Strategic Cyber Security

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Strategic Cyber Security © 2011 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, June 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this pub- lication may be reprinted, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Publisher: CCD COE Publication Filtri tee 12, 10132 Tallinn, Estonia Tel: +372 717 6800 Fax: +372 717 6308 E-mail: [email protected] www.ccdcoe.org Print: OÜ Greif Trükikoda Design & Layout: Marko Söönurm Legal notice NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence assumes no responsibility for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this book. ISBN 978-9949-9040-5-1 (print) ISBN 978-9949-9040-6-8 (epub) ISBN 978-9949-9040-7-5 (pdf) KENNETH GEERS STRATEGIC CYBER SECURITY NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Abstract This book argues that computer security has evolved from a technical discipline to a strategic concept. The world’s growing dependence on a powerful but vulnerable Internet – combined with the disruptive capabilities of cyber attackers – now threat- ens national and international security. Strategic challenges require strategic solutions. The author examines four nation- state approaches to cyber attack mitigation. • Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) • Sun Tzu’s Art of War • Cyber attack deterrence • Cyber arms control The four threat mitigation strategies fall into several categories. IPv6 is a technical solution. Art of War is military. The third and fourth strategies are hybrid: deter- rence is a mix of military and political considerations; arms control is a political/ technical approach. The Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) is used to place the key research concepts into an influence matrix. DEMATEL analysis demon- strates that IPv6 is currently the most likely of the four examined strategies to improve a nation’s cyber defense posture. There are two primary reasons why IPv6 scores well in this research. First, as a technology, IPv6 is more resistant to outside influence than the other proposed strategies, particularly deterrence and arms control, which should make it a more reliable investment. Second, IPv6 addresses the most significant advantage of cyber attackers today – anonymity. About the Author Kenneth Geers, PhD, CISSP, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), is a Scientist and the U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) in Tallinn, Estonia. To Jeanne 6 CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9 1. Cyber Security and National Security ����������������������������������������������������������������9 THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THIS BOOK �����������������������������������������������������������������������������16 RESEARCH OUTLINE ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������17 II. BIRTH OF A CONCEPT: STRATEGIC CYBER SECURITY �������������������������������19 2. Cyber Security: A Short History ������������������������������������������������������������������������19 THE POWER OF COMPUTERS �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19 THE RISE OF MALICIOUS CODE �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20 LONE HACKER TO CYBER ARMY ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������25 NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������28 MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������31 3. Cyber Security: A Technical Primer ������������������������������������������������������������������33 CYBER SECURITY ANALYSIS ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������33 CASE STUDY: SAUDI ARABIA ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������42 MODELING CYBER ATTACK AND DEFENSE IN A LABORATORY ����������������������������������������������������50 4. Cyber Security: Real-World Impact �������������������������������������������������������������������63 CYBER SECURITY AND INTERNAL POLITICAL SECURITY �����������������������������������������������������������63 CASE STUDY: BELARUS ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������72 INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT IN CYBERSPACE �������������������������������������������������������������������������80 III. NATION-STATE CYBER ATTACK MITIGATION STRATEGIES �����������������������87 5. Next Generation Internet: Is IPv6 the Answer? ������������������������������������������������87 IPV6 ADDRESS SPACE ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������87 IMPROVED SECURITY? ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������88 IPV6 ANSWERS SOME QUESTIONS, CREATES OTHERS ��������������������������������������������������������������89 PRIVACY CONCERNS �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������91 UNEVEN WORLDWIDE DEPLOYMENT ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������92 DIFFERENCES OF OPINION REMAIN....................................................................................94 6. Sun Tzu: Can Our Best Military Doctrine Encompass Cyber War? �������������������95 WHAT IS CYBER WARFARE? ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������95 WHAT IS ART OF WAR? ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������96 STRATEGIC THINKING ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������97 CULTIVATING SUCCESS ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������99 OBJECTIVE CALCULATIONS �������................................................................................... 102 TIME TO FIGHT ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������104 THE IDEAL COMMANDER ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������107 7 ART OF CYBER WAR: ELEMENTS OF A NEW FRAMEWORK �������������������������������������������������������109 7. Deterrence: Can We Prevent Cyber Attacks? ��������������������������������������������������111 CYBER ATTACKS AND DETERRENCE THEORY ����������������������������������������������������������������������111 CYBER ATTACK DETERRENCE BY DENIAL ���������������������������������������������������������������������������113 CYBER ATTACK DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT �������������������������������������������������������������������117 MUTUALLY ASSURED DISRUPTION (MAD) ��������������������������������������������������������������������������121 8. Arms Control: Can We Limit Cyber Weapons? �����������������������������������������������123 CYBER ATTACK MITIGATION BY POLITICAL MEANS ��������������������������������������������������������������123 THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION ���������������������������������������������������������������������������124 CWC: LESSONS FOR CYBER CONFLICT �������������������������������������������������������������������������������125 TOWARD A CYBER WEAPONS CONVENTION �����������������������������������������������������������������������127 THE CHALLENGES OF PROHIBITION AND INSPECTION �����������������������������������������������������������130 IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH RESULTS................................................132 9. DEMATEL and Strategic Analysis �������������������������������������������������������������������132 DEMATEL INFLUENCING FACTORS �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������133 NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������133 KEY CYBER ATTACK ADVANTAGES �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������135 CYBER ATTACK CATEGORIES ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������137 STRATEGIC CYBER ATTACK TARGETS ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������138 CYBER ATTACK MITIGATION STRATEGIES ��������������������������������������������������������������������������139 10. Key Findings �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������142 THE “EXPERT KNOWLEDGE” MATRIX ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������142 CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������146 CALCULATING INDIRECT INFLUENCE ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������147 ANALYZING TOTAL INFLUENCE ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������150 V. CONCLUSION ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������155 11. Research contributions ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������155
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