Derivatives Financial Innovation and Stability
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FSR FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW JULY 2010 DERIVATIVES FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND STABILITY 110–014 FFSR14_Page_de_Garde.inddSR14_Page_de_Garde.indd 1 113/07/20103/07/2010 008:55:278:55:27 www.banque-france.fr “No part of this publication may be reproduced other than for the purposes stipulated in Article L.122-5.2° and 3° a) of the Intellectual Property Code without the express authorisation of the Banque de France or, where applicable, without complying with the terms of Article L.122-10. of the said code.” © Banque de France - 2010 ISSN 1636-6964 FFSR14_Page_de_Garde.inddSR14_Page_de_Garde.indd 2 113/07/20103/07/2010 008:55:538:55:53 CONTENTS Redesigning OTC derivatives markets to ensure fi nancial stability I-IV CHRISTIAN NOYER, Governor of the Banque de France ARTICLES Credit default swaps: what are the social benefi ts and costs? RONALD W. ANDERSON, London School of Economics 1 Fiat lux – Shedding new light on derivatives markets MICHEL BARNIER, European Commission 15 Euro public debt and the markets: sovereign fundamentals and CDS market dynamics LAURENCE BOONE, LAURENT FRANSOLET AND SØREN WILLEMANN, Barclays Capital 19 Derivatives: an insurer’s perspective HENRI DE CASTRIES AND BENOÎT CLAVERANNE, AXA Group 27 Credit default swaps and fi nancial stability RAMA CONT, CNRS and Columbia University 35 Credit default swaps – Financial innovation or fi nancial dysfunction? SATYAJIT DAS, Risk consultant 45 Is there a case for banning short speculation in sovereign bond markets? DARRELL DUFFIE, Stanford University 55 Over-the-counter derivative markets in India – Issues and perspectives SHYAMALA GOPINATH, Reserve Bank of India 61 OTC derivatives and central clearing: can all transactions be cleared? JOHN HULL, University of Toronto 71 21st century fi nance cannot do without a sound regulation of the OTC derivatives markets JEAN-PIERRE JOUYET, Autorité des marchés fi nanciers 81 An industrial organisation approach to the too-big-to-fail problem JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, Swiss Finance Institute, University of Zurich and Toulouse School of Economics 93 OTC derivatives: fi nancial stability challenges and responses from authorities DANIELA RUSSO, European Central Bank 101 Under-collateralisation and rehypothecation in the OTC derivatives markets MANMOHAN SINGH, International Monetary Fund 113 Silos and silences Why so few people spotted the problems in complex credit and what that implies for the future GILLIAN TETT, Financial Times 121 Mitigating systemic risk in OTC derivative markets NOUT WELLINK, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, De Nederlandsche Bank 131 What risks and challenges do credit default swaps pose to the stability of fi nancial markets? ORICE WILLIAMS BROWN, US Government Accountability Offi ce 137 OTC derivatives market structure and the credit profi les of wholesale investment banks ALEXANDER YAVORSKY, Moody’s Investors Service 143 What do network theory and endogenous risk theory have to say about the effects of central counterparties on systemic stability? JEAN-PIERRE ZIGRAND, London School of Economics 153 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability • July 2010 FFSR14_Sommaire.inddSR14_Sommaire.indd 1 113/07/20103/07/2010 008:56:358:56:35 CONTENTS Credit default swap and bond markets: which leads the other? VIRGINIE COUDERT AND MATHIEU GEX, Banque de France 161 Concentration risk and the optimal number of central counterparties for a single asset FABIEN RENAULT, Banque de France 169 RÉSUMÉS 177 PUBLISHED ARTICLES 185 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability • July 2010 FFSR14_Sommaire.inddSR14_Sommaire.indd 2 113/07/20103/07/2010 008:56:598:56:59 Redesigning OTC derivatives markets to ensure fi nancial stability CHRISTIAN NOYER Governor Banque de France he turbulences experienced during the crisis Very large losses in the fi nancial sector and the on OTC derivatives markets have prompted need for taxpayers’ money to come to the rescue of Tregulators to fi nd solutions to enhance the institutions nearing bankruptcy was a stark reminder smooth functioning of these markets. It is crystal that this risk had progressively been overlooked or clear that in a context of inadequate underwriting at least inappropriately accounted for and managed. practices in the US subprime mortgage markets and A consensus among policy makers and beyond has excessive granting of loans by non regulated entities, therefore emerged to try and force a change in the fi nancial innovation based on credit derivatives OTC derivatives market to make it adopt as much as was at the heart of the fi nancial crisis. The years possible the technical