The 1984 Reagan-Mondale Presidential Campaign : An Analysis of the Budget Deficit Issue

Takeshi Suzuki (Asia University)

When Walter Mondale boldly revealed his intention to raise taxes to re- duce budget deficits in 1984, it suddenly became the dominant issue of the presidential campaign. Hence, the Japanese mass media applied a metaphor to, and labeled, his strategy as " Niku o kirasete hone o tatsu," which means " to chop the enemy's bone by sustaining serious injury." The Japanese mass media, almost unanimously, jumped at that metaphor to describe Mon- dale's strategy against Ronald Reagan. Considering the " cognitive " func- tion of metaphoric expressions, I believe that an insightful analysis may be gained through their perspective. Actually, in order for one to employ the strategy of " Niku o kirasete hone o tatsu" against another, I believe that there are three conditions, at least psychologically, to be met: (1) He/she is in an extremely disadvantageous position in comparison with his/her opponent; (2) there is no major alterna- tive for him/her in the situation; and (3) in spite of its great risk, he/she can expect a great gain from the success of the strategy. Thus, this is a strategy to " ensure defeat of the enemy by taking great risk." In other words, the old Japanese saying implies the English idea of the last resort. Since the metaphor could be used only for situations which satisfied the above-men- tioned conditions, its application will provide an opportunity to explore a risky strategy. Therefore, in this paper, I analyze Mondale's strategy against Reagan on the budget deficit as an example of a risky strategy in terms of the

* The author would like to thank Dr . Michael D. Hazen, Wake Forest University, and Dr. Ellen R. Gold, University of Kansas, who have generously provided council, suggestions, and materials for this essay. 30 situation, possible strategies, and the outcome.

How Requirements of the Metaphor Met the 1984 Situation A close look at the 1984 presidential campaign reveals how Mondale's posi- tion exactly met the three preconditions. In fact, Mondale had no realistic choice but employ the strategy of "Niku o kirasete hone o tatsu" against Reagan. First, Mondale was far behind President Reagan in the opinion polls. Time reported that, " Polls have never looked gloomer for Democrats : a na- tional survey by NBC News, published last week, showed Ronald Reagan leading Mondale by an astonishing 62% to 32% " (" Poised " 22). Thus, Mondale was in an extremely disadvantageous position compared with Reagan. Second, the deficit problem could be the "Achilles' heel " for Reagan, since one of his promises in 1980 was a balanced budget by 1983. In fact, de- spite his overwhelming popularity among Americans, growing deficits re- mained a major problem for which " Reaganomics " was primarily respon- sible. Not only did Reagan fail to reduce the 52 billion dollars deficit, but he boostedthe budget deficit to 166 billion dollars ("A Beastly " 88). Therefore , it seemed natural for Mondale to be attempted to contest the deficit issue during the campaign. Mondale argued : " One of the key tests of leader- ship is whether one sees clearly the nature of the problems confronted by our nation. And perhaps the dominant domestic issue of our time is what do we do about these enormous deficits " (" Debate " 1443). Finally, while Mondale could expect a great gain by demonstrating a threat and a need to solve the deficit problem, it also entailed great risks for him. Businessweekaccounted for Mondale's great gain, when it predicted: " If the environment of overspending and undertaxing persists, budget shortfalls will grow ever larger. The national debt will soar to nearly $1.6 trillion by the end of this year from $514 billion in 1975. If present trends continue, the debt will double by the end of the decade and amount to $11,000 for every man, woman, and child in the nation" [emphasis added] (" How to Cut " 51). Therefore, could Mondale have indicted the budget deficit as a major failure of the Reagan administration, it would strongly motivate the electorate to vote for Mondale. Mondale's choice to argue for tax increases, on the other hand, was risky 『時 事 英 語 学研 究 』No .XXXII(1993年9月) 31 for two reasons. Initially, Mondale must prove that his plan was not merely solvent but necessary to cope with the budget crisis; otherwise, people would vote against Mondale bacause of his " unnecessary " taxation . Although Mondale promised to reduce the budget deficit, many voters were uncertain whether tax increases were in fact necessary. Edward Yardeni , economist of Prudential-Bache Securities stated: "After hearing most economists shout wolf for two years about the deficit, people are starting to wonder whether the supply-siders might be right after all " ("A Beastly " 88). Thus, the swift recovery of economy made it difficult for Mondale to exploit the budget issue against Reagan. Unless Mondale had proved that tax increases were an inevitable part of the solution, his plan would do harm to him rather than do good, ensuring already inferior Mondale's loss in the upcoming election . In addition, Mondale must make Reagan concede that he would raise taxes if he was re-elected President; otherwise, Mondale's strategy would backlash and hurt his own credibility badly because his statement appeared a " lie " about a highly popular president. While Mondale insisted that Reagan had a secret plan to increase taxes, Reagan constantly denied such an intention by saying that spending reductions and strong economic recovery would trim the deficit ("A Beastly " 88). Thus, Mondale needed to show the va- lidity of his statement.

