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Home , Embodied cognition

Embodied and its implications for the educational system: Designing a model asserting Deleuze’s viewpoint

vorgelegt von

Elham Shirvani Ghadikolaei

ORCID:0000-0002-9592-6484

an der Fakultät I – Geistes- und Bildungswissenschaften der Technischen Universität Berlin

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades

Doktorin der Philosophie - Dr. phil -

genehmigte Dissertation

Promotionsausschuss:

Vorsitzender: Prof. Dr. Friedrich Steinle

Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Axel Gelfert

Gutachter: Dr. Spyridon Koutroufinis

Gutachter: Prof. Dr.Mahdi Sajadi

Tag der wissenschaftlichen Aussprache: 28. August 2020

Berlin 2020

I would like to present all my studies from primary until my Ph.D., and especially this

dissertation, for my angel mother. It was her wish to see my success, but unfortunately, she is no longer in this material world to enjoy it with me. I thank her for the wonderful

support she offered throughout my life. I love you mom and I keep your advice in

both my heart and to “do my best”. Contents

Chapter 1: General ...... 2

1. State of the Art ...... 2

2. Research Questions ...... 5

3. Working Programs (Research Background) ...... 6

4. Research Schedule ...... 10

Chapter 2: Embodied Cognition: Philosophical Foundations ...... 11

2.1. What is Embodied Cognition? ...... 11

2.2. Philosophical Foundations ...... 13

2.2.1. Embodiment in Modern ...... 14

2.3. Body in ...... 30

2.3.1 The Pioneers ...... 30

2.3.2 Embodiment in the Phenomenological Tradition ...... 34

2.3.2.1. The Relation between Phenomenology and , Given the Embodiment Theory ...... 41

2.4. and Embodied Cognition ...... 47

2.4.1. First-Generation Cognitive Science and ...... 47

2.4.2. Artificial ...... 50

2.4.2.1 Embodied Cognition and ...... 55

2.4.3. Cognitive Metaphor ...... 65

2.4.3.1. Cognitive Unconscious ...... 69

2.5. Post- and Embodiment ...... 70

2.6. Conclusion ...... 76

Chapter 3: The Pedagogical Implications of ’s Views ...... 79

3.1. Introduction ...... 79

3.2. Body for Deleuze ...... 88

3.2.1. Deleuze and the Embodiment Thesis ...... 94

3.3. The Dogmatic Picture of ...... 96

3.4. Pedagogical Implications of Deleuze’s Views ...... 99

3.4.1. Education Institutes as Suppressive Institutes ...... 99

3.4.1.1. Nomadism of Students and the Education System ...... 103 3.4.2. The A Priori Structure of the ...... 105

3.4.3. Rhizome and its Pedagogical Consequences ...... 113

3.4.3.1. Transformation of Classrooms ...... 117

3.4.3.2. Creativity-Centrism instead of -Centrism ...... 120

3.4.3.3. The Collapse of the Teacher’s Authority ...... 121

3.4.3.4. Collaborative Learning ...... 122

3.4.3.5. Taking External Factors into Account ...... 124

3.4.3.6. The Structural Problem of Textbooks ...... 126

3.4.4. Semiotic Learning ...... 130

Conclusion ...... 133

Chapter 4: Designing a model asserting Deleuze’s viewpoint ...... 135

4.1. Introduction ...... 135

4.2. Roadmap: Definition of Planning an Education System ...... 137

4.2.1. Goals ...... 140

4.3. Saving the Education Institute from the Institution of Power and Nomadism of the Student and the Education System ...... 142

4.3.1. Democracy ...... 143

4.4. Learning ...... 144

4.4.1. Collaborative Learning ...... 144 4.4.2. Semiotic Learning ...... 145

4.4.3. Deconstructive Education ...... 148

4.4.4. Creativity-Centrism, instead of Memory-Centrism ...... 151

4.4.5. Theories of self-reflection ...... 154

4.5. The Student ...... 155

4.5.1. Facing Up to the Unknown, and Problem-Solving ...... 155

4.5.2. -Centrism ...... 159

4.6. Curriculum ...... 163

Interdisciplinary Curricula ...... 163

4.7. Teacher ...... 164

4.7.1. The Subversion of the Teacher’s Authority ...... 164

4.7.2. Consideration of Differences ...... 166

4.7.3. Flexibility ...... 167 4.7.4. Creating Wonder ...... 168

4.7.5. A Role beyond the Transmission of ...... 169

4.8. Method of Teaching ...... 170

4.8.1 Project-Based Learning ...... 170

4.8.2. Drama-Based Learning ...... 177

4.8.3. Cooperative Learning ...... 184

4.8.4. Indirect Teaching ...... 187

4.9. The Classroom ...... 189

4.10. The School...... 190

4.10.1. Field Trips ...... 198

4.11. Evaluation ...... 199

Chapter 5: Conclusion ...... 203

Practical and Research Suggestions ...... 221

References ...... 224 Abstract

Embodied cognition as a quite contemporary theory has the potential to be used in different fields, especially when this theory challenges many fundamental assumptions of philosophy or even science. On the other hand, one can find common ground between these theories and post-structuralist philosopher Gilles Deleuze. Combining these two would be a radical and revolutionary that transforms the institution and structure of education substantially. In this thesis, we have studied different aspects of this problem. First, there is a very brief introduction to the issue in chapter one. In the second chapter, besides defining embodied cognition and providing a history of it, different theories are mentioned in this field and its common points with Deleuzian are expanded. In the third chapter, the educational implication of Deleuzian ideas is extracted from an embodied cognition point of view. In the fourth chapter, we try to depict the general and practical overview of the structure of education based on Deleuze. In this chapter, some practical suggestions are offered to design the system. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the whole of the previous chapters and provides several research programs and proposals.

1 Chapter 1: General Schema

1. State of the Art

Embodied cognition is a relatively new theory of cognition in the whole range of the sub-fields of the cognitive sciences while maintaining a single core idea that asserts ‘embodiment’ as the necessary condition for cognition. In a straightforward term, the of ‘embodiment’ describes how the sensory input of an organism enables it to interact with the world. In this way, the physical (or bodily) of any organism gain the importance of the gateway to its relationship with the surrounding world. Thus, the goal of this thesis is to formulate a "manner" appropriate enough to explain how the mind, body, and the world can interact with each other and influence the cognitive of an organism.

The relationship between mind and body is one of the oldest philosophical problems about which different opinions are articulated. We might divide the existing approaches to this problem into two categories: those arguing in favor of the embodied cognition and those who do not see the question as relevant. The proponents of the latter approach are againstt the interaction of a non-material substance with a material one. Moore explains the of : If we abandon the assumption that for a word to be meaningful, there must be some substantial entity for it to refer to, the mind-body problem no longer seems intractable… so the problem of how the mind interacts with the body is not a genuine problem… ‘Mind’ is not the name of a thing or a substance but of a complicated set of bodily functions carried out in certain characteristic ways (Moore, 2010, p. 2).

2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a philosopher who belongs to the relatively new school of Phenomenology and the Existential theory, has a different view regarding this issue. In his philosophy, the only way to understand the world is through one’s lived experience, and the key to this experience isdbodily activities. Such an experience can never be static but is always dynamic. Our lived experience shapes us as we shape it. Our perceiving mind is embodied, and our cannot go beyond our lived experience; neither is it apart from it. Merleau-Ponty's thought is focused on the understanding of the of lived and embodied human cognition. Bartend Claude Levi-Strauss, Michel Foucault, Paul Ricoeur, and Louis Althusser are among the leading theorists under his influence. Later on, he was also followed by several social scientists who were keen on criticizing the traditional notions pertaining to the relationship between mind, body, and the nature of the human experience. The of “embodiment” is the key to Merleau-Ponty’s book, Phenomenology of Perception. Unlike traditional approaches that focus merely on the mind, according to Merleau-Ponty, the mind cannot be the sole perceiver, experiencer, and representer of the world. On the contrary, the concept of embodiment shows that the body has a central role in what is experienced. The world (as Merleau-Ponty understands it) is a basis for our perception and experience. Thus, our perceptions of the external things are products of the way our bodies are experiencing them. Those philosophical traditions that believe that our understanding of the world is merely based on cognition are wrong. In terms of Merleau-Ponty, one may not be capable of obtaining an understanding of the world without a body, because the mind and body are integrally intertwined. Therefore, the mind is embodied; this prevents the possibility of an independent cognitive process, which excludes the body. The constant analysis of the world is an activity that belongs to an embodied mind (Määttänen, 2015). In his book Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty uses the term ‘-body’ that corresponds with the German concept Leib. The book

3 expresses the idea that the body, mind, and the world are wholly entangled and (contrary to the Cartesian thought) cannot be separated. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology seeks to understand this relationship of an unchanging cognition beyond the world of bodies. The body-subject concept highlights his emphasis on the connection of the body to the world. This is where the Cartesian dualism breaks down. There is no embodied mind to observe an of the external world. We experience the world through our bodies. Subject and object are united and not dichotomous; this means that they should not be considered as two separate domains, but as two sides of the same entity with a single embodied in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s dialectic, which is based on the concept of Leib, is an attempt to rethink the relationship between the human mind, its body, and the world that it is facing. Incarnated worldview is the relationship between the eternal sensualities of human . The ‘body-subject’ understands its nature in the light of its perception of other similar bodies (or body-subjects). It is through this process that this ‘body-subject’ finds out that the world, as perceived by other ‘body- subjects,’ is the same as its own perceived world. The incorporation of the different body-subjects at this eternal level leads to an incarnated worldview. In other words, Merleau-Ponty argues that what we experience in the world, or what we understand from it, is the product of our bodies and our incarnated . This perception is the basis of classification and theorization, even if it seems that our bodily experiences of that phenomena are secondary. The only door to the world is through physical and space. There are also philosophers (such as Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze…) who not only refuse the separation of or mind from the body, but also believe that without an intact connection to the body, no cognitive understanding can occur. More substantially, there is no abstract cognition which does not refer to bodily

4 experiences. As we already saw in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, our cognition is based on our body’s and functions. Those who believe in the separation of mind and body would also apply it to the field of education. According to them, an educational program seeking to develop the mental capabilities of the pupils would have no application to the programs for physical training. Each of these tracks requires different methods and procedures. This is what we witness today in the educational systems of many countries. If this distinction between body and mind is not warranted, then we have to admit that any sort of change or transformation in the physical development will result in changes in the cognitive and mental developments. In other words, in order to increase learners' cognitive capacity, we should escalate the possibility of more environmental and physical experiences. Other philosophers take issues with mind-body dualism from different perspectives and formulate new based on it. For example, Deleuze refutes any sort of transcendence to the abstract, spiritual level with proposing the concept of “imminence”. Heidegger introduced Lebenswelt (Lifeworld) to try to pin down the subject to the concrete world and refuse the transcendental Husserlian subject. Materialists, like Churchland, harshly repudiate such distinction and in cognitive science, several important and significant movements like those of Lakoff are also against the mind-body duality.

2. Research Questions

Based on the points mentioned above, my research project focuses on the objectives, methods, content, and which should be considered for research on educational processes under the theory of Embodied Cognition. In other words, I want to study the implications of Embodied Cognition for education. The main questions of this research are: 1. What does Embodied Cognition mean? 2. What are the philosophical foundations of the Embodied Cognition?

5 3. What are the implications of Embodied Cognition for the education system from Gilles Deleuze's viewpoint? 4. What are the attributes of the model based on the Embodied Cognition Theory proposed by Gilles Deleuze?

3. Working Programs (Research Background)

Our focus is primarily on the work of Deleuze himself and our interpretation of his ideas. Anyhow, several works that might contribute to the discussion are introduced. • In his article, “Deleuze`s new image of thought, or Dewey Revisited,” Semetsky studies the of Deleuze and Dewey, examines their views on education and learning models, and explains their similarities and differences in epistemology. After explaining Deleuzian theory of rhizome and rhizomatic thinking, he engages in the application of this thought to education. Semetsky remarks that applying rhizome in determining the goals and purposes of education is of vital importance. • Semetsky, in a book titled: Deleuze, Education, and Becoming, regards globalization as the main feature of modern education turned into an industry.

• In the article, “Search, Swim and See: Deleuze Apprenticeship in Signs and Pedagogy of Images,” Ronald Bogue refers to the influence of Proust on Deleuze`s semiotics and proposes a learning model based on non- linguistic signs such as non-material arts, imagination, and memory. Finally, he concludes that a real education from Deleuze`s point of view happens through disproportion of our senses and guiding thought beyond its regular operation. According to him, the best teachers are those who invite students to participate in the interpretation of signs, since learning develops from dealing with them.

6 • Hua, in his article: “Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Daignault: Understanding Curriculum as Difference and Sense,” considers curriculum as an and refers to the poststructuralist curriculum. He believes that conventional teaching limits the dynamic relationship between teacher and student. Deleuze asks us to abrogate the binary dichotomy constructed by and put emphasis on cooperative communication. In his view, Deleuzian style is symbolic, always changing, and in Daignault style. The curriculum is something that happens. Hua considers multiplicity the outcome of the becoming and the main article of Deleuze`s philosophy. • Gregoriou, in his article: “Commencing the Rhizome: Towards a Minor ,” after introducing some features of of Lyotard, studies the why some philosophers of education are in mourning. After explaining Deleuze`s views on the nature of thought and the limits of the rhizome, Gregoriou investigates the application of Deleuzian education and its models; negating teaching as the mere transmission of information and rules and regulations to students. He claims that an experimental approach can save Deleuzian education from constraints of communication and an ideal act of discourse. • Dan Goodley, in his study: “Towards Socially Just Pedagogies: Deleuzoguattarian Critical Disability Studies,” examines the relation between rhizome and Deleuze and Guattari`s views on education. He stipulates that their pedagogy is directly related to culture and politics. “Becoming” is a postmodern approach to education.

• Cole, in his book, Educational Life- form: Deleuzian Teaching and Learning Practice, studies the role of Life-form in the philosophy of Deleuze and its impact on education. This book invites teachers and students to reflect on the place of education and its actions. • Connell, in his article, “From Shame to Joy: Deriving a Pedagogical Approach from Gilles Deleuze,” examines the of Deleuzian

7 education. He believes that methods of systematic violence implicated by teachers and reproduced in various ways is a shameful education. However in a comprehensive Deleuzian education, the teacher functions as a guide who eagerly connects the points of departure. This pedagogical method is a happiness-seeking method. In conclusion, he points out that education in a smooth space is a group work which looks for revealing the possibilities and probable events that do not involve power relations. As Deleuze said, “a genuine revolutionary individual is a joyful individual.” So, a real teacher is a joyful one. • Noel Gough, in his article: “Geophilsophy and Methodology: Science Education Research in a Rhizomatic Space,” studies the effect of the rhizomatic method on teaching the sciences. He believes that teaching the sciences based on nomadic methods should include all mediums, arts, and sciences. A curriculum based on the text cannot solve many questions, but utilizing other aspects, like gathering information and scientific reports and writing science fiction stories, can build a symbolic curriculum. • Peters refers to post-structuralism and its application in Post Structuralism, Politics, and Education. Most of the issues discussed in this book are about multiplicity and its relation to education. After some initial introduction of Deleuze`s ideas, Peters believes that thinking based on difference is the main feature of his philosophy. • Koutropoulos in “Rhizomes of the Classroom” aims to create an activity that helps move the learner away from an external locus of motivation, namely the instructor, and help the learner transition to a learning environment where the learners in the classroom set a large portion of the specifics of the curriculum, within the context of predefined learning objectives for their course. The aim thus becomes a way of providing the learner with an experience rather than a predefined block of knowledge. This activity’s goal is to introduce the learner to learning theories, learning approaches, and methodologies that they can then apply to their own organizational and learning contexts".

8 • Jaarsma, in “Encountering Hegel and Deleuze: Towards a Feminist Pedagogy of the Concept,” tries to develop an understanding of pedagogical relationship by examining the possibilities of the encounter between Hegel and Deleuze, while at the same time striving towards an awareness of the feminist stakes of such an encounter. • Gallo, in “Expressions of the sensible: readings in a pedagogical key,” has a hermeneutic study about the education of the body with the object of analyzing the conditions of sensibility under a pedagogical perspective seen as a part of the study of Physical Education. He thinks about the sense data in respect to education from a philosophical, pedagogical, and experiential approach; the study of the sensible is grounded in the philosophical thinking of and Gilles Deleuze, and the pedagogical reflection on education is based on the ideas of Jorge Larrosa and Fernando Bárcena. • Using the idea of Rhizome, Sellers, in “Growing a Rhizome: Embodying Early Experiences in Learning,” reflects on understandings of the curriculum as continuous dynamic learning-teaching-experiencing processes, what these might mean for children in early childhood settings and the interrelationships of such curricular understandings with Te Whaariki. It suggests that stories about children, like children’s stories, can contribute to curriculum discourse and that reading Te Whaariki rhizomatically has potential for furthering discussion of early childhood curriculum in New Zealand and beyond.

9 4. Research Schedule

In chapter two, firstly, we study the problem and the question of the nature of embodied cognition. We will examine what theories are presented in this field and how these theories are involved in the history of philosophy as well as in cognitive science. Therefore, we begin to define the embodied cognition; although there are many theories in this field, our task is to find the common ground of all these theories and then investigate its formation in . In other words, we will trace back its formation from modern to present and demonstrate with what movement in philosophy it conflicts. Finally, some theories from embodied cognition are selected and studied and the relation between this theory and Deleuzian ideas is stated. In the third chapter, we study the educational implications of Deleuzian ideas regarding theories of embodied cognition. Our question is, what are these implications? Furthermore, what can be extracted from Deleuze in the field of education? Thereby, our task is to get familiar with Deleuzian jargon, particularly those that have to do with education and the Deleuzian ideas would not be investigated. After studying the key concepts, we turn to education and how these terms meet with education and finally, we suggest the path that Deleuzian ideas open up for education. In the fourth chapter, it is time to provide practical and objective propositions for an educational system based on the theoretical framework of the last two chapters. Thus, we will plan to provide practical suggestions for different branches of educational systems from the educational implication of the last chapter; it sets out from the general framework to things like the stance of teacher, position of the school, schoolbooks, teaching methods, evaluation, etc. The fifth chapter will be the summary and conclusion of pervious chapters plus suggestions for future studies.

10

Chapter 2: Embodied Cognition: Philosophical Foundations

2.1. What is Embodied Cognition?

In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that a concept could only be defined when one takes part in a language game in which the concept is deployed. That is, only a posteriori definitions are possible, and a priori definitions are impossible. Thus, a definition of embodied cognition consists in the knowledge of what has been known as embodied cognition. That is to say, the common differentia of actual theories within the framework of “embodied cognition” provides us with its definition. However, what is the common differentia? The thesis of cognition is defined in the entry on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as follows:

Cognition is embodied when it is deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of an agent, that is, when aspects of the agent's body beyond the brain play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive processing. (Wilson and Foglia, 2017)

In Hegel’s terminology, any phenomenon is identified in and by the negation of certain other phenomena. Thus, embodied cognition can, by the same token, be identified in and by the negation of two other views about cognition: (1) classical theory of knowledge, and (2) classical theories of cognitive sciences.

According to classical theories of knowledge, cognition belongs to a transcendental, or in metaphysical terms, an immaterial, subject, which is not only beyond the body, but also beyond any connections to the physical. Thus, according to this view, cognition exclusively belongs to the transcendental subject, and ideally, the role of the body is to provide the contents of thought and cognition. That is to say, the body is solely in charge of perception, playing no

11 role whatsoever in any cognitive processes, conceptualization, , reasoning, and inference.

This view is contrasted to the thesis of embodied cognition, according to which not only is the body involved in all these processes, but also plays a crucial role in the formation of the whole cognition. On this theory (or theories), it is the body’s organic and neurological properties, as well as its presence in, and interactions with, the environment that enables and constructs cognition in its different aspects. Thus, the first turn in theories of embodied cognition has been from the metaphysical subject to the embodied environmentally present subject.

Today, much of research concerning embodied cognition takes place in areas of cognitive science, although it is fundamentally different from earlier theories of the first generation of cognitive scientists. According to earlier theories in cognitive science, cognition has to do with the “mind” and mental functions, as well as the manipulation of abstract symbols. These theories overlook the role of body and embodiment, as well as the interaction between the body and the environment; as if all matters of cognition are exhausted by mere manipulation of abstract symbols, regardless of organic dimensions of the body and its interaction with the environment. However, recent theories of cognition radically challenge those assumptions, hence creating the second dangerous turn by introducing the body as a knowledge-making agent.

In the following sections, we will elaborate on major theories of embodied cognition by introducing the historical development of these turns. It should be noted that philosophical research concerning the body has not been limited to the body-cognition framework. The connection between the body and socio-political phenomena has also been investigated. For example, Foucault characterizes the body as a tool for the exercise of dominance in the modern world. Alternatively put, he looks for the socio-political structure of the modern world in its relation

12 with the body. Another example consists of widespread debates in the area of feminism and gender issues. However, the chapter does not aim to survey the whole domain of the notion of body and embodiment. Thus, we restrict our discussion to the framework of the relation between cognition and (although issues raised in the above areas are deeply connected with the present discussion).

2.2. Philosophical Foundations

The history of philosophy is a history of dualism—dualisms of universals and, ideal and concrete worlds, soul and body, mortal and eternal worlds, the spiritual and the material, God and Satan, and so forth. Notwithstanding this, it was Descartes who noticed the intertwinement of these dualities and tried to disentangle them.

A common element among all these varieties of dualism is the belief in the superiority of the spiritual and immaterial over the material and the mundane. This can be obviously observed in mystical and religious traditions in which body is regarded as a cage for the soul and “the bodily” is deemed an obstacle for acquiring superiority and knowing the truth, as well as in philosophical traditions in which the only way of knowledge was believed to be the “proper deployment of the reason” and avoidance of sources of errors, that is, bodily senses. (Descartes, 2003, Chapter IV, p. 28)

What is at stake here is a challenge for this dualistic view—the view of the body as a primary and immediate source of cognition. The goal is to show that, indeed, no knowledge can be obtained without “embodiment” and bodily functions.

13

Contrary to what Descartes has claimed, thought is no longer deemed an attribute of the substance of the soul. What we call thought is a result of an interaction between an embodied mind and the surrounding environment. Origins and features of knowledge are not to be sought in a transcendental and mysterious soul. They should instead be sought in the living organism.

The for such a turn can be looked for in various grounds: precise philosophical turns in the views of some contemporary philosophers (such as Merleau-Ponty, and before that, in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche), failures of traditional theories in accounting for various aspects of knowledge, and in particular, new studies in cognitive sciences. In what follows, we will first present a brief history of embodiment in philosophy, and then we will survey the role of the above factors in the formation of theories of embodiment.

2.2.1. Embodiment in Modern Philosophy The issue of knowledge and consciousness in modern philosophy pertains to the subject. As pointed out above, the subject here is metaphysical. But what does “metaphysical subject” mean? Before answering the question, we need to provide a brief history of how the metaphysical subject was formed.

As we know, the majority of philosophical issues date back to Ancient Greece, and the issue of the metaphysical subject is no exception. The account we provide of the formation of the metaphysical subject might seem unusual at first sight, but it might shed some light on the issue. Our account begins with an ontological discussion, through which the formation of the metaphysical subject will be accounted for. This may well be the reason why our account seems unusual. After Kant, we are used to be concerned with epistemology, mainly when the issue at hand, i.e., the metaphysical subject, is mainly epistemological, rather than ontological. Pre-Socratic philosophers usually remained concerned

14 with being or existence in their view of the world and their attempt to explain the being, trying to explain the world in terms of an element of the being. In fact, they reduced the world of being to one or more elements of the world itself. One exception here is Anaxagoras, and he serves as the key to our interpretation of the history of the metaphysical subject.

Anaxagoras was the first person who introduced the notion of “reason” (or intellect: nous) into philosophy and tried to explain the world in terms of reason. “Reason” is an abstract concept, which exists in, and directs the world. Elements appealed to by philosophers before Anaxagoras in an explanation of the world, such as the four elements of water, soil, fire, and air, were all parts of the world and observable. However, reason, as discussed by Anaxagoras, lacks such properties. Now a question might arise about the relation is between Anaxagoras’s views and the metaphysical subject. To answer the question, we need to wait until we explain ’s view.

Plato lived in a period when were widely famous. Their views, such as rejection of any sort of knowledge and morality, were not pleasant to Plato and his teacher, Socrates. For example, consider Protagoras’s well-known statement: “man is the measure of all things: of things which are, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not.” Thus, humans must be the criteria of all concepts and all knowledge, as well as moralities. Now since humans are plural and diverse, knowledge and will likewise be diverse, and there will not be an absolute and objective foundation which one can reach.

In order to solve this crisis, Plato began his pursuit of the absolute, the objective, and what is independent of humans. In order to do so, Plato had to either step on the same path as his predecessors or find a new way. The approach adopted by his predecessors was a dead-end. For example, Heraclitus said, “You cannot step into the same river twice, for fresh waters are continually flowing in.” Such constant and continual change and flow of the world constituted a

15 significant obstacle because even if one could know something in the world, it would change in the blink of an eye. Thus, the prior knowledge could not be predicated of the new thing. In other words, if at the time, t1, I obtain knowledge,

Z, of something, x, then at t2, x has changed into x*. Thus, my knowledge, Z, cannot be predicated of x, nor can it be predicated of x*. X no longer exists and is replaced by x*.

Plato’s problem does not boil down to the problem of change and flow. There was another problem, as well. The world is a set of particular entities. When we talk about the human, the dog, the water, the tree, or the fire, there is no single human or dog or water or tree or fire. For these species, there are innumerable particular instances that are distinct from one another. Because of the limits of human faculties, neither do we have time for leaning, nor do we have the power to know, all particular entities. However, in order for knowledge to be useful, it should be general. For if I know one or a few particular entities, there is no guarantee that other particular entities are the same. Knowledge is useful as long as it is generalizable, and it can help account for all instances. If knowledge can only explain a few particular cases and leaves the rest unexplained, it cannot satisfy us and will not be useful.

Moreover, if Plato was to explain the world and all entities within it in terms of a single phenomenon, just like his predecessors, differences within the phenomena would constitute another obstacle to such an explanation. For example, if we take water to be the foundation or origin (arche) of the world, then which water serves as such a foundation? The water in Greece? That in Asia? The one discovered in America? If all these kinds of water were the same, then how could we account for their distinctness?

Thus, the standard of the time failed to home in on a with which general knowledge was possible. Plato had to expand his ontology to find things that lack the properties of actual surrounding entities of the world, and

16 yet could explain the existence of the world, and could serve as objects of knowledge. Moreover, this expanded ontology is what we know as the World of Forms or Ideas—a world in which entities exist in general and eternal unity and in an invariable way. It is such a world that can serve as the object of our knowledge. Here, Plato draws on Anaxagoras’s nous. In fact, Plato accommodated his general concepts within a world of reason, where they cannot be infected with particularity and the flow of the concrete world. In Plato’s world of ideas, only kinds exist, not individuals—the human exists, but Socrates, Plato, and do not (they exist in the concrete world)1; the fire exists, but this or that particular instance of fire does not, only the fire exists.

There was another problem that led Plato to postulate the existence of such a world: the problem that all knowledge is conceptual. Knowledge is obtained through words, and words generate concepts. Consider the word “sugar,” for instance. If asked what sugar is, we would answer something sweet, tongue- tingling, and white. However, all these properties—sweetness, tongue-tinglings, and whiteness—are universal properties that are predicated of many entities. Besides, no how much we try to break something down into more specific properties, what we arrive at are still universal properties. Thus, as Hegel says, “the word is the murder of the Thing” and the generator of concepts. It is as if all we have are concepts.

The conceptuality (and universality) of our cognitive faculties, on the one hand, and the particularity of the concrete, on the other, have always constituted a significant problem for many philosophers. To solve the problem, Plato borrows Anaxagoras’s notion of reason or intellect, clothes the universals with an

1 In the philosophy of Plato, we deal with a hierarchical structure of existence, in such philosophy “existence” is predicated based on stronger and weaker and higher or lower beings. The particular entities, placed in the world of the senses, have a weaker and lower existence than beings existing in the world of the ideas. Thereby, when we mention that that particular beings do not exist in the text, we only refer to the world of ideas and not in general. Our emphasis is on Truth viewed from the world of ideas, not the world of senses.

17 intelligible coat, sends them to the heavens,2 and restricts the attainment of knowledge to knowledge of these intelligible universals. Aristotle constructs the concept of form, and so on.

However, two problems remain unsolved; however: first, how can such an abstract world explain our concrete world? For our primary goal was to account for the concrete world, and the abstract world was postulated to enable us to explain this world. By adding a new world, we cannot explain the existence of the world perceived by the senses and the events that happen in that. It is not enough to suppose something like Demiurge, for Demiurge itself, needs to be explained. It needs to be proven; Plato's trick is like Descarte's Pineal Gland; none of them are adequate. It is not possible to connect an abstract entity to concrete one by assuming something which is not clear how it works; does it belong to the abstract world or concrete one? If the entity belongs to the former, how is it related to the latter? And if the entity belongs to the latter, how is it related to the former?

Now, if that world fails to explain this world, it would be superfluous to postulate its existence following Ockham’s razor. The second problem is how we acquire knowledge; that is, even if such a universal world exists, then how can we know such a world. Even if all knowledge is conceptual and universal, then how should these concepts correspond to those universal entities? Plato was well aware of the two problems and provided answers to both. His answers are not convincing, however. We do not intend to criticize his answers. Since the first problem is not relevant to the issue at hand, we do not engage with Plato’s answer to it, and we will only be concerned with the second problem, which is where the metaphysical subject is generated.

2 Needless to say the word, “heaven,” here is used metaphorically. Platonic universals are not located in any space, including skies. They are indeed non-spatial.

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Our bodily and concrete existence is itself part of this particular and changing world. Thus, such a being will not be able to apprehend universals and intelligible. Now if a bodily and concrete existence is not able to apprehend the universal and the intelligible, then part of us that apprehends such things must be free of, and should indeed be a polar opposite to, such attributes: without a body and immaterial—a metaphysical subject referred to by Plato as a soul. However, the manner of connection between this subject and the intelligible or the universal has not yet been accounted for. Plato responds that, before the creation of the body, the soul existed in the world of forms, where it has apprehended the ineligible (Plato, Phaedo 72e). Furthermore, when it descended to its bodily template, it forgot its knowledge. Thus, any knowledge (that is, knowledge of the universals) achieved in this world only achieved via remembrance (Plato, Menon 82a–86b).

In sum, the postulation of the existence of a metaphysical subject for Plato is necessary, for it enables him to account for the possibility of knowledge. A significant part of debates among advocates of the metaphysical subject throughout the history of philosophy was aimed at the problem of knowledge. The gist of the argument, articulated in a variety of forms, is based on an epistemological problem: if we do not accept the metaphysical subject, then we will not be able to obtain any knowledge, and we will fall into a skeptical or relativistic trap.

The necessity of a knowledge of the universal led Aristotle to the view that thought comes from the metaphysical subject. Although Aristotle provides a detailed account of Platonic forms, he nevertheless takes into account the existence of universals and the necessity of knowledge thereof, instead of particular entities. For Aristotle, whereas knowledge begins with particular entities, knowledge’s ultimate goal is to abstract and recognize a universal form from the particular entity. Furthermore, although Aristotle generally considers the

19 soul to be in relation with the body and locates it in the natural realm because of his concomitance with the body, he takes the highest dimension of the soul—that is, noetic soul, which though is product of it —to be a universal form detached from the body.3 Although different parts of the soul cannot be detached from the body, when it comes to thoughts, Aristotle takes the soul to be detached from the body. And this is no accident. Seeing the world through concepts and universals led Aristotle to detach the soul from the body and nature, notwithstanding the fact, throughout his book, De Anima, that he discusses issues of the soul under natural phenomena.

As we have pointed out, the reason for the sudden ascension of the soul in Plato's and Aristotle's views was the fear of . Consider the following quote from Aristotle regarding the passive intellect:

Since it thinks all things, it is necessary, just as Anaxagoras says, for it to be “unmixed” so that it may “master” them (that is, so that it may come to know them)—for something foreign intruding into it impedes and obstructs it. Thus, it is necessary for its nature to be nothing other than this: possibility. Therefore, what is called the intellect of the soul (and by intellect, I mean that by which the soul thinks things through and arrives at suppositions) is not actively one of the beings until it is thinking. Hence it is reasonable that it notbe mixed with the body, for then it would take on some determinate , would be warm or cold, and there would be some organ for it as there is for the perceptive power—which there is not. (Aristotle De Anima, III, 4, 429a18-28)

3 According to Aristotle, the soul is divisible and has different parts. This difference is not accidental. Instead, it is longitudinal and graded. That is to say, some parts of the soul are higher in degree than others. The thought is the highest dimension of the soul.

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As it is evident, Aristotle takes the soul to be detachable from the body to avoid relativism—to be able to judge; that is, to know. For we perceive matters of beings with our senses, and we perceive their forms with our intellects. And forms are conceptual and universal. Thus, the active intellect functions to extract or abstract intelligible (universal concepts or entities) from sensory and imagery objects, and then actualize them, just as light actualizes colors that potentially exist in darkness.

Modern philosophy is distinguished from in virtue of its views of the place of the reason (or intellect) and sources of knowledge. Contrary to modern philosophy, medieval philosophy generally assigned a low (or at least not much high) place to the reason. Most medieval schools of thought did not consider the reason to be sufficient for knowledge, maintaining that, without the Divine Revelation, the reason is inadequate4.

However, in modern philosophy, when the Divine Revelation was dismissed as a source of knowledge, deficiencies of the reason, which was to bring about salvation for the human being, had to be compensated in one way or another, while nothing but the reason itself was left for modern philosophy. Attempts to preserve the place of the reason were, in fact, attempts at the revival of , that is, to base all knowledge on certainty-providing and indubitable foundations. The undeniable fact was that of innumerable “errors” of the mind. However, interestingly the “body” was blamed for the errors.

Two founders of modern philosophy, Descartes and Bacon, were looking for ways of avoiding errors and obtaining positive knowledge. For Descartes, knowledge was mostly a psychological phenomenon, separate from the material

4 However, there were followers of Averroes who gave a proper role to the reason. For more see Gibson 1939.

21 substance. Thus, the body as a material entity was put out of the realm of knowledge.

That in order to understand the passions of the soul its functions must be distinguished from those of body[...] the heat and movement of the members proceed from the body, the thoughts from the soul…Thus because we have no conception of the body as thinking in any way, we have reason to believe that every kind of thought which exists in us belongs to the soul (Descartes, 1973, p. 332.)

Although Descartes’s error theory aims to establish the superiority of the will over understanding, rather than the body, Descartes rules the body and embodiment out from the realm of knowledge, indeed. The point becomes more evident if we recall that he denies any reason or soul in non-human animals, on the one hand, and treats the human body as being the same as the animal body, on the other hand.

However, Bacon, the other founder of modern philosophy, directly targets the body. While he does not trace all errors to the body, the interesting point here is that for him, of all grounds of errors, factors relevant to the body are those that can never be eradicated. Bacon- in New Organon- introduces four idols that preclude knowledge (Bacon, 2003, p. 40). Of these, two idols have to do with the human nature: idols of the Tribe and idols of the Cave. The former is about the constraints of human nature in general, such as weaknesses of senses.

Moreover, the latter is about the constraints and weaknesses of human individuals in particular. It is only after awareness and minimization, of these idols that the “soul” can obtain knowledge. Thus, Bacon talks about the soul-body dualism and restriction of knowledge to the soul.

Although Kant presents us with a profound epistemological turn, his subject is, nonetheless, a transcendental rather than an embodied subject. By

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“categories,” Kant refers to factors leading up to knowledge—the keys to knowledge. Without a priori categories that are prior to any knowledge, no conceptualization and cognition would be possible, indeed. Cognition obtains only in light of these categories5(Kant, 1999, B 161, 261). However, these a priori categories have nothing to do with the body; instead, they are related to a transcendental subject. Kant does not explicitly talk about the substance of this subject. However, his distinction between the empirical ego and the transcendental ego reveals that he separates the body from the transcendental subject as well. Thus, in Kant’s analysis, the body as a knowledge-making agent is ignored. Therefore, the body was not studied long after Kant.

Just like empiricists, Kant put aside about objects—a position influenced by Aristotle's definition of the primary substance6. In the first instance, Kant defined an object as a multitude of sense-data which are distinct from one another. A particular sense-datum via vision is distinct from a sense-datum coming from, say, olfactory, or tactile senses. We are faced with a multitude of sensory data, so to speak. However, we treat the object as one, whereas such a unity is not given in the experience. If these sensory data are not unified, there will not be an experience of an object. Thus, categories of the mind are what gives unity to multitudes of sense data, to give rise to experience. According to Kant, the subject should have unity within itself in order to be able to unify multitudes of experience. What is plural or what changes over time cannot bestow unity on multitudes, and so it will fail to give rise to experience. Since the body changes

5 In Critique of Pure Reason in this part Kant explains his position: The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in Possession of Certain “a priori” 6 According Aristotle’s definition in Categories (5, 2a11-13) the primary substance is an individual object like this table, that person ... He defines first substance as a solid whole and studies it in his ontology. But In Kant's philosophy we are not concerned with ontology. It is worth to mention that in his later works Aristotle provides different meanings of the term ‘substance.’

23 over time, it cannot occupy such a unifying role. Transcendental subjects can provide such unity. (Kant, 1999, A107, 232)

With the above background in mind, we can return and provide a better answer to the above question: “what is a metaphysical subject?”: the metaphysical subject is a non-embodied, independent, and a priori subject, which grounds the prior and transcendental conditions of any consciousness and cognition, and without it, cognition is impossible.

It should be noted that this definition of subject has a crucial difference from its pre-modern definition. Despite their similarities: the word, “subject,” is originated from the Latin, “subjectum” which literally means thrown under (Critchley, 1995); that is, a substratum on the existence of which the existence of other things depends. Interestingly, back in the pre-Cartesian period until sometime after the Cartesian period, in philosophical terminology, the word “subjective” refers to what we refer to today as “objective.” That is to say, the meanings of “subject” and “object” were the reverse of how they are philosophically used today.

In Aristotle’s philosophy, a subject is the matter that remains invariant throughout changes, on the one hand, and on the existence of which the existence of all other forms depends, on the other hand; In Aristotle’s philosophy, a Subject can be the of something as well as matter: (, Book VIII, 1042a26-29) To put things differently, a subject is a prior condition of existence. A subject always presumes an absolute foundation. Therefore, from the beginning, the subject was, in the context of Aristotle’s metaphysics, a metaphysical subject7 (P. 15). Thus, it would hardly be an overstatement to say that the replacement of subject by the body has been a great revolution and

7 In Aristotle’s writings the term ‘subject’ sometimes refers also to something material and thus also to bodies, But his metaphysics is based on an application of the word we have described.

