nation began to carve its views on immigrants into law. In considering New York’s Constitution, for instance, John Jay — later to become the first chief justice of the Supreme Court — suggested erecting “a wall of brass around the country for the exclusion of Catholics.” By 1790, with the United States Constitution firmly in place, the first federal citizenship law restricted naturalization to “free white persons” who had been in the country for two years. That requirement was later pushed back to five years and, in 1798, to 14 years. Then, as now, politics was key. Federalists feared that too many immigrants were joining the opposition. Under the 1798 Alien Act — with the threat of war in the air over French attacks on American shipping — President John Adams had license to deport anyone he considered “dangerous.” Although his secretary of state favored mass deportations, Adams never actually put anybody on a boat. Back then, the French warranted the most suspicion, but there were other worrisome “aliens.” A wave of “wild Irish” refugees was thought to harbor dangerous radicals. Harsh “anti-coolie” laws later singled out the Chinese. And, of course, the millions of “involuntary” immigrants from Africa and their offspring were regarded merely as persons “held to service.” Scratch the surface of the current immigration debate and beneath the posturing lies a dirty secret. Anti-immigrant sentiment is older than America itself. Born before the nation, this abiding fear of the “huddled masses” emerged in the early republic and gathered steam into the 19th and 20th centuries, when nativist political parties, exclusionary laws and the Ku Klux Klan swept the land. As we celebrate another Fourth of July, this picture of American intolerance clashes sharply with tidy schoolbook images of the great melting pot. Why has the land of “all men are created equal” forged countless ghettoes and intricate networks of social exclusion? Why the signs reading “No Irish Need Apply”? And why has each new generation of immigrants had to face down a rich glossary of now unmentionable epithets? Disdain for what is foreign is, sad to say, as American as apple pie, slavery and lynching. That fence along the Mexican border now being contemplated by Congress is just the latest vestige of a venerable tradition, at least as old as John Jay’s “wall of brass.” “Don’t fence me in” might be America’s unofficial anthem of unfettered freedom, but too often the subtext is, “Fence everyone else out.” Kenneth C. Davis is the author of “Don’t Know Much About History: Everything You Need to Know About American History but Never Learned.”

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TASM: Technical, Aesthetic, Social Rules, Moral Codes Joanne Eicher, University of Minnesota Acculturation Hierarchy: some patterns of a new culture are easier to adopt than others. The order of the ease of adoption is:

1) Technical Such as: Technonological (Chores) computer and media technology, synthetic fibers, apparel production methods, notions of cleanliness and healthiness. Easy to give up washing by hand and switching to the Laundromat. 2) Aesthetic Color and pattern preferences; fashions in styles of dress: Sensual Activity The Five senses - Taste & Smell of Food, Sound of Music, Sight & Feel of Dress. Food: better fresh beans than canned beans. 3) Social Celebration of ceremonies, festivals: Group Identity Rules (and adoption of dress that is part of those social events) 4) Moral / Behaviors that reflect primary Moral Codes Core Values Ritual (related to norms of modesty; gender distinctions; ethics; Codes religious conviction; The Sacred)

Originally found at: http://www.fcs.iastate.edu/classweb/spring2003/tc165/notes/acculturationx.pdf Notes by Mary Lynn Damhorst, 1/13/02, for the course: The Immigration Process: Moving across Cultures (tc 165)

Eicher, J. and Damhorst, M.L. (2002). TASM, an Acculturaion Hierarchy, originally downloaded from: http://www.fcs.iastate.edu/classweb/spring2003/tc165/notes/acculturationx.pdf

Updated: 14 August 2016

Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 113 350th Anniversary of the Flushing Remonstrance: A celebration of a document and the principles it embodies

New York began as the Dutch colony of New Quakers to hold services in his home. He was Netherland in 1624, when it was governed by a imprisoned and refusing to pay a fine or plead series of Directors who were appointed by guilty, Stuyvesant sent him to Holland. There he the Dutch West India Company and argued his case successfully before the Remonstrance of the Inhabitants of the operated under Dutch and local administration of the Dutch West India law. Peter Stuyvesant became Company, which then sent a letter Town of Flushing to Governor Stuyvesant, Director General in 1647, and rebuking Stuyvesant, saying that he one of his goals was to should ‘not force people’s con- December 27, 1657 establish a strong, cohesive sciences, but allow every one to Right Honorable society. He strongly have his own belief’-effectively You have been pleased to send unto us a certain prohibition or com- believed at the time that ending the persecution of full acceptance of many Quakers and other religious mand that we should not receive or entertain any of those people called religions would put a minorities in the colony. Quakers because they are supposed to be, by some, seducers of the society at great risk. The Stuyvesant surrendered people. For our part we cannot condemn them in this case, neither can “Society of Friends” or the colony of New Netherland we stretch out our hands against them, for out of Christ God is a con- Quakers were among the to an English fleet in 1664. most radical religious Laws were issued for the new suming fire, and it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living sects at the time. Some colony of New York in 1665, God. Quakers welcomed public under authority of the charter confrontation, disrupted reli- issued by the Duke of York by his Wee desire therefore in this case not to judge least we be judged, nei- gious services and sought per- brother, King Charles II. The secution and martyrdom. “Duke’s Laws” gave the Anglican and ther to condemn least we be condemned, but rather let every man stand It was in this environment, in Dutch Reformed churches official status, or fall to his own Master. Wee are bounde by the law to do good unto all 1657, that Director General but declared that no Christians should be men, especially to those of the household of faith. And though for the Stuyvesant issued a procla- Petrus (Peter) Stuyvesant “molested, fined, or imprisoned present we seem to be unsensible for the law and the Law giver, yet mation which severely lim- Courtesy of the New York State Archives for differing in judgment in mat- ited the rights of Quakers to ters of religion.” Thus the legacy when death and the Law assault us, if wee have our advocate to seeke, worship freely within his colony. Those who of the Flushing Remonstrance continued. who shall plead for us in this case of conscience betwixt God and our allowed Quakers to worship in their homes were It has been argued that the Flushing own souls; the powers of this world can neither attach us, neither excuse fined, and any ships carrying Quakers were to be Remonstrance is a forerunner of the First us, for if God justifye who can condemn and if God condemn there is turned away. Residents of the predominantly Amendment in the Bill of Rights. Whether the English town of Flushing were unhappy with the framers of the U.S. Constitution had knowledge of none can justifye. proclamation. They saw it as an infringement of this document is not certain. However, the remon- their “Liberty of Conscience” which had been strance quotes the Dutch charter to the town of And for those jealousies and suspicions which some have of them, that promised to them in a 1645 Flushing and the “fundamental law of Holland” in they are destructive unto Magistracy and Ministerye, that cannot bee, for patent establishing the town. re·mon·strance its appeal to the director general. The Dutch repub- In response, the residents of (ri-mon’strens) lic was admired by American revolutionaries. The the Magistrate hath his sword in his hand and the Minister hath the Flushing prepared a remon- noun - An Dutch declaration of independence (1581 Act of sword in his hand, as witnesse those two great examples, which all strance that protested expression of Abjuration) and constitution (Union of Utrecht) may Magistrates and Ministers are to follow, Moses and Christ, whom God Stuyvesant’s actions and protest, com- have served as examples for the American founding plaint, or reproof, raised up maintained and defended against all enemies both of flesh and asserted their right to reli- fathers. especially a for- gious freedom. Stuyvesant The Flushing Remonstrance can best be spirit; and therefore that of God will stand, and that which is of man will mal statement of rejected the remonstrance; the understood within the context of its time, but it come to nothing. And as the Lord hath taught Moses or the civil power to grievances. constable who brought it to embodied principles of liberty of conscience and give an outward liberty in the state, by the law written in his heart the council was arrested. freedom of religion that are now considered basic designed for the good of all, and can truly judge who is good, who is evil, Despite Stuyvesant’s continued persecution of human and civil rights. Quakers and signers of the petition, Quakerism and who is true and who is false, and can pass definitive sentence of life or the desire for freedom of religious expression con- About the document: death against that man which arises up against the fundamental law of tinued to spread. Five years later, a Quaker settler The text and signatures on the original docu- the States General; soe he hath made his ministers a savor of life unto John Bowne, openly defied the ban and allowed ment were evidently copied and incorporated into the minutes of the Dutch Colonial Council and were life and a savor of death unto death. maintained in the secretary’s office. What happened to the original petition is unknown. The signatures The law of love, peace and liberty in the states extending to Jews, Turks on the copy of the remonstrance in the minutes and Egyptians, as they are considered sons of Adam, which is the glory appear to be in the same handwriting, a clear indication that the document is a contemporary copy, not of the outward state of Holland, soe love, peace and liberty, extending to the original. all in Christ Jesus, condemns hatred, war and bondage. And because The Dutch Colonial Council minutes and other our Saviour sayeth it is impossible but that offences will come, but woe records of the New Netherland government were unto him by whom they cometh, our desire is not to offend one of his lit- transferred to the new British government in 1664. Ultimately, the Flushing Remonstrance along with tle ones, in whatsoever form, name or title hee appears in, whether all the Dutch records were transferred to the New Presbyterian, Independent, Baptist or Quaker, but shall be glad to see York State Library in 1881 and again to the New anything of God in any of them, desiring to doe unto all men as we York State Archives in 1978. The Dutch records have been in continuous custody of the government desire all men should doe unto us, which is the true law both of Church of New York since 1664. and State; for our Saviour sayeth this is the law and the prophets. The photo at left is the front of the first page of the Flushing Remonstrance. It was damaged along Therefore if any of these said persons come in love unto us, we cannot with other government documents in a fire in 1911. The text at right is a transcript of the Flushing in conscience lay violent hands upon them, but give them free egresse Remonstrance in the original old-style spelling. and regresse unto our Town, and houses, as God shall persuade our For more detailed information on the Flushing consciences, for we are bounde by the law of God and man to doe good Remonstrance www.flushingremonstrance.info unto all men and evil to noe man. And this is according to the patent and For more on the historic documents of New York charter of our Towne, given unto us in the name of the States General, State go to www.nysarchives.org which we are not willing to infringe, and violate, but shall houlde to our patent and shall remaine, your humble subjects, the inhabitants of Newspaper Tie-ins to Today Vlishing.

As modern Americans, we may take freedom of religion for granted but we are not with- Written this 27th of December in the year 1657, by mee. out religious conflict. Search recent editions of the newspaper for any example of conflict Edward Hart, Clericus that involves religious freedom. Divide the class into as many groups as you see repre- Additional Signers sented within the article and an extra to serve as the mediator group. Each group is to argue their group’s position based on the information presented in the article and addition- Tobias Feake Nathaniell Tue al sources. The mediator group is to help these conflicting groups reach a reasonable The marke of William Noble Nicholas Blackford resolution of the conflict keeping in mind the religious freedom guarantees of the U.S. William Thorne, Seignior The marke of Micah Tue Constitution First Amendment. The marke of William Thorne, Jr. The marke of Philip Ud Edward Tarne Robert Field, senior The U. S. Constitution prohibits laws that put state (government) power behind any particular religion or entangle the state with religious activities. It guarantees not only freedom John Store Robert Field, junior of religion, but also freedom from religion. Examples of the separation clause are prayer in Nathaniel Hefferd Nich Colas Parsell school, displays of the Ten Commandments in government offices and even school or Benjamin Hubbard Michael Milner town holiday celebrations with religious themes or symbols. Look for articles in your The marke of William Pidgion Henry Townsend newspaper about the separation issue. Each student should write in the style of newspaper editorial expressing their opinion on one of these issues. Be sure to support opinions The marke of George Clere George Wright with facts. Elias Doughtie John Foard Antonie Feild Henry Semtell The people of Flushing petitioned their government to address an issue and correct an Richard Stocton Edward Griffine injustice they felt strongly about. It took time but they ultimately achieved their goal - reli- John Mastine Edward Farrington gious freedom. Look through recent editions of the newspaper for issues you feel strongly about. As a class, select one of these problems and draft your own remonstrance. Be John Townesend sure to have everyone who supports this view sign their name to it. Is this a local, state or national issue? Research where your document would be “delivered.”

People make their voices known in our government directly such as in congressional hearings, and indirectly through letters to their representatives in Congress. Other indirect methods to influence change include the use of newspapers and other media. Letters to the editor, political cartoons, press releases and even newspaper advertising are all vehi- cles used to sway public opinion and potential voters. Each student should select one of the newspaper methods listed and create a persuasive argument based on a local issue in the news. Be sure to use facts to strengthen their point of view. http://nynpa.com/docs/nie/niematerials/Flushing_Remonstrance.pdf

NIENew York Newspaper Publishers Association Newspaper In Education Program

This feature was created by the New York Newspaper Publishers Association Newspaper In Education Program in partnership with the New York State Archives © 2007. All rights reserved. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 114

6 July 2015

The Traits that Make Human Beings Unique

We’re all just animals… right? Not so fast, says Melissa Hogenboom, a few things make us different from any other species. By Melissa Hogenboom "I am become death, the destroyer of worlds." So said the physicist Robert Oppenheimer, who helped to invent the atomic bomb.

No animal can get close to the devastation humans can cause (Credit: Thinkstock) The two bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 killed around 200,000 Japanese people. No other species has ever wielded such power, and no species could. The technology behind the atomic bomb only exists because of a cooperative hive mind: hundreds of scientists and engineers working together. The same unique intelligence and cooperation also underlies more positive advances, such as modern medicine [and going to the moon]. But is that all that defines us? In recent years, many traits once believed to be uniquely human, from morality to culture, have been found in the animal kingdom (see part one in this two-part series). So, what exactly makes us special? The list might be smaller than it once was, but there are some traits of ours that no other creature on Earth can match. Ever since we learned to write, we have documented how special we are. The philosopher Aristotle marked out our differences over 2,000 years ago. We are "rational animals" pursuing knowledge for its own sake. We live by art and reasoning, he wrote. Much of what he said stills stands. Yes, we see the roots of many behaviours once considered uniquely human in our closest relatives, chimpanzees and bonobos. But we are the only ones who peer into their world and write books about it. We see the roots of many behaviours once considered uniquely human in our closest relatives "Obviously we have similarities. We have similarities with everything else in nature; it would be astonishing if we didn't. But we've got to look at the differences," says Ian Tattersall, a paleoanthropologist at the American Museum of Natural History in New York, US. To understand these differences, a good place to start is to look at how we got here. Why are we the only human species still alive today whereas many of our early-human ancestors went extinct?

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Neanderthals (left) didn't fare as well as we did (Credit: SPL) Humans and chimpanzees diverged from our common ancestor more than six million years ago. Fossil evidence points to the ways which we have gradually changed. We left the trees, started walking and began to live in larger groups. And then our brains got bigger. Physically we are another primate, but our bigger brains are unusual. We don't know exactly what led to our brains becoming the size they are today, but we seem to owe our complex reasoning abilities to it. It is likely that we have our big brain to thank that we exist at all. When we – Homo sapiens – first appeared about 200,000 years ago we weren't alone. We shared the planet at least four other upright cousins: Neanderthals, Denisovans, the "hobbit" Homo floresiensis and a mysterious fourth group.

The human brain is advantageously big (Credit: Thinkstock) Evidence in the form of stone tools suggests that for about 100,000 years our technology was very similar to the Neanderthals. But 80,000 years ago something changed. "The Neanderthals had an impressive but basically routine material record for a hominid. Once H. sapiens started behaving in a strange, [more sophisticated] way, all hell broke loose and change became the norm," Tattersall says. We started to produce superior cultural and technological artefacts. Our stone tools became more intricate. One study proposes that our technological innovation was key for our migration out of Africa. We started to assign symbolic values to objects such as geometrical designs on plaques and cave art. There is little evidence that any other hominins made any kind of art By contrast, there is little evidence that any other hominins made any kind of art. One example, which was possibly made by Neanderthals, was hailed as proof they had similar levels of abstract thought.

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However, it is a simple etching and some question whether Neanderthals made it at all. The symbols made by H. sapiens are clearly more advanced. We had also been around for 100,000 years before symbolic objects appeared so what happened?

We had the capacity for art early in our history (Credit: SPL) Somehow, our language-learning abilities were gradually "switched on", Tattersall argues. In the same way that early birds developed feathers before they could fly, we had the mental tools for complex language before we developed it. We started with language-like symbols as a way to represent the world around us, he says. For example, before you say a word, your brain first has to have a symbolic representation of what it means. These mental symbols eventually led to language in all its complexity and the ability to process information is the main reason we are the only hominin still alive, Tattersall argues. It's not clear exactly when speech evolved, or how. But it seems likely that it was partly driven by another uniquely human trait: our superior social skills. While both chimps and humans cooperate, we will always help more Comparative studies between humans and chimps show that while both will cooperate, humans will always help more. Children seem to be innate helpers. They act selflessly before social norms set in. Studies have shown that they will spontaneously open doors for adults and pick up "accidentally" dropped items. They will even stop playing to help. Their sense of fairness begins young. Even if an experiment is unfairly rigged so that one child receives more rewards, they will ensure a reward is fairly split.

Children show 'proactive' kindness, unlike our close relatives (Credit: Thinkstock)

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We know that chimpanzees also work together and share food in apparently unselfish ways. However, Michael Tomasello of the Max Planck institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, says they will only cooperate if there is something in it for them. "Humans do that too, but in addition they care about what their partner gets. In some experiments we have children as young as 14-18 months who seem to expect their partner to collaborate in certain ways and who share in ways chimps don't." Human children are less selective about who they share with. Chimpanzees though, largely only share with close relatives, reciprocating partners or potential mates. Felix Warneken of Harvard University in Cambridge, US, differentiates it like this. Children are "proactive", that is, they help even when presented with only very subtle cues. Chimpanzees though, need more encouragement. They are "reactive": they will hand over objects but only after some nudging. What happened in our evolution to make us reliant on each other? Something must have happened in our evolution, Tomasello says, to make humans increasingly reliant on each other. Our brains needed fuel to get bigger and so collaborative hunting may have played a key role in that. Our advanced teamwork may simply reflect our long history of working together to get food. Mind readers The fact that our nearest relatives share too simply shows that it is an ancient trait. It was already present in the messy branch of early humans that led to us, but none of these other species were as hyper cooperative as we are today.

Humans have a unique ability to understand the beliefs of another person (Credit: Thinkstock) These cooperative skills are closely tied to our incredible mind reading skills. We understand what others think based upon our knowledge of the world, but we also understand what others cannot know. The Sally-Anne task is a simple way to test young children's ability to do this. The child witnesses a doll called Sally putting a marble in a basket in full view of another doll, Anne. When Sally leaves the room, Anne moves the marble to a box. Sally then comes back, and the experimenter asks the child where Sally will look for the marble. Chimpanzees know what others know and what others can see, but not what others believe Because Sally didn't see Anne move the marble, she will have a "false belief" that the marble is still in the basket. Most 4-year-olds can grasp this, and say that Sally will look in the basket. They know the marble is not there, but they also understand that Sally is missing the key bit of information.

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Chimps can knowingly deceive others, so they understand the world view of others to some extent. However, they cannot understand others' false beliefs. In a chimpanzee version of the Sally-Anne task, researchers found that they understand when a competitor is ignorant of the location of food, but not when they have been misinformed. Tomasello puts it like this: chimpanzees know what others know and what others can see, but not what others believe. We are unique in the level of abstractness with which we can reason about others' mental states This tells us something profound about ourselves. While we are not the only creatures who understand that others have intentions and goals, "we are certainly unique in the level of abstractness with which we can reason about others' mental states", says Katja Karg, also of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology.

Language gave us the skill to exchange complex thoughts and ideas (Credit: iStock) When you pull together our unparalleled language skills, our ability to infer others' mental states and our instinct for cooperation, you have something unprecedented. Us. Just look around you, Tomasello says, "we're chatting and doing an interview, they (chimps) are not." We have our advanced language skills to thank for that. We may see evidence of basic linguistic abilities in chimpanzees, but we are the only ones writing things down. We tell stories, we dream, we imagine things about ourselves and others and we spend a great deal of time thinking about the future and analysing the past. We have a fundamental urge to link our minds together There's more to it, Thomas Suddendorf, an evolutionary psychologist at the University of Queensland in Australia is keen to point out. We have a fundamental urge to link our minds together. "This allows us to take advantage of others' experiences, reflections and imaginings to prudently guide our own behaviour. "We link our scenario-building minds into larger networks of knowledge." This in turn helps us to accumulate information through many generations.

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We connect up our brains, and it's one of our defining traits (Credit: SPL) That our rapidly expanding technology has allowed us all to become instant publishers means we can share such information at the touch of a button. And this transmission of ideas and technology helps us in our quest to uncover even more about ourselves. That is, we use language to continue ideas that others put forward. Of course, we pass on the good and the bad. The technology that defines us can also destroy worlds. Take murder. Humans aren't the only species that kill each other. We're not even the only species that fight wars. But our intelligence and social prowess mean we can do so on an unprecedented scale.

We can fight and kill on an unparalleled scale (Credit: istock) Charles Darwin, in his book The Descent of Man, wrote that humans and animals only differ in degree, not kind. This still stands true but Suddendorf says that it is precisely these gradual changes that make us extraordinary and has led to "radically different possibilities of thinking". And it is these thoughts that allow us to pinpoint to our differences with chimpanzees. That we do so is because they are the closest living relative we have. If any of the now extinct early humans were still alive, we would be comparing our behaviour to them instead. Still, as far as we know, we are the only creatures trying to understand where we came from. We also peer further back in time, and further into the future, than any other animal. What other species would think to ponder the age of the universe, or how it will end?" We have an immense capacity for good. At the same time we risk driving our closest relatives to extinction and destroying the only planet we have ever called home. This is part of a two-part feature series looking at whether humans are really unique. Part one looks at the similarities between us and our closest relatives.

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Child Development, January/February 2001, Volume 72, Number 1, Pages 50–65

God’s Beliefs versus Mother’s: The Development of Nonhuman Agent Concepts

Justin L. Barrett, Rebekah A. Richert, and Amanda Driesenga

Little research exists on how children understand the actions of nonhuman agents. Researchers often assume that children overgeneralize and attribute human properties such as false beliefs to nonhuman agents. In this study, three experiments were conducted to test this assumption. The experiments used 24 children in New York (aged 2,11–6,11 years), 52 children in Michigan (aged 3,5–6,11 years), and a second group of 45 children in Michigan (3,4–8,5 years) from Christian backgrounds. In the ﬁrst two experiments, children participated in false-belief tests in which they were asked about human and various nonhuman agents including animals and God. Experiment 3 consisted of a modiﬁed perspective-taking task, also including nonhuman agents. The results of the study suggest that children do not consistently use human agent concepts but instead can use different agent concepts for some nonhuman agents like God and special animals. Children are not bound to anthropomorphize, but they often do.

INTRODUCTION ple, the practice of verbally abusing computers to enhance their performance is not uncommon. Simi- Social interaction demands rich attributions of inten- larly, the world over people conceptualize and gener- tions, desires, and beliefs. People constantly try to ex- ate inferences about a multitude of other nonhuman plain others’ behavior in terms of intentional states. agents such as ghosts, demons, and monsters. These sorts of cognitive attributions are so ubiquitous Scholars have long assumed that as children’s con- that they are typically taken for granted. But imagine cepts of their own human agency develop, they are if people did not understand human agency, that projected onto other human and nonhuman agents. It people can initiate action on the basis of internal is proposed that this is not the case. The research re- states and not only respond mechanically to environ- ported here suggests that the development of agent mental contingencies. If people did not understand concepts be slightly reframed: Children start with a each other as agents, they might not talk to each other broad, flexible concept of agency that is then refined to try to motivate action but might try to get others to into more specific and importantly different agent act only through physical contact. People would be concepts for some nonhuman agents, such as God surprised when others got up and moved and would and some animals. After a brief description of the de- have no way to explain many actions. Agents are not velopment of agent concepts through recent research merely acted upon but may begin causal chains of and presenting the most common theoretical expla- events. For this reason, “understanding” agents holds nations, three experiments addressing the develop- an important position in reasoning about causal ment of human and nonhuman agent concepts are events. (Throughout this discussion, “understand- presented. In conclusion, theoretical implications of ing” agents means that children or adults have cogni- the data for understanding the development of agent tive expectations or intuitions about the thing in concepts in general and God concepts in particular question—agents in this case—that minimally map are presented. onto the real world. Of course, this understanding need not be conscious or explicit but does have behavioral, measurable consequences.) The Development of Agent Concepts Abundant research documents children’s acquisi- The development of human understanding of tion of human concepts over the first several years of agency can be roughly divided into three phases: tel- life. But what about nonhuman agents such as go- eological agency, mentalistic agency, and representa- phers, gorillas, ghosts, and God? People are not the tional agency. These divisions do not imply that each only beings that are understood as agents. Conceptu- is radically different from the previous phases or that ally speaking, “agents” refers to any objects or entities that are perceived to initiate action. People often attribute to animals and complicated machines inten- © 2001 by the Society for Research in Child Development, Inc. tions, beliefs, and desires (Caporael, 1986). For exam- All rights reserved. 0009-3920/2001/7201-0004

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Barrett et al. 51 characteristics of later phases are not present in ear- strongly suggest that infants expect humans to be- lier ones. Rather, it seems that through the course of have purposefully. More strikingly, babies as young development different forms of understanding agency as 9 months old understand tease-games by holding become more assertive. Before any reasoning about out objects to parents and then pulling them away, agents is possible, however, distinguishing agents which gives an early indication that children know from nonagents is necessary. purposeful human action can be frustrated (Reddy, In the first year of life, infants show remarkable 1991). achievements in understanding the differences be- Mentalistic agency: “He feels hungry. He will act.” tween the movements of humans and those of inani- At some point, children begin to attribute internal, mate objects. Unlike a rock or a ball, humans can mental states to others. When this happens is unclear, move and act without that action being the physical but the estimates range from birth to well into the consequence of direct contact. Infants are aware of third year (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1995; Perner, this fact and so attempt to influence human action 1991). Verbal use of mental state terms begins around through nonphysical means (Spelke, Phillips, & age 2 but it is unclear whether or not the terms really Woodward, 1995). For example, Legerstee reported have mental state referents and complex behavioral that 4-month-olds responded to the disappearance of referents or merely follow discourse conventions a person behind an occluder by vocalizing rather than (Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983). Although the age touching the occluder as they did when an inanimate when children begin to make mentalistic attributions object disappeared behind it (Legerstee, 1994). Seven- is still debated, it is clear that they eventually appre- month-olds who significantly dishabituate to inani- ciate the role of two particularly important mental mate objects that violate the “contact principle” do states: desires and beliefs. If a person wants an apple, not appear to find humans who move without contact and he knows where the apple is, he reaches for it. the least surprising (Spelke, et al., 1995). Understand- Even in simple scenarios such as this, both states are ing that humans possess this property of “self-pro- useful in predicting or explaining action. For some pelledness” is a fundamental step in developing a time, however, children likely understand others’ ac- concept of agency, according to some theorists (Leslie, tions as motivated only by simple desires and not be- 1995; Premack, 1990). liefs. This transition probably occurs during the mid- Teleological agency: “She did that for a reason.” Once dle or end of a child’s fourth year (Wellman, 1990, infants distinguish which objects are self-propelled, 1993). Children at this phase tacitly understand that they can begin to apply another early principle of people have mental states akin to desires that lead agents: that they are goal-directed, which implies that them to act to obtain some object or goal specified by children have a concept of teleological agency. that mental state, but they do not understand mental In the first year of life, children begin to appreciate states to possess any representational component that humans do not merely propel themselves; rather, (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). That is, mental states do they do so in purposeful ways. For some time “proto- not represent a hypothetical state of affairs but only conversation” in 8-month-old infants, including turn- map onto reality. taking vocalizations, facial expressions, and common Much of the evidence for 2- and 3-year-olds’ non- gaze, has been taken as evidence that infants under- representative understanding of agency is negative. stand humans as intentional (Poulin-Dubois & Children at this age fail tests that clearly indicate Shultz, 1988). But as Poulin-Dubois and Shultz argue, representational reasoning. The bulk of the studies these child–parent interactions do not necessarily im- showing this deficit are versions of the false-belief ply a mentalistic construal but only an assumption task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), although difficulty that humans act predictably and can be enlisted to with representation in other theory-of-mind tasks perform purposeful behavior without physical con- such as deception (Sodian, Taylor, Harris, & Perner, tact. Pointing, among other gestures, emerges be- 1991) and understanding differences in visual per- tween 9 and 13 months (Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, spective (Flavell, 1993) has also been demonstrated. 1977; Masur, 1983; Zinober & Martlew, 1985), and also Not until children are 3 or 4 do they begin to clearly around this time infants couple pointing with check- distinguish beliefs and real states and use them to ing parents’ gaze to be sure they are looking to the predict or explain action (Flavell, Flavell, Green, & right thing (Lempers et al., 1977; Masur, 1983). Moses, 1990; Moses & Flavell 1990; Perner, 1988). Not Around the end of the first year, infants respond ap- until children are 3 do they understand the ontologi- propriately to mothers’ gestures, such as giving their cal distinction between representational mental states mothers an object when the mothers hold their hands and their real-world counterparts: that real dogs can outstretched (Masur, 1983). All these behaviors be petted but not imagined ones (Estes, Wellman, &

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52 Child Development

Wooley, 1989; Harris, Brown, Marriot, Whithall, & Wellman, 1989; Flavell et al., 1990; Gopnik & Slaughter Harmer, 1991). Only some 3-year-olds understand 1991; Moses & Flavell, 1990; Perner, 1988, 1989; Perner, that emotions can be caused by actors’ beliefs and de- Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; Wellman & Bartsch 1988; sires (Harris, 1989; Stein & Levine, 1989). Linguisti- Wellman & Wooley 1990; Wimmer & Perner, 1983); cally, only by age 3 do children appropriately use and the documented ability to pretend may not entail terms referring to the full range of mental states, and a fully developed ability to understand representa- even then they do not understand the terms in the tion (Perner, 1995). Cross-cultural evidence suggests same way adults do (Tager-Flusberg, 1993). The diffi- that the emergence of representational agency around culty in understanding that beliefs do not need to age 4 may be a universal phenomenon (Avis & Harris, match reality may be symptomatic of a general repre- 1991). sentational deficit and not a domain-specific diffi- Succeeding at various false-belief tasks is the hall- culty with understanding mental states, as is evi- mark for achieving a representational understanding denced by children’s inability to understand the of agents, for according to Sodian et al. (1991, p. 468), representational nature of other media such as photo- “To understand false beliefs is to appreciate that a graphs (Zaitchik, 1990; but also see Perner, 1995). person’s mental perspective will have a causal impact On the positive side, some older 2-year-olds and on his or her actions, statements, and emotions, even 3-year-olds appear to understand that goals or “sim- when that perspective runs counter to current reality ple desires” motivate action and that outcomes of and cannot be derived from it.” As long as an actor’s actions need not agree with intended outcomes behavior matches what a child understands to be re- (Moses & Flavell, 1990; Wellman & Wooley, 1990). ality, investigators cannot discern if children are un- The emergence of understanding of nonrepresenta- derstanding the role of beliefs or merely that people tional desires is supported by children’s explana- act in accordance with reality. After Dennett, (1978) tions of actions. Moses and Flavell (1990) found that laid out the theoretical groundwork for this method 3-year-olds often explained actors’ behavior in a of measuring belief-based agency, Wimmer and false belief task in terms of goals or desires but rarely Perner (1983) adapted the “false-belief” task for ex- mentioned beliefs. In fact, already around the 2nd amining children. False-belief tasks measure chil- birthday children begin to use goal or desire verbs dren’s understanding that people may hold beliefs but not beliefs (Tager-Flusberg, 1993). The earlier about states of affairs that are incorrect or do not understanding of something like desires is not sur- match reality, such as being mistaken about the con- prising because goals, purposes, and drives can be tents of a cupboard or a container. Subsequent re- used without representation and would spring nat- search has shown that 3-year-olds are accurate about urally out of an earlier disposition to reason about 33% of the time on these types of tasks (Flavell et al., action teleologically. 1990); they confuse the actors’ beliefs with actual Representational agency: “She thinks it is in the box, states of affairs. but it isn’t.” During the fourth or fifth year of life, Along with false-belief tasks, the ability to make probably the most dramatic and important shift in the appearance–reality distinction signals the acqui- understanding agency occurs. Around this time, chil- sition of a representational concept of agency. This dren normally begin to understand that human distinction occurs as a child realizes that an object agents can represent counterfactual states and use can seem different from the way it really is (Flavell, these beliefs to motivate behavior. This occurrence 1986). For example, children who understand the has been referred to as a full-fledged “theory of appearance–reality distinction would say a fake rock mind” or a “belief-desire psychology” (Perner, 1991; looks like a rock even though they know it is a Wellman, 1990). sponge. This ability emerges concurrent with passing Exactly when this transition takes place has been a false-belief tasks. matter of considerable debate generating an abun- Successes on false-belief and appearance–reality dance of research focusing on this accomplishment tasks are not the only differences between 3- and 4- (e.g., Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Carruthers & year-olds’ reasoning about human agents. Three-year- Smith, 1996; Whiten, 1991). Although some evidence olds also find it more difficult to remember where has emerged for the presence of representational rea- they got a belief (O’Neill & Gopnik, 1991; Taylor, soning in 3-year-olds (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Esbensen, & Bennett, 1994). They don’t know how Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991; Lewis & Osbourne, and when their beliefs change (Gopnik & Slaughter, 1990; Siegal & Beattie, 1991), the bulk of the data 1991), don’t understand surprise is the result of dis- available suggests that this achievement is not stable confirmed beliefs (Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Wellman nor robust until children are 4 and older (Bartsch & & Banerjee, 1991), are less able to pair emotional out-

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Barrett et al. 53 comes with confirmed or disconfirmed beliefs (Harris, ing theoretical principles that govern how beliefs and 1989; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988), and are poorer at un- desires motivate behavior and then applying this the- derstanding the connection between perception and ory to themselves and others. beliefs (Pratt & Bryant, 1990). Cumulatively, these dif- In contrast, simulation theorists claim that children ferences amount to a significantly different set of ex- predict others’ mental states and behaviors by imag- pectations for agents by school-aged children. ining what they themselves would do in the other’s To summarize, in the first year of life infants tacitly situation (Gordon, 1996; Harris, 1992). That is, they understand that humans can violate the contact prin- run a “simulation” in their minds on what another ciple and move without first being struck by another agent is likely to do in a particular situation using object. In the first 2 years children seem to interpret themselves as the model of intentional agency. Simu- self-propelled action as goal-directed. Naive psychol- lation theory (Ruffman, 1996, p. 389) “requires a child to ogy emerges anywhere from infancy to age 3 with the (a) input various beliefs, desires, percepts, etc. into her first attributions of internal, mental states to other own mind (imagine having these states), and (b) run a people. From this crude beginning, children in their simulation (imagining what she herself would think or fourth year start to distinguish reality from representa- feel, or how she might act given such inputs).” tional mental states leading to understanding humans Though both theoretical perspectives would ac- as thinking beings who act on the basis of beliefs and commodate anthropomorphic agent attributions, the- desires. This distinction is widely regarded as a revo- ory theory would better account for flexible reason- lutionary development in conceptualizing agents. ing about different sorts of agents. The simulation theory would predict that because the (human) self is used as an exemplar for generating all predictions Nonhuman Agents about actions and intentions, all agents will be treated Note that by and large the research pertaining to the same, provided human “inputs” are used. That is, agent concept development deals exclusively with if children don’t have any salient reasons to think that human agent concepts: how children’s concepts of a nonhuman agent does not have access to the same agency become increasingly specialized from general information a human would, they will tend to treat teleological agency to the more distinctively human the agent like a human or anthropomorphize. The representational agency. In false-belief tasks and de- theory theory offers more potential for nonanthropo- ception tasks, as well as most other studies on chil- morphic attributions because theoretical understand- dren’s understanding of agency, experimenters have ings of other agents could be used to predict internal asked children to reason about human action, beliefs, states or behaviors. For example, if a child knows that desires, and emotions. When using puppets, experi- Superman “can see through things,” this theoretical menters typically name them and treat them as repre- knowledge could be imported into a theory of mind senting humans or human-like beings. Consequently, task. Because, however, such theoretical statements very little available research addresses the generaliz- about other agents’ mental and perceptual properties ability of children’s understanding of agents to non- are likely to be rare and lack salience for children, humans. Agent concepts of humans become more re- they are unlikely to factor into most theory of mind fined, but are other agents treated increasingly like problems. humans? The little research that pertains to nonhu- Probably the most relevant body of research sys- man agency is ambiguous, and current theoretical tematically exploring concepts of a nonhuman agent explanations of how children come to understand is the research on concepts of God. Following Piaget’s agency are of limited help. lead, cognitive accounts primarily deal with the cog- Two main theoretical camps disagree in how to nitive limitations people have at various stages of de- explain the development of agent concepts. The velopment and what these limitations mean for the theory theorists believe that children have a “folk- physical, biological, and psychological attributes psychological theory of the structure and functioning incorporated in superhuman concepts. Piaget saw of the mind” (Carruthers, 1996). Children are like lit- concepts of God inextricably connected to children’s tle scientists in that they draw theoretical conclusions understanding of their parents. Rather than this rela- on the basis of available data and then use these the- tionship being cashed out in terms of the psychologi- ories to generate predictions, explanations, and infer- cal need to project a protecting parent figure (Freud, ences about novel cases or hypothetical situations. 1927/1961), Piaget emphasized children’s cognitive They may then revise these theories on the basis of representations and understandings of their parents new evidence (Ruffman, 1996). Put more simply, chil- and the origins of the world (Piaget, 1969). He under- dren understand others’ beliefs and desires by posit- stood children’s concepts of God to be based in an-

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54 Child Development thropomorphism of a “crudely physical kind” (Gold- or understanding humans as having beliefs and de- man, 1964). sires that motivate and guide behavior is widely ac- Under Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, knowledged as a watershed event in the development children simply don’t have the faculties to deal with a of agent concepts and cleanly dissociates human more abstract concept of God until they pass out of agency from most if not all animals, these experi- the stage of concrete operations, sometime in early ments examine whether children acquire a similar adolescence (Gorsuch, 1988; Piaget, 1969). Conse- theory of nonhuman agents’ minds simultaneously quently, concepts of God begin crudely anthropomor- with acquiring a representational theory of human phic but become abstract by adulthood. minds. This transition is particularly important be- Several theoretical works have incorporated Pia- cause it is when children first begin to appreciate that getian thinking into the exploration of developing other humans may have different perspectives on re- God concepts (e.g., Elkind, 1970; Goldman, 1964, ality and different beliefs and also because only when 1965). Likewise, many empirical studies have turned children make the distinction between beliefs and re- up evidence of the concrete-to-abstract shift by using ality may they understand God’s (or other agents’) interviews with children and young adults (Pealting, beliefs as fallible like humans. This point in develop- 1974; Tamminen, 1991), asking children to draw pic- ment holds promise for falsifying the hypothesis that tures of God (e.g., Pitts, 1976), and asking children to children are capable only of representing agents as write letters to God (e.g., Heller, 1986); however, some having human agent properties. of these tasks may bias children toward anthropo- Provided the human agency hypothesis is correct morphism (Petrovich, 1997). Repeatedly the Piaget- and assuming mentalistic attributions can be made to ian notion that “the term God for a young child is God in the same way that they are made to other non- likely to mean big person” (Paloutzian, 1996), echoes human agents, up until around age 4 children would throughout the literature. understand God as a nonrepresentational, mentalistic On the basis of past research, it seems likely that agent, as human agents are understood. The differ- children anthropomorphize God, but what about ence is that understanding God as a nonrepresenta- other potential agents? Research on children’s under- tional agent does not present the problems that understanding of animals suggests that animals are anthro- standing humans as nonrepresentational does, because pomorphized as well. For example, Inagaki and God cannot have misperceptions or false beliefs. God, Hatano (1987) found that kindergartners were prone as characterized in the Abrahamic religious traditions, to overextend human traits to rabbits and tulips when is omniscient. What this suggests is that until about asked to reason about psychological attributes. Forty age 4, assuming God is understood as an agent, chil- percent of the children said a tulip can feel happy, dren can have a more accurate understanding of God’s 72% said it can feel pretty, and 72% said it can feel agency than that of humans. If, however, children pain. More recently, upwards of 80% of the time kin- have only one way for understanding agents and that dergartners agreed that primates, other mammals, is anthropomorphically, then when children acquire birds, reptiles, and fish possess various psychological an understanding of agents as directed by fallible, rep- properties (e.g., thinking, feeling pain, being smart, resentational beliefs, they will also attribute fallible feeling angry; Coley, 1995). beliefs to God and other agents. On the basis of previ- Previous research on God concepts and concepts of ous scholarship, anthropomorphic attributions to God animals has focused on the sorts of human properties and animals seem likely. Consequently, the 3-year- that are attributed to them by children. What is lack- old’s theologically accurate representation of God ing is a systematic comparison of children’s develop- would disintegrate with acquiring a “theory of mind.” ing concepts of human agents versus other agents on Alternatively, the development of agents concepts central agent properties such as the nature and func- may not be only a refinement of human agent proper- tion of beliefs. Perhaps the emphasis on human fea- ties. Perhaps teleological agency is modified through tures has obscured real differences in how different the course of development to accommodate and dis- agent concepts develop. Different agent concepts tinguish various classes of agents, thereby rendering may converge on similar surface features while hav- children capable of reasoning about various agents in ing different developmental histories and possibly importantly different, nonanthropomorphic ways. different cognitive architecture. Evidence against the human agency hypothesis would The present experiments attempt to address this be any demonstration that young children can reason shortcoming by comparing the development of a cen- about fundamental agent properties (such as the na- tral component of human agent with other agent con- ture of beliefs) as different from humans in predicting cepts. Because the acquisition of a “theory of mind” behavior of nonhuman agents.

