Nationalism and Issue Saliency: a Mixed-Method Analysis of Eastern Europe and Russia

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University of Nevada, Reno

Nationalism and Issue Saliency: A Mixed-Method Analysis of Eastern Europe and Russia

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Nataliia Kasianenko

Dr. Robert L. Ostergard, Jr./Dissertation Advisor

May, 2018

ABSTRACT

Nataliia Kasianenko: Nationalism and Issue Saliency: A Mixed-Method Analysis of Eastern Europe and Russia (Under the direction of Robert L. Ostergard, Jr.)

In three articles, my dissertation examines nationalism in the context of Eastern

Europe. Overall, the argument put forward in the dissertation is that nationalism can take a variety of forms, and the mechanism behind nationalist mobilization is multilevel, with both top-down and bottom-up processes in place. The articles explore the nature of nationalism and its origins in a multi-level perspective through saliency theory. Saliency theory, applied in this dissertation is originally associated with democratic, competitive and multi-party systems. This dissertation is testing the application of saliency theory to understanding nationalism in the context of newly democratic and semi-democratic countries of Eastern Europe.

The dissertation further explores the interaction between two levels of analysis by looking at how nationalist ideas might be communicated by the political elites to the masses through media sources and how individuals might be receptive to these ideas by associating them with specific issues and concerns. The dissertation is based on multi- method research, including theoretical analysis, comparative case studies, historical analysis, quantitative content analysis and Mokken scaling analysis.

The first article presents a theoretical analysis of nationalism as a concept and its typology in the context of Eastern Europe. The typology of nationalism is reevaluated in the course of the dissertation. I argue in support of a typology expressed in terms of degrees/gradations of nationalism from weaker to moderate and strong forms. Historical ii analysis is also incorporated in order to investigate the nature and typology of nationalism in particular Eastern European states through a multiple case study. I find that the nature of nationalism is shaped by the salience of issues that individuals may face. These issues may not be the typical challenges a country faces like economic recession and immigration; instead, the issues may be more personal, with local individuals and elites exchanging cues about local conditions. When it comes to strongest forms of nationalism, they tend to originate on the level of political elites and are then transferred to local individuals through elite nationalist rhetoric and mass media.

The second article puts forward a new theoretical argument that clarifies the conditions under which political elites are successful in promoting nationalism. Drawing on the existing literature that connects nationalism and the saliency theory, I advance the understanding of why despite similar political and socio-economic conditions some states are more successful in promoting nationalism than others. The article outlines how nationalism can be used by state leaders to promote legitimacy and how media serves as the main instrument in this top-down process. Media flows are compared in Russia and

Ukraine to see whether nationalist ideology in both countries has been tied to salient issues in the national media space before and after the 2014 conflict. I find that despite similar ability to control media and an interest in promoting nationalism, the Russian president is advancing nationalism differently compared to the leaders of Ukraine. First of all, in Russia nationalist rhetoric is couched in both political and cultural issues, while in Ukraine nationalism is advanced in the context of solely political concerns. Secondly, the Russian president is advancing a larger volume of nationalist rhetoric in state- sponsored media, particularly at the time when nationalism is most salient to the domestic iii publics in both Russia and Ukraine, in the spring of 2014.

The third article addresses an existing gap in the literature by presenting one of the first attempts to measure nationalism in 12 Eastern European states. Using

International Social Survey Program data from 1995-2013 and Mokken scaling analysis, I create a new nationalism index measure that accounts for the intensity of nationalist sentiments based on the measures of national identification, national consciousness, patriotism, national pride, national superiority and xenophobic nationalism. I find that the patterns of weak, moderate, and strong manifestations of nationalism are time dependent and context dependent. The changes in the intensity of nationalism can be linked to socio-economic transformations in a country, new policies advanced by the government, or the rhetoric of political elites.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have to thank a lot of people in my life who made this dissertation possible. The department of Political Science and its chair, Dr. Herzik were supportive throughout my graduate school experience, assisting me with funding and opportunities to grow as an instructor, an advisor, and a scholar. My graduate education was also enriched through the research experience and funding provided by the International Foundation for

Electoral Systems (IFES) and GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences.