24 invention in the history of philosophy. Embodiment is an alternative for the metaphysical subject that was appealed to throughout the history of philosophy.

Probably (and not positively) the reason why concepts found a central role for many philosophers is that if we break down the language into its part, its most fundamental part would be words, rather than language as a whole, or a sentence consisting of two propositions (for example, conditional propositions), or a single proposition, or complex phrases. One might object that letters and phonemes are more basic than the former. However, these linguistic parts do not signify . In fact, words are the most basic “meaningful” units of language. If we ignore words such as “and,” “if,” and “or,” which have no meanings on their own, we will be left with ordinary words of the language, including nouns,adjectives, and relations. Furthermore, since words are universals in the view of these philosophers, we arrive at concepts.

We seek to show that knowledge is propositional, rather than conceptual. As pointed out, earlier philosophers mainly begin their linguistic analysis from meaningful words,8 unaware that this analysis is propositional in turn. Words have no meanings or concepts on their own. They acquire their meanings or concepts within propositions.9 Concepts in traditional philosophy or meanings in contemporary philosophy are generally present either in a Platonic world or as an intelligible in this world.10 However, if we take the level of analysis from words

8 See Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. 9 We are aware that there is a conceptual distinction between “meanings” and “concepts” in philosophy. However, we use these two terms alongside each other to establish the position that an account of concepts as self-organizing and separate from meanings and words is wrong. Such an error has been perfectly pointed out by philosophers such as Wittgenstein. 10 By the latter group, we mean to refer to philosophers such as Kant and Hegel. According to Kant, a concept is what arises from applying categories to sense data, and Hegel’s spirit explains concepts as self-organizing. Notwithstanding this, the two philosophers finally accept the intelligible and have to acquiesce to do dualism.

25 to propositions, then the question will no longer be the application of a concept to particular entities; instead, the question will be about relations between propositions themselves, or between propositions and external things.

Hegel was right that there is no direct knowledge. Even when we try to avoid concepts altogether and focus on our experience here and now, there is nothing that we can immediately grasp. The assumption that there is something here and now, which can be grasped without our intervention, implies certain other propositions. It implies a distinction between objects and subjects, as well as a unification of both objects and subjects. The very assumption of the existence of something before me implies a distinction between me and that object. Moreover, it implies a distinction between this object and other objects, as well as “me.”

From this fact, Hegel infers that all knowledge is obtained via concepts. However, we, in fact, obtain knowledge via propositions as well as comparisons of propositions with one another. Even when we only use one word such as “dog,” that word is short for a sentence such as “there is a dog here,” or “be careful! The dog might attack you.” When we use the word “this,” it has no meaning except as a symbol for a full proposition. For example, it can be short for “there is something in this place; take note of it.” This is easier to discern in the case of other words. We have frequently observed that a word can have different meanings from context to context.

As we have pointed out, for realists, the ultimate level of analysis is that of words, which refer in turn to concepts, rather than propositions. In addition, if these concepts do not correspond to anything in the external world, it will lead to a version of relativism or pure . Thus, in order to avoid relativism, realists had to accept a correspondence theory of truth, as well as universals to which concepts correspond. We have nevertheless shown that, in order to know concepts are not required. We must deal only with propositions. Now, In order to

26 avoid the radical relativism, do we need to assert the existence of universals? In what follows, we briefly sketch some dimensions of a pragmatic theory of truth and then answer the latter question in terms of this theory.

Wittgenstein was one of the first people who considered propositions as basic, seeing words only in terms of propositions. However, given the long-term dominance of the correspondence theory, he remained an exponent of its framework. Early Wittgenstein obviously defended the correspondence theory. Here is the first sentence of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: “the world is a set of facts.” In our view, the motive behind this statement is Wittgenstein’s internal dilemma between the fundamentality of propositions and the correspondence theory of truth. For if what matters are propositions, rather than concepts, and yet the criterion of truth is correspondence, then the world must no longer be a set of objects; instead, it must be a set of facts. Only in this case can propositions be applied to the world, as put by Wittgenstein. Prior to Wittgenstein, concepts were applied to a plurality of instances, and now that propositions substitute concepts, propositions must be applied to something. Seeing the world in the form of separate objects does not allow propositions to be applied to , or, more precisely speaking, it does not allow correspondence. Thus, the world must be seen in a way in which things are combined, just as propositions which are combined of words. It is the later Wittgenstein (especially in Philosophical Investigations) with his tendency towards , who recognizes that a proposition does not require correspondence for its truth. This is when he comes to be convinced that the correspondence theory is too flawed to be defensible. (Wittgenstein, 2004, p. 136)

So, what is the criterion for the truth of a proposition? According to pragmatism, other propositions. However, the traditional metaphysics of truth believe in a reality beyond propositions, in virtue of correspondence to which the

27 proposition is true. A second-order viewpoint will quickly reveal to us, nevertheless, that the proposition that “there is a reality independent of propositions” is itself a proposition. Every claim is a proposition. We do not think except through propositions. Philosophical thought is primarily concerned with propositions. Every affirmative or negative claim is propositional. Whomever, the Philosopher is, what a person says is propositional. Whatever we say about the world is a proposition. The idea that “an external world outside the mind exists” is itself a proposition. If it is said that we have a self-evident and immediate experience of the world, we will repeat our previous answer that every piece of knowledge is mediated. Every piece of knowledge takes into account other propositions as well as their compatibility with one another. What would it mean to say “I perceive this” if it was not possible to use “I” and “me” consistently. Is it not incompatible to say that “I exist” and “this exists” independently of one another?

We have frequently learned from our experiences that propositions sometimes contradict or exclude one another. They are sometimes incompatible with each other, and a contradicting proposition can be found for every proposition. A philosopher’s philosophical thought challenges other philosophers as well as the philosopher himself. These controversies are sometimes endless. We logically know that two conflicting or contradictory thoughts cannot be both true. Thus, at least one proposition should be put aside.

Moreover, truth should be conceived of in terms of these propositions:

Purely objective truth, truth in whose establishment the function of giving human satisfaction in marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts played no role whatever is nowhere to be found. The reasons why we call things true is the reason why they are true, for 'to be true' means only to perform this marriage-function. (James 1931, p. 64)

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For a pragmatist, the external world exists, but the validity of the proposition that “the external world exists” is not derived from a dogmatism based on recourse to so-called “self-evident” propositions. Its truth is derived from the fact that all of our propositions as a system are compatible with this proposition. Moreover, a pragmatist is ready to set this proposition aside if he finds a host of incompatible propositions (because dogmatists are not metaphysicians of truth).

Now we are prepared to answer the realist’s linguistic objection based on concepts: if the propositions that “the world consists only of concrete entities” and “knowledge depends on an embodied subject” are compatible with other propositions, then these two will be true11, and no universal concept will be required. The realist claimed that when stating a proposition, we assume certain universal concepts. However, we have shown that what we primarily assume are propositions, which are valid in virtue of their interrelations, and not in virtue of their correspondence to external instances. Thus, it suffices if our theory can work well; that is, if it has a high degree of explanatory and predictive powers, and can survive various tests12.

Much of what we have said so far was concerned with the traditional view of the concept of soul and its historical roots, which were mainly grounded in metaphysical issues. Now our encounter with the problem of cognition or knowledge takes place in another paradigm and with somewhat different problems. In the remainder of the chapter, we will tackle some of these problems

11 This is true of all propositions, including those that accept the existence of universals; But if it can be shown that these two statements are compatible with those of our epistemic system and are superior to competing theories, the problem will be solved. The point is that by changing the theory of language one can avoid ontological commitments, so it is not necessary here to prove the two abovementioned propositions. 12 We do not intend to defend the pragmatic or coherence theory of truth here. Our main purpose was to provide an example to prove the main point that is metaphysical subject depends on a particular conception of language and truth.

29 and their relations with theories of embodied cognition. Before that, we had better see how the metaphysical subject is developed in modern philosophy. We will then point out the formation of the concept of embodiment and specific approaches to it. Subsequently, we discuss the problems mentioned above concerning the .

2.3. Body in Modern Philosophy

2.3.1 The Pioneers Schopenhauer can be referred to as the first philosopher who has characterized the body as a knowledge-making agent. Moreover, he has characterized the body as an entity to which knowledge is attributed. In his famous work, The World as Will and Representation, he portrays the world as a representation of the will. Concerning the human knowledge, he believes that the world of which the human is aware is not the world in itself. Instead, it is the world that represents the will in nature, wherein human beings, the will in nature, occur via the body. In the case of humans, the will in nature and the will in the body will be the same: “there is no causal connection between the act of will and the action of the body, for they are directly identical” (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 248).

Schopenhauer considers embodiment at both levels of perception and thought, in both of which the body is key to, and an agent of, cognition. In his view, not only do we, at the level of perception, perceive in ways in that depend on bodily properties and structure but also, at the level of thought, we think in ways in that depend on the bodily structure and the will in nature which is manifested in such structure (Schmicking, 2007, p. 93). In general, he conceives of consciousness and intelligence as a function of the bodily organism:

The organism is the will itself, embodied will, in other words, will objectively be perceived in the brain. For this reason, many of its

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functions, such as respiration, blood circulation, bile secretion, and muscular force, are enhanced and accelerated by the pleasant, and generally robust, . The intellect, on the other hand, is the mere function of the brain, which is nourished and sustained by the organism only parasitically. Therefore, every perturbation of the will, and with it of the organism, must disturb or paralyze the function of the brain. (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 216)

Therefore, we see how significant the body becomes in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. For, in his view, the smallest disorder in the organic body affects the whole consciousness. Medical studies today have shown such a correlation notwithstanding their constraints—dramatic advances in these studies may well have been achieved, had there not been specific ethical considerations!

Another thought-provoking idea in Schopenhauer’s theory, which can similarly find its counterparts in recent scientific studies, is the existence of an unconscious part in the body. The unconscious is not just a minor part of the body, and to the contrary, it is thought to play a remarkable role in cognition and knowledge. As it happens, the conscious part is to this unconscious part, as a small island to a vast ocean. For Schopenhauer, significant activities of the will (the organic body) do not fall in the scope of consciousness. Notwithstanding this, they play the most part in consciousness and our actions. As will be delineated in what follows, Lakoff refers to this part as “cognitive unconscious,” believing, as Schopenhauer would, that much of our consciousness is affected by this domain,13 - which, they both maintain, is not available to us and can only be

13 Notice that although Schopenhauer has had a deep influence on Freud and his theory of the unconscious, his theory, as well as Lakoff’s, differ from Freud’s in that they do not give a central role to sexual desires. All three agree, however, that there are unconscious parts within the human organism that direct the human actions and consciousness. For more on Schopenhauer’s view of the unconscious see (Schmichking, 2007, p. 91).

31 discovered from specific actions and consequences thereof, and which directs our cognition and .

The next philosopher who seriously grappled with embodiment and assigned a pivotal role to the body in the process of cognition and consciousness was Nietzsche, who was, in turn, influenced by and an admirer of Schopenhauer. For Nietzsche, cognition and knowledge that are appealed to by proponents of the metaphysics of truth are merely wills to power, which is closely tied to the human body as an active force:

Most of a philosopher’s conscious thought is secretly directed and forced into determinate channels by the instincts. Even behind all and its autocratic posturings stand valuations or, stated more clearly, physiological requirements for the preservation of a particular type of life. (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 7)

The will to power, which pursues its desires via drives and instincts and constructs the illusion of consciousness, treats the truth as so higher entity that is deemed too great to depend on low-level bodily instincts (p. 6). In his essay, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” Nietzsche presents us with a more profound aspect of his view of the relation between the body and truth. In this essay, he regards concepts and thoughts that we know as to be mere metaphors, which are anthropomorphic and dependent on neural stimuli:

What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures

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and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins. (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 250)

Concept is nevertheless merely the residue of a metaphor, and that the illusion which is involved in the artistic transference of a nerve stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then the grandmother of every single concept. (P. 251)

Nietzsche’s consideration of the role of metaphors as going beyond language and literature to the whole process of cognition was later pursued by people such as Mark Johnson, , and Rafael Núñez. Similarly, and of course, prior to contemporary cognitive scientists, Nietzsche believes that when a metaphor refers, it, in fact, refers to the structure of thought, albeit a thought is totally unified with our bodily structure. He treats as cognitive metaphors not only much of our thoughts, but also concepts such as space, time, and causation, which Kant had considered as a priori categories (Marietti, 2008, p. 3).

Nietzsche defines consciousness in its relation to the body. For him, the body is a collection of inferior and superior forces. Borrowing Schopenhauer’s parlance, higher-level forces are instinctual and physiological drives, or Lakoff’s cognitive unconscious, while Consciousness is always the consciousness of an inferior about a superior to which he is subordinated or into which he is incorporated. As Deleuze (1983) says:

Consciousness is never self-consciousness, but the consciousness of an ego in relation to a self which is not itself conscious. It is not the master's consciousness but the slave's consciousness in relation to a master who is not himself conscious…Consciousness usually only appears when a whole wants to subordinate itself to a superior whole . . . Consciousness is born in relation to a being of which we could be a function. (p. 39)

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Just like Schopenhauer, Freud, Lakoff, and others, Nietzsche endorses the existence of a superior body as what directs consciousness—a body of which we are unconscious, but in which our entire cognitive process takes place; in fact, all mental circumstances that we have imagined have been a consequence of the body. A body we have always been ignorant of!

2.3.2 Embodiment in the Phenomenological Tradition Early in his career, Husserl was looking for a transcendental consciousness and the appearance of consciousness for a transcendental subject. Late in his career he found a tendency to a notion, which turned out to be the origin of the approach to the body in the phenomenological tradition—the notion of “Life-World or Lebenswelt.”

Although, as Merleau-Ponty has put it, the change led to the destruction of Husserl’s early transcendental philosophy,14 it introduced an idea which led to the formation of some of the most crucial views of intellectuals such as Merleau- Ponty, Heidegger, and Sartre. His consideration of the notion of Life-World and the central role he gave to historical perspective, took place at the same time as his agreement with some of Dilthey’s views he had previously criticized.

Thus, it was natural that, just like Dilthey, he became interested in the notion of body. According to Dilthey, every psychological life is materialized in a physical system. Life is manifested as the inner life of the external organization, that is, the body. Moreover, bodily processes and foundations are tied with sensation, association, and memory, and our motivations and sensations are, in turn, tied with processes within the body organs (Naghashian, 2012, p. 81).

14 Note, however, that there are marginal references to the embodiment in the early works of Husserl as well. For more, see Gallagher, 2014, p. 9.

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In any case, in this period of his career, Husserl aimed to establish a connection between knowledge, life, and overcoming the crises of European sciences. In his The Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl criticizes these sciences for overlooking what he called the lived experience. European sciences tried to marginalize the human lived experience and turn him into a neutral observer—an observer who is to find out about the ideal essence of the world merely through observation and reflection.

When Husserl talks about such an ideal world, he points to the origin of modern science, which is the Platonic (formal or ideal) conception of mathematics. The metaphysical origin of modern science is the revival of Platonic mathematics and the attempt to mathematicize the entire human knowledge, just as Galileo famously said, “The book of nature is written in the language of mathematics.” In Plato’s analogy, mathematics belongs to the world of intellect, and mathematical entities count as intellectual , being lower than Forms (or Ideas) only by one degree. Thus, in modern European sciences, in which such mathematics is assumed, our Life-World and our immediate and first-person experiences of the world are overlooked.

The Lifeworld redirects us to the recognition of factors such as culture, tradition, and history in the formation of our knowledge. In other words, knowledge has nothing to do with such an ideal world. Instead, it is relevant to the fore-mentioned factors. The focus on the Life-World is the focus on “horizons” open to each of us—horizons obtained via ordinary life, perception of, and immediate presence in, the environment, perception of things and human beings, culture, and history.

However, such immediate perception and ordinary life take us directly to the body as what makes such facilities and horizons possible. Without the body, direct presence, and living life in the world, the possibility of cognition and

35 knowledge goes away. Note that when we study the place of the body for Husserl and other phenomenologists, we do not mean to reduce cognition to the body. For, as pointed out before, cognition is not only dependent on the body. In fact, it is dependent on the lived experience and is obtained through a presence in, and encounters with, various horizons appearing in the Life-World.

Following Husserl, Heidegger also directs his philosophy in the framework of the notion of the Life-World. When Heidegger says that our only way to ask about Being is through beings, he adopts approximately the same approach as that of modern philosophy, in which the human being is assigned a central role. As Hume (2009) says

“We ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects, concerning which we reason” (p. 10).

Heidegger parts company with modern philosophy when, despite his focus on the human being, he does not regard the human being as separate from Being or existence, or the Life-World, so to speak. That is, for him, to be is to be in the world. The main question in Heidegger’s philosophy is the question of Being, which can only be answered by Dasein, which means "there-being." The word that Heidegger uses indicates the direction to which he wants to take us: to set aside the self-sufficient subject, which is before Being.

In modern philosophy, consciousness or perception is prior to Being: cogito, ergo sum. The priority of consciousness over Being in Husserl’s early philosophy was attacked by Heidegger (Smith, 2018). However, in his Being and Time, Heidegger does not concern himself with the body and sense perception. This is a further step taken by Merleau-Ponty.

Merleau-Ponty was the person who directly connected phenomenology and Life-World to the notion of body. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is in continuity with and radicalization of Husserl’s later theories, while it rejects his early

36 theories and dismisses any metaphysical subject. His rejection is in line with his critiques of , although he attacks the classical enemy of , that is, . Merleau-Ponty’s point of departure is the theory of perception. But why perception? What makes perception central to Merleau-Ponty’sviews?

Merleau-Ponty finds his way from phenomenology to perception. Thus, it needs to be seen how phenomenology directs us to perception. Phenomenology is an attempt to see phenomena from a first-person perspective. Phenomenology is necessary because sciences always try to see and interpret the world from a third-person perspective. To observe the world from a third-person perspective results in always seeing the world within specific conceptual frameworks that are imposed on us via scientific theories and education. As pointed out before, Husserl and Heidegger have severely attacked this approach. A grave problem with science is that it tries to explain the world from a nowhere point of view prior to any consideration of the subject’s perceived world. According to Husserl (1965):

Mathematical science of nature…Concerning the rationality of its methods and theories, however, it is a thoroughly relative science. It presupposes as data principles that are themselves thoroughly lacking in actual rationality. In so far as the intuitive environing world, purely subjective as it is, is forgotten in the scientific thematic, the working subject is also forgotten, and the scientist is not studied (Thus from this point of view the rationality of the exact sciences is on a level with the rationality of the Egyptian pyramids). (p. 186)

Thus, we need to return to a subject who is not engaged in such concepts and does not see the world through these conceptual frameworks which conceal the reality. As Husserl has repeatedly emphasized, phenomenology is a method, rather than

37 a science. That is, it is a method of seeing the world, in which conceptual presuppositions of sciences are ruled out and the connection to the world is supposed to be unmediated.

As much as we try to make our experiences objective, the fact is that concepts with which we begin have been experienced from inside. Thus, perception is significant as the first and the most immediate pre-reflective and direct experience. So, phenomenology is the phenomenology of perception (Matthews, 2006, p. 21). Hence the title of Merleau-Ponty’s seminal work: Phenomenology of Perception. It is Merleau-Ponty who, unlike his predecessors, discovers the significance of perception. Husserl and Heidegger were ignorant of the place of perception and the necessity of its consideration, or at least, they did not adequately elaborate their views of perception. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s project is to study perception and its features, and we should see how his project proceeds.

In his examination of the role of perception, Merleau-Ponty attacks two well-known theories in the history of philosophy, trying to explain what perception is by saying what perception is not through his rejection of these views. He attacks both Empiricism and Rationalism. Let us survey some of his objections to Empiricism.

His first objection is that classical Empiricism ignores the holistic character of perception and tries to provide an atomistic account thereof. According to classical Empiricism, perception is a phenomenon that depends on sensory data as separate entities. For example, in the perception of a pen, its color, length, and shape are separately perceived. However, thanks to his studies of Gestalt , Merleau-Ponty highlighted the of perception. He draws upon several examples from Gestalt psychology to criticize classical Empiricism. One such example is the Müller-Lyer illusion. Look at the following two lines:

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The lines are of the same length, but different directions of their arrows cause the line below to look longer than the one above. The appearance persists even after noticing their actual equality in length. Merleau-Ponty draws on this case to show that it is only in light of the whole that objects of perception make sense. Another example:

Fig. : Simultaneous contrast illusion. (Packard 2014, p. 240)

The narrow horizontal stripe in the middle of the picture looks darker at the right end than at the left one. Nevertheless, its color does not change. The perception of its color depends on its contrast to the color of the broader stripes above and below it.

The second objection is that Empiricism is based on a vicious circle. For it verifies the existence of empirical evidence through perception, while it accounts for perception by an appeal to empirical evidence. There does not seem to be a way out of this circle for classical Empiricism. Merleau-Ponty’s third objection is that, considering Empiricism, perception is indirect. According to Empiricism, at the end of the day, objects of my perception are not things themselves; rather, my impressions and sensations of the things. To put it the other way around, Empiricism holds that what we deal with are only our own , rather than the world. It is this feature of Empiricism that has led Berkley to the denial of the

39 world outside the mind and Hume to the rejection of any argument for the existence of a mind-independent world. However, Merleau-Ponty rejects the indirect conception of perception, seeking a direct and immediate perception of the world. That is, a perception directed at the world itself, rather than our sensations. This is why he relies on pre-reflective experiences in phenomenology.

In addition to all this, for later Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, perception is practical engagement with objects. Influenced by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty holds that being-in-the-world is prior to thoughts about the world. This is to say that life in the world is primary, and thinking about the world is secondary. Thus, to perceive something is not just to have an idea of it. Instead, it is a kind of being related to it. This is what separates Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy from Empiricism.

In Merleau-Ponty’s view, what Rationalist theories of perception cannot understand is the embodiment and situatedness of experience. Merleau-Ponty parts company with Heidegger when he takes the body and sense perception to be conditions of being-in-the-world. Furthermore, this is what separates him from Husserl’s semantic theory as well. Earlier Husserl makes a distinction between the content of a mental act and the mental act itself, referring to them as noema and noesis, respectively. What he has in mind corresponds to what Frege has in mind by sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). The sense or noema is something abstract without any connections whatsoever to the material or the mental worlds.

When Husserl stated that the goal of phenomenology was to arrive at essences of things, by the “essence,” he had noema in mind. Obviously enough, such a conception of the essence and reality of things is totally foreign to the body and environmental experience, and this is precisely the point at which Merleau- Ponty departs from early Husserl and semantic theories.

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Merleau-Ponty subscribes to Husserl’s theory of intentionality, but he does not deploy it to account for knowledge of noema. Instead, he deploys it to account for embodiment and the body’s being-in-the-world, as well as its role in perception and cognition and agrees that consciousness, or conscious experiences, are always directed and oriented at something, but he does not agree that objects of consciousness are abstract entities. Instead, he believes that objects of consciousness and perception are always entities of the world of perception that are grasped through orientations of the body. The thought that we reflect upon, asses, understand, or grasp contents of our experiences in a phenomenological vacuum is itself an abstract thought resulting from ignoring the environmental backgrounds that always directly or indirectly motivate, stimulate, reinforce, or neutralize our responses or states in one way or another (Carman, 2008, p. 35).

For Merleau-Ponty, the entire process of meaning depends on the body and embodied perception. Perception cannot be born everywhere. It only emerges in relation to the body and environmental experience. In other words, the body is a prior condition of the formation of perception and cognition. It should be noted that Merleau-Ponty’s prior conditions are different from Kant’s because Kant’s subject, as pointed out before, is a transcendental subject that has no interaction with the body or environment.

2.3.2.1. The Relation between Phenomenology and Materialism, Given the Embodiment Theory. Merleau-Ponty does not view the body as a merely passive entity that transmits perceptions to the brain. On the contrary, for him, the body and its structures have a crucial role in the processes of cognition, inference, and decision-making. This can give us a clue to Merleau-Ponty’s view of materialism, as well as the

41 boundary he draws between his own view and materialism. In order to further illuminate the boundary, we introduce the views of one of the most contemporary fierce advocates of materialism—Paul Churchland—and compare his views with Merleau-Ponty’s. There are different brands of materialistic views of mind and body, including , reductionist materialism, , and the like. Of all these views, we briefly introduce reductionist and eliminative materialism—the latter being Churchland’s own position—examining Merleau- Ponty’s objections to materialism as well as Churchland’s objections to the whole tradition of phenomenology.

Folk psychology involves concepts that are not of a materialist type, including anxiety, fear, desire, happiness, depression, and the like. Throughout history, such states have been recognized as internal and psychological states, and in attempts at interpretations of, or treatments for, such states, the body or any kind of matter has never been appealed to. This is a characteristic of folk psychology as well. Such an approach is definitely rejected by materialism. Thus, it tries to offer an alternative framework that replaces folk psychology so that we can dispense with the dualism inherent therein.

The first such theory was behaviorism, which tried to rephrase propositions within the folk psychology into propositions in which one’s behaviors were not explained by reference to internal and psychological states, and were explained, instead, by reference to observable behaviors. Reductionist materialism tried (and still tries) to reduce internal states to material and neural states, instead of a linguistic rephrase.

Reductionist materialism does not seek to deny the notions of anxiety, consciousness, desire, happiness, and the like. However, instead of treating them as mysterious internal states, it tries to account for these concepts in terms of neural and neuronal . For example, happiness is no longer thought of as

42 an internal state; it is accounted for by investigating the secretion of certain hormones within the brain. In general, according to reductionist materialism, every mental state is identical to a state of the brain. However, Churchland’s own eliminative materialism is more radical than reductionist materialism.

It tries to establish a full-fledged denial of folk psychology. Here is how Churchland explicates eliminative materialism:

As the eliminative materialists see it, the one-to-one match-ups will not be found, and our common-sense psychological framework will not enjoy an intertheoretic reduction, because our common-sense psychological framework is a false and radically misleading conception of the causes of human and the nature of cognitive activity. On this view, folk psychology is not just an incomplete representation of our inner natures; it is an outright misrepresentation of our internal states and activities. Consequently, we cannot expect a truly adequate neuroscientific account of our inner lives to provide theoretical categories that match up nicely with the categories of our common-sense framework. Accordingly, we must expect that the older framework will simply be eliminated, rather than be reduced, by a matured (original emphasize). (Churchland, 1992, p. 43)

One of the most serious arguments proposed by Churchland is that the common sense and conceptual frameworks that prepare the ground for common sense are fundamentally wrong. He draws on analogies and examples from the history of science to show that the replacement of a theory or a concept with a new theory or concept does not merely consist in the reduction of the former to the latter. It is a total elimination of the old framework and the introduction of a new perspective on phenomena. One of his frequent examples is heat. In the past, the

43 heat was thought to be an imperceptible fluid that is kept within the bodies, just like water within a sponge. However, today we know that heat is not a substance. It is, indeed, the mean kinetic energy of trillions of molecules that constitute a hot body. In this case, we do not see the reduction of one conceptual framework to another. Instead, the old framework is totally eliminated, and a whole new framework is introduced. Now, in Churchland’s intellectual framework, how is our cognition and consciousness produced? Furthermore, what should be studied in order to answer this question?

As apparent from his materialistic view, we need to look for the answer in the brain and the neural system, as well as the interconnections therein. At the lowest level of cognition, molecular, synaptic, neural, network, map-like, systemic, and brain roots are located. Neurophilosophy must examine and understand these neural functions in order to understand cognition. Otherwise, even hours of philosophizing would not be able to provide a unified theory concerning philosophy and neuroscience (Babaee et al., 2017, p. 68). Thus understood, we may now ask: what is the mind? What is consciousness and cognition?

Chruchland’s view can be contrasted to Merleau-Ponty’s view in some respects. The contrast can be traced to objections made by Enactive Cognition theorists. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, who have been influenced by Merleau- Ponty, tried to reject views like Churchland’s employing a revival of Merleau- Ponty’s view. The first thing they put their fingers on, as inspired by Merleau- Ponty, was the reliance on first-person, instead of third-person experiences.

As pointed out before, the essence of phenomenology is the reliance on immediate first-person experiences. However, Churchland directly targets the phenomenological view of science and the world:

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If all knowledge is inevitably a matter of conceptual construction and speculative interpretation[…]then it would seem that the 'special access' to the 'essential nature' of the mind sought by the phenomenologists is but a dream and that the standard methods of empirical science constitute the only hope the mind has of ever understanding itself. This need not preclude admitting introspective judgments as data for science and thus need not preclude 'phenomenological research,' but it will deny the results of such research any special or unique epistemological status. (Churchland, 1992, p. 87)

Despite the solution of certain problems of learning, perception, and consciousness from a third-person perspective by the deployment of strict methods of measurement and their reduction to chemical and physical levels, there remain difficulties for such interdisciplinary science.

The first difficulty goes back to the gap within the connection between neural and computational levels, and consequently, between cognitive and phenomenal levels. The problem is how consciousness and perception of a learner as a dynamic organism or a living brain at the level of the first-person experience at structural and functional levels of the neural organization can be reduced to the molecular level. Thus, in Body in Mind, Varela and colleagues try to revive Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach in opposition to materialism.

There is another respect in which Merleau-Ponty’s view can be discriminated from materialism: his particular emphasis on body and its orientation and situatedness. Materialists usually tend to reduce events of consciousness and cognition to brain events, regardless of the role of body and experiences resulting from bodily orientation. Thus, they ignore the structures of body organs, as well as environmental and kinesthetic experiences resulting from

45 bodily movement and perceived by body organs. Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on movement has resulted in the theory espoused by his followers: Enactive Cognition theory.

Finally, Merleau-Ponty’s view also differs from materialism in that he highlights the intentionality of conscious activities. Historically speaking, materialism relies on mechanical relations, and thus it conceives of human beings as products of such relations. So, human beings will, on this conception, be passive beings with passive consciousness and perception. This has been broached by Merleau-Ponty both in his emphasis on the intentionality of consciousness and perception and his objections to Empiricism.

Classically, Empiricism accounts for the whole consciousness in terms of sensory data. Hume takes subjects to be products of sensory data, indeed. He does not conceive of the subject as constitutive. This conception has hugely influenced behaviorists and proponents of neuroscience. However, Merleau-Ponty rejects both. Contrary to these accounts, particularly Empiricism, he believes that perception is both passive and active. It is active in that, according to the theory of intentionality, every mental act is directed at something. Thus, perception is both intentional and embodied, both sensory and kinesthetic, and thus, it is neither merely subjective, nor merely objective; neither merely internal, nor merely external (Carman, 2008, p. 78). Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis comes from the phenomenological doctrine that being-in-the-world is prior to any thinking. We are primarily present in the world, and we experience it before we think about it.

However, despite all boundaries drawn by Merleau-Ponty and his followers between his view and materialism, it seems that they have no way to escape materialism. If we think of materialism merely as a philosophy that reduces mental acts to the brain, then the demarcation between Merleau-Ponty’s view and materialism will be justified. However, materialism is not exhausted by

46 these options. In a broader sense, materialism amounts to a rejection of abstract entities that are beyond space and time. Such a weak version of materialism does not necessarily lead to behaviorism and merely neurological approaches. For, the body is, just like the brain and behavior, a concrete, spatiotemporal entity.

Moreover, instead of a Cartesian functionalistic approach, one can talk about the intrinsic notion of matter and forces within the materialistic framework. The idea is that matter is not a mere extension, and mechanical behavior does not explain the . Instead, the matter has an intrinsic force, and its motions come from within. Thus, we think Merleau-Ponty’s view should not be thought of as opposed to all forms of materialism.

2.4. Cognitive Science and Embodied Cognition

2.4.1. First-Generation Cognitive Science and Analytic Philosophy

As pointed out earlier in this chapter, theories of embodied cognition in cognitive science are contrasted to traditional theories in this field. To more carefully examine these traditional theories, we need a digression to some origins of analytic philosophy, since there are many similarities between the views of early analytic philosophers and first-generation cognitive scientists. Lakoff also traces first-generation theories in cognitive science to the metaphysics of analytic philosophy.

Brentano introduces a concept that turned out to be fundamental in and orient, both strands—the concept of “intentionality.” For Brentano, every mental act is directed at something and has an object, so to speak. In his view, no state of consciousness is pure and self-sufficient. For example, fear is always a fear of something; anger is always anger at something; consciousness is always

47 consciousness of something, and so on. Now the question is what these states are directed at.

At first, Brentano took objects of mental acts to be immaterial contents. However, he later shifted to reism, saying that their objects are physical objects. Notwithstanding this, some of his contemporaries, and in particular his students who, in Brentano’s own words, put on every old jacket that he threw away and clung to Brentano’s earlier view. Husserl postulated the concepts of noema and noesis, and Frege appealed to a distinction between sense and reference in order to overcome some mathematical issues and avoid psychologism, taking the object of mental acts to be sensed.15

Frege’s attempts to reject psychologism led him to the introduction of a new theory of meaning. He characterized the sense as something objective and yet abstract and immaterial. In his The Thought (Der Gedanke), Frege clearly denies that for things to exist, they need to be material, classifying thought, and sense as abstract entities (Frege, 1956, p. 302). More precisely, Frege has introduced entities into his ontology that are rejected by many philosophers, and in particular Empiricists and proponents of Ockham’s razor.

Frege expanded his ontology, partitioning the world into three parts: the material world, the mental world, and a third realm, which is neither material nor mental (Rosen, 2017), that is, the world of abstracta. Concerning how knowledge of the abstract world is acquired, given that, as Benacerraf suggests (1973), we do not have a causal relation to such a world, Frege claims that such abstract senses are grasped in a social act. He does not elaborate upon how senses are grasped, but what he has in mind, which was being pursued by the first-generation

15 For more about the effect of theories of intentionality on post-Brentano , see Pierre, 2014.

48 cognitive scientists, can be uncovered by a close examination of his well-known book, Begriffsschrift.

In Begriffsschrift, Frege invents a formal and totally artificial language. His invented language is formal so that it would not involve ambiguities of the natural language. He invented the language primarily in order to revise in this language, and secondarily, to accomplish his project of logicism or the reduction of mathematics into logic. His goal (in his The Foundations of Arithmetic) was to arrive at ideal mathematical meanings which existed in his world of abstracta.

What he, and his successors, do in logic is indeed the stipulation of purely meaningless symbols and then making deductions from them via specific axioms. In Frege’s view (and as assumed in modern formal systems of logic), intuitions or other rules or axioms should not be used in deductions. For instance, in the following inference, two symbols—P and Q—are used, and no axiom or intuition other than modus ponens is applied, and its truth is not specified outside of logic— it is specified in virtue of a mechanical action based on truth tables:16

P → Q

P

Q

Although Frege’s system was primarily invented for mathematics, it is, as he suggests in his Begriffsschrift, a Leibnizian project in fact, which intends such a language to be constructed for, and applied to, all sciences from physics and chemistry to other natural sciences. What relates this issue to our discussion is that, throughout Frege’s work and his metaphysics and philosophy, as well as in his favored and , no role is assigned to an embodiment.

16 Truth tables were not invented by Frege himself; they were invented by Wittgenstein.

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For Frege, the body is irrelevant to cognition just as it was for Descartes. In his semantics, the formation of categories and concepts to which symbols refer has nothing to do with the body. In fact, for Frege, concepts and categories are not formed at all; they already exist in an eternal world. For Frege, meanings are neither products of social practices and their uses in ordinary life, as Wittgenstein believed, nor products of the Life-World and horizons before a moving body which is in the process of formation.

As we have seen in the previous chapter and will see in this section, concepts and meanings are formed and identified a posteriori in a social act as dependent on structures of the body and the environment, rather than as a pre- existing pre-formulated package. In any case, although Frege’s views did not find any advocates in natural sciences, it seemed interesting to practitioners of cognitive science and artificial intelligence, and constituted the building blocks of these sciences, so to speak. Theories of embodied cognition seriously challenge the assumptions of first-generation cognitive science by giving a central role to the body and its environmental and social presence.

2.4.2. Artificial Intelligence

Now it is time to discuss the relationship between embodied cognition and a significant issue of the present century, that is, artificial intelligence. The debate over artificial intelligence is rather new, dating back to at most one century. In Fact, artificial intelligence officially began in 1956 at a conference in Dartmouth. Artificial intelligence thrived alongside functionalist theories. Thus, we need to discuss functionalism and how artificial intelligence was developed therefrom briefly.

Objections to behaviorism justified the development of a new theory of mind. In addition to solving the problems of behaviorism, the new theory had to offer a solution to the most significant problem in the philosophy of mind—that

50 is, the mind-body problem. One theory offered to solve the problem was the theory, which came in two versions: type identity theory and token identity theory, both of which were reductive materialistic theories, as briefly pointed out before. According to the type identity theory, types of mental states are identical to types of brain states, and then every type of mental state is reduced to a type of brain state. For example, pains are reduced to C-fiber firings. Just as we reduce water to H2O, we can use the term “C-fiber firing” instead of “,” which refers to a mysterious mental state.

This brings us to an advantage of type identity theory, that is, simplicity. For, as pointed out earlier, when a trans-physical entity is reduced to a physical entity, things will be more concrete and straightforward. Moreover, it will bring with it a sort of simplicity in language and concepts, because if all mental states are reduced to brain states, the metaphysical language will be eliminated, and only one language will remain with which brain processes are articulated. Although this theory did not suffer from limits and problems of behaviorism, it was subject to other objections. Of these, we briefly sketch one.17

If a mental state “type” were identical to a brain state “type,” then it would follow that a necessary relation holds between the two. More technically speaking, there should be a necessary relation between them in all possible worlds. That is to say, in every possible world (that is, in all imaginable circumstances), pains should be identical to C-fiber firings. However, not all animals that experience pains undergo C-fiber firings. Instead, other parts of their brain states might give rise to experiences of pains in those animals. The same applies to other mental states and their reduction to brain states.

17 This is because the following objection allows us to account for how the token-token identity theory was developed.

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To solve the problem, some people propounded a token identity theory. On this view, instead of looking for a “type” of a brain state for every “type” of a mental state, we look for “tokens” of a brain state for “tokens” of a mental state. Here is how Searle summarizes this theory:

The token identity theorists simply said: for every token of a certain type of mental state, there is some token of some type of physical state or other with which that mental state token is identical. They, in short, did not require, for example, that all token pains had to exemplify exactly the same type of brain state. They might be tokens of different types of brain states even though they were all tokens of the same mental type, pain. For that reason, they were called “token- token” identity theorists as opposed to “type-type” identity theorists. (Searle 2004, p. 60)

In any case, the failure of behaviorism and objections leveled at type identity theory led some philosophers to offer a new theory: functionalism. There are two versions of this theory: machine functionalism and causal-theoretical functionalism. Now we should see the appeals and potentials of functionalism that led to its remarkable impact on the philosophy of mind.