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Barrett et al. 55

Assuming, then, that the human agency hypothe- of these “agents” the experimenter asked children an sis is accurate, it would be expected that when chil- action question and a thought question. For all but dren start attributing to humans false beliefs, they God the action question was in the form, “If your will likewise attribute false beliefs to God and other mother wanted some crackers, where would she look agents. Alternatively, radically different treatment of first?” To avoid unfairly biasing children to anthropo- God or other agents from the onset of a representa- morphize, the parallel question for God was, “If God tional understanding would suggest a more flexible, wanted to show you some crackers, what would God general concept of intentional agents. show you the inside of?”1 For all five “agents,” the To test these predictions, two false-belief experi- thought question was in the form, “If I showed your ments and one level-2 perspective-taking experi- mother this closed box, what would she think is in- ment were conducted with 3- to 8-year-old children. side it?” The thought question always followed the What makes these experiments different from previ- action question. ous theory of mind experiments is that the children For the bear, ant, and tree items, children were answered questions about the perception, beliefs, shown realistic pictures of each to ensure the children and consequent actions of nonhuman agents as well were thinking of real animals and trees, and not car- as a human. toon characters. For these three “agents,” the experimenter first asked the children if the “agent” in question could think. If it could not, they were asked to EXPERIMENT 1 pretend that it could think and that it wanted crackers. So that children might develop some comfort with Method the task, the experimenter always asked the children Participants. Twenty-four children ranging in age about their mothers or fathers first, and then the other from 2 years, 11 months to 6 years, 11 months partici- four “agents” in random order. pated. To maximally ensure that the children knew who God is, all children were recruited from Chris- Results tian families either from a nondenominational evangelical Christian family camp or from an interdenomi- Children’s responses were scored 1 point for an- national Bible study. Both groups comprised primarily swers on each false-belief question suggesting an Protestants from an Anabaptist theological orienta- understanding of false beliefs and 0 points for a tion. One child claimed she did not know who God response suggesting infallible beliefs. That is, indi- was so she did not answer the questions about God. cating that an agent would look for the crackers in The children were all residents of Maryland or New the box was scored as 1 point, and answering that an York State. agent would think there were crackers in the box was Materials and procedure. Children were shown a scored as another point. A score of 0 indicated that closed saltine cracker box and a closed, unmarked, the child answered that the agent would look in the brown paper bag. They were asked what they be- bag and would think that there were rocks in the box. lieved to be inside the cracker box, and because the As expected on the basis of previous research, a box had pictures of crackers on it, they responded simple linear regression examining answers to mother “crackers.” (Children who did not guess that there questions found a significant positive correlation were crackers in the box guessed something semanti- with age, r(22) .59, t(22) 3.541, p .002. Because cally similar such as “cookies.” One hopeful 6-year- age and answers to the items were both continuous old did guess that there might be a toy in the box but measures in Experiment 1, regression analyses admitted that crackers were typically in this type of were performed. Regressions were also used in Ex- container.) The experimenter then showed them the periments 2 and 3 for the sake of continuity. Older inside of the box, which contained small rocks. The children were more likely to “pass” the false-belief children were shown that the crackers were inside the task, that is, have a score of 2. The youngest chil- bag. After reclosing both the bag and the box, the experimenter checked that the children were still clear 1 Eight participants were given the same “show” question for on where the crackers and rocks were located. The ex- mother as for God, and also a “look” question for their mother. perimenter then asked the children the false-belief These questions were maximally distanced in the presentation questions. order. For 7 of these children, the answers were identical. For the eighth, the false belief attribution was made for the “show” The experimenter asked the children to reason question but not the “look” question. It appears, therefore, that about the thoughts and actions of a parent (usually the “show” rephrasing is not markedly more difficult or simple “mother”), a bear, an ant, a tree, and God. For all five than the “look” question.

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56 Child Development dren to pass were 3,10. Twelve children passed and Discussion 11 failed. The most straightforward explanation of the find- Answers to the bear questions correlated posi- ing that children answered questions about the tree tively with answers on the mother questions, r(22) most similarly to questions about a parent is that .70, t(22) 4.62, p .001, as did ant questions, r(22) children were confused by or rejected the idea of the 67, t(22) 4.245, p .001. But the tree had the stron- tree really being an agent in its own right and so re- gest relationship of all with the mother questions, treated to the most appropriate proxy concept: hu- r(22) .92, t(22) 10.72, p .001. man agency. Bear and ant questions might have been When answering questions about God, children did answered similarly to human questions for the same not show a meaningful correlation with age, r(21) reason but showed slightly more divergence because .15, t(21) .72, p .481. Similarly, performance on the of increased knowledge about actual behaviors of God questions was not significantly correlated with these animals. For example, one 6-year-old reasoned performance on the mother questions, r(21) .32, that the bear would look in the bag and not the box t(21) 1.52, p .142. Overall, scores on the God ques- for crackers because it would be able to smell where tions averaged less than those for the mother ques- the crackers are. tions. The mean score for the parent questions was Children seemed to treat God quite differently 1.08 (SD 1.02) versus .48 (SD .79) for the God from the other agents, an existence proof that children questions. A paired t test found this difference to be are not doomed to anthropomorphize but can reason significant, t(22) 2.92, p .008. Figure 1 illustrates about different types of agency. Before this conclusion these results. may be drawn with confidence, however, at least two Naturally, the performance of children who passed potential shortcomings of Experiment 1 must be ad- the false-belief task when reasoning about parents dressed. First, only one experimenter spoke with the primarily accounts for these differences. That is, chil- children and, knowing the hypotheses, may have in- dren who scored 2 for the parent questions did not advertently biased the children’s responses. Second, show a corresponding tendency to have higher scores the “look” question was included because of the strong on the God questions. Only 4 of 13 children who precedent in previous research for this measure. Sug- passed on the parent questions scored 2 on the God gesting, however, that the animals (and God) might questions. Eight of these 13 children scored 0 for want some crackers and then asking the “look” ques- God, which suggests no anthropomorphism. Children tion may have unfairly biased children toward an- 3,10 (the age at which they began to pass the false- thropomorphism. Experiment 2 addresses these pos- belief task) and older had a mean score of 1.37 (SD sible sources of bias, expands the range of animals .95) for mother versus .50 (SD .86) for God. This dif- introduced as possible agents, and uses a population ference was also significant, t(17) 4.01, p .001. from slightly different religious traditions.

EXPERIMENT 2 Method Participants. The sample consisted of 52 children: twelve 3-year-olds (3,5–3,11), fourteen 4-year-olds (4,0–4,11), seventeen 5-year-olds (5,0–5,11), and nine 6-year-olds (6,0–6,11). Thirty were male. The children were recruited from Reformed and Lutheran Protes- tant churches in Michigan. No differences were detected between Lutheran and Reformed children; therefore, they are treated as one group for all analyses. Parents signed consent forms providing the name, age, and birthdate of each child. Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure were nearly identical to those used in Experi- ment 1. Only four slight differences were introduced. Figure 1 Experiment 1 results: Mean combined scores for false belief questions by age groups. A score of 2 indicated First, to broaden the range of animals examined, a “passing” both false belief questions. A score of 0 indicated snake and an elephant were used with a bear, a tree, “failing” both false belief questions. God, and mother as agents. Second, photographic

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Barrett et al. 57 prints instead of realistic illustrations were uniformly used to introduce the children to the animals. Third, only one false belief question was asked for each “agent.” Children were asked what X would think is inside the box. Because the “Where would X look for crackers ﬁrst?” question was answered essentially identically with the “think” question in Experiment 1, dropping the “look” question shortened the task, thereby allowing for more animals to be included, and reduced possible bias introduced by suggesting that the agents would want to look for crackers. Fi- nally, to reduce experimenter bias, two naive experimenters gathered all of the data.

Results Figure 2 Experiment 2 results: Percent of children by age Because the experimenter asked only the “think” group reporting that the agent in question would believe question, each child had essentially a dichotomous crackers were in the box. score for each of the agents. They were scored 1 for answering “crackers” and 0 for all other answers– almost always “rocks.” Occasionally, children an- ences between mother and any of the other agents swered for the animals (as children are apt to do) with were found at any age. entirely unexpected answers such as that the box Although there were no significant differences might contain water. These few cases were coded as 0 among the animal and tree correlations, as in Experi- because they do not evidence the anthropomorphic ment 1, a suggestive trend in the correlations related response “crackers” but rather suggest thinking of to taxonomic differences from humans emerged. Of the animal as having different beliefs than a human the animals, bear and elephant were most tightly cor- would have. related with mother, r(51) .66, and snake was No developmental differences were found be- slightly worse, r(51) .62. Tree, however, was the tween mother, bear, elephant, snake, or tree. They all most closely correlated with mother, r(51) .73, just showed positive correlations with age, which indi- as in Experiment 1. cates that as age increased, children were more likely to answer that the agent would think crackers were in Discussion the box. For example, 18% of the 3-year-olds said their mothers would think crackers were in the box com- Potential sources of bias in Experiment 1 seemed to pared with 87% of 6-year-olds. Replicating the well- be of no consequence in Experiment 2. As in Experi- documented improvement in passing false-belief ment 1, all of the non-human agents, with the excep- tasks with age, the correlation between answers for tion of God, were treated like a human (mother). mother and age was strong, r(51) .63, followed by Three- and 4-year-olds maintained that all agents elephant, r(51) .61, snake, r(51) .50, and bear, r(51) would know there were rocks in the box. By age 5 and .48. Surprisingly, the strongest relationship with age 6, the majority of children agreed that mother, the was tree, r(51) .65. Figure 2 illustrates these results. bear, the elephant, the snake, and the tree would be- In contrast, children clearly treated God differently lieve that crackers were in the box, but God would from the other five. No correlation was detected still know better. No developmental lag was detected between answers for God and age, r(48) .09. Of between children learning that people can have false course, the divergence between God and the other beliefs and transferring this knowledge to the other agents took place upon children passing the false- agents, minus God. belief task. Of the 25 who passed the false-belief task A possible explanation of children treating God for mother and answered for God, only 6 said God differently from the animals and tree is that God has would think crackers were in the box. A Wilcoxon different perceptual abilities. Perhaps God does not Signed-Ranks Test for matched pairs found signifi- have infallible beliefs per se, but rather sees all. In both cant differences in “cracker” responses between Experiments 1 and 2, when asked if God could see the mother and God only for 5- and 6-year-olds, z 2.93, cracker box at the time of the experiment, children p .003; z 2.37, p .018, respectively. No differ- overwhelmingly answered yes. In Experiment 2, only

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58 Child Development

8 of the 44 children who answered said God could not yields the child’s best possible approximation of see the box; however, perspective on God’s vision did God’s actual (infallible) perspective, granting that not predict answers to the God item of the false-belief God sees things in some sense. Childhood realism task, r(48) .17, ns; even when considering only the would also support young children’s being able to children passing the task when reasoning about par- understand and use knowledge about animals who ents, r(24) .16.2 Thus, although children claiming might see things that they themselves cannot. Exper- that God could see the box either entails that God was iment 3 explores these possibilities by examining 3- to present in the room (and invisible) or that God could 8-year-old children’s performance in a modified see the box even when not present (both nonhuman perspective-taking task. properties), it does not appear to account for chil- Whereas traditional level 2 perspective-taking dren’s failure to attribute false beliefs to God. The tasks involve an object viewed from various angles issue of whether God’s visual perception as well as and participants are asked to appreciate that the same beliefs are represented differently than humans’ is ad- object may appear differently depending on line of dressed more directly in Experiment 3. sight, in this task, the lighting conditions of the object were manipulated. Children reported on their own and other agents’ perception of the dark interior of a EXPERIMENT 3 box before and after knowing that a red block was in Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that young children the box. Do children understand that light level af- may reason about ontologically different agents as fects the ability to see an object differentially depend- having importantly different properties. Specifically, ing on the type of agent doing the viewing? The diffi- children can use God’s infallible beliefs to solve sim- culty with asking children to reason about God’s ple false-belief problems. The result is that, overall, visual perspective by using an angular rotation ma- children from ages 3 to 6 more accurately reasoned nipulation is that God’s location cannot be specified. (theologically speaking) about God’s beliefs than their In Experiment 3, the two possible perspectives of the parents’. This conceptual advantage might not be lim- same visual field are detection of a block in a box ver- ited to false-belief situations and might not be limited sus not seeing anything. The task also resembles an to God but might also be true of visual perspective- appearance–reality task (Flavell, 1986) in that chil- taking for animals with superhuman vision. dren must understand that even though in reality a Not until just before age 4 do children shift from block is in the box, it may appear to others that there what Flavell (1974) calls “level 1” knowledge of vi- is no object in the box. sual perception to “level 2” knowledge of visual per- If children anthropomorphize God and animals ception (Masangkay et al., 1974). Level 1 is the ability with regard to visual perception, then when an object to know if someone else can or cannot see something cannot be seen because of darkness, no one can see it. because of obstructed line of sight, whether or not Alternatively, if God possesses infallible perception you can see it. Level 2 is the more sophisticated un- as well as beliefs, darkness should not matter. Fur- derstanding that one thing can look different from ther, another special agent, a kitty cat who can see different perspectives. Before level 2 knowledge of vi- well in the dark, was included. sual perspective develops, children mistakenly assume that others see an object or scene in the most Method complete visual perspective possible (Liben, 1978; Light & Nix, 1983; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988). Participants. Recruited from various Protestant That is, they assume the other person’s perspective is churches and preschools in Michigan, 45 children, an accurate and complete representation of reality as ages 3,2 to 8,5, participated. Participants included the child understands it. When reasoning about other thirteen 3-year-olds, ten 4-year-olds, eleven 5-year- humans’ perspectives, this strategy is often mistaken. olds, and eleven 6- through 8-year-olds. As with the false-belief tasks, however, this strategy Materials. A shoe box with a small slit in the top, a hole in the side, and a red block inside, were used as 2 To examine the relationship between children’s beliefs stimuli. A standard flashlight served as the light about God seeing the box and their beliefs about God’s knowl- source for the inside of the box. Three puppets repre- edge of its contents, a 2 analysis was performed. The analysis sented a monkey, a kitty cat, and a girl named Maggie. gave no evidence that the two sets of belief were at all related Procedure. Each child participated individually. among children who passed the false belief task, 2(1, N 23) .65, p .42. The corresponding correlation was also calculated All children looked through the slit in the top of and yielded a probability of .44. Because of the similarity of out- the darkened box and were asked, “What do you see comes, the coefficients are reported for easier interpretation. inside the box?” After the children agreed that they Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 129

Barrett et al. 59 could see nothing, the experimenter then shined the ﬂashlight through the small hole, thereby revealing the block inside to the child. The experimenter then turned off the light and allowed the child to look again. To see if children could be taught about special properties of animal perception, the experimenter told the child that kitty cats have special eyes and can see in the dark. Then, in random order, the child was asked about what each agent saw in the darkened box. Note that the experimenter did not instruct children about God at all but only asked at the beginning of the task if God could see. All children who reported knowing who God is also said that God can see.

Results Answers to the second set of questions (i.e., after Figure 3 Experiment 3 results: Percent of children by age the child knew there was a block in the box but could group reporting the agent in question would see the block in the darkened box by answering “block.” no longer see it) were simply coded 1 if the agent in question was reported as seeing the block and 0 for not seeing. Results were analyzed by using simple linear regression analyses for relationships with age block. Similarly, 81.8% of 5-year-olds said God would and Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Tests for matched pairs. see the block, whereas 90.9% said the kitty would. On the basis of the previous two experiments, it was Across ages, children maintained that God would be predicted that children at all ages would tend to re- more likely to see the block than Maggie, z 4.00, p port that God and the kitty would see the block but .001; and the kitty would also be more likely to see the that across ages children would show a standard de- block, z 4.36, p .001. Inferential tests detected no velopmental shift from failing the task at age 3 to significant differences between the kitty and God at passing the task by age 5 when reasoning about Mag- any age. gie and the monkey. Figure 3 illustrates Experiment 3 results. Consistent with previous appearance–reality and level 2 perspective-taking tasks, older children were Discussion more likely to report that Maggie could not see the block in the darkened box; they appreciated that just As in previous appearance–reality and level 2 because the block was present did not mean it would perspective-taking experiments, 3-year-olds demon- be perceived, r(44) .52, t(44) 4.01, p .001. strated difficulty in understanding that even though Whereas 76.9% of 3-year-olds reported that Maggie an object was present, other viewers might not be able could see the block, only 36.3% of 5-year-olds did so, to see the object; they often reported that Maggie z 1.97, p .049. would see the block even when it was completely in- As in Experiments 1 and 2, children treated the visible because of lack of illumination. By age 5 most monkey similarly to Maggie. A negative relationship children correctly reported that Maggie would not be between answers to monkey questions and age was able to see the block, thereby overriding their knowl- detected, r(44) .47, t(44) 3.49, p .001. At no edge that the block was in the box. age, nor collapsing across age, was Maggie signifi- Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, children eas- cantly different from the monkey. Overall, 46.7% of ily generalized the acquired ability to accurately rep- children reported that Maggie would see the block resent other’s representations of the display to a non- versus 51.1% for the monkey, z .58, ns. human agent, the monkey, but did not generalize to In contrast, participants treated God and the kitty all other agents. Once again, children treated God as as importantly different from either Maggie or the importantly different from the monkey or Maggie. monkey. Neither God nor the kitty related to age neg- Without receiving any training from the experi- atively, r(44) .08, ns, r(44) .26, ns, respectively. Of menter, children at all ages tended to report that God the 3-year-olds, 91.7% answered that God would see would see the block, thereby supporting the claim the block, and 76.9% said the kitty would see the that children do not represent God as just another Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 130

60 Child Development person but rather understand God as a meaningfully with which young children personify nonhumans different sort of agent with some nonhuman properties. (Eddy, Gallup, & Povinelli, 1993). Apparently, children discern God as having non- Although the tight correspondence between hu- human perceptual systems as well as beliefs, al- man and animal treatment in the false-belief task is though the two may not be unrelated. Young children evidence that children may apply their theory of hu- have been shown to understand that perception leads man minds and action to other things, their perfor- to beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 1995; O’Neill & Gopnik, mance on the God items casts doubt on the thesis that 1991; Pratt & Bryant, 1990). In this case, acknowledg- human agency is the only form of agency available to ing that God can see things that people cannot could young children. Children who had an understanding entail that God also has accurate beliefs in situations of false beliefs in humans did not automatically transfer when people do not (e.g., the cracker box task). Chil- this knowledge to all other agents. Rather, they seemed dren may hold, however, that God has both infallible to be selective about the agents to which they would perception and infallible beliefs independently. apply this knowledge. Similarly, when given new in- Experiment 3 also demonstrates that children can formation about the perceptual abilities of kitties be- successfully apply knowledge about superhuman vi- ing different from those of humans’, children incorpo- sion in animals. Children seemed to easily compre- rated this information into their judgments of the hend what it would mean for the kitty cat to see in the kitty’s differing perspective. dark. At all ages children reported that the kitty A small but growing number of recent studies sup- would see the block. This result suggests that pre- port the notion that young children can and do treat school children may already be making important other agents as importantly different from humans. distinctions between the sorts of agents that populate Children are not doomed to be strictly anthropomor- the natural world. Although in some cases they may phic when it comes to central properties of mind or exhibit overextension of human properties (Inagaki & causal powers. For example, contrary to Piagetian ar- Hatano, 1987), when differences with humans are sa- tificialism (Piaget, 1969), Petrovich (1997) found that lient, their agent concepts are flexible enough to ac- although 4-year-olds know that humans make ma- commodate nonhuman properties. Indeed, it would chines and God doesn’t, when asked to account for be unlikely for a young child who grows up with the origins of natural objects such as large rocks or dogs as pets to not appreciate that dogs typically can mountains, they gave God the credit and not people. smell and hear better than people. Similarly, several studies have uncovered evidence that 4-year-old (and in some cases, older) children believe magicians are a special type of agent able to per- GENERAL DISCUSSION form actions that apparently violate natural causa- The results of the three experiments support two tion. It seems children believe this ability is not merely general conclusions. First, contrary to the line main- learned but either an inborn or endowed power tained by many in the Piagetian tradition and implic- (Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, itly assumed by others, young children need not treat 1994; Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling, & Gelman, 1994). all agents the same as humans with regard to nonsu- Further, recent research suggests that 4- and 5-year- perficial agent properties. That is, the human agency olds appreciate differences in perceptual abilities of hypothesis is false. Second, children may be better different agents across sensory modalities (Richert & prepared to conceptualize the properties in some Barrett, 1999) and appreciate that whereas God is nonhuman agent concepts (e.g., God) than for under- more likely than humans to possess various forms of standing humans. knowledge, animals are less likely (Barrett & New- man, 1999). That God was treated differently from the other Flexibility in Agent Concepts “agents” in the false-belief experiments is strong evi- As predicted, the data presented here support the dence that children do not have to treat all agents the strong tendency for children to understand most same; but why was God treated differently? Perhaps agents much in the same way as humans. Children at- the reason is that already by the age of 4, children of tributed to bears, elephants, snakes, ants, and even the Protestant populations sampled have been thor- trees false beliefs (i.e., representational agency) simul- oughly taught that “God knows everything” or “God taneous with this attribution to humans. No develop- is never wrong” and fluently applied this abstract mental lag was detected. The attribution of human- rule to the crackerbox task. Similarly, children may like beliefs to the tree and the animals is unsurprising have been taught that “God sees everything” and in light of previous research demonstrating the ease used this rule to reason that God would even see in Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 131

Barrett et al. 61 the dark; however, Sunday school teachers from the that children find it as easy or easier to represent at participating churches did not report that teaching on least some properties of nonhuman agents than hu- God’s properties such as infallibility or seeing in the man properties. In Experiment 3, children more accu- dark was a focus of their instruction. rately predicted what a cat would see better than The fluidity with which children applied their what other people would see. Further, children at all training to (presumably) override the tendency to an- ages sampled in both false-belief experiments more thropomorphize suggests that other factors might accurately predicted God’s knowledge than their par- have cued children to treat God as a different sort of ents’, theologically speaking. For children to “get God agent. Through the Bible stories that make up most right” all they had to do is keep answering like a church teaching for young children, children are taught young 3-year-old. God’s beliefs are much like the pre- that God has extraordinary powers and physical representational child’s understanding of beliefs: properties but is clearly an agent. The knowledge that They always match what is in the world. This pre- God is a different sort of agent than humans probably representational foundation apparently facilitates makes children who have just begun to “pass” the slightly older children’s ease at continuing to under- false-belief task hesitant to transfer this newly discov- stand God’s infallible beliefs. ered insight about most agents to God. Both being taught that God is infallible and knowing that God is Naturalness of God Concepts a different sort of agent than humans probably contribute to God not being treated like a bear or a tree. Theorists commonly suggest that understanding That children truly understand God as a different goal-directedness and making mentalistic attribu- sort of agent and not just a human with a few strange tions may be hardwired but understanding represen- properties (e.g., infallible beliefs, ability to make tational agency is learned through experience (e.g., mountains) that have been overlearned is difficult to Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). As Zaitchik (1990) sug- disambiguate. Few agents that young children know gests, a plausible account for how children come to about are presented either as radically different from understand that mental representations do not al- humans but having fallible beliefs (like a fallible god) ways match reality is that they experience an enor- or similar to humans but having infallible beliefs (like mous amount of evidence that does not support a a supersmart person). Possible test cases such as one-to-one correspondence. They know when their Santa Claus or angels do not quite fit. Santa Claus is own beliefs are not confirmed and witness others act- not perfectly infallible because really he only knows if ing in ways that are incongruent with reality. This ac- you are naughty or nice but requires letters to tell him count is consistent with recent research demonstrat- what gift to bring. Angels are not radically different ing that environmental factors such as number of from humans because they are often depicted as siblings may profoundly influence when false beliefs humans with wings and are often described as just are understood (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, & Tesla, being humans who have died and gone into God’s 1991; Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Perner, Ruffman, & service. Information about precisely which proper- Leekam, 1994; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & ties an agent must possess to be treated differently Clements, 1998). Following this line of reasoning, it is from humans on the false-belief task will wait for a form of agency at the core of many God and other future studies. supernatural concepts that is “native,” whereas a By no means do the data here support the claim more appropriately human form of agency must be that children’s concepts of God are independent of learned. In some respects, God concepts (and some their understanding of people or parents. Christian other nonhuman agent concepts) may be more con- theology teaches about a God who practiced self- ceptually primitive, in part accounting for why such anthropomorphization by becoming human in the God concepts are so widespread. form of Jesus of Nazareth. Not surprisingly then, These observations corroborate the arguments of Christian children often conflate God and Jesus’s several scholars applying insights of cognitive sci- properties. The present studies do, however, clearly ence to the study of religion. Each in their own ways, demonstrate that young children need not treat God these scholars have maintained that religious beliefs or other agents possessing salient special properties and practices are “natural” or “intuitive” in the sense (such as the cat) as merely human. that they primarily enlist ordinary cognitive resources. Not only do the data presented here support the Lawson and McCauley (1990) have shown how reli- claim that children can adequately represent and gen- gious rituals are undergirded by garden-variety ac- erate inferences by using concepts of agents impor- tion and agent representations. Boyer (1994, 1995) has tantly different from humans, but they also suggest argued that religious concepts satisfy the bulk of intu- Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 132

62 Child Development itive assumptions generated by their ontological cate- problems. In the case of God’s inability to have false gory membership (e.g., living things, artifacts, per- beliefs, the child simply imports this theoretical knowl- sons) but gain their unusual qualities by minor edge when addressing the problem, thus producing violations of these assumptions. Guthrie (1993, 1997) the observed differences with other agents. To judge maintains that gods are explained by an overactive what the cat would see, children would use their the- agent detector that cares little if a postulated agent oretical knowledge about vision to generate infer- has some nonhuman qualities such as invisibility be- ences about what it might mean for a cat to see better cause being able to reason about unseen agents in the dark. Although these data certainly fall short of would have had great survival value in our evolu- a convincing blow against simulation theory, they do tionary past. Likewise, assuming agents may be infal- add to the growing case against it (Ruffman, 1996). lible with regard to beliefs would be a good survival bet: If wrong, little is lost; but gambling that a preda- Reframing the Development of Agent Concepts tor or prey knows less than it does could be disas- trous. The relative ease humans have at representing As suggested earlier, research concerning the de- an agent with properties such as infallible beliefs and velopment of understanding agency typically focuses invisibility could help explain why concepts of gods on how children better and better approximate adult are so widespread and contagious (Sperber, 1996). understandings of human agency. Consequently, even Not all of the properties attributed to gods, however, the earliest evidence of children appreciating purpose- are easily understood. Many properties are quite ful movement is regarded as a primitive representa- counterintuitive and cognitively cumbersome, espe- tion of human agency. But in what sense are these early cially in real-time inference generation (Barrett, 1998; agent concepts only human agent concepts? Although Barrett & Keil, 1996). individual humans are certainly the most important agents for developing children to understand, successful survival (at least in our human past) also re- Simulation-Theory and Theory-Theory quires reasonably accurate prediction of the behaviors of Nonhuman Agents of animals and organized groups of humans. Early That children treat God differently from humans in agent concepts must be refined not only into human the false-belief task and God and the kitty cat differ- agent concepts but also into these other agent concepts. ently than Maggie in the perspective-taking task is Given the need for flexible application of early more easily explained by a theory theory of mind than agent concepts across the lifespan, not surprisingly, a pure simulation theory of mind. Simulation theories evidence exists that infants do not require a human argue that children solve theory of mind problems substrate to apply agent expectations. For example, such as the false-belief task and the perspective- already at 3 months old, children appear sensitive to taking task by imagining themselves in the position the difference between something like teleological of the agent in question and “simulating” what that causation and similar independent movement in geo- agent would believe or see in the task by comparison metric shapes. Rochat, Morgan, and Carpenter (1997) with their own beliefs or perceptions. Because omni- found that infants preferentially look at two colored presence and omniscience cannot be simulated, it is circles “chasing” each other on a computer monitor difficult to see why a simulation of a bear’s or ant’s over a control display with two independent moving beliefs would yield different conclusions than simu- circles matched for speed, changes in direction, and lating God’s beliefs about the contents of the cracker average distance. By 9 months infants significantly box. That children’s simulation of God and the bear dishabituate when the roles (who is chasing whom) differed in visual access to the box (different inputs), are reversed in a display of “chasing” colored circles, thus accounting for the difference in God’s beliefs, re- which again suggests some rudimentary understand- ceived no support from the data gathered. Similarly, ing of the causal relationship being illustrated (Morgan to successfully simulate the kitty’s visual perception & Rochat, 1998). Likewise, Gergely and colleagues as different from the monkey’s or Maggie’s, children found that 12-month-olds seemed to anticipate tel- would have to be able to simulate what it would eological agency from circles that exhibited self- mean to see in the dark—an unlikely feat. propelledness (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995). Versions of the theory theory, including those Note that these are circles, not people, which suggests that use some simulation (e.g., Perner, 1996), argue that concepts of teleological agency might not be tied that children have access to some general rules about to humans even in infancy. how minds behave in certain situations and use these That infants attribute teleological agency to circles rules, rather than simulation, to solve theory of mind should not be confused with the claim that infants an- Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 133

Barrett et al. 63 thropomorphize the circles. Clearly these infants do Barrett, J. L. (1998). Cognitive constraints on Hindu con- not expect circles on a computer screen to converse cepts of the divine. Journal for the Scientiﬁc Study of Reli- with them or get them a bottle. Many human proper- gion, 37, 608–619. ties that infants recognize in people are not general- Barrett, J. L., & Keil, F. C. (1996). Conceptualizing a non-nat- ized to other agents. The development of agent con- ural entity: Anthropomorphism in God concepts. Cogni- tive Psychology, 31, 219–247. cepts is not only a matter of ﬁguring out which Barrett, J. L., & Newman, R. (1999, October). Knowing what properties apply to humans but which ones do not. God Knows: Understanding the importance of background Given a less anthropocentric perspective on the de- knowledge for interpreting static and active visual displays. velopment of agent concepts, little reason remains to Poster session presented at the Cognitive Development suppose that young children have only one concept Society meeting, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. of agents—human agency—that is uniformly and in- Bartsch, K. & Wellman, H. M. (1989). Young children’s attri- discriminately applied to all other agents. At each im- bution of action to beliefs and desires. Child Development, portant step in the development of human concepts, 60, 946–964. children must also determine to which objects the Boyer, P. (1994). The naturalness of religious ideas: A cognitive newly discovered properties of humans apply. The theory of religion. Berkeley: University of California Press. present experiments demonstrate that children need Boyer, P. (1995). Causal understandings in cultural representations: Cognitive constraints on inferences from cul- not extend the discovery of fallible, representational tural input. In D. Sperber, D. Premack, & A. J. Premack beliefs to all agents, nor humanlike visual perspec- (Eds.), Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary debate (pp. tives. Development of agent concepts is a story not 615–644). Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. just of how representations of human agency become Caporael, L. A. (1986). Anthropomorphism and mechano- increasingly accurate but also of how general con- morphism: Two faces of the human machine. Computers cepts of agency become specialized and selectively in Human Behavior, 2(3), 215–234. applied to represent various agents. Carruthers, P. (1996). Simulation and self-knowledge: a de- fence of theory-theory. In P. Carruthers & P. K. Smith (Eds.), Theories of theories of mind (pp. 22–38). Cambridge, ACKNOWLEDGMENTS U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Carruthers, P., & Smith, P. K. (1996). Theories of theories of The authors thank Ithaca (NY) Women’s Bible Study, mind. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Bay Area Community Church (Severna Park, MD), Chandler, M., Fritz, A. S., & Hala, S. (1989). Small-scale deceit: Young Life’s Lake Champion (New York), Sunshine Deception as a marker of two-, three-, and four-year-olds’ Community Church (Grand Rapids, MI), Lutheran early theories of mind. Child Development, 60, 1263–1277. Church of the Redeemer (Birmingham, MI), Hillcrest Chandler, M. J., & Lalonde, C. E. (1994). Surprising, magical Christian Reformed Church (Hudsonville, MI), John and miraculous turns of events: Children’s reactions to Knox Presbyterian Preschool (Kentwood, MI), and violations of their early theories of mind and matter. Fairhaven Reformed Church (Jenison, MI) for their British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 12, 83–95. assistance in recruiting participants. Coley, J. D. (1995). 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Tager-Flusberg, H. (1993). What language reveals about the Pitts, V. P. (1976). Drawing the invisible: Children’s concep- understanding of minds in children with autism. In tualization of God. Character Potential, 8, 12–24. S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, & D. J. Cohen (Eds.), Poulin-Dubois, D., & Shultz, T. R. (1988). The development Understanding other minds: Perspectives from autism (pp. of the understanding of human behavior: From agency 138–157). Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. to intentionality. In J. W. Astington, P. L. Harris, & D. R. Tamminen, K. (1991). Religious development in childhood and Olson (Eds.), Developing theories of mind (pp. 104–125). youth: An empirical study. Helsinki, Finland: Suomen Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Tiedeakatemia. (Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, Pratt, C., & Bryant, P. E. (1990). Young children understand Tiedekirja, Kirkkokatu 14, 00170, Helsinki, Finland) that looking leads to knowing (so long as they are look- Taylor, M., Esbensen, B. M., & Bennett, R. T. (1994). Chil- ing into a single barrel). Child Development, 61, 973–982. dren’s understanding of knowledge acquisition: The Premack, D. (1990). The infant’s theory of self-propelled ob- tendency for children to report that they have always jects. Cognition, 36, 1–16. known what they have just learned. Child Development Reddy, V. (1991). Playing with others’ expectations: Teasing 65, 1581–1604. and mucking about in the first year. In A. Whiten (Ed.), Wellman, H. M. (1990). The child’s theory of mind. Cam- Natural theories of mind. New York: Basil Blackwell. bridge, MA: MIT Press. Richert, R. A., & Barrett, J. L. (1999). Perspectives in a new Wellman, H. M. (1993). Early understanding of mind. In S. sense: Children’s understanding of various agents’ percep- Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg H., & D. J. Cohen tions of across modalities. Unpublished manuscript. (Eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from autism Rochat, P., Morgan, R., & Carpenter, M. (1997). Young in- (pp. 10–39). Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. fants’ sensitivity to movement information specifying Wellman, H. M., & Banerjee, M. (1991). Mind and emotions: social causality. Cognitive Development, 12, 537–561. children’s understanding of the emotional consequences Rosengren, K. S., & Hickling, A. K. (1994). Seeing is believ- of beliefs and desires. British Journal of Developmental Psy- ing: Children’s explanations of commonplace, magical, chology, 9, 191–214. and extraordinary transformations. Child Development, Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children’s rea- 65, 1605–1626. soning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239–77. Rosengren, K. S., Kalish, C. W., Hickling, A. K., & Gelman, Wellman, H. M., & Wooley, J. D. (1990). From simple desires S. A. (1994). Exploring the relation between preschool to ordinary beliefs: The early development of everyday children’s magical beliefs and causal thinking. British psychology. Cognition, 35, 245–275. Journal of Developmental Psychology, 12, 69–82. Whiten, A. (Ed.). (1991). Natural theories of mind. New York: Ruffman, T. (1996). Do children understand the mind by Basil Blackwell. means of simulation or a theory? Evidence from their Wimmer, H., Hogrefe J., & Perner, J. (1988). Children’s un- understanding of inference. Mind and Language, 11, 388– derstanding of informational access as source of knowl- 414. edge. Child Development, 59, 386–396. Ruffman, T., Perner, J., Naito, M., Parkin, L., & Clements, Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Rep- W. A. (1998). Older (but not younger) siblings facilitate resentation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in false belief understanding. Developmental Psychology, 34, young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 161–174. 13, 103–128. Shatz, M., Wellman, H. M., & Sibler, S. (1983). The acquisi- Zaitchik, D. (1990). When representations conflict with real- tion of mental verbs: A systematic investigation of first ity: The preschooler’s problem with false beliefs and references to mental state. Cognition, 14, 301–321. “false” photographs. Cognition, 35, 41–68. Siegal, M., & Beattie, K. (1991). Where to look first for chil- Zinober, B., & Martlew, M. (1985). Developmental changes dren’s knowledge of false beliefs. Cognition, 38, 1–12. in four types of gesture in relation to acts and vocaliza- Sodian, B., Taylor, C., Harris, P. L., & Perner, J. (1991). Early tions from 10 to 21 months. British Journal of Developmen- deception and the child’s theory of mind: False trails and tal Psychology, 3(3), 293–306. genuine markers. Child Development, 62, 468–483. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 136

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Stark, R. (2001). Gods, rituals, and the moral order. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40, 619–636. doi:10.1111/0021-8294.00081 Swanson, G.E. (1960). The birth of the gods; the origin of primitive beliefs. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Underhill, R. (1975). Economic and political antecedents of monotheism - cross-cultural study. American Journal of Sociology, 80, 841–861. doi:10.1086/225893 Valdesolo, P., Ouyang, J., & DeSteno, D. (2010). The rhythym of joint action: Synchrony promotes cooperative ability. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 693–695. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.03.004 Willerslev, R. (2011). Frazer strikes back from the armchair: A new search for the animist soul. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 17, 504–526. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9655.2011.01704.x Wright, R. (2009). The evolution of God (1st ed.). New York, NY: Little, Brown.