I would like to specifically thank my mentor and the chair of my dissertation committee, Dr. Robert Ostergard. From my first semester in the graduate program (when

I took three classes from him and it nearly killed me), he was my greatest source of inspiration. He guided my research and mentored me in my teaching. Most importantly, he always believed in my abilities more than I could ever believe in myself. He is both a brilliant academic and a great person. This dissertation would not be possible without his guidance, support, and expertise.

I owe a great deal to my dissertation committee members. Dr. Susanne Martin and

Dr. Ian Hartshorn have helped clarify my research questions and case selection. Dr.

Kemmelmeier and Dr. Houmanfar have provided helpful feedback at the prospectus stage of my dissertation and beyond. The faculty members at the department of Political

Science, Drs. Bozena Welborne, Elizabeth Koebele, Steven Wilson, Nicholas Seltzer,

Jeremy Gelman, and William Eubank either read or discussed parts of my dissertation with me. Their comments and suggestions for improvement helped me tremendously.

I would like to thank my graduate student colleagues for their support, friendship, and constructive criticism of my work. In no particular order, Jeffrey Griffin, RJ Groh, v

Courtenay Burns, Travis Hagner, and Janicke Stramer-Smith helped me through the academic and the non-academic parts of my graduate school career. I am also grateful to

Paula Makienko, an undergraduate student with Russian and Ukrainian language expertise, who assisted me with coding for Article 2.

Finally, my success in graduate school would not be possible without the support of my family. I’d like to thank my parents, Liubov and Petro Kasianenko. They made a lot of sacrifices to make sure I had the best opportunities in life and could pursue my dreams. They were always my most enthusiastic supporters. I would like to thank my

American host parents, Cindy and Phillip Brown. They made it possible for me to pursue my education in the U.S. and for that I will be forever grateful. Finally, I would like to thank Amanda Smith for her love, encouragement, and support. She has endured my long hours of writing, the moments of enthusiasm, and the times of despair. Through it all, she has never stopped encouraging me and lifting me up. I am lucky to have her.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Scope ...... 1

State of the literature ...... 2

Overview of the component articles...... 10

ARTICLE 1. The Continuum of Eastern European Nationalism...... 13

Introduction ...... 13

The Conceptualizations of Nationalism...... 15

The Nature of Eastern European Nationalism ...... 21

Political elites and saliency theory ...... 22

Gradations of Nationalism in the Eastern European Context ...... 25

Weak Manifestations of Nationalism...... 28

National identity: Russian nationalism in the 1990s...... 29

Western Ukrainian nationalism in the early 19th Century ...... 30

Moderate Manifestations of Nationalism...... 31

Patriotism: Poland in the 1980s...... 34

National pride: Bulgarian nationalism in the 1990s...... 36

Strong Manifestations of Nationalism ...... 37

National superiority: Slovenian nationalism in the 1990s...... 39

Xenophobic nationalism: present-day Hungarian nationalism ...... 40

Conclusion...... 42

References ...... 44

Appendix A ...... 52 vii

ARTICLE 2. State-Sponsored Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Russia and

Ukraine...... 54

Introduction ...... 54

Top-down Nationalism in the Media ...... 57

Application of Saliency Theory...... 62

Understanding Russian and Ukrainian Nationalism Historically ...... 65

Methodology...... 71

Data Collection ...... 74

Data Analysis ...... 77

Content Analysis of Nationalist Rhetoric in the Russian Media...... 78

Content Analysis of Nationalist Rhetoric in the Ukrainian Media...... 83

Results...... 89

Discussion...... 92

Conclusion...... 93

References ...... 97

Appendix B...... 104

ARTICLE 3. Measuring Dimensions of Nationalism in East-Central Europe: A

Cross-National Analysis ...... 108

Introduction ...... 108

The study of nationalism from below...... 111

Individual-level measures of nationalism...... 114

Theoretical Approach ...... 118

Data...... 123 viii

Scale Construction...... 125

Variables of Interest...... 129

Nationalism Scales...... 131

Scale Analysis...... 134

Analysis of regional trends...... 135

Analysis of country trends...... 137

Comparing the dimensions of nationalism...... 142

Discussion and Conclusion ...... 148

Weak dimensions ...... 149

Moderate dimensions ...... 150

Strong dimensions ...... 152

Strengths and weaknesses of the nationalism index...... 154

References ...... 157

Appendix C ...... 165

CONCLUSION...... 176

Directions for future research...... 178

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1A. Empirical Markers for Gradations of Nationalism ...... 52

