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Colombia and Venezuela: Testing the Propaganda Model

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Colombia and Venezuela: Testing the Propaganda Model NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS mala MEDIA ACCURACY mala ON LATIN AMERICA www.mediaaccuracy.org Colombia and Venezuela: Testing the Propaganda Model By Kevin Young ECENT U.S. NEWS COVERAGE OF PARALLEL government, was home to a strong labor union. political events in Colombia and Ven- Three years later, the Chávez government de- R ezuela offers an opportunity to test the clined to renew the public broadcasting license usefulness of Edward Herman and Noam Chom- of RCTV, a privately owned Venezuelan network sky’s “propaganda model,” developed in their critical of Chávez policies that had supported 1988 book Manufacturing Consent: The Political a brief military coup against Chávez in 2002. Economy of the Mass Media (Pantheon, reissued RCTV returned to the airwaves seven weeks 2002). The model predicts that the news media later via cable and satellite. will look favorably upon the Colombian gov- 2. Presidential term limits. Between 2004 and ernment of Álvaro Uribe, a close U.S. ally, while 2007, both Chávez and Uribe attempted to consistently vilifying the Venezuelan government extend or abolish presidential term limits in of Hugo Chávez, whom the U.S. government fre- their respective countries; Uribe was success- quently identifies as an antagonist. If the model ful, Chávez was not. Their proposals differed in holds, U.S. media outlets will be found to portray three respects: first, Chávez included his request the Uribe government as relatively democratic, within a larger package of social, economic, and progressive, and peaceful, while casting the political reforms, whereas Uribe did not; sec- Chávez government as authoritarian, regressive, ond, the Chávez proposal and reforms were de- and militaristic. feated by a popular referendum, whereas Uribe’s Restricting the comparison to the two leading request was granted by the Colombian Congress liberal U.S. newspapers, The New York Times and and upheld by a Supreme Court ruling; and The Washington Post, this prediction is testable us- third, Chávez proposed to eliminate term lim- ing two sets of similar events revolving around its entirely, whereas Uribe proposed to extend issues of political freedom and democracy: them. Nonetheless, both were proposals to ex- 1. Freedom of speech and the press. In October pand executive power. Kevin Young is a 2004 the Uribe government closed down Inrav- If the propaganda model holds, U.S. newspaper graduate student isión, a public broadcaster analogous to PBS, reports and editorials will express outrage over in history at Stony calling it “inefficient.” The station, which often Chávez’s actions while ignoring, justifying, or Brook University. broadcasted reportage critical of the Colombian endorsing Uribe’s. 50 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2008 mala N MAY AND JUNE 2007, THE TIMES Neither paper reported the well- that recalled stories of underground and the Post together published documented fact that RCTV had dissidents in the Eastern bloc: “He I 19 articles dealing with the lent vocal support to an authoritar- changes cellphones every few days. Chávez government’s nonrenewal of ian military coup against the demo- After receiving dozens of death the RCTV license, plus two edito- cratically elected Chávez adminis- threats, he moves among the apart- rial columns strongly condemning tration—comparable to NBC or CBS ments of friends here each day in the Venezuelan government’s deci- advocating the violent overthrow search of a safe place to sleep.” Two sion. The Times’ May 27 report de- of the U.S. government. RCTV was days before, on November 8, the scribed a decisive “shift in media” frequently described as a “dissident Times had reported that “a march by under Chávez, noting network” or an “opposi- tens of thousands of students to the the emergence of “a new Unfortunately, tion TV station” without Supreme Court” was met by masked media elite” composed we cannot any mention of its support gunmen who injured two people. of Chávez’s “ideologi- for the coup. When news The report made little attempt to cal devotees,” although compare the reports and opinion pieces avoid giving the impression that the it did acknowledge that coverage of did mention this fact, they gunmen were sent by the govern- “most news organizations usually qualified it by say- ment, simply quoting a government in Venezuela remain in the RCTV affair ing that Chávez claimed official as saying that “we do not private hands.” The next to coverage of RCTV had supported the know what faction they belong to.” day Times correspondent the Inravisión coup. A typical example in After the December 2 referendum, Simon Romero reported the Post: “Authorities here four more Times articles on the issue that “thousands of pro- scandal in say that RCTV support- appeared in eight days, all convey- testers” supporting RCTV Colombia: The ed a