features and infrastructures of preceding the crisis were indeed marked by the organised markets. This is a very important challenge creation and development of so-called structured since derivatives transactions remain largely traded fi nancial products, which consist in constructing over the counter and exchange traded derivatives fi nancial instruments using different «underlying» only account for 10% of transactions. elements, including these subprime loans. The subprime crisis spread to some structured products The consensus reached by the G20 leaders in as the latter were partly composed of them, and then Pittsburgh and reaffi rmed recently in Toronto is to structured products across the board since there therefore a very pressing issue and explains why the were doubts as to the actual composition of these setting up of resilient OTC derivatives infrastructures products. The infl ated use of securitisation led to the is a widely shared key priority. Progress must indeed proliferation of these structured and very complex be made in two directions: increasing transparency products (CDOs of ABS, CDO squared). It also and improving counterparty risk management. contributed to the rise of a new business model for banks allowing them to switch from their traditional The devil is in the details and the main challenge “originate and hold” role to a new “originate and for regulators now lies in fi nalising the rules and distribute” function. Financial innovation and credit incentives that will be conducive to reaching these derivatives in particular thus contributed to bolster targets. We need to fi nd the right balance in order to credit growth and the buildup of excessive credit give market participants enough incentives to better risks as, in the process, credit providers somewhat manage their risks without threatening fi nancial lost skin in the game and the system as a whole innovation or reducing their incentives to hedge built up signifi cantly leveraged positions on what economic risks at a reasonable cost. turned out to be low credit quality claims. In addition, the opacity of the markets reinforced the potential OTC derivatives are bilaterally traded contracts for excessive risk-taking and contagion effects across designed to isolate and transfer market or credit market participants: AIG and Lehman Brothers both risk from one counterparty to another. Given that in different domains illustrate the systemic risks they are negotiated bilaterally, they are tailor-made embedded in an unrestrained use of derivatives. and can precisely suit specific hedging needs. Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability • July 2010 I FFSR14_NOYER.inddSR14_NOYER.indd I 112/07/20102/07/2010 117:34:187:34:18 ARTICLES Christian Noyer: “Redesigning OTC derivatives market to ensure fi nancial stability” As such, they serve important economic and risk for “appropriate” measures.3 Such measures may not management purposes. They also foster fi nancial be effi cient and, worse, may be counterproductive. innovation and contribute to the completeness of They may not be effi cient since security prices are fi nancial markets.1 Regulation should be designed not formed in national contexts but on global markets. in such a way that these economic and fi nancial What would not be possible in Paris or Frankfurt could benefi ts are not undermined. However, loopholes in still be allowed in London or New York for instance. the design and infrastructure of these markets have They may also be counterproductive since they could led to misuse these instruments. We need to address deter activities away from our market onto others and these fl aws in order to foster market effi ciency and they could signifi cantly alter the liquidity of securities a level playing fi eld. aimed by the restriction since foreign investors may shy away from them and turn to other opportunities. The issue of opacity was clearly brought to the fore during the crisis. The very limited disclosure Instead of banning and creating incentives to relocate in these unregulated markets sometimes resulted certain activities elsewhere or circumvent those in an overestimation of risks and fuelled market rules, it is preferable to attract and better supervise. uncertainty, as counterparties had no information This can be done: about each other’s exposures.2 To be fair, though, information regarding individual counterparties is • First, by integrating OTC markets into regulated generally not available either in organised markets and supervised market infrastructures such as but it is not a source of concern since these markets trading platforms, trade repositories and CCPs. have developed structures to mitigate counterparty In the case of sovereign CDSs this will mean that risks. This opacity led to an undifferentiated rise