Big Gods can get in your head Justin L. Barrett* and Tyler S. Greenway

School of Psychology, Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, CA, USA

I (first author) once bought a pair of shoes from a gentlemen’s shop in Oxford, England. I brought the shoes to the service desk and went to place them on the counter. To my surprise, the attendant immediately took them and, with care, placed them on the floor. He explained that his mother had taught him to never put shoes anywhere but on the floor. I did not see his mother anywhere, and I, the paying customer, had actually committed the transgression against his mother’s code of conduct. Nevertheless, he could not tolerate this breech of etiquette. Why? The American colloquialism is that his mother had “gotten in his head.” That is, his mother’s behavioral code had been so drilled into him, that even as a grown man with no mother around, he would not violate her wishes. “Your mother may be watching” did not need to be primed in him. Human psychology works in this way: certain values and actions become so internalized or habitual that they no longer need policing or even, in many cases, conscious deliberation. In Robert McCauley’s (2011) terms, they become part of practiced naturalness: fluent, automatic, and easy through direct tuition and rehearsal. So, too, we argue that attitudes, values, and behavioral directives derived from beliefs in morally interested, super-knowing gods or Big Gods (following Norenzayan, 2013) can become cognitively natural. Big Gods can get in your head.

Downloaded by [SUNY Brockport] at 07:43 27 January 2016 Our thesis, then, challenges one element in Ara Norenzayan’s(2013) thoughtful and much-needed synthesis of cognitive and evolutionary approaches to explaining the origins and persistence of theistic belief. Specifically, we challenge the second of eight principles that Norenzayan uses to structure the argument articulated in Big Gods: the claim that “Religion is more in the situation than in the person” (p. 39). While rejecting this “principle” leaves (in our estimation, at least) the bulk of Norenzayan’s argument intact, it does impact the implications he wants to draw for the future of atheistic societies.

Religion more in the situation? The second principle expresses a relative claim: that situational factors matter more than personal factors in influencing religious behavior. To support this claim Norenzayan

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected] Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 137

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begins by reviewing two studies, one within a Muslim context (Morocco; Duhaime, 2011) and the other within a Hindu context (Mauritius; Xygalatas, 2013). Both experiments presented religious individuals with an economic game situation in which they could be selfish or generous to some degree. Norenzayan relays that when religious reminders were present, participants were less selfish and more generous. Norenzayan is trying to make the point that as a result of situation effects, rather than personal factors, these individuals behaved generously. In other words, these religious individuals were reminded of their supernatural monitor, and as a result they acted in accordance with the actions expected of that supernatural monitor. Whereas these studies may demonstrate that religious reminders may increase generosity and decrease selfishness, they do not, however, support the relative claim that situation matters more than the particulars of the person. Norenzayan mentions no consideration of personal factors in the study of Muslims and only notes that the relative degree of self-reported religious commitment “had little bearing” (p. 40) on the Hindu participants.1 Comparisons with non-Muslims and non-Hindus are wanted to make the strong relative claim. Indeed, given what Norenzayan reports about the Muslim shopkeepers opting to give all of a sum of money to charity 100% of the time when the call to prayer was sounded, it would be difficult for a sample of non-Muslim or atheist shopkeepers to be so generous: religious commitment (a personal factor) almost certainly mattered. In order to more accurately test the argument that religion is more situational than personal, non-religious participants would need to be involved as well. This shortcoming applies to the famous Good Samaritan Study (Darley & Batson, 1973) that Norenzayan uses as further evidence that “religion is in the situation more than the person.” Darley and Batson failed to investigate whether the Princeton seminarians’ rate of stopping to help a slumped confederate (40% of the time) would be matched by a less- or non-religious sample. These studies (and others like them) show that religious people are human: situations powerfully shape their actions. On this point Norenzayan is surely right. What we do not have is strong evidence that these situational demands are so much stronger than personal factors that they would motivate (or demotivate) prosocial activity if the people in question were not religious. Indeed, Norenzayan himself suggests otherwise. He writes: “[W]e find that nonconscious religious primes have reliable effects on believers. Interestingly, the results are mixed when it comes to nonbelievers. Some studies find priming effects for nonbelievers, while others do not” (p. 48). The personal Downloaded by [SUNY Brockport] at 07:43 27 January 2016 factor of being religiously committed, then, influences whether situational factors have an impact. As an instance of the long-standing person/situation debate in psychology, Norenzayan’s second principle is largely intractable. Personal and situational factors cannot be cleanly dissociated. Further, when pitting these two classes of factors against each other, it is not easy to know whether both are being measured or manipulated to the same degree (e.g., how does self-reported “high” versus “moderate” degree of religious commitment compare in magnitude of difference to exposure to five religion-related words versus no religion-related words). Finally, we may wonder whether the momentary impact of situational priming is comparable to day-to-day differences in behavior due to personal factors. It may be impossible to marshal the sort of evidence required to accept Norenzayan’s second principle with any confidence. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 138

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Two alternative ways for religion to motivate prosociality More important to Norenzayan’s broader argument is the overall importance of religious situational factors, particularly needing to be reminded of supernatural monitoring, in motivating prosocial action. The basic idea that Norenzayan is attempting to convey from his second principle is that religion only has an effect on individuals when religious ideas – particularly the idea that a morally interested god may be watching – are made salient. Norenzayan writes: “Believers have to think of God and His omniscience at any given moment if that belief is to have an impact on their actions” (p. 39). Such a claim is far too strong in at least two respects. First, even accepting strong situationism (i.e., that the situation drives action), it may be that other situational cues can impact religious people’s actions without having to think of God specifically. Second, it is likely that previous thought about God can drive religious believers to internalize attitudes and values, and acquire behavioral habits, that require no situational priming at all. God can get in your head. We take up these two possibilities below.

Changing one’s environmental cues and support Constant thought about God’s omniscience2 is not even required for religion to lead to prosociality, even if we accept the general idea that religious effects on action are situational. For instance, theists may form the belief that God wants people to care for the poor and so then work to establish church missions or charities (e.g., Oxfam, Red Cross, World Vision) through which they administer care for the poor. The institution becomes a cultural scaffold for benevolent action that does not require a constant reminder of divine omniscience in order for those working through the organization to persist at their prosocial activities. This example illustrates that prosocial religious activities need not continue only because of thought about God. Perhaps the activities were initially engaged in because of a morally interested supernatural watcher, but they result in a changed cultural environment, one that continues to promote the prosocial motives without needing to constantly remind that God is watching. Other priming may be taking place, and this priming may weakly activate God concepts, but we lack evidence that God and God’s omniscience is driving the prosocial activities at all moments. That is, believers do not have to think of God and God’s omniscience at any given moment for the belief to have an impact on their actions. This “priming” may be of prosocial pursuits themselves or

Downloaded by [SUNY Brockport] at 07:43 27 January 2016 other correlates of them (e.g., “be a good Christian”) that do not make direct reference to a supernatural watcher. Indeed, much of the evidence that Norenzayan cites concerning prosociality being primed by religious reminders (e.g., church buildings and calls to worship) is readily interpreted in this way. Religious people need not be primed that “God is watching” but only primed and scaffolded in their prosocial pursuits. As Norenzayan writes: “In the United States and other majority Christian countries, once a week on Sundays, many Christians naturally expose themselves to a high dose of religious priming” (p. 37). But “religious” priming is not the same as priming that God is watching, a distinction lost in Shariff and Norenzayan’s(2007) landmark study, too. The case is analogous to the actions of a married man who has arranged his life’s patterns in such a way so as to avoid strip clubs and singles bars for the sake of preserving his marriage. He has created patterns of life that reflect marital commitments so that he does not have to constantly remind himself of his marital status in order to impact actions. Of course, it does not follow that he would not be even more dutiful in his marital commitments because of reminders of his marital status, let alone the presence Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 139

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(real or imagined) of his wife. Similarly, it may very well be, as Norenzayan demonstrates experimentally in various priming studies, that reminders of religion or God elevate some kinds of prosocial behavior; but it does not follow that prosocial behaviors of theists are only motivated by preceding cues that God may be watching.

Internalized values and habituation Norenzayan’s emphasis on situation leads to a neglect of the possibility that religious beliefs and practices really can be internalized to the point that they no longer require constant reminders that God is watching. That is, they become cognitively natural (McCauley, 2011). If we accept the general thesis common in cognitive science of religion that religious beliefs are cognitively natural and readily connected to moral considerations (see, e.g., Barrett, 2004, 2011; Boyer, 2001; McCauley, 2011), as Norenzayan seems to, then religious commitments and their accompanying values, attitudes, and behavioral routines should (in general) easily acquire a high degree of fluency and not require lots of external prompting.3 Not all of these values, attitudes, and behavioral routines will be prosocial, but the idea that there are no cross-situational differences between, say, Hasidic Jews and Southern Baptists is absurd. Consider this simple thought experiment: which would you trust more to not eat the bacon you just prepared? This claim that religion is more in the situation than in the person also fails to account for some psychological findings unmentioned in Norenzayan’s book that indicate that religion is not mostly situational. For instance, two of the traits within the Big Five personality scale, agreeableness and conscientiousness, are often positively correlated with religiosity (Saroglou, 2002). These findings, and others like them, present a problem for Norenzayan’s thesis, as these major aspects of personality that promote prosocial behavior appear to be enduring, cross-situational, and not a product of supernatural monitoring being primed. It could be argued that, although indeed there are some personal factors that are associated with religiousnesss, the situational effects are greater than these personal factors. This defense, however, would require further articulation, as personality characteristics such as agreeableness and conscientiousness are arguably more influential on a daily basis then being lightly reminded of a supernatural monitor periodically. Downloaded by [SUNY Brockport] at 07:43 27 January 2016 Implications for societies Norenzayan’s commitment to the situational character of religiously motivated prosociality seems to grow from two desires articulated in his book: (1) to persuade us that you can be good without being religious (chapter 4); and (2) that we can have a Godless civil society without losing prosocial morality (chapter 10). If religious people are only “good” because they think God is watching, and someone else watching (e.g., government) will do the same job, then we do not need God to get along, and we do not need to be theists for this other watcher to help us be good. Contrariwise, if religious commitments really do lead to more moral, prosocial people, then the vision of a society of mostly atheists presents a problem: the baseline trustworthiness of such a society would be lower unless its citizens have internalized prosocial values via some non-religious indoctrination – presumably governmental. Government would need to inculcate what is right and wrong to get the same level of prosociality of a theistic community. Such a prospect begins to sound Orwellian. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 140

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Perhaps shadows of Big Brother keep Norenzayan shy of spending too much time applying his situationism to atheists. Norenzayan does note that when primed with words such as “civic, jury, and police” that serve as reminders of a government that can be trusted, participants respond similarly to how they respond when primed with religious words (pp. 35–36). If by “climbing the ladder of religion, then kicking it away” (p. 172), government monitoring is to take over in the place of supernatural monitoring, an equally constant stream of reminders of such monitoring should need to be in place, unless we have reason to think that the prospect of Government watching is more potent than God watching. Norenzayan gives us no evidence in this regard and is relatively silent about the need for priming that “Government is watching.” Norenzayan also ignores the reality that theological systems do promote certain values and moral codes that other theological systems and atheistic moralities do not embrace. Part of religious conflict and theists’ mistrust of atheists (rightly or wrongly) surely stems from real differences in commitments about what it means to be good. For religious reasons, people oppose (or support) abortion, birth control, civil disobedience, euthanasia, genocide, homosexuality, infanticide, misogyny, polygamy, suicide, and vegetarianism. Until we have sufficient evidence that religious teachings and indoctrination really do not penetrate past situational effects, we must take seriously religious systems’ roles as articulators and sustainers of social values. If government, instead, is to take the role of God in reminding people to “be good,” whose good will they be? Can government comparably fill the shoes of moral arbitrator? We are not optimistic.

A friendly amendment Norenzayan’s central thesis appears promising. Naturally developing conceptual systems working in historically ordinary human environments incline people to be receptive to various ideas that we often call religious, including belief in supernatural agents of various sorts. Once part of our cognitive equipment, some of these god concepts promote actions such as religious rituals of various sorts that increase in-group trust and cooperation and prosocial attitudes and actions. The gods that are most effective in this way are likely to be morally interested gods with an observational reach beyond an immediate locality. These Big Gods then provide a mechanism for growing broader social connections and networks and, thereby, support larger human groups, and hence, could Downloaded by [SUNY Brockport] at 07:43 27 January 2016 have played a pivotal role in human social and cultural evolution. So far, so good. Where we part company with Norenzayan is at the suggestion that Big Gods cannot get in your head and make an enduring, cross-situational impact on human values, attitudes, and actions, beyond the impact of situational factors. Whereas this particular claim regarding the situational effects and personal factors of religion presents challenges that need to be addressed with more convincing data, Big Gods raises a number of stimulating questions that provide a worthwhile avenue for thinking about the nature of religion and its effects on society, past and present. Norenzayan produces an excellent attempt to synthesize a number of fields into a single coherent argument, for which we are grateful.

Acknowledgements We thank the Templeton World Charity Foundation for a grant [grant number TWCF0020] to the first author that supported, in part, both authors’ work on this paper. Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 141

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Notes 1. Failure to find a relationship is different than documenting that there is no relationship. An actual relationship may have not been found due to any number of challenges including measurement error (religiosity is not easy to measure reliably across faith traditions) and lack of variability in degree of religiosity (e.g., as when everyone is high on religiosity). 2. Indeed, Norenzayan frequently makes reference to “omniscience,” but his view only requires the god in question to stand a good likelihood of knowing one’s moral transgressions, not being all-knowing. The idea that at any given non-reflective moment a difficult theological abstraction such as omniscience is activated and used to drive actions as the result of priming runs counter to data investigating what gods implicitly know that suggest a less than omni-god (e.g., Barrett & Keil, 1996; Purzycki, et al., 2012). 3. Some religious values may be largely counterintuitive, in which case they may never become entirely natural and would require priming or cultural scaffolding to be activated. Barrett (2011) has suggested that the Christian doctrine of grace (by which all humans are equally loved and repentant humans are all forgiven by God regardless of the apparent gravity of their sins) may be one of these counterintuitive religious values because it violates natural reciprocity and fairness intuitions.

References Barrett, J.L. (2004). Why would anyone believe in God? Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. Barrett, J.L. (2011). Cognitive science, religion, and theology: From human minds to divine minds. West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Press. Barrett, J.L., & Keil, F.C. (1996). Anthropomorphism and God concepts: Conceptualizing a non-natural entity. Cognitive Psychology, 31, 219–247. doi:10.1006/cogp.1996.0017 Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained: The evolutionary origins of religious thought. New York, NY: Basic Books. Darley, J.M., & Batson, C.D. (1973). “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A study of situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27(1), 100–108. doi:10.1037/ h0034449 Duhaime, E. (2011). Did religion facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperative societies? Religious salience and the “Ritual Effect” on prosocial behavior (Unpublished MA thesis). Cambridge University, Cambridge. McCauley, R.N. (2011). Why religion is natural and science is not. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Norenzayan, A. (2013). Big gods: How religion transformed cooperation and conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Purzycki, B.G., Finkel, D.N., Shaver, J., Wales, N., Cohen, A.B., & Sosis, R. (2012). What does God know? Supernatural agents’ access to socially strategic and non-strategic information. Cognitive Science, 36, 846–869. doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01242.x Saroglou, V. (2002). Religion and the five factors of personality: A meta-analytic review. Personality and Individual Differences, 32,15–25. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00233-6 Shariff, A.F., & Norenzayan, A. (2007). God is watching you: Priming god concepts increases prosocial behavior in an anonymous economic game. Psychological Science, 18, 803–809. doi:10.1111/j.1467- Downloaded by [SUNY Brockport] at 07:43 27 January 2016 9280.2007.01983.x Xygalatas, D. (2013). Effects of religious setting on cooperative behaviour: A case study from Mauritius. Religion, Brain, & Behavior, 3,91–102. doi:10.1080/2153599X.2012.724547

Empirical problems with the notion of “Big Gods” and of prosociality in large societies Nicolas Baumarda and Pascal Boyerb*

aPhilosophy, Politics, and Economics Program, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA; bDepartment of Anthropology, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected] Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 142

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Darwin’s God

"Stars No. 1207," 1996 by David Stephenson/Julie Saul Gallery

Heavenbound A scientific exploration of how we have come to believe in God.

By Robin Marantz Henig Published: March 4, 2007

God has always been a puzzle for Scott Atran. When he was 10 years old, he scrawled a plaintive message on the wall of his bedroom in Baltimore. “God exists,” he wrote in black and orange paint, “or if he doesn’t, we’re in trouble.” Atran has been struggling with questions about religion ever since — why he himself no longer believes in God and why so many other people, everywhere in the world, apparently do. Call it God; call it superstition; call it, as Atran does, “belief in hope beyond reason” — whatever you call it, there seems an inherent human drive to believe in something transcendent, unfathomable and otherworldly, something beyond the reach or understanding of science. “Why do we cross our fingers during turbulence, even the most atheistic among us?” asked Atran when we spoke at his Upper West Side pied-à-terre in January. Atran, who is 55, is an anthropologist at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, with joint appointments at the University of Michigan and the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York. His research interests include cognitive science and evolutionary biology, and sometimes he presents students with a wooden box that he pretends is an African relic. “If you have negative sentiments toward religion,” he tells them, “the box will destroy whatever you put inside it.” Many of his students say they doubt the existence of God, but in this demonstration they act as if they believe in something. Put your pencil into the magic box, he tells them, and the nonbelievers do so blithely. Put in your driver’s license, he says, and

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most do, but only after significant hesitation. And when he tells them to put in their hands, few will. If they don’t believe in God, what exactly are they afraid of? Atran first conducted the magic-box demonstration in the 1980s, when he was at Cambridge University studying the nature of religious belief. He had received a doctorate in anthropology from Columbia University and, in the course of his fieldwork, saw evidence of religion everywhere he looked — at archaeological digs in Israel, among the Mayans in Guatemala, in artifact drawers at the American Museum of Natural History in New York. Atran is Darwinian in his approach, which means he tries to explain behavior by how it might once have solved problems of survival and reproduction for our early ancestors. But it was not clear to him what evolutionary problems might have been solved by religious belief. Religion seemed to use up physical and mental resources without an obvious benefit for survival. Why, he wondered, was religion so pervasive, when it was something that seemed so costly from an evolutionary point of view? The magic-box demonstration helped set Atran on a career studying why humans might have evolved to be religious, something few people were doing back in the ’80s. Today, the effort has gained momentum, as scientists search for an evolutionary explanation for why belief in God exists — not whether God exists, which is a matter for philosophers and theologians, but why the belief does. This is different from the scientific assault on religion that has been garnering attention recently, in the form of best-selling books from scientific atheists who see religion as a scourge. In “The God Delusion,” published last year and still on best-seller lists, the Oxford evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins concludes that religion is nothing more than a useless, and sometimes dangerous, evolutionary accident. “Religious behavior may be a misfiring, an unfortunate byproduct of an underlying psychological propensity which in other circumstances is, or once was, useful,” Dawkins wrote. He is joined by two other best- selling authors — Sam Harris, who wrote “The End of Faith,” and Daniel Dennett, a philosopher at Tufts University who wrote “Breaking the Spell.” The three men differ in their personal styles and whether they are engaged in a battle against religiosity, but their names are often mentioned together. They have been portrayed as an unholy trinity of neo- atheists, promoting their secular world view with a fervor that seems almost evangelical. Lost in the hullabaloo over the neo-atheists is a quieter and potentially more illuminating debate. It is taking place not between science and religion but within science itself, specifically among the scientists studying the evolution of religion. These scholars tend to agree on one point: that religious belief is an outgrowth of brain architecture that evolved during early human history. What they disagree about is why a tendency to believe evolved, whether it was because belief itself was adaptive or because it was just an evolutionary

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byproduct, a mere consequence of some other adaptation in the evolution of the human brain. Which is the better biological explanation for a belief in God — evolutionary adaptation or neurological accident? Is there something about the cognitive functioning of humans that makes us receptive to belief in a supernatural deity? And if scientists are able to explain God, what then? Is explaining religion the same thing as explaining it away? Are the nonbelievers right, and is religion at its core an empty undertaking, a misdirection, a vestigial artifact of a primitive mind? Or are the believers right, and does the fact that we have the mental capacities for discerning God suggest that it was God who put them there? In short, are we hard-wired to believe in God? And if we are, how and why did that happen? “All of our raptures and our drynesses, our longings and pantings, our questions and beliefs . . . are equally organically founded,” William James wrote in “The Varieties of Religious Experience.” James, who taught philosophy and experimental psychology at Harvard for more than 30 years, based his book on a 1901 lecture series in which he took some early tentative steps at breaching the science-religion divide. In the century that followed, a polite convention generally separated science and religion, at least in much of the Western world. Science, as the old trope had it, was assigned the territory that describes how the heavens go; religion, how to go to heaven. Anthropologists like Atran and psychologists as far back as James had been looking at the roots of religion, but the mutual hands-off policy really began to shift in the 1990s. Religion made incursions into the traditional domain of science with attempts to bring intelligent design into the biology classroom and to choke off human embryonic stem-cell research on religious grounds. Scientists responded with counterincursions. Experts from the hard sciences, like evolutionary biology and cognitive neuroscience, joined anthropologists and psychologists in the study of religion, making God an object of scientific inquiry. The debate over why belief evolved is between byproduct theorists and adaptationists. You might think that the byproduct theorists would tend to be nonbelievers, looking for a way to explain religion as a fluke, while the adaptationists would be more likely to be believers who can intuit the emotional, spiritual and community advantages that accompany faith. Or you might think they would all be atheists, because what believer would want to subject his own devotion to rationalism’s cold, hard scrutiny? But a scientist’s personal religious view does not always predict which side he will take. And this is just one sign of how complex and surprising this debate has become. Angels, demons, spirits, wizards, gods and witches have peppered folk religions since mankind first started telling stories. Charles Darwin noted this in “The Descent of Man.” “A

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belief in all-pervading spiritual agencies,” he wrote, “seems to be universal.” According to anthropologists, religions that share certain supernatural features — belief in a noncorporeal God or gods, belief in the afterlife, belief in the ability of prayer or ritual to change the course of human events — are found in virtually every culture on earth. This is certainly true in the United States. About 6 in 10 Americans, according to a 2005 Harris Poll, believe in the devil and hell, and about 7 in 10 believe in angels, heaven and the existence of miracles and of life after death. A 2006 survey at Baylor University found that 92 percent of respondents believe in a personal God — that is, a God with a distinct set of character traits ranging from “distant” to “benevolent.” When a trait is universal, evolutionary biologists look for a genetic explanation and wonder how that gene or genes might enhance survival or reproductive success. In many ways, it’s an exercise in post-hoc hypothesizing: what would have been the advantage, when the human species first evolved, for an individual who happened to have a mutation that led to, say, a smaller jaw, a bigger forehead, a better thumb? How about certain behavioral traits, like a tendency for risk-taking or for kindness? Atran saw such questions as a puzzle when applied to religion. So many aspects of religious belief involve misattribution and misunderstanding of the real world. Wouldn’t this be a liability in the survival-of-the-fittest competition? To Atran, religious belief requires taking “what is materially false to be true” and “what is materially true to be false.” One example of this is the belief that even after someone dies and the body demonstrably disintegrates, that person will still exist, will still be able to laugh and cry, to feel pain and joy. This confusion “does not appear to be a reasonable evolutionary strategy,” Atran wrote in “In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion” in 2002. “Imagine another animal that took injury for health or big for small or fast for slow or dead for alive. It’s unlikely that such a species could survive.” He began to look for a sideways explanation: if religious belief was not adaptive, perhaps it was associated with something else that was. Atran intended to study mathematics when he entered Columbia as a precocious 17- year-old. But he was distracted by the radical politics of the late ’60s. One day in his freshman year, he found himself at an antiwar rally listening to Margaret Mead, then perhaps the most famous anthropologist in America. Atran, dressed in a flamboyant Uncle Sam suit, stood up and called her a sellout for saying the protesters should be writing to their congressmen instead of staging demonstrations. “Young man,” the unflappable Mead said, “why don’t you come see me in my office?” Atran, equally unflappable, did go to see her — and ended up working for Mead, spending much of his time exploring the cabinets of curiosities in her tower office at the American Museum of Natural History. Soon he switched his major to anthropology.

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Many of the museum specimens were religious, Atran says. So were the artifacts he dug up on archaeological excursions in Israel in the early ’70s. Wherever he turned, he encountered the passion of religious belief. Why, he wondered, did people work so hard against their preference for logical explanations to maintain two views of the world, the real and the unreal, the intuitive and the counterintuitive? Maybe cognitive effort was precisely the point. Maybe it took less mental work than Atran realized to hold belief in God in one’s mind. Maybe, in fact, belief was the default position for the human mind, something that took no cognitive effort at all. While still an undergraduate, Atran decided to explore these questions by organizing a conference on universal aspects of culture and inviting all his intellectual heroes: the linguist Noam Chomsky, the psychologist Jean Piaget, the anthropologists Claude Levi-Strauss and Gregory Bateson (who was also Margaret Mead’s ex-husband), the Nobel Prize-winning biologists Jacques Monod and Francois Jacob. It was 1974, and the only site he could find for the conference was at a location just outside Paris. Atran was a scraggly 22-year-old with a guitar who had learned his French from comic books. To his astonishment, everyone he invited agreed to come. Atran is a sociable man with sharp hazel eyes, who sparks provocative conversations the way other men pick bar fights. As he traveled in the ’70s and ’80s, he accumulated friends who were thinking about the issues he was: how culture is transmitted among human groups and what evolutionary function it might serve. “I started looking at history, and I wondered why no society ever survived more than three generations without a religious foundation as its raison d’être,” he says. Soon he turned to an emerging subset of evolutionary theory — the evolution of human cognition. Some cognitive scientists think of brain functioning in terms of modules, a series of interconnected machines, each one responsible for a particular mental trick. They do not tend to talk about a God module per se; they usually consider belief in God a consequence of other mental modules. Religion, in this view, is “a family of cognitive phenomena that involves the extraordinary use of everyday cognitive processes,” Atran wrote in “In Gods We Trust.” “Religions do not exist apart from the individual minds that constitute them and the environments that constrain them, any more than biological species and varieties exist independently of the individual organisms that compose them and the environments that conform them.” At around the time “In Gods We Trust” appeared five years ago, a handful of other scientists — Pascal Boyer, now at Washington University; Justin Barrett, now at Oxford; Paul Bloom at Yale — were addressing these same questions. In synchrony they were moving toward the byproduct theory.

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Darwinians who study physical evolution distinguish between traits that are themselves adaptive, like having blood cells that can transport oxygen, and traits that are byproducts of adaptations, like the redness of blood. There is no survival advantage to blood’s being red instead of turquoise; it is just a byproduct of the trait that is adaptive, having blood that contains hemoglobin. Something similar explains aspects of brain evolution, too, say the byproduct theorists. Which brings us to the idea of the spandrel. Stephen Jay Gould, the famed evolutionary biologist at Harvard who died in 2002, and his colleague Richard Lewontin proposed “spandrel” to describe a trait that has no adaptive value of its own. They borrowed the term from architecture, where it originally referred to the V-shaped structure formed between two rounded arches. The structure is not there for any purpose; it is there because that is what happens when arches align. In architecture, a spandrel can be neutral or it can be made functional. Building a staircase, for instance, creates a space underneath that is innocuous, just a blank sort of triangle. But if you put a closet there, the under-stairs space takes on a function, unrelated to the staircase’s but useful nonetheless. Either way, functional or nonfunctional, the space under the stairs is a spandrel, an unintended byproduct. “Natural selection made the human brain big,” Gould wrote, “but most of our mental properties and potentials may be spandrels — that is, nonadaptive side consequences of building a device with such structural complexity.” The possibility that God could be a spandrel offered Atran a new way of understanding the evolution of religion. But a spandrel of what, exactly? Hardships of early human life favored the evolution of certain cognitive tools, among them the ability to infer the presence of organisms that might do harm, to come up with causal narratives for natural events and to recognize that other people have minds of their own with their own beliefs, desires and intentions. Psychologists call these tools, respectively, agent detection, causal reasoning and theory of mind. Agent detection evolved because assuming the presence of an agent — which is jargon for any creature with volitional, independent behavior — is more adaptive than assuming its absence. If you are a caveman on the savannah, you are better off presuming that the motion you detect out of the corner of your eye is an agent and something to run from, even if you are wrong. If it turns out to have been just the rustling of leaves, you are still alive; if what you took to be leaves rustling was really a hyena about to pounce, you are dead. A classic experiment from the 1940s by the psychologists Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel suggested that imputing agency is so automatic that people may do it even for geometric shapes. For the experiment, subjects watched a film of triangles and circles moving around. When asked what they had been watching, the subjects used words like

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“chase” and “capture.” They did not just see the random movement of shapes on a screen; they saw pursuit, planning, escape. So if there is motion just out of our line of sight, we presume it is caused by an agent, an animal or person with the ability to move independently. This usually operates in one direction only; lots of people mistake a rock for a bear, but almost no one mistakes a bear for a rock. What does this mean for belief in the supernatural? It means our brains are primed for it, ready to presume the presence of agents even when such presence confounds logic. “The most central concepts in religions are related to agents,” Justin Barrett, a psychologist, wrote in his 2004 summary of the byproduct theory, “Why Would Anyone Believe in God?” Religious agents are often supernatural, he wrote, “people with superpowers, statues that can answer requests or disembodied minds that can act on us and the world.” A second mental module that primes us for religion is causal reasoning. The human brain has evolved the capacity to impose a narrative, complete with chronology and cause- and-effect logic, on whatever it encounters, no matter how apparently random. “We automatically, and often unconsciously, look for an explanation of why things happen to us,” Barrett wrote, “and ‘stuff just happens’ is no explanation. Gods, by virtue of their strange physical properties and their mysterious superpowers, make fine candidates for causes of many of these unusual events.” The ancient Greeks believed thunder was the sound of Zeus’s thunderbolt. Similarly, a contemporary woman whose cancer treatment works despite 10-to-1 odds might look for a story to explain her survival. It fits better with her causal- reasoning tool for her recovery to be a miracle, or a reward for prayer, than for it to be just a lucky roll of the dice. A third cognitive trick is a kind of social intuition known as theory of mind. It’s an odd phrase for something so automatic, since the word “theory” suggests formality and self- consciousness. Other terms have been used for the same concept, like intentional stance and social cognition. One good alternative is the term Atran uses: folkpsychology. Folkpsychology, as Atran and his colleagues see it, is essential to getting along in the contemporary world, just as it has been since prehistoric times. It allows us to anticipate the actions of others and to lead others to believe what we want them to believe; it is at the heart of everything from marriage to office politics to poker. People without this trait, like those with severe autism, are impaired, unable to imagine themselves in other people’s heads. The process begins with positing the existence of minds, our own and others’, that we cannot see or feel. This leaves us open, almost instinctively, to belief in the separation of the body (the visible) and the mind (the invisible). If you can posit minds in other people that you cannot verify empirically, suggests Paul Bloom, a psychologist and the author of “Descartes’ Baby,” published in 2004, it is a short step to positing minds that do not have to

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be anchored to a body. And from there, he said, it is another short step to positing an immaterial soul and a transcendent God. The traditional psychological view has been that until about age 4, children think that minds are permeable and that everyone knows whatever the child himself knows. To a young child, everyone is infallible. All other people, especially Mother and Father, are thought to have the same sort of insight as an all-knowing God. But at a certain point in development, this changes. (Some new research suggests this might occur as early as 15 months.) The “false-belief test” is a classic experiment that highlights the boundary. Children watch a puppet show with a simple plot: John comes onstage holding a marble, puts it in Box A and walks off. Mary comes onstage, opens Box A, takes out the marble, puts it in Box B and walks off. John comes back onstage. The children are asked, Where will John look for the marble? Very young children, or autistic children of any age, say John will look in Box B, since they know that’s where the marble is. But older children give a more sophisticated answer. They know that John never saw Mary move the marble and that as far as he is concerned it is still where he put it, in Box A. Older children have developed a theory of mind; they understand that other people sometimes have false beliefs. Even though they know that the marble is in Box B, they respond that John will look for it in Box A. The adaptive advantage of folkpsychology is obvious. According to Atran, our ancestors needed it to survive their harsh environment, since folkpsychology allowed them to “rapidly and economically” distinguish good guys from bad guys. But how did folkpsychology — an understanding of ordinary people’s ordinary minds — allow for a belief in supernatural, omniscient minds? And if the byproduct theorists are right and these beliefs were of little use in finding food or leaving more offspring, why did they persist? Atran ascribes the persistence to evolutionary misdirection, which, he says, happens all the time: “Evolution always produces something that works for what it works for, and then there’s no control for however else it’s used.” On a sunny weekday morning, over breakfast at a French cafe on upper Broadway, he tried to think of an analogy and grinned when he came up with an old standby: women’s breasts. Because they are associated with female hormones, he explained, full breasts indicate a woman is fertile, and the evolution of the male brain’s preference for them was a clever mating strategy. But breasts are now used for purposes unrelated to reproduction, to sell anything from deodorant to beer. “A Martian anthropologist might look at this and say, ‘Oh, yes, so these breasts must have somehow evolved to sell hygienic stuff or food to human beings,’ ” Atran said. But the Martian would, of course, be wrong. Equally wrong would be to make the same mistake about religion, thinking it must have evolved to make people behave a certain way or feel a certain allegiance.