Table 2A. Typical Cases of Gradations of Nationalism in Eastern Europe...... 52

Table 2.1 Survey Results for Support of Russian Nationalism ...... 55

Table 2.2 Survey Results for Support of Ukrainian Nationalism ...... 56

Table 2.3 Comparison of Russia and Ukraine: Most-Similar Design ...... 72

Table 2.4 Political/Economic Environment in Russia and Ukraine ...... 73

Table 2.5 Television Sources of Media Content...... 75

Table 2.6 Media Sources and Clip Counts...... 77

Table 2.7 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Russian Media, % to the total number of references to the nation...... 78

Table 2.8 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Russian Media, by number of references (September 2013-August 2014) ...... 79

Table 2.9 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian Media, % to the total number of references to the nation...... 84

Table 2.10 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian media, by number of references (September 2013-August 2014) ...... 85

Table 1B. Clips Containing Direct Speech of Leaders in Russia and Ukraine, by number… ...... 104

Table 2B. Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Russian and the Ukrainian

Media, by number of references ...... 104

Table 3B. Nationalist Rhetoric (Associated with “People”) and Issue Saliency in the

Russian and the Ukrainian Media, by number of references...... 104 x

Table 4B. Nationalist Rhetoric (Associated with “People”) and Issue Saliency in the

Russian Media, by number of references...... 105

Table 5B. Nationalist Rhetoric (Associated with “People”) and Issue Saliency in the

Ukrainian Media, by number of references ...... 105

Table 6B. Nationalist Rhetoric (associated with “nation”) and Issue Saliency in the

Russian and the Ukrainian Media, by number of references...... 105

Table 7B. Nationalist Rhetoric (associated with “nation”) and Issue Saliency in the

Russian Media, by number of references ...... 105

Table 8B. Nationalist Rhetoric (associated with “nation”) and Issue Saliency in the

Ukrainian Media, by number of references ...... 105

Table 3.1 The Variables of Interest for Nationalism Scales ...... 130

Table 3.2 Average Scores for All Countries...... 135

Table 3.3 Summary Statistics for Scales...... 136

Table 3.4 Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 1995 (sorted by Nationalism Index) ....139

Table 3.5 Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 2003 (sorted by Nationalism Index) ....140

Table 3.6 Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 2013 (sorted by Nationalism Index) ....141

Table 1C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 1

(National Identity) 1995...... 165

Table 2C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 2

(National Consciousness) 1995...... 165

Table 3C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 3

(Patriotism) 1995 ...... 165 xi

Table 4C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 4

(National Pride) 1995...... 166

Table 5C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 5

(National Superiority) 1995 ...... 166

Table 6C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 6

(Xenophobic Nationalism) 1995...... 166

Table 7C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 1

(National Identity) 2003...... 167

Table 8C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 2

(National Consciousness) 2003...... 167

Table 9C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 3

(Patriotism) 2003 ...... 167

Table 10C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 4

(National Pride) 2003...... 168

Table 11C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 5

(National Superiority) 2003 ...... 168

Table 12C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 6

(Xenophobic Nationalism) 2003...... 168

Table 13C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 1

(National Identity) 2013...... 169

Table 14C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 2

(National Consciousness) 2013...... 169 xii

Table 15C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 3

(Patriotism) 2013 ...... 169

Table 16C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 4

(National Pride) 2013...... 170

Table 17C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 5

(National Superiority) 2013 ...... 170

Table 18C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 6

(Xenophobic Nationalism) 2013...... 170

Table 19C. Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 1995...... 174

Table 20C. Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 2003...... 174

Table 21C. Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 2013...... 175

Table 22C. Weak Dimension Score Trends by Country...... 175

Table 23C. Moderate Dimension Score Trends by Country...... 175

Table 24C. Strong Dimension Score Trends by Country ...... 175

xiii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1A. Feedback Mechanism of Nationalist Mobilization...... 53

Figure 2A. Gradations of Nationalism...... 53

Figure 2.1 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Russian Media by Type, as a percentage of the total number of all key words associated with nationalist rhetoric ...... 79

Figure 2.2 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Russian Media by Type, as a percentage of the total number of all key words associated with nationalist rhetoric ...... 80

