Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
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Ayn Rand? Ayn Rand Ayn
Who Is Ayn Rand? Ayn Rand Few 20th century intellectuals have been as influential—and controversial— as the novelist and philosopher Ayn Rand. Her thinking still has a profound impact, particularly on those who come to it through her novels, Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead—with their core messages of individualism, self-worth, and the right to live without the impositions of others. Although ignored or scorned by some academics, traditionalists, pro- gressives, and public intellectuals, her thought remains a major influence on Ayn Rand many of the world’s leading legislators, policy advisers, economists, entre- preneurs, and investors. INTRODUCTION AN Why does Rand’s work remain so influential? Ayn Rand: An Introduction illuminates Rand’s importance, detailing her understanding of reality and human nature, and explores the ongoing fascination with and debates about her conclusions on knowledge, morality, politics, economics, government, AN INTRODUCTION public issues, aesthetics and literature. The book also places these in the context of her life and times, showing how revolutionary they were, and how they have influenced and continue to impact public policy debates. EAMONN BUTLER is director of the Adam Smith Institute, a leading think tank in the UK. He holds degrees in economics and psychology, a PhD in philosophy, and an honorary DLitt. A former winner of the Freedom Medal of Freedom’s Foundation at Valley Forge and the UK National Free Enterprise Award, Eamonn is currently secretary of the Mont Pelerin Society. Butler is the author of many books, including introductions on the pioneering economists Eamonn Butler Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, F. -
RATES of PASSAGE James Van Cleve That Time Flows Or Passes
To appear in Analytical Philosophy. RATES OF PASSAGE James Van Cleve That time flows or passes seems to be among the most obvious and inescapable of truths, yet there is an entire camp of philosophers who deny it—upholders of what is variously called the static theory of time, the eternalist theory, the four-dimensional theory, or the B theory.1 There is an initially compelling argument for their position, expressible in a pair of rhetorical questions: If time passes, must there not be a rate at which it passes? Yet what could that rate possibly be? The very idea of such a rate seems nonsensical or absurd. To make sense of it, we would evidently need to posit a hyper-time in which ordinary time passes, but the notion of hyper-time, besides being mystifying by itself, seems to be but the second step in a preposterous infinite series of time dimensions, hyper-hyper-time and so on up.2 My aim in this paper is to defend the man in the street’s dynamic conception of time by answering this simple yet forceful argument. The sections are as follows: 1. Markosian and Prior on the passage of time 2. Markosian’s reply to the rate-of-passage arguments 3. Rates of passage and infinite regress arguments 4. Absolute lengths and absolute rates 5. An hour per hour all over again 6. Prior’s schema and the puzzle of passage 7. Summary and conclusion Appendix: Shoemaker worlds 1 For a run-down of various related “isms” and the various names in play for them, see Sider 2001 or the introduction to Gale 1967. -
The Anti-Essentialism Paper
The New Pragmatism, Anti-essentialism, and What is Universal: It’s The Situation All The Way Down C. F. Abel Stephen F. Austin State University [email protected] The New Pragmatism, Anti-essentialism, and What is Universal: It’s The Situation All The Way Down C. F. Abel Stephen F. Austin State University [email protected] A well-known scientist once gave a public lecture on astronomy. He described how the Earth orbits around the sun and how the sun, in turn, orbits around the center of a vast collection of stars called our galaxy. At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and said: "What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise." The scientist gave a superior smile before replying, "What is the tortoise standing on?" "You're very clever, young man," said the old lady. "But it's turtles all the way down!" Introduction “New Pragmatism” attacks the very foundation of pragmatic thought by denying that we may ever have any definitive experience. As what we are experiencing is up for grabs, we can never know any situation that we may encounter, and we are left to ground both our knowledge and our values in our language games alone. This paper argues that this set of claims is founded on two errors, one regarding the nature of language games and the other regarding the nature of deconstruction. The “Old Pragmatism,” by way of contrast, is non-essentialist but not anti- essentialist, and it resolves the problem of how we might know “the situation,” given the subjectivity of our observations and the contingencies of our language games, by suggesting that our experiences can be understood as existing in, and constituted by, the totality of their particular instances or modes at the time of inquiry. -