According to functionalism, different systems can, despite their differences in types, exhibit the same function. For example, a wristwatch, a wall clock, an hourglass, a sundial, and the like display the same function, despite their differences in type. Remember the objection to type identity theory: pains are associated with different types of brain states in different species; thus, all kinds of pains cannot be reduced to the same physical type. Now we learn from the clock analogy that in order to define what a clock is, we do not need to see what material it is composed of (type identity18) or to see how one type of a clock, such

18 This thesis is also well known as the thesis of “multiple realizability”.

52 as a cuckoo clock, behaves (behaviorism). The only thing we need for the definition of a clock is how it functions, which is common to all types of clocks. Thus, if we find how “pains” function, we can specify all types of pains in all species that experience the pain.

Philosophers and cognitive scientists who advocate functionalism associate it with the mathematical notion of function. In mathematics, a function is an operator that receives an input or argument, and then yields a specific output or value based on well-defined principles and rules. For example, in a function such as y=x2+1, given different arguments input to x, different values will be obtained. For example, if we input the argument, 2, into the above function, we will have five as our value, and if 3 is an input, we will have ten as our value. Here a function operates only following a specific rule. Earlier, we pointed out the role of Frege on followers of functionalism, and now we are able to further elaborate upon the issue.

Frege has established the functional paradigm by introducing the mathematical notion of function into logic and trying to formalize the natural language. Frege thought of logic is a paradigm of certainty, and thus, he believed that if we could derive a proposition with purely logical methods, then the proposition would be “necessarily” true. However, in his view, the natural language was a significant obstacle. Thus, we had to devise a machine that was free of linguistic ambiguities, which are mainly grounded in semantic ambiguities. Thus, Frege looked for a language that was void of any meaning: a purely formal language, in which there is no reference to meaning and whose truth is solely determined by the deployment of specific rules; hence, the distinction between syntax and semantics in modern logic. In other words, Frege’s language is self-sufficient; that is, it does not need meaning.

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Now Turing machine turns out to support this theory. Turing refers to the machine as a digital computer, in terms of which the table of rules and programming are defined. The table of rules is a book of laws deployed by the computer in performing its operations, and programming is a set of rules or instructions from the table in an order selected for a operation. What is significant about a Turing machine is that it merely takes forms of signs into account, remaining neutral concerning any content. Since Turing thinks of the brain as having the same function, it will be possible to construct machines that can perform its computations. Thus, there can be artificial intelligence, equal and equivalent to human intelligence. In other words, just as Turing machine operates in accordance with inputs and outputs, the mind operates between its inputs (sensory data) and its outputs (behaviors).

Thus, mental states are indeed, computational states of the brain. The relation of a mind to the brain is like that of software to hardware:

If one had to summarise the research program of , it would look like this: Thinking is processing information, but is just symbol manipulation. Computers do symbol manipulation. So the best way to study thinking (or as they prefer to call it, 'cognition') is to study computational symbol- manipulating programs, whether they are in computers or in brains. On this view, then, the task of cognitive science is to characterise the brain, not at the level of nerve cells, nor at the level of conscious mental states, but rather at the level of its functioning as an information processing system. And that's where the gap getsfilled. (Searle, 1984, p. 41)

Let us return to the example of pain; a mental condition like pain turns into a causal-functional condition, meaning that it plays a functional role of definite

54 causation and thereby, mentally-caused concepts turn into functional concepts. For example, an organism can endure pain, only when there is a mechanism which reflects superficial damages. The function of this function is causal, i.e., superficial damages activate this function and activate other dependent mechanisms in the following. These functions accompany the behavior outcome of this sequence, defined in functional terms and the resulting function works between the middle (causal) ground of input pain condition (e.g., superficial damage) and its output (e.g., yelling). According to functionalists, this model is true for all types of mental events and hence all mental conditions are causal- functional conditions. What is assumed in studying samples of mental conditions is that all the mental conditions have a specific role to play. In other words, if one looks at mental events as internal events of person, they must have the actual causal power to cause other mental events and occurrences.

2.4.2.1 Embodied Cognition and Artificial Intelligence Having surveyed a brief history of how philosophical views of artificial intelligence were developed, we are now in a position to consider the problem of artificial intelligence from the view of advocates of embodied cognition. The embodied approach to cognition was propounded in about 1980 in response to formalism and computationalism (Lindblom 2007, p. 76). As we have seen before, earlier approaches to artificial intelligence were based on pure formalism and were thus free of any relations to the body. However, more recent approaches sought to rediscover the role of the body in the process of cognition. Thus, we elaborately review the accounts provided by a number of prominent people who have worked on embodied cognition: Brooks, Agre and Chapman, Dreyfus, and Lakoff.

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2.4.2.1.1. Brooks was the first person who developed a connection between artificial intelligence and embodied cognition. He sought to apply to life. Thus, he considered two main theses: situatedness and embodiment (Lindblom 2007, p. 76). Here is how he formulates the two theses:

[Situatedness] The robots are situated in the world—they do not deal with abstract descriptions, but with the here and now of the world directly influencing the behavior of the system.

[Embodiment] The robots have bodies and experience the world directly—their actions are part of a dynamic with the world and have an immediate feedback on their own sensations.

Brooks’ approach to robots was bottom-up. It was preceded by an approach in which robots operated in accordance to complex algorithms and pre- determined rules or instructions. However, in the bottom-up approach, robots learn how to adjust themselves based on environmental circumstances. Brooks’ idea was inspired by the lives of more rudimentary animals such as insects. They are not born with prior knowledge of the world. However, they begin to learn how to adjust themselves to the world. The idea inspired Brooks to designs robots that could do the same.

“In a paper, he reports that he has presented a different approach in a wireless based on the idea that “the world is the best model of itself.” This robot deploys the world as it constantly consults its sensors, instead of an internal model of the world” (Dreyfus, 2007, p. 5).

It is programmed for particular responses to particular situations, and it learns to respond to changes reported by its sensors directly.

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2.4.2.1.2. Agre and Chapman Agre and Chapman pioneered an approach they called “interactionism.” Their approach was more or less influenced by Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the- world, which we sketched before. To draw on Heidegger’s views is to criticize Cartesian views, in which the subject can self-sufficiently think. The Cartesian view constituted the first cornerstone of the first generation of advocates for artificial intelligence. However, in Heidegger’s view, Dasein does not go out of the enclosure of its consciousness. On the contrary, it is already present in the world. In perception, it is not as if Dasein goes out of its territory, invades the territory of objects, where it robs truths, and then goes back to its own territory. Instead, Dasein remains outside of itself, even in understanding and remembering (Biemel 1976, p. 38).

Just as Brooks made recourse to more rudimentary animals and a bottom- up approach, Agre and Chapman began to study human pre-reflective behaviors (given their background in Heidegger’s philosophy) and learned that ordinary human behaviors are generally uniform, and changes take place very slowly. Moreover, in their view, the complexity and uncertainty of the world does not allow us to think that artificial intelligence can be constructed that can adjust itself to all these complexities and uncertainties by relying on a program. Many of our behaviors are immediate and pre-reflective, rather than programmed.

In general, there are important similarities between the view of Agre and Chapman on the one hand, and that of Brooks on the other:

Agre and Chapman’s work bears many similarities to the architecture proposed by Brooks. Both schemes originated on the assumptions of a complex, immediate, and uncertain agent environment. Also, both architectures stress that there is no need for

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an internal world model and that the world is its own best model. The work done by Brooks has a more practical flavor and chooses actual mobile robots as testbeds while Agre and Chapman rely on a simulated environment. What is more, is that Brooks’ architecture relies more on pre-packaged behaviors. The subsumption architecture is essentially a hierarchy of behaviors and behaviors consist of pre-determined sets of instructions. Agre and Chapman’s architecture, on the other hand, places more emphasis on the behaviors as patterns of interaction between the agent’s ‘simple machinery’ and the complex world. (Habibi, 1998, p. 12)

2.4.2.1.3. Dreyfus Influenced by the views of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus has criticized theories of artificial intelligence since their heydays until periods in which most of them failed. Dreyfus levels four main objections against four assumptions by artificial intelligence:

Biological objection: as pointed out before, in theories of artificial intelligence, the relation of minds to brains is analogized to that of software to hardware.

Psychological objection: this was also pointed out earlier; according to theories of artificial intelligence, the mind thinks by operating on symbols and in accordance with rules of the process of thinking.

Epistemological objection: according to theories of artificial intelligence, all brain activities can be predicted and modeled by extracting relevant laws. In other words, all knowledge can be formalized, and thus, we can devise a model on which we can draw in systems of artificial intelligence.

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Ontological objection: according to these theories, the world consists of facts that are independent of each other and irrelevant to their background. Thus, in order to know a concept, we do not need to know its background or surrounding concepts. This is a purely atomistic view.

Since Dreyfus takes the main problem with artificial intelligence to be its ontological assumption, we do not tackle other objections, and will only elaborate upon the ontological objection in what follows.

The history of philosophy is a history of categorization—a history of bringing individuals under type concepts and separating them from their actual and relational existence. Plato was the first person to carry out this task. He sees every particular entity under universal types. Moreover, he finally believes that to know a particular entity, it suffices to know the universal type under which it falls. Thus, in order to know Socrates, we do not need to know his background and particular factors that led to what he is now. All that is required for knowing Socrates is to know the type under which he falls, which already exists as intelligible in terms of a universal concept. Aristotle provided a table of categories in order to facilitate such categorization. In the rest of the history of philosophy, all knowledge was treated as knowledge of independent, self-standing, and abstract types. Dreyfus believes that one reason why the computational processing approach defeated the brain modeling approach was that the former was backed by the traditional history of philosophy:

It was not just Descartes and his descendants who stood behind symbolic information processing, but all of . According to Heidegger, traditional philosophy is defined from the start by its focusing on facts in the world, while "passing over" the world as such. This means that philosophy has, from the start, systematically ignored or distorted the everyday context of human

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activity. The branch of the philosophical tradition that descends from Socrates through Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant to conventional AI takes it for granted, in addition, that understanding a domain consists in having a theory of that domain. A theory formulates the relationships among objective, context-free19 elements (simples, primitives, features, attributes, factors, data points, cues, etc.) in terms of abstract principles (covering laws, rules, programs, etc.). Plato held that in theoretical domains such as mathematics and perhaps ethics, thinkers apply explicit context-free rules or theories they have learned in another life, outside the everyday world. Once learned, such theories function in this world by controlling the thinker's mind, whether he or she is conscious of them or not. Plato's account did not apply to everyday skills but only to domains in which there must be some set of context-free elements and some abstract relations among those elements that account for the order of the domain and for man's ability to act intelligently in it is a priori knowledge. The success of theory in the natural sciences, however, reinforced the idea that in any orderly domain. (Dreyfus 1988, p. 39)

In fact, this is what grounds Dreyfus’s objection: there are many background elements in every piece of knowledge that cannot be controlled or measured, and thus, they cannot be taken into consideration when designing artificial intelligence. In Heidegger’s view, the foundation of knowledge is our pre- reflective experience of the world, in contrast to the Cartesian view that the world can be explained and controlled by consciousness. Obviously, the foundation of ideas behind artificial intelligence is Cartesian. Thus, in these views, skills,

19 In contemporary , context refers to cultural, environmental, historical, political … elements which determines the structure and also content of theories.

60 actions, judgments,20 and the like are not taken into account in that they are not volitional. Because of Husserl’s ignorance of this point, Dreyfus takes him to be a pioneer of artificial intelligence in his time. For at least the early Husserl believed in the suspension (epoche) of phenomenology, as a result of which consciousness could grasp the reality of entities with a purely theoretical reflection. Thus, consciousness did not need to be present in the world. Dreyfus’s objection is grounded in the idea that artificial intelligence ignores such a need for the presence in the world.

Thus, it turns out that situatedness in the world is prior to atomic propositions (which seems appealing to advocates of artificial intelligence). Therefore, it is impossible to understand an atomic proposition without understanding its background and situation (which is not given in the proposition). However, what is not given is not taken into consideration when designing artificial intelligence. Thus, artificial intelligence is doomed to failure when it comes to simulating the human mind.

One ancillary objection by Dreyfus, based on the latter idea, is the objection from an extensive database:

Granting for the moment that all human knowledge can be analyzed as a list of objects and of facts about each, Minsky's analysis raises the problem of how such a large mass of facts is to be stored and accessed, how could one structure these data a hundred thousand discrete elements so that one could find the information required in a reasonable amount of time? When one assumes that our knowledge of the world is knowledge of millions of discrete facts, the problem

20 Heidegger believes that, prior to any reflective encounter with the world, we have a practical and instrumental encounter with things in the world, and except in particular circumstances, our encounter with them does not turn into a reflective one.

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of artificial intelligence becomes the problem of storing and accessing an extensive database. (Dreyfus 1978, p. 121)

Since the body plays a crucial role in our pre-reflective experience of the world, it appears at the heart of Dreyfus’s argument. Here is the course of his argument:

I shall consider two areas in which work in AI has not fulfilled early expectations: recognition and problem-solving. In each, I will try to account for the failure by arguing that the task in question cannot be formalized, and by isolating the non-formal form of information processing necessarily involved. Finally, I will try to show that the non-formalizable form of information processing in question is possible only for embodied beings, where being embodied does not merely mean being able to move and to operate manipulators. (Dreyfus 1967, p. 16)

The first function of the body is that it provides us with our internal horizon— that is, our indeterminate and prior expectations—as a whole (Khalaj 2014, p. 279). Without our bodies and bodily habits, we would merely have vague ideas of data. Our bodies help us, nevertheless, to have practical and behavioral expectations. The of a proper viewpoint and details involves coordinated actions and expectations. For example, in order to drink a glass of milk, our bodies should be positioned in a particular angle towards the glass, our fingers should be placed around the glass, and so on and so forth. An advocate of artificial intelligence might respond that the robot might be commanded to perform a particular behavior in response to a particular stimulus (such as a glass of milk). However, Dreyfus gives a rejoinder in terms of wide-ranging possibilities of human bodies.

According to Dreyfus, our bodies help us exhibit responses in different circumstances, dependent on different environmental demands, whereas this is

62 not possible for artificial intelligence. He quotes the following passage from Merleau-Ponty:

When the percipient acquires a skill, he does not weld together individual movements and individual stimuli but acquires the power to respond with a certain type of solution to situations of a certain general form. The situations may differ widely from place to place, and the response movements may be entrusted sometimes to one operative organ, sometimes to another, both situations and responses in the various cases having in common not so much a partial identity of elements as a shared significance. (Dreyfus, 1978, p. 161)

And then goes on to say:

“Thus, an anticipation of an object does not arouse a single response or specific set of responses but a flexible skill that can be brought to bear in an indefinite number of ways”. (Dreyfus 1967, p. 20)

This is, indeed, the second primary function of bodies: they enable us to encounter objects without representing them (whereas representation is a fundamental assumption of artificial intelligence).

Moreover, feedbacks determine whether a human or a machine properly knows an object, although there is an essential difference between the two. Artificial intelligence can ultimately detect errors based on a limited number of defined data, whereas bodies have much broader possibilities and facilities than artificial intelligence. Bodies adjust themselves to their environments and objects therein and place themselves in the best possible position concerning these objects. For example, to read a book, one needs to put one’s body in a position, which differs in different conditions (such as those in which there is excessive or dim light, or when one’s hand is physically damaged). However, a machine does not have such capabilities, particularly the capacity to adjust itself.

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According to Dreyfus, human intelligent behavior and processing occur in a non-formal way. That is to say, from an ontological point of view, the behavior constitutes a whole. The elements of this point of view are meaningful only in light of the whole (Khalaj, 2014, p. 282). Dreyfus maintains that grasping the whole requires the existence of an embodied organism, and unless artificial intelligence has such a body, it fails to equal the power of human minds.21 Dreyfus takes his holism from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.

In Heidegger’s well-known example of a hammer, the smith has no conscious recognition of the hammer, nails, or his bench—that is, he lacks consciousness of a sort possessed by a person who might look at him and reflect on what he is doing. The smith has no consciousness of tools with which he works, nor of himself. Thus, there is no subject here, nor object. There is only a constant experience of working. The body and the hammer will constitute an integrated whole. Therefore, to separate the body from its surrounding environment or to ontologically distinguish them is to empty the living body of its contents, whereas human intelligence behavior is a result of such an ontological connection. Thus, artificial intelligence fails to simulate the intelligent human behavior by the distinction it makes between them and their transformation into independently existing units (p. 283). Therefore, any attempt to simulate the human mind without a simulation of the human body is doomed to failure22.

21 This is not say that robots can equal the human mental power if a day comes when a human body is designed for them. This is to say that having a living body is a necessary, albeit not a sufficient, condition for the simulation of the human mind. 22 Neither the human body nor any other real organism can be simulated without making some oversimplifying and biologically unrealistic oversimplifications. For more reading: Spyridon A. Koutroufinis (2014). “Beyond System Theoretical Explanations of an Organism’s Becoming: A Process Philosophical Approach”. In: Koutroufinis, Spyridon A. (ed.). Life and Process. Towards a New Biophilosophy. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 99-132.

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2.4.3. Cognitive Metaphor

Lakoff has been one of the most severe thinkers who introduced and developed the theory of embodied cognition. He and his colleagues, Johnson and Núñez, pursued the role of metaphor in the cognitive process, and thus, they discovered the role of the body in the formation of cognition. The book, Philosophy in the Flesh, co-authored by Lakoff and Johnson, opens with the following three theses:

1) The mind is inherently embodied.

2) The thought is mainly unconscious.

3) Abstract concepts are mainly metaphorical.

Let us begin with the last thesis: throughout history, metaphors were usually deemed relevant to language and literature and were never thought of as relevant to cognition and scientific knowledge. If it was believed, on the one hand, that metaphors are aesthetic merits for artwork, it was, on the other hand, believed that metaphors are threats to science and the scientific language. Recent studies concerning metaphors have revealed that the whole scientific language and our whole cognitive process mostly have a metaphorical structure. Consider the following phrases: “black hole,” “air resistance,” “electric charge,” “electric field,” “natural selection,” and “temporal distance.” These phrases lie at the heart of modern scientific theories, but they are pregnant with numerous metaphorical concepts.

Despite their occasional severe disagreements with each other, contemporary theories of metaphor share the assumption that our cognition is necessarily metaphorical. Although, as pointed out before, Nietzsche was the first to discover the cognitive role of metaphors, the idea was developed and elaborated by recent theories. For example, in his interactive theory, Black

65 conceives of metaphorical propositions as “cognitive apparatuses” such as “charts, maps, and diagrams” that somewhat model the reality and can “show how things are” (Black, 1997, p. 456). Davidson’s causal theory rules out the distinction between metaphorical and non-metaphorical , holding that the whole language is metaphorical, and metaphors, properly speaking, do not represent something else; instead, they are vehicles of meanings on their own. However, it was Lakoff who brought metaphors to the level of the body and bodily-environmental experiences. Lakoff and Johnson believe that, in addition to language, our thoughts, experiences are metaphorical. They believe, and argue, that when an environmental experience takes place, a specific neuronal array occurs, which causes the formation of various metaphors that encompass not only our experiences and ordinary cognitive reservoirs, but also our whole philosophical, scientific, and even mathematical thoughts.23 However, how do these metaphors work?

Consider the following : “ is warmth.” For a human baby, mental-emotional experiences are not usually discriminable from the sensory experience of warmth; that is, the warmth of the mother’s arms. The two experiences are later discriminated, although they reconnect in a metaphorical framework, hence metaphors such as “warm smile,” “a warm welcome,” “warm-blooded person,” and so on. Moreover, the safety and peacefulness of the mother’s arms give rise to the metaphor of “intimacy is spatial proximity” as evident in: “we were close to each other,” “there is a distance between us,” “we are far away from each other” and so on.

In all these, and similar, metaphors, the crucial role is played by the body and bodily projections. For example, spatial relations in terms of body cause the

23 In their Where Mathematics Comes From, Lakoff and Núñez show the metaphorical structures of mathematical theories.

66 constitution of concepts of directions, such as “above,” “below,” “before,” “behind,” and the like, and these concepts play a key role in the constitution of many conceptual metaphors such as “Christmas is before us” and “we have left the summer behind.”

In the constitution of a metaphor, two domains come to be linked: the source domain and the target domain. In each metaphorical schema, elements in the source domain are mapped into the target domain, which results in cognition. The source domain is a domain that is more familiar to the person, and the target domain finds meaning through mapping into the source domain. For example, in the conceptual metaphor of “love is a journey,” which gives rise to metaphors such as “we are still in the first steps of our relation,” “the relation does not go anywhere,” “we are not moving on,” and “there are many obstacles before us,” the source domain is journey and the target domain is love. Or consider the following example about time and spatial position:

Source: observer’s position in Target: time space

Observer’s current position in Present time space

The space in front of the Future observer

The space behind the observer Past

To better understand the reason for such a mapping, we had instead turned to Gestalt psychology. At a philosophical level, William James traced the

67 acceptance or rejection of beliefs to a pre-existing web of beliefs in terms of which observation becomes meaningful and, ultimately, accepted or rejected. The Gestalt theory develops a similar view at a psychological level.

According to Gestalt psychology, perception and understanding do not work on the model of Rationalism and Empiricism, which is a passive reception of sensory data. Instead, sensory data is meaningful only in terms of a pre-existing whole. Thus, a perceptual experience does not make sense on its own, and it remains meaningless unless it is positioned within the framework of a pre- existing gestalt. On the other hand, in both ordinary experiences and scientific investigations, the structure of the world sometimes surpasses the structure of the language. Thus, to perceive and communicate a new observed structure, there is no way but to understand in previous general frameworks. It is in these cases, metaphors come in to help us understand and communicate the meaning. This closed holism24 is what grounds the critical role of metaphors in human knowledge.

However, what forms inferences as well as metaphors which constitute our concepts is neuronal model-making. In Lakoff’s view, neuronal model-making can show what the embodiment of the mind amounts to—rational inferences can be computed with the same neuronal architecture that applies to sense perception or bodily movements. Thinking involves categorizing, that is, putting individual beings into classified categories, such as “human,” “man,” “woman,” “mammal,” “food,” “danger,” and the like. Such categorizations are entirely dependent on neuronal models and arrays, which are, in turn, functions from the bodily structure of the organism and the sensory-motor experience resulting from being

24 “Closed” in the sense that parts of the whole are in relation to one another and a change in one part affects other parts. The parts ultimately aim to constitute a coherent whole.

68 in, and interacting with, the environment. Thus, the role of the body in the process of cognition will be further illustrated.

2.4.3.1. Cognitive Unconscious The last noteworthy point in Lakoff’s theory is the problem of the cognitive unconscious. The cognitive unconscious bears many similarities with what we have seen in the views of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. It amounts to the existence of a part to which we have no access and of which we are not conscious, although it oversees much of cognitive processes. Not only does cognitive unconsciousness constitute concepts and categories, but it also plays an essential role in how we perceive, infer, and think. Without the cognitive unconscious, cognition would be practically impossible.

According to Lakoff and Johnson, and formerly Freud, the cognitive unconscious cannot be accessed in our consciousness, but innumerable findings and observations have implied its existence. For example, consider stages of a straightforward conversation: access to memory, apprehension of the phonetic structure of the language and its division into separate parts, recognition of phonemes and morphemes, formation of sentences following grammatical rules, word choice, giving meaning to words relevant to the content, relating sentences to one another, formulation of what is said according to the present topic, making inferences, making mental images, filling in possible gaps during the conversation, observation, and interpretation of the body language, prediction of where the discussion is going, and planning for possible replies. Much of this, if not all, takes place under the surface of consciousness. Consciousness goes beyond mere awareness.

The issue is related to embodied cognition in that the existence of the cognitive unconscious provides us with a refutation of theories of cognitive representations, according to which consciousness is separate from the body and

69 has only to do with certain symbolizations and inferences based on rules. The argument against the representation theory is reinforced by the fact that unconscious is embodied and conforms to bodily structures and sensory-motor experiences.

2.5. Post-Structuralism and Embodiment

Post-structuralists have not offered a direct theory of embodiment and embodied cognition. However, for reasons that will be elaborated below, their theories can serve as a source of inspiration for a theory of embodied cognition. In our view, Deleuze is a philosopher whose theories come very close to an account of embodiment. Although he does not offer a direct view of the embodiment, we believe that his intellectual principles directly target theories of embodied cognition, and implications of his views for the area of embodied cognition, as well as education, are sometimes very revolutionary. Thus, instead of dealing with the whole post-structuralist tradition, we restrict the discussion to Deleuze’s theories, thereby trying to open new horizons to our view of embodied cognition.

Deleuze is a philosopher of difference, as he is a different philosopher. The theory of embodied cognition is against much of the history of philosophy—from its rejection of any dualism to its denial of the metaphysical subject. Thus, if we reject the old philosophical tradition and want to replace it with novel theories, we need to know other people who have criticized the predominant philosophical tradition to be in a better position to elaborate the theory of embodied cognition. This is particularly important because principles and methods of the educational system, today and throughout history, were built on the metaphysics we are trying to reject.

The best candidate for this is Deleuze - “the philosopher of the twentieth century,” as Foucault called him. Deleuze considers himself as an ontologist and

70 an empiricist. Thus, to know him, we need to know the directions of his ontology and empiricism. It should be noted that our treatment of Deleuze’s philosophy in this section will be very brief and limited to his view of embodied cognition. We will say more about Deleuze’s philosophy in later chapters.

Deleuze’s ontology is about the singular in contrast to the universal and the single. Since Plato, philosophy was intertwined with —with respect to the relation between ideal beings and objects. After Plato, philosophers made attempts at categorizations and classifications, in ontology (Aristotle and Medieval philosophy) and also in epistemology (modern-era subjectivism). The history of unity or monism is as old as the history of philosophy itself. For instance, Thales of Miletus reduced all pluralities in the world to the unity of water. However, Deleuze tries to topple down the tradition and highlight differences. In his philosophy, particular and different things constitute the truth, and unity is but an illusion. Even when he gives a central role to the notion of force, he talks about forces. The interaction of forces that are always becoming constitutes the experience, and the experience constitutes the subject. In his account of the world, he does not seek to go beyond the world itself to dualistic . Therefore, he extracts the concept of immanence from Spinoza’s work.

Deleuze greatly admires Spinoza’s philosophy. For, Spinoza seeks an account of the foundation of the world and its interrelations entirely within the world itself, without going beyond. Spinoza’s philosophy was formed in the background of the Cartesian philosophy. We say “Cartesian” because his philosophy is not an answer to Descartes himself, but also Cartesian philosophers such as Malebranche and Pascal. When Descartes arrived at his distinction between the soul and the body, Cartesians such as Pascal and Malebranche sought to fill in the gaps of his theory, particularly the causal relationship between the soul and the body. To do so, they proposed occasionalism.

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The idea was that it is God who occasions the relations between beings. For instance, if the soul wants to raise the hand, it cannot do so because thehand is a real extension. Thus, God raises the hand once the soul wants to. In response to these philosophies, Spinoza highlighted the immanence of the world as well as the following two ideas: (1) there is nothing beyond this world, be it a soul or any other entity, and whatever there is, including the soul, exists in this world and is a of the substance, where the substance is present in the world; (2) all relations are formed in this world, and whatever happens comes either from properties of the immanent substance or from its states(Spinoza, II/64, 100).25

In other words, For Spinoza, everything happens within the boundaries of the ONE substance, which is God. So, everything, including the subject, must be determined in this world. The place and origin of the subject is the point at which Deleuze links Spinoza, the Rationalist, to Hume, the Empiricist. We have already talked about the notion of the metaphysical subject and its persistence in the history of philosophy. Now let us see how Deleuze stands against the subject.

When he refers to himself as an empiricist, he has in mind philosophers who espouse a subject prior to experience, holding the subject forms that experience. In other words, the subject is a transcendental and a priori condition of experience. It is the subject that constitutes the experience, particularly in the view of philosophers such as Kant and Hegel. Kant’s transcendental subject and his categories allow the unification of the pluralities of experience so that they can become objects of thoughts after being filtered by all categories. Kant’s pure perceptual unity is what came under an attack by Deleuze (1989): “Empirical subjectivity is constituted in mind under the influence of principles affecting it;

25It must be noticed that for Spinoza God is the one substance and that the whole plurality of the world is just the infinite many attributes or modi(states) of the one substance. This holistic and at the same time Monistic aspect of Spinoza's philosophy leads him to immanentism.

72 the mind, therefore, does not have the characteristics of the pre-existing subject” (p. 29).

For Hegel, the rational is prior to the world. History is a path to the self- consciousness of the soul. That is, the soul prior to experience is what makes the world and history, and informs, or constitutes experiences. However, Deleuze believes that the subject is not prior to experience. Indeed, it is a product of experience.

"The mind is not subject; it is subjected". (P. 31) In his first book, Empiricism and Subjectivity, Deleuze discusses Hume’s philosophy, because in the Empiricist tradition, and in particular for Hume as the most radical Empiricist, the subject is a product, rather than constitutive of experience. Hume seeks to account for understanding and imagination in terms of experience by way of relations such as adjacency, similarity, causation, and the like. All these come from sensory data or experience. The fact that Deleuze exchanges the places of the subject and the object and makes the constitution of the subject contingent upon experience turns experience into something prior and transcendental, but not in the sense that this prior entity is metaphysical, as Kant’s subject was, but in an empirical and immanent sense.

The given is no longer given to a subject; rather, the subject constitutes itself in the given. Hume's merit lies in the singling out of this empirical problem in its pure state and its separation from transcendental and the psychological. (P. 87) It is the critique of the transcendental that encourages us more and more to extract a theory of embodiment from Deleuze’s philosophy. For, if the subject is not transcendental, it must be embodied. Nevertheless, what is the body? That is, how does Deleuze define the body?

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Deleuze’s ontology is a link between Nietzsche and Spinoza. Where Spinoza conceives of existence as immanent, Nietzsche takes the agent of change, motion, and the formation of existents to be the force (that is, Nietzsche accounts for existents in terms of force, which is a concept belonging to this world, instead of an agent beyond this world). It is the interaction of forces that constructs distinct existents. Trees, stones, mountains, seas, and the like are results of such interactions, and so is the body. Thus, for Nietzsche and Deleuze, the body is but a result of interactions of forces:

…All reality is already a multitude of forces. There are nothing but quantities of force in mutal "relations of tension." Every force is related to others and it either obeys or commands. What defines a body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of forces constitutes a body—whether it is chemical, biological, social, or political. (Deleuze, 1983, p. 40) Now given the purpose of this research, we should see the relationship between the body as resulting from forces with cognition and consciousness. As we have said before, for Nietzsche, consciousness belongs to superior forces. It is formed when we want to know something which is not in the scope of our consciousness and yet constitutes our consciousness. Thus, it is tough for the inferior entity to grasp consciousness:

Active forces […] by nature, escape consciousness. The significant activity is unconscious. Consciousness merely expresses the relation of certain reactive forces to the active forces which dominate them. Consciousness is essentially reactive; this is why we do not know what a body can do, or what activity it is capable of. And what is said of consciousness must also be said of memory and habit […] It is inevitable that consciousness sees the organism

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from its own point of view and understands it in its own way; that is to say, reactively (P. 41)

However, for Deleuze, bodily consciousness is political, just like any other consciousness. In general, Deleuze considers every thought to be political, and this comes from the afore-mentioned theories. Since the subject is, for Deleuze, a product of experience, factors leading to the formation of the subject—such as politics, culture, society, and the like—lie outside, and are prior to, the subject. This is why he takes Hume’s Essay, which is on the face of it an epistemological work, to be entirely ethical and political. To study these factors, Deleuze appeals to the concept of “the body without organs.”

Deleuze and Guattari maintain that the body is not restricted to organisms and organs. It is, indeed, the product of factors beyond the body, such as cultural and social factors. In other words, the body without organs connects the physical body to social forces and gives rise to conceptions, such as the conception of the self. It should be noted; however, that body without organs is necessarily embodied; that is, the background of its dynamism is constituted by neuronal and physiological limitations of the body with organs (Fox, 2014, p. 13). Notwithstanding this, he does not reduce the body to the organism. In this recognition of entities beyond the body, Deleuze and Guattari arrive at a distinction between the paranoid body and schizophrenic body.

The paranoid body is one that is oppressed by different powers. Its desires are directed at certain specific directions. Institutional powers have always tried to control and redirect people’s desires, and such discourses have always imprisoned the body. The paranoid body is one that must live in specific ways from fears of humiliation, ridicule, rejection, and even physical and social punishments. For instance, one must keep his body in shape with excruciating diets and exercises in order to comply with certain social and cultural values. One

75 must wear certain clothes and use certain goods (though not inexpensive) so that he or she is not ridiculed. Thus, people are either oppressed or manipulated. Thus, even people’s identities and their definitions of themselves depend on what has been specified in the society (birthplace, nationality, occupation, education, and so on).

The schizophrenic body, on the other hand, is a disobedient body that riots against social orders and norms and tries to exit the discourse of the oppressive system. In any case, we do not need to go into the details of these issues. In later chapters, we will further elaborate on Deleuze’s views. In this section, we have sought to review Deleuze’s ontology and epistemology briefly, and so, present his definition of the subject as well as the body. We have shown how his ontology treats the body as a product of interactions among forces and how the concept of the body without organs is constituted via such interactions. Moreover, we discussed his objection to metaphysical subjects, which leads us to its alternative, i.e., embodied subject. Throughout, we have tried to examine the place of embodied consciousness and cognition in the views of Deleuze.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to review various philosophical views concerning embodiment and embodied cognition briefly. In addition to a historical survey and a search for origins of the embodied cognition theory in modern philosophy, we tried to introduce various conceptions of embodiment in contemporary philosophy and show how they are contrasted to traditional epistemological theories.

The central idea of all theories of embodied cognition is the rejection of the transcendental subject and the introduction of the embodied subject that produces consciousness and cognition in interaction with the environment and its

76 perceptual experiences, in addition to its organismic structure and features. To illustrate this, in addition to an account of the two 19th century philosophers (Nietzsche and Schopenhauer), we provided an account of three essential strands in contemporary philosophy: phenomenology, post-structuralism, and analytic philosophy.

Phenomenology began, in the hands of Husserl, with an assumption of the transcendental subject, but it later tended towards the historical subject and the worldly subject (the notion of being-in-the-world), and in the hands of Merleau- Ponty, it finally arrived at the body. However, the tradition preserved its boundaries with materialistic traditions. Moreover, it emphasized on the first- person, versus third-person, experience in cognitive processes to show that motor experience in the world is as essential as the study of the brain. In other words, phenomenology rejects the reduction of all consciousness and cognition to the brain and brain processes.

Post-structuralism did not directly engage itself with the notion of embodied cognition, but in its full-fledged dismissal of metaphysical theories, it rejected the transcendental subject and highlighted immanent relations and the falsity of any dualism, which implies embodied cognition. Simply put, embodied cognition is a logical implication of post-structuralist, and in particular, Deleuze’s theories. We then argued that the discussion of the role of the body is not limited to continental philosophies. It has been, directly or indirectly, discussed in analytic philosophy as well as cognitive science studies. First-generation cognitive science was influenced by the metaphysics of analytic philosophy, as formulated by Frege and other founders of analytic philosophy. However, recent studies in cognitive science, such as Lakoff’s work, reject the views of first- generation cognitive scientists and deal with the notion of body.

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Lakoff’s view is not the only theory of embodied cognition in cognitive science. As pointed out before, one well-recognized theory of embodiment and embodied cognition is the enactive view of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch. In The Embodied Mind, they try to connect cognitive science to the work of Merleau- Ponty as well as Buddhist thoughts. They believed that the duality between external and pre-given features of the world, on the one hand, and internal representations, on the other, must be put aside. Instead, the experienced world must be specified with an interaction of organismic physiology, sensory kinesthetic, and the environment. In contrast to Lakoff’s approach, this view does not condition the experienced world merely upon the neuronal activities of the subject. It also conditions it upon the bodily activities of the organism. In addition to Lakoff’s and enactive mind theories, other views have also been developed in cognitive science, such as Gibson’s ecological view. However, we do not have to deal with these views in this chapter.

Thus, we believe that this provides us with the required philosophical and theoretical foundations of the embodied cognition theory for delving into other issues. One of these issues is education. In the subsequent chapters, we will discuss the implications of the embodied cognition theory for our educational system and changes it might bring about.

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Chapter 3: The Pedagogical Implications of Gilles Deleuze’s Views

3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, we provided a survey of the problem of consciousness and cognition in the history of philosophy, showing why predominant answers throughout the history of philosophy are inadequate and how recent theories of embodied cognition challenge them. We examined how the leading schools of modern philosophy view the cognition, and we finally considered the tendency on the part of more recent views held by advocates of these schools to an embodied cognition. Now it is time to scrutinize various dimensions of these new findings. One such dimension is their implication for theories of education or pedagogical theories. Before we embark upon a consideration of this issue, however, let us reflect more on why it is necessary to ask about cognition and clarify the perspective from which we shall tackle the issue.

What is cognition? An authentic thought is one that is revealed in response to a crucial question. Moreover, an authentic question is characterized by its implicit reference to the inadequacy of previous replies; that is, it discloses the inadequacy of those replies and seeks a new one. Thus, when we ask what thought is, we have in mind that extant replies to the question are inadequate. We believe that we need to transcend already established replies since they cannot stand scrutiny in the face of new questions. Those replies should be put behind, thrown away, and then we should move forward. Thus, we need a deconstructive thought—a new brave thought that seeks to topple down the pre-established replies. That is to say, a thought that is not afraid of counting as a minority; to the

79 contrary, it praises such thought. Notwithstanding this, the minority stream of thought is what seems to offer an answer to our present questions. This is why we adopt a Deleuzian approach.

Now that we have found our philosopher, we shall treat him in just the same way as we treated other philosophers. Despite his remarkable critiques of the history of philosophy, Deleuze consults this history very often in an attempt to revive and reappropriate them. There is something to this apparently paradoxical approach that justifies both Deleuze’s attempts and ours. Deleuze consults philosophers throughout history, although he is not a commentator or interpreter of their philosophies. Instead, he re-creates them anew. He cherry- picks things from their philosophies that he needs for his own philosophy. In fact, they become Deleuze’s tongues, whereby new concepts are generated. For Deleuze believes that only philosophers are in a position to generate concepts. His opposition to a mere historical view of philosophy is because no new concept is created therein. New concepts should continuously be created, because, as we shall see, the world is in a constant process of renewal. Having said this, other philosophers can be deployed as one’s tongue for the creation of new concepts. Now Deleuze is our tongue.