Methodology In an attempt to discover their rhetorical handling of budget deficits, both Mondale and Reagan's speeches in the 1984 campaign are examined. For Mondale, I will use Excerpts from the Speechesof Walter F. Mondale: Cam- paign for the Presidency, 1982-1984 as a resource for the analysis. All the five speeches in the package during the 1984 campaign were examined. Since the speeches were selected by Mondale himself, it is reasonable to as- sume that important addresses were included, i.e., " Speech at the National Press Club," January 3, 1984; " Tampa Rally Speech," March 6, 1984; " Presidential Nomination Acceptance Address," July 19, 1984: " Speech on Human Rights," October 29, 1984; and " Speech at Abysinnian Baptist Church," November 1, 1984. For Reagan, I will use Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 32 Book 11-June 30 to December31, 1984 (1441-62) as a resource for the anal- ysis. Based on the subject index, six speeches in which Reagan talked chiefly about the budget deficit were selected and examined, namely, "Remarks at a Reagan-Bush rally in Atlanta Georgia," June 26, 1984; " Radio Address to the Nation on Deficit Reduction and Taxation," August 4, 1984; " Presi- dential Nomination Acceptance Address," August 23, 1984; " Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at the Choosing a Future ' conference in Chicago," Illinois, September 5, 1984; " Remarks and a Question-and-An- swer Session at the Economic Club of Detroit " in Detroit, Michigan, Octo- ber 1, 1984; and " Remarks at a Reagan-Bush Rally in Portland," Oregon, October 23, 1984. Also, I will explore the transcript of the " Debate Between President Re- agan and Former Vice President Mondale in Louisville, Kentucky, October 7, 1984 " (Public Papers) because the first presidential debate focused upon do- mestic issues. An analysis of the transcript will provide us with a unique op- portunity to examine interaction between two candidates on the deficit issue.

Mondale's Strategies Against Reagan With regard to the budget deficit, Mondale used three major strategies to attack Reagan. First, Mondale criticized Reagan by saying that he had spent too much on defense and too little on welfare. He argued that an ex- pansion of the military spending was one of the main causes of the deficit. In terms of the first strategy, Mondale also used contrasts to attack Reagan. effectively. For example, in his speech on human rights, Mondale contrast- ed money spent on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) with that on food program, and money spent on the Contras with that on African people (" Human rights "). Mondale's second major strategy was to criticize the result of the 1981 tax cuts by indicating that Reagan made the rich richer and the poor poorer. Specifically, Mondale demonstrated in three ways that Reagan's tax cuts were unfair, and at the same time caused the deficit. First, Mondale argued that Reagan caused hardships for the poor, the sick, the young, women, the hungry, and the homeless. Second, Mondale attacked the rich and big busi- nesses which benefited under the Reagan administration. In so doing, Mon- 『時 事英 語学 研 究』No .XXXII(1993年9月) 33 dale used a repetition strategy: The rich and big business are going to begin to pay their fair share of taxes under the Mondale Administration. To the 90,000 profitable cor- porations who paid no taxes last year, my message is this: your free ride is over. To the health lobby, my message is this: your profits and high fees will no longer come ahead of affordable health care for patients . . . To the big oil companies, and the utilities, and the telephone companies, my message is this: the rip-offs are over . . . (" Tampa Rally " 40) Third, Mondale asked the American people if they really enjoyed the ad- vantages of Reagan's tax cuts by turning Reagan's favorite question against him. It was clearly Mondale's most effective attack on Reagan's tax cuts, when he told us: The President's favorite question is: Are you better off? Well, if you're wealthy, you're better off. If you're middle income, you're about where you were. And if you're modest income, you're worse off. That's what the economists tell us. (" Debate " 1461)

