Unfolding Transatlantic Eugenics in Disability Scholarship

Articles “[L]ess than accessible and seriously disheartening”: Unfolding Transatlantic Eugenics in Disability Scholarship Gesine Wegner Abstract As a discussion between American historian Ruth Schwartz Conan and Disabil- ity Studies scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson illustrates, reaching consensus on what a term like eugenics means and how it might be used accurately in contemporary discourse proves to be highly difficult. This article shows that Disabil- ity Studies methodologies enforce a reassessment of the United States’ eugenic past, and, further, that by looking at the ‘long arm’ of this eugenic ideology, Dis- ability Studies has provided ample ground for the reconsideration of eugenic discourses of normalization and their influence on biopolitical questions of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Looking at these discourses through a Literary Studies lens, I aim to stress the importance of creative nonfiction within Disability Studies writing. Disability Studies scholars challenge academic forms of knowledge production through unconventional aesthetics and change how questions of eugenics (past and present) are being addressed in the United States and beyond. 1 Introduction From heated discussions about genetic diagnosis and prenatal screening to questions of assisted suicide and life support: whenev- er eugenics are brought into the equation, the term most frequently functions as a means of accusation, subsequently leading to debates about the appropriateness of the word for current bioethical discussions. In what contexts is it justified to call a practice eugenic, and, more importantly, how do we define the term in the first place? These fundamental questions characterize an online debate about the past and present of eugenics held by Disability Studies scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson and historian Ruth Schwartz Cowan (Cowan and Garland-Thomson). As a specialist in the History of Science, Technol- ogy, and Medicine, Cowan defines eugenics as a social movement of Amerikastudien / American Studies 64.2 (2019): 189-214 189 Gesine Wegner 1 Developments made the past, which gained worldwide popularity during the first half of in the medical sciences include practices of genetic the twentieth century. In line with her book Heredity and Hope: The engineering, prenatal test- Case for Genetic Screening (2008), Cowan moves on to emphasize the ing, and assisted suicide— to name just some of divide between “negative eugenics” and “positive eugenics” that has the issues that are also historically been used by policymakers to differentiate between dif- prominently discussed in public media. Less often ferent eugenic practices (Bland and Hall 219). While negative eugenics addressed in public dis- seek to reduce certain parts of the population through measures such as course are the implications for disabled lives that arise immigration restriction, institutionalization, sterilization, and ethnic from the development of cleansing, the term positive eugenics refers to discourses and measures stem cell treatments and the adoption of regenera- of normalization that seek to supposedly optimize the genetic progress tive medicine. According of a population. In light of current biopolitical discussions that arise to a 2008 article by Shelley Tremain, some of the recent from far-reaching developments made in the medical sciences (see and most contentious Kuczewski 36-44; Tremain 102; Goering 126-29; Shildrick, “Deciding” 1 discursive objects within the discussion of these 212), it seems striking that Cowan explicitly accuses practices of ‘nega- very different practices are tive eugenics’ of having “give[n] eugenics a bad name” (Cowan and “quality of life,” “end of life,” “normalcy,” “enhancement,” Garland-Thomson). By not simply condemning these practices but by and “futility” (102). Mark purposefully alleging that they have brought eugenics into disrepute, Kuczewski claims that scholars of bioethics focus Cowan legitimizes practices of “positive eugenics.” While advocates of too much on debates of eugenics in the twentieth century certainly tried to enforce their ideas whether and when disabled people should be allowed through the implementation of very different practices that cannot and or assisted to die instead should not easily be equated, all of these practices—positive and nega- of considering disabled life as it is lived (36). Indeed, tive eugenics—were rooted in a strictly evaluative logic and the idea of conflicts between bioethi- human selection. Early twentieth-century publications such as Caleb cists and disability theorists often arise over the permis- William Saleeby’s Parenthood and Race Culture: An Outline of Eugenics sibility of euthanasia and (1909) draw