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That is what most fascinated Atran. “Why is God in there?” he wondered. The idea of an infallible God is comfortable and familiar, something children readily accept. You can see this in the experiment Justin Barrett conducted recently — a version of the traditional false-belief test but with a religious twist. Barrett showed young children a box with a picture of crackers on the outside. What do you think is inside this box? he asked, and the children said, “Crackers.” Next he opened it and showed them that the box was filled with rocks. Then he asked two follow-up questions: What would your mother say is inside this box? And what would God say? As earlier theory-of-mind experiments already showed, 3- and 4-year-olds tended to think Mother was infallible, and since the children knew the right answer, they assumed she would know it, too. They usually responded that Mother would say the box contained rocks. But 5- and 6-year-olds had learned that Mother, like any other person, could hold a false belief in her mind, and they tended to respond that she would be fooled by the packaging and would say, “Crackers.” And what would God say? No matter what their age, the children, who were all Protestants, told Barrett that God would answer, “Rocks.” This was true even for the older children, who, as Barrett understood it, had developed folkpsychology and had used it when predicting a wrong response for Mother. They had learned that, in certain situations, people could be fooled — but they had also learned that there is no fooling God. The bottom line, according to byproduct theorists, is that children are born with a tendency to believe in omniscience, invisible minds, immaterial souls — and then they grow up in cultures that fill their minds, hard-wired for belief, with specifics. It is a little like language acquisition, Paul Bloom says, with the essential difference that language is a biological adaptation and religion, in his view, is not. We are born with an innate facility for language but the specific language we learn depends on the environment in which we are raised. In much the same way, he says, we are born with an innate tendency for belief, but the specifics of what we grow up believing — whether there is one God or many, whether the soul goes to heaven or occupies another animal after death — are culturally shaped. Whatever the specifics, certain beliefs can be found in all religions. Those that prevail, according to the byproduct theorists, are those that fit most comfortably with our mental architecture. Psychologists have shown, for instance, that people attend to, and remember, things that are unfamiliar and strange, but not so strange as to be impossible to assimilate. Ideas about God or other supernatural agents tend to fit these criteria. They are what Pascal Boyer, an anthropologist and psychologist, called “minimally counterintuitive”: weird enough to get your attention and lodge in your memory but not so weird that you reject them altogether. A tree that talks is minimally counterintuitive, and you might believe it as a

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supernatural agent. A tree that talks and flies and time-travels is maximally counterintuitive, and you are more likely to reject it. Atran, along with Ara Norenzayan of the University of British Columbia, studied the idea of minimally counterintuitive agents earlier this decade. They presented college students with lists of fantastical creatures and asked them to choose the ones that seemed most “religious.” The convincingly religious agents, the students said, were not the most outlandish — not the turtle that chatters and climbs or the squealing, flowering marble — but those that were just outlandish enough: giggling seaweed, a sobbing oak, a talking horse. Giggling seaweed meets the requirement of being minimally counterintuitive, Atran wrote. So does a God who has a human personality except that he knows everything or a God who has a mind but has no body. It is not enough for an agent to be minimally counterintuitive for it to earn a spot in people’s belief systems. An emotional component is often needed, too, if belief is to take hold. “If your emotions are involved, then that’s the time when you’re most likely to believe whatever the religion tells you to believe,” Atran says. Religions stir up emotions through their rituals — swaying, singing, bowing in unison during group prayer, sometimes working people up to a state of physical arousal that can border on frenzy. And religions gain strength during the natural heightening of emotions that occurs in times of personal crisis, when the faithful often turn to shamans or priests. The most intense personal crisis, for which religion can offer powerfully comforting answers, is when someone comes face to face with mortality. In John Updike’s celebrated early short story “Pigeon Feathers,” 14-year-old David spends a lot of time thinking about death. He suspects that adults are lying when they say his spirit will live on after he dies. He keeps catching them in inconsistencies when he asks where exactly his soul will spend eternity. “Don’t you see,” he cries to his mother, “if when we die there’s nothing, all your sun and fields and what not are all, ah, horror? It’s just an ocean of horror.” The story ends with David’s tiny revelation and his boundless relief. The boy gets a gun for his 15th birthday, which he uses to shoot down some pigeons that have been nesting in his grandmother’s barn. Before he buries them, he studies the dead birds’ feathers. He is amazed by their swirls of color, “designs executed, it seemed, in a controlled rapture.” And suddenly the fears that have plagued him are lifted, and with a “slipping sensation along his nerves that seemed to give the air hands, he was robed in this certainty: that the God who had lavished such craft upon these worthless birds would not destroy His whole Creation by refusing to let David live forever.” Fear of death is an undercurrent of belief. The spirits of dead ancestors, ghosts, immortal deities, heaven and hell, the everlasting soul: the notion of spiritual existence after

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death is at the heart of almost every religion. According to some adaptationists, this is part of religion’s role, to help humans deal with the grim certainty of death. Believing in God and the afterlife, they say, is how we make sense of the brevity of our time on earth, how we give meaning to this brutish and short existence. Religion can offer solace to the bereaved and comfort to the frightened. But the spandrelists counter that saying these beliefs are consolation does not mean they offered an adaptive advantage to our ancestors. “The human mind does not produce adequate comforting delusions against all situations of stress or fear,” wrote Pascal Boyer, a leading byproduct theorist, in “Religion Explained,” which came out a year before Atran’s book. “Indeed, any organism that was prone to such delusions would not survive long.” Whether or not it is adaptive, belief in the afterlife gains power in two ways: from the intensity with which people wish it to be true and from the confirmation it seems to get from the real world. This brings us back to folkpsychology. We try to make sense of other people partly by imagining what it is like to be them, an adaptive trait that allowed our ancestors to outwit potential enemies. But when we think about being dead, we run into a cognitive wall. How can we possibly think about not thinking? “Try to fill your consciousness with the representation of no-consciousness, and you will see the impossibility of it,” the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno wrote in “Tragic Sense of Life.” “The effort to comprehend it causes the most tormenting dizziness. We cannot conceive of ourselves as not existing.” Much easier, then, to imagine that the thinking somehow continues. This is what young children seem to do, as a study at the Florida Atlantic University demonstrated a few years ago. Jesse Bering and David Bjorklund, the psychologists who conducted the study, used finger puppets to act out the story of a mouse, hungry and lost, who is spotted by an alligator. “Well, it looks like Brown Mouse got eaten by Mr. Alligator,” the narrator says at the end. “Brown Mouse is not alive anymore.” Afterward, Bering and Bjorklund asked their subjects, ages 4 to 12, what it meant for Brown Mouse to be “not alive anymore.” Is he still hungry? Is he still sleepy? Does he still want to go home? Most said the mouse no longer needed to eat or drink. But a large proportion, especially the younger ones, said that he still had thoughts, still loved his mother and still liked cheese. The children understood what it meant for the mouse’s body to cease to function, but many believed that something about the mouse was still alive. “Our psychological architecture makes us think in particular ways,” says Bering, now at Queens University in Belfast, Northern Ireland. “In this study, it seems, the reason afterlife beliefs are so prevalent is that underlying them is our inability to simulate our nonexistence.” It might be just as impossible to simulate the nonexistence of loved ones. A large part of any relationship takes place in our minds, Bering said, so it’s natural for it to continue much

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as before after the other person’s death. It is easy to forget that your sister is dead when you reach for the phone to call her, since your relationship was based so much on memory and imagined conversations even when she was alive. In addition, our agent-detection device sometimes confirms the sensation that the dead are still with us. The wind brushes our cheek, a spectral shape somehow looks familiar and our agent detection goes into overdrive. Dreams, too, have a way of confirming belief in the afterlife, with dead relatives appearing in dreams as if from beyond the grave, seeming very much alive. Belief is our fallback position, according to Bering; it is our reflexive style of thought. “We have a basic psychological capacity that allows anyone to reason about unexpected natural events, to see deeper meaning where there is none,” he says. “It’s natural; it’s how our minds work.” Intriguing as the spandrel logic might be, there is another way to think about the evolution of religion: that religion evolved because it offered survival advantages to our distant ancestors. This is where the action is in the science of God debate, with a coterie of adaptationists arguing on behalf of the primary benefits, in terms of survival advantages, of religious belief. The trick in thinking about adaptation is that even if a trait offers no survival advantage today, it might have had one long ago. This is how Darwinians explain how certain physical characteristics persist even if they do not currently seem adaptive — by asking whether they might have helped our distant ancestors form social groups, feed themselves, find suitable mates or keep from getting killed. A facility for storing calories as fat, for instance, which is a detriment in today’s food-rich society, probably helped our ancestors survive cyclical famines. So trying to explain the adaptiveness of religion means looking for how it might have helped early humans survive and reproduce. As some adaptationists see it, this could have worked on two levels, individual and group. Religion made people feel better, less tormented by thoughts about death, more focused on the future, more willing to take care of themselves. As William James put it, religion filled people with “a new zest which adds itself like a gift to life . . . an assurance of safety and a temper of peace and, in relation to others, a preponderance of loving affections.” Such sentiments, some adaptationists say, made the faithful better at finding and storing food, for instance, and helped them attract better mates because of their reputations for morality, obedience and sober living. The advantage might have worked at the group level too, with religious groups outlasting others because they were more cohesive, more likely to contain individuals willing to make sacrifices for the group and more adept at sharing resources and preparing for warfare.

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One of the most vocal adaptationists is David Sloan Wilson, an occasional thorn in the side of both Scott Atran and Richard Dawkins. Wilson, an evolutionary biologist at the State University of New York at Binghamton, focuses much of his argument at the group level. “Organisms are a product of natural selection,” he wrote in “Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society,” which came out in 2002, the same year as Atran’s book, and staked out the adaptationist view. “Through countless generations of variation and selection, [organisms] acquire properties that enable them to survive and reproduce in their environments. My purpose is to see if human groups in general, and religious groups in particular, qualify as organismic in this sense.” Wilson’s father was Sloan Wilson, author of “The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit,” an emblem of mid-’50s suburban anomie that was turned into a film starring Gregory Peck. Sloan Wilson became a celebrity, with young women asking for his autograph, especially after his next novel, “A Summer Place,” became another blockbuster movie. The son grew up wanting to do something to make his famous father proud. “I knew I couldn’t be a novelist,” said Wilson, who crackled with intensity during a telephone interview, “so I chose something as far as possible from literature — I chose science.” He is disarmingly honest about what motivated him: “I was very ambitious, and I wanted to make a mark.” He chose to study human evolution, he said, in part because he had some of his father’s literary leanings and the field required a novelist’s attention to human motivations, struggles and alliances — as well as a novelist’s flair for narrative. Wilson eventually chose to study religion not because religion mattered to him personally — he was raised in a secular Protestant household and says he has long been an atheist — but because it was a lens through which to look at and revivify a branch of evolution that had fallen into disrepute. When Wilson was a graduate student at Michigan State University in the 1970s, Darwinians were critical of group selection, the idea that human groups can function as single organisms the way beehives or anthills do. So he decided to become the man who rescued this discredited idea. “I thought, Wow, defending group selection — now, that would be big,” he recalled. It wasn’t until the 1990s, he said, that he realized that “religion offered an opportunity to show that group selection was right after all.” Dawkins once called Wilson’s defense of group selection “sheer, wanton, head-in-bag perversity.” Atran, too, has been dismissive of this approach, calling it “mind blind” for essentially ignoring the role of the brain’s mental machinery. The adaptationists “cannot in principle distinguish Marxism from monotheism, ideology from religious belief,” Atran wrote. “They cannot explain why people can be more steadfast in their commitment to admittedly counterfactual and counterintuitive beliefs — that Mary is both a mother and a virgin, and God is sentient but bodiless — than to the most politically, economically or scientifically persuasive account of the way things are or should be.”

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Still, for all its controversial elements, the narrative Wilson devised about group selection and the evolution of religion is clear, perhaps a legacy of his novelist father. Begin, he says, with an imaginary flock of birds. Some birds serve as sentries, scanning the horizon for predators and calling out warnings. Having a sentry is good for the group but bad for the sentry, which is doubly harmed: by keeping watch, the sentry has less time to gather food, and by issuing a warning call, it is more likely to be spotted by the predator. So in the Darwinian struggle, the birds most likely to pass on their genes are the nonsentries. How, then, could the sentry gene survive for more than a generation or two? To explain how a self-sacrificing gene can persist, Wilson looks to the level of the group. If there are 10 sentries in one group and none in the other, 3 or 4 of the sentries might be sacrificed. But the flock with sentries will probably outlast the flock that has no early- warning system, so the other 6 or 7 sentries will survive to pass on the genes. In other words, if the whole-group advantage outweighs the cost to any individual bird of being a sentry, then the sentry gene will prevail. There are costs to any individual of being religious: the time and resources spent on rituals, the psychic energy devoted to following certain injunctions, the pain of some initiation rites. But in terms of intergroup struggle, according to Wilson, the costs can be outweighed by the benefits of being in a cohesive group that out-competes the others. There is another element here too, unique to humans because it depends on language. A person’s behavior is observed not only by those in his immediate surroundings but also by anyone who can hear about it. There might be clear costs to taking on a role analogous to the sentry bird — a person who stands up to authority, for instance, risks losing his job, going to jail or getting beaten by the police — but in humans, these local costs might be outweighed by long-distance benefits. If a particular selfless trait enhances a person’s reputation, spread through the written and spoken word, it might give him an advantage in many of life’s challenges, like finding a mate. One way that reputation is enhanced is by being ostentatiously religious. “The study of evolution is largely the study of trade-offs,” Wilson wrote in “Darwin’s Cathedral.” It might seem disadvantageous, in terms of foraging for sustenance and safety, for someone to favor religious over rationalistic explanations that would point to where the food and danger are. But in some circumstances, he wrote, “a symbolic belief system that departs from factual reality fares better.” For the individual, it might be more adaptive to have “highly sophisticated mental modules for acquiring factual knowledge and for building symbolic belief systems” than to have only one or the other, according to Wilson. For the group, it might be that a mixture of hardheaded realists and symbolically minded visionaries is most adaptive and that “what seems to be an adversarial relationship” between theists and

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atheists within a community is really a division of cognitive labor that “keeps social groups as a whole on an even keel.” Even if Wilson is right that religion enhances group fitness, the question remains: Where does God come in? Why is a religious group any different from groups for which a fitness argument is never even offered — a group of fraternity brothers, say, or Yankees fans? Richard Sosis, an anthropologist with positions at the University of Connecticut and Hebrew University of Jerusalem, has suggested a partial answer. Like many adaptationists, Sosis focuses on the way religion might be adaptive at the individual level. But even adaptations that help an individual survive can sometimes play themselves out through the group. Consider religious rituals. “Religious and secular rituals can both promote cooperation,” Sosis wrote in American Scientist in 2004. But religious rituals “generate greater belief and commitment” because they depend on belief rather than on proof. The rituals are “beyond the possibility of examination,” he wrote, and a commitment to them is therefore emotional rather than logical — a commitment that is, in Sosis’s view, deeper and more long-lasting. Rituals are a way of signaling a sincere commitment to the religion’s core beliefs, thereby earning loyalty from others in the group. “By donning several layers of clothing and standing out in the midday sun,” Sosis wrote, “ultraorthodox Jewish men are signaling to others: ‘Hey! Look, I’m a haredi’ — or extremely pious — ‘Jew. If you are also a member of this group, you can trust me because why else would I be dressed like this?’ ” These “signaling” rituals can grant the individual a sense of belonging and grant the group some freedom from constant and costly monitoring to ensure that their members are loyal and committed. The rituals are harsh enough to weed out the infidels, and both the group and the individual believers benefit. In 2003, Sosis and Bradley Ruffle of Ben Gurion University in Israel sought an explanation for why Israel’s religious communes did better on average than secular communes in the wake of the economic crash of most of the country’s kibbutzim. They based their study on a standard economic game that measures cooperation. Individuals from religious communes played the game more cooperatively, while those from secular communes tended to be more selfish. It was the men who attended synagogue daily, not the religious women or the less observant men, who showed the biggest differences. To Sosis, this suggested that what mattered most was the frequent public display of devotion. These rituals, he wrote, led to greater cooperation in the religious communes, which helped them maintain their communal structure during economic hard times. In 1997, Stephen Jay Gould wrote an essay in Natural History that called for a truce between religion and science. “The net of science covers the empirical universe,” he wrote. “The net of religion extends over questions of moral meaning and value.” Gould was

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emphatic about keeping the domains separate, urging “respectful discourse” and “mutual humility.” He called the demarcation “nonoverlapping magisteria” from the Latin magister, meaning “canon.” Richard Dawkins had a history of spirited arguments with Gould, with whom he disagreed about almost everything related to the timing and focus of evolution. But he reserved some of his most venomous words for nonoverlapping magisteria. “Gould carried the art of bending over backward to positively supine lengths,” he wrote in “The God Delusion.” “Why shouldn’t we comment on God, as scientists? . . . A universe with a creative superintendent would be a very different kind of universe from one without. Why is that not a scientific matter?” The separation, other critics said, left untapped the potential richness of letting one worldview inform the other. “Even if Gould was right that there were two domains, what religion does and what science does,” says Daniel Dennett (who, despite his neo-atheist label, is not as bluntly antireligious as Dawkins and Harris are), “that doesn’t mean science can’t study what religion does. It just means science can’t do what religion does.” The idea that religion can be studied as a natural phenomenon might seem to require an atheistic philosophy as a starting point. Not necessarily. Even some neo-atheists aren’t entirely opposed to religion. Sam Harris practices Buddhist-inspired meditation. Daniel Dennett holds an annual Christmas sing-along, complete with hymns and carols that are not only harmonically lush but explicitly pious. And one prominent member of the byproduct camp, Justin Barrett, is an observant Christian who believes in “an all-knowing, all-powerful, perfectly good God who brought the universe into being,” as he wrote in an e-mail message. “I believe that the purpose for people is to love God and love each other.” At first blush, Barrett’s faith might seem confusing. How does his view of God as a byproduct of our mental architecture coexist with his Christianity? Why doesn’t the byproduct theory turn him into a skeptic? “Christian theology teaches that people were crafted by God to be in a loving relationship with him and other people,” Barrett wrote in his e-mail message. “Why wouldn’t God, then, design us in such a way as to find belief in divinity quite natural?” Having a scientific explanation for mental phenomena does not mean we should stop believing in them, he wrote. “Suppose science produces a convincing account for why I think my wife loves me — should I then stop believing that she does?” What can be made of atheists, then? If the evolutionary view of religion is true, they have to work hard at being atheists, to resist slipping into intrinsic habits of mind that make it easier to believe than not to believe. Atran says he faces an emotional and intellectual struggle to live without God in a nonatheist world, and he suspects that is where his little

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superstitions come from, his passing thought about crossing his fingers during turbulence or knocking on wood just in case. It is like an atavistic theism erupting when his guard is down. The comforts and consolations of belief are alluring even to him, he says, and probably will become more so as he gets closer to the end of his life. He fights it because he is a scientist and holds the values of rationalism higher than the values of spiritualism. This internal push and pull between the spiritual and the rational reflects what used to be called the “God of the gaps” view of religion. The presumption was that as science was able to answer more questions about the natural world, God would be invoked to answer fewer, and religion would eventually recede. Research about the evolution of religion suggests otherwise. No matter how much science can explain, it seems, the real gap that God fills is an emptiness that our big-brained mental architecture interprets as a yearning for the supernatural. The drive to satisfy that yearning, according to both adaptationists and byproduct theorists, might be an inevitable and eternal part of what Atran calls the tragedy of human cognition. Robin Marantz Henig, a contributing writer, has written recently for the magazine about the neurobiology of lying and about obesity.

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JFK's Speech on His Religion

On Sept. 12, 1960, presidential candidate John F. Kennedy gave a major speech to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association, a group of Protestant ministers, on the issue of his religion. At the time, many Protestants questioned whether Kennedy's Roman Catholic faith would allow him to make important national decisions as president independent of the church. Kennedy addressed those concerns before a skeptical audience of Protestant clergy. The following is a transcript of Kennedy's speech:

Kennedy: Rev. Meza, Rev. Reck, I'm grateful for your generous invitation to speak my views. While the so-called religious issue is necessarily and properly the chief topic here tonight, I want to emphasize from the outset that we have far more critical issues to face in the 1960 election: the spread of Communist influence, until it now festers 90 miles off the coast of Florida; the humiliating treatment of our president and vice president by those who no longer respect our power; the hungry children I saw in West Virginia; the old people who cannot pay their doctor bills; the families forced to give up their farms; an America with too many slums, with too few schools, and too late to the moon and outer space. These are the real issues which should decide this campaign. And they are not religious issues — for war and hunger and ignorance and despair know no religious barriers. But because I am a Catholic, and no Catholic has ever been elected president, the real issues in this campaign have been obscured — perhaps deliberately, in some quarters less responsible than this. So it is apparently necessary for me to state once again not what kind of church I believe in — for that should be important only to me — but what kind of America I believe in. I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute, where no Catholic prelate would tell the president (should he be Catholic) how to act, and no Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to vote; where no church or church school is granted any public funds or political preference; and where no man is denied public office merely because his religion differs from the president who might appoint him or the people who might elect him. I believe in an America that is officially neither Catholic, Protestant nor Jewish; where no public official either requests or accepts instructions on public policy from the Pope, the National Council of Churches or any other ecclesiastical source; where no religious body seeks to impose its will directly or indirectly upon the general populace or the public acts of its officials; and where religious liberty is so indivisible that an act against one church is treated as an act against all. For while this year it may be a Catholic against whom the finger of suspicion is pointed, in other years it has been, and may someday be again, a Jew— or a Quaker or a Unitarian or a Baptist. It was Virginia's harassment of Baptist preachers, for example, that helped lead to Jefferson's statute of religious freedom. Today I may be the victim, but tomorrow it may be you — until the whole fabric of our harmonious society is ripped at a time of great national peril. Finally, I believe in an America where religious intolerance will someday end; where all men and all churches are treated as equal; where every man has the same right to attend or not attend the

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church of his choice; where there is no Catholic vote, no anti-Catholic vote, no bloc voting of any kind; and where Catholics, Protestants and Jews, at both the lay and pastoral level, will refrain from those attitudes of disdain and division which have so often marred their works in the past, and promote instead the American ideal of brotherhood. That is the kind of America in which I believe. And it represents the kind of presidency in which I believe — a great office that must neither be humbled by making it the instrument of any one religious group, nor tarnished by arbitrarily withholding its occupancy from the members of any one religious group. I believe in a president whose religious views are his own private affair, neither imposed by him upon the nation, or imposed by the nation upon him as a condition to holding that office. I would not look with favor upon a president working to subvert the First Amendment's guarantees of religious liberty. Nor would our system of checks and balances permit him to do so. And neither do I look with favor upon those who would work to subvert Article VI of the Constitution by requiring a religious test — even by indirection — for it. If they disagree with that safeguard, they should be out openly working to repeal it. I want a chief executive whose public acts are responsible to all groups and obligated to none; who can attend any ceremony, service or dinner his office may appropriately require of him; and whose fulfillment of his presidential oath is not limited or conditioned by any religious oath, ritual or obligation. This is the kind of America I believe in, and this is the kind I fought for in the South Pacific, and the kind my brother died for in Europe. No one suggested then that we may have a "divided loyalty," that we did "not believe in liberty," or that we belonged to a disloyal group that threatened the "freedoms for which our forefathers died." And in fact ,this is the kind of America for which our forefathers died, when they fled here to escape religious test oaths that denied office to members of less favored churches; when they fought for the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom; and when they fought at the shrine I visited today, the Alamo. For side by side with Bowie and Crockett died McCafferty and Bailey and Carey. But no one knows whether they were Catholic or not, for there was no religious test at the Alamo. I ask you tonight to follow in that tradition, to judge me on the basis of my record of 14 years in Congress, on my declared stands against an ambassador to the Vatican, against unconstitutional aid to parochial schools, and against any boycott of the public schools (which I have attended myself)— instead of judging me on the basis of these pamphlets and publications we all have seen that carefully select quotations out of context from the statements of Catholic church leaders, usually in other countries, frequently in other centuries, and always omitting, of course, the statement of the American Bishops in 1948, which strongly endorsed church-state separation, and which more nearly reflects the views of almost every American Catholic.

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I do not consider these other quotations binding upon my public acts. Why should you? But let me say, with respect to other countries, that I am wholly opposed to the state being used by any religious group, Catholic or Protestant, to compel, prohibit, or persecute the free exercise of any other religion. And I hope that you and I condemn with equal fervor those nations which deny their presidency to Protestants, and those which deny it to Catholics. And rather than cite the misdeeds of those who differ, I would cite the record of the Catholic Church in such nations as Ireland and France, and the independence of such statesmen as Adenauer and De Gaulle. But let me stress again that these are my views. For contrary to common newspaper usage, I am not the Catholic candidate for president. I am the Democratic Party's candidate for president, who happens also to be a Catholic. I do not speak for my church on public matters, and the church does not speak for me. Whatever issue may come before me as president — on birth control, divorce, censorship, gambling or any other subject — I will make my decision in accordance with these views, in accordance with what my conscience tells me to be the national interest, and without regard to outside religious pressures or dictates. And no power or threat of punishment could cause me to decide otherwise. But if the time should ever come — and I do not concede any conflict to be even remotely possible — when my office would require me to either violate my conscience or violate the national interest, then I would resign the office; and I hope any conscientious public servant would do the same. But I do not intend to apologize for these views to my critics of either Catholic or Protestant faith, nor do I intend to disavow either my views or my church in order to win this election. If I should lose on the real issues, I shall return to my seat in the Senate, satisfied that I had tried my best and was fairly judged. But if this election is decided on the basis that 40 million Americans lost their chance of being president on the day they were baptized, then it is the whole nation that will be the loser — in the eyes of Catholics and non-Catholics around the world, in the eyes of history, and in the eyes of our own people. But if, on the other hand, I should win the election, then I shall devote every effort of mind and spirit to fulfilling the oath of the presidency — practically identical, I might add, to the oath I have taken for 14 years in the Congress. For without reservation, I can "solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of president of the United States, and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, so help me God. Transcript courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ALL6YEBJMEKYGMCntnSCvg.aspx https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16920600

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Contested Words: History, America, Religion Author(s): Catherine A. Brekus Source: The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January 2018), pp. 3-36 Published by: Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5309/willmaryquar.75.1.0003 Accessed: 03-02-2018 21:13 UTC

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Contested Words: History, America, Religion

Catherine A. Brekus

N his 1844 Religion in America, the first survey of American religious history, Robert Baird claimed that America was destined to be “a great IProtestant empire.” Writing at a time when large numbers of Catholic immigrants were arriving from Ireland and Germany, Baird insisted that God had chosen America “to throw off the shackles of Rome, and to become, in due time, the most powerful of all Protestant kingdoms.” A Presbyterian minister, Baird decided to write his book to defend the United States from the charge that the separation of church and state—or what he called “the voluntary system”—had led to atheism and infidelity. He argued that America had always been essentially Christian in character. Despite its commitment to religious freedom, America’s “national” religion was “evangelical Christianity” and its “national character” was “Anglo-Saxon.”

Editor’s note: The following essay grew out of the 2016 WMQ-EMSI workshop, “Religions in the Early Americas,” the eleventh in an annual series sponsored by the Uni- versity of Southern California-Huntington Early Modern Studies Institute (with financial support from the USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences, the Mellon Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities) and the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, hosted by the Huntington Library and the University of Southern California on May 12–14, 2016. The workshops are intended to foster intellectual exchange among a group of scholars approaching a general historical question from diverse chronological, geographic, and methodological perspectives. Catherine A. Brekus acted as the workshop’s convener. The participants, most of whom have embarked on second or third book projects, were Mairi Cowan, Katharine Gerbner, Janet Moore Lindman, Erik Seeman, Owen Stanwood, Mark Valeri, Adrian Chastain Weimer, and Rachel Wheeler. Each supplied a precirculated paper and offered a formal comment on another essay. For the 2016 WMQ-EMSI workshop website, see http:// oieahc.wm.edu/workshops/emsi/2016/index.cfm. Catherine A. Brekus is the Charles Warren Professor of the History of Religion in America at Harvard Divinity School. The author would like to thank Peter Mancall and all the participants in the 2016 WMQ-EMSI workshop for a stimulating conversation. She would also like to thank W. Clark Gilpin and David Holland for their comments on this essay.

William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 75, no. 1, January 2018 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5309/willmaryquar.75.1.0003

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4 william and mary quarterly The history of early American religion, according to Baird, was a history of Protestant unity.1 As historian Jerald C. Brauer notes, Baird began a “distinguished historiographical tradition” in American religious history that was built on two assumptions: the possibility of creating “a unified picture of the development of religion in America” despite denominational diversity and the conviction that “a Protestant reality gave shape and form to that history.”2 Martin E. Marty has called this historiographical tradition a “canon,” “an almost scriptural collection of themes and a privileged way of treating them.”3 For more than one hundred years following the publication of Baird’s book, historians of early American religion circled around the same themes: the formative influence of the Puritans, the close relationship between religion and nationalism, the advantages of the “voluntary system,” and the dominance of the Protestant mainstream. During the late 1960s and 1970s, however, historians began constructing a new canon—perhaps best described as a “countercanon” because of its oppositional spirit—that challenged almost all of Baird’s assumptions about three key terms: history, America, and religion.4 These scholars turned Baird’s portrait upside down, emphasizing themes that he had either ignored or minimized, particularly religious pluralism, racial and sexual inequality, and denominational conflicts. Baird’s bit players—ordinary European farmers and goodwives, Native Americans, and the enslaved—took center stage, and religion, including Protestantism, was portrayed as more diverse and more contested. Debates among historians of early American religion about history, America, and religion have continued ever since. Scholars have argued over how historical change takes place, whose histories are important to tell, and whether history, as a field, should focus on the practices of everyday life or on the power of ideas. Scholars have also sparred over the geographic boundaries of early America—especially over whether the colonies that became the United States should enjoy a privileged place in historical narratives—and over the term religion, which has often been treated as synonymous with institutional Christianity or, more to the point, Protestantism. Those debates animated the William and Mary Quarterly and USC-Huntington Early Modern Studies Institute workshop “Religions in the Early Americas,” held at the Henry E. Huntington Library in May

1 Robert Baird, Religion in America. . . . (New York, 1844), 15 (“great”), 37 (“voluntary”), 26 (“national,” “national character”), 292 (“evangelical”). 2 Jerald C. Brauer, review of A Religious History of the American People, by Sydney E. Ahlstrom, Church History 42, no. 3 (September 1973): 406–9 (quotations, 406). 3 Martin E. Marty, “The American Religious History Canon,” Social Research 53, no. 3 (Autumn 1986): 513–28 (quotations, 514). 4 I am indebted to Martin E. Marty for conversations about the countercanon.

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contested words 5

2016. The participants in the workshop were asked to think about the development of global religions such as Christianity and Judaism in the New World, the encounters between competing religious groups, the gendering of religion in the early Americas, the role of religions in shaping conversations about slavery, and the similarities and differences among religious beliefs and practices in British, French, and Spanish colonies. They were also asked to consider both the history and the future of the field. What was at stake for previous generations of historians writing about early American religion? What is at stake for historians today? As revealed by the workshop papers, the canon has not been completely dismantled, a tribute to its interpretive power, but historians have developed new definitions of the three words that frame the field:history , America, and religion. Since the 1970s they have been building a countercanon founded on the conviction that early American religious history is best understood as pluralistic, fractious, and transatlantic—the creation of ordinary people as well as leaders. Like the canon, the countercanon is not only a mirror of historical reality, imperfect as it may be, but also a mirror of its own historical moment.

Robert Baird’s Religion in America advertised itself as a book about the entirety of American “religion,” but according to Baird’s definition of the term, not all religion was equally important or deserving of respect. Disturbed by the diversity of religious traditions, Baird divided America’s religious groups into two categories. The “evangelical churches” that had grown in America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—including Episcopalians, Congregationalists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Quakers—were responsible for the best features of American religious life. Middle-class, virtuous, and well-educated, they were strongly committed to religious liberty. In contrast, the “unevangelical sects” were a blight on the landscape: tradition-bound Jews, transplanted Catholics whose primary allegiance was to Rome, “fanatical” groups such as the Shakers, and homegrown dissidents such as the Unitarians.5 Baird took it for granted that history should focus on the lives of influential white Protestant men. Although he could have consulted some of the anthropological accounts of Native American religions written in the eighteenth century, he chose to treat “Aborigines” as a monolith—a choice that was repeated by many historians in his wake. Highlighting the contributions of ministers and leaders such as John Winthrop, Jonathan Edwards, and William Penn, he rarely discussed enslaved Africans and Native Americans except in relationship to white missionaries. Baird was

5 Baird, Religion in America, 219 (“evangelical churches”), 288 (“unevangelical sects”), 283 (“fanatical”), 82–84, 269–70.

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6 william and mary quarterly effusive in his praise for ministers such as John Eliot, the “Apostle to the Indians,” for trying to convert “uncivilized tribes” despite their “crude and incoherent” theology, but besides a brief derogatory reference to Indian women as “squaws,” he discussed almost no women in his book. A notable exception was Anne Hutchinson, whom he described as “one of the most extraordinary women of her age.”6 If Baird was clear about who made history, he was equally clear about his definition of the wordAmerica . After devoting a few of his opening pages to French and Spanish colonies in the New World, he focused almost immediately on “the colonization of the territories now constituting the United States.” Because his main goal was to narrate how religion had shaped the character of the new nation, he identified America as the thirteen British mainland colonies, and he did not try to hide his biases about which of those colonies had been the most “American” in spirit. Rather than discussing them in chronological order, he began with the founding of Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay, and he praised all the New England colonies for their biblicism, commitment to education, missionary impulse, patriotism, self-denial, and defense of “liberty of conscience.” Though he criticized Puritans for their intolerance, he ended his discussion of them by exulting, “How wonderful, then, was the mission of the founders of New-England! How gloriously accomplished!”7 The South, however, was “widely different in character.” Reminding his readers of the evils of the Norman Conquest, Baird lamented, “If New-England may be regarded as colonized by the Anglo-Saxon race, with its simpler manners, its equal institutions, and its love of liberty, the South may be said to have been colonized by men very much Norman in blood, aristocratic in feeling and spirit, and pretending to superior dignity of demeanour and elegance of manners.”8 Though he expressed admiration for the Middle Colonies, which he portrayed as a refuge from religious persecution in Europe, his disdain for the South was palpable. Its “Norman,” hierarchical spirit was an affront to the democratic impulses of New England and the Middle Colonies. Baird’s crude distinction between “evangelical” and “unevangelical” was abandoned by later historians, but the broad outlines of his interpretive vision, especially his focus on tolerance and Protestant consensus, survived until the 1970s. When Daniel Dorchester, a Methodist minister, published

6 Ibid., 11 (“Aborigines,” “uncivilized”), 294 (“Apostle”), 12 (“crude”), 296 (“squaws”), 64 (“most extraordinary”). For an eighteenth-century account of Native American religions, see the work of Bernard Picart, The Ceremonies and Religious Customs of the Various Nations of the Known World. . . . , 7 vols. (London, 1733–39). 7 Baird, Religion in America, 17 (“colonization”), 59 (“liberty”), 60 (“How wonderful”), 58. 8 Ibid., 60 (quotations).

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Christianity in the United States in 1888, he built on Baird’s work by arguing that Protestantism was “the chief molding religious force of the country.” On the one hand, Dorchester appeared to be more attentive to the diversity of early American religion, and he replaced Baird’s dichotomous categories with a new three-part division of American religion into “Protestantism, Romanism, and a variety of Divergent Elements.” His opening chapter was devoted to “the first discoveries and settlements—under Roman Catholic auspices.” On the other hand, Dorchester’s emphasis on the work of Catholic missionaries was designed to highlight the ultimate triumph of Protestantism. “While thirst for gold, lust of power and love of daring adventure served the Providential purpose of opening the New World to papal Europe, and Roman Catholic colonies were successfully planted in some portions,” he explained, “the territory originally comprised within the United States was mysteriously guarded and reserved for another—a prepared people.” Protestants, not Catholics, had been “intended by Providence to found in the New World a great Christian Republic.”9 Though Dorchester became federal superintendent of Indian schools only a year after publishing his book, he shared Baird’s disdain for Native American and African religions. “Scarcely a gleam of light shone into the minds of these savages,” he claimed, describing the Indians that the Puritans encountered in Massachusetts Bay. “They adored the sun and the moon, and were in bondage to a system of conjuring and of professed intercourse with evil spirits.” Similarly, Dorchester labeled Africans as “children of the Dark Continent” and, despite his hatred of slavery, denounced their religious beliefs as “fetich superstitions and sorceries.”10 Though Dorchester’s book was published more than twenty years after the Civil War, he echoed Baird’s hostility toward the South. Repeating Baird’s comment about its “Norman” character, he described the Anglican Church as “monarchical” in its polity. In contrast, he argued that churches in New England had been more “democratic,” with Plymouth Colony representing “pure democracy.” An “Anglo-Saxon foundation,” he explained, was the best “on which to build up a vigorous, independent, liberty-loving people.”11 Like many other nineteenth-century historians, Baird and Dorchester saw their scholarship as a form of Christian service. Before the profession- alization of history in the late nineteenth century, with the accompanying development of a creed of scientific detachment, most historians were

9 Daniel Dorchester, Christianity in the United States from the First Settlement Down to the Present Time (New York, 1888), 775 (“religious force”), 4 (“Divergent Elements”), 13–34 (“first discoveries,” 13), 24 (“thirst for gold”), 25 (“intended”), 66. 10 Ibid., 174 (“Scarcely”), 224 (“children”). 11 Ibid., 30 (“Norman”), 83 (“monarchical”), 85 (“pure”), 759 (“Anglo-Saxon foundation”).

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8 william and mary quarterly amateurs who wrote for the general public. Despite insisting that they did not want to “distort” the past, Baird and Dorchester were candid about their religious motivations. Baird explained that he hoped to “promote the extension of the Messiah’s kingdom in the world,” and Dorchester aspired to serve “the best interests of Christianity.”12 Both assumed that their books should try to uncover the providential direction of history. Perry Miller, a distinguished professor at Harvard University, did not attribute historical events to divine intervention, but when he published the first volume ofThe New England Mind in 1939, he echoed many of the themes of earlier scholarship. Evidently, Baird and Dorchester’s version of American religious history was so powerful that even Miller, who identified himself as an atheist, found it compelling. Miller did not aim to write a survey of American religion, but because he thought that his history of New England could explain the nation’s culture, he revitalized an understanding of the Puritans as quintessentially American. Early twentieth-century historians such as James Truslow Adams and Vernon Louis Parrington had criticized the Puritans for their pessimism and theocratic impulses, but when Miller looked for the origin of American identity, he found it in New England. Fascinated by the Puritans’ covenantal theology, Miller argued that the roots of the nation’s identity as a “city on a hill” lay in seventeenth-century Massachusetts Bay. The “New England mind” was, to him, the American mind.13 Miller also shared Baird and Dorchester’s assumptions about the nature of historical change. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Progressive school of historians had argued that American history was the product of class and sectional conflicts, but Miller privileged the power of ideas. Focusing on religious leaders such as Cotton Mather and Edwards, Miller suggested that their novel ideas transformed religious life by trickling down to the masses of ordinary believers, and he wrote little about Native Americans, slaves, or women of any race other than Hutchinson, whose theology had threatened the Puritans’ understanding of the relationship between works and grace.14 Sydney E. Ahlstrom’s A Religious History of the American People, published in 1972, represents the capstone of the historiographical tradition inaugurated by Baird in 1844. Ahlstrom claimed that his narrative reflected the nation’s “post-Protestant” era, but his thousand-page work was remarkable more for its comprehensiveness than for its innovation. After beginning

12 Ibid., 3 (“distort,” “best interests”); Baird, Religion in America, viii (“promote”). 13 On New England as a “city on a hill,” see Perry Miller, Errand into the Wilderness (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 15. See also Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (New York, 1939), viii; James Truslow Adams, The Founding of New England (Boston, 1921); Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought: An Inter- pretation of American Literature from the Beginnings to 1920, vol. 1, The Colonial Mind, 1620–1800 (New York, 1927). 14 Miller, New England Mind, 389–91.

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contested words 9 his book with a “European Prologue” about the Catholic tradition and the church in New Spain and New France, he titled part 2 “The Protestant Empire Founded.” Though he emphasized the diversity of Protestant denominations, he chose not to discuss either Catholics or Jews in his chapters focusing on prerevolutionary America. Instead he circled back to their early histories when discussing nineteenth-century immigration, a choice that underlined their marginal place in his larger narrative. Even though Ahlstrom, unlike Baird and Dorchester, had no interest in making the triumphalist claim that God had reserved America for Protestants, he still identified the central theme of the nation’s religious history as the “Puritan spirit.” “A Great Puritan Epoch,” he explained, “can be seen as beginning in 1558 with the death of Mary Tudor, the last monarch to rule over an officially Roman Catholic England, and as ending in 1960 with the election of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the first Roman Catholic president of the United States.”15 Colonial New England, not the South or the Middle Colonies, had laid the foundation for America’s religious identity. Ahlstrom never explicitly defined the termreligion , but he judged other religions against an implicit Protestant norm: American religion involved inward faith rather than external practice, rationality rather than enthusiasm, and voluntarism rather than coercion. Democratic and individualistic, it fostered economic productivity, women’s domesticity, and a strong commitment to education and social reform. Ahlstrom described other religions, including Catholicism and Judaism, as “countervailing” currents.16 If Ahlstrom’s plot was familiar, so were his characters, mostly white Protestant leaders such as Edwards. After his discussion of French and Spanish missions to the Indians, Ahlstrom rarely wrote about Native Americans, describing them as “tragically odd in American history.” Influenced by the civil rights movement, he was more sensitive to the religious experiences of African slaves, and he included a chapter on “the rise of the black churches.” Yet, like earlier historians, he implied that slavery was the product of a distinctively Southern religious culture and “did not exist in the full sense” in the North. To be fair to Ahlstrom, he wrote at a time when relatively little had been published about slave religion, and he was painfully aware that his treatment was superficial. “My efforts can be regarded as no more than preliminary,” he emphasized. “The amount of work yet to be done is awesome.”17 A synthesis rather than a work of original research, Ahlstrom’s book inevitably reflected both the strengths and the weaknesses of the American

15 Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven, Conn., 1972), 1–14 (“post-Protestant,” 1), 15 (“Prologue”), 121 (“Protestant Empire”), 124 (“Puritan spirit”), 1079 (“Great Puritan Epoch”), 527–39, 569–82. 16 Ibid., 511–632 (quotation, 511). 17 Ibid., 156 (“tragically odd”), 698–714 (“rise,” 698, “My efforts,” 699 n. 1), 635 (“did not exist”).