The last major strategy employed by Mondale was to argue that the pre- sent economic prosperity was based on the future burden so that his plan should be adopted to remedy the situation. He also accused Reagan of not presenting any countermeasure to solve the deficit problem. According to Mondale, his plan would reduce the deficit by two-thirds over the next five years, mostly by curbing the growth of defense spending and raising taxes for families with annual income of more than $25,000 ("A Beastly " 88). Mondale stated his arguments in the presidential nominee acceptance ad- dress, when he said: Here is the truth about the future; we are living on borrowed money and borrowed time. These deficits hike interest rates, clobber exports, stunt investment, kill jobs, undermine growth, cheat our kids and shrink our future. Whoever is inaugurated in January, the American people will have to pay Mr. Reagan's bills. (61) This part of the speech was carefully written to escape from the two risks previously argued. Initially, Mondale claimed that it was inevitable for the American people to " pay Mr. Reagan's bills " regardless of the result of the presidential election. In so doing, Mondale attempted to provide an im- 34 pression that Reagan was the person responsible for tax increases. Next, Mondale promised the voters to cut the deficit by two-thirds by the end of his first term as part of his strategy of criticizing Reagan's tax cut. He charged Reagan with not telling his secret intention to raise taxes. He maintained that Reagan would raise taxes unfairly, but that Mondale would not do so. Thus, Mondale intended to, at least, make himself appear an honest and fair candidate. The biggest problem in Mondale's third major strategy was that Reagan had never mentioned his intention to raise taxes to solve the deficit problem. Reagan rather stated that spending reductions and the strong economic growth would trim the deficit ("A Beastly "). Thus, no one was certain whether Reagan really had a plan to raise taxes or not if he was re-elected Pres- ident. The dilemma, as a result, led Mondale to make the following state- ment: " I challenge Mr. Reagan to put his plan on the table next to mine- and debate it with me on national television. Americans want the truth about the future—not after the election, but now " ("Acceptance " 61). In reality, the focus of the first Reagan-Mondale debate was the deficit issue. Both candidates discussed the cause of the budget deficit, uses of the budget, and the plan to solve the problem. During the debate, Mondale successfully employed all the three strategies although Mondale could not convince Reagan to admit that he would raise taxes. According to Time, there was an indication, " in a New York Times / CBS News poll of 329 voters taken immediately after the debate on Sunday night, 43% thought Mondale had won, while 34% judged Reagan the victor " (" Getting " 26). Thus, at least in a short term, " The shift in momentum began to be felt almost as soon as the cameras blinked off on the first debate " (" Gettting " 25). In the long run, however, Mondale's bold strategies caused Reagan's landslide victory. Why then did Mondale's strategies fail? The purpose of the next section of this paper is, therefore, to describe Re- agan's strategies against Mondale.

