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Fordham Competition Law Institute 45TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY Day 1: 6 September 2018 | 9:15 a.m.–4:40 p.m. reception immediately following CLE Course Materials & Speaker Biographies Fordham Law School Skadden Conference Center | 150 West 62nd Street New York City Table of Contents 1. Speaker Biographies (view in document) 2. CLE Materials Keynote: Panel 2: All Things Vertical: Divergence or Convergence? Suggested Readings United States of America v. AT&T Inc. et al Case (June 12, Baker McKenzie. Competition and antitrust in the digital 2018) age. (July 20, 2017) (view in document) (view in document) The case of the European Commission’s curious interpretation of the Intel judgement. (Feb. 2018) Panel 3: Emerging Issues in Competition Law and (view in document) Health Care Helm, A. Optimizing Private Antitrust. HeinOnline Citation Panel 1: Antitrust and Populism (view in document) Fox, E. Antitrust and the Pulls of Populism. King, J. and Fuse Brown, E. The Anti-Competitive (view in document) Potential of Cross-Market Mergers in Health Care. HeinOnline Citation Hovenkamp, H. Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle (view in document) Imperiled? (view in document) Jenny, F. Should Competition Authorities Care About Fairness and If So How? (view in document) Monti, M. America First, Populism and Antitrust Transatlantic Reflections (view in document) Monti, M. Europe is now more competitive than America. (view in document) Pro-Market The blog of the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Former European Competition Commissioner Mario Monti: Why Antitrust Enforcement is "More Vigorous i Europe Than in the US. (view in document) Shapiro, C. Antitrust in Time of Populism. (view in document) Stiglitz, J. Towards a Broader View of Competition Policy (Antitrust) (view in document) Reiko Aoki and healthcare industry. In his current practice, he Commissioner, Japan Fair Trade Commission regularly counsels clients on merger clearance issues and business practices, and he has represented a Reiko Aoki is Commissioner of Japan Fair Trade diverse range of clients before the FTC, including Commission and formerly Executive Vice-President companies from the medical device, pharmaceutical, (International, IP and Gender Equality) at Kyushu and media sectors. University. She has conducted research and published on economics of patents, patent pools, standards, Jeff also serves as the pro bono coordinator for the innovation and intergenerational political economy in New York office, and he has worked on numerous academic journals such as Journal of Economics, immigration and asylum-related matters. He was Management and Strategy and American Economic awarded the John Wilson Award, which is presented Review. She has been Principle Investigator for research annually to individual attorneys who have projects funded by Japan Science and Technology demonstrated a significant commitment to the firm's Agency and by Japanese Society for Promotion of pro bono clients. Additionally, Jeff currently serves as Science, and Research Institute of Economics, Trade board president for Spoons Across America, a New and Industry where she was a Faculty Fellow. She has York-based nonprofit. been actively involved in science, technology and innovation policy as Executive Member of Council for Jeff received his J.D. from Cornell University Law Science and Technology Policy, Japanese Cabinet Office School. 2009-2014. Previous appointments include Member of Science Council of Japan, Member of Industrial Structure Council (METI), Intellectual Property Jean-Francois Bellis Committee (JPO), its Patent System Subcommittee and Managing Partner, Van Bael & Bellis its Expert Working Group, and Information and Communications Council (Ministry of Internal Affairs Jean-François Bellis is a founding partner of Van Bael & and Communication) and its subcommittees. She Bellis. Before setting up the firm in 1986, he clerked for received her Bachelor of Science (Mathematics) from Lord Mackenzie Stuart, the British judge at the University of Tokyo, Master of Arts (Public Policy) from European Court of Justice, and was a partner in the University of Tsukuba, Master of Science (Statistics) European law department of a major Brussels law firm. and PhD (Economics) from Stanford University. She has Jean-François has several decades of experience in held positions at the Ohio State University, SUNY Stony competition and trade law, representing clients in Brook, University of Auckland and Hitotsubashi numerous cases before the European Commission and University. the EU Courts. Jean-François assists clients on all aspects of Jeffrey C. Bank competition law with particular expertise in cartels, Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati abuses of dominance