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10 william and mary quarterly religious historical canon. The emphasis on New England Puritans, the privileging of Protestant consensus, the valorization of Protestants as essentially democratic and tolerant, the single-minded focus on the relationship between religion and the nation-state, the invisibility of women—all were characteristic of more than a century’s worth of writing about early American religious history.

To read the papers of the 2016 workshop with this historiography in mind is startling. Even as Sydney E. Ahlstrom was finishing his book, his assumptions about the definition of history were being dismantled. Starting with the rise of social history in the 1970s, religious historians have crafted a new understanding of how historical change occurs and what questions are important to ask. Rather than portraying change as trickling down from the elite, social historians have argued that ordinary people’s collective decisions transformed colonial American life. Aided by the invention and growing accessibility of computers, religious historians during the 1970s began analyzing enormous amounts of data about church membership and religious practice, with fascinating results. Historians now know, for example, that most church members in early America were women and that one of the markers of a revival was the conversion of significant numbers of men.18 Like the rise of social history, the emergence of cultural history during the 1980s helped to dismantle older assumptions about what constitutes history. Influenced by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, cultural historians have focused on asking questions about meaning-making and religious practice, defining culture in broad terms as the “webs of significance” or the “pattern of meanings embodied in symbols” that have framed people’s lives. Rhys Isaac, for example, cited Geertz in his 1982 book that treated architecture, dance, worship, and clothing as stories that eighteenth-century Virginians told themselves about themselves.19 Other historians have used Geertz’s method of “thick description” to recover the “mental world” of early Americans, as David D. Hall did in 1989 when asking how ordinary New Englanders relied on religious practices and beliefs, both Christian and

18 Gerald F. Moran, “‘Sisters’ in Christ: Women and the Church in Seventeenth- Century New England,” in Women in American Religion, ed. Janet Wilson James (Phil- adelphia, 1980), 47–66; Richard D. Shiels, “The Feminization of American Congrega- tionalism, 1730–1835,” American Quarterly 33, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 46–62; Harry S. Stout and Catherine Brekus, “A New England Congregation: Center Church, New Haven, 1638–1989,” in American Congregations, vol. 1, Portraits of Twelve Religious Communities, ed. James P. Wind and James W. Lewis (Chicago, 1994), 14–102, esp. 41. 19 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York, 1973), 3–30 (“webs of significance,” 5); Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” ibid., 87–125 (“pattern of meanings,” 89); Geertz, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” ibid., 412–54; Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740–1790 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982).

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contested words 11 folk, to help them make sense of their lives.20 More recently, Jenny Shaw has explored how Irish Catholic laborers and enslaved Africans found ways to preserve their own religious rituals in the English Caribbean, where the planter elite pressured them to convert to Protestantism.21 Though continuing to write about many of the same topics that preoccupied earlier generations of scholars, social and cultural historians have emphasized the role of ordinary people in creating historical change. For example, in her workshop paper, “Rumors and the Religious Imagination in the Early Restoration,” Adrian Chastain Weimer examines how a wide variety of Puritans—including militia captains, farmers, and goodwives—made political decisions, and she concludes that they were influenced by their “religious imagination,” particularly their belief in prodigies. Rather than focusing on printed tracts and pamphlets produced by elites, Weimer ana- lyzes how personal letters, ballads, and conversations with travelers shaped the Puritans’ understanding of political events in England. By focusing on cultural media that have often been overlooked, Weimer reveals that Puritan men and women from all social ranks—not only gentlemen—had access to news from England and used rumors to justify resistance to the king.22 Similarly, historians have looked beyond Thomas Jefferson and James Madison to argue that ordinary farmers and goodwives also fought for toleration and religious freedom. Rather than being imposed on Americans by the Founders, church disestablishment, with all of its interpretive complex- ities, was chosen by religious dissenters who believed that the government should not have the power to coerce belief.23 To recover the lives of the ordinary people who made history, social and cultural historians have used new kinds of sources, consulting not only texts but also architecture, portraiture, communion silver, busts, and clothing.24 Even though most early Americans did not keep personal

20 Geertz, “Thick Description,” 5; David D. Hall, Worlds of Wonder, Days of Judgment: Popular Religious Belief in Early New England (New York, 1989), 213 (“mental world”). See also Erik R. Seeman, Pious Persuasions: Laity and Clergy in Eighteenth-Century New England (Baltimore, 1999). 21 Jenny Shaw, Everyday Life in the Early English Caribbean: Irish, Africans, and the Construction of Difference (Athens, Ga., 2013), 101–28. 22 Adrian Chastain Weimer, “Rumors and the Religious Imagination in the Early Restoration,” paper presented at the 2016 WMQ-EMSI workshop. 23 Andrew R. Murphy, Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Reli- gious Dissent in Early Modern England and America (University Park, Pa., 2001); Chris Beneke, Beyond Toleration: The Religious Origins of American Pluralism (New York, 2006); Paul Rasor and Richard E. Bond, eds., From Jamestown to Jefferson: The Evolution of Reli- gious Freedom in Virginia (Charlottesville, Va., 2011). 24 Gretchen Townsend Buggeln, Temples of Grace: The Material Transformation of Connecticut’s Churches, 1790–1840 (Hanover, N.H., 2003); Louis P. Nelson, The Beauty of Holiness: Anglicanism and Architecture in Colonial South Carolina (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2008); David S. Shields, ed., Material Culture in Anglo-America: Regional Identity and

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12 william and mary quarterly records such as diaries or letters, they still left behind material traces of their lives. In his paper for the workshop, “‘Conversation with the Departed’: Talking Gravestones and the Materiality of Speaking with the Dead in New England,” Erik R. Seeman uses gravestones as well as published sermons and devotional books to explore how early Americans made sense of death. Gravestones were common objects in early New England that were deeply meaningful. Based on his examination of the epitaphs and carvings on 810 gravestones erected on Cape Cod from 1700 to 1849, Seeman reveals that ordinary people were the drivers of a profound theological transformation that took place in the mid-eighteenth century. Whereas ministers tended to portray heaven as a place where the resurrected would bask in the beatific vision of God, the laity increasingly imagined heaven as a place of reunion with loved ones. Theology, Seeman shows, must be understood as the product of a conversation between the clergy and the laity.25 Seeman’s questions about individual religious experience might have struck previous generations of historians as too private and personal—perhaps even antiquarian. But just as historians have questioned older models of how change takes place, they have also argued over what questions are most important to ask. It is no longer clear what history should be “about.” In contrast to Robert Baird, Daniel Dorchester, and Ahlstrom, who believed that their central task was to explain how the dominant Protestant tradition had shaped public life in the United States, American religious historians now debate whether there is a center to the field. Though most still organize their books around major political events such as the American Revolution and the Civil War, they tend to approach the question of the relationship between religion and the nation-state as only one among many, and historians writing about America’s national identity are outnumbered by those interested in personal religious experience, gender, and race.26 Neither Baird nor Ahlstrom asked questions about individual religious experience, but ever since feminists declared in the 1970s that “the personal is political,” historians have argued that personal life does not stand apart from larger economic, religious, political, and social structures. Topics that were once seen as belonging to the domain of private life—such as sexuality, the personal meaning of conversion, and family—are now invested with

Urbanity in the Tidewater, Lowcountry, and Caribbean (Columbia, S.C., 2009); Christo- pher M. B. Allison, “Holy Man, Holy Head: John Wesley’s Busts in the Atlantic World,” Common-place 15, no. 3 (Spring 2015), http://www.common-place-archives.org/vol-15 /no-03/lessons/#.WbwMRciGM2w. 25 Erik R. Seeman, “‘Conversation with the Departed’: Talking Gravestones and the Materiality of Speaking with the Dead in New England,” paper presented at the 2016 WMQ-EMSI workshop. 26 On this theme, see Stephen J. Stein, “American Religious History—Decentered with Many Centers,” Church History 71, no. 2 (June 2002): 374–79.

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contested words 13 public and political significance.27 One of the most innovative questions— and one that remains contested—involves gender, an analytic category that did not emerge until the 1970s and 1980s, when women’s historians such as Joan W. Scott argued that the binaries of masculinity and feminin- ity should be understood as “a primary way of signifying relationships of power.”28 Highlighting the close connection between gender norms and religious texts, early American historians have argued that Judaism and Christianity were deeply implicated in upholding men’s religious, political, and economic dominance over women. Elizabeth Reis and Sarah Rivett, for instance, have shown that Puritan assumptions about the normative character of masculinity influenced everything from the Salem witchcraft trials to individual experiences of conversion. Thus Reis explains that Puritans believed that women’s weak “feminine souls” made them easy targets for Satan, and Rivett argues that even though women made up the majority of church members, the archetypal convert was still a man. Men’s accounts of their conversion, with their “self-discovering ‘I,’” were elevated as “the ideal testimonial witness of grace.”29 Adding to this portrait of Puritan masculinity, R. Todd Romero argues that Puritans saw manliness and aggression as central to their Christian identity. During King Philip’s War, they equated being a Christian with being a soldier for God.30 These studies have been illuminating, but, as Janet Moore Lindman argues in her workshop paper, “Religious Gendering in Early Transatlantic Protestantism,” the study of gender has not yet been fully integrated into studies of early American religion. Lindman focuses on five sectarian groups—Quakers, Moravians, Methodists, Baptists, and Shakers—that reconstituted concepts of gender to distinguish themselves from mainstream Protestants. Gender worked on several different levels at once, constituting men’s and women’s religious identities, shaping institutional structures, and influencing images of God, Jesus, and the church. Gender, Lindman argues, was central to “the perpetuation of early modern Protestantism”—a reality that most historians have failed to acknowledge.31 Though some of the

27 Tracy Fessenden, Nicholas F. Radel, and Magdalena J. Zaborowska, eds., The Puritan Origins of American Sex: Religion, Sexuality, and National Identity in American Literature (New York, 2001); Richard Godbeer, Sexual Revolution in Early America (Balti- more, 2002). 28 Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” American Historical Review 91, no. 5 (December 1986): 1053–75 (quotation, 1067). 29 Elizabeth Reis, Damned Women: Sinners and Witches in Puritan New England (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997), 94 (“feminine souls”); Sarah Rivett, The Science of the Soul in Colo- nial New England (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2011), 74 (“self-discovering”). 30 R. Todd Romero, Making War and Minting Christians: Masculinity, Religion, and Colonialism in Early New England (Amherst, Mass., 2011). 31 Janet Moore Lindman, “Religious Gendering in Early Transatlantic Protestant- ism,” paper presented at the 2016 WMQ-EMSI workshop, 2 (quotation).

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14 william and mary quarterly workshop participants questioned whether this argument still needs to be made, it bears repeating. Even when writing about topics in which gender seems to be a crucial category, some historians have chosen to ignore it. For example, Benjamin C. Ray’s recent book about witchcraft devotes only a few pages to an analysis of gender, although 80 percent of those accused of witchcraft were women. Even more problematic, some historians treat gender and women as synonymous, as if only women are gendered.32 Of the eight participants in the workshop, Lindman alone wrote about masculinity and considered gender as an analytic category. If previous generations of historians would be surprised by the new questions about gender, a word that once referred primarily to grammar, they would be even more surprised by the intense interest in race—a topic they rarely considered in depth. Building on the pathbreaking work of Francis Jennings, Winthrop D. Jordan, Donald G. Mathews, and Albert J. Raboteau, today’s historians ask how early American Christians influenced the construction of racial categories.33 On the one hand, Travis Glasson argues that even though eighteenth-century Christians defended slavery in order to protect planters’ economic interests, missionaries never renounced their belief in “the essential unity of humankind.”34 Richard W. Cogley makes a similar point about the missionary John Eliot, who insisted that Indians could be true Christians.35 On the other hand, several historians have recently countered that Christianity was central to the creation of slavery, violence against Native Americans, and the construction of whiteness. Focusing on three colonies in the Puritan Atlantic—Bermuda, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts Bay—Heather Miyano Kopelson argues that Christians excluded Native Americans from their understanding of the “body of Christ.”36 Similarly, Rebecca Anne Goetz argues that white Anglicans in seventeenth-century Virginia discarded centuries of Christian thought to defend “hereditary heathenism”: “the notion that Indians and

32 For Benjamin C. Ray’s discussion of why accused witches were women, see Ray, Satan and Salem: The Witch-Hunt Crisis of 1692 (Charlottesville, Va., 2015), 198–201. On the pattern of treating women and gender as synonymous, see Janet Moore Lindman, review of Baptists in America: A History, by Thomas S. Kidd and Barry Hankins, Journal of American History 103, no. 1 (June 2016): 166–67. 33 Winthrop D. Jordan, White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1968); Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1975); Donald G. Mathews, Religion in the Old South (Chicago, 1977); Albert J. Raboteau, Slave Religion: The “Invisi- ble Institution” in the Antebellum South (New York, 1978). 34 Travis Glasson, Mastering Christianity: Missionary Anglicanism and Slavery in the Atlantic World (New York, 2012), 240. 35 Richard W. Cogley, John Eliot’s Mission to the Indians before King Philip’s War (Cambridge, Mass., 1999). 36 Heather Miyano Kopelson, Faithful Bodies: Performing Religion and Race in the Puritan Atlantic (New York, 2014), 2.

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Africans could never become Christian.” As Goetz explains, this belief faded in the eighteenth century under pressure from white missionaries and black converts (which may explain her differences with Glasson’s interpretation), but she argues that it undergirded the power of white planters into the future. Christianity, she asserts, “created race.”37 Influenced by this scholarship, Katharine Gerbner’s workshop paper, “Christian Slavery: Protestant Missions and Slave Conversion in the Atlantic World, 1660–1760,” asks difficult questions about the role of Protestants in creating a theology of Christian slavery—a harmful, dehu- manizing theology that posited two Christianities, one for white masters and another for enslaved Africans. As she argues, Moravian missionaries on Saint Thomas articulated a distinct, racialized understanding of Christianity that separated conversion from both literacy and freedom. “As missionaries and their supporters sought to appease the fears of white planters,” Gerbner writes, “they turned increasingly to the language of race to demonstrate the stability of slavery and its compatibility with conversion.” Eighteenth-century Protestants were responsible for creating a proslav- ery theology that identified race, not religion, as the “defining feature of mastery.”38 As illustrated by Gerbner’s work, modern-day historians have chosen to ask questions that Baird, Dorchester, and even Ahlstrom treated as inconse- quential or, at best, secondary. If it is true that history is a dialogue between the present and the past, then what we seem most driven to understand today is no longer the religious identity of the nation but rather the meaning of individual religious experience, the religious basis for norms of sexuality and gender, and especially the long heritage of American racism.

As historians have dismantled older assumptions about what questions count as significant, they have also challenged the consensus about whose stories are the most important to tell. Of all the transformations in the writing of history since the 1960s, perhaps the greatest is the conviction that ordinary people—even those without political or economic power—should be treated as important historical actors. Like Katharine Gerbner, who has scoured missionary records to recover the voices of the enslaved living on Saint Thomas, historians no longer assume that their main characters should be the most powerful or well known. And as historians rethink trickle-down models of social change, they have also moved beyond an exclusive focus on white Protestant leaders. Nathan Cole, an

37 Rebecca Anne Goetz, The Baptism of Early Virginia: How Christianity Created Race (Baltimore, 2012), 3. 38 Katharine Gerbner, “Christian Slavery: Protestant Missions and Slave Conversion in the Atlantic World, 1660–1760,” paper presented at the 2016 WMQ-EMSI workshop, 24 (quotations).

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16 william and mary quarterly Anglo-American farmer who was inspired by the Great Awakening; Rebecca Protten, an enslaved woman who served as a missionary in the Atlantic world; Joseph Woolley, a Delaware who became a Christian missionary— these are only a few of the characters whose lives now seem valuable to study.39 In contrast to Sydney E. Ahlstrom, who wanted to write about slave Christianity but lacked the sources, historians have now recovered the stories of many enslaved Christians, including Phillis Wheatley, Jupiter Hammon, and Lemuel Haynes—three of the first African Americans to become published authors. Rejecting an older emphasis on the sacrifices of white missionaries, historians have emphasized that black evangelists were especially crucial to the growth of Christianity in the slave quarters. Based on extraordinary archival research, Edward E. Andrews has discovered that at least 275 black and Native American Christians served as indigenous missionaries. Though influenced by white Protestants, slaves practiced a distinctive form of Christianity that reflected their experiences of dislocation and suffering.40 In addition to exploring the religious experiences of slaves, historians have also tried to recover the stories of Native Americans. Influenced by Native American activism and the American Indian Movement, historians such as Francis Jennings and James Axtell published books during the 1970s and 1980s challenging older portraits of pious missionaries converting the “heathens.” Rather than celebrating John Eliot as the “Apostle to the Indians,” Axtell describes Christian missionaries as “black-robed invaders” who “declared open war on the heart of the Indians’ cultural identity.”41

39 Michael J. Crawford, “The Spiritual Travels of Nathan Cole,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 33, no. 1 (January 1976): 89–126; Jon F. Sensbach, Rebecca’s Revival: Creating Black Christianity in the Atlantic World (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); Edward E. Andrews, Native Apostles: Black and Indian Missionaries in the British Atlantic World (Cambridge, Mass., 2013), 151–52. 40 On early African American published authors, see Joanna Brooks and John Saillant, eds., “Face Zion Forward”: First Writers of the Black Atlantic, 1785–1798 (Boston, 2002); Saillant, Black Puritan, Black Republican: The Life and Thought of Lemuel Haynes, 1753–1833 (New York, 2003); Vincent Carretta, Phillis Wheatley: Biography of a Genius in Bondage (Athens, Ga., 2011); Cedrick May, ed., The Collected Works of Jupiter Hammon: Poems and Essays (Knoxville, Tenn., 2017). For a list of Native American missionaries, see Andrews, Native Apostles, 231. On slave religion, see Jon F. Sensbach, A Separate Canaan: The Making of an Afro-Moravian World in North Carolina, 1763–1840 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998); Shaw, Everyday Life in the Early English Caribbean, 101–28; John W. Catron, Embracing Protestantism: Black Identities in the Atlantic World (Gainesville, Fla., 2016). 41 Baird, Religion in America, 294 (“Apostle”); James Axtell, The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America (Oxford, 1981), 265 (“black-robed”); Jennings, Invasion of America; Axtell, Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colo- nial North America (New York, 1992). For Native American writings, see Joanna Brooks, ed., The Collected Writings of Samson Occom, Mohegan: Leadership and Literature in Eighteenth-Century Native America (Oxford, 2006); Kristina Bross and Hilary E. Wyss,

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Recasting the “discovery” of America as an “invasion,” historians have tried to imagine how Native Americans responded to Christianity, a religion that seemed peculiar and even frightening to them. In her workshop paper, “Black-Robed Demonology,” Mairi Cowan argues that both the Jesuits and the Huron in early Canada imagined the other as virtually—and perhaps literally—demonic. At the same time that Jean de Brébeuf, the founder of the Huron missions in New France, claimed that the Huron were in contact with the devil, the Huron themselves feared that the Black Robes, with their strange rituals and objects, were responsible for the epidemics that ravaged their communities. Unlike Axtell and Jennings, Cowan approaches both the Huron and the Jesuits in a spirit of critical empathy, examining their encounter from multiple points of view. Nevertheless, she shows that the Jesuits’ desire for spiritual conquest was devastating for the Huron.42 Because of their interest in demonstrating that slaves and Native Americans were not powerless to shape history, scholars have been particularly invested in tracing episodes of religious resistance. In response to the argument that African religious systems were destroyed by the Middle Passage, for example, historians have argued that African religious practices—including conjure and Muslim prayer—continued to survive in America. When an excavation in New York City uncovered a slave coffin from the colonial era with a heart-shaped pattern on the lid, many scholars were quick to assert that it was a sankofa, a West African symbol—a conclusion that has since been debated. The symbol’s meaning remains unclear, but historians have been drawn to it because it seems to offer evidence of the preservation of African traditions. Other historians have pointed out that since many of the enslaved had already been exposed to Christian missionaries in Africa, especially in the Kingdom of Kongo, their decision to convert may have been an affirmation of their African roots. Similarly, many historians have insisted that Indians did not capitulate to colonial oppression by converting to Christianity. Writing about the revivals of the Great Awakening, for example, Linford D. Fisher has hesitated to use the word conversion at all, preferring the term affiliation. He has argued that Native Americans’ decisions to join churches may have been a political strategy to ensure their survival.43 eds., Early Native Literacies in New England: A Documentary and Critical Anthology (Amherst, Mass., 2008). 42 Mairi Cowan, “Black-Robed Demonology,” paper presented at the 2016 WMQ-EMSI workshop. 43 On conjure, see Yvonne P. Chireau, Black Magic: Religion and the African Amer- ican Conjuring Tradition (Berkeley, Calif., 2003). On Muslim slaves, see Michael A. Gomez, Black Crescent: The Experience and Legacy of African Muslims in the Americas (New York, 2005), 143–84; Kambiz GhaneaBassiri, A History of Islam in America: From the New World to the New World Order (New York, 2010), 59–94. On the debate over survivals, see Sylvia R. Frey and Betty Wood, Come Shouting to Zion: African American

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18 william and mary quarterly The desire to affirm the agency of Native Americans and Africans is admirable, as is the aspiration to recover the survival of indigenous religions. Historians have left little doubt that marginalized peoples were crucial historical actors. But by defining agency only as opposition or resistance—and not as the ability to influence events—historians have placed themselves in the odd position of implicitly denigrating the same people whom they want to dignify.44 As Rachel Wheeler discusses in her workshop paper, “Joshua’s Story: A Mohican-Moravian Man, Daniel Boone, and the Story of American Religion,” historians have sometimes tried to demonstrate Indian agency by suggesting that Indian conversions were not “real.” In her words, “in the older triumphalist narrative, Indians couldn’t be ‘true’ Christians because of their very nature; in the revisionist narrative, they could not be true Christians because that would make them colluders in their own oppression.” Though it seems likely that converts in early America, regardless of race, joined religious communities for many different reasons, historians rarely speculate about the sincerity of white converts—only black and Indian ones. In “Joshua’s Story” Wheeler argues that Joshua, a Mohican born in 1742, understood his religion as additive: he identified himself as both a Mohican and a Christian. Influenced by Catherine L. Albanese’s work on the “combinative” nature of religion, Wheeler urges historians to recognize that for all early Americans, regardless of race, conversion represented a mixing of the old and the new.45

Protestantism in the American South and British Caribbean to 1830 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), 9–28; Jon Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Cam- bridge, Mass., 1990), 129–63. On the meaning of the symbol on the slave coffin, see Erik R. Seeman, “Reassessing the ‘Sankofa Symbol’ in New York’s African Burial Ground,” WMQ 67, no. 1 (January 2010): 101–22. On Christian missionaries in Africa, see Cecile Fromont, The Art of Conversion: Christian Visual Culture in the Kingdom of Kongo (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2014); Catron, Embracing Protestantism, 46. On Indian attitudes toward Chris- tianity, see Linford D. Fisher, The Indian Great Awakening: Religion and the Shaping of Native Cultures in Early America (New York, 2012). See also Joel W. Martin, Sacred Revolt: The Muskogees’ Struggle for a New World (Boston, 1991). 44 On the limitations of equating agency with liberation and resistance, see Saba Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival,” Cultural Anthropology 16, no. 2 (May 2001): 202–36; Catherine A. Brekus, “Mormon Women and the Problem of Historical Agency,” Journal of Mormon History 37, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 59–87. 45 Rachel Wheeler, “Joshua’s Story: A Mohican-Moravian Man, Daniel Boone, and the Story of American Religion,” paper presented at the 2016 WMQ-EMSI workshop, 6 (“older triumphalist narrative”). On the “combinative” quality of religion, see Catherine L. Albanese, A Republic of Mind and Spirit: A Cultural History of American Metaphysical Religion (New Haven, Conn., 2007), 97. On historians’ treatment of Native American conversions, see also David J. Silverman, Faith and Boundaries: Colonists, Christianity, and Community among the Wampanoag Indians of Martha’s Vineyard, 1600–1871 (New York, 2005), 10.

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Like Wheeler, Tracy Neal Leavelle offers a helpful model for dealing with the complexity of Native American conversions to Christianity. Rather than assuming that conversion represented religious weakness or capitula- tion, he points out that when French Jesuits tried to explain Christian concepts to the Illinois Indians, their attempts at translation inevitably created a distinctively Indian form of Christianity. Jesuits translated the word “God,” for example, as the “great spirit.” Like Lamin Sanneh, a scholar of African and global missions, Leavelle argues that Christianity is always inculturated: it is impossible to translate scripture without incorporating the deep cultural assumptions that are embedded in language. Rather than being one-sided, conversion is always a “cross-cultural practice.”46 If the new attention to the agency of Native Americans and Africans marks a welcome departure from older models of top-down history, a troubling feature of the older scholarship still remains: a tendency to focus on men. Though a few Indian and black women have been the subject of books, sources are difficult to find, and the scholarship on them is still relatively slim.47 More work has focused on white women and religion, but not as much as one might expect. Inspired by the feminist movement, many women’s historians in the 1970s and 1980s began to recover the stories of women’s lives. According to a quantitative study by Sharon Block and David Newman, however, articles on women’s history began to level off after the mid-1990s, and from 1985 to 2005 only 6 percent of articles focused on either women or gender. Though there has been no quantitative analysis of the articles published since 2005, Terri L. Snyder—who convened the 2011 William and Mary Quarterly–Early Modern Studies Institute workshop, “Women in Early America”—argues that “an explicit focus on women as subjects has waned in early American history over the last decade or so.”48

46 Tracy Neal Leavelle, The Catholic Calumet: Colonial Conversions in French and Indian North America (Philadelphia, 2012), 108 (“God”), 1–18 (“cross-cultural,” 1); Lamin Sanneh, Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Culture (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1989). See also Richard W. Pointer, Encounters of the Spirit: Native Americans and Euro- pean Colonial Religion (Bloomington, Ind., 2007); Joel W. Martin and Mark A. Nicholas, eds., Native Americans, Christianity, and the Reshaping of the American Religious Landscape (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2010). 47 On Native American women, see Rachel Wheeler, “Women and Christian Prac- tice in a Mahican Village,” Religion and American Culture 13, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 27–67; Kristina Bross, Dry Bones and Indian Sermons: Praying Indians in Colonial America (Ithaca, N.Y., 2004), 36, 110; Allan Greer, Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits (Oxford, 2005); Catharine Brown, Cherokee Sister: The Collected Writings of Catha- rine Brown, 1818–1823, ed. Theresa Strouth Gaul (Lincoln, Neb., 2014); Lisa J. M. Poirier, Religion, Gender, and Kinship in Colonial New France (Syracuse, N.Y., 2016). On enslaved women, see Sensbach, Rebecca’s Revival. 48 Terri L. Snyder, “Refiguring Women in Early America History,”WMQ 69, no. 3 (July 2012): 421–50 (quotation, 421); Sharon Block and David Newman, “What, Where, When, and Sometimes Why: Data Mining Two Decades of Women’s History Abstracts,” Journal of Women’s History 23, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 81–109, esp. 83–85. See also Catherine

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20 william and mary quarterly Thus, despite the perception that women’s history has become a major subfield of the historical profession, most historians continue to focus on men as the most important historical actors. Although Block and Newman did not analyze how many women’s history articles focused particularly on early American women and religion, their statistics suggest that the number is small. Only 3.4 percent of all women’s history articles, no matter the place or period, focused on religion.49 Despite the paucity of scholarship on women and early American religion, historians have revealed women’s crucial role in sustaining their religious communities. Influenced by the pathbreaking contributions of scholars such as Nancy F. Cott and Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, historians have argued that there would have been no churches without women’s religious labors.50 Women not only made up the majority of church members but also passed on their faith to their children, and Protestant women often served as prayer leaders, evangelists, and (in Quaker communities) ministers. Like earlier historians, modern scholars have continued to be fascinated by Anne Hutchinson, the “American Jesabel” who challenged the authority of her ministers, but they have also identified other remarkable female religious leaders such as Elizabeth Ashbridge, Sarah Osborn, and Jemima Wilkinson.51 Though most scholarship has focused on Protestant women, especially white Puritans, historians have also recovered the stories of Jewish and Catholic women, including Rebecca Gratz, who founded several char- itable organizations in early nineteenth-century Philadelphia, and Elizabeth Bayley Seton, the first native-born American woman to be canonized.52

A. Brekus, “Introduction: Searching for Women in Narratives of American Religious History,” in The Religious History of American Women: Reimagining the Past, ed. Brekus (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2007), 1–50. 49 Block and Newman, Journal of Women’s History 23: 97. 50 Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: “Woman’s Sphere” in New England, 1780–1835 (New Haven, Conn., 1977); Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, Good Wives: Image and Reality in the Lives of Women in Northern New England, 1650–1750 (New York, 1982); Susan Juster, Disorderly Women: Sexual Politics and Evangelicalism in Revolutionary New England (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994); Marilyn J. Westerkamp, Women and Religion in Early America, 1600–1850: The Puritan and Evangelical Traditions (London, 1999); Lisa Vollen- dorf and Daniella J. Kostroun, eds., Women, Religion, and the Atlantic World (1600–1800) (Toronto, 2009). 51 David D. Hall, ed., The Antinomian Controversy, 1636–1638: A Documentary History, 2d ed. (Durham, N.C., 1990), 310 (“Jesabel”); Cristine M. Levenduski, Peculiar Power: A Quaker Woman Preacher in Eighteenth-Century America (Washington, D.C., 1996); Susan Juster, Doomsayers: Anglo-American Prophecy in the Age of Revolution (Phila- delphia, 2003); Timothy D. Hall, Anne Hutchinson: Puritan Prophet (Upper Saddle River, N.J., 2010); Catherine A. Brekus, Sarah Osborn’s World: The Rise of Evangelical Christian- ity in Early America (New Haven, Conn., 2013); Elizabeth Bouldin, Women Prophets and Radical Protestantism in the British Atlantic World, 1640–1730 (New York, 2015); Paul B. Moyer, The Public Universal Friend: Jemima Wilkinson and Religious Enthusiasm in Revo- lutionary America (Ithaca, N.Y., 2015). 52 Dianne Ashton, Rebecca Gratz: Women and Judaism in Antebellum America (Detroit, Mich., 1997); Regina Bechtle and Judith Metz, eds., Elizabeth Bayley Seton: Col-

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Of course, not all scholars of early American religion have embraced the new understanding of history that was created by social and cultural historians in the 1970s and 1980s. “Great man” history continues to thrive, especially in studies of the religion of the Founding Fathers, and some historians still imagine change as flowing from elites to ordinary people. Too often, scholars focus on male leaders such as Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield without asking about the religious women who empowered them by flocking to their meetings. But even if older assumptions still cast a shadow over the field, it is clear that historians of early American religion have challenged understandings of who makes history, how historical change takes place, and what questions are important to ask.

If religious historians have dismantled many assumptions about the category of history, they have been equally intent on broadening definitions of America. Since Sydney E. Ahlstrom published his Religious History of the American People in 1972, the study of “early America” has not only moved beyond New England but also widened to include the Atlantic world. New England, however, has not completely lost its appeal. Though Perry Miller’s influence on the study of early American religion has waned since his death, his legacy still endures: many historians have viewed the Puritans as central to the creation of America’s distinctive religious and political culture. Michael P. Winship and David D. Hall, for example, claim that the roots of the nation’s republican form of government lie in Puritan New England, and Abram C. Van Engen argues that Puritans, contrary to their dour reputation, fostered an ethic of sympathy that culminated in the sentimental tradition. Likewise, David F. Holland traces the origins of American arguments over the biblical canon to early New England, where believers debated the possibility of ongoing revelation. For his part, Mark Valeri argues that by the eighteenth century the Puritans had sacralized the market, laying the foundation for the fusion of capitalism and Protestantism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.53 Although all of these historians lected Writings, 4 vols. (Hyde Park, N.Y., 2000–2006). On Catholic women, see Emily Clark, Masterless Mistresses: The New Orleans Ursulines and the Development of a New World Society, 1727–1834 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2007); Carol Mattingly, Secret Habits: Cath- olic Literacy Education for Women in the Early Nineteenth Century (Carbondale, Ill., 2016). On Jewish women, see Holly Snyder, “Queens of the Household: The Jewish Women of British America, 1700–1800,” in Women and American Judaism: Historical Perspectives, ed. Pamela S. Nadell and Jonathan D. Sarna (Hanover, N.H., 2001), 15–45; Hasia R. Diner and Beryl Lieff Benderly, Her Works Praise Her: A History of Jewish Women in America from Colonial Times to the Present (New York, 2002). 53 On the Puritans, see James F. Cooper Jr., Tenacious of Their Liberties: The Congre- gationalists in Colonial Massachusetts (New York, 1999); Louise A. Breen, Transgressing the Bounds: Subversive Enterprises among the Puritan Elite in Massachusetts, 1630–1692 (New York, 2001); Fessenden, Radel, and Zaborowska, Puritan Origins of American Sex; Carla Gardina Pestana, The English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 1640–1661 (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); Joseph A. Conforti, Saints and Strangers: New England in British North

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22 william and mary quarterly are careful not to conflate New England with America, their research suggests that previous generations of historians were fixated on New England for a good reason. Even though the Puritans were not modern, many of their ideas influenced the rise of the modern world. Since the 1970s, however, growing numbers of historians have made the same claim about both the Middle Colonies and the South: these regions, too, influenced the future shape of American religion. Unlike Robert Baird and Daniel Dorchester, who saw Protestant diversity as a problem to be overcome, modern-day historians tend to see the religious and linguistic diversity of the Middle Colonies as foreshadowing a more pluralistic America.54 Three of the four mainland British colonies that extended religious liberty to all Protestants on the eve of the American Revolution— Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania—were located in the Middle Colonies (the fourth colony was Rhode Island), and Pennsylvania allowed Catholics and Jews to worship freely as well. Earlier generations of historians tended to depict early American Quakers as a bit odd, even “fanatical,” but historians today often celebrate their tolerance, pacifism, opposition to slavery, and support of women ministers.55 Historians of early American religion tend to be uncomfortable about identifying a center to the field, preferring to speak about many centers. But if the number of books and articles is any indication, an important center— if not the overall center—is now the South. Turning the judgments of Baird and Dorchester upside down, historians have argued that the South was not alien or “Norman” but quintessentially American: its hierarchy, patriarchy, and defense of slavery laid an enduring foundation for American religion. Thus, scholars have examined the clash between Anglicans and evangelicals in the South, asking how the South (as Christine Leigh Heyrman puts

America (Baltimore, 2006); Mark Valeri, Heavenly Merchandize: How Religion Shaped Commerce in Puritan America (Princeton, N.J., 2010); David D. Hall, A Reforming Peo- ple: Puritanism and the Transformation of Public Life in New England (New York, 2011); David F. Holland, Sacred Borders: Continuing Revelation and Canonical Restraint in Early America (New York, 2011); Rivett, Science of the Soul; Francis J. Bremer, First Founders: American Puritans and Puritanism in an Atlantic World (Durham, N.H., 2012); Michael P. Winship, Godly Republicanism: Puritans, Pilgrims, and a City on a Hill (Cambridge, Mass., 2012); Abram C. Van Engen, Sympathetic Puritans: Calvinist Fellow Feeling in Early New England (Oxford, 2015). 54 See, for an example, Evan Haefeli, New Netherland and the Dutch Origins of American Religious Liberty (Philadelphia, 2012). 55 Baird, Religion in America, 93 (quotation). On Quakers, see Phyllis Mack, Vision- ary Women: Ecstatic Prophecy in Seventeenth-Century England (Berkeley, Calif., 1992); Levenduski, Peculiar Power; Rebecca Larson, Daughters of Light: Quaker Women Preach- ing and Prophesying in the Colonies and Abroad, 1700–1775 (New York, 1999); Murphy, Conscience and Community, 165–208; Jane E. Calvert, Quaker Constitutionalism and the Political Thought of John Dickinson (New York, 2009).

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contested words 23 it) became the “buckle” of the Bible Belt.56 According to Heyrman, early evangelicals owed their popularity not to their countercultural positions but to their eventual willingness to accommodate southern culture, including slavery. Evaluating southern evangelicals more positively than did Baird, historians have also pointed out that Baptists and Presbyterians were crucial to the new nation’s defense of religious liberty.57 If the religion of the early South pointed toward a future of both racial violence and religious freedom, it also anticipated the international flavor of religion in the later United States. Although historians have tended to equate southern religion with evangelicalism, the South was home to a wide variety of peoples—including the Creek, Choctaw, Kongolese, Angolans, Spanish, German, British, and French—who practiced many different faiths. From the sixteenth until the end of the eighteenth century, in the words of Jon Sensbach, “the South contained more forms of spiritual expression and saw more cataclysmic changes in religious practice than perhaps any other region at any point in American history.”58 Sensbach’s portrait of a cosmopolitan South points to the importance of the “transatlantic turn,” a development that has transformed the very definition of America. Even though earlier generations of historians were sensitive to the connections between England and the North American mainland, particularly because of the legacy of the Protestant Reformation, they wrote relatively little about the other British, Spanish, and French colonies in the hemisphere. Since the late 1980s, however, religious historians have asked how people in the Atlantic world exchanged religious ideas and practices. For example, the Great Awakening, which was once treated as a series of

56 Christine Leigh Heyrman, Southern Cross: The Beginnings of the Bible Belt (New York, 1997), 3 (“buckle”). On southern Anglicanism, see John K. Nelson, A Blessed Com- pany: Parishes, Parsons, and Parishioners in Anglican Virginia, 1690–1776 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001); Nelson, Beauty of Holiness; Lauren F. Winner, A Cheerful and Comfortable Faith: Anglican Religious Practice in the Elite Households of Eighteenth-Century Virginia (New Haven, Conn., 2010); Glasson, Mastering Christianity. On Christianity and race, see Paul Harvey, Christianity and Race in the American South: A History (Chicago, 2016). 57 On evangelicalism in the South, see Mathews, Religion in the Old South; Isaac, Transformation of Virginia; Cynthia Lynn Lyerly, Methodism and the Southern Mind, 1770–1810 (New York, 1998); Erskine Clarke, Dwelling Place: A Plantation Epic (New Haven, Conn., 2005); Jewel L. Spangler, Virginians Reborn: Anglican Monopoly, Evan- gelical Dissent, and the Rise of the Baptists in the Late Eighteenth Century (Charlottesville, Va., 2008); Thomas J. Little, The Origins of Southern Evangelicalism: Religious Revivalism in the South Carolina Lowcountry, 1670–1760 (Columbia, S.C., 2013). On religious liberty, see James B. Bell, A War of Religion: Dissenters, Anglicans, and the American Revolution (New York, 2008); John A. Ragosta, Wellspring of Liberty: How Virginia’s Religious Dis- senters Helped Win the American Revolution and Secured Religious Liberty (New York, 2010). 58 Jon Sensbach, “Early Southern Religions in a Global Age,” in The American South and the Atlantic World, ed. Brian Ward, Martyn Bone, and William A. Link (Gainesville, Fla., 2013), 45–60 (quotation, 50).