Reagan's Strategies Against Mondale Before the first debate with Mondale, Reagan spoke about the budget defi- cit as well as other campaign issues. With regard to handling the deficit 『時 事 英 語 学 研 究 』 No .XXXII (1993 年9 月) 35 issue, Reagan used five major strategies. First , Reagan explained to voters what he really said about tax increases. Reagan insisted that he had given his position against tax increases, but that when he added one qualifier it had been distorted. Reagan stated at the " rally in Atlanta ": What I said was, if and when we bring government spending down to where we have a government that can fulfill its responsibilities and do those things the people require of government, and then, at that bottom level, that still is above what our tax system is bringing in in revenues, yes, then we would have to look and make those two balance so that we would be spending within our means. (1091) Thus, Reagan denied specifically his intention to raise taxes. Not only did Reagan strongly deny his intention to raise taxes, but he attacked the credi- bility of Mondale's attack on his positon. Hence this strategy was intended to make Mondale's risk associated with Reagan's secret plan likely. Namely, Mondale has been lying to American voters. The second major strategy employed by Reagan was to blame the Dem- ocrats-controlling Congress which was responsible for the budget deficit. Reagan argued that all spending originated in the Congress, which did not want to regulate their spending ("Atlanta "). Reagan also charged the Con- gress with rejecting a constitutional amendment mandating that the govern- ment stop spending more than it took in and a line-item veto on appropria- tion bills (" Economic Club "). Though such attacks on the Congress provided Reagan with a good ex- cuse for the deficit spending, the strategy was somewhat problematic. If he wanted to indict the Congress as a vital cause of the problem, Reagan must prove that he could change their attitude; otherwise, his explanation might lead to a conclusion that ultimately Reagan could not solve the problem. Third, Reagan questioned the workability of Mondale's plan to decrease the budget deficit. Reagan presented two reasons why Mondale's plan would fail to solve the problem. First, Reagan argued that Mondale mis- estimated the amount of new government spending. Reagan pointed out that, although Mondale stated that his increase would total about $30 billion per year, other sources, including the Wall Street Journal, said that the in- creased spending would be almost $90 billion. Therefore, even if Mondale 36 said he would cut defense, health care, and agriculture programs by a total of $55-60 billion, Reagan maintained the deficits would be higher than Mondale assumed (" Radio " 1122). Next, Reagan argued that Mondale also mis- calculated the necessary tax increases to reduce the deficit: " the truth is he'd need an increase of more than twice his $60 billion, an increase of $135 bil- lion to square with his promises. That averages $1,500 in increased taxes for every American household, and one way or another, that means you. It's the same tired old formula—tax and tax to spend and spend " (" Radio " 1122). The fourth major strategy employed by Reagan was to compare his own approach to deficit reduction with Mondale's. Regan argued that the deficit should be reduced primarily by reducing wasteful government spending, not by raising taxes: Through the Grace commission, for example, we've developed 2,478 recommendations of possible ways to reduce spending without hurting the needy ... We've already begun to implement almost 20 percent of them. We're still completing our review of the rest, but they're there for all to see, and every one that is worth implementing will be impre- mented. (1122-3) Finally, Reagan never talked about the budget deficit in isolation. He always first demonstrated the economic recovery, and then added that further economic growth would reduce the deficit. Reagan looked at the deficit as being partly structural and the result of the ecomonic slump : " Now, as you bring back the economy and it expands, even at the lowest tax rates that we put in as an incentive to help bring the economy, your revenues grow " (" choosing a future " 1238). The last major strategy was particularly important for Reagan since it demonstrated his achievement in domestic policies, i.e., economic expansion. At the same time, such a strategy contributed to appearing inevitability of tax increases unlikely. Namely, Mondale's tax increases would be unnecessary, hence, he should not be elected President. Overall, Reagan successfully prepared against all of Mondale's attackds on the deficit. In the first debate, however, Reagan did not do well as he should. Time explained the reasons for his failure: " One Reagan associ- 『時 事 英 語 学 研 究 』 No.XXXII (1993 年9 月) 37 ate pointed a finger at White House Aide and Chief Debate Coach Richard Darman. Says this advisor: ' The whole attitude of Darman was to make sure that the President didn't screw up.' Other aides insisted that nearly everyone involved was equally at fault for putting too much stress on avoid- ing factual gaffes, and for that matter, the President was overly eager to rebut Mondale point by point and prove himself a master of detail " (" Getting " 27). As indicated earlier, the concentration upon the deficit issue must have upset Reagan, putting him on the wrong course in the debate. Actually, after the first presidential debate, Reagan's rhetorical changeover pertaining to the budget deficit was striking. He simply stopped mentioning the deficit problem. Instead, Reagan started focusing on optimistic views of the economy which guided us to a bright future. According to the subject index of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, during the campaign, Reagan touched upon the deficit prob- lem only three times after the first debate. Two of them were brought up during interviews, so Reagan was forced to comment on the deficit. More- over, the other mention did not really talk about the deficit itself: My opponent is concerned now about the deficit. But back during the Jerry Ford years, he proposed that the deficit should be doubled be- cause a deficit would stimulate the economy. (" Portland " 1645) Thus, Reagan made up his mind not to discuss the budget deficit as an issue of the campaign. Clearly, from his experience in the first presidential de- bate, Reagan realized the potential danger of such a discussion. At this point, in Handbook of Political CommunicationChapter 19 " Content Anal- ysis ", C. Richard Hofstetter notes campaigners' " tendency to emphasize issues in the areas of a party's strength and to ignore issues in the areas of the opponent's strength " (546). For that reason, in Verbal Behavior and politics, Doris A. Graber concludes " lack of mention or infrequent mention is considered evidence of lack of concern " (83). The deficit problem in the 1984 campagin is a good example of such an issue. If the budget deficit became a major issue in the campaign, Mondale could gain a great advantage, while Reagan would gain a little. At worst, in Reagan's view, American voters perceived the budget deficit to be a major failure of the Reagan Ad- ministration. At best, the voters perceived that Reagan had a plan to cope 38 with the problem.