Deleuze is our tongue, in the sense that we draw on his views and integrate them with the theory of embodied cognition elaborated in the previous chapter to examine and criticize contemporary approaches to education and to yield new pedagogical approaches and outlooks. Thus, the first thing we will do is to recount and explain the theory of embodied cognition in Deleuze’s language: why and how he helps us to elaborate upon this concept and then prepare it to be deployed in theories of education. This chapter has two general sections. In the first section, we consider the connection between Deleuze’s views and the theory of embodied cognition. This is indeed a supplement to issues discussed in the second chapter. This section goes on to consider the materials of our main discussion about the

80 pedagogical implications of his theory. In the second section, we shall scrutinize the pedagogical implications of Deleuze’s view from the standpoint of the theory of embodied cognition.

But before turning to our goal in general in this chapter, it is requisite to raise a more serious problem, i.e., is it even possible to build an educational system from the postmodern and anti-structural views of Gilles Deleuze? Is it not the case that Deleuzian philosophy is grounded on the refutation of any structure, including an educational one? This is a very challenging question and must be answered without further ado.

Usher and Edwards study various views of postmodern philosophers in Postmodernism and Education: Different Voices, Different World, and demonstrate that such views are in complete contrast with educational structures. They point out the fact that educational theories are based on Modernist discourse:

Historically, education can be seen as the vehicle by which modernity’s ‘grand narratives’, the Enlightenment ideals of critical reason, individual freedom, progress, and benevolent change, are substantiated and realized. The very rationale of the educational process and the role of the educator is founded on modernity’s self- motivated, self-directing, rational subject, capable of exercising individual agency. Postmodernism’s emphasis on the inscribed subject, the decentered subject constructed by language, discourses, desire, and the unconscious, seems to contradict the very purpose of education and the basis of an educational activity. (Usher and Edwards, 1994, p. 2)

They came to believe that people like Lyotard, Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan paid attention to break away from the educational discourse, which stipulates

81 experiential learning in logocentric terms such as “natural” attributes of individual learner (Baranova, 2017, p. 151). The philosophers above mentioned, criticize one or several presuppositions of educational structures in one way or the other. Adopting the views of these philosophers, Usher and Edwards try to incorporate their views into a new structure. They do not refer to Deleuze or even mention his name, although the discussion around Deleuzian ideas has become increasingly popular. Notwithstanding, the main question is yet to be answered: is the movement that Deleuze belongs to, fundamentally against all structures, including that of education?

Deleuze`s critique of Hegel and his interest in Nietzsche does originate from his anti-structural views. Hegel viewed the world as a dialectical system which puts the creatures of the world in an indivisible unity and then leads them toward the particular goal of self- consciousness of the Spirit(Geist). This movement has two aspects: hierarchical order of creatures and their unity. It is hierarchical since the ultimate goal of the world is the very idea that precedes it and is superior to the world. The movement is unity since it views all the creatures as one unified whole.

Both hierarchical order and unity are the components of the metaphysic of power. Therefore, they could not come to terms with Deleuze`s ideas (these two elements are reproduced in the structure of educational system, for instance, hierarchical educational system transmits its policies from governmental level to student step by step, on the other hand, it endeavors to construct similar individuals which can be noticed through uniform clothing and restricted training pattern of students.). If we want to illuminate the hierarchical structures, even more, we must return to Plato`s allegory of the cave.

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ONTOLOGY EPISTEMOLOGY

The first point is that the hierarchical order is manifest in the very Forms. Each step is higher than the other and is arranged in a vertical and not horizontal way. If we take a look at this allegory, we can see that each ontological level has an epistemic status. However, neither ontological features nor epistemological features are on the same level with each other, respectively.

The visible world comprises of two parts: 1- visible objects, 2- images and shadows, which have an inferior disposition in the philosophy of Plato. The corresponding epistemology of the visible could not even be called knowledge and maintains a lower form of speculation. On the other hand, although the visible world is an inferior, intelligible world, i.e., the world of ideas and mathematical truths, is a sublime world and knowledge or episteme is only possible through it. The intelligible world is so sacred and sublime that when

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Parmenides asks Plato about the existence of ideas like dirt and impurity, contrary to the logical conclusion of the Forms, Plato answers: absolutely not.

The point that we have come to is crucial for the rest of the argument, which is the marriage of knowledge and virtue. Knowledge cannot be attributed to dirt and impurity since they do not have an ideal Form. Lacking Form means lacking Goodness, and lacking Goodness means lacking existence. In the philosophy of Plato, existence is fundamentally Good; in the same vein, knowledge cannot but belongs to the Good, the knowledgeable man is also a man of virtue. Because Plato thinks no one does evil willingly, evil actions done by men could be justified by ignorance and is not concluded from dirt and impurity. The political consequences of such theory are that in order to avoid evil, we must acquire knowledge; in other words, only the knowledgeable can avoid evil and do good. For Plato, the knowledge applies only to the categories, and the only person who can access the intelligible world is the philosopher (not artist involved in the shadows nor empirical scientist dealing with the visible). It was not without occasion that on the entry gate of academia, it was written: “LET NO ONE IGNORANT OF GEOMETRY ENTER.” Since knowledge belongs to the intelligible world and philosopher is the one who has access to Forms and the mathematical world. Therefore, the ruler must also be a philosopher: a philosopher king!

Deleuze`s emphasis on differences withstands the concept of unity and the concept of imminence resists the hierarchical order. That is the exact opposite of Plato`s view (analogy of the divided line). Highlighting imminence breaks up the marriage of Truth and Virtue, education, and teaching.

If all the creatures can only be classified under one category, then none have intrinsic values by themselves or in comparison with the others, because value is a relative concept, one thing is only valuable with other beings. If everything is valuable, the concept of value would be meaningless. For example,

84 in a materialist ontology, in its Marxian sense, since we are confronted with an immanent ontology which consists of only on category-matter-, there is no superiority over anything else. In a world that is merely a materialist world, and everything is matter. One cannot speak of the inherent superiority of one being over another, the only way of valuing and thus empowering some of the creatures is to build a hierarchical ontology. Marx, at the beginning of The Capital (1999), says:

The reality of the value of commodities differs in this respect from Dame Quickly, that we don't know "where to have it." The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition. Turn and examine a single commodity, by itself, as we will, yet in so far as it remains an object of value, it seems impossible to grasp it.” (p. 9)

The values of domination systems transfer through an educational system; therefore, educational systems are an anti-Deleuzian institution in nature. In addition to the political aspect, another issue is that based on Deleuze, there is no absolute a priori Truth. If that is the case, then what becomes of education? Is not the education only transmitting specific given data to students?

If, as Deleuze says, the world is the world of new probabilities and repetition of the differences and prophet Solomon is wrong in believing that nothing is new under the sun, then what remains for education? Can Deleuze`s institutional structure turn on itself and become anti- Deleuzian? Which, instead of welcoming various discourse, it becomes one dominant discourse and imposes a discourse seeking a unified meaning. The problem becomes more sophisticated when Deleuzian ideas and postmodern philosophy are considered as a single historical discourse. Then, is it possible that an anti-postmodern discourse that refutes postmodernism be allowed to exist besides it? Even if that means the end of postmodernism? This paradoxical situation is quite challenging for Deleuze since a critic of postmodernism can claim that its institutional structure is based

85 on Power relations. If postmodern philosophy can only justify itself with its own claim, so can the critic of postmodernism. However, our main argument was something else, i.e., apart from the paradoxical nature of Deleuzian thought, is it permissible to build an educational structure based on his views?

On the first look, it seems hardly possible, yet it might be possible if we want to supplant Modernist educational structure, which is grounded on transferring fixed and rigid concepts, by not adopting any structure in the first place. The thing which is permissible in the Deleuzian educational structure is how to perceive the world, not to display the representation of it! Deleuze urges us not to be deceived by worldly modern appearances, and that is only possible by changing our perspectives. The same method must be our measure to take in educational structures; this designation must not be based on rigid, fixed concepts, but rather on designing deconstructive, participatory, rhizomatic, creative-based, and difference-based spaces. If such spaces can be made, the Deleuzian educational structure can be a reality.

On the other hand, a leftist thinker like Deleuze cannot be indifferent to the necessity of change in educational outlook toward actions. Since the present structure of education not only results in inequality, but also causes alienation. In their Ph.D. treatise Helping Adult Learners to Overcome Alienation, Marry Anne and Fallon Panner studied the theory that showed acquiring knowledge is fundamental for overcoming alienation. According to this theory, humans are not necessarily alienated from themselves and the products of their work or non- human objects and society, but rather are alienated from the knowledge they have of these things. Possessing private properties to require a present critique of knowledge along with persistent actions and critical self-reflection. Subsequently, the theories of thinkers like Deleuze can become a problem solver.

Finally, this analysis could culminate in the supposition that the atmosphere contributing to the understanding of possession and overcoming

86 alienation is the ideal language state. The ideal components of discourse include avoiding internal and external predicaments, self-reflective cognition, practicing critical understanding helps to maintain the status quo with communicative Reason and cementing social relations.

Another reason that legitimizes the educational theory of Deleuze is the necessity of appraising communicative culture instead of the dominant culture. In communication, there can be no trace of imposing one`s beliefs on others. Communication is a horizontal relationship in a speech that results in mutual trust; dialogue against a dialogue. The epistemology of Deleuze, as we will see, intends to derive information from learners` experiences; therefore, students can only be instructed through adjoining their lifeworld with the new information. Simply put, the only way for instruction is through communication.

Anti-communication is the counterpoint of communication. The urge to dominate is the first step to provoke this movement. The goal of the anti- communicative act is to control others with whatever means possible. Domination over others makes the defeated turn into an object. In this process, the person condescends the opponent`s point of view to stop him from thinking. The most critical and final element of this action is cultural subjugation that facilitates the dominative goals. Accordingly, domineering individual influences the cultural background of the opponent overlooks his talent imposes his view on him, and by avoiding his existence stumbles against his creation. Deleuzian education is communicative and interactive; thereby, he criticizes the traditional education system for turning students passive so that the teacher could mold them to whatever shape he desires. In contrast to this, the educational environment, if altered, could train individuals in such a way to make use of communicative culture over the dominant culture outside the spheres of education.

Generally speaking, although transferring educational content is not much of importance for Deleuze, learning skills are a priority. Skills which comprise

87 not only the right manner of thinking, but also life skills and social freedom. The possibility of taking an active role in the public sphere is a must for education. Education aims to help individuals obtain the required knowledge for contributing to society as responsible, committed citizens. However, from the critical point of view, education as a process of impartial cultural transmission of knowledge leads to individuals without capability and commitment.

Any kind of rationality depends on different forms of interests that determine how one thinks about the world. The interests, including the values and needs of individuals originate from issues such as struggles, the tension in everyday life, and social institutions. Therefore, different kinds of rationality are not merely a reaction to the internal logic of issues and knowledge but are primarily located in material conditions and symbolic social life. Along these lines, Deleuzian education places knowledge in the focal point of question about history, culture, ethics, and politics. Thus, the necessity of studying education becomes a lot more precise for a political thinker such as Deleuze. However, one must remember that deducing excessively from Deleuze is not possible since there always is the danger of falling into the trap of authority and domination that Deleuze wants us to avoid. One should remember that for Deleuze, the centrality of freedom and creativity of students is paramount and not coercion of structures. The goal of the educational system is to pave the way for the development and growth of students` ability and nothing more.

3.2. Body for Deleuze

Despite his numerous uses of the word “body,” in his various works, Deleuze never directly discussed the body, which has led to difficulties for his commentators. For example, Guillaume and Hughes wrote their book, Deleuze and Body, to address the issue. In the introduction of the book, they say:

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The theory of the body in Deleuze’s work is thus a problematic site. It is not clear what kind of work the concept is supposed to do within Deleuze’s corpus, and it is not immediately clear what kind of work we can do with it. (Guillaume and Hughes, 2011, p. 2)

Another problem is that Deleuze uses “body” to mean something broader than it generally means. In general, “body” refers to a living or dead organism; that is, a biological entity, such as the human body, a dog’s body, a cat’s body, a horse’s body, and the like. However, Deleuze makes broader use of the word. For him, every set that involves parts which bear certain relations to one another constitutes a body:

“A body can be anything,’ Deleuze says; ‘it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity”. (Cull, 2011, p. 189)

“The “body” [. . .] is not [. . .] the special field of ”. (Cutler, 2011, p. 55)

Such use of “body” is probably grounded in Deleuze’s tendency to go beyond an anthropologic view. Since he rejects any transcendental view of the world and phenomena therein, he holds that the human does not enjoy a substance that renders him superior over other creatures. Deleuzian immanence (a concept he owes to Spinoza) has as a logical consequence that the human has a place along with other beings in the world; neither is he superior over them nor is he inferior to them. However, as pointed out earlier, we are supposed to reappropriate Deleuze and make him our tongue. Thus, we will concern ourselves with what constructs the human consciousness. We shall, of course, tackle other kinds of bodies only to clarify our main issue.

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For Deleuze, each body is a desiring machine. But what is a desiring machine? To answer the question, we need to take a step backward to Nietzsche and Foucault. According to Nietzsche’s ontology, the world is a struggle of forces, each of which strives to establish itself, dominate, and fulfill its desires. Thus, each body is a desiring machine. When a steady water flow removes a shrub, the water’s desire has dominated the shrub’s.26 By the same token, when a society isolates people of peculiar tendencies or characteristics, such as mad people, sadistic people, and …, the social body as a desiring machine dominates such minorities and suppresses their desires. Alternatively, as Nietzsche suggests, when subjects of slave morality establish values such as humbleness in the world, they have already managed to win their battles, as do subjects of master morality when they establish their characters as good characters. The world is an interaction of bodies or desiring-machines through and through.

Desiring production machine has two main characteristics: firstly, they surpass the boundary between human and non-human; from a Deleuzian perspective, every being, even non-human, is a desiring-production machine. Secondly, they produce desires, which means they are not some passive objects held in subjection by outside forces, but instead they are actively producing desires themselves and looking for fresh experiences.; in other words, they have a will to experience. The ontology of Deleuze and Guattari is the ontology of desiring-production machines, which are everywhere and work relentlessly. They are producers of desires.

Here Deleuze argues that trees or stones function are not based on a priori awareness of desire; in other words, what he tries to say is that they are not anything like desire or force in the metaphysical sense. Every desiring-machine interacts with the environment, makes several connections and avoids some. In

26 Note that we do not mean to say that the water flow consciously fulfils its desire and removes the shrub. The parlance he should be taken metaphorically. The idea is that in the struggle of forces, some of them dominate.

90 other words, Deleuze mentions the will to synthesize, which is not a priori fact but the main characteristic of desiring-machine. A desiring-machine is nothing but an entity which unconsciously establishes itself through connections. The positive ontology of Deleuze refers to the same thing as well.

They [Deleuze and Guattari] are using ‘machine’ here in a specific and unconventional sense. Think of a bicycle, which obviously has no ‘end’ or . It only works when it is connected with another ‘machine’ such as the human body; and the production of these two machines can only be achieved through connection. The human body becomes a cyclist in connecting with the machine; the cycle becomes a vehicle. But we could imagine different connections producing different machines. The cycle becomes an art object when placed in a gallery; the human body becomes an ‘artist’ when connected with a paintbrush. The images we have of closed machines, such as the selfcontained organism of the human body, or the efficiently autonomous functioning of the clock mechanism, are effects and illusions of the machine. There is no aspect of life that is not machinic; all life only works and is insofar as it connects with some other machine.

We have already seen the importance Deleuze gives to the camera; it is important as a machine because it shows how human thought and life can become and transform through what is inhuman. By insisting that the machine is not a metaphor Deleuze and Guattari move away from a representational model of language. If the concept of machine were a metaphor, then we could say that we have life as it is, and then the figure of machine to imagine, represent or picture life. But for Deleuze and Guattari there is no present life outside of its connections. We only have representations, images or thoughts

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because there have been ‘machinic’ connections: the eye connects with light, the brain connects with a concept, the mouth connects with a language. Life is not about one privileged point – the self-contained mind of ‘man’-representing some inert outside world. Life is a proliferation of machinic connections, with the mind or brain being one (sophisticated) machine among others. Neither philosophy, nor art, nor cinema represent the world; they are events through which the movement of life becomes. (Colebrook, 2002, p. 56)

Here, it should be noted that “the machine” is not to be confused with “the mechanism.” Mechanism refers to sets of particles coming together to perform a goal or a function, but the Deleuze-Guattari machine has brought together composite particles which are not aiming at an external function or goal. The only aim of their coming together is coming together itself and nothing more! This gathering is not bound with the function of the organism. Desire production points out that the existence of a desiring-production machine is not the actualization of potential (like Aristotelian entities). An Aristotelian world cannot contain the production of a new entity and new desires; it is a world of potentiality and actualities, which in the best possible scenario ends up in reproduction. On the contrary, the desiring-production machines are on the lookout for creation and production, new desires, a will to experience new things, and avoid predefined boundaries and a priori frameworks.

From Deleuze-Guattari's point of view, one of the manifestations of a desiring-production machine is the artist; he is the master of objects and combines broken, burned, and malfunctioned objects together. Therefore, the work of art is in itself a desiring-production machine. One of the main concerns of Deleuze and Guattari in their Anti-Oedipus is the relation between these machines and institutions, which is more destructive in their view. Institutions that work by trapping the unconscious, crumbling the desiring-machines and supplanting it

92 with a system of beliefs. In fact, institutions subject desires to a set of formal fixity and selective pressure and thereby unify and organize them.

As pointed out, everything can be a body or a desiring machine. With this in mind, it seems that what is referred to as “subject” in philosophy can plausibly be taken as part of this desiring machine. However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, Deleuze does not believe in subjects as conceived of in the history of philosophy; that is, transcendental a priori subjects. Although Deleuze’s definition of the body does not exclude transcendental subjects as parts of the human body, Deleuze rejects such subjects for different reasons outlined in the previous chapter. In the previous chapter, we suggested that there is no a priori subject. That is to say, a subject becomes a subject, or a subject is constructed. A subject does not construct the world. Instead, it is a product of the world. Thus, we need to see what a human subject is, and what parts of the world it is produced from. If the subject is not transcendental and metaphysical, thenis it merely a product of the organism?

Our human bodies are, nevertheless, not merely organismic. The human body is constructed from struggles among forces and desiring-machines. The human organism is constructed from desiring-machines such as chromosomes and other natural factors. However, the human body is not limited to such factors. It is a product of trans-bodily forces such as social, cultural, political, religious, and other forces and bodies. Thus, the human subject is constructed by both the organism and such forces. This is what constructs Deleuze’s concept of the body without organs.

The reason why Deleuze highlights the body without organs is his critical view of the definition of “being” in the historical tradition of philosophy. Early in its formation, philosophy conceived of beings in the world as detached and separated from one another, as if every being can stand by itself and has no relation whatsoever to the world except in accidental ways. Unlike Descartes, and

93 like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze emphasizes on interrelations of beings in the world. There is no longer a self-standing essence in Deleuze’s philosophy. Instead, everything amounts to a relation—relations particular objects bear in every period. Moreover, these relations are what constitutes the being, rather than its essence:

The individual object set off from the world is an abstraction. What is primary and immediate is an object embedded within a context that gives that object its sense, its importance, its relation to other objects, its inseparability from our actions and its potential uses, and so on. (Hughes, 2009, p. 12)

Thus, trans-organismic forces (those constituting a body without organs), which contribute to the formation of the human subject, are as crucial as the organism.

3.2.1. Deleuze and the Embodiment Thesis

Lakoff believes that post-structuralism is based on four claims about the nature of language, and these claims or their conclusions are incompatible with scientific data about embodied cognition. These four claims are the following:

1. The complete arbitrariness of the sign; that is, the utter arbitrariness of the pairing between signifiers (signs) and signifieds (concepts)

2. The locus of meaning in systems of binary oppositions among free-floating signifiers (difference)

3. The purely historical contingency of meaning

4. The strong relativity of concepts: and other branches of cognitive science have shown all of these views about the nature of language to be empirically incorrect (Lakoff, 1999, p. 414)

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The problem with Lakoff`s criticism is that by reducing post-structuralism to its claims about language, he regards it as against embodied cognition. Apart from whether the claims of post-structuralist about language is correct or not, there are some aspects, especially in Deleuze, which can be included among the theories of embodied cognition, particularly that of immanence:

As we have shown, it is a mistake to reduce the Deleuzian body to an organism. Notwithstanding this, according to the principle of immanence, this does not amount to a rejection of the embodiment of the human subject. In fact, such forces are perfectly material and do not go beyond any transcendental level. Whereas trans-organismic forces lie outside the organism, they eventually act via the organism. Deleuze emphasizes that a subject and its cognitive faculties should be seen outside the subject as well. Put alternatively, he takes the subject as a product of trans-organismic, rather than trans-material, forces. This is meant to target idealists who maintain that it is the subject that constructs the world, and not the other way around.

These points allow us to see the deep connections between Deleuze’s view and theories of embodied cognition. As elaborated in the previous chapter, as much as different views of embodied cognition have their own disagreements, they agree over certain ideas encapsulated in the embodiment thesis. The embodiment thesis rules out transcendental and non-physical subjects, on the one hand, and rejects any reduction of consciousness and cognition to the brain. Both of these two main theses can be found in Deleuze’s philosophy. For, correspondingly with the rejection of transcendental subjects, he emphasizes on the immanence of the subject, and corresponding to irreducibility to the brain, he takes the subject as merely being a part of the organism, which is a product of political, social, cultural, environmental, and other forces.

Furthermore, the unconscious part is as significant for Deleuze as it is for theorists of embodied cognition. We explained the importance of the unconscious

95 part of the previous chapter. For example, Deleuze (2001) defines learning as follows:

“Learning always takes place in and through the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound complicity between nature and mind.” (p. 165)

The connection between Deleuze’s views, on the one hand, and embodied cognition and the embodied thesis, on the other, is rather apparent. Thus, in the rest of the present chapter, we deal with details and pedagogical implications of Deleuze’s views.

3.3. The Dogmatic Picture of Thought

We have faculties whose forms are never doubtful to us, even if we might doubt their contents. Descartes shed skepticism about many of our concepts and even postulates. However, Deleuze shows that there are forms inherent in Descartes’s work that challenge his skepticism and his attempt at presuppositionlessness. On the face of it, Descartes takes his skepticism to the extreme of its logical consequences, challenging even the principles and rules of logical syllogisms. He thus alleges to state the proposition, “I think, therefore I am,” merely based on his intuitions. Deleuze shows, nevertheless, that even this proposition has numerous presuppositions taken for granted by Descartes and the common sense (Deleuze 130): for example, the presupposition that “I,” “think,” and “being” are terms known to everyone, that there is an independent, a priori, and unified subject unifying all various powers such as thought, memory, imagination, association, and the like, which is referred to as “I.” On Deleuze’s view, the idea of such an “I” derives from common sense and is never without presuppositions. That we accept such a postulate without taking it into question is grounded in the dogmatic idea that we have both a natural capacity to receive the truth and goodwill towards the truth.

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Deleuze is the Nietzsche of our time and just as Nietzsche was an iconoclast or a breaker of idols, Deleuze likewise tries to topple down our dogmatic ideas. Furthermore, is there a more dogmatic idea than that of thought? Just like Nietzsche, he begins to question the sphinx of truth (Nietzsche, 2002. P. 5). What Deleuze tries to say is that we should acquiesce the bitter truth that we are not truth-seeking creatures. In the historical tradition of philosophy, the thought has always gone along with the truth, as if the thought represents a truth, and what guarantees the truth of thought is the human goodwill and natural capacity for thought (Deleuze, 2001, p. 130). And this is the dogmatic idea of thought:

According to this image, thought has an affinity with the true; it formally possesses the true and materially wants the true. It is in terms of this image that everybody knows and is presumed to know what it means to think. Thereafter it matters little whether philosophy begins with the object or the subject, with Being or with beings, as long as thought remains subject to this Image which already prejudges everything: the distribution of the object and the subject as well as that of Being and beings (P. 131).

Let us express Deleuze’s idea from Nietzsche’s own text:

“How could anything originate out of its opposite? Truth from error, for instance? Or the will to truth from the will to deception? Or selfless action from self-interest? Or the pure, sun-bright gaze of wisdom from a covetous leer? Such origins are impossible, and people who dream about such things are fools – at best. Things of the highest value must have another, separate origin of their own, – they cannot be derived from this ephemeral, seductive, deceptive, lowly world, from this mad chaos of confusion and desire. Look instead to the lap of being, the everlasting, the hidden God, the ‘thing-in-itself’– this is where their

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ground must be, and nowhere else!”– This way of judging typifies the prejudices by which metaphysicians of all ages can be recognized: these types of valuation lies behind all their logical procedures. From these “beliefs” they try to acquire their “knowledge,” to acquire something that will end up being solemnly christened as “the truth.” The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is the belief in oppositions of values. It has not occurred to even the most cautious of them to start doubting right here at the threshold, where it is actually needed the most–even though they had vowed to themselves “de omnibus dubitandum.” (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 5)

Thus, Deleuze defines the truth and power in terms of a new framework. The truth is no longer a sacred thing to be grasped or taught in educational systems. Instead, the truth is produced by relations of power and educational systems. This we will elaborate in the first part of the next section.

Another feature of this dogmatic idea is that no question arises of the faculties or powers themselves and how they are generated. This is the ground of Deleuze’s critical, yet praiseful, approach to Kant. Deleuze (in Kant’s Critical

Philosophy) is interested in Kant’s third critique because it is where he talks about the origins of the faculty of understanding. In the first two critiques, Kant takes the faculty of understanding to exist a priori and to have existed all the time, never discussing how it is originated. In the third critique, however, he grapples with the origins of the categories of understanding. In his own account of the origin of faculties of thought, nonetheless, Deleuze does not rest content with the subject. As we have shown in the previous chapter, he praises Hume because he rejects the subject as fundamental, and elaborates upon how faculties of the subject are generated. We have already talked about Deleuze’s theory of the body, and so we will not deal with it anymore.

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3.4. Pedagogical Implications of Deleuze’s Views

Deleuze is a revolutionary philosopher. Thus, an application of his theories to various domains must be somewhat radical. That is to say, it cannot rest content with minor modifications. Thus in the domain of education, it is not Deleuzian to rest content with minor modifications and stick to pre-established frameworks. So we need to take the question to its extreme, that is, to the heart of theories of education, or the very philosophy of education. What is the philosophy of education, after all? What is the goal of education? Why have we founded institutes for this purpose? What do we teach in these institutes? Questions of this sort will be central to our study in this section. In the remainder of this section, we will go into more details, scrutinizing Deleuze’s views from our own perspective concerning particular problems of education.

3.4.1. Education Institutes as Suppressive Institutes

“Every education system is a political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it.”

Michel Foucault

Deleuze and Foucault had very close ties. Indeed, Deleuze wrote a book about Foucault, and Foucault expresses his debt to the work of Deleuze and Guattari (Foucault 1991, p. 309). One result of their companionship was Deleuze’s belief in the connection between knowledge and power, as well as that between education systems and power. Thus, for Deleuze, schools are institutes in which

99 paranoid bodies are made for capitalistic purposes. Again, as Foucault has put it, it is the power that makes the discourse of the truth.

Perhaps we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful). (Foucault,1991, p. 27)

If Foucault’s view is combined with Deleuze’s theory of desiring-machines, it will be shown that schools and educational contents, as desiring-machines, exert their force and impose the truth on students—that is, a truth created by them. In a dogmatic idea of thought, the truth is something sacred sought by the goodwill. In his discussion of Plato, Deleuze offers a humorous example clarifying the dogmatic idea of thought inherent within the education system. He first highlights Plato’s well-known triad: the unparticipated, the participated, and the participant, comparing them to a triad of the foundation, the object aspired to, and the pretender, or a triad of the father, the daughter, and the fiancé (Deleuze 1990, p. 255). The foundation primitively possesses something; it possesses what is aspired to, so to speak. And the participated seeks to achieve the aspired object in the hand of the foundation, just as a man seeks a girl who is under the guardianship of her father. If the example is extended to the education system, the nature of the system will be disclosed: a system that claims the truth and sees itself as the possessor of the truth. The truth is an aspired thing that should be grasped, and it is only after participation in tests of this system (that is, studying at school and college, and receiving a degree), the participant can grasp the aspired thing.

The institution of power makes it seem as if it has exclusive possession of the truth, and thus, no one can claim the truth except by making a recourse to structures under its control. Hence, it is made compulsory to study at the school,

100 and people are evaluated and selected for jobs depending on how much truth they get from institutes verified by the power. To have no certificate from institutions of power amounts to not having share of the truth. Thus, people who do not have degrees or certificates recognized by institutions of power are not employed, their writings are not published, and furthermore, they are strongly attacked by such institutions. Social positions defined by institutions of power refer to people without official degrees as illiterate, deprived of the truth, unqualified, and incompetent.

The power controls and manipulates people by creating paranoid bodies so that they comply with its frameworks. In fact, people are forced to follow the instructions of institutions of power lest they are insulted, referred to as incompetent, and in order to gain social capitals, find jobs, be taken seriously, and so on. In order to enjoy endowments, he has been denied by the power (such as social capital, job, credit, money, etc.), one needs to go to an institute in which the power gives those endowments to him. And that is the institute of education. This institute does not aim to benefit from the truth; it aims to control, manipulate, and subjugate people.

Foucault believes that institutes of the modern world aim to discipline and subjugate bodies. With his new view of the notion of discipline in the modern period, Foucault shows that much as conceptions of discipline transformed throughout the history, it never vanished. Foucault does not restrict discipline to education; he accounts for discipline in the structural nature of modern institutes as well; that is, prisons, hospitals, and schools. Just like Foucault, Deleuze believes that the exertion of power did not vanish from such institutes; only its methods have changed. Prisoners are no longer bodily tortured, but tremendous efforts are made to rehabilitate them in order to exploit them as work forces. Children are no longer physically punished at schools, but they are educated and trained at schools in ways that assure that they comply with forms and norms

101 endorsed by institutions of power and turn into sufficient workforces, rather than riots or nomads.

Once people are compelled to enter controlling institutions, means should be sought to control and guide them. Physical punishment no longer works now. Newer methods are appealed to, such as the grading system, summoningparents to the school, failing students at tests, monitoring their attendance or lack of attendance, and so on. More importantly, all scientific and ethical educations provided by textbooks or teachers aim at controlling, manipulating, and training people who can turn into productive workforces. At a university level, the publication of books or papers depends on having academic degrees. There is even control and manipulation in the form and contents of papers and books, including specific page numbers, redlines that must not be crossed, staying inside dominant discourses, and so on and so forth.

Potential workforce turns into an effective workforce only if a student’s scientific and ethical courses are designed in ways that lead to applicability in the production of wealth. And in this system, if science has no role in the cycle of wealth production, it will be neglected. Thus, the education system is so designed that it results in the production of instruments and technologies that could be sold on the market. Thus, sciences are divided and pluralized as much as possible, they become specialized, and engineering fields dominate over theoretical sciences. As to ethical and pedagogical values, particular Western values based on a culture of work and consumption are reproduced. A person is prepared for work and consumption from childhood to college. A child learns that they are valuable only when they can gain money and that they have social capital only when they can spend money. Moreover, the art is valuable only when it can be sold in fairs, cinemas, and even bookstores. Thus, authentic art is replaced by sellable art, and artists are replaced by celebrities. Thus, we are faced with a

102 controlling system and systematic manipulation. The only way suggested by Deleuze to resist the system is to become a nomad.

3.4.1.1. Nomadism of Students and the Education System

The nomad and his war machine oppose the despot with his administrative machine: an extrinsic nomadic unit as opposed to an intrinsic despotic unit. And yet the societies are correlative, interrelated; the despot's purpose will be to integrate, to internalize the nomadic war machine, while that of the nomad will be to invent an administration for the newly conquered empire. They ceaselessly oppose oneanother—to the point where they become confused with one another. (Deleuze. 1977, p. 148)

Deleuze celebrates the nomad's thought. Nomadism consists in a refusal to reside in a particular place, and in a tendency to move all the time, to flow continuously, to encounter new events, and most importantly, not to acquiesce to manipulations. As we have seen, controlling institutions have a tendency to subjugate people. This is obvious in urban life and its imposed relations. Thus, Deleuze uses the nomad metaphor to celebrate a thought that does not acquiesce to controls and manipulations—a body that is not subjugated. Sedentism is layered by enclosures, but nomadism has no enclosures, and nomadic locomotion lacks any invariable distributive pattern. Their locomotion patterns and life are not controlled by institutions of power, so to speak.

Deleuze`s critique of psychoanalysis is that the entire enterprise and the “I” of psychoanalysis are a pattern for controlling humans. Desires are caused by unconscious and Oedipus complex which is an impulse derived from childhood. In other words, desire is an expression of Oedipus complex, i.e. the desires we have of specific actions are there to satisfy our repressed childhood complex. The

103 example that Deleuze gives is breast sucking, which can be analyzed in psychoanalytic terms as the person`s longing for his mother`s breast that has been missed and gone.

Yet Deleuze avoids this approach to unconscious and parallels it with the project of political subjection, since as soon as desire implies a negative connotation in the word “complex”, it becomes an illness and immediately the process of subjugating the person and controlling him as a patient sets off. Therefore, Deleuze thinks of psychoanalysis as a political project; on the other hand, for Deleuze desire has no subject nor an object (Deleuze, 2006, p.81). Desire has no origin in the repressed complexes of childhood nor selects its objects in accordance with it. Desire is what simply is there! Like the desire to eat and the desire to enjoy a fresh air. Desire should not only be repressed but must be revolutionized (81). However, the exact opposite takes place and that is why Deleuze binds psychoanalysis with politics.

The issue is not only related to psychoanalysis and has immersed in every bit of capitalism. Deleuze gives the following example:

Here the child is split up: on the one hand, the child in all its concrete activities is a subject of utterance; on the other hand, the child in psychotherapy is elevated to the symbolic level of an expressing subject only to be reduced more effectively to the ready-made, standard utterances which are expected of a child, and which are imposed on the child. There you have your glorious castration, which merely cuts off the "it," prolonging this interruption with the famous cleavage of the subject. (P. 84)

The argument from psychanalysis is to illuminate Delueze`s stance towards nomads which means that modern society tries to subjugate the students. As we pointed out in the discussion regarding Foucault, three institutions play a significant role in controlling the society, i.e. school, prison, and hospital. That is

104 the reason Deleuze and Foucault have written extensively on them and criticized psychanalysis as well. Against the view that wants to build a pure and controlled ego or a subject, Deleuze proposes the nomadic thinking, which is not subjugated and must be taught through education.

Thus, students should be educated so as to live a nomad life and think in nomadic ways. However, as we have seen before, the school as a suppressive institute subjugates and manipulates students. Any violation of the school’s norms amounts to harsh reactions by teachers and administrators of the school. If a student has a belief contrary to what is in textbooks and expresses it, he will not receive a good score, nor will he be permitted to continue to the school (or college, for that matter). The only obligation of the education system is to train some technicians who can produce sellable instruments or even sellable thoughts and arts. As regarding ethical matters, the student’s behaviors are strongly controlled. Any violation of standard beliefs is banned and is pushed back to in one way or another. Even teachers are strictly monitored and controlled. People are allowed to teach only if their qualifications are confirmed by institutions of power. And in their teaching courses, they are merely permitted to convey or transmit to students what they are told by higher ranking authorities to do.

3.4.2. The A Priori Structure of the Truth

Deleuze rejects any idea of an eternal nature or an unchangeable structure for the truth. Thus, he wages a war both against the history of philosophy and against structuralists. The problem begins from Plato, where he characterizes the true as universal and invariant. According to Plato, the sensible world is a world of particular and changeable things. For knowledge to be true knowledge, nevertheless, it must concern universal and invariable things. Thus, we should go beyond the appearance of objects as particular and changeable to the universal and invariable. However, our surrounding objects are all particular and different,

105 and yet changeable and transient. Thus, we must find a universal, shared, and invariant foundation in them. This is how the history of philosophy turns into a history of finding such shared and invariant entities. In fact, the history of philosophy seeks to reduce differences to unity and the changeable to the invariant.

The Aristotelian logic which was until recently a cornerstone of philosophical thought is totally negligent of particular entities. Aristotelian syllogism consists of three terms: minor, major, and middle. These three terms are characterized by their universality. For example, a proper name or a particular entity cannot be an input to any of these terms; otherwise the syllogism will be invalid. Thus, the Aristotelian logic only recognizes a thought that is concerned with the universal, or shared foundations, so to speak. In Porphyrian tree, everything begins from a unity: a substance. Then, the substance as a “genus” is specified by a “differentia” and turns into a “species.” In this logic, the differentia is what grounds the difference. The difference between the human and the dog lies in their differentiae. They have the same genus, being the “animal.” If the animal is specified by the differentia of “rational,” the human species comes to exist, and will thus be differentiated from the dog. The idea is that the difference between the human and the dog is conceivable only if it is situated within another unity, that is, the animal. The difference between the human and the dog is a difference in species, not individuals. And within the human species, although there are different particular humans, their difference is reduced to the unity of the species, that is, the human species. In this view, all differences go back to one unity or identity that encompasses all differences and remains invariant through changes and time. For example, Socrates, Plato, and Napoleon remain humans throughout their lives.

The logical consequence of such a view is that the truth exists eternally and is unchangeable, and our task is merely to know it. For if there are universal

106 and unchangeable truths, innumerable particular entities will lose their significance, as will new events. Such a point of view is somewhat fostered by structuralism, because structures turn into essential and rigid things, where all particular entities, their differences, and their becomings are to be seen in relations to linguistic, logical, cultural, social, and other sorts of structures. However, Deleuze cannot accept such a view. He celebrates pure differences and welcomes new events. He wants to allow differences and events to express themselves. Just as power and modern institutes control the society, thoughts are controlled in the history of philosophy—differences are controlled, changes and time are deemed illusory, and are not allowed to develop and flourish.

Corresponding to his rejection of unificationist and arboreal (or treelike) views in ontology, Deleuze seeks to reject any arboreal view of knowledge as well.An arboreal view is axiomatic, where in axiomatic approaches, certain concepts and ideas are presented as self-evident and needless of argumentations, and the rest of knowledge is derived from these axioms and primitive terms. What guarantees the truth of new propositions is their reducibility to axioms. If an arboreal view is not conceived of in a Cartesian axiomatic or set-theoretic style, it might well be conceived in terms of foundationalist projects. Other examples of arboreal or layered views of knowledge include classical empiricism, which takes sense data as ultimate entities, or Kant’s idealism, which takes categories as fundamental and constructs knowledge through them, or Hegel’s logic, in which knowledge is accumulative and progressive. In this view, each layer is put on another layer, thus constituting the treasure of knowledge.