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24 william and mary quarterly local revivals in New England and the South, is now portrayed as transatlantic in scope, involving not only the British colonies but also England; Scotland; Wales; Salzburg, Austria; Africa; and Germany. Since every revival had a local dimension, the new scholarship does not necessarily invalidate the old: it remains true, for example, that revivals were often triggered by local events, such as an epidemic of diphtheria in many New England towns in 1735–36.59 But a transatlantic approach has made it possible to see that evangelicalism was an international movement that was facilitated and shaped by new communication networks stretching across the ocean. The first historians of the Atlantic world were particularly interested in trade, and, building on their work, Owen Stanwood has helped to clar- ify the deep connections among religion, politics, and economics.60 In his paper for the workshop, “Dreams of Silk and Wine: Religion, Agriculture, and the Huguenot Migration to Colonial America,” Stanwood reminds us that the Protestants who settled in colonial America hoped not only to worship freely but also to make their fortunes. Fleeing persecution in France, Huguenot refugees arrived in Virginia and early Carolina with dreams of creating a new Eden—a paradise where they would practice their faith while cultivating silk and wine. If not for the support of imperial powers who were more interested in profit than religious freedom, Huguenots would never have been granted title to lands in America.61 Stanwood’s work reflects the growing interest in broadening the category of early America to include non-Anglophone European peoples. Unlike Ahlstrom, who discussed New France only in the “European Prologue” to his book, recent historians have emphasized that French Catholics and British Protestants struggled for religious control of North

59 On the Atlantic world, see Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, eds., Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500–1800 (Princeton, N.J., 1987); John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1680 (Cambridge, 1992); Bernard Bailyn, “The Idea of Atlantic History,” Itinerario 20, no. 1 (March 1996): 19–44; Philip D. Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1998); David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800 (New York, 2002). On the transatlantic character of evangelicalism, see Harry S. Stout, The Divine Dramatist: George Whitefield and the Rise of Modern Evangel- icalism (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1991); W. R. Ward, The Protestant Evangelical Awakening (New York, 1992); D. Bruce Hindmarsh, The Evangelical Conversion Narrative: Spiritual Autobiography in Early Modern England (New York, 2005); Ward, Early Evangelicalism: A Global Intellectual History, 1670–1789 (Cambridge, 2006). On the diphtheria epidemic, see Michael N. Shute, “A Little Great Awakening: An Episode in the American Enlight- enment,” Journal of the History of Ideas 37, no. 4 (October–December 1976): 589–602. On the Great Awakening in America, see Thomas S. Kidd, The Great Awakening: The Roots of Evangelical Christianity in Colonial America (New Haven, Conn., 2007). 60 Owen Stanwood, The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious Revolution (Philadelphia, 2011). 61 Owen Stanwood, “Dreams of Silk and Wine: Religion, Agriculture, and the Huguenot Migration to Colonial America,” paper presented at the 2016 WMQ-EMSI workshop.

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America for more than a century. Besides recounting the stories of Puritan captives taken to French Canada—most famously, Eunice Williams and Esther Wheelwright—scholars have also explored the attempts of French missionaries, including Catholic sisters in Louisiana, to convert other Europeans, Indians, and slaves.62 Historians have likewise turned their attention to New Spain, especially to Spanish missions among Native Americans. Convinced that God sided with the Catholic Church in the wars of the Reformation, Spaniards imagined America as the site of a rising Catholic power. According to J. H. Elliott, many Franciscans shared the Puritans’ belief that America was destined to be a sacred space, “the theater in which the great drama of salvation was played out.”63 Linking religion and empire, missionaries throughout the Americas argued that if salvation necessitated violence, then this too was part of God’s providential plan.64 As historians have explored the relationship between European empires and their American colonies, they have increasingly recognized that “American” religion was forged out of transatlantic encounters. American Protestant understandings of race, for example, were shaped by missionaries’ experiences in the Caribbean as well as in the plantation South.65 Similarly, black Christianity was a diasporic tradition that grew as slave ships traveled throughout the British Empire. In 1800, John W. Catron argues, “the epi- center of early Afro-Protestantism in the Americas” was not in Virginia or South Carolina but in Antigua, where there were almost fifteen thousand Afro-Caribbean Methodists and Moravians.66 As Noel Leo Erskine argues, “African American religion was born in Caribbean slavery.”67 Yet because of the linguistic and conceptual challenges of placing early American religion in a multilingual, transatlantic framework, the majority

62 Ahlstrom, Religious History, 15 (quotation); John Demos, The Unredeemed Cap- tive: A Family Story from Early America (New York, 1994); Clark, Masterless Mistresses; Leavelle, Catholic Calumet; Stephanie Kirk and Sarah Rivett, eds., Religious Transfor- mations in the Early Modern Americas (Philadelphia, 2014); Ann M. Little, The Many Captivities of Esther Wheelwright (New Haven, Conn., 2016); Poirier, Religion, Gender, and Kinship. 63 J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492– 1830 (New Haven, Conn., 2006), 185 (quotation). See also Nicholas Griffiths and Fer- nando Cervantes, eds., Spiritual Encounters: Interactions between Christianity and Native Religions in Colonial America (Lincoln, Neb., 1999). 64 On this theme, see Linda Gregerson and Susan Juster, eds., Empires of God: Reli- gious Encounters in the Early Modern Atlantic (Philadelphia, 2011). 65 Sensbach, Rebecca’s Revival; Michele Gillespie and Robert Beachy, eds., Pious Pur- suits: German Moravians in the Atlantic World (New York, 2007); Jonathan Strom, Pietism and Community in Europe and North America: 1650–1850 (Boston, 2010); Aaron Spencer Fogleman, Two Troubled Souls: An Eighteenth-Century Couple’s Spiritual Journey in the Atlantic World (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2013); James Van Horn Melton, Religion, Community, and Slavery on the Colonial Southern Frontier (New York, 2015). 66 Catron, Embracing Protestantism, 51. 67 Noel Leo Erskine, Plantation Church: How African American Religion Was Born in Caribbean Slavery (New York, 2014).

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26 william and mary quarterly of scholars interested in religion in the Atlantic world have chosen to focus on British colonies. Elliott’s Empires of the Atlantic World contains several fascinating chapters on religion, including one that compares French, British, and Spanish understandings of America as a sacred space, but no one has yet produced a one-volume religious history of America that resembles the geographic scope of Alan Taylor’s American Colonies.68 Even though historians have wanted to integrate New France and New Spain into the religious history of America, they have not always been certain how to do so. The problem has been especially acute for those writing survey texts. After beginning their narratives by acknowledging the presence of New France, New Spain, and British colonies such as the Bahamas or Antigua, historians quickly pivot to the colonies that became the United States. For example, John Corrigan’s 2016 Religion in the United States, the eighth edition of a book that has been used for decades in college classrooms, begins with Native American creation stories and French and Spanish missions, but in the second chapter Corrigan turns to the history of religion in the thirteen mainland British colonies.69 As revealed by Corrigan’s book, the difficulty of conceptualizing the term America involves chronology as well as geography. When does the history of America begin? Should historians write about the Native inhabitants who lived in the Americas for thousands of years before Europeans discovered their existence: for example, the Cahokia who built earthen mounds in what we now call Illinois? Or do these stories belong to the domains of archaeology and anthropology? Corrigan chooses to begin his narrative with the voyages of Christopher Columbus, a chronology that implicitly dates the beginning of “America” to the fifteenth century.70 As a synthesis, Corrigan’s book can be read as an index to the divided state of our thinking about “America” as a category of analysis. On the one hand, many religious historians want to challenge assumptions about American exceptionalism, and they have been particularly interested in recovering the stories of non-Anglophone believers and in tracing imperial contests over religious power in the New World. Their portraits of America tend to emphasize its close connections to the Atlantic. On the other hand, historians remain interested in the role of religion in the creation of American nationalism, and they have particularly highlighted the

68 Alan Taylor, American Colonies (New York, 2001). See also T. H. Breen and Tim- othy Hall, Colonial America in an Atlantic World: From Colonies to Revolution, 2d ed. (Boston, 2017). 69 John Corrigan and Winthrop S. Hudson, Religion in America: An Historical Account of the Development of American Religious Life, 8th ed. (New York, 2016). Hudson published the first edition ofReligion in America in 1965, and he died in 2001. Corrigan has continued to update the book with new editions, making significant changes to the original text. 70 Ibid.

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contested words 27 small number of colonies that sent representatives to the Constitutional Convention.71 In the future, religious historians will have to think more deeply about how these various approaches intersect. What is “American” about American religion? Do we define America as a geographic location, as a cultural formation, or as a set of political principles? And how did the “entangled worlds” of the Atlantic shape the future of American religion? 72

Regardless of their approach to America, virtually all religious historians have tried to move beyond older definitions of early American religion as white Protestantism, some more successfully than others. Today the most common description of early America’s religious identity is that it was diverse and contested, a “spiritual hothouse,” to borrow Jon Butler’s image, where many different religious groups flourished.73 A new, more pluralistic understanding of religion emerged during the 1960s and 1970s in tandem with the creation of freestanding departments of religious studies. Before the 1960s, most scholars writing about early American religion were either members of history or English departments or faculty at theological seminaries, divinity schools, or departments of theology. While some scholars identified themselves as agnostic or atheist, others saw their mission as explicitly religious. Many leading historians of American Christianity, in fact, defined themselves as church historians. In 1955 L. J. Trinterud, a scholar of colonial Presbyterianism, explained that the “task of the American church historian” was to demonstrate that the history of Christianity was “somehow the redeeming work of God through Christ.”74 The 1960s, however, triggered an earthquake in the academic study of religion. In 1963 the Supreme Court ruled in Abington v. Schemp that public schools could teach about religion as part of a liberal education, and in 1965 the Hart-Cellar Act opened the United States to growing numbers of Buddhist, Muslim, and Hindu immigrants. In response to the nation’s growing religious pluralism, many colleges and universities created religious studies departments, and “church history” was gradually replaced by

71 For studies of early American religion and nationalism, see Mark A. Noll, Amer- ica’s God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (New York, 2002); Andrew R. Murphy, Prodigal Nation: Moral Decline and Divine Punishment from New England to 9/11 (New York, 2009). 72 Eliga H. Gould, “Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery,” American Historical Review 112, no. 3 (June 2007): 764–86. 73 Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith, 225–56 (quotation, 225). 74 L. J. Trinterud, “The Task of the American Church Historian,” Church History 25, no. 1 (March 1956): 3–15 (“somehow,” 14). For a longer discussion of this theme, see Catherine A. Brekus and W. Clark Gilpin, eds., American Christianities: A History of Dominance and Diversity (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2011), 1–24.

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28 william and mary quarterly a comparative and theoretical approach to the study of religion. The new discipline of religious studies was built on the premise that religion should be studied as a product of human cultures, not as revelation or dogma. Of course, as Jonathan Z. Smith has commented, no one practices “religion,” only a particular kind of religion, but the word religion proved attractive precisely because of its neutral, abstract quality.75 Influenced by scholars of religious studies who criticized implicit definitions of religion as Protestantism writ large, historians have highlighted the multiplicity of religions in the early Americas, including Judaism, Catholicism, Islam, and indigenous Native American and African religions. Focusing on the Caribbean, for example, Kenneth M. Bilby and Jerome S. Handler have examined the variety of enslaved people’s beliefs and practices that came to be known as obeah, a popular form of religion that, they argue, has been unfairly associated with attempts to cause harm rather than to seek protection and to control spiritual forces. Other historians have emphasized that Afro-Caribbean religions were characterized by a mixture of obeah, Santería, Christianity, Candomblé, Orisha, and vodou.76 Since many historians begin their narratives of American religion with European conquest, they have tended to view Native American religions through the lens of either resistance or conversion to Christianity, but some have still drawn attention to the complex religious cultures that existed among groups such as the Cahokia, Haudenosaunee, Wampanoag, Wendat, and Muskogee.77 Unlike previous generations of historians, who tended to treat different religions as discrete and strictly bounded, recent scholars have emphasized themes of crossing and hybridity. Like Thomas A. Tweed, who describes religions as “organic-cultural flows,” historians have emphasized that religions

75 Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago, 1982), 103. 76 On Judaism, see Jonathan D. Sarna, American Judaism: A History (New Haven, Conn., 2004); William Pencak, Jews and Gentiles in Early America, 1654–1800 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2005). On colonial interest in Islam, see Thomas S. Kidd, American Chris- tians and Islam: Evangelical Culture and Muslims from the Colonial Period to the Age of Terrorism (Princeton, N.J., 2009), 1–36; Denise A. Spellberg, Thomas Jefferson’s Qur’an: Islam and the Founders (New York, 2013). On obeah, see Kenneth M. Bilby and Jerome S. Handler, “Obeah: Healing and Protection in West Indian Slave Life,” Journal of Caribbean History 38, no. 2 (2004): 153–83; Diana Paton, The Cultural Politics of Obeah: Religion, Colonialism and Modernity in the Caribbean World (Cambridge, 2015). On Caribbean religions, see Patrick Bellegarde-Smith and Claudine Michel, eds., Haitian Vodou: Spirit, Myth, and Reality (Bloomington, Ind., 2006); Nathaniel Samuel Murrell, Afro-Caribbean Religions: An Introduction to Their Historical, Cultural, and Sacred Tradi- tions (Philadelphia, 2010); Margarite Fernández Olmos and LizabethParavisini-Gebert, Creole Religions of the Caribbean: An Introduction from Vodou and Santería to Obeah and Espiritismo, 2d ed. (New York, 2011). 77 Martin, Sacred Revolt; Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peo- ples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992); Silverman, Faith and Boundaries; Timothy R. Pauketat, Cahokia: Ancient America’s Great City on the Mississippi (New York, 2009).

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contested words 29 were never static but always in the process of being transformed by their interactions with one another: Puritans, for example, were fascinated by Jews, and many Native Americans debated over how to respond to Christian missionaries.78 Challenging the notion of a singular “black church” in America, historians have emphasized that not all blacks were Protestant, and black religions included Islam, Catholicism, and African traditions. Historians have also recognized the “crossings” between institutional religion and folk religions, religious skepticism, and esoteric traditions such as alchemy and vitalism.79 Even Protestants are no longer depicted as a monolith. Unlike Robert Baird and Daniel Dorchester, who were alarmed by Protestant diversity, or Sydney E. Ahlstrom, who imagined a “Puritan spirit” making order out of chaos, more recent historians have suggested that early America was a contentious, combative place where Protestants argued about everything from the scriptural justifications for infant baptism to whether women should be allowed to preach. As Quakers, Congregationalists, Baptists, Anglicans, and Presbyterians fought over whose understanding of Protestantism was correct, they traded insults that sometimes erupted into episodes of religious violence. Puritanism, once described as singular, is now portrayed as intel- lectually diverse, and, to highlight its fluidity, many historians no longer capitalize the word.80

78 Thomas A. Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), 54 (quotation); Ronald Niezen, Spirit Wars: Native North American Reli- gions in the Age of Nation Building (Berkeley, Calif., 2000); Colin G. Calloway, One Vast Winter Count: The Native American West before Lewis and Clark (Lincoln, Neb., 2003); Michael Hoberman, New Israel/New England: Jews and Puritans in Early America (Amherst, Mass., 2011). 79 On black Catholics, see Cyprian Davis, The History of Black Catholics in the United States (New York, 1990); M. Shawn Copeland, LaReine-Marie Mosely, and Albert J. Raboteau, eds., Uncommon Faithfulness: The Black Catholic Experience (Maryknoll, N.Y., 2009). On black Muslims, see Sylviane A. Diouf, Servants of Allah: African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas (New York, 1998); Gomez, Black Crescent. On crossings, see Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling. On skepticism, see Christopher Grasso, “Skepticism and American Faith: Infidels, Converts, and Religious Doubt in the Early Nineteenth Cen- tury,” Journal of the Early Republic 22, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 465–508; Amanda Porterfield, Conceived in Doubt: Religion and Politics in the New American Nation (Chicago, 2012); Matthew Stewart, Nature’s God: The Heretical Origins of the American Republic (New York, 2014). On alchemy, see Walter W. Woodward, Prospero’s America: John Winthrop, Jr., Alchemy, and the Creation of New England Culture, 1606–1676 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2010). On vitalism, see Kirsten Fischer, “Vitalism in America: Elihu Palmer’s Radical Religion in the Early Republic,” WMQ 73, no. 3 (July 2016): 501–30. 80 Ahlstrom, Religious History, 124 (quotation). On infant baptism, see Thomas S. Kidd and Barry Hankins, Baptists in America: A History (New York, 2015), 1–18. On female preaching, see Catherine A. Brekus, Strangers and Pilgrims: Female Preaching in America, 1740–1845 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), 23–67. On violence, see Jeffrey Williams, Religion and Violence in Early American Methodism: Taking the Kingdom by Force (Bloom- ington, Ind., 2010); Chris Beneke and Christopher S. Grenda, eds., The First Prejudice: Religious Tolerance and Intolerance in Early America (Philadelphia, 2011); Susan Juster,

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30 william and mary quarterly Yet despite these attempts to create a more capacious category of religion, historians have not completely escaped the shadow of the past. In her paper for the workshop, Rachel Wheeler suggests that scholars continue to privilege white, evangelical Christianity as the most authentic and authori- tative form of religion at the same time as they criticize Christians for their treatment of Native Americans. As Winnifred Fallers Sullivan explains in The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, “true” religion is often understood in implicitly Protestant terms as “private, voluntary, individual, textual, and believed,” a definition that marginalizes religions (including Judaism, Catholicism, and Islam) that are perceived as “public, coercive, communal, oral, and enacted.”81 Influenced by the pervasive Protestant culture of the United States, many historians approach religion as if it should be primarily about faith or belief, an assumption that marginalizes religions that are oriented toward practice. To be a Jew, for example, meant observing the Sabbath and keeping kashrut, and to be a Pueblo meant making communal offerings to the Corn Mother.82 The scholarship on Catholicism is a useful index to what has changed— and what has not—in the way early American religion has been defined. In many ways, no religious group has been reimagined more completely than have Catholics, who used to be treated as “un-American” because of their allegiance to Rome. After the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 and the Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965, which changed the Catholic Church’s teachings on religious freedom, a growing number of historians argued that early American Catholics had always supported the American experiment in political and religious liberty. Not only had they resented their persecution in Maryland, where Protestants gained political control, but they had created a distinctively “democratic” church because of the shortage of priests and the power of lay trustees.83 During the 1990s and 2000s, historians of Catholicism published fascinating books about transatlantic missions,

Sacred Violence in Early America (Philadelphia, 2016). On the diversity of Puritanism, see Janice Knight, Orthodoxies in Massachusetts: Rereading American Puritanism (Cambridge, Mass., 1994); Randall J. Pederson, Unity in Diversity: English Puritans and the Puritan Reformation, 1603–1689 (Leiden, 2014), 286. 81 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton, N.J., 2005), 8 (quotations); Wheeler, “Joshua’s Story.” On implicitly Protestant definitions of religion, see also Tracy Fessenden, Culture and Redemption: Religion, the Secular, and American Literature (Princeton, N.J., 2007). 82 Ramón A. Gutierrez, When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846 (Stanford, Calif., 1991); Sarna, American Judaism. 83 Jay P. Dolan, The American Catholic Experience: A History from Colonial Times to the Present (Garden City, N.Y., 1985), 101–24 (“democratic,” 114); Patrick W. Carey, People, Priests, and Prelates: Ecclesiastical Democracy and the Tensions of Trusteeism (Notre Dame, Ind., 1987); John D. Krugler, English and Catholic: The Lords Baltimore in the Sev- enteenth Century (Baltimore, 2004).

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contested words 31 spirituality, women’s religious leadership, and the Catholic Church’s ambition to evangelize the entire continent.84 But because of lingering assumptions about the tensions between Catholicism and republicanism, many historians still seem to feel compelled to show that early American Catholics were indeed “American.” In Papist Patriots, for example, Maura Jane Farrelly argues that even though Maryland Catholics faced religious discrimination, they were passionate supporters of the American Revolution.85 Similarly, Robert Emmett Curran has traced the struggle of Maryland’s Catholics to overcome their reputation as “Papist devils.”86 Recovering the history of the prominent Carroll family, Ronald Hoffman reveals their deep commitment to challenging British imperial rule.87 Though it is important for historians to recover the long history of anti-Catholicism in America, it is surprising that so much of the scholarship on Catholics still revolves around questions about their attitude toward republicanism. British Protestants were equally ambivalent about republican forms of government in the seventeenth century, and yet, with the exception of Mark A. Noll, relatively few historians have treated this ambivalence as a problem that needs to be explained.88 When historians write about religious suspicions of democracy, they usually focus on Catholics, not Protestants. Another sign of the field’s persistent Protestant bias is that, with the exception of those who focus on anti-Catholicism or competition for Native American converts, most historians treat Protestants and Catholics separately instead of examining their many shared ideas and practices. Few have compared Catholic and Protestant spirituality in early America or examined the ways that Catholic and Protestant beliefs and practices may

84 Joseph P. Chinnici and Angelyn Dries, eds., Prayer and Practice in the American Catholic Community (Maryknoll, N.Y., 2000); Megan Armstrong, “Transatlantic Cathol- icism: Rethinking the Nature of the Catholic Tradition in the Early Modern Period,” History Compass 5, no. 6 (November 2007): 1942–66; Margaret M. McGuinness, Called to Serve: A History of Nuns in America (New York, 2013); Kevin Starr, Continental Ambi- tions: Roman Catholics in North America, vol. 1, The Colonial Experience (San Francisco, 2016). 85 Maura Jane Farrelly, Papist Patriots: The Making of an American Catholic Identity (New York, 2012). 86 Robert Emmett Curran, Papist Devils: Catholics in British America, 1574–1783 (Washington, D.C., 2014). See also Antoinette Sutto, Loyal Protestants and Dangerous Papists: Maryland and the Politics of Religion in the English Atlantic, 1630–1690 (Char- lottesville, Va., 2015). 87 Ronald Hoffman, in collaboration with Sally D. Mason, Princes of Ireland, Plant- ers of Maryland: A Carroll Saga, 1500–1782 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000). 88 Noll, America’s God, 53–72. See also the work of Peter M. Doll and Maya Jasa- noff, who have noted Anglicans’ resistance to the American Revolution. Doll, Revolution, Religion, and National Identity: Imperial Anglicanism in British North America, 1745–1795 (Madison, N.J., 2000); Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York, 2011).

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32 william and mary quarterly have converged. A notable exception is Laura M. Chmielewski’s The Spice of Popery, which traces the interactions between Protestants and Catholics in Maine. Although Protestants and Catholics did not learn to tolerate one another, they became “more pragmatic—and less rigidly defensive of the righteousness of their own religious views—when faced with the basic humanity of rival Christians.”89 Chmielewski’s work is a reminder that even though Protestants claimed the title of “Christian” for themselves, they were deeply influenced by their shared history with Catholics.90 Given the political influence of Protestants in British North America, there are good reasons to place them at the center of early American religious history. Yet with the notable exceptions of Jon Butler, Carla Gardina Pestana, and Amanda Porterfield, few historians have acknowledged the strength of Protestant power. Impressed by the diversity of Protestants in early America, some seem to assume that they were too fractured to have united in pursuit of a common goal. Yet despite their competition for converts, Protestants had much in common, and their arguments revolved around the same core beliefs and texts. The empire that they built was always contentious, but it was indeed an empire. Protestants not only dom- inated colonial governments but also influenced everything from attitudes toward the body to the rise of capitalism.91 In order to gain a greater understanding of how Protestants and other religious groups shaped everyday life, historians have consulted scholarship in religious studies, but the two fields remain distinct, and each could learn something from the other. While religious scholars could be more attentive to historical particularity and change over time, historians could be more critical in their approach to the category of religion. In her workshop paper, Wheeler points out that many historians have a tendency to reify religion, reducing it to a single thing instead of recognizing its hybrid quality. Since there is no single “religion,” scholars must be careful not to make universal

89 Laura M. Chmielewski, The Spice of Popery: Converging Christianities on an Early American Frontier (Notre Dame, Ind., 2012), 19. 90 On the plurality of Christianity in early America, see Brekus and Gilpin, Ameri- can Christianities; Kirk and Rivett, Religious Transformations. 91 On Protestant power, see Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith; Carla Gardina Pestana, Protestant Empire: Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic World (Philadelphia, 2009), esp. 265; Porterfield,Conceived in Doubt. On capitalism, see Christine Leigh Heyrman, Commerce and Culture: The Maritime Communities of Colonial Massachu- setts, 1690–1750 (New York, 1984); Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815–1846 (New York, 1991); Stephen Innes, Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of Puritan New England (New York, 1995); Mark A. Peterson, The Price of Redemption: The Spiritual Economy of Puritan New England (Stanford, Calif., 1997); Katherine Carte Engel, Religion and Profit: Moravians in Early America (Philadelphia, 2009). On the body, see Janet Moore Lindman, Bodies of Belief: Baptist Community in Early America (Philadelphia, 2008); Martha L. Finch, Dissenting Bodies: Corporealities in Early New England (New York, 2010).

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contested words 33 statements about its essence. Unlike Rebecca Anne Goetz, who argues that Christianity “created race,” Katharine Gerbner notes in her workshop paper that Christianity not only created race but also dismantled it. As many scholars of religious studies have pointed out, it is misleading to debate whether religion should be understood as either liberatory or oppressive, as if ordinary people experienced their religious beliefs and practices in such a dichotomous way.92 Nevertheless, influenced by public debates over popular religious movements, especially the rise of the Christian Right, historians have felt compelled to make assertions about the essential character of religion. One of the most vibrant questions in early American religious history, for example, is whether the revivals of the Second Great Awakening should be understood either as populist, egalitarian, and antiauthoritarian or as a reassertion of patriarchal control—a question that assumes that the nineteenth-century evangelical movement was a monolith lacking internal tensions and contradictions.93 One sign of the lack of conversation between scholars of religion and historians is the dearth of scholarship about the category of religion in early America. What did colonial peoples mean when they talked about “religion”? Historians who write about Native Americans and African Americans, who did not have a single word for religion, tend to be explicit about their definition, but others seem to take the termreligion for granted, as if its meaning is obvious. But as Mark Valeri explains in his paper for the workshop, “Anglo-American Protestants and Comparative Religions in the Eighteenth Century,” writers such as Jean Frédéric Bernard and Bernard Picart crafted a new definition of religion that highlighted free choice, rationality, and moral sentiments. During the seventeenth century, most Protestants assumed that religion and the state should be connected, but in the eighteenth century, they began to create a new model of religion as separate from the state. Despite their belief that the health of the British Empire depended on Protestant virtues—including patriotism, honesty, benevo- lence, and thrift—Anglo-American Protestants set themselves apart from Catholics by insisting that religion was voluntary. In the future, they hoped that religion would serve the state not by providing a national creed but by inculcating “the patriotic and commercial virtues of tolerance, reasonable- ness, and politeness.” According to Valeri, this understanding of religion legitimated not only the Whig government in England but also “Britain’s

92 R. Marie Griffith, “American Religious History and Women’s History: Old Divides and Recent Developments,” Reviews in American History 25, no. 2 (June 1997): 220–26, esp. 224; Goetz, Baptism of Early Virginia; Gerbner, “Christian Slavery”; Wheeler, “Joshua’s Story.” 93 On the multiple meanings of revivalism, see Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratiza- tion of American Christianity (New Haven, Conn., 1989); Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith; Heyrman, Southern Cross; Brekus, Strangers and Pilgrims; Porterfield, Conceived in Doubt.

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34 william and mary quarterly political and commercial empire—an order resting not on received religious tradition but on a decided separation between revealed religion and public, civil discourse.”94 Valeri’s work, like Wheeler’s, undoubtedly will interest scholars of both early American history and religious studies, but such interchanges tend to be rare. Other historians who have bridged this divide include Sally M. Promey, whose work on Puritanism broadens the definition of religion beyond the intellectual to include the sensory and material, and David D. Hall, whose work on “lived religion” urges historians to approach religion as embodied rather than as a set of intellectual propositions. Though religion is official, institutional, and clerical, it is also popular and lay.95 Most historians of early American religion affirm that they want to take religion seriously—a refrain that was repeated many times by the workshop participants. But it is not entirely clear what taking religion seriously means on a practical level. Even when historians try to avoid reducing religion to a screen for political or economic interests, they tend to approach it from a functionalist rather than a substantive perspective—they are more interested in what religion does than what it is—and at times they have had difficulty treating religion as if it were real to the people practicing it. This was not a problem for Baird and Dorchester, who believed that they were serving God by writing about Christianity, and there are still many scholars who see their work as an act of religious service. Yet whatever their personal feelings about religion, scholars today have been influenced by the rise of religious studies as an academic discipline, and they do not want to sound like apologists. The result is that even though historians have recaptured the diversity of early American religion, they often avoid writing about the questions that early Americans thought were the most important, including the identity of God.96 Historians also tend to be more critical of religion, especially Christianity, than previous generations of scholars. Unlike Ahlstrom, who

94 Mark Valeri, “Anglo-American Protestants and Comparative Religions in the Eighteenth Century,” paper presented at the 2016 WMQ-EMSI workshop, 34 (quotations). 95 David D. Hall, ed., Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice (Prince- ton, N.J., 1997); Leigh Eric Schmidt, Holy Fairs: Scottish Communions and American Revivals in the Early Modern Period (Princeton, N.J., 1989); Laurie F. Maffly-Kipp, Leigh E. Schmidt, and Mark Valeri, eds., Practicing Protestants: Histories of Christian Life in America, 1630–1965 (Baltimore, 2006); Sally M. Promey, Sensational Religion: Sensory Cul- tures in Material Practice (New Haven, Conn., 2014). 96 On the reluctance of historians to treat religion as real in the eyes of practitioners, see Amy Hollywood, Acute Melancholia and Other Essays: Mysticism, History, and the Study of Religion (New York, 2016), 1–64; Robert A. Orsi, History and Presence (Cam- bridge, Mass., 2016). On the history of religious ideas, see Noll, America’s God; E. Brooks Holifield, Theology in America: Christian Thought from the Age of the Puritans to the Civil War (New Haven, Conn., 2003); Holland, Sacred Borders; Mark A. Noll, In the Begin- ning Was the Word: The Bible in American Public Life, 1492–1783 (New York, 2016).

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contested words 35 argued that Protestantism was the glue that held the nation together, recent historians have been more interested in showing how religion fostered racism, imperialism, and violence. These are crucial topics to write about, but it is important not to forget that many early Americans also understood religion to be a source of meaning and hope.

In his book Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans, R. Laurence Moore argues that the historiography of American religion before the 1980s was a historiography of desire: historians insisted that a Protestant consensus had once existed because of their deep desire for it.97 Historians not only longed for Protestant power but, in many ways, enacted this power themselves. By describing Catholics, Jews, African Americans, and Native Americans as “unevangelical” or “divergent,” these historians made it clear that white Protestant men had been the makers of American religious history. They claimed the power to define which parts of American religious history were worthy of study and which were not.98 We too have created a historiography of desire, and we too hope to influence how people understand both the past and the present. By emphasizing the importance of non-Protestant religions and a wide range of historical actors—including women, Native Americans, and enslaved Africans—we have replaced the old portrait of white Protestant consensus with narratives of dissent and pluralism. In contrast to earlier generations of scholars, who understood history as the actions and ideas of great male leaders, America as the original thirteen colonies, and “true” religion as Protestantism, historians have been slowly constructing a countercanon that defines history as the record of everyday life as well as civic culture, America as a porous place that absorbed religious ideas and practices from the wider Atlantic world, and religion as any set of beliefs or practices that help people to make meaning and to orient themselves in time and space. In my estimation, this portrait of early American religion offers a more truthful representation of the diversity of religion in the past, especially because historians have been devoted to recovering the stories of those who were once marginalized. And yet when I read the work of scholars such as Baird, I cannot help wondering about the way that future generations of historians will assess our scholarship. We have created a more pluralistic history, but in our desire to highlight the agency of ordinary people and the diversity of American religion, we may have failed to acknowledge the power of white Protestant leaders, for both good and ill, to shape American culture in their own image.

97 R. Laurence Moore, Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans (New York, 1986), 3. 98 Baird, Religion in America, 288 (“unevangelical”); Dorchester, Christianity in the United States, 492 (“divergent”).

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36 william and mary quarterly If our historical vantage point makes it possible to see things that previous generations of historians overlooked, it is important to acknowledge that Baird and his intellectual descendants also had insights into the past. Though they would not have used this language, they recognized the urgent reality of power: the power of whites over blacks and Indians, the power of men over women, the power of Protestants over those who practiced other religions, and the power of rising nation-states. As we continue to build a countercanon around new understandings of America, religion, and history, we should remind our readers that from the first narratives of American religion until the present day, these three words have involved power, and they have never ceased to be contested.