Introducing More Students to Ayn Rand's Ideas
Volume 11, Number 9, September 2005 Introducing More Students to Ayn Rand’s Ideas he 14,332 high school students who entered Ayn Rand’s works but, for lack of funding, cannot Tthe Ayn Rand Institute’s annual essay contest obtain enough copies for their classrooms. With in 2005 will soon receive an acknowledgement of the books, we also send suggested lesson-plans their effort and an invitation to read another of Ayn and teachers guides. Rand’s novels—in the form of a free copy of The In the last three years the Institute has distrib- Fountainhead or Atlas Shrugged. uted more than 165,000 free books. Whereas, to In the fall ARI will send all students who date, the flyers have produced a steadily grow- submitted essays to The Fountainhead contest ing stream of book requests, the Web site has the last academic year a complimentary copy of potential to generate a torrent. Atlas Shrugged. These students are entering their ARI’s ability to supply books depends senior year in school or have recently graduated; on funding. The decision to invite teachers to those starting college are eligible to enter our request books online was made after the Institute contest on Atlas. received a million-dollar contribution to help All 9,525 students who entered the Anthem fund the program. contest as freshmen or sophomores in 2005 will soon receive a copy of The Fountainhead. Of these Foundation’s Grant Is Matched—Again former entrants, students now in the 11th grade are For the second straight year, a foundation in eligible to enter the Fountainhead contest. -
Understanding Rational Egoism
Understanding Rational Egoism CRAIG BIDDLE Copyright © 2018 by The Objective Standard. All rights reserved. The Rational Alternative to “Liberalism” and Conservatism OBAMACARE v. GOVERNMENT’S ASSAULT ANDY KESSLER ON Ayn Rand THE BRILLIANCE THE CONSTITUTION (p.11) ON CAREER COLLEGES (p.53) “EATING PEOPLE” (p.75) Contra Nietzsche CEO Jim Brown’s Vision OF LOUIS PASTEURTHE OBJECTIVE STANDARD THE WAR BETWEEN STANDARD OBJECTIVE THE for the Ayn Rand Institute EDUCATION IN INTELLECTUALS AND CAPITALISM Capitalism A FREE SOCIETY Because Science Alex Epstein on How to The Objective StandardVOL. 6, NO. 2 • SUMMER 2011 THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD The Objective Standard Improve Your World – 2014 VOL. 8, NO. 4 • WINTER 2013 Robin Field on Objectivism Forand theProfit Performing Arts The Objective Standard VOL. 12, NO. 1 • SPRING 2017 “Ayn Rand Said” Libertarianism It is Is Not an Argument VOL. 11, NO. 2 • SUMMER 2016 vs. THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD Time: The Objective Standard Radical Capitalism America CONSERVATIVES’FAULT at Her The Iranian & Saudi Regimes Best Plus: Is SPRING 2017 ∙ VOL. 12, NO. 1 NO. 12, VOL. ∙ 2017 SPRING (p.19) SUMMER 2011 ∙ VOL. 6, NO. 2 NO. 6, ∙ VOL. SUMMER 2011 MUST GO WINTER 2013–2014 ∙ VOL. 8, NO. 4 Plus: Ex-CIA Spy Reza Kahlili on Iran’s Evil Regime (p.24)Hamiltonian Ribbon, Orange Crate, and Votive Holder, 14” x 18” Historian John D. Lewis on U.S. Foreign Policy (p.38) LINDA MANN Still Lifes in Oil SUMMER 2016 ∙ VOL. 11, NO. 2 lindamann.com ∙ 425.644.9952 WWW.CAPITALISTPIG.COM POB 1658 Chicago, IL 60658 An actively managed hedge fund. -
Putnam's Theory of Natural Kinds and Their Names Is Not The
PUTNAM’S THEORY OF NATURAL KINDS AND THEIR NAMES IS NOT THE SAME AS KRIPKE’S IAN HACKING Collège de France Abstract Philosophers have been referring to the “Kripke–Putnam” theory of natural- kind terms for over 30 years. Although there is one common starting point, the two philosophers began with different motivations and presuppositions, and developed in different ways. Putnam’s publications on the topic evolved over the decades, certainly clarifying and probably modifying his analysis, while Kripke published nothing after 1980. The result is two very different theories about natural kinds and their names. Both accept that the meaning of a natural- kind term is not given by a description or defining properties, but is specified by its referents. From then on, Putnam rejected even the label, causal theory of reference, preferring to say historical, or collective. He called his own approach indexical. His account of substance identity stops short a number of objections that were later raised, such as what is called the qua problem. He came to reject the thought that water is necessarily H2O, and to denounce the idea of metaphysical necessity that goes beyond physical necessity. Essences never had a role in his analysis; there is no sense in which he was an essentialist. He thought of hidden structures as the usual determinant of natural kinds, but always insisted that what counts as a natural kind is relative to interests. “Natural kind” itself is itself an importantly theoretical concept, he argued. The paper also notes that Putnam says a great deal about what natural kinds are, while Kripke did not. -
In Defense of Happiness: a Response to the Experience Machine