The arboreal view is valid only as long as the eternal truth preexists, and with the discovery of every eternal truth, we can discover further truths from it or in relation to it; that is, truths and structures that exist in the world and we need to represent. In other words, no new truth occurs. As we have seen, throughout the human intellectual history, pluralities were always reduced to unity and

107 identity, and changes were reduced to invariance. Thus, it suffices to know these unities only once. New relations and situatednesses of phenomena do not bring about a change in their natures and principles. Let us illustrate different aspects of Deleuze’s view with a discussion of the Aristotelian logic.

Russell holds that the problem of Hegel’s philosophy as well as many metaphysical traditions lies in the Aristotelian logic and its subject-predicate form. The existence of relations is not recognized in the Aristotelian system—it only recognizes subject-predicate propositions. Thus, a proposition such as “A and B are two things” is not a well-formed proposition in the Aristotelian system, unlike a proposition such as “A is one thing.”

Bradley tries to demonstrate that all the relations, as it seems to us, is the result of ignoring the unconditional universal; the fact that we view entities from different relations is because of we fail to see the unconditional and absolute, in other words, Bradley denies the existence of relations in entirety:

“The unity of immediate experience is non-relational. What is given is not made up of distinct objects with relations holding among them; it is, rather, a unified whole within which diverse aspects can be distinguished”. (Hylton, 1990, p. 47).

Bradley believed that since we always see objects and relations conditionally, we cannot achieve true consciousness of the world, yet Hegel believed otherwise. He maintained that universal knowledge is attainable and explains the movement of self-consciousness towards Absolute Ideal, i.e. knowledge of oneself as universal. In his reading of Hegel, Russell enumerates this concept in the following way:

This illustration might also be used to illustrate the dialectic, which consists of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. First we say: "Reality is an uncle." This is the Thesis. But the existence of an uncle implies that of

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a nephew. Since nothing really exists except the Absolute, and we are now committed to the existence of a nephew, we must conclude: "The Absolute is a nephew." This is the Antithesis. But there is the same objection to this as to the view that the Absolute is an uncle; therefore, we are driven to the view that the Absolute is the whole composed of uncle and nephew. This is the Synthesis. But this synthesis is still unsatisfactory, because a man can be an uncle only if he has a brother or sister who is a parent of the nephew. Hence we are driven to enlarge our universe to include the brother or sister, with his wife or her husband. In this sort of way, so it is contended, we can be driven on, by the mere force of logic, from any suggested predicate of the Absolute to the final conclusion of the dialectic, which is called the "Absolute Idea." Throughout the whole process, there is an underlying assumption that nothing can be really true unless it is about Reality as a whole. (Russell, 1961, p. 732)

For this underlying assumption, there is a basis in traditional logic, which assumes that every proposition has a subject and a predicate. According to this view, every fact consists of something having some property. It follows that relations cannot be real since they involve two things, not one. "Uncle" is a relation, and a man may become an uncle without knowing it. In that case, from an empirical point of view, the man is unaffected by becoming an uncle; he has no quality which he did not have before, if by "quality" we understand something necessary to describing him as he is in himself, apart from his relations to other people and things. The only way in which the subject-predicate logic can avoid this difficulty is to say that the truth is not a property of the uncle alone, or of the nephew alone, but of the whole composed of uncle-and-nephew. Since everything, except the Whole, has relations to outside things, it follows that nothing quite true can be said about separate things and that in fact, only the

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Whole is real. This follows more directly from the fact that "A and B are two" is not a subject-predicate proposition, and therefore, on the basis of the traditional logic, there can be no such proposition. Therefore, there are not as many as two things in the world; therefore, the Whole, considered as a unity, is alone real. (372)

Russell considered the problem of traditional philosophy to be the inefficiency of Aristotelian logic to deal with the categories of relations and believed that the form of traditional logic, which only allowed for one-sided relations, caused series mistakes in the formation of philosophies. Therefore, he introduced two and three dimensional and higher relations. (Russell,2010, p.26) From this Russell concludes that the endorsement of the Aristotelian system has the logical consequence of recognizing monism. Russell rejects monism; hence he sets himself to develop Frege’s logical system. For it recognizes relations as true and thus paves the path for Russell’s .

However, relations are of utmost significance to Deleuze. Indeed, everything is a relation. A thing is determined by a relation it bears to something else and creates in different situations, rather than its unified invariant identity. Deleuze’s ontology is one in which everything finds a new form or determination when it is in new situations. Such a new determination provides it with a different meaning, as it opens it to new possibilities. And this is not reducible to unifying invariant principles. Thus, we do not, say, have a nature or quiddity such as humanness in the first place, and particular entities will no longer have invariant natures or identities in the second place. For example, Socrates and Plato will no longer have a centered personal identity during time. Instead, they will be redefined by their new relations. This is why it is a mistake to have an a priori arboreal conception of the truth.

Science should also be alert to new events and relations, instead of seeking invariant structures. Thus, science should be constantly revised. However,

110 science is increasingly becoming “event-centered” rather than structural. Science is no longer structural or axiomatic, which amounts to the disappearance of the arboreal schema of knowledge and the emergence of rhizomatic movements in science (Jamshidi 2018, p. 164). Before we embark on an elaboration of the important concept of rhizome in Deleuze’s philosophy, we will sketch the notion of becoming and its place for Deleuze. In our elaboration of the concept of the rhizome, pedagogical repercussions of the rhizomatic approach, and those of the arboreal approach which is based on an a priori structure of the truth (pointed out above).

3.4.2.1. Becoming

“You cannot step into the same river twice.”

Heraclitus

A central concept in Deleuze’s philosophical thought is that of becoming. The passage of time is the most undeniable existing truth. Everything is in flux, but in what direction and towards what end? Deleuze’s answer is straightforward:to every direction, but without an end. For Aristotle, motion is to go from potentiality to actuality, where something’s actuality is its end. For example, a seed grows to become a tree, and if it does not become a tree, it must have gone corrupt. However, for Deleuze, becoming a tree or anything else is not grounded in the seed’s end. When a seed does not become a tree, it has not gone corrupt— we are the only ones comparing one contingent relation of the seed (which is to become a tree) with another contingent relation thereof (not to become a tree), taking one as an end and the other as corruption. Becoming is a pure motion without any end. Becoming is not a stage between two states or conditions; it is not a middle term going towards an invariant state. Becoming is not a motion

111 from an origin to a destination. To the contrary, becoming is purposeless and endless. Becoming is not an intermediary between events; instead, it is the very occurrence of events. The only thing that is repeated is this becoming, although it creates new things. Eternal return is not an eternal return of things and concepts; rather, it is the becoming that is repeated. For example, my becoming is repeated, not me. The becoming of humans is repeated, not humans themselves.

Deleuze and Dewey are both influenced by Darwin in their theories of becoming. Rorty even believes that Dewey is at the end of the road that Deleuze is paving now (Semetsky, 2006, p. 22). Subsequently, if everything is in the process of becoming, there could not be a fixed concept as a truth of mutable and changing entity. The traditional metaphysics of Truth was trying to put every theory and practice within fixed concepts of truth, but if motion has no beginning or end, nor design and purpose, every fixed and a priori theory for explaining the world is doomed to failure.

It seems that the theory of becoming has an impact on his curriculum of schools. A Deleuzian pedagogical plan is a plan in becoming. Part of the challenge for the creative and innovative curriculum is to always direct situations to new learning opportunities. The curriculum has to be produced in relation to the becoming, which is called an educational plan in becoming. This approach to the educational plan is not a student-oriented nor teacher-oriented plan. Such curriculums are “rhizomatic” or “non-axiomatic,” which has no center. This type of learning investigates perception and learning from the perspective of rhizomatic spaces (Roy, 2013, p. 115).

Meanwhile, since the multiplicities of Deleuze are always becoming, directing towards differentiation and will not take a final shape, it would be possible for us to reject the concept of teacher as a fixed, reliable and ultimate being. We consider effects, ideas, and habits as parts of flux. The ontology of

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Deleuze is compatible with what we said of negation of a priori structure of Truth and thereby, a priori truth cannot be introduced.

Besides, Deleuzian “becoming” sets the stage for providing a room for resistance, social justice, and expressing critical proposals. Deleuze and Guattari ask teachers and students to put everything to experiment and reach the line of flight. “Beings” related to the old structures (of trees) must be replaced by “becoming” (rhizomes). Becoming of the teacher and student is a two-way movement. This movement is on the threshold all the time, in which they feel unconfident and this is the best time for learning. The openness of teacher and student transform them to a dynamic society (Goodley, 2007, p.325). In fact, becoming provides a classroom with unlimited capacity and raising the question of the introduces a model for ecological education. This model demonstrates that a complex ecosystem is changing all the time; cultural, social inclinations, ideas, and values are inflow of change. Teachers and students invariably involve themselves with renewing their identities against changes. This ecosystem affects everything; everything that students wish to become (Cole, 2011, p.14).

3.4.3. Rhizome and its Pedagogical Consequences

“Rhizome” is a term borrowed by Deleuze from botany and metaphorically used in his philosophy. A tree has a fixed root in the soil and grows vertically. Everything springs from within it, and it establishes no new connections. However, the rhizome is a plant that moves on the surface of the earth, and resides everywhere; it goes just like a nomad. A rhizome has no specific movement patterns and grows in every direction. Unlike trees that have one root and a fixed vertical joint, rhizome makes new and various connections.Rhizome creates new

113 relations in order to determine itself. It is not a passive product of its relations. Thus, rhizome allows no specific unity and pre-determined identity.

In fact, a rhizome is always renewing itself. Newly established communications are not copied by rhizomatic communication, but they create a new map every moment; a new “cartography” will be created, which is not made of dimensions but dimensions and directions. A rhizome is a non-concentrative system based on uncertain patterns that are in the process of becoming every moment. Instead of moving only in one direction, they move in many directions and expand their lines. A Deleuzian rhizome is another name for Dewey`s empirical investigation. A naturalistic investigation is an open investigation (Semetski, 2003, p.148).

Deleuze and Guattari make use of discourse in two spaces: smooth and striated space. Smooth space or rhizomatic space is a place where a rhizome grows in and striated space or tree space is where the tree grows (cf. what was mentioned of rhizome and tree previously). Inhabiting within these spaces have a substantial implication in the way of thinking and humane and social activities. Deleuze describes the smooth space as a dominant space of nomads and striated space, a dominant space of sedentary living.

Nomadic thought is one of the significant concepts of a rhizomatic approach, which is always on the lookout for tracing repetition and multiplicity; nomadic thinking cannot stand stability and fixity. Deleuze introduces the nomadic war machine as the arch-enemy of the dominant culture. Another element in relation to nomadic thought is “smooth space.” It stands opposite to layered and steep space and is always in the process of becoming. This space is the nomadic space in which movement and activity are far more critical than standing still. Nomads have a soft spot for rhizomatic learning to multiply itself and change ideas. Nomads are always looking for differences and avoid preordained conventional ways; they do not follow instructions but rather to make them (Cormier, 2008, p.

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4). The strategy of the nomadic war machine is to escape official possibilities by extraction from unprecedented formulas. This machine fundamentally paves the path of thinking formulating, inventing, and constructing new concepts, which differ from the proscription of states.

The rhizomatic approach stands against the transcendental and essentialist tradition of western metaphysics, egocentrism, and, of course, immutability of modernist principles. In this confrontation, rhizome acts as metaphors for the creative subject of artist and author to create a heterogeneous space in an environment subjected to the rules of capitalism.

In a rhizomatic environment, every point can and should be relatable to any other point, a relation that has no constraints and boundaries. The principle of binary opposition is entirely abrogated (Peters, 1996, p. 98) since the binary systems of classifications are quite restrictive and do not act openly in relation to other things. Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus criticize the binary systems of linguistics (Chomsky) and believe that rhizome focuses not only on various symbolic systems but takes into consideration different methods and relations instead of extended communications and relations. In a rhizomatic system, there is no universal or mother language (Deleuze,1992, p.7). Homogeneity is meaningless, but there are extended groups of local languages and accents and especial languages in this system(7). In communication and heterogeneity (two of five tenets of rhizome), every point is related to another point, and there are close relations between circles and chains of signs and different codes. A rhizome is a non- hierarchical environment within which all points and bonds are intertwined, and none is in the center of the system.

Thus, the rhizomatic thought is a deterritorializing deconstructive thought that knows no boundaries, and it provokes pluralities and heterogeneities with the rejection of centrality and dogmatism, as well as unity and totality. The rhizomatic thought is a plural thought seeking to break hierarchies down; that is,

115 hierarchies consistently reproduced in the education system. However, it should be noted that the dialectical relationship we outline below is the very structure of power that depends on the outcome. They reproduce each other27:

The structure of power

government student policies

education teacher ministry

school

This hierarchical system imposes a variety of concepts in terms of rigid and static categories to students. Categorization and categories are cornerstones of all our thoughts. We always categorize or subsume our new observations in terms of our prior categories, and it seems as if thought is even impossible except through categorization. For example, we cannot help categorizing things in terms of categories such as “human,” “animal,” “food,” “man,” “woman,” “mammal,” “table,” “chair,” and so on. The problem arises when such categories and concepts are treated as absolute, transcendental, and preexisting concepts that can only be determined by the institution of power. The institution is in charge of conveying these categories to students. This is just how Plato conceived the education system. The philosopher-king, who discovers the nature ofcategories,

27 Note that we do not reduce the power structure to this process. Rather, we have expressed only one aspect of the power structure.

116 should control, censor, and then convey concepts to students. The modern period does the same with its instruments.

Nowadays, there is a different view of categories, at least in cognitive sciences, psychology, and even philosophy. Theorists of embodied cognition account for the formation of categories in terms of phenomena such as environmental-perceptual experiences, neuronal arrangements, and spatiotemporal movements and orientations. For example, Lakoff takes categorization as essential to the survival of every animal, holding that neuronal arrays grounding the formation of categories are essential for survival. He emphasizes, however, that the formation of such categories entirely depends on organic structures of the embodied entity and its environmental interactions. Proponents of the motor theory maintain that the formation of categories is a function from the movements of an embodied entity in its environment and its orientation to environmental phenomena. A consideration of Deleuze’s view in terms of the thesis of embodied cognition reveals that the formation of categories, which depends both on the organism, and according to the theory of body without organs, in cultural, political, environmental, and other contexts, cannot be accommodated within the traditional view of concepts and categories. The main pedagogical implication of this is the necessity of revising the concept of school and classrooms.

3.4.3.1. Transformation of Classrooms

All these theories are critical to our subsequent discussion of education because they show that concepts and categories can be learned not through classrooms and mere listening, but environmental experiences and bodily orientations:

From the neurological perspective, the categorization is functionally orchestrated by the connections of neurocognitive structures, such

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as the prefrontal cortex, with other anatomical structures dedicated to processing core effect and memory. These intrinsic neural networks enable a conscious being to contextualize its various sensory, somatosensory and somatovisceral inputs with the prior affective information stored in the brain in order to conceptualize the qualities of the core in some form of subjective meaning. Researchers in the cognitive science maintain that the information about these emergent prototypical emotional categories is activated when people remember past experiences, during emotion self- regulation and simulation of the future events. (Perak, 2011, p. 198)

However, the educational structure has classically pursued the learning of categories only in classrooms, and thus students have always been deprived of environmental and bodily experiences. Obviously, confinement of students in classrooms and their deprivation of having such experiences will seriously undermine their understanding and creation of new concepts and categories. Classrooms and schools in their present form should be done away with. For just as a rhizome has no fixed location and just as a nomad is in constant migration, thought and education do not have a fixed place and can express themselves in different environments.

Moreover, paying attention to the aesthetic and artistic aspects of educational environments are among the issues which have a tremendous effect on the feelings and mentality of students during the learning process. Some specialists are mainly engaged with the relation of educational environments and architecture with the of the learners. They have emphasized on the physical structure of these environments as an essential factor in perception and recognition of educational and training methods (Margolis, 2001). In other words, it is assumed that factors such as designation and structure of classrooms, corridors, visual features, the arrangement of chairs, desks and other educational

118 appliances, and other aesthetic considerations have a considerable effect on learning and the students` perception of schools and educational process.

The importance of the order of classroom and school is capitalized when their relations to senses and bodies have been clarified on the one hand, and knowledge and thought on the other. Perak states this relation in the following way:

The entanglement of the body and culture in shaping the human notion of reality is perhaps best exemplified in the study of categorization and conceptualization of emotions. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, emotions are embodied phenomena thatare intimately shared by all humans, regardless of their culture origin. Furthermore, emotional categories have been introduced in all languages and cultures. In this sense, emotions are universal, intrinsic part of the human biological evolution and cultural heritage which makes them a valid scientific domain of inquiry. (Perak, 2011, p. 193)

Applying the theory of Gerzles, Gordon (1982) claims that every physical structure depicts an image of ideal students in the minds of students. For example, in rectangular classroom setting, in which students` desks and chairs are arranged in a straight line fixed to the ground, and teacher`s desk is right in front of them in the middle of the , brings this image to the mind that students are beings bereft of knowledge and subjected to the teacher as the primary source of learning. Therefore, it is evident that the existence of such sterile and banal educational facilities without any aesthetic or visual effects leads to the decline of communication and passive, unconditional acceptance of materials to the students.

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3.4.3.2. Creativity-Centrism instead of Memory-Centrism

Another important point in rhizomatic terms is the necessity of creativity, which is not possible in the present educational structure. Creativity is necessary because, in Deleuze’s ontology, there is no fixed thing, including a fixed concept. Thus, existence is a context in which new events and relations are formed. The present education system seeks to transmit rigid concepts. Thus, it gives priority to memory rather than creativity. Instead of encouraging the student’s creativity, it controls and redirects their thoughts.

Deleuze believes that the fundamental task of philosophy and philosopher consists of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts; hence, he is radically opposed to academic tendencies of reading the history of philosophy because such an approach does not allow for concept formation. In an article titled: Geophilosophy and methodology, Gough thinks that Deleuze and Guattari have depicted a map of the geography of reason from pre-Socrates time to the present and he continues:

“Geo-philosophy is describing relations between particular spatial configurations and locations and the philosophical formations that arise therein. They characterize philosophy as the creation of concepts through which knowledge can be generated”. (Gough, 2005, p. 3)

Deleuze and Guattari have created a new critical language to analyze thoughts as a movement throughout space; concepts such as montage, deterritorialization, nomadic, and rhizome and rhizomatic all refer to spatial relations and ways to know other moving objects. For example, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between rhizomatic thought and the root-tree system. (Gough, 2005, p.3).

If there are no rigid, static concepts, then the only thing that remains is to discover new horizons through new events. This has the pedagogical

120 consequence that textbooks, educational programs, and teaching methods should be designed so that, instead of a mere transmission of concepts, they expose students to new events and situations and try to create new solutions and concepts via new methods and drawing on creativity and imagination.28 Textbooks should not merely consist of a body of information to be transferred to the student’s memory; instead, they should encourage the student’s creativity via different means. For example, Sellers (2005) draws upon Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic approach and fiction to study the effect of rhizomatic thought on developing young students in New Zealand. By the same token, the teacher will be just obligated to pave the ground for the student’s imagination to be flourished. The teacher is no longer a mere transmitter of information; he or she is a facilitator and a guide.

3.4.3.3. The Collapse of the Teacher’s Authority

Another advantage of the rhizomatic view is that horizontal relations in education obviate the authoritarian atmosphere between the teacher and the student, and even that between the teacher and policy-makers of education (as pointed out earlier).

In Bergsonism, he explains the following paragraph regarding the word- grammar:

We are wrong to believe that the true and the false can only be brought to bear on solutions, that they only begin with solutions. This prejudice is social ( for society, and the language that transmits its order-words [ mots d'ordre ], "set up" [ donnent] ready-made problems, as if they were drawn out of "the city's administrative

For more about pedagogical consequences of Deleuze’s concept of becoming see Deleuze, Education and 28 Becoming.

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filing cabinets," and force us to "solve" them, leaving us only a thin margin of freedom). Moreover, this prejudice goes back to childhood, to the classroom: It is the school teacher who "poses" the problems; the pupil's task is to discover the solutions. In this way, we are kept in a kind of slavery. True freedom lies in power to decide, to constitute problems themselves. (Deleuze, 1988, p. 15)

Deleuze explains in A Thousand Plateaus:

“…A rule of grammar is a power marker before it is a syntactical marker […] Language is not life; it gives life orders. Life does not speak; it listens and waits…” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 7)

Thus, the teacher will be more concerned with the student’s interests, lifestyles, and needs, and will no longer seek to impose his or her views on them. A vertical thought is, in contrast, organized in a way in which only one decisive and final answer is expected. Methods, contrary to the central origin, are put aside. The horizontal thought, however, is not concentrated on any specific method, and all possible creative methods are welcomed. The mind is fluid, and unusual methods are considered and assessed. In a classroom organized by a horizontal thought, students are free to express their views, they are not afraid of offering illogical solutions, and the process of learning is distributed among all students. Horizontal thought does not lead to a definitive solution. Instead, it seeks a spectrum of solutions.

3.4.3.4. Collaborative Learning

The obviation of the teacher’s authority puts forth the notion of collaboration. In the Deleuzian view, learning occurs in action, indeed. Thus, a teacher is one who participates in the student’s activity, and the student learns via doing with the teacher. Deleuze holds that we never learn by doing like someone; we learn by

122 doing with someone (Deleuze 2000, p. 22). Of course, collaboration is not exhausted by collaboration with the teacher. What Deleuze has in mind is a collective collaboration. As Deleuze suggests in his Difference and Repetition, learning is not obtained via re-creation; it is obtained through encounters with others (Gallo, 2014, p. 201). In this method, no one is responsible for decisions and on his or her own. Given the increasing knowledge of students and the expansion of the domain of information through information banks and electronic media provided in rhizomatic ways, teachers should focus more on teaching how to learn; that is, they should help students by motivating and facilitating the process of learning. According to Deleuze, collaborative learning is more fruitful than learning through the repetition of other people’s activities.

This type of learning is beyond thinking without representation. An empirical thought is rooted in action; learning cannot take place between a representation and an action since, under this circumstance, learning would be the reproduction of the analogous. This is what Deleuze denies: for learning to take place, there must be a meaningful communication between a symbol and an answer. Deleuze calls this the repetition of differences. He believes that encountering an unidentified situation is what would harmonize sensual and kinesthetic activities. Teaching at a level playing field focuses on symbols. By disrupting the constant and fixed structures of representation that concentrate on studying known objects, Deleuze proposes critical thinking which is always in motion and capable of motion. For example, he refers to an amateur sportsman who is learning how to swim. In order to illustrate this way of thinking, Deleuze gives us an example of a man confronted with an unidentified new situation (swimming for the first time). This swimmer must encounter waves, learn to hold his breath because he is confronting an unidentified situation. All in all, it is the confrontation with an unidentified and unknown situation that leads to rhizomatic thinking.

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Nomadic learning refers to a moment of development where body comprehends and perceives the world under a new light; in other words, learning takes place with a moment of pause and deep shock to the thought; learning requires path toward the threshold of consciousness within which our real actions would be compatible with our real understanding of the world (Connell, 2008, p. 12).

For Deleuze, thinking is a practical art. He is considered to be an empiricist, but his empiricism has a significant difference with British empiricists; they believed that all our knowledge of the world drives from sense data, but Deleuze`s empiricism involves confrontation with the phenomenon and dynamic experience of things. His empiricism is embodied concrete and contingent. (Jaarsma, 2005, p. 130). Thus the teacher’s obligation is not merely to present information; learning occurs when it is in relation to, and collaboration with, others, and the teacher should create a smooth collaborative environment. Deleuze believes that teachers who act in unsmooth environments lead their students to the imitation of their own actions and give priority to simulation. Thus, a smooth environment should be prepared in classrooms and schools in which students have multi-dimensional communications with one another.

3.4.3.5. Taking External Factors into Account

In the present system, educational contents are systematically imposed on students in a top-down manner, in which demands of students are taken into account. Even if we make the obviously false assumption that the education system seeks to convey the truth to students, the question arises of how the truth should be conveyed: will students learn the alleged truth through a top-down transmission and presentation of contents as truths? The presumption behind this view is what we have pointed out earlier: we have goodwill to the truth, and we search for it once we encounter it. In his Proust and Signs, Deleuze says:

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Proust does not believe that man, nor even a supposedly pure mind, has by nature a desire for truth, a will-to-truth. We search for truth only when we are determined to do so in terms of a concrete situation…truth is never the product of a prior disposition but the

result of violence in thought. (Deleuze, 2000, p. 15)

For Deleuze, thought is not a volitional action towards the good; it is a reaction. In the previous chapter, we showed how Nietzsche sees self-awareness and thought as being in relation to the superior. External factors, signs, and external stimuli are what provoke thoughts. Thus, the role of external factors in the educational structure should be taken seriously. The necessity of considering such factors is felt both in organisms and those constituting a body without organs. We have pointed out earlier that, for Deleuze, the subject or body is a product. The subject does not make the world; it is affected by the world. Thus, emotions come to have an important place in his view. Given the dualism governing the educational environment, the role of emotion in the process of cognition has not been recognized in education systems. In other words, students go to their classes every day and regardless of emotional conditions in which they are on that day. They are obligated to learn the material without there having been a plan to control their emotions, and this is an openly misplaced expectation. Obviously enough, a student’s emotional condition directly bears on his or her learning potentials. The way we respond to the physical and social world around us is hugely dependent on our emotional condition. Since childhood, we experience intense emotional patterns such as expectations, disappointment, or satisfaction, which are indeed embodied experiences. The way we interpret events, which includes our final-stage abilities such as critical analyses, is always affected by our emotions. Delight, stress, anger, fear, and satisfaction constitute parts of a fundamental matrix that inform our reactions and even “rationality.”

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However, these factors are not taken into account in textbooks, which serve as essential tenets of education.

3.4.3.6. The Structural Problem of Textbooks

The bulk of education systems is based on books and the transmission of concepts via textbooks. However, this method for the transmission of information is imperfect for several reasons. In the process of transmitting information via textbooks, the information is merely transmitted via words, and the reader has no perceptual, environmental, and bodily experience of concepts and categories appearing in the book. If the student is to “learn” a new concept, she needs to have the environmental-perceptual experience the discoverer or inventor of the concept has had. As we have quoted Deleuze earlier, one learns only by doing with someone, but this experience is not obtained by reading words in a book. Thus, the student will need to understand new concepts in terms of her pre-given concepts and experiences. Moreover, this is an obviously sterile or fruitless experience because she cannot grasp the new concept just as it was experienced and constructed by the theorist. This causes problems for the process of transmission of new concepts.

This is originated in a theory held by the first generation of cognitive scientists; that is, the myth that the whole process of cognition and reasoning occurs in mind, and it is the mind that receives data as symbols and then processes them. Concerning reading a book and a book-centered education system, “words” enter the mind as data, and then the mind is expected to understand them merely by processing such symbolic data as if it is an advanced computer not affected by sensory interactions as well as biological and environmental reactions. Thus, the mere reading of words on a paper cannot help convey concepts(Neither on paper nor screen). Contrary to this representational view, Deleuze takes thought to be

126 concerned with signs. He takes thoughts, and even the whole process of teaching and learning, to be semiotics of some sort.

Deleuze refers to his view on the history of philosophy; such a view is in contrast with academia and dominant educational systems. Of course, Deleuze does not define his philosophical work with them but has a different and unique attitude towards it. This view studies the history of philosophy (history of literature and history in general) with respect to the creation of concepts, potentials, and capacities. This history is no longer merely a history of ideas, proofs, and critiques but engages with the whole history and all its ruptures, stammers and silence; to look at the world beyond the framework. Then, studying history in all academic forms will be rigid and lifeless. It would only be questions and answers. The specific text that regularly disguises its ulterior motive. Deleuze in Letter to a Harsh Critic distinguishes two kinds of reading:

There are, you see, two ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies and then if you're even more perverse or depraved you set off after signifiers. And you treat the next book like a box contained in the first or containing it. Moreover, you annotate and interpret and question, and write a book about the book, and so on and on. Or there's the other way: you see the book as a little non-signifying machine, and the only question is "Does it work, and how does it work?" How does it work for you? If it doesn't work, if nothing comes through, you try another book. This second way of reading's intensive: something comes through or it doesn't. There's nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. There is an electronic diversion […] this second method of reading contrasts with the first method which relates books directly to the outside world…A book is just a small cog in a complicated external machine. Writing is a flux among other kind of

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flux; there is no special point about it and it enters other fields and fluxes. (Deleuze, 1995, p. 7)

This is the second reading that Deleuze views it with the external world; like a flux against all fluxes; like a test for each reader. This type of reading is in sheer contrast with that of educational systems. Rules like: if you do not understand the text do not pass or you must understand and the rules that determine the priorities. However, Deleuze proposes a kind of reading that has nothing to do with school books and can relate to anything imaginable. However, the relation with starts from here; from the first type of learning that exists in all the educational systems. Truth, as the most conventional form of , is explained by Deleuze in the following way: as if independent truths and meanings are awaiting us to be interpreted and revealed. Colebrook (2002) writes:

It is this invention of truth that produces ‘priests’ (those who will lead us to the truth) and ‘asceticism’ (for we renounce our desires and enslave ourselves to supposedly higher ideals). More importantly, this whole process leadsto nihilism: despair when that higher, truer world that we imaginedbehind appearances turns out to be ungraspable. (p. 72)

Over interpretation is one of the strongest tendencies in studying school books and universities, i.e., there is something hidden to be discovered and awaits us and gives us meaning, thereby we interpret and are supposed to reach beyond the text. The path will come to an end with our discovery, and even if we do not discover, nonetheless, there is blissfulness awaiting us. However, there is a stinking smell of nihilism here since there is no ideal being or thing at all. Our sensual experience does not already exist so that ‘our’ presupposed interpretation be counted as a solution. Meaning is created, and, it is the appearance and material forms that count.

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3.4.4. Semiotic Learning

Learning is essentially concerned with signs. Signs are the object of a temporal apprenticeship, not of abstract knowledge. To learn is first of all to consider a substance, an object, a being as if it emitted signs to be deciphered, interpreted. There is no apprentice who is not “the Egyptologist” of something. One becomes a carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the signs of wood, a physician by becoming sensitive to the signs of disease. Vocation is always predestination with regard to signs. Everything that teaches us something emits signs; every act of learning is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphs. (Deleuze, 2000, p. 4)

For Deleuze, signs and semiotics are so important that there would be no truth, nor would we learn anything without them:

“We discover no truth, we learn nothing except by deciphering and interpreting” (p. 5).

Deleuze suggests that we never learn anything without signs, and learning is fundamentally dependent on signs. Earlier, we saw how Deleuze challenges the claim that goodwill searches for the truth. According to Deleuze, what one wants in his search for the truth is to interpret, decipher, express, and find the meaning of a sign (p. 17). In fact, we do not seek the truth; rather, there is something that forces us to think. Deleuze has famously said that there is something in the world that leads us to think. And that thing is a sign. He concurs with Peirce that our world is full of signs. There are different types of signs: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. However, Deleuze takes us to a strange realm. We usually take signs to refer to fully specific entities, whereas Deleuze takes them to be encoded indications going beyond themselves, without necessarily ending up in a specific point. In fact, signs do not present us with something determined. They lead us to create new meanings for them. Such a view of signs was held by other post-

129 modern philosophers as well. For example, Derrida sees us as prisoners of signifiers, there being no fixed structure or meaning beyond signs. This is a characteristic of post-modern thought. Thus, the function of a sign is not to represent; it is to help creativity—the power to create new concepts—and to help inventions29.

For Deleuze, signs are not explicit tools for transmitting information, but are mysterious inferences that go beyond themselves and refer to hidden, implicit things. Shiny moonlight speaks of its darkest half. Every sign has contained within itself something that must be revealed. Deleuze believes that a genuine learning is learning through signs (Bogue, 2004, p.328). Teaching signs constitutes a critique of codes and conventions, and avoids the orthodox relations and comes up with new ones. The gap in between these relations causes a series of new and different relations. This teaching method is one form of learning since it engages with problems by implementing signs. (Ibid)

According to Deleuze, education should, instead of imposing grand narratives and what we have dubbed absolute and a priori truths, teach semiotics and interpretation of signs. The student should be able to decipher signs. The whole educational structure should coordinate with this process. Textbooks should be designed in ways that guide students to interpret and decipher concepts, instead of transmitting already deciphered concepts. The student should find signs in her textbooks to interpret and create meanings. On the other hand, since there is no fixed meaning or truth behind signs, no single interpretation should be picked and favored. This interferes with one of the most central foundations of the

29 To avoid further misunderstanding, we should add that Deleuze considered the use of symbols as necessary for improving the creativity of the learners. Of course, he does not mean that if we observe the red color in the traffic sign meaning stop, we should look for creativity here. However, one can ask students to be creative in the educational environment and how they can come up with a new interpretation for signs; in other words, we can offer a different conceptual framework for a singular sign. In the following part, we can further clarify the issue by giving an example of Putnam.

130 present education system, that is, the testing and grading system, in which signs have a particular meaning and interpretation offered to the student by the textbook and the teacher. The student ought to learn them and then accurately duplicate them on her answer sheet. The student has no right to interpret and create a new meaning for the sign.

The necessity of Deleuze’s notion of democracy in the education system arises from the above point. The structure of power has monopolized the right for the interpretation of signs. This is manifest in all aspects of modern society. Goodness, badness, virtue, vice, scientific, non-scientific, right, and wrong are all determined in a top-down way. For it is institutionalized that there is a fixed truth behind signs, which was then discovered by those in power. This is the of the Middle Ages that still survives behind the veils of modern structures, such as schools or new controlling instruments. This is the origin of the emphasis Deleuze puts on the pure difference. He highlights the real difference and avoids attributing any sort of unity to differences in order to resist such dictatorship. Dictatorship has always gone hand in hand with unity; for example, unity in the guise of a king, unity in the guise of a religion, unity in the guise of nationalism, and now in the guise of the truth, that is, the alleged truth that presents itself in templates such as scientific/non-scientific or academic/non- academic, and in journalistic platforms, it is engaged in a suppression of oppositions. In schools and universities, the right to interpretation of signs is monopolized by the teacher and the textbook.

Deleuze’s solution to this problem is widespread democracy. In an education system, this amounts to an opening of the possibility of dialogues, interpretations, and deciphering. Textbooks should not seek to impose contents, the teacher should not be the authority for choosing the right exegesis of signs, and tests and grading should be done away with. To view problems from different perspectives and to expand the range of interpretation of signs, collaboration with

131 others is required. To do so, the classroom environment should be open, and students from different groups and classes, races, and religions should gather in one place. Students should not be signed up in schools of higher qualities, just in virtue of their family’s wealth. Moreover, particularly religious schools should not be established, because a particular group of people will then monopolize the interpretation of signs. No particular group should be in charge of education. All different groups and classes of people should be in charge of education, as students should be of all these groups and classes.

Conclusion

This chapter, concerning pedagogical implications of Deleuze’s views, begins with the question of what a body is. We first pointed out how difficult it is to define bodies in Deleuze’s view. We then provided an account of his different views of the body. As we have seen, for Deleuze, the body goes beyond an organism. The body is a result of different forces: cultural, political, moral, physical, organismic, and so on. However, this does not lead to dualism. We then defined the concept of a desiring machine. Each body is a desiring machine that seeks dominance. Thus, the world is an interaction of bodies or desiring- machines through and through.

We then considered the relationship between Deleuze’s views and the embodiment thesis: despite their disagreements, different theories of embodied cognition share specific ideas as encapsulated in the embodiment thesis. The latter thesis emphasizes, on the one hand, on the rejection of transcendental and non-physical subjects, and on the other hand, it rejects the reduction of consciousness or cognition to the brain. Deleuze holds both main theses. For he emphasizes on the immanence of the subject, which corresponds to the rejection of transcendental subjects, and following anti-reductivism, he takes the subject

132 to merely be a part of an organism that results from political, social, cultural, environmental, and other forces. Moreover, the unconscious part is as crucial to Deleuze as is to embodied cognition theorists.

For Deleuze, every phenomenon is political, because every phenomenon falls under relations of power, and power is political by nature. Thus, we have accounted for the relationship between politics and education. In our search for the roots of the problem, we arrive at the dogmatic picture of thought—that in which thought is valuable in itself and people intrinsically desire to think. Drawing on the views of Nietzsche and Foucault, Deleuze rises against this dogmatic picture. He concludes that the foundation of the present education system is based on a wrong or fraudulent assumption, which ultimately turns into an instrument for dominance, transforming the education system into an imperialistic and controlling system.

Having outlined these preliminaries, we then dealt with our main problem, that is, pedagogical implications. In this section, we pursued critical concepts in Deleuze’s philosophy, such as rhizomes, becoming, and , and gleaned the pedagogical implications of each.

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Chapter 4: Designing a model asserting Deleuze’s viewpoint

4.1. Introduction

In previous chapters, we provided theoretical foundations we needed for planning our model of education. In the second chapter, we elaborated the theory of embodied cognition in general, and as applied to Deleuze in particular, and in the third chapter, we discussed pedagogical implications of his view. Now we are in a position to plan a model of education based on theoretical foundations we have outlined thus far. Our model has three elements: goal, content, and method. We first introduce the goal we pursue in an education system given pedagogical implications of Deleuze’s views in accordance with the theory of embodied cognition and then explicate the content that needs to be applied, and we will finally develop the best methods that help our purposes.

However, before starting this chapter, let ask a significant and vital question:

Is an altogether Deleuzian education possible in the present capitalistic world?

Let us reply explicitly: NO, as we previously mentioned in the text(last chapter), the educational system is one of the most and perhaps the most essential instrument of subjection and control in a capitalistic world; a system that has been designated with capitalistic formalities and goals from head to foot. Humans are trained and controlled so that they could be obedient, useful citizens, and it is not possible without the maintenance of the status quo. It is not thereby unreasonable that a lot of present philosophers, who are critical of the status quo, have taken into consideration the problem of education. Therefore, the educational system cannot be viewed as an independent institution and hope for reformation without fundamental transformation in the political structure. One of the greatest lessons of Marx and Hegel was to demonstrate that any system and political structure,

134 including capitalism, must be viewed in totality. Although capitalism appears to constitute independent institutions, yet there are many intertwining and cooperative relationships between them. When Marx considered that a communist society would be fulfilled with the communist revolution throughout the world, he pointed out the same issue. Since the existing international system withstands against any local action in the severest way possible, such as putting pressures and international boycotts, but does that mean one must simply give up any attempt to change the present structure of the educational system?

