Nonagentic Anti-Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century and the Legacy of Chavismo

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Nonagentic Anti-Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century and the Legacy of Chavismo Chapman University Chapman University Digital Commons International Studies (MA) Theses Dissertations and Theses Summer 8-2020 The Origin of Usurpation and Tyranny: Nonagentic Anti- Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century and the Legacy of Chavismo Juan Bustillo Chapman University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/international_studies_theses Part of the International Relations Commons, Latin American Studies Commons, Political Theory Commons, and the Politics and Social Change Commons Recommended Citation Bustillo, Juan Andrés. "The Origin of Usurpation and Tyranny: Nonagentic Anti-Imperialism of the Twenty- First Century and the Legacy of Chavismo." Master's thesis, Chapman University, 2020. https://doi.org/ 10.36837/chapman.000173 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Studies (MA) Theses by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Origin of Usurpation and Tyranny: Nonagentic Anti-Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century and the Legacy of Chavismo A Thesis by Juan Andrés Bustillo Chapman University Orange, CA Wilkinson College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Studies August 2020 Committee in charge: Dr. Maytha Alhassen, Ph.D., Chair Dr. Crystal Murphy, Ph.D. Dr. Tekle Woldemikael, Ph.D. The thesis of Juan Andrés Bustillo is approved. Dr. Maytha Alhassen, Ph.D., Chair Dr. Crystal Murphy, Ph.D. Dr. Tekle Woldemikael, Ph.D. July 2020 The Origin of Usurpation and Tyranny: Nonagentic Anti-Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century and the Legacy of Chavismo Copyright © 2020 by Juan Andrés Bustillo III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This is my first acknowledgements section, so I only hope to thank all who have earned this recognition. First and foremost is my advisor, Dr. Maytha Alhassen. Her guidance and invaluable insights led me to engage critically with my work in ways I would never have considered otherwise. I often struggled to remove myself emotionally from the material, but her advice and teaching showed me that those struggles are something to embrace even in academia. I likewise owe a major debt of gratitude to Dr. Crystal Murphy, whose academic leadership and mentorship going back to my undergraduate career at Chapman has helped shape me into the student and creator I am today. The generous opportunities she has provided me with will continue to be counted among the highlights of my time as a graduate student. Dr. Tekle Woldemikael, though I only met him in my last semester, has been another source of clarity throughout this process. His course could not come at a more opportune time– his insights changed my perspectives on critical sections of the paper, leading to more than a few last-minute rewrites. This project would ultimately never have succeeded without the help and teaching of many other scholars from Wilkinson College: Dr. Sandra Alvarez, Dr. Lynn Horton, Dr. Dan McClure, and Dr. Andrea Molle. To my classmates in the MAIS program and to my friends who took the time to look over the longest paper I have ever written, a heartfelt thank you. I reserve special gratitude for the Walking for Freedom team, particularly Juan Pío Hernandez of Plan País and Carlos Enrique Macher Bárcenas of Mycrom Films, for allowing me to work as an intern on their documentary about Venezuelan refugees. The project was not only an invaluable resource academically but it continually reminded me of why I was undertaking this thesis. For that I cannot thank them enough. IV ABSTRACT The Origin of Usurpation and Tyranny: Nonagentic Anti-Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century and the Legacy of Chavismo by Juan Andrés Bustillo As Venezuela’s Chavista regime presides over the country’s descent into Latin America’s worst refugee and humanitarian crisis in modern times, a mass exodus of nearly five million Venezuelans since 2015, the rhetoric of Western anti-imperialists and the regime itself has absolved it of any responsibility for the crisis and the increasing authoritarianism that led to it by abdicating the regime's agency to act according to its own free will. This paper develops the discursive concept of nonagentic anti-imperialism, a rhetoric that effectively absolves self-declared anti-imperialist regimes, from Castro’s Cuba to Rajapaksa’s Sri Lanka, of human rights abuses and democratic erosions by arguing that these leaders had no choice but to rule with an iron fist in the face of Western imperialism. Focusing on Chavismo, this paper analyzes the steps towards Venezuela’s democratic breakdown taken by both Hugo Chávez and Nicolas Maduro, the nonagentic anti-imperialist rhetoric that deflected the true intent behind these steps, and how those steps led the country to the manufactured disaster it finds itself in today. It concludes by positing that the legitimacy of supposedly anti-imperialist policies hinges not on the fierce rhetoric surrounding them but rather on the lived ends of the people affected by them. V TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................... IV ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... V LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................. VII 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................1 1.1 Literature Review ................................................................................................................2 1.2 Themes ................................................................................................................................7 2 NONAGENTIC ANTI-IMPERIALISM .................................................................................9 3 VENEZUELA 1948-1998 .......................................................................................................19 4 CHAVISMO ............................................................................................................................32 4.1 The Centralization of Power .............................................................................................45 4.2 Media Controls ..................................................................................................................47 4.3 2017 Protests .....................................................................................................................50 4.4 Civil Society Organizations Under Chavismo ..................................................................52 4.5 A Nonagentic Anti-Imperialist Foreign Policy .................................................................59 4.6 Food Shortages..................................................................................................................65 5 VENEZUELA UNDER CHAVISMO ...................................................................................68 5.1 The Economic War ...........................................................................................................76 5.2 The Kleptocrats on Top ....................................................................................................79 6 REVISITING THE RHETORIC OF NONAGENTIC ANTI-IMPERIALISM ...............86 7 EXISTING BETWEEN INVISIBILITY AND SPECTACLE ...........................................90 7.1 Rocío, From Valencia, Venezuela ....................................................................................94 7.2 Karina Torres, From Valencia, Venezuela .......................................................................99 7.3 José & De La Cruz ..........................................................................................................102 8 CONCLUSION: THE MAGICAL BOLIVARIAN STATE .............................................107 9 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................111 VI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviation Meaning AD Acción Democrática (Democratic Action) AN Asamblea Nacional (National Assembly) AI Amnesty International CAP Carlos Andrés Pérez CAT Convention Against Torture CLAP Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción (Local Committees for Supply and Production) COPEI Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (Social Democratic Party) CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies CSO Civil Society Organization CTU Comités de Tierra Urbana (Urban Land Committees) FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces) FEVA Federación Venezolana de Abogadas (Venezuelan Women Lawyer’s Federation) FPV El Foro Penal Venezolano GNB Guardia Nacional Bolivariana (Bolivarian National Guard) IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICG International Crisis Group VII PSUV Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) RCTV Radio Caracas Television TPS Temporary Protected Status TSJ Tribunal Supremo de la Justicio (Supreme Tribunal of Justice) UNHCR United Nations Human Rights Council URD Unión Republicana
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