In Defense of Happiness: A Response to the Experience Machine Introduction Hedonism has seen better days. As a philosophical doctrine, it flourished in the utilitarian climate maintained by the great nineteenth-century British empiricists Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick. And even though utilitarianism continues to hold sway among many contempo rary ethical theorists, its hedonistic foundations have been all but abandoned. Nowadays, most philosophers entertain the idea of hedonism just long enough to dismiss it. Traditionally, hedonism has come in many guises. The term itself is derived from the Greek word hoovi] (hedone), meaning pleasure, and theo ries are hedonistic in virtue of the central role they assign to the notion of pleasure. Psychological hedonism is a view about human motivation. It holds that pleasure is the only possible object of a desire or pursuit. Moral hedon ism contends that pleasure is the only thing one ought to desire or pursue. A third version, rational hedonism, maintains that pleasure is the only thing one has reason to desire and pursue. 1 The most familiar formulation of hedonism, though, and the one with which I am primarily concerned here, is a doctrine about well-being and prudential value. Well-being is itself an elusive concept in need of explanation. An ex haustive and reductive definition is, however, beyond the scope of this essay; I offer instead some synonymous expressions. Although these expressions may not dispel all confusion, they will, I hope, help us recognize what is ascribed to a person when we say that he or she has well-being. -
The Methods of Ethics
The Methods of Ethics Henry Sidgwick Copyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017. All rights reserved [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. Longer omissions are reported between brackets in normal-sized type.—The division of the work into Books, chapters, and numbered sections is Sidgwick’s. —Cross-references follow this system: ‘chapter 3’ means ‘chapter 3 of this Book’. ‘chapter 4.2’ means ‘chapter 4, section 2, of this Book’. ‘II/3’ means ‘Book II, chapter 3’. ‘IV/3.4’ means ‘Book IV, chapter 3, section 4’. An accompanying page-number refers to the page where the passage in question starts.—This version omits most of the 2,000+ cautions that Sidgwick includes, such as ‘I think. ’, ‘I conceive. ’, ‘it seems. ’ and so on. Even with these out of the way, the work doesn’t come across as bullyingly dogmatic.—In this version, most notably on pages 166 and 196, the author addresses the reader (‘you’), but in the original it is always ‘the reader’ and ‘he’.—This version is based on the sixth edition of the work (1901), the last non-posthumous one. The first edition appeared in 1874, the year after Mill died. First launched: October 2011 The Methods of Ethics Henry Sidgwick Contents BOOK I 1 Chapter 1: Introduction........................................................1 Chapter 2: The relation of ethics to politics.............................................7 Chapter 3: Ethical judgments................................................... -
The Metaphysics of Natural Kinds
THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL KINDS Alexander Bird Abstract Rev.8.2—Thursday 12th August, 2010, 11:20 This paper explores the meta- physics of natural kinds. I consider a range of increasingly ontologically com- mitted views concerning natural kinds and the possible arguments for them. I then ask how these relate to natural kind essentialism, arguing that essentialism requires commitment to kinds as entities. I conclude by examining the homeo- static property cluster view of kinds in the light of the general understanding of kinds developed. 1 Introduction The principal aim of this paper is to examine the various options concerning the metaphysics of natural kinds, in particular as regards their ontology. Initially pro- ceed by posing a series of questions whose positive answers correspond to a se- quence of increasingly metaphysically committed views about natural kinds. In sec- tion 2 these questions concern the naturalness and kindhood of natural kinds. This leads, in section 3 to the question whether natural kinds are themselves genuine en- tities. In section 4 I present an argument for a positive answer to the existence ques- tion, that takes essentialism about natural kinds to imply their existence: (having an) essence implies existence. In section 5 I consider the objection that kind essen- tialism reduces to individual essentialism, which would undermine the import of the essence-implies-existence argument. In sections 6 and 7, I put this machinery to work, asking first what sort of entity a natural kind may be (e.g. a set, an uni- versal, or a sui generis entity), and, finally, how homeostatic property cluster view fares when compared to the general conception of natural kinds developed in the preceding sections. -
Miriam Schoenfield