Again the answer is No. Marx in an article entitled: Indifference to Politics rejects and rebukes the view held by many socialists that any attempt to gain privileges in the existing structure is doomed to failure, for example, one of the passages that Marx quotes from them is the following:

If the political struggle of the working class assumes violent forms, if the workers substitute their revolutionary dictatorship for the dictatorship of the bourgeois class, they are committing the terrible crime of lese-principle, for to satisfy their own base everyday needs and crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, instead of laying down arms and abolishing the State they are giving it a revolutionary and transient form. The workers should not form individual unions for each trade, since they thereby perpetuate the division of social labour found in bourgeois society. This division which disunites the workers is really the basis of their present servitude. (Marx, 1972, p.95)

Or the following paragraph:

Workers should even less desire that, as happens in the United States of America, the state whose budget is swollen by what is taken from the working class should be obliged to give primary education to the workers' children; for primary education is not complete education. It is better that working men and working womenshould

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not be able to read or write or do sums than that they shouldreceive education from a teacher in a school run by the state. It is far better that ignorance and a working day of sixteen hours should debase the working classes than that eternal principles should be violated.(95)

Then Marx criticizes the socialists:

The first socialists (Fourier, Owen, Saint-Simon, etc.), since social conditions were not sufficiently developed to allow the working class to constitute itself as a militant class, were necessarily obliged to limit themselves to dreams about the model society of the future and were led thus to condemn all the attempts such as strikes, combinations or political movements set in train by the workers to improve their lot. But while we cannot repudiate these patriarchs of , just as chemists cannot repudiate their forebears the alchemists, we must at least avoid falling back into their mistakes, which, if we were to commit them, would be inexcusable. (P. 96)

Therefore, as Marx did not confine class struggles to the proletarian revolution, we should not subject struggles to bringing down the entire system. One must make the maximum effort to achieve our educational demands at best (e.g., from public protests to capitalizing on the philosophical and scientific consequences about the existing educational structure). For example, Marx demonstrates some samples of workers` struggle in the tenth chapter of The Capital, in which did not culminate in uprooting the capitalistic structure but ended in improving the conditions of workers; the same circumstance can happen with the educational situation.

4.2. Roadmap: Definition of Planning an Education System

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Before we present a comprehensive definition of planning an education system, we need to illustrate what we mean by an education system. A system is defined as a purposeful unit that coordinately carries out certain actions in order to achieve its goals. In the case of education, there are numerous instances of a system: an “education system” sometimes refers to a classroom containing a teacher, students, curricula, and instruments, and sometimes to the school with all of its constituting agents and elements. Sometimes the whole education machinery of a country is considered as an education system (Fardanesh, 1994, p. 85). In the previous chapter, we saw how Deleuze sees an education system as a political phenomenon and in relation to the concept of power. Thus, for Deleuze, the education system should be seen in a background of the whole political structure of the country. To overlook this would lead to negligence of the importance and place of the political for Deleuze.

Education systems are particularly characterized by their incorporation of all materials and methods required to achieve specific educational goals. In general, an education system consists of programs, methods, and materials in the service of achieving specific goals. The requirement of an education system is a program in which all methods and materials required for the transmission of specific knowledge and skills are determined. In other words, whenever a program is provided, in which the details of required methods and materials are specified, an education system has come to exist.

Education consists of a set of decisions made and measures taken in order for learners to maximally achieve specific educational goals. Definitions of an education program can, by and large, be divided into two classes. The first mostly emphasizes the educational content, and the second emphasizes educational methods. As explicated in the previous chapter, Deleuze does not believe in an a priori structure of the truth. He does not hold that there is a fixed and a priori content that should be transmitted via an education system. Instead, he maintains

137 that the very process of learning should lead to the formation of new knowledge. It is not as if there are predetermined truths that we should transmit to students through textbooks or teachers.

On the contrary, the student should create new knowledge in collaboration with the teacher and the prepared background. Thus, within the above classification, Deleuze falls into the second. That is to say, he mostly emphasizes on methods, rather than contents. Of course, this does not mean that any pre-existing field of knowledge (e.g., physics and mathematics) should not be transmitted to the students, but that the teaching method must be a student-oriented method. In this method, the student arrives at conclusions himself (not as a piece of ready meat) and secondly, besides the transition of this knowledge should not get in the way of creativity and an alternative perspective. For example, if a student arrives at a different conclusion from his experiment in physics or the mathematical intuition of a student is against the established text, he must be obliged to give up that alternative path but rather such a student must be praised for his bold and daring creativity and alternative thinking.

Planning consists of preparing a practical map to arrive at what is already specified. Thus, education planning consists in preparing specific maps for achieving educational goals (Zavaraki 2013, p. 29). To build a bridge, a building, a power generation engine, or whatever you have, one needs first to predict how their different parts are combined and interconnected and to predict the methods in which different things should be carried out. Education as a combination of contents, methods, and facilities, demands such predictions. In this systematic process, a host of key elements are involved, including detection of educational problems, examination of the learner’s properties, detection of the content, specification of educational goals, content sequence in each educational unit for logical learning, specification of educational strategies, specification of educational messages and the development of educations, preparation of

138 evaluation instruments, and selection of sources to support educational and learning activities. In general, planning a curriculum includes the following (Fardanesh, 1994, p. 91):

- Axiological or value-based decision-making on a large scale - Particular decision-makings concerning educational goals - Particular decision-makings concerning contents - Particular decision-makings concerning learning activities - Particular decision-makings concerning evaluation methods - Particular decision-makings concerning materials and resources - Particular decision-makings concerning methods of teaching - Particular decision-makings concerning the language - Particular decision-makings concerning atmosphere and situation - Particular decision-makings concerning the grouping of students

In what follows, we talk about goals we have adopted in accordance with pedagogical implications discussed in the previous chapter, and then given the above points, we outline our plan according to Deleuze’s ideas.

4.2.1. Goals

According to pedagogical implications of Deleuze’s views, our goals for planning an education system should be as follows:

Factors affecting an The goals according to Deleuze’s ideas education system

The outline of the - Saving the education institute from education system institutions of power - Nomadism of students and the education system

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Learning - Collaborative - Semiotic - Deconstructive - Creativity-centered instead of memory- centered

Student - Problem-centered and encountering unknown problems - Experience-centered

Curriculum - Plateau-like

Teacher - Breakdown of the teacher’s authoritarianism - Taking differences into account - Flexibility - Engendering wonder - A role beyond the transmission of information

Classroom - Multi-dimensional - Rhizomatic

School - New environments, instead of the present fixed and static form of schools

Evaluation - Based on critical power, instead of grading

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4.3. Saving the Education Institute from the Institution of Power and Nomadism of the Student and the Education System

According to Deleuze, arrangements should be made, so that different nomadic thought is not suppressed, and not only that, it should be encouraged. This is not possible, however, as long as the government or the institution of power is in charge of education. Thus, the first step towards the reformation of education is to save it from institutions of power and assign it to individual people. In fact, the education system should not be administered by associates of institutions of power, particularly capitalistic institutions. Instead, they should be administered by experts who have no connections to institutions of power. The government should not fund the budgets of schools, nor should it be directly funded by people. It should be provided indirectly by people through taxes, instead. To fund the budget via taxes makes it possible for masses of people to not to turn into another institution of power, leading to a new controlling system. Furthermore, the government should be obligated by-laws to pay the taxes to administrators of education without any qualifications or preconditions. Obviously, there should be constant supervision of how the taxes are paid to guarantee that the government does not impose its policies on the education system utilizing budget (for example, by refusing from paying taxes).

For nomadism, it is also required that people who administrate educational institutes be from different groups and have different viewpoints, because if a particular group of people with the same approach administrate the institution of education, that would be a significant threat to nomadism. Nomadism supports minorities and different views. However, if a particular group is in charge of education, then only ideas favored by that group would be allowed to be expressed or taught. In planning educational content, different views should be presented to the student so that she can learn to see things from a variety of perspectives. Moreover, this would help the student to find the courage to be

141 creative and to be able to offer novel ideas by having seen the possibility of different perspectives.

4.3.1. Democracy

History teaches us that the best way to combat dictatorship is to expand democracy. As seen earlier, if education systems are thought of as totalitarian dictatorial institutions that seek to control and manipulate students, we should then try to institutionalize democracy at the heart of these institutions. Democratic schools are places for the flourishing of critical thinking. In such schools, students are given the opportunity to display their critical capacities to combat and change established political and social forms, instead of mere conformity to it. Moreover, students will learn skills with which they can find a place in history, find their own voice, be prepared for courageous civil acts, take risks, and reinforce social habits, customs, and occasions that are essential to general forms of democracy (Giroux 1991). Furthermore, just as democracy is essential for educational institutes, it should be noted that education is also essential for democracy. In order to have a democratic society, we need democratic education. However, it is painful and challenging to materialize this latter. To develop such a view in educational institutes, requisite backgrounds should be prepared. To do so, the following solutions might be helpful:

1. Multiculturalization of schools: schools should admit students regardless of their racial and cultural backgrounds. Moreover, religious tendencies or financial conditions of their families should not lead to discrimination or segregation of students.

2. Assigning students with tasks: it is not sufficient for students to be mere learners. Since the central tenet of democracy is social responsibility and collaboration, different tasks should be assigned to students.

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3. Emphasizing on collaboration and group works: we will elaborate on this in what follows. Here we only point out that in order to democracy to be promoted, it is important to have participation and activities within groups that are culturally and axiologically diverse. This will help students to treat different cultures, values, and as standard, and be able to easily deal with them, instead of trying to eliminate or negate them.

4.4. Learning

4.4.1. Collaborative Learning

In Deleuze’s view, plurality is preferred over unity, just as the difference is preferred over sameness. This is not, nevertheless, to say that every student should go on his path. On the contrary, collaboration is much more important in rhizomatic thought (Koutropoulos, 2017, p. 104). Learning and knowledge are obtained via differences over beliefs. Where the same thoughts are involved, no new thought will emerge. Furthermore, such sameness would defeat Deleuze’s purpose of innovation and criticism of the a priori structure of the truth. In general, a teacher teaches by giving a lecture in classrooms as an omniscient in front of students who are just sitting next to each other. Thus, although students are present in a social environment, they do not collaborate in education and learning. They are not given problems to discover and solve. Their different views are not discussed. Everyone should listen to the teacher or the textbook and accept them as ultimate authorities. In the present structure, the teacher makes students repeat or duplicate their own activities, and the priority will thus be given to sameness rather than difference.

In a collaborative classroom, however, when there is a problem, it is discussed by students themselves, if an experiment is needed, it will be carried out by students, and if someone has a different view of a matter, he is free to

143 express it. In this method, students are first divided into different groups, information is collected, and then students begin to analyze the problem, and in a collaborative action, they learn new perspectives and new concepts via practical and bodily learning.

In such classrooms, members of groups first convene to choose from a list of topics they are supposed to work on throughout the year or the semester, and then make research or a project about the topic. Then, each group plans and decides what to look for in their topic, how to pursue it, and how to divide tasks and responsibilities among them so that they can successfully carry out their project. Throughout the semester, they collaborate in activities such as analysis and evaluation of information they have collected from numerous sources. They discuss, and exchange information about the topic in order to develop and clarify their findings. When the group finishes its work, all members convene and share their findings so that they arrive at a final solution and information, and then prepare themselves to present a report or their project. In the final meeting, each group shares its findings with all groups within the class.

4.4.2. Semiotic Learning

We can highlight two concepts of denotation and connotation. Denotation serves as a direct relation between signifier and signified but connotation has a more sophisticated symbolic structure. Here, a sign contains within itself a signified and a signifier and serves as a signifier for another signified. For instance, the picture of a horseman on the cigarette pack has a signifier and a signified which refers to another signified like steadfastness and masculinity.

Another example can be educational spaces are limited to classrooms in the form of chairs, desks lined up behind one another like a group of soldiers and some are fixed to the ground (signifying immovability). Students prick theirears

144 to listen to the teacher, without the least interaction among themselves. There are no round tables in this class, which signifies mutual interaction and dynamic communication. It is clear that such staled educational environments decrease interaction and lead students to passive unconditional acceptance.

Any environment is full of signs, and signs are problems put forth to students. A student’s encounter with signs amounts to an encounter with new problems. In terms of the problem-solving model, a Deleuzian school puts students in a position in which they test hypotheses via research drawing on existing or collected signs, and then they make conclusions on their own. In general, semiotics is concerned with signs and semiotic systems that make learners engage in learning. There are four types of messages sent by an educational environment to the learner:

1. Architectural messages

2. Textual and curricular messages

3. Social and behavioral messages

4. Political messages

Since Deleuze takes signs as foundations of learning, it can be implied that an educational environment can be full of signs, and training or education can proceed through signs. That is to say, students can learn through signs. Signs should be designed in terms of the four above-mentioned groups. The architecture of an educational environment should be full of signs provoking students to interpret, rather than simply being a safe settlement. Curricula and textbooks should, instead of explicitly stating the material, engage students in the material through signs and encourages them to interpret the signs. The teacher’s speeches and behaviors should also be signs. The teacher should not explicitly convey the material. Instead, he should present them with signs, and thereby help provoke thoughts in their minds.

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Heidegger believes that the fundamental event of the modern period was to grasp the world as picture (Pallasmaa, 2007, p. 21). Much of the Western culture as well as the Eastern culture is only focused on vision and was oblivious to other senses. As put by Juhani Pallasmaa, thought is considered as vision; hence the metaphor: “thinking is seeing.” The Western culture, which is conquering the world and swallowing other cultures, is vision-centered, and directly or indirectly suppresses cultures in which vision is not predominant. The Western culture fills people’s spare times with pictures as if everything there is should be seen—from advertisements to crazy investments in cinema, the selfie culture, and virtual networks. We are not focused on whether or not such tendency is rooted in political power. What we wish to draw attentions to is the focus of the education system on a vision-based culture.

Our senses are intermingled and our perception is a product of the activity of all senses. Merleau-Ponty says:

My perception is [therefore] not a sum of visual, tactile, and audible givens: I perceive totally with my whole being: I grasp a unique structure of the thing, a unique way of being, which speaks to all my senses at onc. (Pallasmaa 2007, p. 23)

Pallasmaa quotes Febvre as saying:

the sixteenth century did not see first: it heard and smelled, it sniffed the air and caught sounds. It was only later that it seriously and actively became engaged in geometry, focusing attention on the world of forms with Kepler (1571–1630) and Desargues of Lyon (1593–1662). It was then that vision was unleashed. (p. 28)

However, it is obvious that the theory of embodied cognition does not acquiesce to the reduction of senses to vision, recognizing the whole body and perceptual experience, which includes all senses. What the educational structure restsupon,

146 nevertheless, is vision. The focus is visibly on the whole idea of school and university—from textbooks to school buildings, educational equipment, and methods of teaching. Thus, it should be noted that if we are to design signs, they should not merely be visual. They should involve the whole body because in this case there will be wider scope for interpretation.

4.4.3. Deconstructive Education

Deconstruction encourages us to ask questions about relations among words— relations that reproduce a reality that we might not apprehend at first reading. Deconstruction helps us find shadows of fascist ideologies in words so that we can counter them (Gough and Price 2009, p. 6). According to Deleuze, Teaching is not providing the students with information. When teachers explain action to their students or teaching them grammatical rules, he is not only transmitting information but also transfers to them systems of signification, which can correspond to the dominant meaning of the terms. (Gregoriou, 2004, p. 235).

In education, deconstruction is a way to freedom; that is, to the collapse of the structures and authorities. Neither does the teacher have the ultimate truth at his disposal, nor the book, nor anyone else. Every concept is formed only within a collaborative act and through breaking down the prior structures and processing new ideas.

Reynolds and Weber consider the poststructuralist symbolic curriculum of Deleuze to have the following characteristics:

1. The curriculum must be based on difference.

2. Since we always live in relation and accompanied by others, cooperative thinking must be motivated. This multi-layered thought is the basis for curriculum and emphasizes on the Deleuzian concept of “in-between- ness.” Cooperative thinking is a pathway in which when a path closes,

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another begins (Reynolds and Weber, 2004, p. 14). According to Heva, structuralist educational methods have shackled the dynamic communication between students and teachers.(Hua,2004:181-210). The theory behind the curriculum must be founded on the Deleuzian pathway, which allows for multiple trajectory movements in different relations.

3. The curriculum has to be regarded as an event. Viewing a curriculum as an event is a nomadic way of thinking about education. Questioning the curriculum as an event leads to a better understanding of this discourse (Reynolds, 2004, p.17). A poststructuralist curriculum is not merely transmitting the knowledge, value and ways to learn, but also a way to exhibit knowledge along the crossway. This crossway for Nietzsche is the “will” and for Deleuze is the “event”, which everyone can be their own educators. (Hua, 2004, pp. 181-210)

According to Deleuze, a curriculum must always be in progress and change. Gauthier points out that the curriculum is paradoxical and symbolic in Deleuzian style. Generally speaking, the curriculum of thoughts without words is a subject that fills in the blanks all the time. We must not equate the act of thinking with the pictures of it. For Diagnoltt, the curriculum is what takes place. (181-210)

In short, Roy lists out the main benefits of rhizomatic curriculums in the following:

1. Effective investigation

2. The efficient learning environment in haphazard designs

3. Refutation of opportunities by the official curriculum.

4. Keeping in touch with the life world and social activities, in other words, every act could be a learning opportunity.

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5. Avoiding Mollarian30 type of curriculum.

6. The flexibility of curriculum. (Roy, 2003, p. 172)

Thus, deconstruction in education should pursue the following:

• Avoiding the assumption of generalizability in a text. When giving lectures to students, the teacher should avoid offering explicit, decisive, and general judgments. • Question-centered learning. In this method, the student learns to arrive at an answer by asking questions, instead of listening to ready facts (Boytchev, 2013, p. 4). • Breaking concepts and structures into smaller parts and scrutinizing them. After this stage, the parts are juxtaposed so that personal knowledge is constructed. Finally, the student is asked to reconstruct the parts in a different way (p. 6), so that he could in fact see one text in different ways, which is the goal of post-structuralism. • Textbooks and teachers should teach the method of deconstruction. The student should learn how to break down a text, a concept, and a narrative, and reveal different and conflicting thoughts lying behind them, detecting singular points eluding the framework of the concept. • Rejection of duality and bifurcation: Derrida suggests that Western metaphysics rests upon bifurcations such as presence/absence, body/soul, form/content, good/bad, man/woman, etc., where the first part is deemed prior to the second, dialectical movements always being from the first to the second, such that the second always counts as annihilating the first. Deleuze highlights the concept of immanence

30 The Molar Machine produces centralized, hierarchical, and organized structures, whose examples can be recaptured in concepts such as class and nation. However, molecular machine products lack these properties. Institutions such as kinship and ethnicity are examples of this category. Obviously, the molar structure corresponds to the tree pattern and the molecular products correspond to the rhizome pattern

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after his rejection of such a dualistic system. Thus, such dualism should be avoided in designing textbooks and educational methods. Educational contents should not duplicate such dualisms, and should try to avoid the dualistic literature as much as possible. For example, they should not highlight concepts and categories such as man and woman or girl and boy. Such dualities should be avoided when preparing textbooks and educational fictions.

4.4.4. Creativity-Centrism, instead of Memory-Centrism

One key concept in post-structuralism is the breakdown or collapse of texts and narratives in order to describe them in new forms. This is precisely how Deleuze treats the history of philosophy when he talks about philosophers such as Hume, Nietzsche, Spinoza, Leibniz, etc. And this is how we have treated Deleuze, in our attempt to provide a characterization of him in a new form and terms of a new narrative. This central idea of post-structuralism acknowledges creativity because new knowledge is born out of creativity, rather than a consultation of one’s memory of the a priori structure of reality31.

To develop creative thinking abilities, curricula should not be based on a linear32 approach, standardization, topic-centrism, transmission of knowledge, specification of behavioral goals, or acquisition of knowledge. Instead, in order to develop creativity, the emphasis should be put on mixed and interdisciplinary curricula. For when an interdisciplinary approach is adopted, the student finds the required materials and means to be able to see problems from different points of view and to introduce new ideas. Thus, the domain of creativity will be further expanded. Moreover, curricula should be designed and compiled differently from the traditional content of knowledge, based on processes of learning, communication and interaction, classmate dialogues, a collaborative critical

31 See previous chapter: The A Priori Structure of the Truth 32 For more detail about linear approach see previous chapter: Rhizome and its Pedagogical Consequences

150 approach, and avoidance of merely giving lectures in the educational environment to foster creative thinking and the ability to produce novel and innovative ideas. The latter point is significant in that confinement to the classroom environment deprives the student of having encounters with variegated signs that might lead him to discover new unknown phenomena. Having an opportunity to be present in various environments, as well as an occasion for deciphering and interpreting signs therein, are primary factors contributing to the increase of the student’s creativity.

In the present framework, the education system is actively controlled by discourses and narratives. One way to foster creativity, as suggested by Lyotard, is to deploy new discourses and dialogues to invent new laws (Hosseini, 2011, p. 1309). The textbook and the teacher should not compel the student to account for phenomena from the perspective of already established narratives. Instead, they should allow her to embark on an explanation of data by drawing upon new theories. They should teach her how to see weak spots of theories, and then teach her how to try to correct or replace them. For instance, when the student propounds a false theory, the teacher’s task is not to provide the right answer. His task is to present the student with counterexamples to her theory and challenge her, or to ask her to correct her theory and produce a new theory that both explains the previous phenomenon and the new one. And this process goes on forever. In this way, the student’s creativity will be maximized. For she constantly looks for a new theory and tests different points of views.

As an example let us present the `s defense of relativity of concept as an example. It can be a good example of different ways in which the teacher can facilitate students` creativity by discussing different theories and unfolding the students` minds:

Consider a world with three individuals, x1, x2, x3, which are not further decomposable within that universe of discourse— say three

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point particles, of which two have “spin up” and one has “spin down.” I will suppose that (who liked to imagine very small universes like this when he was studying inductive logic in the 1950s) would have described the world as I just have: as “a world with three individuals, Now, suppose that we add the calculus of parts and wholes invented by Lesniewski to our logical apparatus. Then (if we ignore the so-called “null object”) we will find that the world of three individuals, as I just imagined Carnap describing it, actually contains seven objects, as shown in the table below. (Putnam, 2005, p. 38)

As we observed, these are two different classifications that describe the world differently and both have the practical and functional requirements for explanation of phenomenon. The similar approaches can be made in other fields as well, for example, in physics, instead of linear instructions of contemporary scientific paradigms, former paradigms be instructed as well and the students are asked to view the world from these perspectives: beside utilizing quantum physics to explain phenomenon, one must seek Newtonian or Leibnizian physics, Aristotelian motion and theories of Ptolemy to exposit the world and its phenomenon. In the case of geometry, Euclidian geometry has to be taught beside the new theories of geometry.

Another way to increase the student’s creativity is to encourage her to engage in writing activities. In this way, her mind will seek to create new concepts by way

152 of revising texts. In fact, writing helps disseminate the meaning and create a situation in which the student can glean a new construal of the text every time she consults it. Writing tasks stimulate critical thinking and intellectual challenges in classrooms, and they provoke the student to see her surroundings in more careful ways and to draw on the environment to express herself.

The above ideas can be listed as follows:

• Mixed and interdisciplinary curricula • Development and variability of the educational environment • Dispensing with grand narratives and established discourses, and trying, instead, to create a new discourse, or at least interpreting topics through different discourses and perspectives. • The teacher’s role as an interlocutor, instead of an instructor • Emphasis on writing

4.4.5. Theories of self-reflection

In these theories, individuals evaluate their beliefs, thoughts, and paradigms; question their presupposed lesson plan and ingrained values; in fact, they learn to have critical exposure. All this requires the person to utilize self-evaluating reasons and specific methods for discovering the surrounding environment (instead of following one single mental paradigm) in the face of paradoxical and contradictory remarks. Thus, the person turns into an opportunist (in the positive sense of the word) and demands constant transformation.

Self-reflection is one of the goals of education for Deleuze; the same thing can be said of Foucault, who thinks it possible that existence can be understood in terms of self-reflection. He believes that self-reflectivity, as a critique of culture and self, can be taken notice of as a significant educational goal. For Foucault,

153 there is no absolute, eternal essence of things for man; we humans are free to receive and create our own essence.

4.5. The Student

4.5.1. Facing Up to the Unknown, and Problem-Solving

Given the significance and role of creativity for Deleuze and post-structuralism, as well as the need for creativity in this approach, instead of learning a preexisting body of knowledge, the education system should try to train the student as a problem-solver. Thus, the “problem-solving” approach should be emphasized. The student should be subjected to problems in different sciences, such that his mind is tickled, and as Deleuze suggests, he comes to have violence in thought. For Deleuze, learning is not knowing what is already known. The known does not provoke thoughts in us. What provokes thoughts is the student’s doubt when facing up to the unknown. When the student faces something unknown or something missing, then in response, he will engage in a stream of thought.

If we want to demonstrate the theoretical definition of the problem, it would be like this: teaching method for problem-solving is a sequential and orderly process of ways to achieve a goal or a solution. In a situation in which a person encounters problems, she must overcome the obstacles overthe head to goals. The leading proponent of problem-based learning is utilizing previous experiences to solve unknown and unprecedented problems. At least, a special situation in which the person is involved in, the previous experiences and skills are prerequisite to solving the problems.

In addition to the importance of dealing with the problem in order to solve it, the role of the body in the process is of paramount importance. For example, there have been many investigations about the role of the body in learning mathematics and solving math problems. We are not going to get into them here, but the role

154 of the body in solving problems must be studied within the theories of embodied cognition. For instance, Dixon and others studied playing cards and concluded that the previous supposition on the separation of motor processes and cognitive processes was mistaken (Dixon, Kelty-Stephen, Anastas, 2014, p. 165). In this study, two groups of students were asked to do two different tasks. The first group had to organize some cards based on a pattern and then deduce the exact pattern. The second group was given a pattern from the very beginning. While two groups were organizing the cards, their gestures and hand movements were studied. The accuracy of this study is reported as follows:

For both conditions, we tracked the motion of the participant’s dominant hand (i.e., the hand used to sort the cards) at a high sampling rate (60 hertz) and with considerable precision (on the millimeter scale). We used the time series of the motion data to quantify the multiscale activity of the system (P. 164).

This study implies that the process of problem-solving does not merely occur in the cognitive process, but rather the body and bodily activity are intertwined with the cognitive process, and both lead to conclusions and new patterns. There are two more examples to illustrate the point further:

Several studies have shown that actions can facilitate problem- solving when they embody a problem’s solution (e.g., Catrambone, Craig, and Nersessian, 2006). For example, Thomas and Lleras (2007) asked participants to solve Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem, in which a doctor tries to destroy a tumor with a ray. If the ray is directed at the tumor with enough intensity to destroy it, it will also destroy the healthy tissue it passes through. At lesser intensities, the ray can safely pass through healthy tissue, but will not affect the tumor. The solution is to split the ray into multiple, less intense rays that will converge on the tumor. Participants worked on the radiation problem and took

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frequent breaks to do a seemingly unrelated eye-tracking task, in which they directed their eyes to a digit among an array of letters. In the critical condition, the location of the digits required that participants move their eyes repeatedly from the periphery of the screen to the center, mirroring the rays converging on the center from different locations. Participants who produced these seemingly unrelated eye movements were more likely to solve the radiation problem than participants who produced other eye movement patterns.

The effect of the action is not limited to eye movements. Thomas and Lleras (2009) asked participants to solve Maier’s (1931) two- string problem, which requires figuring out how to tie together two strings that are hanging from the ceiling at a far enough distance that participants cannot reach one while holding the other. The solution is to tie a pair of pliers that are available in the room to one string so that it will swing like a . Participants who took problem-solving breaks in which they engaged in arm-swinging “exercises” were more likely to solve the problem than were participants who engaged in stretching exercises that did not embody the problem’s solution. Moreover, this effect held even for participants who were not aware that there was a connection between their movements and the solution. (Alibali, Boncoddo, and Hostetter, 2014, p. 153)

Problem-based learning was first used by Baroze in 1976 and put into practice in the university of Mac-Master, Canada. However, this method has supplanted the traditional pedagogy experimentally or officially, but there are still many challenges for replacing the traditional pedagogy (e.g., speech) with the modern “teaching methods.” Accordingly, despite the advantages of that this modern method brings such as ‘development of skills and effective clinical process,’ ‘gaining basic knowledge to use them in clinics,’ factors such as

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‘limitation of time, increase in the desire to learn, individual learning’ are among the challenges for a PBL (Problem-Based Learning). The main idea behind PBL is that the leaning has to set off with the proposition of a problem so that learners, who are typically in groups of five to ten, get the necessary information for solving a problem besides working on it. In the meantime, the presence of the teacher facilitates the learning process (not presenting the content of learning) and acts as an incentive to learners. Contrary to traditional methods of learning in which students learn the patterns before going over the problem itself, in the PBL method, knowledge is the fruit of solving the problems.

Problem-solving has several steps that include the following:

First step: choosing the right approach to a problem so that we contemplate in the first place and are consciously self-aware of our feelings and emotions. In this stage, it is required to identify and reform the problems.

Second step: the precise definition of the problem; in this stage, the following questions must be answered: what is the problem? When did the problem start? Who plays a role in it?

Third step: getting to solutions (brainstorming) without constraining mind, i.e. every decision and solution that comes to mind, regardless of its truth or falsity, positive or negative, must be noted.

Fourth step: Evaluating the options and selecting the best one; in this part, we are obliged to judge and evaluate the third step. The important thing in the third stage was various options, and what is essential in this step is to think of the pros and cons of choosing the best solution.

Fifth step: performance and reassessment of solutions; in this part, we choose practical solutions, prioritize, fix the schedule, and put into practice the most appropriate solution.

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The foundation of textbooks, signs within the educational environment, and teacher-student encounters should always be problem-centered since this can lead to creativity. This is the case both in the natural and human sciences. In humanities, the student should be faced with problems with which intellectuals were concerned, instead of views espoused by such intellectuals, and then the student should be asked to find a solution for them. Furthermore, through solutions the student offers, the teacher should challenge his view based on the views of those intellectuals and should then ask him to either defend his view or to find another answer to the problem. Moreover, students should face each other and converse or exchange ideas about their views. Thus, introducing problems and dialectics is the best way to enhance creativity in students.

In this method of teaching, the classroom will no longer be dull and traditional, and teacher-student, as well as student-student relations, will be accompanied with respect and intimacy, and the following pieces of advice can improve the efficiency of such a teaching method:

• The teacher should work on the problem in advance and improve its scholarly load. • It is essential for students to record their stages of activity (when working on the problem). • The teacher can participate in students’ groups and act alongside them.

4.5.2. Experience-Centrism

In his famous example of swimming, Deleuze says that we do not learn how to swim by being given instruction or a set of guidelines; we learn swimming when we “do” it with someone. In other words, we learn something only by experimenting with it. The theoretical foundation of Deleuze’s view is the concept of immanence and the rejection of the transcendental. If there is no

158 abstract truth, then it is only via experimenting that we can achieve knowledge. Deleuze’s experimentalism is based on embodiment, the concrete, and facilities, rather than idealism, the abstract, and the universal (Jaarsma, 2005, p. 130).

In order to create knowledge, we are not required to turn to abstract and inaccessible concepts. Instead, we should begin with the student’s , experiences, and present interests, and then organize her knowledge. Students have two types of experiences: individual and social. To ask students to share both types of experiences develops their social skills and internalizes learning for them. To consider the student’s experiences means that the teacher is not the first person who begins activities in the classroom; the teacher can relate the student’s classroom experiences with experiences of everyday life, and thus, help improve the quality of learning and experience. Knowledge would then follow careful scrutiny and critical operations, and education would then be seen as what can promote the quality of one’s life and lead to participation in public activities. Thus, teaching can be performed by relying on this feature.

Besides, Deleuze`s view has a close affinity with the educational ideas of Rancière and his theory of the ignorant schoolmaster. Rancière`s was inspired in writing his book the Ignorant Schoolmaster by the ideas of Joseph Jacotot, a French teacher who made a huge controversy in the academia in the first years of the nineteenth century. Jacotot proposes a pedagogical method based on the four following tenets:

1) all men have equal intelligence (they are only different in terms of puttinginto practice their intelligence);

2) every man has received from God the faculty of being able to instruct himself;

3) we can teach what we do not know;

4) everything is in everything.

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From Rancière`s point of view, the teacher forgets the fact that students who are in front of him know a great many things and have learned them all by themselves: By observation and listening to the environment, by finding the meaning of what he has seen and heard and examining his previous data. Acquiring the mother tongue is perhaps the most popular and illustrative example. The originality of Jacotot`s idea is that there is always a spark of equality at work, to say the least, the teacher and student share a common language. Rancière makes use of Jacotot `s educational idea to form his concept of equality. His understanding of equality differs significantly with liberal views on this concept. He believes that equality is not the goal but rather the point of departure. One must be cautious that equality does not mean subverting teacher and student roles or equalizing the cognitive abilities and intelligence of the teacher with the student or swapping their role. Rancière thinks that this procedure (confirmation of equality/) can bear results only if the teacher simply supposes that students can understand the exposition of the problems and his words. Therefore, it is not the case that all must be equal. The important thing is that the learning process must not be viewed as the movement from ignorance to knowledge; Learning is the process that starts with students knowing already and moves on to know more. In fact, the distance between students and teachers that the formal learning presupposes and covers up is not the problem to be got rid of. This is not a gap that needs skilled men to cover up; on the other hand, it does not mean absolute and sheer equality and no distance. We must change our outlook towards the distance between teacher and student.

This issue is significant since the distance is the usual condition of any communication. The thing that the ignorant must cover-up is not the gap between his/her ignorance and teacher`s knowledge, but instead is the path between what he already knows and that which he does not know yet. He can learn a fact using the same process. The ignorant schoolmaster can cover up the student`s ignorance

160 by avoiding being ignorant. He only must distance himself from his superior position, rather than teaching his knowledge; he only asks students to say what they see, think, etc. Any kind of distance is without importance. Each thinking process weaves a bond between ignorance and knowledge. No hierarchical structure could be constructed based on this understanding of distance

In the pedagogical process, it is supposed that the role of the teacher is to bridge the gap between himself and the ignorance of students. Lessons and frequent practices are to lessen the gap between knowing and not knowing something; paradoxically, the teacher has to build a distance while lessening the gap. By replacing ignorance for adequate knowledge, the teacher must always be one step ahead of the ignorant. The reason for this is apparent: in the educational system, the ignorant does not know how to learn what he does not know. In addition to that, he does not know how to learn about it. The teacher does not only know what is unknown for the student but also he knows how, where, and when of learning and the methods of it. Teaching gets to be an objective process of transmission: each part following the other; every word following the other; every principle following one another. Every part of knowledge transfers from the memory of teachers or pages of a book to a student`s mind, but this transmission is dependent on an unequal relationship. The teacher knows about the right time and place of equal transmission. He knows something that the ignorant can never know unless the student becomes a teacher himself, which is more significant than the teaching materials. The teacher knows the exact distance between knowledge and ignorance. The real distance between detailed knowledge and ignorance is a metaphor, based on the radical gap of student and teacher; a metaphor for the radical difference of two bits of intelligence.

As Rancière points out, the ignorant or the student is, in fact, very knowledgeable, and the teacher could not deny that. His knowledge is obtained by observing and listening to the environment, in other words, by discovering

161 various phenomena, repetition of things learning by chance, and comparison between them. It is similar to acquiring the mother tongue, yet the teacher considers this the only knowledge that the student, the knowledge of a small child who sees and hears accidentally, compares and guesses and repeats the accustomed actions, without knowing the cause things he observes. The role of the teacher is to stop the blind trial and error process. He teaches his studentsthe knowledge in his own way: an advanced method that puts aside all blind paths and chance, i.e., with the exploration of topics, from the simplest to most difficult according to the age, level, social disposition, and students` capacity. Therefore, the role of the teacher is detrimental to creativity and critical thinking.

4.6. Curriculum

Interdisciplinary Curricula

A Deleuzian curriculum should avoid any exclusivity. It should not acquiesce conformism and should, instead, open new horizons to the student. In the present structure, curricula and educational contents are imposed on students via textbooks, teachers, and schools. In general, curricula should reject oppressive beliefs, hierarchical relationships, and universality. The necessity of avoiding universalization is to reject the idea that a metanarrative could explain all the phenomena (regardless of the field of study). As Chomsky writes:

The only debatable issue, it seems, is whether it is more ridiculous to turn to experts in social theory for general well-confirmed propositions, or to the specialists in the great religions and philosophical systems for insights into fundamental human values […] If there is a body of theory, well tested and well verified, that applies to the conduct of foreign affairs or the resolution of domestic or

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international conflict, its existence has been kept a well-guarded secret. (Quoted in Murphy, 2019, p. 194)

To avoid the predominance of such a structure, a practical solutions can be put forth: Interdisciplinary curricula.

Interdisciplinary curricula take different courses into account, including history, social sciences, philosophy, arts, natural sciences, and so on; it considers interdisciplinary materials and seeks to break down the boundaries among disciplines. In this sense, curricula are seen as environments in which knowledge consists of a variety of disciplines around one problem or topic, and actual needs are put into the discussion instead of being compiled behind closed doors in accordance with the political goals of those in power.

Interdisciplinary curricula allow the student to view problems from different points of view and to take up ideas from different sources that can apply to other cases as well. Thus, the dominance of the text will thus be broken down. In this situation, the student is free to view problems from any of the varying points of view. In such a curriculum, there is no fixed criterion as the correct answer. Instead, the student’s power of analysis will be improved. The student can deploy the deconstructive method in the best way, break down the text, grasp points in the margin of the text, and develop them in different directions.

4.7. Teacher

4.7.1. The Subversion of the Teacher’s Authority

A hierarchical system has two dimensions: upwards and downwards. Every element in a hierarchical system is dominated by an element in a higher ranking and has the upper hand in relation to lower-ranking elements. Thus, on the one hand, the teacher-in all stages- as an element in a hierarchical educational structure complies with higher-ranking officials and has authority over the

163 student, on the other. According to Foucault, many factors contribute to robbing the teacher of his authority in teaching: standardized tests, methods of evaluating the qualifications of teachers, and schools that are administered by way of top- down dominion. Thus, teachers should reclaim their active and transformational roles by relating a variety of classroom issues to larger-scale social and political issues. In a rhizomatic school, the teacher-student relationship is a horizontal and latitudinal, rather than vertical and longitudinal, relation. Accordingly, teachers should take into account the putative differences in students’ ways of life, interests, and needs.