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IROQUOIS GREAT LAW OF PEACE AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: HOW THE FOUNDING FATHERS IGNORED THE CLAN MOTHERS Renee Jacobs* Introduction The Iroquois Confederacy gave rise to the first federal con stitution on the American continent. That constitution, the Great Law of Peace (the Great Law), provided for federalism, sepa ration of powers, equitable distribution of wealth, accountability of elected officials, freedom of assembly, speech, and religion, and a system of natural rights that influenced thinkers like Benjamin Franklin, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Frederick En gels. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Great Law was its recognition of the status and suffrage accorded women by the Iroquois Confederacy. Approximately one-fourth of the Great Law,s clauses recognize the power and influence of women in the Iroquois culture. 1 While Franklin and the Founding Fathers borrowed liberally and literally from the Great Law in theorizing about and framing the American model, no reference to universal suffrage or the rights of women appeared in the United States Constitution as originally written. It was not until the passage of the nineteenth amendment in 1920 that the United States Constitution recog nized women as sentient citizens with an ability to exercise the vote. United States courts, taking their cue from the Constitu tion, had regarded women as merely the property of their hus bands, fathers, and brothers. 2

© 1991 Renee E. Jacobs. • Associate, Ater Wynne Hewitt Dodson & Skerritt, Portland, Oregon. J.D., 1990, Northwestern School of Law at Lewis & Clark; B.A., 1983, Pennsylvania State University. First place award, 1989-90American Indian Law Review Writing Competition. Third place award, 1990-91 Petra Shattuck Memorial Writing Competition sponsored by the Indian Law Resource Center. 1. A. PARKER,THE CONSTITUTIONOF THEF1vE NATIONSOR THE IROQUOISBOOK OFTHE GREAT LAW (1916), reprinted in NEWYORK STATE MUSEUM, SIXTY-NINTH REPORT OF THENEW YORKSTATE MUSEUM BUUETIN. There are six versions of The Great Law of Peace and the Founding of the Confederacy. See G. SCHAAF,THE GREATLAW OF PEACEAND THE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (spec. ed. 1987). For purposes of this paper, Parker's translation will be used. 2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIX; see infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text. 497 Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 199 498 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 The influence the Great Law had on the United States Con stitution has only recently been acknowledged. In October 1988, the United States Congress passed concurrent resolutions ac knowledging the contribution of the Iroquois Confederacy and the Great Law to the development of the confederation of the original thirteen colonies and the United States Constitution. 3 Previously, the connection had at best been ignored; at worst, it had been distorted and suppressed. 4 Admitting that native cultures had participatory democracies that influenced the Founding Fathers is anathema to the supposedly unbroken line of-political and intellectual influence generated by Anglo-Euro pean men. Therefore, it was not in the best interests of male American historians and politicians to admit the influence of an egafitarian, communal system where women controlled the ec onomics, property, government, and structure of the society. 5 This note will examine the matriarchal aspects of the Iroquois Confederacy that fostered equal rights (if not legal superiority) for women as well as ideas of natural law that profoundly influenced Enlightenment thinkers and the Founding Fathers. Colonial America and the sentiments of the Founding Fathers at the time of the Constitutional Convention serve to shed light on the prevailing social and political attitudes towards women. Finally, the contrasting positions of power for women in the Iroquois system as opposed to the scorn, subjection, and sub jugation of women at the hands of the American legal system will be examined. Women and Societal Structure of the Iroquois The Founding of the Iroquois Confederacy The Seneca, Onondaga, Oneida, Mohawk, and Cayuga tribes forged the League of the Hodenosaunee, or Iroquois, in the area that is now New York State, somewhere between A.D. 1000 and 1450. The Five Nations (later Six Nations when the Tuscarora joined in about 1722) are still governed by The Great Binding Law of Peace, or the Gayaneshagowa. Seth Newhouse, a Mohawk, transcribed the Great Law, which had been passed down orally from generation to generation, into English in about 1880.6

3. S. Con. Res. 76, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. Con. Res. 331, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). 4. See, e.g., G. SCHAAF,supra note 1. Schaaf has also posited that the colonists borrowed the symbology of the eagle and bundle of arrows from the Iroquois. 5. Id. 6. B. JOHANSEN,FORGOTIEN FOUNDERS: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE IROQUOIS, AND THE RATIONALE FORTHE AMERICANREVOLUTION (1982).23 Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 200 No. 2] NOTES 499

Legend has it that Dekanawida, a messenger from the Creator, went among the Five Nations to bring an end to the continual warfare that had plagued the tribes. Dekanawida was conceived by a virgin who had been told by a messenger in a dream that she was to have a son who would become a great man and raise the Great Tree of Peace. Fearing catastrophe, the virgin's mother urged the woman to kill the child. The mother twice tried to drown the child, only to have it reappear the same evening. According to legend, the third time the grandmother herself took the child and drowned him, but in the morning the child nestled as before on its mother's own bosom. So the grand mother said to her daughter, "Mother, now nurse your child for he may become an important man. He cannot be drowned and you have borne him without having marriage with any man. Now I have never heard of such an occurrence nor has the world known of it before." 7 Men of the Five Tribes, skeptical that the peace-seeking De kanawida was a messenger of the Creator, asked for proof. Dekanawida responded that the Creator had endowed him with the choice of his own death. He agreed to climb to the top of a tree on the edge of a waterfall chasm and let the men chop the tree down, with all in agreement that he would most certainly drown. Many people witnessed Dekanawida's plunge and were convinced of his death. The next morning, the warriors saw strange smoke arising from the smoke hole of an empty cabin. Upon approaching, they found Dekanawida alive and cooking his morning meal. The people were convinced that Dekanawida had indeed been sent to establish the Great Peace. 8 The legends of the founding of the Iroquois Confederacy parallel the Virgin Birth and Resurrection legends of the origins of Christianity, the religion that most directly molded the hier archy of colonial society. However, the evolution of women in the two societies is radically dissimilar. Societal and Governmental Structure of the Iroquois Confederacy The societal structure of the Iroquois revolves around a system of clans, or gens, that are composed of the progeny of a woman

7. A. PARKER,supra note 1, at 14. 8. Id. at 16. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 201 500 AMERICAN IND/AN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 and her female descendants. Historically, the clans occupied a longhouse which was perhaps twenty to thirty feet wide and long enough to accommodate a grouping of people related to the matron of the household. Upon marriage, a young woman brought her husband into her mother's home; he was obliged to tum over either all or part of his hunt to his mother-in-law. 9 The clans, with names like Great Bear, Turtle, Hawk, and Deer Pigeon, overlapped the different tribes in the league. Marriage within clans was prohibited, ostensibly to prevent factions within the League.10 Clan Mothers are the most respected members and hold the highest positions of authority, leading the matrilineal clan. They are chosen by other adult women in the clan. 11 The Clan Mothers select the Sachems, or Chiefs, to serve on the Council of Clans. While the Clan Mothers have the constitutional authority to depose Sachems, or literally, to "dehorn the Sachems," no constitutional provision exists for the removal of a Clan Mother .12 Upon the death or removal Qf a Sachem, a new one is chosen by a Clan Mother who walks around the Council House acting as if she were making a spontaneous choice from the spectators, although actually her decision was made some time before . . . . When the Clan Mother presents the man of her choice she does so through a chief who speaks for her; she does not speak to the people herself. 13 Thi~ Clan Mother is then responsible for distributing the dead Sachem's property.14 Vvomen not qualified to be Clan Mothers might be delegated as matrons or Faithkeepers. Matrons are responsible for raising children and are likely to be chosen as ceremonial leaders in the Longhouse. 15Faithkeepers, the majority of which are women, ess1!ntiallyrun the Longhouse religious ceremonies. 16

9. L. CARR,THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PosmoN OF WOMEN AMONG THJl HURON• IROQUOIS TRIBES, REPORT OF THE PEABODY MUSEUM OF AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY 215 (1884). 10. B. JOHANSEN, supra note 6, at 28-29. 11. C. Richards, The Role of Iroquois Women: A Study of the Onondaga Reser vaticm 85 (1957) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University). For an excellent description of modern-day Iroquois women, see id. at 86. 12. Id. at 82, 161. 13. Id. at 83. 14. Id. at 161. IS. Id. at 158. 16. Id. at 161. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 202 No. 2] NOTES 501

The governmental structure of the Confederacy is marked by a system of delegated authority that flows upward through the system to the League Council of Clans, rather than downward, and evinces shared liberty and responsibility for all members. As Lewis Henry Morgan, the father of American anthropology, observed in his 1851 study of the Iroquois, "With the departure of the individual, every vesdge of Indian sovereignty vanishes." 17 Fifty Sachems make up the League Council of Clans; each tribe casts a unit vote in the Council through its Sachem. The Mohawks and Senecas were designated the Elder Brothers; the Cayugas, Oneidas and Tuscaroras the Younger Brothers. The Onondagas became the Firekeepers of the Confederacy, com pleting the tripartite government with separation of powers and checks and balances. 18 Cadwallader Colden, who published the first English-language account of the political system of the Iroquois in 1727, wrote: Each of these Nations is an absolute Republick by itself, and every Castle in each Nation makes an in dependent Republick, and is govern' d in all pub lick Affairs by its own Sachems or old Men. The Authority of these Rulers is gain'd by, and consists wholly in the Opinion the rest of the Nation have of their Wisdom and Integrity. They never execute their Re solutions by Force upon any of their People. Honor and Esteem are their principal Rewards; as Shame, and being despised, their Punishments . . . . Their great Men, both Sachems and Captains, are generally poorer than the common People; for they affect to give away and distribute all the Presents of Plunder they get in their Treaties or in War, so as to leaving nothing to themselves. There is not a Man in the Ministry of the Five Nations, who has gained his Office, otherwise than by Merit; there is not the least Salary, or any Sort of Profit, annexed to any Office, to tempt the Covetous or Sordid. 19 The Council bestows great rights, privileges and duties upon the Iroquois through enduring constitutional mechanisms such as equal representation of the tribes, a rule of unanimity in legis-

17. l L. MORGAN, LEAGUE OF THE HODENOSAUNEE OR IROQUOIS 55 (1901). 18. See G. SCHAAF, supra note l. 19. l C. COLDEN, HISTORY OF THE FIVE INDIAN NATIONS xvi (1904 ed.). Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 203 502 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 lative discussions, male and female leadership, and political accountability .20 The Social and Political Status of Women in the Confederacy The powerful status of women pervaded Iroquois society. Ac,::ording to the Great Law, Clan Mothers selected and con firmed the Iroquois Sachems and war chiefs. Clan Mothers held the hereditary lines of title to the chieftainships. 21 The Council itself selected some Pine Tree Chiefs on the basis of merit, in order that those "uterine families" not represented by hereditary chieftainships were not excluded. Some families joined with sister families in order to be represented. 22 Historically, upon the death of a Sachem: he was succeeded not by his son, but by the son of a sister or of an aunt or niece on the maternal side; and his property, at least all of it that was not buried with him, was hereditary in his gens, it fell to the same parties and could not descend to his child for the reason that, by their peculiar laws of marriage, a child and its father must necessarily belong to different gentes. . .. This mode of reckoning descent was very general among our American Indians .... In fact there is no other way of accounting for many of their institutions, and notably to that singular phase of society in which woman, by virtue of her functions as wife and mother, exercised an influence but little short of despotic, not only in the wigwam but also around the council fire. 23 Not only were the Clan Mothers of each extended family responsible for holding title to a chieftainship, they monitored the Sachem's conduct closely and would warn a Sachem to abide by the Great Law if it appeared he was not proceeding with the welfare of the people in mind. After three warnings by the Clan Mothers who nominated him, a Sachem would be removed. 24 The~white wampum belts that indicated the hereditary names of

20. J. CoLI.IER,INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS 120 (1947). 21. A. PARKER,supra note 1, at 29. 22. J. COLI.IER,supra note 20, at 120. 23. L. CARR, supra note 9, at 210-11. 24. Johnston, Self-Determinationfor the Six Nations Confederacy,44 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REv. 9 (1986). The Beloved Woman in the Cherokee tradition possesses similar capabilities, e.g., leading the Council, deciding the fate of captives, and the ability to wage:war. See P. All.EN, THE SACRED Hoop 32, 36-38 (1986). No. 2] Professor MilsteinCivicNOTES Engagement of Religions 503 204 the Sachems were kept by the women, and women were solely responsible for communic~ting the history of the nation to the children. 25 The Clan Mothers also had great influence with warriors. Women could support or disapprove the wisdom of a war party by providing or withholding moccasins and charred com pounded into meal and sweetened with maple sugar for the warriors' joumey. 26 If a Clan Mother forbade the departure of a war party, neither the Sachems nor the Council could object. The women had "entire control of affairs, even of those that are supposed to have been the peculiar province of the man.' ' 27 Further, "apparently in pure mockery of the man's helplessness, [women also possessed the right] of sending him out on such an expedition whenever she pleased. " 28 Mary Brant, the Mohawk widow of Sir William Johnson, is credited with convincing warriors to maintain loyalty to the British during the Revolution. Women had their own separate council and would deliberate an issue first. 29 Upon determination of an issue, the Women's Council would notify the Sachems who would then convene the General Council. 30 The Women's Council sent a message to a General Schuyler in 1776, objecting to proposed movements of American troops. Schuyler responded to the women's concerns at a Council of the Sachems and implored the Sachems to ask the Clan Mothers not to unleash the warriors in a way that would disrupt the American-Iroquoian alliance. 31 Clan Mothers settled General Council disputes and generally had far greater respect, status and control than did European or colonial women. Clan Mothers decided whether captives would be adopted or killed. Adoptees were immediately accepted into the Confederacy as lost relatives. Many rose to prominence and few sought return. In 1689, the Wolf Clan of the Oneidas adopted the French Jesuit missionary Milet to replace a Sachem. The leading women of the Tribe helped him and, Milet wrote, "through the influence of the chief women, they showed me the friendship of giving me the place of a Sachem who had died long before of disease, rather than of one killed in the attack on the French. " 32

25. B. GRAYMONT, THE IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 13 (1972). 26. Id. at 21. 27. L. CARR,supra note 9, at 223. 28. Id. 29. Id. at 230. 30. Id. 31. Id. at 230-31. 32. B. GRAYMONT, supra note 25, at 18. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 205 504 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 Siimilarly, Mary Jemison, "the white woman of the Genessee," had been captured during the French and Indian War and later given to the Senecas. The Senecas adopted Jemison, who married twice, became quite content with Iroquois life, and most prob ably her elevated status as a woman, and chose to remain a S1mecarather than return to white society.33 Non-adopted prisoners were treated with much cruelty, both by men and women. As Cadwallader Colden stated: The Warriors think it is for their glory to lead them through all the Villages of the Nations subject to them . . . and . . . draw up two lines, through which the poor Prisoners, stark naked, must run the Gauntlet; and on this occasion, it is always observed that the Women are much more cruel than the Men.34 With regard to women's status in Iroquoian society, Colden further observed that: Polygamy is not usual among them; and indeed, in any Nation where all are on a Par, as to Riches and Power, Plurality of Wives cannot well be introduced. As all Kind of Slavery is banished from the Countries of the Five Nations, so they keep themselves free also from the Bondage of Wedlock; and when either of the Parties becomes disgusted, they separate without Formality or Ignominy to either, unless it be occa sioned by some scandalous Offence in one of them. And in Case of Divorce, the Children, according to the natural Course of all Animals, follow the Mother. The women here bring forth their Children with so much Ease as other Animals, and without the Help of a Midwife, and, soon after their Delivery, return to their usual Employment. They alone also perform all the Drudgery about their Houses, they plant their Corn . . . they likewise cut all their firewood, and bring it home on their Backs; and in their Marches bear the Burdens. The Men disdain all kind of Labor, and employ themselves alone in Hunting, as the only proper Business for Soldiers.35

33. Id. at 13. The great freedom and influence of women was extended to white women in Iroquois country. The Tory Sarah McGinnis prevented a wampum belt dei:cribing an American victory over the British from passing beyond her village. See also M. JEMISON, LIFE OF MARYJEMISON: DEH·HE-WA-MlS (1824). 34. C. COLDEN, supra note 19, at xxvii. 35. Id. at xxxii-xxxiii. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 206 No. 2] NOTES 505

Some eighteenth-century European and American men were astounded at the liberty, political, social, and familial power held by Iroquois women. When Iroquois men returned from a hunt, they turned everything over to the women. An unsigned manuscript of the day stated that every possession of the man except his horse and rifle belonged to the women after marriage. Women controlled the household economy, giving money to their husbands as they deemed necessary. Further, "[t]he truth is that Women are treated in a much more respectful manner than in England and they possess a very superior power; this is to be attributed in a very great measure to their system of Education.' '36 As is repeated so often in women's history, the status of Iroquois women has not been immune from revisionist historians trying to diminish or distort the importance of women in the society. In 1883 Lucien Carr, the assistant curator of the Pea body Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, wrote grudgingly of women's status in the confederacy. Unable to reconcile women's power without a corresponding diminishment of male stature, Carr relates that the male warriors Corn Planter and Red Jacket were obliged to follow the commands of the Clan Mothers, despite their protestations. Chiefs, warriors and councils were obliged to yield to her demands when authoritatively expressed. This is perhaps a somewhat startling assertion. Bear in mind that among the gens or clan, with its privileges and obligations was, in reality, nothing but a brotherhood of individuals bound together by ties of blood, and it will at once be seen why women, through whom alone, this kind of union could be preserved and perpetuated, should have been accorded a prominence which can scarcely be paralleled outside the realms of fable. 37 Carr also seems appalled at the suggestion that polyandry, yet not polygyny, may have been practiced by the Senecas and was a result "of the gyneocracy that existed among them ... Th[e] moderation [of having only one spouse] speaks well for the Iroquois men. I am sorry, however, to say that the virtue was

36. B. JOHANSEN,supra note 6, at 40-41. 37. L. CARR,supra note 9, at 211-12. See also W. OSWALT,THIS LAND WAS THEIRS (1978); Richards, Matriarchy or Mistake: The Role of Iroquois Women Through Time, in CULTURALSTABILITY AND CULTURAL CHANGE 36 (ed. V.F. Ray 1957) (proceedings of the 1957 annual spring meeting of the American Ethnological Society). Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 207 506 AMERICAN IND/AN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 n,ot imitated by the women, as they allowed themselves a plu rality of husbands. " 38 However, Father Joseph Lafitau, who spent considerable time among the Iroquois, summarized the position of women with more clarity: [The women] constitute the tribe, transmit the nobility of blood, keep up the genealogical tree and the order of inheritance, and perpetuate the family. They possess all actual authority; own the land, and the fields and their harvests; they are the soul of all councils, the arbiters of peace and war; they have the care of the public treasury; slaves are given to them; they arrange marriages; the children belong to them and to their blood is confined the line of descent and the order of inheritance. The men on the other hand are wholly isolated and restricted to their personal affairs; their children are strangers to them, and when they die, everything comes to an end, as it is only the women who can keep up and perpetuate the family. If there are only men in a household no matter in what num bers nor how many children they may have it is doomed; and although by courtesy they are made chiefs, and public business is transacted by a council of old men, yet they act merely as the representatives of the woman and to aid her in those affairs in which it would not be becoming for her to appear and act for herself.39 There has been considerable debate as to whether Iroquois society constituted a true matriarchy, since Clan Mothers se le,:ted, but did not serve as, Sachems. Many historians claim that no true matriarchy has ever existed.40 Some assert that Iroquois society is as close to a matriarchal model as the world has ever seen.41 Most agree that the authority exercised by the Cllan Mothers over the economy, property, and government of

38. L. CARR,supra note 9, at 223. 39. Id. 40. See J. BROWN,IROQUOIS WOMEN: AN ETHNOHISTORJCNorn 235-51; P. WEBSTER, Mtrtriarchy: A Vision of Power in TOWARDAN ANTHROPOLOGYOF WOMEN 127-56 (R. Reiter ed. 1975};E. REED,WOMAN'S EVOLUTION 154-58 (1975}; c. NIBTllAMMBR,DAUOH• TBltS OF THE EARTH:THE LIVBSAND LEGENDSOF AMERICANINDIAN WOMEN 139-40 (l!J'77};G. LERNER,THE CREATIONOF PATRIARCHY30-31, 249 nn.42-43 (1986). 41. J. BROWN,supra note 40, at 243. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 208 No. 2] NOTES 507 the society was unprecedented.42 Paula Gunn Allen writes con vincingly of the Sachem's actions being mere proxies for Clan Mother sentiment, with all decision making solely reserved for the women.43 Women in the Great Law No amount of revisionist history, however, can derogate the actual codification of the Iroquois woman's status in the Great Law. J.N.B. Hewitt, a nineteenth-century ethnographer, has written that the original constitution of the League recognized federal women chiefs who had official standing equal to that of the Sachems, and had the same rights to attend the General Council sessions.44 Hewitt's claim of women chiefs remains iso lated; most historians generally agree that women were never chiefs in the Confederacy. Nonetheless, it is true that of the 117 clauses in the Great Law, twenty-three deal with the rights and responsibilities of women. Of paramount importance, clause 44 of the Great Law states that "[t]he lineal descent of the people of the Five Nations shall run in the female line. Women shall be considered the progenitors of the Nation. They shall own the land and the soil. Men and women shall follow the status of the mother.'' 45 Clause 45 stipulates that "[t]he women heirs of the Confederate Lord ship titles shall be called Royaneh (Noble) for all time to come. " 46 According to the Great Law, The women of every clan of the Five Nations shall have a Council Fire burning in readiness for a Council of the clan. When in their opinion it seems necessary for the interest of the people they shall hold a Council and their decision and recommendation shall be intro duced before the Council of Lords by the War Chief for its consideration. 47

42. Id. 43. P. ALLEN,supra note 24, at 213. According to traditional Mohawk Brian Cole: "The men who go to a council fire, puff up their chests and push their weight around. But the women have the real power. The Clan Mothers are the power in the shadows of the Council fires." Interview with Brian Cole (Sept. 21, 1989). For descriptions of other historical matriarchies, see M. STONE,WHEN GOD WAS A WOMAN(1976). 44. J. HEWITT, Iroquoian Cosmology in FORTY-THIRD ANNuAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY 463 (1925). 45. A. PARKER,supra note 1, at 42. 46. Id. 41. Id. at 55. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 209 508 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16

Clan Mothers held the wampum belts of hereditary title, 48 could choose and depose chiefs (although no constitutional pro vision provided for their deposition), 49 or transfer chieftainships to sister families. 50 Women could punish those seeking to estab li!;h independent authority. 51 "Women's Work," as it has come tci be known, was optional and esteemed. "When a Lord holds a conference in his home, his wife, if she wishes, may prepare th.e food for the Union Lords who assemble with him. This is an honorable right which she may exercise and an expression of h(:r esteem. " 52 Women held the white wampum belts, the color white sym bolizing "peace, love, charity and equity." 53 In contrast, men h(:ld the black wampum, entitling them to execute enemies of the League and take up the weapons of war. 54 The funeral recitation for Clans Mothers contained the acknowledgement that they "were one of the many joint heirs of the Lordship titles. " 55 Both women of the people and Clan Mothers were laid to rest with chants of "You once held a sacred position as a mother of the Nation. "S6 The Great Law not only elevated and embraced the status of w,:>men,but also secured the natural rights of the people as a wib.ole.Among the admirable aspects of the Iroquois system was the Council's system of checks and balances, which resulted in unanimous decision making. Disputes were remanded for solu tions. An issue would be debated by the Mohawks and Senecas, then referred to the Oneidas and Cayugas, establishing a process of checks, although the legislative council was unicameral. The decision would then be passed onto the Onondagas, who w1~rethe Firekeepers, for their opinion. If affirmed by unanimity of the tribes, the motion would carry. 57 The Great Law had provisions for amendment, 58 punishment for murder, 59 embrac ing concepts of citizenship offered to conquered nations, 60 free-

48. Id. at 34. 49. Id. 50. Id. at 40. 51. Id. at 37. 52. Id. at 43. 53. Id. at 47-48. 54. Id. at 47, 54. 55. Id. at 59. 56. Id. 57. B. JOHANSEN, supra note 6, at 24. 58. A. PARKER,supra note 1, at 34. 59. Id. 60. Id. at 53. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 210 No. 2] NOTES 509 dom of religion, 61 confirmation of the rights of the people to approach the council for redress of problems, 62 federalism, 63 prohibition against unauthorized entries of homes, 64 and com munal possession of the land. 65 The Lords of the Confederacy were constitutionally required to serve at the behest of the people while showing endless patience. "Their hearts shall be full of peace and good will and their minds filled with a yearning for the welfare of the people of the Confederacy . . . . Neither anger nor fury shall find lodgement in their minds and all their words and actions shall be marked by calm deliberation. " 66 The Great Law also provided that "the men of every clan of the Five Nations shall have a Council Fire ever burning in readiness for a council to be held to discuss the welfare of the clans. This council shall have the same rights as the council of the women. " 67 The Iroquois, according to former U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs' John Collier, wrought out a social institution, a system of greatness of human relationships, a system for evoking maxi mum genius and for socializing it, and a role of women in society which well may stand today as the most brilliant creation in the record of man. Then from a world unknown, a ravenous race swept in a dark age for the native life which was hurled into the pit by cannon, by rum, by money, by unconscionable in trigue.' '68

Colonial America Women's Status If the tenets of equality that so pervaded the Iroquois Great Law had been adopted by the American legal system or overlaid onto the existing common law framework, the status of women in colonial America would have been radically altered. Under

61. Id. at 56. 62. Id. 63. Id. at 55. 64. Id. at 57. 65. Id. at 50. 66. Id. at 37. 67. Id. at 55. 68. J. CoumR, supra note 20. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 211 510 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 th,~ English common law system embraced by the colonies, women were not considered "persons" or "citizens. " 69 Corre spondingly, women were disenfranchised and thereby precluded from directly changing their conditions. It has been noted that the subjugation of women at early common law was not entirely dissimilar from the way slaves we:re treated. 70 Unlike the co-equal status of women in the Iroquois society, women under Anglo-American common law were, as noted by feminist legal authority Sylvia Law, relegated mf:rely to roles of production, reproduction, maintenance, consumption, and acculturation in the home. Home and family - the core social unit upon which [Anglo-American] constitutional, political, economic [and common law] arrangements are built - are constructed on the prem ise that women are not active citizens or people free to pursue the full range of common occupations and callings.71 At common law, as developed from Blackstone's Commen taries, a woman merged her legal identity into that of her husband when she married. She could not sue, be sued, enter into contracts, make wills, keep her own earnings, or control her own property. Married women were civilly dead.72 This concept of coverture, or femme covert, meant that upon mar riage, a woman became quite literally "veiled"; clouded, covered by her husband. 73 Correspondingly, at common law, a man could chastise his wife, restrain her freedom, beat, and rape her.74 The husband gained control and management of his wife's real property and complete ownership of her personal property, including a worn-

69. In 1765, Blackstone wrote: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law, that is the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the maniage, or at least is incorporated into that of her husband under whose wing, protection and cover she performs everything." Law, Rethinking Sex and the Consti tution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 957 (1984) [hereinafter Law, Rethinking Sex] (quoting 1 w. BLACKSTONE,COMMENTARIES 430 (Oxford 1765)); see also In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (denying writ of mandamus by woman seeking admission to Virginia bar; for purposes of the statute, "person" meant "male"). 70. C. HYMOWITZ& M. WEISSMAN,A HISTORYOF WOMEN IN AMERICA21 (1980). 71. Law, Family, Gender and Sexuality: What Our Founding Fathers Had to Say, 26 JUDGE'SJ. 22, 24 (1987) [hereinafter Law, Founding Fathers]. 72. Id. 73. E. Fi.EXNER,CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'SRlOHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITEDSTATES 8 (1959). 74. Law, Founding Fathers, supra note 71, at 25. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 212 No. 2] NOTES 511

an's clothes and household goods.75 New England colonies had prohibitions against "solitary living" to assure that women would be subject to the governance of family life.76 At common law, divorce was prohibited; divorce became more commonly available to men at the time of the Revolution. 77 Women were not entitled to keep their children following di vorce; divorce was granted at a woman's behest only for flagrant abuses such as adultery, desertion, non-support, and extreme physical cruelty.78 Women were denied identity - since they were required to assume the husband's name - and power. One of the most significant common law tenets resulting in male dominance was the concept of illegitimacy. The legal doctrine permitting con demnation of a child as a bastard and the resulting legal disa bilities were alien to the Iroquois system.79 Common law concepts of illegitimacy fostered sexual purity of women and the social and economic dependence of both the child and mother upon the male.80 Married women had the same rights as children or idiots - virtually none. Single women fared only slightly better. Since they had no man to protect them, they retained some legal rights, such as the ability to own property and keep their wages. A single woman could amass a fortune, but was excluded from voting or sitting on a jury. 81 Even if a woman outlived her husband, common law still discriminated against her. Property passed from the husband to the eldest son or closest male blood relation. If a man died without a will, a wife would inherit one-third of his estate. On her death, however, the inheritance reverted to a male heir. A widow could not alienate any of the estate's property. 82 It is not surprising that Thomas Paine, who had spent con siderable time with the Iroquois, condemned the position of women in colonial America. Paine wrote that even in countries where they may be esteemed the most happy, constrained in their desires in the disposal

75. Law, Rethinking Sex, supra note 69, at 957. 76. Law, Founding Fathers, supra note 71, at 25. 77. Id. at 27. 78. E. FLEXNER, supra note 73, at 8. 79. Law, Rethinking Sex, supra note 69, at 957. 80. Id. at 962. 81. Id. 82. C. HYMOWITZ & M. WEISSMAN, supra note 70, at 23. After the Revolution, courts of equity improved some of the rights of married women. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 213 512 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16

of their goods, robbed of freedom and will by the laws, the slaves of opinion, which rules them with absolute sway and construes the slightest appearances into guilt; surrounded on all sides by judges, who are at once tyrants and their seducers . . . . Who does not feel for the tender sex?83 The common law structure thus supported the subservience of women in ways that were fundamentally inconsistent with the natural rights and concepts of equality that were blended in the Iroquois Great Law. At common law, women had many duties, but no rights apart from the protection their husbands or fathers might deem fit. In contrast, Iroquois women had many rights, duties, and received great respect. Had American common law adapted to Iroquoian concepts, legal equality would have been normative. Attitudes of the Founding Fathers Although the Great Law's ethical and governmental structure influenced the Founding Fathers and a number of American men, the status of women in Iroquois society left no indelible imprint on their own domestic relations or the documents that would shape the American government. Perhaps the exposure to the status of Iroquois women acted to reinforce the desire to isolate women from political participation. Of the Founding Fathers, Franklin and Jefferson had the most contact with the matriarchal Iroquois society and were greatly influenced by the ethical edicts and complex government of the League. 84 .AJthough American feminism is presumed to have originated in the 1830s with the activism of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, feminism was not unknown in the Revolu tionary Era. 85 The white privileged males that forged the Con stitution did not do so in a vacuum, isolated from the political dreams and aspirations of the politically disenfranchised. The sentiment of the Founding Fathers is perhaps most accurately

113.Id. American changes to the English common law included recognition of a wife':; right to share her husband's home and bed, a right to be supported by her husband even if he abandoned her, and a right to be protected from a husband's violence. But women were denied the right to sue in court. 84. See B. JOHANSEN, supra note 6; B. GRAYMONT, supra note 2S. 85. Sally Roesch Wagner has posited that the feminist movement of the 1820s did not accidentally form in the area of Seneca Falls. Rather, the status of Iroquois women in what is now New York greatly influenced early feminists. Interview with Sally Roesch Wagner (Nov. 15, 1989). See Wagner, Introduction, in M. GAGE,WoMAN, CHu&cH AND STATE (1980). Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 214 No. 2] NOTES 513 revealed in exchanges between Abigail Adams and her husband, John Adams, who later became the second President. Abigail Adams, uneducated herself, ardently supported the rights and education of women. On the eve of the adoption of the Declaration of Independence in 1776, while John Adams was at the Continental Congress in New York and she was managing their farm in Massachusetts amidst insecurity, war, and epidemic,86 Abigail implored her husband to "Remember the Ladies": In the new code of laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make, I desire you would remem ber the ladies and be more generous and favorable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited power into the hands of the husbands. Remember, all men would be tyrants if they could. If particular care and attention is not paid to the ladies, we are deter mined to foment a rebellion, and will not hold our selves bound by any laws in which we have no voice or representation. That your sex are naturally tyrannical is a truth so thoroughly established as to admit of no dispute; but such of you as wish to be happy willingly give up the harsh title of master for the more tender and endearing one of friend. Why, then, not put it out of the power of the vicious and the lawless to use us with cruelty and indignity with impunity. Men of sense in all ages abhor those customs which treat us only as the vassals of your sex. Regard us as Beings placed by providence under your protection and in imitation of the Supreme Being make use of that power only for our happiness. 87 John Adams replied on April 14, 1776: As to your extraordinary code of laws, I cannot but laugh. We have been told that our struggle has loos ened the bonds of government everywhere; that chil dren and apprentices were disobedient; that schools and colleges were grown turbulent; that Indians slighted their guardians and Negroes grew insolent to their

86. Law, Founding Fathers, supra note 71, at 22, 24. 87. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), reprinted in THE BOOK OF ABIGAIL AND JOHN: SELECTED LETTERSOF THE ADAMSFAMILY, 1762-1784, at 121 (L. Butterfield, M. Friedlaender & M. Kline eds. 1975). Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 215 514 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16

masters. But your letter was the first intimation that another tribe, more numerous and powerful than all the rest, were grown discontented. This is rather too course a Compliment but you are so saucy, I wont blot it out. Depend upon it, we know better than to repeal our Masculine system. We dare not exert our Power in its full Latitude. We are obliged to go fair and softly, and in Practice you know We are the subjects. We have only the Name of Masters, and rather than give up this, which would completely subject Us to the Despotism of the Petticoat, I hope General Washing ton and all our brave Heroes would fight. I am sure every good politician would plot against Despotism, Empire, Monarchy, Aristocracy, Oligarchy, or Och- locracy.88 · Abigail answered on May 7, 1776: I cannot say that I think you are very generous to the ladies; for, whilst you are proclaiming peace and good will to men, emancipating all nations, you insist upon retaining an absolute power over wives. But you must remember that arbitrary power is like most other things which are very hard, very liable to be broken; and, notwithstanding all your wise laws and maxims, we have it in our power, not only to free ourselves, but to subdue our masters, and without violence, throw both your natural and legal authority at our feet. 89 Adams, who believed that "power always follows property," wai; by no means alone.90 Thomas Jefferson, responding to a French woman who had queried him on the United States Constitution, wrote that it "need not agitate you. The tender breasts of ladies were not formed for political convulsion; and the French ladies miscalculate much their own happiness when they wander from the true field of their influences into that of polnticks."91 In a letter to Washington, Jefferson expressed fur-

;~8. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (April 14, 1776), reprintedin THB BOOKOF ABIGAIL AND JOHN:SELECTED LETI'ERS OF THEADAMS FAMILY,1762-1784, at 123 (L. Butterfield, M. Friedlander & M. Kline eds. 1975). 89. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adiµns (May 7, 1776), reprinted In FBMI· NISM:THE EssENTIAL HISTORICALWRITINGS 3-4 (M. Schneir ed. 1972). 90. 4 PAPERSOF JOHNADAMS 108-211 (R. Taylor ed. 1979). !>I. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Angelica Schuyler Church (Sept. 21, 1788), reprii11edin 13 THE PAPERSOF THOMASJEFFERSON 623 (J. Boyd ed. 1956). No. 2] Professor MilsteinCivic NOTESEngagement of Religions 515 216 ther vexation regarding French women, their influence in the French Revolution and gratitude that American women were not similarly inclined. 92 And this notation from a visit Jefferson made to Holland: While one considers [women] as useful and rational companions, one cannot forget that they are also ob jects of our pleasures. While employed in dirt and drudgery some tag of a ribbon, some ring or bit of bracelet, earbob or necklace . . . will shew that the desire of pleasing is never suspended in them. 93 Jefferson had dealings with the Iroquois and corresponded with Handsome Lake, a Seneca Chief. 94 While Jefferson ex pressed admiration for many of the accomplishments of the lroquois, 95 he was inexplicably unaffected by the status of women in the society. Undoubtedly, if he considered the matriarchal aspects of the League at all, it was with the same scorn with which he viewed French women. Jefferson and Adams' emphases on property-based suffrage and the subjugation of women clearly stand in stark contrast to the embracing paradigm of Iroquois society. In the late 1700s and early 1800s, other voices were calling for universal suffrage, proposing systems of natural law and embracing the ethics and equality of the Iroquois. In England Mary Wollstonecraft wrote A Vindication of the Rights of 92. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Dec. 4, 1788), reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OFTHOMAS JEFFERSON 330(J. Boyd ed. 1956). Jefferson wrote: The manners of the nation allow [women] to visit, alone, all persons in office, to solicit the affairs of the husband, family or friends and their solicitations bid defiance to laws and regulations. Nor can one, without evidence of his own eyes, believe in the desperate state of which things are reduced in this country from the omnipotence of an influence, which, fortunately for the happiness of the sex itself, does not endeavor to extend itself in our country beyond the domestic line. Id. 93. T. Jefferson, Notes of a Tour Through Holland and the Rhine Valley (Apr. 19, 1788), reprinted in 13 THE PAPERS OFTHOMAS JEFFERSON 27-28(J. Boyd ed. 1956). Jefferson further wrote: How valuable is that state of society which allots [women] internal em ployments only, and external to the men. [Women] are formed by nature for attentions and not for hard labor. A woman never forgets one of the numerous train of little offices which belong to her; a man forgets often. Id. 94. THE PORTABLETHOMAS JEFFERSON 305(M. Peterson ed. 1975). Paula Gunn Allen has commented that the Code of Handsome Lake ("the tribal version of the white man's way") which advocated adoption of nuclear family arrangements where women cleaved to their husbands, helped to patriarchize the Iroquois in the early 1800s. P. ALLEN,supra note 24, at 33. 95. See B. JOHANSEN,supra note 6; B. GRAYMONT,supra note 25. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 217 516 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16

Woman, and critics labeled her a "hyena in petticoats. " 96 John Stuart Mill fought for women's equality; as we have seen, Thomas Paine did also. However, while the Iroquois influenced Enlightenment thinkers on a panoply of ideas, its philosophical proponents ignored the status of women in Iroquois society. The Founding Fathers and the Iroquois .Although numerous colonial statesmen had contact with the Iroquois and witnessed the status of women in that society, Benjamin Franklin probably had the most far-reaching interac tion with the League. Franklin started his political career as a provincial governor of Pennsylvania. Among his tasks was as sisting colonial envoys assigned by the British to form an alliance with the Iroquois against the French. 97 As a Philadelphia printer, Franklin had begun printing treaty accounts and news of the Iroquois in 1736. At a treaty confer ence between the British and Iroquois in 1744, Franklin, his son William, and Cadwallader Colden, sat around the Iroquois Council Fire with the Iroquois Sachems. 98 In 1753, he received his first diplomatic assignment, as an Indian commissioner rep rescmting Pennsylvania. 99 Franklin's early writings and publications indicate that his int<~ractionswith the Iroquois influenced his concepts of f eder alism, natural rights, and the role of man and property in society 100. At the same time, Franklin was shaping his thoughts about an American federal union of the colonies in which each state would govern its own internal affairs, and a confederated government, much like the League, would oversee common, ext,ernal matters.101 In one account of the 1744 treaty council printed by Franklin, an Iroquois Sachem named Canassatego urged the colonists to unite by saying, "Our wise forefathers established union and amity between the Five Nations. This has made us formidable . . . . We are a powerful Confederacy and by your observing the same methods ... you will acquire much strength and power; therefore, whatever befalls you, do not fall out. with one another. " 102

96. Kramnick, Introduction, in M. WOLLSTONECRAFT, VINDICATION OF THB RIOHTS OF WOMAN 7 (1983 ed.). 97. B. JOHANSEN, supra note 6, at 31, 69. 98. Id. at 46-47. 99. Id. at 54-56. I 00. Id. at 54. I 01. Id. at 64. 102. Id. at 61-62. No. 2] Professor MilsteinCivic NOTESEngagement of Religions 517218

Using the parlance of the day, Franklin wrote the following in a letter in 1751: It would be a very strange thing if Six Nations of Ignorant Savages should be capable of forming a Scheme for such a Union and be able to execute it in such a manner, as that it has subsisted Ages, and appears indissoluble and yet a like Union should be impracticable for ten or a dozen English colonies, to whom it is more necessary, and must be more advan tageous.103 Franklin also suggested that the thirteen colonies form a movable council to meet successively at the different colonies, much like the Council of the League.104 In 1754, the colonists met with the Iroquois at Albany, New York. The purpose of this Albany Conference was twofold: to cement a British/Iroquois alliance against the French; and to formulate a plan of union for the colonies.105Franklin solicited commentary on his "Short Hints Toward a Scheme for Uniting the Northern Colonies."105 Tiyanuga, an Iroquois Sachem who had been specifically in vited by the Governor of New York to instruct the colonial delegates on the structure of the Iroquois Confederacy, urged the colonists to unite.107After two weeks of debate, the colonists voted unanimously to support a colonial union based on Frank lin's principles.108Several weeks after the Albany Conference, Franklin published his famous "Join or Die" severed snake cartoon in his Pennsylvania Gazette.109 The ratified plan for unification bore numerous similarities to the Iroquois structure. In each system, one "state" could veto the action of the entire body; unanimity was required. The colonies were to have a "Grand Council" capable of choosing its own speaker. Like the Iroquois system, the plan endorsed a unicameral legislature, unlike the bicameral British system that was eventually adopted. Both governments had varying numbers of representatives from the states with the colonists' systems based roughly on population. Iroquois representation sprang

103. 3 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN,1750-1759, at 42 {A. Smyth ed. 1907). 104. Id. 105. B. JOHANSEN, supra note 6, at 69. 106. Id. at 70. 107. Id. 108. Id. 109. Id. at 71. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 219 518 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 more from tradition. Both systems embraced the concept for a common, voluntary militia. The proposed colonial Grand Coun cil was to have forty-eight delegates; the Iroquois Council had fifty.HO Franklin's plan, prescient though it was, died in the colonial legislatures because states feared losing autonomy. The Crown vetoed the plan, believing that it gave the colonies too much fre:edom. The failure led Franklin to remark that "the councils of the savages proceeded with better order than the British Parliament. " 111 Franklin also feared that the failure would lead the Iroquois to dissolve their alliance with the British since ''no assistance from [the Six Nations] is to be expected in any dispute with the French 'till by a Compleat Union among our selves we ar(: able to support them in case they should be attacked." 112 ]Franklin's comments indicate that his belief in an Iroquois style union stemmed not just from grand principles of Enlight enment thinking, but also from very practical military consid erations. Franklin and Jefferson, however, did see in the Iroquois a "happy mediocrity" that embodied the visions to which En lightenment thinkers aspired. Ideally, Franklin saw a "Virtuous Order" that would combine the best of European art and lit erature and the natural rights inherent in the Iroquois system, yet would remain unburdened by overcivilization.113 Both men believed that an Iroquoian-style culture provided more opportunity for happiness than a European model. 114 Both men admired the fact that leaders of the Iroquois held their positions to serve the people and were readily retractable for failing to do so. Both preferred the Indian attitude towards the possession of private property .11s

1IO. Id. at 74. 111. Id. 112. Id. 113. Id. at 83. 114. Id. at 91. 115. Franklin wrote of the Iroquois: All property, indeed except the savage's temporary cabin, his bow, his matchcoat and other little Acquisitions absolutely necessary for his Sub· sistence, seems to me to be the creature of public Convention. Hence, the public has the rights of regulating Descents, and all other conveyances of Property, and even of limiting the quality and uses of it. All the property that is necessary to a man is his natural Right, which none may justly deprive him of, but all Property superfluous to such Purposes is the property of the Public who, by their Laws, have created it and who may, by other Laws dispose of it. B. JOHANSEN, supra note 6, at 104-05. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 220 No. 2] NOTES 519