The Comparison of Mondale and Reagan's Strategies In an attempt to appraise each candidate's rhetorical handling of the budg- et deficit, I will use three criteria: techniques of sending message, views of reality, and flexibility of strategies. First, in terms of techniques of sending message, Reagan sent his message more effectively than Mondale . Owing to its simplicity, audience could easily understand Reagan's real intent . James W. Ceaser notes: Yet Reagan's reputation as a communicator rests so much with his ease before the camera as with a more general capacity, to quote the CBS News poll questionnaire, " to get his message across." It is the message as much as the medium that has earned the president his standing—a fact critics implicitly acknowledge when they accuse him of offering a " simplistic " view of affairs. (10) Ceaser concludes that " simplification and simplicity—as distinct from be- ing simplistic—represent one of the distinguishing features " of President Reagan's rhetorical style. Such a style enabled Reagan to explain his spe- cific message in a plain language. The following excerpt provides an exam- ple of how well Reagan sent his message in attacking Mondale's position: But there are two things we do know that are not a matter of prediction: First, my opponent is committed to large spending increases and a tax increase equivalent to $1,800 per household, and, second, those policies, which he has supported all his political life, gave America an economic hangover that we must never, ever suffer through again. (" Economic " 1402). On the contrary, Mondale did not make his message understandable to the voters in comparison with Reagan. Paul Light points out that, " Messages are filtered through a range of prisms, distorted and refracted by friends and enemies alike. Voters need help, and, at least in the primaries, Mondale was not giving it to them. His speeches often lacked enthusiasm and luster, perhaps because Mondale anticipated their endless repetition over the long campaign " (13). Mondale's approach was far from what Safire called Reagan's " person-to- 『時 事 英 語 学 研 究 』No .XXXII(1993年9月) 39 people-in-the-hall approach." Despite the fact that Mondale's speeches contained a lot of repetitions, a lot of his messages remained simplistic with little explanation. For instance, Mondale repeated the lines of " When we speak of . . . " five times, " We know . . . " four times, " You did not vote for . . . " seven times and " By the start of . . . " six times all in his ac- ceptance address (61). When these four different phrases repeated many times, each explanation must have given a " sloppy " impression. Second, in terms of views of reality, Reagan was more optimistic about the economy, America, and the future than Mondale. In other words, it was Reagan's strategies which gave Mondale a label of " pessimist." Reagan stated: The future, according to them, is dark and getting darker, and Ameri- cans are very unhappy. According to the other party, there's nothing to hope for but despair, and we have nothing in store but fear itself. In fact, I thought it sounded a little bit like one of those disaster of hor- ror movies in which they picked me to play the monster [Laughter]. ("Atlanta " 1090) In fact, there were two factors which made Mondale's rhetoric sound pessimistic. First, one of the major themes of Mondale's vision is " the restoration of American excellence." Light explains why such a theme did not work :

In contrast with Reagan's message that "America is back, standing tall," Mondale says America is still down and falling behind. Mondale argues that Reagan has sacrificed the future for a moment's pleasure. It is a touchy theme, if only because it is hard to get voters to think about a gloomy future when they are having such fun with lower inflation, Gre- nada, and the Olympics, in the present. (15) Thus, Mondale's quest for excellence ironically contributed to making his rhetoric sound pessimistic. Americans were happier with Reagan's rhetoric. In addition, in order to attack the President successfully, Mondale must con- vince the public that Regan's good times would end abruptly when the bill for the big deficit finally came due. Therefore, Mondale has a little choice but present pessimistic views. Lastly, in terms of flexibility of strategies, Reagan was more flexible in 40 changing his strategies than Mondale. Reagan had no problem in adapting his strategy according to each situation once he felt it necessary. The very example is his rhetorical changeover on the budget deficit after the first debate. On the contrary, Mondale maintained the same style and message through- out the campaign. Light maintains that Mondale told those who urged him to change his style, " There may not be enough slogans, but I don't think (my vision) lacks in substance " (13). Mondale should have helped the voters to understand his message by changing his strategies whenever necessary.