coup that dislodged ing similar impressions. filled the streets of the Chávez for two days in Much of the coverage in both pa- capital Caracas before “the latter event 2002.” By framing RCTV’s pers implied or even stated explic- police dispersed [them] received not a support for the coup as itly that the proposal, if approved, by firing tear gas into a mere allegation of the would install Chávez as “de facto single mention [the] demonstrations.” Venezuelan government— president for life.” Before the vote Even more so than the in either paper. rather than as a matter of Post columnist Jackson Diehl wrote Times’, the Post’s cover- fact—the newspapers im- indignantly that “Chávez will be- age tended to glorify the protesters plied that the charge against RCTV come the presumptive president- as freedom fighters confronting the could simply be dismissed by out- for-life of a new autocracy.” The repression of the Chávez govern- side observers. Times’ Roger Cohen went a step ment. During the two-week stretch Unfortunately, we cannot com- further, comparing Chávez to fascist immediately before and after RCTV pare this coverage of the RCTV affair dictators of the past because of his went off the airwaves, the Post fea- to the papers’ coverage of the Inrav- “grab for socialist-emperor status.” tured six updates in its World in isión scandal in Colombia: The latter The Times editorial page registered Brief section that all cast Chávez in event received not a single mention its full agreement. In their one edi- a decidedly autocratic light. Several in either paper. torial, titled “Saying No to Chavez,” also portrayed government forces as the editors expressed shock at the having violently repressed the pro- HE RESULTS FOR THE SECOND “breathtaking gall of Mr. Chavez’s lat- tests in Caracas. The May 29 update of the two case studies are est lunge for power,” echoing Times reported that “[p]olice fired tear gas T similar. Chávez’s package of reports that “thousands of university and plastic bullets into a crowd of social and political reforms later in students have taken to the streets to about 5,000,” but the report did not 2007 was dealt predictable treat- protest, facing down armed Chavis- mention that many of the protest- ment in the U.S. press prior to its ta thugs.” The December 4 editorial ers had themselves committed acts defeat by popular referendum in compared Chávez to Vladimir Putin of violence. One later update noted December, with most media atten- of Russia and applauded the cour- that the protests were “sometimes tion focusing on opposition pro- age of Venezuelan voters for having violent” and another mentioned tests in the lead-up to the vote. The defeated Chávez’s proposal. that “[a]t least 30 [protesters] were Times painted a romantic portrait Nor was this type of language charged with violent acts.” of student leader Yon Goicoechea limited to editorial columns; news 51 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS mala reports often spoke of “constitutional Three years earlier the U.S. press of popular opinion polls showing changes that, if approved by voters had been similarly uncritical of significant support for Chávez, was on Sunday, could extend [Chávez’s] Uribe’s political maneuvers. In No- all but missing. Forero’s brief re- presidency for life.” Post correspon- vember 2004 the Colombian Con- ports on Uribe represent the closest dent Juan Forero wrote a total of eight gress had approved Uribe’s proposal thing to criticism of Uribe in the the reports dealing with Chávez’s pro- allowing him to run for an addi- mainstream U.S. media; more often, posal to eliminate term limits. In his tional term, and eleven months later reports and editorials have heaped November 29 article Forero opened the Supreme Court had declared the praise upon Uribe for his commit- by saying that the upcom- proposal constitutional. ment to democracy and freedom. ing referendum vote “could The two papers During the two-month For the Post editors, for example, extend [Chávez’s] presi- published 30 time frame around each “Uribe stands out as a defender of dency for life.” In the same of these events (November liberal democracy.” articles and piece he interviewed an 2004–January 2005 and Uribe’s commitment to democra- opponent of the proposal, 15 editorials September 15–November cy was revealed again in June 2008, and then seemed to agree on Chávez’s 15, 2005), little indigna- when the Colombian Supreme Court with his interviewee that tion appeared in either the sentenced a member of the Colom- its passage “would effec- bid to extend Times or the Post. The two bian Congress to house arrest for ac- tively turn Venezuela into term limits; two papers mentioned Uribe’s cepting bribes from the Uribe gov- a dictatorship run at the proposal a combined total ernment in exchange for supporting whim of one man.” In case articles and of four times: two news the 2004 constitutional amendment Forero’s reportage left any no editorials articles in the Times, and allowing for presidential reelection.
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