and merger control. Jean- François has assisted clients in numerous anti- Jeff Bank is a partner in Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & dumping and anti-subsidy cases in proceedings before Rosati's New York office, where he practices antitrust the European Commission and in related litigation litigation and counseling, particularly in the before the EU Courts and the WTO dispute settlement pharmaceutical industry. system. He was appointed by the WTO Director- General as a member of the WTO panel in As an experienced litigator representing both plaintiffs the Automotive Leather dispute between the US and and defendants, Jeff's work has ranged from complex Australia. multi-district litigations and global cartel cases to actions against competitors. He has successfully Jean-François Bellis teaches a course on EU defended pharmaceutical, technology, and media competition law at the Institute of European Studies of companies against class actions, and has experience in the University of Brussels (ULB) and directs a seminar all aspects of litigation, from discovery through appeal. on competition law at the University of Liège. He also lectures on abuses of dominance at the Brussels School Prior to joining the firm, Jeff practiced at the Federal of Competition. Trade Commission's Health Care Division, where he focused on competition issues in the pharmaceutical He received his LL.M. from the University of Michigan and a Master of Laws from the University of Brussels. Assistant to the President and Deputy White House Counsel. Mr. Delrahim’s rich antitrust background covers the full range of industries, issues, and institutions touched upon by the work of the Antitrust Fiona Carlin Division. He is a former partner in the Los Angeles Managing Partner, European and Competition Law office of a national law firm. He served in the Antitrust Practice; Chair, Global and Antitrust Law Practice Division from 2003 to 2005 as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General, overseeing the Appellate, Foreign Fiona Carlin is a UK qualified barrister and has been Commerce, and Legal Policy sections. During that practicing EU and competition law in Brussels for more time, he played an integral role in building the Antitrust than 20 years. She is the managing partner of Baker Division’s engagement with its international McKenzie’s EMEA+ region and until July 2018 she was counterparts and was involved in civil and criminal Chair of the Firm’s Global Antitrust & Competition Law matters. He has served on the Attorney General’s Task Practice Group that is ranked in the Top 5 Global Elite Force on Intellectual Property and as Chairman of the by Global Competition Review. Merger Working Group of the International Competition Network. Mr. Delrahim was also a Fiona advises on a wide variety of competition law Commissioner on the Antitrust Modernization issues including merger control, State aid grants, sector Commission from 2004 to 2007. Earlier in his career, inquiries and the defence of clients involved in cartel Mr. Delrahim served as antitrust counsel, and later as and other investigations, including to appeal stage the Staff Director and Chief Counsel of the U.S. Senate before the European Courts in Luxembourg. Her Judiciary Committee. practice spans many sectors with a particular focus on pharmaceuticals and industrial and consumer goods. Eleanor M. Fox Fiona has been a long-standing advisor to the European Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University pharmaceutical industry association, EFPIA, ever since School of Law the EU pharma sector inquiry that was launched 10 years ago. Eleanor M. Fox is the Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation at New York University School of Isabella de Silva Law, She is an expert in antitrust and competition President, French Competition Authority policy, and teaches, writes, and advises on competition policy in nations around the world and in international Isabelle de Silva is the President of the French organizations. She has a special interest in developing Competition Authority. Between 1999 and 2000, she countries, poverty, and inequality, and explores how worked at the French Ministry of Culture and opening markets and attacking privilege, corruption, Communication. From 2005 to 2008, she was Deputy and cronyism can alleviate marginalization and open Reporter at the Conseil constitutionnel (the French paths to economic opportunity and inclusive constitutional court). As government commissionner, development. Fox received her law degree from NYU she worked at the court of conflicts (2006-2009) and School of Law in 1961; she received an inaugural at the French Council of State (2000-2009). From Lifetime Achievement Award in 2011 by the Global 2009 to 2011, she was legal
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