However, the teacher’s authority over the student amounts to the teacher having the last word in classrooms, the truth being what the teacher says, the right thing being what he confirms, and the wrong thing is what he rejects. An authoritarian teacher has dominion over moral training. The student is not allowed to be creative, because the teacher already has all the answers at her disposal, and the student’s job is solely to listen. The rhizomatic environment, as pointed out in the previous section, seek to collapse the teacher’s authority and allow room for different methods of learning. Thus the teacher’s role will change, and his authority will break down for the following reasons:

1. Sources of teaching at the disposal of a textual teacher will be abrogated, and thus, the sources will change.

2. Methods of textual evaluation33 will be put aside and will no longer apply.

3. Teachers should begin to reevaluate their students’ learning needs and the match between curricula and requirements of human thinking.

33 By that we mean evaluating the knowledge of student by his ability to remembering some texts which is written in books.

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4.7.2. Consideration of Differences

As it was mentioned before, the goal of an education system is to organize speeches and unify everything and everyone (that is, to make them uniform). To treat everything as the same is an idea associated with power and aimed at control. This comes in a variety of forms in different classrooms and for different teachers. For example, the teacher teaches the same thing to everyone, asks the same questions from everyone, wants the same answer from everyone, and sometimes selects one student as a role-model and asks other students to try to emulate her, and so on.

Such unification is obviously at odds with Deleuze’s nomadic thought. A Deleuzian teacher is aware of students’ differences and the plurality ofconcepts. Teachers are alert to students’ cultural, racial, gender, biological, intelligence, economic, religious, and other differences. They know that every student has different capacities and potentials. Thus, teachers will not try to impose a series of particular concepts and training patterns to everyone. Instead, their role is to detect such differences and help every student to find his own way of learning. It is not the case that they only know one way of teaching; rather they are able to teach every student as fits his interests and talents and the best way he can learn34. Such teachers are obligated to remove themselves from rigid frameworks of teacher-student relations and infiltrate the inner world of every student so as to get the best out of themselves and out of the student. To do so, the teacher should always allocate a certain time to mutual dialogues with every student. The teacher

34 Of course, this problem is more complicated than that. For example, the point that in this teaching method, the number of students is limited. Therefore, it is not possible to hold classes with many students and it can lead to problems like lack of teachers, rooms, facilities and higher and unaffordable costs. You should take this into consideration that this is only a general instruction for Deleuzian education. Tackling the practical problems of this educational plan is related to various statistical studies and providing the appropriate infrastructure. The adequate analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of the present thesis.

165 should ask them to share their internal feelings with her. In addition to asking simple questions, the teacher should draw on psychological tests in order to know each student’s interests and talents. When teaching, the teacher should take cultural and other differences, as mentioned earlier, into account so that no student is offended because of his or her characteristics and differences. When introducing a problem, and when asking students to answer a question, the teacher should ask them to face up to the problem depending on environments from which they have come and in accordance with their interests. Thus, the teacher is required to know her own place in the new educational process and organize curricula and classroom activities based on cultural sources and backgrounds students bring with them to the school. These sources include language, history, and individual and collective experiences of students. The teacher should analyze her relation with society and the student.

4.7.3. Flexibility

In a Deleuzian approach, the teacher loses his authority so that the student can develop her creativity and arrive at new ideas. This requires flexibility on the part of the teacher. In fact, the teacher should no longer ask students to provide him with invariant and fixed answers. Instead, he should respect and encourage their different views and imaginations. He should help them develop their own ideas. He should not rest content with one textbook; instead, he should deploy some different textbooks. He should teach students how to search. He should not follow a particular and invariant method of teaching. For example, he should sometimes teach by giving a lecture, and he should, at other times, provoke the student’s thoughts by creating a puzzle. He should, on certain occasions, narrate a story, and yet at other times, he should draw on students’ personal experiences. In any case, what matters is that the teacher should not be uniform in his methods of teaching. He should instead use a variety of teaching methods depending on contexts and conditions.

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4.7.4. Creating Wonder

As pointed out earlier, in the Deleuzian view, learning begins with wonder, rather than a natural will to knowledge. Thus, in his view, we do not teach anything indeed. Instead, we teach students how to think (Fleming 2014, p. 1370). As illustrated before, thinking begins with violence in thought or a wonder. Therefore, one main task of a teacher is to expose the student to such violence or wonder. The teacher should provoke the student’s wonder at issue at hand and encourage the student to look for an answer to the question on her own.

In such circumstances, the teachers should create wonders in students at any moment, in addition to the ability to express himself and familiarity with what constitutes a problem for students of different ages. In fact, the method that should be adopted by the teachers is a Socratic dialectical method. The teachers should not bring with them answers to the classroom. Instead, they should bring questions and problems. To ask questions and introduce problems, semiotics is called for. Signs and their interpretations provoke wonders, indeed. Each sign can be a problem, and thus, the student can struggle to solve the problem when encountering a sign. According to the traditional view, teachers are considered superior talents and their task are to cover curricula (that is, the body of knowledge and skills appearing in textbooks and teacher’s guidebooks). In this case, teaching is thoroughly planned as a communicative activity in one area suffering from impoverished semiotics, such as a limited number of semiotic systems used in classrooms. In the new approach, however, the teacher learns how to use signs, brings signs to the classroom, and asks the student to interpret the signs or give news meanings to it.

Accordingly one of the ideas proposed is the inquiry training method. Exploratory patterns, based on theories of Richard Suchman, induce challenges and tip the balance of learners by creating a complex and interesting problems.

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Exploratory Instruction starts with the introduction of unusual events. Learners will be provoked in the face of these events. This state makes it possible for improving research and study skills of students for the teachers.

4.7.5. A Role beyond the Transmission of Information

Given the Deleuzian principle of multiplicity (discussed in Deleuze, 1992, p. 8), the teacher is not an instructor; preferably teacher is a lesson planner, a guide to situations, and these elements are not separate from each other. They are interrelated, instead. Since students live in a society of which dynamics is an inevitable part, teachers are needed who are creative concerning their roles as creators of relations between the domain of experience and the school. This is not restricted to formal dimensions of the domain of experience; preferably, it includes students who bring with them points of views and experiences from a variety of environments. Competition should be created in different situations. These relations are aimed at a triangular relation holding among the school, the society, and the curriculum (Roy 2003, p. 74). Put differently, the teacher’s role goes far beyond a mere transmitter of information.

In this case, the teacher will have a position along with (not higher than) students, and learning will be a collective activity between teachers and students as well as among students themselves. In fact, the teacher will no longer conceive of herself as someone who should transmit a preexisting body of knowledge. Instead, the teacher creates content and knowledge along with students, experiments with them, have dialogues and dialectics with students, and finally tries to prepare them for presence in social environments. As Deleuze suggests (Deleuze, 2001, p. 23), the best teachers are those who say: “do it with us,” instead of saying: “do what I say.” In this model, the teacher’s role is not to transmit and present course materials. The teacher plays the role of a guide in the teaching process. Instead of transmitting information and scientific facts, she teaches

168 students to learn methods of acquiring information. Students are not mere receivers; instead, they are participants and partners in planning and executing the plan.

Most young people and students need to be encouraged and helped in order to know daily needs and learn ways to fulfill them. Furthermore, one might say that such need to help and encouragement is the thing in virtue of which students are dependent on adults, including teachers. Thus, not only does not the teacher’s role fade away, but instead, it becomes more crucial.

4.8. Method of Teaching

Based on what we expressed in this part, here are some methods which are capable of providing Deleuzian aims in teaching:

4.8.1 Project-Based Learning

The method of project-based teaching allows students to promote their management, programming, and self-controlling skills. In this method, students can choose a topic based on their own interests and then actively participate in concluding the topic. Thus, students learn how to perform a task in organized and procedural ways, which enhances their self-confidence. For in this method, a proper educational relation holds between them and their teachers. It will finally improve the students’ cooperation skills, sense of obligation, work discipline, patience, tolerance of other people’s beliefs, and necessary research skills.

Here, we can refer to and use the phenomenological approach of previous chapters. As we saw, this approach is dependent on the unmediated first-person experience, not scientific concepts transmitted from a third-person point of view and school books to students. Although Husserl is not much concerned with education, yet the logical consequence of critiques from him and other phenomenologists to science is also applicable to the educational structure, as

169 well. Since the very structure is reflective of the modern understanding of truth and science, framed truth in packages of concepts are transmitted through school books.

Even a person like Agamben, who is a critic of phenomenology and Heidegger, poses the same critique to modern science. At the beginning of his Infancy and History, he states that the possibility of experience has been destroyed (Agamben, 1993, p. 13). His approach to experience follows up Benjamin`s, with a difference that Benjamin believes that the impossibility of experience lies in the experience of the second world war, whereas Agamben finds it in modern science. The science within which knowledge and experience are married; by quoting from the following paragraph from Bacon, he demonstrates how the destruction of experience begins with the onset of modern science:

There remains but mere experience, which when it offers itself is called chance; when it is sought after, experiment. But this kind of experience is nothing but a loose faggot, and mere groping in the dark, as men at night try all means of discovering the right road, while it would be better and more prudent either to wait for a day or procure a light and then proceed. On the contrary, the real order of experience begins by setting up a light, and then shows the road by it, commencing with a regulated and digested, not a misplaced and vague course of the experiment, and thence deducing axioms, and from these axioms new experiments (Bacon quoted in Agamben, 2013, p. 17).

Agamben continues:

In its search for certainty, modern science abolishes this separation and makes experience the locus- the 'method'; that is, the pathway- of knowledge. But to do this it must begin to recast experience and rethink intelligence, first of all expropriating their different subjects

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and replacing them with a single new subject. For the great revolution in modern science was less a matter of posing experience to authority (the argument ex re against the argumentum ex verbo, which are not, in fact, irreconcilable} than of referring knowledge and experience to a single subject, which is none other than their conjunction at an abstract Archimedean point: the Cartesian cogito, consciousness. (P. 19)

Therefore, we can see how modern science, which develops from modern education, has destroyed the possibility of experience. One of the solutions to avoid this problem is project-based learning.

The history of the project-based method goes back to the theories of developmental educators such as William Heard Kilpatrick and Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi. Pestalozzi, at the beginning of the 19th century, and Kilpatrick, in the 20th century, continued to criticize the educational system based on learning as proficiency over bookish information. Reformative naturalists argued that this type of education is based on mechanical learning and, consequently, makes an active child completely passive. They recommended that learning should guarantee children`s active participation with the environment, making use of their faculty, and solving problems (Gutek, p. 2015, 109). As it was mentioned, one of the current methods of teaching is ‘Project-based learning.’ William Heard Kilpatrick, who was a famous professor of faculty of education at the University of Colombia, invented the project-based method, which became the established method among educators. Kilpatrick`s method refuted the project of traditional education based on school books. Even though Kilpatrick was not against rationality, he believed that the book could not replace learning from life. The most unfortunate aspect of bookish infatuation is found in the dominance of books in traditional education; teachers depend on the information of books exclusively. Most of the time, this leads to second-handed experiences organized

171 in mechanical ways. A successful student in a traditional school is mostly oriented towards book-based learning and succeeds in memorization, not necessarily understanding. Because of its emphasis on book and memorization, traditional education has descended into a banal mechanical activity, in which teachers choose some learning materials, make students practice and memorize them, and finally evaluate them. According to Kilpatrick, this method kills the individual creativity of students, bores them, and lacks cooperative social goals.

In contrast to the mechanical learning of traditional education, Kilpatrick`s project-based education was designed to explain organized development. In this method, students have to design, choose, and guide their works in terms of purposeful activities (P. 445-447). William Heard Kilpatrick established the project method; he believed that this method should comprise theoretical, practical, and artistic activities. He designed four different project units, of which the fourth one aims at gathering information. The present learning method was used in the first years of industrial learning but was used as an excellent method in theoretical and practical learning other than an industrial one. Anyhow, the project method turned into a set of activities done by the learner; in other words, the principle of the project unit is the learning method that students do in the presence of their teachers. The teacher determines the aim of the project in primary schools, but students can cooperate in determining the project in higher learnings. The project learning method provides learners with freedom of action in implementing and practicing different ways (Aghazadeh, 2006, p. 302).

Project-based learning sets off with one or two projects leading up to the production of a final work (e.g., a pattern, computer simulation). The end of the project usually includes a piece of writing or an oral report, which constitutes a summary of utilized methods for production and conclusion. There is a give-and- take relationship between the authority of the teacher in selecting projects that

172 help the aims of the lesson plan and the freedom of students in shaping projects and guidelines, which increase their motivation. While working on projects, students can find solutions to life problems through the scientific method. Firstly, they must begin their work by raiding questions and reforming scientific predictions, then they go on to design, perform, gather, interpret, argue, and ultimately publish their reports. Therefore, project-based learning can be viewed as a guideline to learning, which places the student in a complicated situation and asks him to solve scientific problems with the help of other students and teachers. This method can be multistage and time-consuming. “Project” can be a pattern of student activity and transforms learning from ‘teacher `s utterances’ to “student`s participation.” A project leads to gaining knowledge and building up skills through involvement with pedagogical activities. This approach can maximize the learning capacity of students, unlock their potentials and makes their project significant (Mosavi,2015, p.55).

Degraff and Colmz (2003) define three different projects based on the freedom of students:

• Working project: groups of students work on a finished project by the teacher and implement the recommended method by the teacher. This method provides the motivation and growth of skill among students in the least, and it is part of the engineering curriculum in traditional education.

• Subject-based project: the teacher defines the area of investigation and defines the general approach (which often includes the basic method in it), but the students determine specific projects and designation of their utilized methods.

• Problem-based project: Students almost have utterly a free rein in selecting and handling their projects. They refer to primal difficulty in

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dealing with the transferring methods and required skills from one atmosphere based on a project to other projects. Teachers must put these transmissions part of their learning goals and guide their students to understand the relation between the present project and their previous works and gradually eliminate the guidelines when students begin to comprehend these relationships. Teachers must prepare the students for filling the present gap between content relation knowledge becausethe gaps would emerge in project-based learning than in learning based on speeches. Project-based learning has a close affinity with problem- based learning(PBL) from several perspectives. They both emphasize group work of students in open home works (similar to professional challenges) and asking students to form unraveling solutions and constant reevaluations of methods, but they differ in the application of these methods in the traditional way. A project is more comprehensive and extensive and is possibly comprised of several problems; in project- based learning, the focus is on the final outcome and finishing a project depends on putting into practice the already held information, whereas solving a problem requires a piece of new knowledge and more attention to solving-knowledge. In other words, project-based learning emphasizes the interpretation of knowledge, whereas problem-based learning emphasizes gaining knowledge.

The differences between project-based learning and traditional learning are illustrated in the following tablet:

Subject Matter Traditional Method Project-Based Method

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Focus of • Covering materials • Deepening learning

curriculum • Knowledge of the facts • Comprehending concepts and • Learning knowledge and skill principles. are fixed and separate • Development of sophisticated • The lesson to lesson problem-solving according to a

procedure situation • Emphasis on a particular • Done in parts depending on the subject problem • Proposing extended and interdisciplinary subjects.

Orientation Speech-based Activity-based Focus of • Production • Process and product evaluation • Score • Tangible achievement of project

• Comparison with other • Comparison with oneself and progr ess students of learning • Information output • Indication of comprehension

Learning • Text, speech, and • Direct sources through stu dy, materials presentation investigation, and interview • • School books and teacher`s Experimental findings questions

Application of • Default and unnecessary • Central and intertwined technology • Provided by the teacher • Done by students

Work in the • Students work separately • Students work in groups classroom • Students compete with each • Students cooperate with one anothe r other • Students produce information toge ther • Students only gainknowledge

from teacher

The role of student • Follow instructions • They determine the direction of • Repeat and memorize the learning concepts • Discover and present the concepts • • 35 Teacher assigns homework Determine their own homework • They are listeners • They argue with one another

The short-term • Knowing concepts and • Comprehension of the function of

goals principles process and complicated thoughts • Separate skills • Intertwined skills The long-term • Heeding the level of • Heeding the depth and profundity of goals knowledge knowledge

• Students with more • More self-reliant students, steadfast knowledge are more acquire more skills. successful.

35 Of course in this part, it is better to discuss adult learners. Regarding children, it is more appropriate that teachers are more active since determining which issue is related to society is difficult for children.

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4.8.2. Drama-Based Learning In the previous chapter, we demonstrated Deleuze`s encounter with abstract thinking; for example, when we defined the subject in his terms, it is stated that the subject is not transcendental and abstract but takes shape within the boundary of experience and thinking. It makes new relations and creates new concepts. When we talked about “imminence”, we showed how Deleuze thinks everything within one world, i.e. the concrete world. We quoted from Deleuze that abstract entities are not explanatory but are in need of explanation. Now we can study image and drama from Deleuze`s point of view.

For Deleuze, image and drama hold a special place in his philosophy so that it is the first time that a philosopher directly deals with cinematography. Contrary to several critics like Adorno and Horkheimer, who considered cinema as a “culture industry,” Deleuze defends cinema as did people like Arnheim, Münsterberg, and Bellabellach for this new budding art. The common point between them is the ‘ontological’ defense and not a ‘theoretical’ defense and epistemological one. In the preface to Cinema 1: The Movement Image, Deleuze, in the preface of Cinema 1(1997), says:

“In all these respects, it is not sufficient to compare the great directors of the cinema with painters, architects or even musicians. They must also be compared with thinkers”.

Therefore, art for Deleuze counts as a sphere for contemplation and art is not only opposite to science but also holds a close relationship with it:

What I am interested in are the relations between the arts, science, and philosophy. There is no order of priority among these disciplines. Each is creative. The true object of science is to create functions, the true

177 object of art is to create sensory aggregates, and the object of philosophy is to create concepts. (Deleuze, 1995, p. 123)

In all of his works about cinema, Deleuze engages in the relation between time, image, and action. His writings and theories never stay in an enclosed environment without relating to a different aspect of life and experience. From the perspective of many contemporary philosophers, art is an excuse to determine and impose philosophical and socio-political theories; in contrast, Deleuze searches the specific explanation and distinction of each art. He makes happen new relations in all fields (e.g., art, philosophy, politics) to produce a singular experience, potentiality of creation, discovery, and creation. That is why when we discover cinema in ‘experiences’ and ‘visions’ of Deleuze, it is not only cinema investigated, but the inward experience of cinema leads us to think about literature and sometimes physics and mathematics. Different and fundamental reasons for cinema find various and incomplete answers through experience. These reasons do not take place in a superior position but are produced within the very experience of art. For Deleuze, the being of a thing is also the power of its becoming (in an actual way).

As an example, in the Movement Image, he writes about privilege movements and any moment whatever:

The modern scientific revolution has consisted of relating movement not to privileged instants, but to any-instant-whatever. Although movement was still recomposed, it was no longer recomposed from formal transcendental elements (poses), but from immanent material elements (sections). Instead of producing an intelligible synthesis of movement, a sensible analysis was derived from it. In this way, modern astronomy was formed, by determining a relation between an orbit and the time needed to traverse it (Kepler); modern physics, by linking the space covered to the time taken by a body to fall (Galileo); modern

178 geometry, by working out the equation of a flat curve, that is, the position of a point on a moving straight line at any moment in its course (Descartes); and lastly differential and integral calculus, once they had the idea of examining sections which could be brought infinitely closer together (Newton and Leibniz). Everywhere the mechanical succession of instants replaced the dialectical order of poses. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 4)

Any whatever entity (which Hegel predicted its significance in modern art in another way) makes specific connections with all the elements of modern art through cinema. Deleuze believed that animation entirely belongs to cinema since its design does not produce a complementary figurative state but the description of a kind of figure which is always in formation and disappearance and he writes:

The cartoon film is related not to a Euclidean, but-to a Cartesian geometry. It does not give us a figure described in a unique moment, but the continuity of the movement which describes the figure. Nevertheless, the cinema seems to thrive on privileged instants. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 5)

That is the reason that it is not beyond expectation that Deleuze recreates Kantian concepts with Shakespeare or Rimbaud and does not confine himself with pure abstract definitions and preordained concepts. Deleuze replies to the question of continuity from Cahiers du cinema (about Jean-Luc Godard`s works):

Godard is not a dialectician. What matters in his work is not 2 or 3 or any other number, but ET (AND), the conjunction ET. The use of ET is the most basic thing. It is important because our thought systems tend to be modeled entirely on the verb 'to be,' EST (IS). Philosophy is littered with discussions about the judgment of attribution (the sky is blue) and the judgment of existence (God is), their reducibility or

179 irreducibility. But it is always the verb 'to be'. Even conjunctions are measured against the verb 'to be', as can be seen in the syllogism. The British and the Americans are virtually alone in having liberated conjunctions and reflected on relations. Only when you make the relational judgment independent from all others do you realize that it gets everywhere, works its way into everything, affects everything; ET is no longer even a particular conjunction or relation, it brings in all relations; there are as many relations as ETs and ET does not only put all relations into the balance, but being, language, etc. The ET,'et ...et ... et', is precisely a form of creative stammering, a foreign usage of language, in contrast to its dominant, conformist usage based on the verb 'to be'[…] [so] what is this AND? I think Godard’s force lies in living and thinking and presenting this AND in a very novel way, and in making it work actively. AND is neither one thing nor the other, it is always in between, between two things; it is borderline, there is always a border, a line of flight or flow, only we do not see it, because it is the least perceptible of things. Nevertheless, it is along this line of flight that things come to pass, becomings evolve, revolutions take shape. (Deleuze, 2000, pp. 129-130)

Therefore, the relationship between philosophy and art turns into creating heterogeneous goals and lines of becoming, instead of thinking and domination. It could be concluded from above that deriving a teaching method based on drama from Deleuze is, in some sense, inevitable.

Drama-based learning is based on the illustration of concepts, principles, and subject matters, and skills. This method can be utilized in different ways, among which learning practical skills and pedagogical goals from psychological- kinesthetic points of view are the most significant. Therefore, it can be used for practical and vocational lessons. Implementing this method, one can teachmany

180 skills to a great number of people. Generally speaking, the necessary operation for skill would be demonstrated to the students; while presenting and making images, they are explained simultaneously. After finishing off teaching, in order to make sure of learners ` comprehension, they have to present their material so that besides practice and repetition, the degree of comprehension and probable mistakes would be spotted and rectified.

From a pedagogical point of view, teaching is considered an art that has a different format, and utilizing the art of drama is one of these learning methods. The term ‘DIE’ (Drama in Education) refers to drama in learning, which came into existence in 1960 in English and is addressed to teachers. Accordingly, considering the subject matter of learning and putting students in place actors and audience, the teacher will be inclined towards a new experience. Through dramatic action, the teacher studies social, behavioral problems, and evaluates learners. The people who play a role in the act are the following:

• Teacher as the director and the writer

• Actors: learners who do not need to have experience and artistic enthusiasm

• Audience: other learners who participate in the course or end of the show.

One of the most important characteristic features of this method is using real objects and providing the highest level of direct experience that leads to an ideal and stable level of experience. Since dramatic action is efficient and exciting, learners get motivated and well prepared for learning new things. For example, for learning devices and pedagogical pamphlets (e.g., learning the stages of breast self-examination), explanatory scale models can be used. Thereby, apart from the diversity of learning methods, a great volume of knowledge can be taught in a short period with the drama-based method and expect students to have better and similar knowledge. In this method, using teaching aids and visual-auditory

181 devices is emphasized upon. Regarding drama-based learning, one of the most significant points is the relation of body and bodily involvement, which includes various senses, and we shall study some of them. In fact, we delve into some aspects of physical acts like display, game, action, etc. and cleared up how this happens in the teaching process.

Display

In 1979 Christian Carrignon (writer, director, actor) and Katherine Doyle founded ‘kitchen sink drama’ and in the early 1980s, the term ‘object theater’ came into use. Displaying is the process in which objects are exhibited in front of the audience, and emphasizing the concept of thing is introduced in the form of characters. It concludes what is known as the theater of the object. This is the same action in which the teacher shows the object to the learners while teaching so that they are guided to the ultimate goals of the curriculum. The most important part of this teaching method is defamiliarization, which was part of drama from antiquity.

Defamiliarization in Drama

The requirements for conducting the object theater:

• Every-day objects

• Actors ahead of the performance

• Personalization

• Connecting with the audience

During teaching, the teacher, playing the role of actor, shows two colored balls as atoms and moves them in a ring-like the real movement of atoms. Personalization makes the learners, in the role of audience, receive new concepts, and the learning process develops in such a way that if the learners are asked what

182 object the teacher is holding, their answer would undoubtedly be atoms, in other words, learners have forgotten the real name of the object and this is the defamiliarization in theater.

The Art of Speech in Drama

Regarding the existence of sender, message, and receiver, the relation is necessary and the lack of any of them disrupts the communication process. This communicative process is proposed as one of the goals of theater in terms of speaking; this is extended to the form, rhetoric, and recitation and even appears in the teaching method. In teaching art of speaking, one can imagine the teacher as the messenger and the student as the receiver. In this view, speech is a one- way approach to transfer information, in which the learner does not have active participation. Therefore, one of the most recognizable forms of deficiency is revealed since the teacher`s lack of knowledge of the art of speaking and dogmatic argument makes the art of speaking inevitable. Constantine Stanislavski-actor, theater manager, and theorist- has considered nine elements in voice production and its formation:

• Highest pitch: the height of voice, the loudest voice

• Voice frequency: increasing and decreasing the voice

• Voice range: the difference between the highest and lowest voice

• The tone of voice: quality of voice and resonance

• Manner of speech: the clear and precise pronunciation of voice

• Voice beat: the psychological aspect of speech and stress, pause and intonation

• Passion and energy: power and effect of internal feelings on speech

• Clarity: the power of transferring words

183 Therefore, speech is the most substantial tool that both teacher and learner can use in learning process and artist can use in drama, of course, it is worth mentioning that conveying messages is not confined to speech but has various forms.

Movement

We use more than verbal language to communicate our thoughts and feelings; we also use body language. The way we sit, stand, andmove all help reveal attitudes and emotions that we frequently can't conceal. The hidden truth about people is often given. (Bernardi, 1992, p. 113)

Movement is the advanced form of speech and sense, and our behaviors and actions are shown in front of the audience, and it is the visual effect that would be etched in the mind of the audience. In fact, according to the needs of the teacher in the teaching process, the slightest gesture of the face or a finger of the teacher can serve as getting information. If it supposed to describe the gesture in words, it would take a lot more time. Thus, drama without words make more communication without considering worldviews and allows for transparent communication and avoids circumlocution.

4.8.3. Cooperative Learning

The lifetime of cooperative learning is not more than four decades, and cooperative learning theories are influenced by John Dewey, the eminent philosopher of education. He believes that learning and education are social phenomena, and thereby school is a social institution. The social reform can and have to start from schools. Besides, he believes that students make progress in an environment that allows them to experience and interact with each other, and all students should be able to interfere and cooperate in the learning process; in fact,

184 students` interference in the learning process is the most efficient way for social reform. Dewey had some precise ideas about how to put cooperative learning into practice. In The Child and the Curriculum (1902), he argues about two main and contradictory ways about education. The first one is based on the curriculum and mainly focuses on the intended subject matter for learning. Dewey believes that the main deficiency of this method is the absence of students` participation. In this view, “the student is a crude and superficial who needs to be baked and cooked.” He thinks that the most efficient learning is the one in which materials are presented so that the students can connect them with their own experiences and thereby deepen their understanding of new knowledge.

According to Gillies, in the cooperative learning method, students work in groups to master content and learning materials (Gillies,2016, p. 39). In addition, they are from different colors, races, cultures, and races. The system of reward and punishment is not individualistic but collective. In order to better understand the cooperative learning, we introduce two other methods used in many countries nowadays.

4.8.3.1. Competitive Learning

According to Ellis and Whalen, the most familiar and prevailing educational environment is competitive in which questions such as “who will come first this year?” or “if I want to come first this year, who should I defeat?” (Ellis and Whalen, 1996, p. 13). The motto of a competitive school is this:

“If you win, I will lose, and if I win, you will lose.”

Students compete with one another to become the best in this approach, and this ‘best’ is determined by general examination and score. They gain the attention of their elders and take center stage and rewards through competition. In such an environment, students consider their fellow as an obstacle, and many

185 lose their spirit and consider themselves as losers before even coming to the classroom. They see themselves so behind other students that after several weeks turn away from the competition. We can be sure that they do not participate in the learning game. One can offer reasons that even winners are vulnerable in this method. When we discuss the third type of learning, i.e., cooperative learning, it will be evident that in the absence of cooperative learning, even the diligent students will lose many skills.

4.8.3.2. Individual Learning

In a solitary environment, each student is different from others, and his success or failure has nothing to do with others. Thereby, the student is responsible for his learning. These students have a fundamental problem in communication and most probably will not understand the dominant norms of society. Johnson believes that most of these students are shy and secluded and sometimes get depressed. The traditional teaching methods will not provide cooperative thinking for students in the class. In this approach, the focus is on the individual learner, regardless of other students` status. (Johnson and Roger T. Johnson,2016, p. 3)

As Piaget indicated, most of our knowledge comes from interaction with other people. If a student has only his opinion of books, homework, or a series of problems, his learning will be lesser than when he interacts. In addition, experience has shown that individual work is, most of the time, quite dull for the students.

4.8.3.3. Cooperative Learning

However, cooperative learning has an entirely different outlook and rejects all the previous attitudes about learning.

186 Learning is not something that students do, nor is it something done for the students. Therefore, cooperative learning requires the active and direct participation of students just like a mountaineering team; students get to the top if they are part of teamwork. In this environment, by collaboration and participation in groups, students learn the materials and feel responsible for one another learning. When their classmate needs help, they are eager to help him out; the success of others is their success and failure of others is their failure. This approach makes learning more profound and increases the level of creativity and innovation:

The motto of the cooperative class is this:

All are saved, or all are drowned together.

In a cooperative classroom, instead of looking up to their teacher as the authority, they look up to one another as a valuable and essential source of information. In a competitive and individualistic environment, the teacher tries to keep students far away from one another.

Do not cheat, everyone, mind your own business, do not look over other students` exam paper.

These statements are often heard inside a classroom from a teacher, whereas students in cooperative learning are classified in groups of three to five and strive for their common goal. Whatsoever the outcome is enjoyed by one and all.

4.8.4. Indirect Teaching

Based on what we wrote in the previous chapter, it is possible to introduce Indirect Teaching. This model leads to the participation of learners in the learning process, teaching them how to learn materials and solve problems. The teacher has the role of a guide and facilitator, and the student has the role of a beginner. The teacher helps students to define their problems and take steps towards solving

187 them. Moreover, the teacher ought to provide students with a peaceful, positive environment rife with the information needed by the students. The model enables students to increase their individual consciousness and to promote self-growth as well as various social and educational goals. Here are the stages of teaching on this model:

1. Definition of the situation by the learner in a way that the teacher encourages the learner to express her emotions.

2. Discovery of the problem by students.

3. Development of insights through debates advanced by students over the problem, with the teacher’s support.

4. Programing and decision-making by students.

5. Integration through the development of the insights of students concerning the problem, with the teacher’s support.

188 4.9. The Classroom

Deleuze’s conception of a rhizomatic space is as an infinite, fluid, and open space, which is continuously in the process of change, and in which movements and fluidities can give rise to new connections despite disconnections. Deleuze and Guattari argue that people in rhizomatic networks are subject to constant movements and go beyond limits and frameworks with quick changes of positions in fluid spaces. Rhizomatic movements and fluidities occur in all dimensions and respects and yield the possibility of plurality, interminglements, and creations (Usher and Edwards 2007). A rhizomatic space informs an open system. An open rhizomatic system subjects one to different experiences and allows him to adopt varying perspectives and undergo consecutive changes of positions. Such space shifts the focus from uni-perspectival fixed and rigid meanings to polysemic centers as well as varying and fluid perspectives. Just as in film montages in which the adjacency of irrelevant pieces leads to the formation of new ideas, in a rhizomatic space, irrelevant and heterogeneous things are juxtaposed to give rise to new creations.

The student is a “decentralized” being, and contrary to traditional spatial patterns of education based on perspectival space, the student participates in the formation of the rhizomatic space by way of dialogues. The classroom space is a shared space among people, each of whom participates therein with their lived experiences. Such space is basically concomitant with body-centrism and embodied presences of people, and no rhizomatic teaching can be conceived without the learner’s bodily presence. Thus, the classroom space should be such that the student can have maximal bodily experiences. Since the traditional architecture of classrooms does not yield us with enough possibilities, we should, in addition to designing new spaces structurally different from the present form, contemplate the use of out-of-school environments as classrooms.

189 Another critical point is to take signs into account when designing a classroom. As elaborated earlier, learning takes place in accordance with signs and their interpretations. Thus, a classroom should be a place in which signs can be interpreted. Semiotics looks for signs and semiotic systems that implicate the learner in the process of learning. A semiotic view of educational environments helps us detect and criticize irrelevant and ineffective messages, and then replace them with compelling messages and appropriate cultural habits. New attempts have been made in order to most optimally deploy buildings as means of learning and introduce pedagogical concepts into the building designs of open institutes, constructions, and spaces. Thus, buildings will turn into means of learning, and a classroom should, in fact, be full of signs.

The way in which a classroom and a natural environment are constructed helps the teacher to suggest laws and beliefs that students were supposed to be taught in far better ways. For example, an energy workshop should be designed in ways that introduce the student to the concept of energy, heat, and other concepts of physics. The student can also comprehend the relation between plants and animals by means of examining them in the school’s ecology. In fact, the student should be able to feel (experience) with her/his body.

4.10. The School

Since the core of Deleuze’s idea of the school rests upon a rejection of a hierarchical and organizational structure, it is not required for a school to have a fixed location or for the hierarchy of its official positions and educational principles be determined in advance.

Today, Deleuze’s point of view on experimental learning procedure has its manifestation in a different form known as “service delivery learning,” which is a kind of learning via experiments. This kind of learning is structured around certain situations in which the student is situated in society to carry out a task.

190 Eisner points out a number of significant factors which should be taken into account by present and future schools, two of which are of utmost significance to us:

1. Collaboration and participation

2. Service delivery

Service delivery learning amounts to the possibility of the student’s presence in social and service delivery environments. Put in different words, they are situated at the heart of real-time social life. Tasks of learning should be offered in ways that provide the student with opportunities to have communications and interactions with cultural centers, social institutes, and other social foundations. Schools can sign memos of understanding or agreements with other establishments and institutes to which students can be sent, and thus help them to observe and experience a variety of environments up close. Within this new type of education, schools turn in fact into extended schools, and such a change in their structure does not only encourage collaborative or participatory learning but is also in compliance with Deleuze’s experience-centered view or experimentalism.

In comparison to closed educational environments, the studentis provided with more space in daily life in which he can find a way out of imposed hierarchical frameworks and view things from a different dimension, and this is for the simple reason that the body finds a more expanded space for movement and experience. New perceptions and experiences are made sense of or understood as depending on preexisting frameworks and networks of beliefs. Such frameworks are not, nevertheless, rigid or unchangeable, and the factor which enables one to go beyond such frameworks is the body. To ignore the body and to restrict the process of knowledge or cognition to textbooks and crypt-like schools preclude the flourishing of the student’s body and bodily senses.

191 William James introduces an interesting theory known as “radical empiricism,” which was later developed by Michael Jackson and applied to anthropological studies. Michael Jackson, in Paths Toward a Clearing: Radical Empiricism and Ethnographic Inquiry, suggest that we always seek to make sense of our new observations in terms of our prior theories. For example, when a Western sociologist tries to analyze the behaviors, rituals, ceremonies, traditions, beliefs, and conducts of an African tribe, he tries to do so in terms of a particular sociological theory, rather than an immediate or direct presence among people of the tribe. Thus, there will always be much of what people of the tribe do, which remains meaningless to the Western sociologist, and thus he fails to see the world from their standpoint. Of course, the way a tribal man sees the world and the use he makes of his senses might as well be helpful or beneficial to our theoretical and practical lives and may help us embark upon new discoveries. Such immediate encounter demands a bodily presence and fully bodily experiences among those people. From this, we learn that negligence of immediate bodily experiences can deprive us of seeing the world from a variety of points of view to a considerable extent.

We previously spoke of Agamben`s theory of the destruction of experience and how modern science knowledge and experience have been considered the same thing. Experience is made possible in the shadow of knowledge and vice versa. An experience is validated only when it is embodied within a framework of a theory. Otherwise, it would be put aside as slanderous, superstition, delusion, and myth. However, as Jackson indicates, many human experiences cannot be enclosed within a theory or scientific method (since this method is based on observation and put aside other senses). To determine such experiences, there needs to be an unmediated, bodily presence in the environment because it does not only fill the gap of theory but also disrupts the authority and imposition of dominant frameworks.

192 I want to stress that lived experience encompasses both the "rage for order36" and the impulse that drives us to unsettle or confound the fixed order of things. Lived experience accommodates our shifting sense of ourselves as subjects and as objects, as acting upon and being acted upon by the world, of living with and without certainty, of belonging and being estranged, yet resists arresting any one of these modes of experience in order to make it foundational to a theory of knowledge. (Jackson, 1989, p. 2)

Therefore, a bodily and living experience, engaging all human senses, can open up new horizons to understand the world. Eschewing the supervisory perspective of traditional empiricism (which, as Foucault observes, privileges gaze as an instrument of both knowledge and control), the radical empiricist tries to avoid fixed viewpoints by dispersing authorship, working through all five senses, and reflecting inwardly as well as observing outwardly. However, striving for these goals… brings one hard up against the limitations of literacy. Marshall McLuhan argues that perspective derives unconsciously from print technology. Like perspective, literacy privileges vision over the other senses, abstracts thought from the social context and isolates the reader or writer from the world (McLuhan 1962). "If oral communication keeps people together, " notes David Riesman, "print is the isolating medium par excellence.” Similar perils attend what Richard Rorty calls "textualism, " the idea that there is nothing outside of texts, that all lived experience can be reduced to intertextuality:

36 The order is what Foucault is talking about, the order of discourse, the order of things, and so on. That human societies have always tried to control people by creating order that negates freedom and at the same time represses the people.

193 "stimulus to the intellectual's private moral imagination provided by his strong misreadings, by his search for sacred wisdom, is purchased at the price of his separation from his fellow-humans" (Jackson, 1989, p. 8).

To demonstrate the dependence of categorization on human body, Lakoff gives the following example:

To take a concrete example, each human eye has 100 million light- sensing cells, but only about 1 million fibers leading to the brain. Each incoming image must therefore be reduced in complexity by a factor of 100. That is, information in each fiber constitutes a "categorization" of the information from about 100 cells. Neural categorization of this sort exists throughout the brain, up through the highest levels of categories that we can be aware of. When we see trees, we see them as trees, not just as individual objects distinct from one another. The same with rocks, houses, windows, doors, and so on. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 27)

On the role of the movement in categorization, we can refer to Mettlak and his colleagues. By carrying out three tests, they showed how abstract movement (moving from one sign to another or from one alphabet to another) can affect temporal arguments. They understood that thinking about numbers from lower to higher or alphabets from first to last can have a positive effect on the efficacy of time during a test, whereas the higher to lower numbers has no effect at all. In their view, the reason for this difference is the embodied and everyday experiences of humans. According to them, in everyday life all animals and humans do move in such way to direct themselves in front. Human movement is just the same with air plane and bicycle. They believe this moving-forward is ingrained in our conceptual structure and influences our perception of time.

