An Archaeological Perspective on the Andean Concept of Camaquen: Thinking Through Late Pre- Columbian Ofrendas and Huacas Tamara L

Wayne State University DigitalCommons@WayneState Anthropology Faculty Research Publications Anthropology 10-1-2009 An Archaeological Perspective on the Andean Concept of Camaquen: Thinking Through Late Pre- Columbian Ofrendas and Huacas Tamara L. Bray Wayne State University, [email protected] Recommended Citation Tamara L. Bray (2009). An Archaeological Perspective on the Andean Concept of Camaquen: Thinking Through Late Pre-Columbian Ofrendas and Huacas. Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 19, pp 357-366. doi:10.1017/S0959774309000547. Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/anthrofrp/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Anthropology at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Anthropology Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState. Bray — Archaeological Perspective on the Andean Concept of Camaquen An Archaeological Perspective on the Andean Concept of Camaquen: Thinking Through Late Pre-Columbian Ofrendas and Huacas Tamara L. Bray Ethnohistoric sources suggest that the indigenous inhabitants of Andean South America saw both people and things as animated or enlivened by a common vital force (camaquen). In approaching the subject of camaquenȱ¢ǰȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ their materiality at the analytical centre, rather than the normally privileged ethnohistoric or ethnographic data, in order to see what new insights into the nature of Pre-Columbian ontologies might be gained from ‘thinking through things’. In this, I follow recent theories premised on the idea that the traditional segregation of concepts and things may hinder ȱȱȱ ǯȱȱ¢ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱǰȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱ contexts dating to the Inca period. The earliest Spanish reports of initial encounters with ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ native Andean peoples render a sense of the profound theoretical stance advocating the idea of ‘thinking strangeness experienced but not yet digested by the through things’, I highlight two key concepts brought European invaders. The alien character of this new forth in the ethnohistoric documentation with regard world can be detected in such comments as those of to Andean ontological assumptions, and then turn to ȱȱȱǻŗşŚŝǼȱȱȱȁę¢ȱ ȱ a consideration of late Pre-Columbian sacred objects pole’ worshipped as the great Andean oracle Pach- ȱ ěȱ ǻofrendas) in light of these. The reas- acamac, or the reported wedding of a young girl to sessment of these archaeological phenomena from a sacred blue stone ‘no bigger than the size of one’s an ontological position that extends the notion of palm’ (Avila 1918, 69–70, cited in Salomon 1991), or ȱȱȬȱȱȱȱĚȱ the confession that a ceramic pot dressed in female back upon our common understanding of these key garb was venerated as the ancestor of a particular ayllu indigenous concepts, enriching our reading of them (Polia 1999, 505). Such observations suggest a radically through a recognition of their necessarily material and ěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ relational nature. of being on the part of indigenous people in the Andes. Within the context of an emerging paradigm The ontological turn in anthropology: in anthropology that seeks to move beyond the dual- thinking through things ȱ¢ȱȱȱȦȮȦĴȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ ‘What would an artifact-oriented anthropology look ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ like if it were not about material culture’ the authors of ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ę¢ȱ ǰȱ a recently published volume entitled Thinking Through ontologies. As an archaeologist, I am most interested Things ask? (Henare et al. 2007, 1). Arguing against the a ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱ prioriȱȱ ȱĴȱȱǰȱȱ ȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ and things, representation and reality, they question the ȱȱȱȱȬȱǯȱĞȱĚ¢ȱ utility of this assumption from an anthropological point Cambridge Archaeological Journal 19:3, 357–66 © 2009 McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research doi:10.1017/S0959774309000547 Received 1 April 2009; Accepted 20 May 2009; Revised 23 July 2009357 ѝђѐіюљȱђѐѡіќћȱȯȱAnimating Archaeology ȱ ǯȱ¢ȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ the understanding that every subject, whether human things might be treated sui generis as meanings (2007, 3) or non-human, has its own point of view, and that and take as their starting point the identity of meaning wherever there is a point of view, there is necessar- and thing, allowing that these may be one and the same, ily a ‘subject position’. Rather than the subject being e.g. that things don’t ‘carry’ meaning but are meaning. ȱȱȱę¡ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ The ultimate aim of this refusal of the Western dichot- view emanates, however, in Amerindian theory, it is omiZation of the mental and the material is to explore the point of view which is understood to activate or other ways of understanding and being in the world