Indeed, for Jefferson, the natural, inalienable rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" expounded in the Decla ration of Independence were paramount, as contrasted to the philosophy of John Locke, who advocated "life, liberty and property." 116 As Jefferson wrote, "I am convinced that those societies [such as the Indians] which live without government enjoy in their general mass an infinitely greater degree of hap piness than those who live under European governments. " 117 Jefferson myopically overlooked how pervasive that happiness was, never mentioning the ramifications of sexual equality when discussing the ethical, natural state that bound and harmonized the Iroquois. Franklin, however, was at least cognizant of the role of women in the Iroquois society, acknowledging that ''women are the Records of the Council . . . who take exact notice of what passes and imprint it to their Memories, to communicate it to their children. " 118 Thomas Paine, who travelled to America at Franklin's invi tation, sat around Iroquois Council Fires, learned the language, and tried to negotiate an alliance with the Iroquois during the Revolution. He wrote that Iroquois society lacked "any of those spectacles of human misery which poverty and want present to our eyes in all the towns and streets of Europe." 119 Paine, unlike Jefferson or Franklin, may have been influenced by the role of Iroquois women, for he was an advocate of women's rights. Two decades after the Albany Conference, Franklin's modi fied plan turned into the Articles of Confederation. 120 In 1775 the colonists sent word that they were finally heeding Canassa tego' s advice from thirty years earlier. The colonists wrote: Our old men have . . . frequently taken a single arrow and said, Children, see how easily it is broken. Then they have taken and tied twelve arrows together with a strong string or cord and our strongest men could not break them . . . . This is what the Six Nations mean. Divided, a single man may destroy you; united you are a match for the whole world. We thank the great God that we are all united; that we have a strong confederacy, composed of twelve provinces . . . . These

116. Id. at 103. 117. Id. at 98. 118. Id. at 86. 119. Id. at 116. 120. Id. at 75. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 221 520 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16

provinces have lighted a great council fire at Phila delphia and sent sixty-five counsellors to speak and act in the name of the whole, and to consult for the common good of the people.121 It was in this environment that the great (male) thinkers of the day convened in Philadelphia in 1787 to hammer out the Great Compromise. We now know that women were among the most compromised. The Formation of the United States Constitution The Constitutional Convention commenced in Philadelphia on May 29, 1787, with ten states represented by forty delegates.122 At different points of the convention, fifty-five men actually attended. 123The average participant was a wealthy, white male, about forty-two or forty-three years of age.124All were landed, but a self-made man was regarded as at a "social disadvan tage. "125 Three-quarters serve"din Congress; many were Revolutionary War heroes. There were gentlemen, doctors, lawyers, politicians, teachers, and "respectable Characters. " 126Franklin, though in attendance, was in frail health. Jefferson, who was in Paris at the time, referred to them as a "collection of demi-Gods. " 127 Others were not so impressed. One contemporary writer, con sidering that some appointments were randomly made to round out state delegations, opined that "Some of the characters which compose it, I revere; others I consider as of small consequence, and a number are suspected of being great public defaulters and to have been guilty of notorious peculation and fraud, with regard to our public property in the hour of our distress." 128 The gathering seemed acutely aware of the historical magni tude of the Convention. Pennsylvania's Governor Morris re marked that "the whole human race will be affected by the proceedings of this Convention. " 129In opposing slavery and the counting of slaves in determining congressional representation,

121. Id. at 76. 122. M. FARRAND, FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 58 (1913). 123. Id. at 39. 124. Id. 125. Id. at 26. 126. Id. at 23. 127. Id. at 39. 128. Id. at 40. 129. Id. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 222 No. 2] NOTES, 521

Morris remarked that citizens of southern states who might go to Africa, and "in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest connections and damns them to the most cruel bondages" would have more votes in a "Government instituted for protection of the rights of mankind" than would Northern Citizens who loathed "with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice." 130 Yet, remarkably, Morris eventually wrote the final draft of the Constitution 131 that embraced political representation in the House of Repre sentatives based on the population of "free Persons" in each state, plus three-fifths of all "other Persons." 132 Two hundred years later, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, commenting on the Constitution's flaws and explain ing why his enthusiasm for celebrating the document's bicenten nial anniversary lacked the same patriotic fervor evinced by many, remarked that the Framers "possessed ... [an] ability to trade moral principles for self-interest." 133 Marshall further noted that the slave trade commercially benefitted the North, since customs duties of up to ten dollars a slave helped raise public revenue.134 Although some delegates objected to the recognition of slavery in the Constitution on moral grounds, the majority "regarded slavery as an accepted institution, as a part of the established order, and public sentiment on the slave trade was not much more emphatic and positive than it is now on cruelty to ani mals." tJs It is surely an extension of this acceptance of the patriarchal structure of society that accounts for the complete absence of discussion by the Framers regarding the rights of women. Sylvia Law has remarked, "Silence - absolute and deafening - is the central theme of the original Founders' discussions of women and families." 136 Law has found virtually nothing in the consti tutional text, the Federalist Papers, the constitutional debates, or the ratification discussions in the colonies directly addressing the situations of women and families.137 The only reference to

130. Marshall, Those the Constitution Left Out, 26 JunoE's J. 18, 20 (1987). 131. Id. 132. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2. 133. Marshall, supra note 130, at 20. 134. Id. at 21. 135. M. FARRAND,THE FATHERSOF THE CoNSTITUTION 120 {1921). 136. Law, Founding Fathers, supra note 71, at 23. 137. Id. at 24. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 223 522 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 women in the Federalist Papers is "a brief allegorical discussion of the dangers that courtesans and mistresses pose to the safety of the state." 138 When the Constitution and subsequent Bill of Rights were completed, the influence of the Great Law was unmistakable. Elements of first amendment free speech, religion, and assembly docilrines, provisions for amendment, fourth amendment search and seizure protections, federalism, checks and balances, and separation of powers were all firmly rooted in the Great Law .139 Unl:1kethe Great Law, however, the Founding Fathers summarily rejected equality by embracing slavery and denying suffrage for women, blacks, and non-propertied men. 140 The Transition from Iroquois Matriarchy to Colonial Patriarchy Anglo-American male society embraced and codified the sub jugation and enforced dependence of women, in contradistinc tion to the co-equal status of women and men in the Iroquois Great Law and society. How could the Founding Fathers gen erate~a Constitution so revered for its eloquence and, in part, modeled after the Iroquois Great Law, that lacked recognition of the rights of citizens below the narrowest strata of society at the top of the social ladder? Why did the oft-venerated opening language of the Constitution - "We the People" - ring hollow for so many for so long? Overwhelmingly, the recognized intellectual and philosophical und{irpinnings of American political thought reinforced pa triar,::hical systems. Of the early Western philosophers who in fluenced the Founders, perhaps Plato stands alone as a proponent of women's rights. Plato's Republic espoused that confining women to domesticity was a waste and that "the innate qualities of women could not be known, so long as the socialization and education of the sexes were so different." 141 However, the En lighti~nment political theory, which Jefferson and Franklin ex pounded, emphasized male dominance.142 John Locke, who challenged patriarchal styles of government, still believed in the natural dominance of a husband over a wife in aireas of domestic disagreement. Locke wrote that where

138. Id. 139. See G. ScHAAF,supra note I; see also supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text. 140. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2. 141. Law, Founding Fathers, supra note 71, at 57 n.8. 142. Id. at 24-25. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 224 No. 2] NOTES 523 matters of common interest and property are concerned, "the Rule ... naturally falls to the Man's share as the abler and stronger." 143 Early American courts took their views on women's rights from Blackstone's Commentaries. 144 The man, by law and custom, was the titular head of the household. A wife was no better than a child, a helpless creature, a supportive assistant (at best) but viewed legally as a nullity - perhaps a piece of property. Under Blackstone's legal analysis, a married woman could not sue or be sued, create contracts, wills, or exercise any legal control over her property. Since possession of property, according to Blackstone and Locke, was the linchpin for participation in the political process, the fact that a woman and her property dissolved into her husband logically should not have foreclosed the right of an unmarried women in possession of property to exercise the vote. However American legal thinkers did not make this logical leap. 145 The property rights of women in Revolutionary America, according to Sylvia Law, "reveal above all else a picture of enforced dependence. " 146 In contrast, the Iroquois paradigm rested on egalitarian prin ciples. Engels, building on Morgan's work with the Iroquois, used the possession of property as the starting point in his analysis of the subjugation of women in "civilized" society. Engels continued: The substitution of the female line for the male, ef fecting thereby the disinheritance of the son, the par tially elective character of the Sachemships, the absence of all landed estates, and the power of deposing lodged with the tribes, are reasons conclusive for regarding the government of the Iroquois as an oligarchy rather than an aristocracy. The spirit which prevailed in the nations and in the Confederacy was that of freedom. The people appear to have secured to themselves all the liberty which the hunter state rendered desirable. They fully appreciated its value, as is evinced by the liberality of their insti tutions. The red man was always free from political bondage, and, more worthy still of remembrance, his free limbs never wore a shackle. His spirit could never

143. Id. at 25. 144. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text. 145. Law, Rethinking Sex, supra note 69, at 955, 957. 146. Law, Founding Fathers, supra note 71, at 25. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 225 524 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16

be bowed in servitude. In the language of Charlevoix, the Iroquois were "entirely convinced that man was born free, that no power on earth had any right to make any attempts against his liberty and that nothing could make him amends for its loss." It would be difficult to describe any political society, in which there was less of oppression and discontent, more of indi vidual independence and boundless freedom . . . . The absence of family distinctions, and of all property, together with the irresistible inclination for the chase, rendered the social condition of the people peculiar to itself. It secured to them an exemption from the evils, as well as denied to them the refinements, which flow from the possession of wealth, and the indulgence of the social relations ... [The Iroquois] never felt the "power of gain" . . . . It was doubtless the great reason of his continuance in the hunter state; for the desire of gain is one of the earliest manifestations of progressive mind, and one of the most powerful pas sions of which the mind is susceptible. It clears the forest, rears the city, builds the merchantman - in a word, it has civilized our race. 147 Alllother byproduct of the "uncivilized" matriarchical Iroquois society was that theft, hunger, and deswtution were unknown among the Iroquois. 148 Morgan, however, believed that the ma triarchy was mqstly ceremonial and that true sexual equality did not ·exist. In Morgan's view, "[t]he Indian regarded woman as the inferior, the dependent, and the servant of man, and from nurt1L1reand habit she actually considered herself to be so." 149 Morgan quoted Montesquieu for an explanation of why the Iroquois system is preferable and paradigmatically superior to the American system: "In aristocratical governments, there are two principal sources of disorder: excessive inequality between the governors and the governed, and the same inequality between the different members of the body that governs." 150 The Iroquois had neither (integrity was a publicly accountable common de nominator and Sachems wielded equivalent amounts of power); the American model has elements of both.

147. F. ENGELS,THE ORIGINOF THEFAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY ANDTHE STATE 75 (1942). 148. L. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 319, 324. 1451.Id. at 315. 150. Id. at 97. No. 2] Professor MilsteinCivic EngagementNOTES of Religions 525226

Engels built on Morgan's findings about the difference in communal societies and civilized societies in which an insular "us-versus-them" mentality predominates. Engels, however, named this schism as the most important factor in defining and perpetuating the subjugation of women. Engels adopted a theory advanced by Bachofen in the 1861 publication, Mutterrecht (Mother Right), to explain matrilineal society.151 According to Bachofen, man (presumably the generic use of the word) originally lived in a state of sexual promiscuity and as such, any certainty of paternity was excluded. By extension, descent could only be in the female line; therefore, women were held in high esteem and rule by women (gyneocracy, as termed by Bachofen) naturally resulted. 152 Monogamy, "a violation of a primitive religious law," thus led to Father Rights. Bachofen pointed out that "it is not the development of man's actual conditions of life, but the religious reflections of these conditions inside their head, which has brought about the his torical changes in the social position of the sexes." 153 Thus, Bachofen's basic premise is that women originally held an ele vated status in society simply because mothers were the only certainly ascertainable parent of a child. This view, however, may be criticized because of its simplistic, unwaveringly hege monic biological and anti-intellectual approach. It is entirely possible that in the Iroquois society (and other primitive matri archies) women held positions of power because of a superior ability to effectuate harmony, structure, and cohesiveness. Engels faulted Enlightenment theory for its view that in the beginning of society, women were the slaves of men, a notion that had even entered Morgan's analysis. Rather, the commu nistic households evidenced in Iroquois society resulted in the supremacy of women, since most women in the household were members of the same gens, as opposed to the men who would come to the arrangement from different gens.154 Engels quoted Ashur Wright, a long-time missionary among the Iroquois: The female [gens] ruled the house ... The stores were in common; but woe to the luckless husband or lover who was too shiftless to do his share of the providing. No matter how many children, or whatever goods he

151. F. ENGELS, supra note 147, at 75. 152. Id. 153. Id. at 76. 154. Id. at 113. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 227 526 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16

might have in the house, he might at any time be ordered to pick up his blanket and budge; and after such orders it would not be healthful for him to attempt to disobey. The house would be too hot for him and he must retreat to his own clan; or as was often done, go and start a new matrimonial alliance in some other. The women were the great power among the clans. They did not hesitate, when occasion re quired, "to knock off the horns," as it was technically called, from the head of a chief, and send him back to the ranks of the warrior .155 Engels argued that the introduction of monogamous pairing and wealth into society fostered the rise of Father Right and the corresponding decline of Mother Right. When inheritance tool!con the importance of wealth, men tried to strengthen their position in favor of their children. Therefore, men had to overthrow Mother Right, the traditional order of inheritance. Engels wrote that this revolution - one of the most decisive ever experienced by humanity - was deceptively simple and could occur by simple decree that, in the future, the off spring of the men would remain within the gens, but that those of the female should be transferred to the gens of the father .156 Engels wrote that the ease of the revolution can be seen "in a whole seric~sof American Indian tribes where it has only recently taken place and is still taking place under the influence, partly of increasing wealth and a changed mode of life (transference from forest to prairies), and partly of the moral pressure or civilization and missionaries. " 157 According to Engels, the overthrow of Mother Right then resulted in the "world historical defeat of the female sex." 158 Women became degraded and relegated to mere involuntary incu.bators.159 Male supremacy is then effectuated through the

155. Id. 156. Id. 157. Id. at 119. Catherine MacKinnon challenges Engels' assumptions for being "rigidly causal, unidirectional, and one-sided. Material conditions alone create social relations; consciousness and materiality do not interact . • • • And he takes history as a fixed object within a teleology in which what came before necessarily led to what came after • . . . One must understand that society could be other than it is in order to explain it, far less to change it .... Engels' empiricism can imagine only the reality he finds, and therefore he can find only the reality he imagines." C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 36 (1989). 158. F. ENGELS,supra note 147, at 120. 159. Id. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 228 No. 2] NOTES 527 patriarchal family .160 Engels pointed out that the ancient Roman word for family,famulus, means "domestic slave"; andfamilia, the "total number of slaves belonging to one man. " 161 Engels further argued that the monogamous patriarchal family was the first form of the family to be based not on natural but on economic conditions - on the victory of private property over primitive, natural communal property . . . . The first class opposition that appears in history coincides with the development of the an tagonism between man and woman in monogamous marriage, and the first class oppression coincides with that of the female sex by the male. · Monogamous marriage was a great historical step forward; never theless, together with slavery and private wealth, it opens the period that has lasted until today in which every step forward is also relatively a step backward, in which prosperity and development for some is won through the misery and frustration of others. 162 It is most probably the combination of factors - movement away from the communal gens to the monogamous pair, desire for gain and private property, coupled with the effects of Judeo Christianity - that accounts for the differences between the female-driven interconnectedness in both the Iroquois legal and social system and the male-driven disconnectedness of the pa triarchal American system. In her 1982 book In A Different Voice, Carol Gilligan de scribes what she sees as the differences between socialization of men and women: The images of hierarchy and web, drawn from the texts of men's and women's fantasies and thoughts, convey different ways of structuring relationships and are associated with different views of morality and self . . . . As the top of the hierarchy becomes the edge of the web and as the center of a network of connection becomes the middle of a hierarchical pro gression, each image marks as dangerous the place which the other defines as safe. Thus the images of

160. Id. at 121. 161. Id. 162. Id. at 128-29. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 229 528 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16

hierarchy and web inform different modes of assertion and response: the wish to be alone at the top and the consequent fear that others will get too close; the wish to be at the center of connection, and the consequent fear of being too far out on the edge. These disparate fears of being stranded and being caught give rise to different portrayals of achievement · and affiliation, leading to different modes of action and different ways of assessing the consequences of choice. 163 According to Gilligan, the differences originate in self-defi nition. Men see their interactions on contractual terms, and perceive themselves as lonely contenders in a competitive battle for a spot at the top of the hierarchical ladder .164Morality and justice are thus defined by rights to be free from the interference of others. 165 Vvomen tend to distrust a morality based on rights and non interference, because of its potential for justification of indif f en:nce and unconcern. Further, women define morality and justice in the language of responsibility, seeking solutions for mo:ral problems not in impersonal abstract rules, but in the capacity to understand what someone else is experiencing; women rea,:t from a desire to preserve human interrelationships. 166In the male ladder of hierarchy, competition and isolation predom inate. In the fem ale web of connection, an understanding and contextual morality emerges; the self is more in connection with a continuous human environment of networked social rela tions.161 Jf Gilligan's premise is adopted, American constitutional ju risprudence undoubtedly resembles the ladder. The Iroquois so cial and legal system, with its desire to embrace and expand,

163. C. GILLIGAN,I~ A DIFFERENTVOICE 62 (1982). MacKinnon has criticized Gilligan for describing women's voice as the gender-constructed "feminine" - a voice that is incorrect "because his foot is on her throat." Conversation between Carol Gilligan and Catharine MacKinnon, Mitchell Lecture Series, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School (Nov. 20, 1984), reprinted in Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law - A Conversation, 34 BUFFALOL. REV. 11 (1985). See also Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 M1cH. L. REV. 797 (1989) (arguing that Gilligan's des,:ription of "women's voice" is less a description of women's psychology than an attempt to attribute to women a critique of traditional Western epistemology and possessive individualism). 164. C. GILLIGAN,supra note 163, at 100. 165. Id. at 24-63. 166. Id. at 66. 167. Id. at 27. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 230 No. 2] NOTES 529

seems much closer to the web of connection. The varying de scriptions of the systems parallel which sex held access to de cision making power in the respective communities.168 The Iroquois held property communally and offered citizenship freely with the belief that the inherent superiority of the system would reign. Morgan wrote that the Iroquois were a "progressive confed eracy" founded by the assimilation of five warring tribes, with sufficient accumulated "power to absorb adjacent nations, mold ing them, successively by affiliation, into one common fam ily." 169 It is this aspect of outreach and continual embrace that marks Gilligan's female-oriented web paradigm in contradistinc tion to the male ladder model of hierarchy marking most Anglo European systems. Morgan added, "Unlimited in their capacity for extension ... the tribes thus interleagued would have suf fered no loss of unity by their enlargement, no loss of strength by the increasing distance between their council-fires. The destiny of this League, if it had been left to work out its own results among the red races exclusively, it is impossible to conjecture. With vast capacities for enlargements, and remarkable durability of structure, it must have attained a great elevation, and a general supremacy." 110 The dominant vision of Iroquois society is of an ever-expanding interdependent web of egalitarian rela tionships in which natural rights, notably "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" could flourish. The gaps between the rungs of the Anglo hierarchical ladder are antithetical to estab lishing a system based on egalitarian principles.

Conclusion The Iroquois might be unlike any other civilization with regard to the extremely elevated and institutionalized status of women. The significant differences between the legal and social systems of the League and those of Anglo culture can be explained by a combination of factors. The most significant difference is the Anglo emphasis on private property and economical hierarchies. The male dominance perpetuated in the American system has been continued by rigid, stratified definitions of citizenship. In Anglo culture, men established for themselves positions of power

168. See supra notes 21-56, 69-83 and accompanying text. 169. L. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 88. 170. Id. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 231 530 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16

- through means of religious, mental, physical, emotional, legal and economic force - that allowed them to control access to po.liticalparticipation and finite resources. The Founding Fathers th(:n codified that stratification in a constitutional code of law that attempted to annihilate any outside threats to that domi nance. Initially, this was achieved by restricting the citizenship and suffrage of blacks and women. As the barriers to black men, first, and to women, later, began to break down, the circle of protection changed from societal power to societal resources and farnilial structure. If participation in the political process is restricted, those who form the bottom rungs of the hierarchical ladder remain non threatening. A relatively small number of people retain the greatest amount of control through arbitrary and self-serving pat.terns of legal and social control. In the United States, this was historically, and is continually, played out at the national political level (witness the failure of the equal rights amendment and the current attempts to restrict abortion) as well as in every home where violence and enforced subjugation keep women either in, or on the edges of, circles of abuse and poverty .171 Thi~ Iroquois system lacks this hierarchical structure. 1rhe influence of, and the distinctions between, the embracing Iroquoian principles and the "arms-length" patriarchical Amer ican model are nowhere shown more clearly than in the pream bles to the respective constitutions: I am Dekanawida, and with the Five Nations Conf ed erate Lords, I plant the Tree of the Great Peace ... Roots have spread out from the Tree and the name of these Roots is The Great White Roots and their nature is Peace and Strength. If any man or nation , outside the Five Nations shall obey the laws of the Great Peace . . . they may trace the Roots to the Tree if their minds are clean and they shall be welcomed to take shelter beneath the Tree of the Long Leaves.172 * * * We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure do mestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings

171. R. SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT AMERICA (1986); Female and Poor: If These Are the Best of Times ••. They Are Also the Worst, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 26, 1984, at 4, col. 1. 172. A. PARKER, supra note 1, at 30. Professor MilsteinCivic Engagement of Religions 232 No. 2] NOTES 531

of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United states of America.173 The Great Law reflects the Iroquois philosophy of inclusion. The United States Constitution evinces the male Anglo desire to secure privileges for themselves and their posterity, and to ex clude the rest of humanity.

173. U.S. CONST. preamble. Professor Milstein Civic

B RY A CTIONEngagement GEORGEWASHINGTON AND RELIGIOUSFREEDOM of Religions 233

NATIONAL MUSEUM OF~ AMERICAN JEWISH HISTORY Professor Milstein Civic Engagement of Religions 234

Detail Portraitof GeorgeWashington (The Dunn-Robinson Portrait of Washington. GilbertCharles Stuar t, ca.1801 PhiladelphiaMuseum of Ar~ Gift of the HonorableWa lter H.Annenberg and Leonore Annen berg a nd the AnnenbergFoundation, 200 George Washington's Correspondence with the Jews of Newport or.Jonathan D. Sarna ChiefHistorian, National Museum of American Jewish History Professor JosephH. and Belle R. Braun Professorof American Jewish History at Brandeis University

George Washington was inaugurated as president of the United Three days after Congress adjourned, on August 15, he and a Milstein States of America on April 30, 1789. The federal Constitution, large entourage, including Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, by then, had been ratified by the requisite nine states and was set out for Newport. in effect. Two other states soon signed on, and a twelfth state, North Carolina, ratified the Constitution in November 1789. Only On August 18 four addresses (written, in keeping with the Rhode Island, fearful that as a small state its rights would be literary style of the day, in the form of open letters) were read out trampled upon by the others, held back. It refused to ratify the to the president at a prearranged ceremony; it was customary to Constitution, although it was already bound by it.

greet visiting dignitaries in this way. There was an address from Civic the town , a joint statement of welcome from all of the Christian

The new Constitution did not contain any clause guaranteeing clergy, and a greeting from the Masonic order (whose president Engagement religious liberty; that would only appear in the Bill of Rights was also the warden of the city's synagogue, Moses Seixas). The in 1791. Article Six of the Constitution did outlaw religious final and most historically important address came from the tests "as a qualification to any office or public trust under the "Hebrew Congregation" - the community's Jews.

United States." That, for Jews and other non-Christians, marked of Religions a huge step forward as it guaranteed them the right to hold public offices in the federal government. The United States, unlike most countries with Christian majorities, promised non Christians that they could, at least in theory, hold the highest governmental office in the land .

Washington wanted the new Constitution to be unanimously approved. He believed that would make all Americans feel a part , ...... ,-. of the great experiment that the United States represented ; it ~ -- - ~.,.~II,...... ,.__--,_-·...... ,.,...... ;,~-- - would signify consensus. When Rhode Island held out against (..,I .,,_,...._..,,.....,...... ,, ~-,,._,,.._.. ""--"'...... ,,._... ,_ --- ·---- 1"-"-- ·-- ratification, Washington publicly demonstrated his unhappiness \ 1'1 .,,.1, ...... f.,'-'!f/"!lll'I' ti_, 235 o,- ~1-;,,·,. 01 tT )I ., •• r..,.._,_ To"·~· OA."'""'°""J..,._ by refusing to visit the state when he toured New England in .. ~ ...... J>..;....,,,.,.__,...... ~ HlllllH: lei.\ •P .,...... ,.,.,lliJll-t,~ ....._.,._,IPVI_ Sunin...J lll·l"l1 .\JiU J'!< lh ..\•Jr.(I\• rTL , 7 ...... ,..f,. ...~ .. - the autumn of 1789. Only after Rhode Island finally ratified • i'r-"fl-'{),11(,JAil .,,._.,,....,,.._ ,, \\ 11 l~ I \11~•.t lL,o,arf\"' NII 't:,.r,•,;;• ...... the Constitution on May 29, 1790, did he agree to travel there. ·--,~-- .. .1h ... - .,.--- ... Mapof Newport, 1777 NewportHistorical Society 17 The fact that Jews were included at all is noteworthy. They formed a small but signif icant merchant community in Newport,

and had built a beautiful synagogue, Yeshuat Israel, now Professor known as the Touro Synagogue, in 1763. So, at the very end of Washington's visit to Newport , their representative stepped up to Milstein read an address to him. This was not the first Jewish address to Washington. That had come from the Jews of Savannah months earlier. And it was also not the last Jewish communication he received that year. Jews of New York , Philadelphia , Charleston, and Richmond sent him a joint letter several months later . But t he Newport letter was, by general consensus, the most important of

the lot, partly because of its content, and mostly because of his Civic celebrated reply, sent a few days later from New York City. Engagement

Both letters were carefully written documents that reward close reading and minute study . To facilitate this, the letters are reprinted here; a commentary appears beside the text. of Religions George Washington's correspondence with the Hebrew Congregation in Newport was published in newspapers across t he country in 1790 and was frequently reprinted thereafter. A search on Google Books yields thousands of volumes that quote or reprint the letters, spanning the entire history of the United States . Though Washington directed his address to a small community of Newport Jews, it was understood, from the beginning, that his words carried far wider significance. In defining religious liberty as an "inherent natural right" and promising that "the Government of the United States ... gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution

no assistance," George Washington set a high bar , not only for his 236 . successors, but for Americans of every faith and creed The AmericanStar (Geor ge Washington} Frederick Kemmelmeyer.c a.18 03 Gift of EdgarWilliam and Bernice Chrysler Garbisch, 1962 (62256.7). The Metropolitan Museumof Art. New York,NV, U.S.A. Image copyright: TheMet ropolitan Museumof Art. Image source:A rt Resource.NV

18 ~~4/nl/u/ ~ ~ / ~~/t:~ Professor . Milstein

1 In colonial America. the word"Jew" carried negat ive associationsin some Sir Christiancirc les. Therefore. in writing to George Washington. Newport's Jewsa used more positiveterm which. ironically. they found inthe King James versionof the Book of 1 Permit thechildren of the stock of Abraham Acts (13:26) which describesPau l's addressto "Men andbrethren. children of thestock of Abraham." to approach youi thw the most cordial affection and esteem for 2 your person and rimets - and to join with ourfellow citizens 2 In 1790, Jews couldspeak ofthemselves as"fellow citizens· almost nowhereCivic else in the world. Newport's Jewsemphasized this pointi n the opening sentenceof their in welcoming you to NewPort.

address. Later in the text. they again underscored how much citizenship Engagement meant to them: "Deprivedas we heretofore havebeen of theinvaluable rightsof free Citizens..:. With pleasure we reflect on those days -those days of difficulty, 3 From Psalms144:10, this verseis also included inthe traditional Jewish prayer for and danger, when the God ofsrael I , who delivered David the government(hanoten teshu'a). regularly recitedin early American synagogues.

3 of from the peril of the sword , - shielded Your head Religions in the day of battle: - and we rejoice to think, that the same 4 Daniel5-6. Note that Babylon.where Daniel resided. was.like America. a diaspora Daniel 4 land. Thevarious references to Daniel, an apocalyptic book of the Bible.int also at an h Spirit, who rested in the Bosom of the greatly beloved apocalyptic interpretation theof American Revolution. Some Jewsviewed the colonists' enabling him to preside over the Provinces of the Babylonish miraculous victoryas a harbinger of themessiah. Empire, rests and ever will rest upon you, enabling you to 5 S Theterm "president" had notyet comeinto commonusage . discharge the raduous duties of Chief Magistrate in these States. 6 In 1762. AaronLopez and Isaac Elizer had petitionedobtain to naturalizationin Newport. and were denied.The court ruled that the 1740 tNauralization Act only applied Deprived as we heretofore have been ofinvaluable the to under-populatedsettlements and that locala lw limitedcitizenship to believing Christians. This maywell have been whatNewport's Jews had in mind whenwr iting to rights of free Citizens ,6we now with a deep sense the President. 237

20 of gratitudeto the Almighty disposer 7 of all events 7 OnMarch 20 , 1779,the ContinentalCongress emp loyeda similar term: "WHEREAS,in just Punishmentof our manifoldTransgressions it hath pleased behold a Government,erected by the Majesty of the People.-a the SupremeDispose r of all Eventsto visit these UnitedStates with a calamitous Professor Government,which to bigotrygives n o sanction, to persecution War.. .". 8 Washingtonunderstood that the Jewishcommun ity soughth is personal noas sistance- but generouslyaffording to all Liberty of Milstein 8 guaranteethat Jewswould be includedin the word"all." Hethere fore sent the conscience, and immunities of Citizenship congregation'swo rds back to themas if they were his own:"All possessalike liberty of conscienceand immunitieso f citizenship.· His slight modificationof : - deemingevery one , of whatever Nation, tongue, or language languageis neverthelessnotewo rthy.The Jewishcomm unity viewedits liberty equal partsof the greatgo vernmentalMachine: -This so ample as an act of Americangenerosity ("gener ously affording").George Washington let Jewsknow that they possessed these liberties and immunitiesas a matter of ande xtensiveFederal Union whose basis is Philanthropy, Mutual right ("all possess alike"). confidenceand PublicVirtue , we cannotbut acknowledgeto be 9 Daniel4 :32 (4:35 i n King JamesVersion). the workof the GreatGod , who ruleth in the Armiesof Heavenand Civic 10 Daniel 7:9.

among the Inhabitants of the Earth ~ doingwhatever Engagement seemeth him good. 11 Job7:20 .

12 Exodus 23:20. For all these Blessingsof civil andreligious liberty which we

13 The comparisonto the biblical Joshuawas a pt for he both enteredt he of

enjoy under an equaland benign administration, we desireto PromisedL and and,like Washington. was a military leader. Religions send up ourthanks to the Ancient of Days ,10 the great 11 14 Judaism doesno t hold that heaven is restricted only to Jews.H ere preserver of Men - beseechinghim , that the Angelwho Washingtonis consideredto be among"the righteous amongthe nations"who conductedour forefathers through the wilderness 12 will find their reposei n paradise.

into the promisedLand , maygraciously conduct you t hroughall 15 Onceagain, th e congregation deliberately avoidedusi ng the term "Jewish" the difficulties anddangers of this mortallife : - And, when, like (see n. l). The official nameof the "HebrewCongregatio n" wasYeshuat Is rael 13 (Salvation of Israel).a nd it becamekno wn as the Touro Synagoguein the Joshua full of daysand full of honour, youare gatheredt o nineteenthcentury. yourFathers , mayyou be admittedinto the HeavenlyParadise to MosesMendes Se ixas( 1744-1809)of Newportsigned the letter to 14 16 partakeof the waterof life, andthe tree of immortality . Washington in the nameof the city's entire Jewish community.Seixas was a banker.an organizerof the Bank of RhodeIsland , the grandmaster o f Rhode Island'sMasons , anda Jewishcommunal leader. He was also a communityleader 15 238 Done and Signedby orderof the HebrewCongregation and servedas both pamas(president o r.as he was sometimescalled, "warden") of Newport'sJew ish congregation. His brother was GershomSeixas, famed hazan in NewPort, RhodeIsland August 17,1790 (reader)of Congregation Shearith Israel in NewYork.

Moses Se1xas. ,16 w arden 21 d:dJtd~k/7~ h/J~m.,6- Professor Milstein 5l~t>t:& ~,vnct

Gentlemen, 1 Theuse of the past tense confirmsthat Washingtondid not sendhis letter from Newport.but after he haddeparted. The letter to the Jewsof Newportis undated.but

While I receive,with muchsatisfaction, your Address replete sincethe handwritingis that of TobiasLear. who did not accompanyWashington toCivic Newport,there can be no doubtthat it was sent fromNew York. with expressionsof affectionand esteem; I rejoicein the Engagement

opportunityof assuringyou, that I shall alwaysretain a grateful 2 Justas the Jewsreferred to themselvesas "citizens"in the first sentenceof their remembranceof the cordialwelcome I experienced in letter,so Washingtonunderscored in his first sentencethat they forma "classof citizens" my visit to Newport, 1 fromall classesof Citizens .2 3 Washingtonwrote in a similarvein to othergroups. See, for example,his letter of to RomanCatholics in America(March 1790): "The prospect of nationalprosperity Religions Thereflection on the daysof difficulty anddanger which are nowbefore us is truly animating,and ought to excitethe exertionsof all goodmen to past is renderedthe moresweet, from a consciousnessthat they establishand secure the happinessof their Country, in the permanentdura tion of its Freedomand Independence. America, under the smilesof a DivineProvidence - the are succeededby daysof uncommonprosperity and security. protectionof a goodGovernment - andthe cultivationof manners,morals and piety,cannot fail of attainingan uncommondegree of eminence, in literature,commerce, agriculture, If we havewisdom to makethe best useof the advantages improvementsat homeand respectability abroad." A transcriptof this letter is printed with which we are now favored,we cannotfail, underthe just later in this catalogue. administrationof a goodGovernment, to become a great and a happy people .3 4 The ideathat Americawould serve as an exampleto otherco untries was commonplaceat that time.The bishops of the MethodistEpiscopa l Church,for example, praisedthe Constitutionin a letter to Washingtonas "at presentthe admirationof the world,and may in future becomeits greatexemplar for imitation."Washington himself The Citizensof the UnitedStates of Americahave a right to hadused sim ilar languagein his letter to the HebrewCongregation of Savannah: applaudthemselves for havinggiven to mankindexamples of an "Happilythe peopleof the UnitedStates of Americahave, in manyinstances. exhib 239 ited examplesworthy of imitation." enlargedand liberal policy: a policyworthy of imitation :

22 All possessalikeProfessor liberty Milstein of conscienceand immunities of Civic Engagement of 5Religions Washington'saside concerning toleration has long puzzledscholars. 240for the Jewishcommunity made no mentionof tolerationin their letter to him. Moreover, the citizenship.It is nowno more that toleration is spoken indulgentreligious "toleration" practiced by the Britishand much of enlightened 5 Europewas generallyviewed with favorby Jews,especially when contrasted to the of, as if it was by the indulgenceof oneclass of people, that intoleranttreatment and second-class legal statusthat plaguedthem elsewhere 6 anotherenjoyed the exerciseof their inherentnatural rights . in the world. The ideathat tolerationwas inadequate. implying less than complete religiousfreedom, is moreclosely associated with ThomasJefferson than with George Forhappily the Governmentof the UnitedStates, which givesto Washington.For this reason,the editorof Jefferson'spapers suggested that Jefferson bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance ,7 himselfadded these words to the letter.Yet in 1789.in corresponding with Quakers, Washingtonalso hadmade clear tha t libertyof worshipbelonged to the categoryof requiresonly that they who live underits protectionshould "rights"and not just of "toleration." demean themselves as good citizens ,8 in giving it on 6 The languageof "inherentnatural rights" distinguished religious libe rty in the UnitedStates from Jewish "emancipatio n" in Europe. In Europe,emancipation was all occasionstheir effectual support. generallya "quidpro quo" arrangement. It assumedthat Jewswo uld changetheir ways andleft openthe possibility(often later realized)that privilegesgranted to Jews wouldbe takenaway if they did not sufficiently"improve." Washington, by contrast, It would be inconsistentwith the franknessof my character describedreligious liberty as an "inherentnatural right" that cannever be takenaway. not to avowthat I am pleasedwith yourfavorable opinion of my 7 This phrasebecame the mostfrequently quoted passage from the letter. It improved upona phraseused by Newport'sJews in their letter to the President. Administration,and fervent wishes for my felicity. Maythe Children of the Stockof Abraham,who dwell in this land,continue to merit 8 Somescholars argue that Washington'suse of the phrase"demean themselves as goodcitizens" actually conditioned h is promiseof religiousliberty, as if it only held as andenjoy the goodwill of the otherInhabitants; while every one long as Jewsmaintained appropriate behavior. Others point to the fact that Washington frequentlylinked discussions of libertywith the needfor Americansto "demean shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig-tree ; themselvesas goodcitizens." In the wakeof widespreadresistance to federaltaxation, andthere shall be noneto makehim afraid. Maythe fatherof all as evidencedby Shays'Rebellion (1786 -87) in Massachusettsand the Whiskey Rebellion (1790s)in WesternPennsylvania, his concernfor responsiblecitizenship merciesscatter light and not darknessin our paths,and makeus all is perhapsunsurprising. In his letter to the UnitedBaptist Churches of Virginia(May 1789), he madeclear that he held peopleof everyfaith to the samestandard of good in our severalvocations useful here,and in his own duetime andway citizenship:" I haveoften expressedmy sentiment,that everyman, conducting himself everlastingly happy .10 as a goodcitizen, and being accountable to Godalone for his religiousopinions, oughtto be protectedin worshippingthe Deityaccording to the dictatesof his own conscience."A transcript of this letter is printedlater in this catalogue.

9 A close studyof this phraserevealed that this particularbiblical passage,tha t of G.Washington the ancientHebrew blessing and prophetic vision of the NewJerusalem in which every mansits safely" underhis vine andunder his fig tree,"was employedby Washingtonin his ownwritings morethan anyother passage . Likethe Puritans,he evokesthe ideaof Zionbeing in America,as if the prophet'svision would find its fulfillment in the United States.That he appliedh is ownfavorite scr iptural phraseto the Jewishpeople is extraordinary. 10 TheDeclaration of Independencehad declared "life , liberty andthe pursuit of happiness"to be "unalienablerights." Happiness, at that time, impliednot just an emotionalstate. but a deepersense of wellbeing.

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