Johnson remarks that is a repetitive and dynamic pattern of our sensual and kinesthetic interactions that unify and organize our experiences

194 (Johnson,1990, p. 28). These patterns are meaningful structures that come into existence by our bodily movement, dealing with objects, and our perceptual interactions. These patterns have a significant role in our perception, reasoning and understanding of our surroundings. The number of patterns is limited and they are mostly visual but as Johnson says, they can exist on an abstract level and be the repetitive patterns can be observed in wide variety of events and human experiences. In fact, the patterns are embedded on a mental background and act as an intermediary between objective images and abstract propositions. According to Turner (1993), the patterns are made out of few components, organized in determined and limited relations. For example, image schemas include: container schema, force schema, path schema and so on. Some of them refer to location in space and its relations such as: up-down, back-front, part- whole. Some are essentially dynamic and refer to growing movements or expansion of space and steep. Turner claims that all schemas are repetitive patterns derived from our experience of surrounding environment.

The path schema comprises of three elements: the starting point (A), the ending point (B) and the path that connects the two. Johnson (1990) says:

“This FROM-TO schema is a recurrent structure manifested in a number of seemingly different events, such as: (a) walking from one place to another, (b) throwing a baseball to your sister, (c) punching your brother, (d) giving your mother a present, (e) the melting of ice into water. For each of these very different cases, we have the same schema with the same basic parts and relations. In (e) the schema must be interpreted metaphorically, with points A and B representing state (e.g., solid and liquid) of a substance (water). So, we see that image schemata are more general, abstract, and malleable than rich images”. (p. 28)

These schemas are quite dynamic for two reasons: first, they organize our experiences in such ways as to comprehend them. Secondly, they are very flexible

195 so that they can cover our experiences in different texts. These patterns are reflected in language very well. Johnson gives the following examples to illustrate his point:

“I give up”, “I'm getting out of the race”. “Whenever

I'm in trouble, she always bails me out”.

As we see in the above examples, the competition and person`s state are deemed as a space or a capacity that he can enter or exit. These samples are all metaphorical representation of container schema which lead to our comprehension of abstract concepts. Johnson believes that above examples show how image schemas, as a repetitive structure, can help us to understand and judge our various experiences.

Thus, textbooks that seek to put forth concepts in terms of preexisting frameworks and their concomitant educational environments that do not allow the student to have bodily and immediate inquiries or quests preclude the student from having new concepts or points of views, and naturally, they cannot help the student to develop a critical of phenomena.

It is indubitable that present educational environments fail to fulfill bodily needs, provide possibilities of movements in different directions within the environment, and help the student to acquire new perceptual experiences, and this can constitute a serious flaw in the process of education. It should be noted that, as pointed out earlier, all senses and the body, in a general sense, as well as my movement in an environment with the aim of maximal reception from the environment are involved in perception. As Merleau-Ponty says,

I adjust my body, for example, by turning my head and moving my eyes, squinting or cupping a hand around my ear, leaning forward, standing up, reaching, trying all the while to achieve a “best grip” (meilleure prise) on the world. Eventually, things come into focus, and

196 my environment strikes me as organized and coherent; my surroundings make sense to me, and I can find my way about. Only then do I recognize things and establish “associations” among them. (Carman, 2005, p. 57).

Due to their considerable limits, present educational environments fail to provide students with such a range of possibilities. Therefore, present schools should be transformed, either based on the Deleuzian view of acquiring novel experiences and escaping systematic control, or based on theories of embodied cognition (or both, because they are compatible and can complement each other). Schools and their facilities should be expanded, and school trips should be promoted.

Therefore, scientific tour method can be used. Scientific tour or an empirical activity outside school are among the activities that take place outside school, laboratory, and library; it includes direct and comprehensive studies of problems, gathering information by observation, interview, measurement, questionnaire, sampling and other research techniques. Thereby, the validity of assumptions, determining changes, and validity of situations are guaranteed. Mostly, scientists investigate in a lab, office, or outdoor environment. If students are willing to be educated in the scientific method, they should follow the scientific method in the lab, outside school and home. Situations in which observation and investigation of actual content of lessons are possible, scientific tour method can be used. The scientific tour can be short term and limited or long term. Generally speaking, scientific tour can be a visit to a city, museum, exhibition, factory, farm, and other places available. Experience can be attained from school environment or other educational institutions. Thus, it needs not to be a visit to far-away places but rather the environment around the students can be utilized for scientific tours.

197 4.10.1. Field Trips

From the beginning of the field trip, the teacher should scrutinize and guide the activities of students. A teacher should plan for the study of regions visited during the trip. For example, the teacher can start discussions concerning their geographical, historical, and social circumstances inside the bus or the vehicle, and personally guide the discussions in order to affect more consciousness and more learning. Alternatively, the teacher can design a map of the road, and mark specific locations so that students can more carefully attend to their surroundings, and answer the teacher’s questions. After arriving at the location and introduction to the guide, they should immediately start the visit. The visit should proceed in accordance with the itinerary, and it should be guided in a way that all students are involved in the collection of information. It should be noted that it is complicated to carry out all the activities following the anticipated plan because numerous factors might disrupt the procedure. Thus, the flexibility of the plan should always be taken into account.

During the field trip, the teacher should make sure that answers and materials are being collected, and if students encounter a new question about which they have not already thought, they should be allowed some time to think of an answer. After the field trip, students are required to perform various scientific activities in the class. Given the goal, these activities can be limited or wide. In activities after the field trip, what they have learned should be classified and solidified. The findings of the field trip can be presented in the classroom in the form of prose, poems, stories, plays, or reports. Creative writing of what happened during the trip is usually evidence for the success of the field trip. The final report of the trip can be written by the teacher or students and be then submitted to the school.

198 4.10.2. The Deleuzian School

Given what is said in this section and the previous sections, a Deleuzian school can be said to have the following characteristics:

- Different voices can be heard in the school.

- Multicultural rituals are considered, and the school’s curricula and administration are organized in multicultural terms.

- The viewpoint turns from the center to the margins.

- Different views are examined and analyzed.

- Doors of dialogue are open.

- Students are fed with free, multidimensional, and new information.

- The school considers critiques.

- The school welcomes changes.

4.11. Evaluation

The last point we wish to address is the evaluation of students. In a Deleuzian education system, students should be evaluated based on their creativity and their power to pose new problems or to have a different view of problems, instead of reiterating what is already written in textbooks. The goal of the Deleuzian education is to foster and develop creativity, rather than killing it. To compel students to reiterate what is written in textbooks quenches the student’s creative power. Thus, what matters is not that the student provides a decisive answer to questions. The student should be rewarded merely by showing enough courage to think and to see problems from different points of view. Therefore, the written test and grading system should be done away altogether, and the teacher should encourage students to fit the extent of creativity they display. It should also be

199 kept in mind that all students cannot be expected to be equally creative in all courses. Every student has creativity, depending on their different internal and external characteristics.

As it turned out, for Deleuze, cooperative learning is of utmost importance. Because for Deleuze, salvation is only understood in its collective sense, it seems evaluation based on groups and participation must supplant the current methods of evaluation based on the individual. But how is it possible?

Johnson and Johnson in Cooperation in Classroom give the following suggestion for scoring the activities in a cooperative based learning (a combination of individual responsibility and group success are presented):

1. The individual score, plus bonus points so that all members have reached preordained criteria:

After finishing off the group work, each student finishes his own individual work (it can be an exam, writing an article, art project, etc.) and is scored based on this individual work. In addition, if all the members have reached the standard scale for success, the bonus point will be given to each member.

2. The individual score, plus bonus points based on the lowest score of the group:

After finishing off the group work, each student finishes his own individual work and is scored accordingly. The final score of each student is the aggregation of individual work plus the bonus point based on the lowest score of members of the group. So if one of the members of the group gets a low score, the average score of the other group members will come down. As a result, the student will learn that he or she can get a better score by helping the rest of the group.

200

3. The individual score, plus the average score of group members:

After finishing off the group work, each student finishes his own individual work and is scored accordingly. Then, the score is added to the average score of members of the group.

4. The individual score, plus the bonus point for group progress:

After finishing off the group work, each student finishes his own individual work and is scored accordingly. Then if the average score of the group has made progress in comparison to the previous work, a bonus point will be added to each member. (The members of a group must stay the same.)

5. Adding up the individual score:

After finishing off the group work, each student finishes his own individual work and is scored accordingly. The final score of each member is the aggregation of all the members in individual work. Average individual score: After finishing off the group work, each student finishes his own individual work and is scored accordingly. The final score of the students is the average score of all the members in the individual work.

6. The group score based on producing a single item:

Members of a group work together on an item, and each score is the score given to the group.

7. Selection of an exam paper randomly:

201 After finishing off the group work, each student finishes his own individual work and is scored accordingly. Then, the teacher selects a paper of one of the students randomly. This score will be the score of the entire group.

8. The lowest score of the group

After finishing off the group work, each student finishes his own individual work and is scored accordingly. It is supposed that the lowest score will be given to all members. This approach improves the weak students` competence considerably since all the members become motivated to help them out to learn.

202

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The purpose of the past three chapters was to design a pedagogical model, based on embodied cognition and ideas of Gilles Deleuze. In order to do so, we accumulated different theories about embodied cognition in the second chapter and brought out the common features out of them. In the third chapter, we determined the educational implication based on embodied cognition. Finally, in the last chapter, we made use of these theoretical foundations for designing a pedagogical model. In other words, we made use of them in more tangible ways. In the following, a summary of each chapter will be discussed.

Chapter 1 In chapter one, we had a very brief introduction to the issue. We posed our questions and also presented our overall plan and framework.

Chapter 2 By studying different theories about embodied cognition, it was determined that the embodied thesis could be defined in the following: Many features of cognition are embodied in that they are deeply dependent upon characteristics of the physical body of an agent, such that the agent's beyond-the-brain body plays a significant causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in that agent's cognitive processing. Before going over to the concept of embodied thesis and the philosophical strands that support it, it was necessary to study the different theories that had as long a history as the history of philosophy. In doing so, we went on to investigate the concept of “Reason” in the history of philosophy, in order to demonstrate the

203 origin and the foundation of the metaphysical subject, as an alternative to the embodied subject. In ancient Greece, there did not exist a decisive dichotomy between subject and object, as a result, no dichotomy between ontology and epistemology. Thereby, there always was a possibility of explaining epistemological issues and taking them for ontological ones and finding out where they do originate from? We witnessed that while trying to explain the world, philosophy was made to follow a track to explain and regulate the world and bringing it under human control. Each philosopher grasped at some aspects of reality within nature until Anaxagoras invented the concept of Reason and endeavored to explain the world through it. Reason in philosophy is an abstract entity, which is not in space or time. If the reason is supposed to explain the states of affairs in the world, then the knowledge of the world is dependent on the knowledge of the reason. If knowledge is received through conventional means and humans who are spatially and temporally bound, it cannot find its way toward the reason. Therefore, a subject that is outside time and space had to be invented, i.e., metaphysical subject. The first person who invented this subject was Plato. Knowledge for Plato pertained to a soul that was similar to the Intellect that had perceived it. As we mentioned, Plato’s tendency towards the reason is grounded in two problems: Particularity and mutability of the sense data. Whatever exists in our surroundings is particular and mutable, but the fundamental property of knowledge is to be immutable and universal. It must be universal so that it can be applied to the plurality of entities and it must be immutable since if everything is in the flowof change, with the passage of time and change of states of affairs, our knowledge would not be useful. Plato also had another consideration: Any knowledge is a piece of conceptual knowledge, and that requires concepts to be an inevitable component of it. However, the world of senses is not so much compatible with

204 conceptual knowledge; as a result, a world must exist which holds such concepts, and that has to be the world of Intellect. In the proceeding, we brought about Aristotle`s view on active and passive reason to indicate thought for Aristotle does also pertains to the metaphysical subject. After following a summary of the metaphysical subject in western philosophy, we got back to conceptual knowledge and its significance. We demonstrated that the cause of such a foundational view lied in the significance of conceptual knowledge. In fact, this issue is referred back to the theory of language embedded in western philosophy. Accordingly, we have tried to overcome this problem by offering a new theory of language, articulated in the contemporary era.

Then, we raised an important point that although subject and object had been used in different and sometimes contradictory meanings in Pre-Cartesian philosophy, the subject was closely related to the transcendent in both of these eras [before and after Descartes]. The subject was always something that went beyond matter and body and entered the realm of transcendence. If the requisite for Aristotle`s transcendental subject was the categories, after the turn of Kantian epistemology, the requisite for thinking of a subject turned into a transcendental “ego.” Paying heed to such a subject went hand in hand with neglecting and negating the body (this was clearly the case during Medieval philosophy). This conjoining led to the centuries of neglect towards the body and the role it played out in acquiring knowledge. Theories of embodied cognition are a reaction to these ways of doing philosophy and reversing the course of action. Embodied cognition aims to investigate cognition and physical and environmental experiences in terms of body. Proponents of embodied cognition do not study cognition in terms of the metaphysical or transcendental subject; instead, they study the body. The difference between them and the materialist philosophers, along with the first-generation scientists, is that they do not reduce the cognitive

205 process to the brain [events]. For many of the latest thinkers, cognition uniquely pertains to the brain and its functions, yet from the embodied cognition`s point of view, this reduction is not acceptable, but preferably organic features and physical experiences of the environment play a significant role in cognition. In modern philosophy, the first person who paid particular attention to the body was . He thought of the world as the representation of the Will. In terms of epistemology, the world that Schopenhauer depicted for humanity is subjected to awareness is not the world-in-itself but the world as the representation of the Will of nature. The Will of nature represents itself in humans through the body. Schopenhauer studied embodiment at two levels: level of perception and the level of thought; at both levels, the body is regarded as the key and agent of cognition. He believed that not only is our perception dependent on the structure and features of the body, but also our thought is dependent on the structure of the body and the Will of nature. All in all, he considered consciousness and awareness a function of the body and physical organism. Perhaps Schopenhauer was the first person who realized the existence of unconscious dominating over our conscious activity. Confirmation of this matter is paramount for a theory of embodied cognition. Another modern philosopher who considered the body and its role in the cognitive process was Friedrich Nietzsche. By questioning the goodwill of man toward acquiring reasonable knowledge. Nietzsche made knowledge a function of the concept of Will to Power, which carries itself out through desires and instincts. Concepts and thought we know as truth are merely metaphors dependent on neuronal stimulus and analogies related to human essence. Nietzsche places metaphor at the center of the cognitive process. Later, neurologists, such as Mark Johnson, George Lakoff, and Rafael E. Núñez, extended the concept of metaphor beyond the scope of literature and extended it to the whole process of cognition. When Nietzsche, similar and of course precedent to contemporary cognitive scientists, refers to metaphors, he actually

206 refers to the structure of thought. Nevertheless, the thought has been thoroughly united with the structure of the body. Not only does he consider most of our thoughts the result of conceptual metaphors, but also he thinks the same about time, space, and causation, which for Kant are a priori categories. Although Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were among the first to recognize the significant role of the body, embodied cognition took shape in the phenomenological tradition and the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty in more profound ways. Merleau-Ponty followed Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenology and realized that if this method is to be applied correctly, we must begin with the body as the first unmediated phenomenon. Since, before doing anything we perceive, and perception is a bodily experience, phenomenology turns into the phenomenology of perception and through that open up its way to the issue of the body, in many ways. Phenomenological tradition`s confrontation with the body is food for thought because it differs from the way we often view the world, i.e., the scientific method. The scientific method always views the world from a third-person point of view and holds science as a neutral God or a supreme viewer. This fairy tale sort of view is severely criticized in phenomenology. Substitution for this method is a phenomenological method that sheds doubt on concepts and views the world from the first-person point of view. In this chapter, we demonstrated this contrast by comparing Merleau- Ponty`s view with that of Churchland’s. In the proceeding, we tried to determine the difference between Merleau- Ponty`s view and materialists`. The point that separates Merleau-Ponty from materialists is his particular emphasis on the body, its directions, and positions. Generally speaking, materialists most often tend to reduce mental and cognitive events to brain events, and in the meantime, do not pay attention to the function of the body and experiences produced by its directionality. For materialists, every event related to consciousness is merely the result of the activities on the level of the neuronal system and brain structure. Consequently, the structure of the body

207 parts and environmental and kinesthetic experiences rendered by bodily movement is wholly overlooked. Merleau-Ponty`s insistence on movement has influenced the name of his followers` school, i.e., Enactive cognition. In the following part of this chapter, we have attempted to pursue the theory of embodied cognition in the sphere of cognitive science. The contrast was between new views in cognitive science, their advocacy for embodiedcognition, and the first-generation cognitive scientists. This problem goes back to the origin of analytic philosophy and its metaphysical origin in that epoch. Frege, who studies abstract entities, invented a new formal language whose purpose was to study signs that referred to these abstract notions. This idea was transmitted to cognitive scientists, AI, and computer experts. For cognitive scientists, the brain is the part of working with abstract entities. Hence, the body was neglected inits totality. In order to open up the views of the first-generation cognitive scientists, we investigated the AI. Historically speaking, we showed what were the reasons for the appeal and thrive of the theories of AI. One of the reason was the impracticality of behaviorism as on the most essential theories of mind in that time, and other was the point that AI would successfully overcome dualism, the most cumbersome and historic problem of the philosophy of mind. Of course, before that some theories such as type identity theory and token identity theory were proposed. Both of which came to be classified under reductive materialism. Generally speaking, reductive materialism was looking for the reduction of each and every mental event to brain event to solve the problem of dualism. On the other hand, eliminative materialism, considered in common sense terms and folk psychology, was put forward which did not reduce the mental events to brain events but rather eliminated them. However, these theories were heavily criticized, so that their defense was untenable for philosophers. As a result, functionalism emerged from AI.

208 The concept of function in (taken from mathematics) and building of a formal language (taken up by Frege in his new logic) laid the foundation for Functionalist theories of AI. According to the theory, the mind acts like a function that codifies initial data (i.e. sense date) and then, follows a series of specific rules that comes to a conclusion. In this way, the meaning would be obliterated completely and the only thing that remains is abstract signs. Defining mind in this fashion sowed the seed of designing AI in the mind of the scientists. Robots that can think exactly like humans, as a result AI was born. The view, that AI could think as well as humans, was criticized from different perspectives. Thinkers concerned with the body and its components (e.g. position) noticed that AI and its theoretical framework was barren due to its negligence of the body. Cognition is not only representational, formal or symbolic but also extremely entangled with the body. For having a cognitive capacity alike humans, a body like human body must be provided for and this cannot be true of robots. We chose several noteworthy critiques of AI from the works of Rodney Brooks, Chapman, Agrea, and . The basic elements of their thought was briefly expounded but Dreyfus` view was explained a bit more. Anyhow the point observed in almost all of their critiques, particularly that of Dreyfus, were influenced by and Merleau-Ponty, who had dealt with the position of the body and its significance and the question of the body. Therefore, they demonstrated that our pre-reflective experience from the world and the position of the body precedes the conscious thought. This view put them in sharp contrast with the whole Cartesian tradition which ingrained philosophy from Descartes to early Husserl. The origin of AI was also part of the Cartesian tradition, which held thought is prior to being in the world and essentially independent of it. As an example, Husserl believed that thought, through a transcendental suspension and abstraction of the ideas from the world, could

209 reach the essence of phenomenon by working on the sense data. This view is quite similar to AI that held it could produce thought by processing sense data.

Generally speaking, Dreyfus finds four major problems with AI: 1) Biological: as we previously mentioned, the relation of mind to that of brain is analogues to that of computer software to hardware. 2) Psychological: we discussed this problem comprehensively, by psychological criticism it is meant that the mind can perform the thought process by using sign and rules.

3) Epistemological: all of the brain activities can be predicted and modelled by extracting the rules. In other words, all knowledge can be formalized. Since there is a capacity for formalization, we can design a model for the mind and implemented in AI.

4) Ontological: the world is comprised of independent truths and non- relational backgrounds. Subsequently, there is no need to know the background or adjoining concepts to know an object. In fact, this is a purely atomistic view.

Then, some of Dreyfus` critiques were illustrated. Following Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus points out that there are many backgrounds required during cognition that make it uncontrollable and immeasurable. Hence, they cannot be considered in AI. In a critique known as “data base”, Dreyfus stipulates that the human mind is a huge data base of information but functionalism, on which AI is depended, fails to explain how the mind, in a specific circumstance and a short span of time, can select the appropriate information out of thousands of data. Furthermore, we would merely have a vague and distorted conception of data without body and physical experience, yet physical experiences help us to expect specific behavior without a moment`s thought. Expectation without thought is reminiscent of Heidegger`s point that one of the way to encounter the

210 tool is when the tool is broken down. Only in this case it grabs our thought. As Heidegger brought up this problem, so did Dreyfus present this critique in refusing the representational theory. Consequently, the subject and object dichotomy came under fire. Feedback `s problem was another of Dreyfus` criticism. We stated that a robot only detects defined errors and attempts to solve them according to the given instructions. But embodied experiences make it possible to examine phenomena and errors more widely; that is to say, the body, unlike the robot, is not only guided by instructions, but can also find new solutions to new problems.

Accordingly, we studied other cognitive scientists, particularly Lakoff, Johnson and Lakoff believe that not only language but thought, experience, and even perception, are metaphorical. They demonstrated that while developing experience of the environment, specific arraignment and movements of neurons occur in the body. These arrangement lead to the development of different metaphors, that not only do encompass our experience and every-day knowledge but also overshadow the entire realm of philosophy, science, and mathematics. Generally speaking, Lakoff`s view can be summarized in following three propositions:

1) The mind is essentially embodied. 2) Thoughts are most often unconscious. 3) Abstract concepts are mainly metaphorical.

The first proposition can be summarized in the following: the thing that makes up deduction and conceptualizes the metaphors is neuronal model [of the brain]. Lakoff believes that neuronal model can demonstrate what embodied cognition is. Rational deduction can be calculated to work out with the same scale of neuronal structure as do sense perception or physical movement. Categorization

211 is essential for thinking. These categories are completely dependent on neuronal arrangements and models; the very same arrangements are a function of physical structure of the organism and sensual-kinesthetic experience that come about as the result of interaction with the environment. In the second proposition, Lakoff introduces a term reminiscent of Freud`s theory of unconscious, i.e., cognitive unconscious. However, he points out that his theory has substantial differences with that of Freud. The common feature between them is the belief in the existence of unconscious part of human mind, which though not the object of our consciousness, most of our thoughts are dependent on and are a function of it. In the third proposition, metaphors have almost always come down as aesthetic affairs that must be excluded, when it comes to scientific language and all forms of thoughts in the history of western philosophy. Therefore, they reveal their true shape, yet Lakoff indicates that metaphors are not only restricted to literature and but rather our mind works fundamentally with metaphors and most of knowledge comes through a wide range of capacities that metaphors provide us with. These metaphors are part of neuronal model. Finally, we illustrated ideas of Deleuze and its relation to embodied cognition. Despite the fact that Deleuze has no direct theory of embodied cognition, we pointed out that there are elements in his philosophy which put him akin to theories of embodied cognition, particularly his emphasis on the concept of “immanence”, taken from Spinoza. By implementing this concept, he stands against all those views that try to separate cognition from the body. Using the concept of immanence along with his empiricism, taken from Hume, Deleuze criticizes transcendental and metaphysical subject. Through this perspective, Deleuze could be classified as a defender of embodied cognition but one has to notice that the body, for Deleuze, has a different meaning from the conventional one. In his theory, the body goes beyond the mere organism and what makes a man and his mind is physical body along with political, cultural, historical situation. Hence, these factors must be taken into consider to deal with the body

212 from Deleuzian point of view. For example, when Deleuze talks of schizophrenia or bodily paranoia, all concepts must be viewed and interpreted within cultural and political framework.

Chapter3

Third chapter pursues the educational implication of ideas of Deleuze, starting with the question: what is the body? In that part, we referred to the difficulties of defining the body in Deleuze`s theory. Then, we defined his unique perspective on the body and observed that body goes beyond the mere organism. It is the result of various forces: political, cultural, ethical, physical, biological, etc., yet his view does not culminate in dualism. The desiring machine was defined and stated that each body is a desiring machine that pursues supremacy. Then, the relation between Deleuze`s idea and embodied thesis was studied. Various theories in the area of embodied cognition, despite their differences, have some common features summarized in the embodied thesis. On the one hand, embodied thesis emphasizes on the negating metaphysical and transcendental subject, on the other hand, it disputes the reduction of the conscious state to the brain. Regarding Deleuze, both of these are correct. While rejecting metaphysical subject, he emphasizes on the immanence of subject. In correspondence with his opposition to reducing the subject to brain, he considers subject as an organism produced as a result of political, social, cultural, environmental, etc. Moreover, the unconscious is as pivotal for Deleuze as it is for the proponents of embodied cognition. For Deleuze, every phenomenon is a political one, because every phenomenon is subjected to the relations of Power and Power is essentially political. Thereby, we had to explain the relation between politics and education and it was done so. Tracing the origin of the problem took us to a dogmatic view of thought. The picture that thought is itself a valuable thing and humans have a

213 natural inclination toward thinking. By drawing on the works of Nietzsche and Foucault, Deleuze revolts against this dogmatic picture. The result of such revolt is that educational system is founded on a false or even duplicitous assumption which leads to a form of domination. After preliminary points, we came to the main issue of educational implication. As we said earlier, Deleuze is essentially a political philosopher, so his views on education and politics had to be determined and it was done so. Power relations, by building paranoid bodies, controls and leads people on to pre- ordained frameworks. In fact, people follow the instructions of institution of Power to avoid invective and being useless; to increase social capital; to get a job and be taken seriously. Getting back the benefits that Power has deprived the person (e.g. social capital, job, prestige, money, etc.), one must turn to an institution of power again. This institution is educational system in which the purpose of education is not to reach truth but to control and subjugate. The contrastive view against this structure of education or how to withstand it is to become “nomadic”. Deleuze acclaims all sorts of nomadic thinking. The concept signifies instability, motion, and ever changing fluidity, facing up to new issues and above all avoiding control. As we witnessed how institutions tend to control and bring people into subjugation, which is evident in urban life and its enforced relations. As a result, Deleuze uses nomadic metaphor to acclaim the idea to avoid control and subjugation of the body and its movement does not follow a constant distributive pattern. In other words, the institutions of Power cannot control the life and its patterns. The fundamental issue of Deleuzian education is the a priori structure of truth. He is critical of such concept. In this structure, truth is regarded as something constant and eternal, it must be discovered and educational system has to lead the student in such a way as to arrive at the absolute truth. This epistemology winds up in root-tree system of knowledge, in contrast. Deleuze believes that science must look for new events and relations rather than fixed

214 structures. Thereby, rhizomatic structure is born that does not view the science as structural but event-centered. The rejection of a priori structure of truth is closely related to his concept of “becoming”. Deleuze points out that everything is in flow of change, without having particular purpose. Philosophers and scientists have always tried to put motion and becoming in a distinct path directed toward a particular purpose. For instance, Aristotle justifies the motion in terms of reaching actual from the potential, i.e. perfection and form. Hegel viewed motion as essentially dialectical and the world as conscious activity of the Spirit(Geist). In Abrahamic religions, the history moves towards the emancipation of the poor by inheriting the earth. But following Nietzsche, Deleuze only accepts the becoming, that not only has no purpose but it has no repetition. The only repetition is the becoming itself: Eternal Recurrence. We studied the theoretical foundation of educational system and observed these following points:

• The need for changing classroom design: the present structure of the classrooms deprives students of bodily experience. • Creative- based rather than memory- based learning: if there is no a priori structure of truth, then, eternal truth does not exist and we are not responsible for discovering, memorizing and remembering it. We must move toward creativity and making new concepts. This change must take place in educational system. • Negating the teacher`s authority: Negating the a priori structure of truth means the rejection of the authority of teacher as the holder of this truth. Consequently, a student learns creativity rather than some pre-ordained concepts. • Participatory learning: Deleuze believes that learning only occurs in action or interaction with others. Therefore, the curriculum must be set to

215 increase the participation between the students themselves and their teacher. In fact, teacher, likewise, has a participatory role and not an authoritative one.

• The necessity of external factors: Deleuze believes that learning requires violence in the thinking process, since Deleuze, following Nietzsche, rejects the natural inclination toward the truth. Thus, transmitting information is not sufficient and external factors must be accounted for. • The problem of structures of books: educational books emphasize on the transmission of materials through words and study. The overemphasis on the materials impedes paying attention to the body, since these crucial [bodily]experiences are not taken in consideration in learning process. • Learning through signs: according to Deleuze, we could only learn through interpretations of the signs. Furthermore, students should learn about reading sign and the classroom must be filled with signs. The pedagogical method must also be based on semiotics.

Chapter 4

By implementing theories discussed in the previous chapters, this chapter is looking for a pedagogical model based on the purpose, content and method for educational system. This chapter starts with defining educational system designation: The ubiquitous feature of educational system is that it contains all the necessary materials and methods for achieving specific educational goals. Generally speaking, educational system is a set of plans, methods and materials for achieving particular goals. The significance of educational system is to determine plans for transmitting knowledge and special skill to individuals or groups, in other words, whenever a plan is set forth for proposing specific pedagogical contents, in which the detailed methods and necessary materials are

216 determined, a true educational system has emerged. Designation means preparing a practical plan for achieving what has already been determined. According to it, pedagogical design is providing a specific plan for achieving educational goals. The marriage of Deleuze to political thought and strong bonds of his philosophy with notion of power made it evident that perhaps the most immediate work in designing an educational system is to challenge current structure of power and endeavoring to redefine the power relations within it. Thereby, some proposals have been issued to subvert the external structure of education such as hierarchical structure, budget of educational institutes, stopping monopoly of education in the hands of established few. And some solutions for transforming the learning materials were suggested such as problem-solving, rhizomatic learners, changing the teaching method and facing the students in the educational environment. The change that sets out to offer a horizontal and equal structures, instead of hierarchical structure, among students or between student and teacher or up-handed institutions. The other action to take is extending democracy and democratizing the institution of educational institutions. Although in the name of democracy, freedom is given only in appearance but only when we enter institutions and working environment, the high level of tyranny is crystal clear. The educational system and its hierarchical and oppressive structure is no exception. To democratize the educational system, Deleuze offers the following solution:

1. Multi culturalization of schools: schools should admit students regardless of their racial and cultural backgrounds. Moreover, religious tendencies or financial conditions of their families should not lead to discrimination or segregation of students.

2. Assigning students with tasks: it is not sufficient for students to be mere learners. Since the main tenet of democracy is social responsibility and collaboration, different tasks should be assigned to students.

217 3. Emphasizing on collaboration and group works: we will elaborate on this in what follows. Here, we only refer to this issue in order to support democracy, it is important to have participation and activities within groups that are culturally and axiologically diverse. This will help students to treat different cultures, values, and insights as normal, and be able to easily deal with them, instead of trying to eliminate or negate them.

Another problem studied in this chapter was the significance of cooperative learning. For Deleuze, like other opponents of capitalism, salvation is collective. The individual must relearn that his happiness is linked to the happiness of others in the modern world and isolation of oneself in his individual cave is futile and fruitless. Accordingly, the educational environment has to remind this point to the students. In rhizomatic Deleuzian environment participation is more important than individual action, as a result, we compared three types of learning in this chapter: individual, competitive and cooperative learning and studied their characteristic and motto and mentioned the reasons for the superiority of cooperative learning over the others. In fact, cooperative learning requires active and direct participation of students just like a mountaineering team; students get to the top, if they are part of a team work. In this environment, by collaboration and participation in groups, students learn the materials and feel responsible for one another learning. When their classmate is in need of help, they are eager to help him out; success of others is their success and failure of others is their failure. This approach makes learning more profound and increases the level of creativity and innovation.

The one of the aspects in which Deleuze has engaged with extensively and put forward theories is semiotics. In this chapter, we made some brief remarks on the significance of signs for Deleuze and provided different examples of the necessity of studying signs to understand education. We also introduced methodology of sign-based teaching. In addition, we stated how signs are

218 confined to visual signs in the present educational system and the possibility of sign interpretation has diminished from other senses and the body.

The philosophy of Deleuze is based on deconstruction. Therefore, any educational system based on his ideas must take into account the following propositions (here, only the headlines are shown):

• Avoiding the assumption of generalizability in a text.

• Question-centered learning.

• Breaking concepts and structures into smaller parts and scrutinizing them.

• Textbooks and teachers should teach the method of deconstruction.

• Rejection of duality and bifurcation

We spoke of Deleuze`s critique of a priori structure of truth and his emphasis on creativity and necessity of conceptualization in the text. Therefore, the following suggestions were posed:

• Mixed and interdisciplinary curricula

• Development and variability of the educational environment

• Dispensing with grand narratives and established discourses, and trying, instead, to create a new discourse, or at least interpreting topics through different discourses and perspectives.

• The teacher’s role as an interlocutor, instead of an instructor

• Emphasis on writing

In the following part, we demonstrate that problem-solving approach can have a significant place in Deleuzian education and we also studied the connection between this approach and embodied cognition. Accordingly, quantitative and theoretical history of this approach was studied and the stages of this approach was expostulated so that it can be beneficial in educational system.

219 Then, we studied the approach based on experience and how this theory originated from Deleuzian thought and how it is involved in embodied cognition. We got to the point that creating knowledge does not need abstract and far-fetched concepts but rather we should start with students` memories, interests, and experiences and organize his knowledge. Students share two type of experience: individual and social. Asking student to share any kind of experience does not only result in improving his skills but internalizes the learning process. The ideas of Rancière were studied as well and how learning experience could challenge classical hypothesis of teaching. According to him, students can learn new materials by merely relying on their experiences. Anti-exclusivity and rebuking subjection is one of the most pivotal theories of Deleuze that must be heeded in any educational system. Therefore, one of the actions that could be done was the interdisciplinary discourse and other was to destruct the authority of teacher, which as we demonstrated can be broken down in the following way:

1. Sources of teaching at the disposal of a textual teacher will be abrogated, and thus, the sources will change.

2. Methods of textual evaluation will be put aside and will no longer apply.

3. Teachers should begin to reevaluate their students’ learning needs and the match between curricula and requirements of human thinking.

Another matter said was regarding the destruction of authority and his presence in the class such as focusing on difference, flexibility, sense of wonder and a role beyond a procurer of information. We continued with the teaching method derivable from Deleuzian ideas and one of these methods is project-based method. Firstly, we define the method and put forward a history of it, then we refer to its characteristic and different types and finally we compare this method with traditional method. Another teaching method we derived from Deleuze was drama-based teaching method. Firstly, the importance of drama for Deleuze is pointed out and then compatibility of Deleuzian ideas with drama-based teaching

220 is demonstrated. Then, in addition to providing information and a history of the method, the instruction and its characteristic are laid out. Another point was the study of relation between this method and embodied cognition.

In the following parts, classroom environment and its relation with Deleuzian ideas and embodied cognition was studied. We study how such environment deprives students of bodily experience and is anti-Deleuzian. This environment is bereft of any kind of signs for semiotic analysis and possibility for rhizomatic movement. The stance of body is completely overlooked and there is an urgent need for reforming this method. In discussion about schools, we see that a Deleuzian school is founded on the negation of hierarchical and organized structure. In a Deleuzian school, there is no need for a fix place or preordained hierarchies and teaching methods. School would have appropriate and contingent actions depending on the circumstances. We indicate that a Deleuzian school must have two characteristic: 1) cooperation and participation, 2) serviceability. Apart from its educational advantages, this school prepares the students for outside school, namely society. In addition, we studied that confining educational environment has huge deficiencies and how anti-Deleuzian school takes away the possibility of bodily experience from students.

The last thing, investigated in this chapter, is the necessity of revision in evaluation. Evaluation in educational structures is based on individual and competition, whereas in a Deleuzian education both teaching and learning and evaluation are in groups and friendly. Therefore, some solutions for evaluating with new method was proposed.

Practical and Research Suggestions

• Given the fact that the ongoing development of information networks based on rhizomatic growth and breaking up the geographical

221 boundaries between, it is necessary that teachers and students and others become familiar with other cultures and encountering with them.

• Freedom of the teacher must be maintained. In order to discuss learning materials and scientific and social subjects, the teacher must have the freedom and the opportunity to do so.

• Teachers should motivate their students to demonstrate their ideas, on the other hand, the teacher must keep himself up to date and increase his knowledge every day and shouldn`t be satisfied with his past knowledge, since information is growing in rhizomatic way.

• The need of all learners, marginalized minorities and subculture must be taken into account in organizing the curriculum and in the curriculum all the voices must be heard. No minority should be eliminated or marginalized so that a just educational system would be established.

• Decentralization has to have a say in educational system and the schedule makers must pay attention to the lower parts of pyramid in their policies and decisions so that the role of teachers and students would not be overlooked.

• Educational environment based on rhizome should be provided; such environment is non-linear, interactive, flexible, horizontal and decentralized and contrasts with the uneven and steep environment in which relations are linear, hierarchical, vertical, centralized, since it is the even environment in which new ideas emerge and new horizons are opened in front of students.

• Vertical thinking which is a kind of tree-root thinking must be replaced by rhizomatic thinking which is a kind of horizontal thinking and rhizomatic thinking should take the center stage.

222 • Students` experiences should be taken notice of. They must have the opportunity to experience things directly because the learning through experience makes it more efficient. Encountering an unprecedented situation, the individual synchronizes his sensual and kinesthetic activities and rebuilds his pervious experiences.

• Providing the ground for practical participation of students leads to cooperative learning.

• The spirit of criticism must be cultivated among students and this requires that the grounds of critical education be provided. Learning to critique and be critical do not happen automatically but needs grounds and possibilities. First, it needs teachers with critical minds and teacher training institutions are no exception. The classroom must be a place to practice criticism and interaction.

For future project, the following suggestion might be helpful:

• Educational implication of ideas and theories of other postmodern and post structuralist thinkers.

• Comparing the epistemological view of Deleuze and Dewey and their similarities and differences.

• Explaining the concept of space in Deleuze and its impact on education.

• Studying the political and social theories of Deleuze and its implication in politics of education. Comparison with other views of other philosophers.

• Expanding the philosophy of folding and its educational implications.

• Challenges for a rhizomatic space in education

• The stance and solution of semiotics as a research tradition in education.

223

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