________________________________________________________________________ Miriam Schoenfield ________________________________________________________________________ Department of Philosophy E-mail: [email protected] New York University 5 Washington Place New York, NY 10003 Areas of Specialization and Competence AOS: Epistemology, Metaethics AOC: Philosophy of Mind, Applied Ethics, Logic, Philosophy of Race and Gender Employment Bersoff Fellow – New York University (Fall 2015-Spring 2017) Assistant Professor – The University of Texas at Austin (Fall 2012 – Present) Visiting Scholar – The University of Oxford – New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology (May 2013, May 2014, May 2015) Education Ph.D. in Philosophy Dissertation: Imprecision in Normative Domains Roger White (chair) Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2007 – 2012) B.A. in Philosophy with Highest Honors, in Mathematics with Honors, in Neuroscience summa cum laude Brandeis University (2002 – 2006) Publications - Refereed “The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences” Forthcoming in Noûs “Moral Vagueness is Ontic Vagueness” Forthcoming in Ethics 1 “Bridging Rationality and Accuracy” Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy “A Dilemma for Calibrationism” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2015) 91(2):425-455 “Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism is True and What it Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief” Noûs (2014) 48(2):193-218 “Chilling Out on Epistemic Rationality: A Defense of Imprecise Credences (and other imprecise doxastic attitudes)” -
The Dynamic Theory of Time and Time Travel to the Past
University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Philosophy Department Faculty Publication Series Philosophy 2020 The Dynamic Theory of Time and Time Travel to the Past Ned Markosian Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/philosophy_faculty_pubs The Dynamic Theory of Time and Time Travel to the Past Ned Markosian University of Massachusetts Amherst DOI: 10.2478/disp-2020-0006 BIBLID [0873-626X (2020) 57; pp.137–165] Abstract I argue that time travel to the past is impossible, given a certain meta- physical theory, namely, The Dynamic Theory of Time. I first spell out my particular way of capturing the difference between The Dynamic Theory of Time and its rival, The Static Theory of Time. Next I offer four different arguments for the conclusion that The Dynamic Theory is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past. Then I argue that, even if I am wrong about this, it will still be true that The Dynamic Theory entails that you should not want to travel back to the past. Finally, I conclude by considering a puzzle that arises for those who believe that time travel to the past is metaphysically impossible: What exactly are we thinking about when we seem to be thinking about traveling back in time? For it certainly does not feel like we are thinking about something that is metaphysically impossible. Keywords Time travel, Dynamic Theory of Time, Static Theory of Time, backward causation, presentism. 1 Introduction Most people will tell you that the inexorable passage of time is a real thing, and (for better or worse) one of the more salient aspects of reality.1 For most people endorse what is sometimes called The Dynamic Theory of Time, according to which time really passes, and there are fundamental differences between the past, the present, and the future. -
Learn More Icon Summer 2016
SPRING/SUMMER 2016 Peace Arch Hospital & Community Health FOUNDATION TOUCHING LEGACY FOR PEACE ARCH HOSPITAL HOGG BURSARY AWARDS PEI DOCTOR AN EXTRAORDINARY GIFT TO THE NEW ER LYNNE QUIGLEY & PATRICIA JOHNSTON MEET Carry on the tradition for the Peace Arch Hospital Auxiliary Society ✚ LEADING THE WAY WELCOME TO OUR NEWEST EDITION OF ! As usual, the Foundation office has been buzzing with activity. We wrapped up our 2016 Gala, whichthrive raised a staggering $435,000+ for the purchase of a brand new, modern digital x-ray unit for the hospital’s medical imaging department, and the plans are coming together for the ER expansion and new residential care and hospice facility. Needless to say, it has been all hands on deck! Speaking of the Peace Arch Hospital Gala, we decided to shake things up for 2016 and create a whole new experience for our guests, some of whom come year after year. Our Vintage Vegas themed evening was a huge success complete with Elvis, the Rat Pack and a special appearance by Marilyn Monroe who sang her rendition of Happy Birthday to our outgoing board chair, Art Reitmayer, as only Marilyn can. Look for pictures of this fun night of philanthropy on page 6. I would also like to introduce you to our new board chair, Siobhan Philips, who took the reins just last month. She is a dedicated volunteer and passionate fundraiser who has a long history of giving back to her community. Check out pages 12 and 13 for a profile on Siobhan. Lastly, we feature two extraordinary donors in this issue – Westland Insurance who recently made a gift of $500,000 to the ER expansion project and the late Margaret Rodgers, a wonderful friend of the Foundation who dedicated her final birthday to fundraise for Peace Arch Hospital.