The Implications Drawn from the Discussion Mondale's handling of the budget deficit as a risky strategy agaist Reagan seemed to indicate two important implications. First, mere demonstration of the threat, or danger, is not persuasive. In fear arousal theory, the term " reflective " was introduced by Irving L. Janis. According to him, two features of fear reactions in normal adults are emphasized: (1) the emotional state is based on thoughtful reflection; and (2) as a result of being mediated by higher mental process, the intensity of the emotion tends to increase or decrease as the signs of external threat increase or decrease. In essence, a person's level of reflective fear is roughly proportional both to the perceived probability of the dangerous event materializing, and to the anticipated mag- nitude of the danger. Considering the fear arousal theory, Mondale failed to provide the voters with enough information concerning the probability of their personal vul- nerability to the danger, or deprivation. Mondale argued again and again that, " Here is the truth about the future," and the " deficits hike interest rates, clobber exports, stunt investment, kill jobs, undermine growth, chest our kids and shrink our future." Nonetheless, when he talked about " the truth about the future," the voters were yet uncertain about the credibility of these statements. For instance, when would such harms take place? How significant were they? Through what process would the deficit cause harm? Unless Mondale answered those questions, he could be regarded as a " doomsayer " by the voters. Hence Mondale's lack of explanation hurt his image badly, since there is a tendency that optimistic candidates attract 『時 事 英 語 学 研 究 』No .XXXII(1993年9月) 41 more popularity among electorate than pessimistic candidates (" When Opti- mists " 80).

Second, candidates should structure their messages so that favorable in- ferences can be drawn by the electorate. As Graber points out, three sets of things can be inferred about a source from its message: their views of reality, their goals and motivations, and the sender's personality (83-8). When

Mondale focused his attacks on the unfair tax cuts, the voters might assume that his goal was to increase the taxes. When he focused on the threat of the deficit and a need for tax increase, the voters could draw only negative inferences. When he focused on attacking Reagan, the voters could not see his own political vision. Since Reagan's views were, beyond question, op- timistic, they must have perceived Mondale's views as gloomy, or pessimistic.

Although the reduction of the deficit was important, the voters wished to hear what differences Mondale could make to achieve a better America, rather than merely hearing what problems he could avoid. Since " messages are filtered through a range of prisms, distorted and refracted by friends and enemies alike," candidates always should consider how their message is per-

ceived, and change their strategies accordingly.

Sources "A Beastly Question ." Time. (October 15,1984): 88-9.

Ceaser, James W. "As Good as Their Words : Reagan's Rhetoric." Public Opinion.

(June/July 1984): 10-2 & 17. " Getting a Second Look ." Time. (October 22,1984): 25-8.

Graber, Doris. " Inferences Drawn from Verbal Behavior." Verbal Behavior and Politics: 83-91.

Hofstetter, C. Richard. " Content Analysis." Handbook of Political Communication.

(Eds.) Dan D. Nimmo and Keith R. Sanders. (Beverly Hills : Saga Publication, 1981): 529-60. " How to Cut the Deficit ." Businessweek. (March 26,1984): 50-109.

Janis, Irving L. " Effects of Fear Arousal on Attitude Change: Recent Develop- ments in Theory and Experimental Research." Advances in Experimental Social

Psychology III. (Academic Press): 162-224. Light, Paul. "As Good as Their Words : Mondale's Message." Public Opinion.

(June/July 1984): 13-7. Mondale, Walter. Excerpts from the Speeches of Walter G. Mondale Campaign for the

Presidency, 1982-1984. (Washington: March 28,1985): 1-95. Reagan, Ronald. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Book II•\une 42

30 to December 31, 1984. (United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1987): 1441-462. " Reagan's Good -Times Budget: A Risky Election-Year Bet on a Strong Economy." Bussinessweek. (January 30, 1984): 70-80. " Poised for the Big Move Up ." Time. (October 1, 1984): 22. " When Optimists Attract: Life's winners score by saying pleasant things ." News- week. (October 17, 1988): 80.