create the subject (Viveiros de Castro 2004, 467). — the presumed remit of anthropology — and to work On the basis of such insights as those provided ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ by Viveiros de Castro, Hallowell (1960) and others, of the discipline. Henare et al. (2007) argue that there may well be The authors place their work on the continuum ěȱ ǰȱȱȱěȱ ǰȱȱ of what they describe as a quiet revolution in anthropo- ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱĴȱ logy, characterized as ‘the ontological turn’ (Henare et to the ‘ontological anomalies’ that we encounter as al. 2007, 7–12). This turn involves a movement away anthropologists in our engagement with others and from questions of knowledge and epistemology their understandings of the world. Here I extend these towards those concerned with ontology (see also ideas to the realm of archaeology. ȱǭȱǰȱȱǼǯȱȱę¢ǰȱ they see it as a movement away from the habituation Ethnohistoric insights into native Andean of anthropology to the exigencies of Cartesian dual- ontologies: of persons and things ism. From their perspective, the heuristic prescription of ‘thinking through things’ is what will enable us A key Andean concept for purposes of present discus- to go beyond the common sense assumption of ‘one sion is camay, a native Quechua term that has no clear world, many worldviews’, or the axiom that nature equivalent in Spanish or English. Salomon & Urioste is one, while culture is many, which makes the job (1991, 45) translate camay as ‘to charge’ or ‘to charge of anthropologists, then, the ‘interpretation’ of those being with’, ‘to make’, ‘to give form and force’, or ‘to other worldviews. animate’ (see also Taylor 1974–76; 1987). Camay is fun- They derive the idea of multiple natural worlds ¢ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱ (as opposed to multiple cultural views of nature) from force, or power rather than as something abstract the work of Viveiros de Castro (1998; 2004) and the or generalized. Salomon (1991, 16) invokes the idea notion of ‘perspectival multinaturalism’ he developed of ‘species power’ with respect to this term, as, for on the basis of research into Amazonian cosmologies instance, in the case of the patron animals of shamans, and ethno-metaphysics. As discussed by this author ȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱ (2004, 464–4), a foundational ontological premise of such as visual acuity, speed, or strength. Camay also many Amerindian peoples is that humanity, rather carries the connotation of bringing something extant than animality, constitutes the original condition of ȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱ¡ȱĴȱ all phenomena. From this, it follows that animals and (as opposed to creating something from nothing). In other non-human entities, having once been human the later sixteenth century for instance, ecclesiastical must still be; and while their bodily forms may conceal authorities who were intent upon precisely translating their interior subjectivity or core humanness, this the Christian doctrine for native Quechua speakers aspect of their being is nonetheless understood to be rejected the use of the term camay in favour of the verb formally identical to human consciousness. ‘ruray’ to refer to the creation of the universe, as the The ontological presumption here is one of spir- former term would have suggested ‘a god that was the itual unity and corporeal diversity such that culture, or soul (or hidden principle) of the world rather than its the subject, is the form of the universal, while nature, creator’ (Mannheim 1991, 66).1 Unlike the simple act or the object, is the form of the particular (Viveiros de of creation, which once done is over, camay intends ȱŘŖŖŚǰȱŚŜśǼǯȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱȱ something of continuity in sustaining the being, a con- modern Western belief in the unity of nature, lead- dition that involves an on-going relationship between ing Viveiros de Castro to the label ‘multinaturalism’ the camac (e.g. the ‘camay-er’) and its camasca (e.g. its in order to contrast the Amerindian position with tangible instantiation) (Salomon 1991, 16–17). contemporary ‘multiculturalist’ ontologies (Viveiros Many other cultures share a similar notion of de Castro 2004, 466). The perspectival aspect of Amer- a generative life force that infuses and animates all indian ontology as described by this author involves Ĵǯȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ mana-like concepts are ubiqui- 358 Bray — Archaeological Perspective on the Andean Concept of Camaquen tous in early ethnographic literature, though, as one spiritual beings, but as places from which impersonal author recently commented, ‘mana does not animate magical powers were emanating’. anthropological debate like it used to’ (Holbraad 2007, Various indications in both ethnohistoric reports 190). Relegated to the realm of the mythical, local and the ethnographic literature suggest that ‘huacas concepts of life force, sacred power, etc. have been had vibrantly individual personalities’ (Salomon 1991, out of anthropological fashion for decades. In line 18; see also Salomon 1998). The stories recounted

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