attention to the fact that, from its early stages, positive and physician-assisted suicide. Far from merely criticizing negative eugenics were understood to be different sides of the same new medical treatment, coin, following the same principle: “one [positive eugenics] would seek Disability Studies scholars have also pointed out a to encourage the parenthood of the worthy, the other [negative eugen- reluctance to use medical ics] to discourage the parenthood of the unworthy” (172). Eugenics in developments in the treatment of disabled people. its entirety has always had, as Philippa Levine and Alison Bashford Abortion, for example, is assert, “an evaluative logic to its core. Some human life was of more frequently justified on the grounds of disability while value—to the state, the nation, the race, the future generations—than treatment of medically other human life” (3-4). In reducing her analysis to concentrate merely correctable conditions can be denied on grounds of a on the differences between negative and positive eugenics, Cowan ne- fetus’s disability, e. g., in the glects to acknowledge the shared politics of normalization that under- case of Down syndrome. lie both types of practices as well as their mutual goal of regulating This case, as brought for- 2 ward by Margrit Shildrick, is populations. only exemplary of the ways in which biomedical prac- In conversation with Cowan, Literary and Cultural Studies scholar tice has come to operate Rosemarie Garland-Thomson sheds light on this problematic divide as against the disabled body (Shildrick, “Deciding” 212). she ultimately uncouples eugenics from its historical usage related to the 2 Due to its early devel- Nazis. In contrast to her counterpart, she understands eugenics more opments in prenatal care, France is used by Cowan broadly as a “way of shaping human communities or shaping human as a desirable example of populations” (Cowan and Garland-Thomson). In redefining eugenics as positive eugenics. This choice seems at least a specific, culturally determined mode of thinking about community, surprising, considering Garland-Thomson destabilizes Francis Galton’s original understanding France’s history as the first of eugenics as “the science of improving the human stock through selec- 190 Amst 64.2 (2019): 189-214 “[L]ess than accessible and seriously disheartening” 3 tive breeding” (Galton 24-25). Instead of understanding eugenics as a rational, semi-scientific mode of thinking about different bodies, a relic of the past, Garland-Thomson refers to eugenics as a complex biopolitical regime. She rejects the claim that eugenic ideas and practices can only be considered as phenomena of the past: Although eugenics itself—the word, as you well know and have pointed out—comes from a very specific history within the development of medicine and science, in some sense what we might call eugenics—that is to say the shaping of human communities—has been practiced in lots of different ways over the course of history. (Cowan and Garland-Thomson) While the scientific character of eugenics has long been discredited, it is precisely this discrediting of eugenics after the Holocaust that has led scholars of American Studies and other fields to miss the continuous country where eugenic 4 violence against disabled impact of eugenic ideology on American and other modernities. For people took place (Mitchell and Snyder, “The Eugenic Garland-Thomson, eugenic thought and its prevalence in contemporary Atlantic” 852). Indeed, thinking raises the question: whom do we talk about when we concep- “educational techniques” from France would be tualize the “human” and its place in different socio-cultural settings, directly exported to the past and present? The notable tension and disagreement between Gar- United States to treat so called “idiocy” (854). As land-Thomson and Cowan—and by extension between Disability Stud- this article will further re- ies and traditional research in History—are emblematic for discussions veal, when looking at these countries and their eugenic about eugenics, which frequently seem to generate more questions than histories in isolation, one they are able to answer. Failing to find a shared language with which does not only risk missing the importance of their to define eugenics, their discussion further illustrates that, thus far, no transatlantic engagement consensus can be found regarding a definition of “eugenics” and how in eugenics but might also overlook parts of today’s the term relates to contemporary discussions in bioethics. Reaching far critical scholarship on beyond questions of mere terminology, such discussions make differenc- eugenics that has devel- oped within the context of es between the embodied epistemologies of Disability Studies, on the Transatlantic Studies.

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