Figure 2.3 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian Media by Type, as a percentage of the total number of references to the nation...... 84

Figure 2.4 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian Media by Type, as a percentage of the total number of references to the nation...... 85

Figure 1B. Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian and Russian

Media ...... 106

Figure 2B. Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian and Russian

Media ...... 107

Figure 3.1 Frequency of Countries by Nationalism Index...... 137

Figure 3.2 Distribution of Nationalism Scores in 1995, 2003, and 2013 ...... 138

Figure 3.3 Distribution of National Identity Scores in 1995, 2003, and 2013...... 142

Figure 3.4 Distribution of National Consciousness Scores in 1995, 2003, and 2013...... 143

Figure 3.5 Distribution of Patriotism Scores in 1995, 2003, and 2013 ...... 144

Figure 3.6 Distribution of National Pride Scores in 1995, 2003, and 2013...... 145

Figure 3.7 Distribution of National Superiority Scores in 1995, 2003, and 2013 ...... 146

Figure 3.8 Distribution of Xenophobic Nationalism Scores in 1995, 2003, and 2013....147 xiv

Figure 1C. Distributions of National Identity Estimates ...... 171

Figure 2C. Distributions of National Consciousness Estimates ...... 171

Figure 3C. Distributions of Patriotism Estimates ...... 172

Figure 4C. Distributions of National Pride Estimates ...... 172

Figure 5C. Distributions of National Superiority Estimates...... 173

Figure 6C. Distributions of Xenophobic Nationalism Estimates...... 173

Figure 7C. Distributions of Nationalism Estimates ...... 174

INTRODUCTION

My dissertation follows a three-article format, with the articles being independent, yet linked together by a common theme and theory. The dissertation deals with an incredibly salient set of questions in comparative politics. In 2017, nationalism predominated throughout the world. Political leaders in the United States, the United

Kingdom, Poland, Austria, Israel, Hungary successfully used nationalistic rhetoric to win elections, exit the European Union, and enact sweeping policy changes. These political victories have left pundits grasping for explanations as to why nationalism has become such an effective political force. While rather new to Western European and North

American political observers, nationalism has remained a prominent political ideology in

East-Central Europe (ECE). While nationalism persists in the region, it is not omnipresent and may change its intensity or manifestation over time.

Scope

The dissertation offers a conceptual reexamination of the nature of nationalism in the context of East-Central Europe and Russia. I argue that nationalism as an ideology and as an individual sentiment is more complex and fluid than what scholars have conceptualized it to be. Most research on Eastern European nationalism has focused on the negative consequences of nationalism, while overlooking the underlying processes behind the formation of nationalist ideology and nationalist sentiments that can produce neutral, benign and mixed expressions of nationalism among individuals. This trend has resulted in a stereotype of “Eastern nationalism” as a source of aggression and instability.

Recent political developments in the region associated with the influx of refugees, new interstate conflicts, and the rise of populist and ultra-nationalist parties and movements in 2

ECE countries suggest that it is essential to have a more comprehensive understanding of nationalism. In my dissertation, I reexamine the origins and manifestations of nationalism and the trends in nationalist sentiments across the ECE region. The questions my dissertation addresses are the following. What typology of nationalism might reflect the diversity of nationalist sentiments in Eastern Europe? How can aggressive nationalism evolve out of its weaker and benign forms? How do leaders in nondemocratic regimes use nationalist rhetoric and frame nationalism in the media to control public opinion?

What measures of nationalism can be used to compare the level of nationalist sentiments across multiple states in ECE? I rely on mixed methodology in my dissertation, including process tracing, multiple case studies, historical analysis, content analysis, and Mokken scaling analysis.

State of the Literature

The understanding of nationalism among scholars has been changing and evolving, which resulted in a large number of academic literature on the topic. Still, scholars cannot agree on a single definition of nationalism, its typology, and a reliable explanation of the origins of nationalist sentiments. As a consequence, the measures of nationalism are based on scales that represent different conceptualizations of this phenomenon. In the meantime, scholars rely on nationalism as an explanatory variable in their research on international and domestic conflict, party politics, and democratization.

In the words of Mayall (1990), “…nationalism is…regarded as a convenient black box into which whatever cannot be explained in any other way…can be filed away without further consideration” (5). 3

Scholars of nationalism have varying opinions on the origins of nationalism.

Some claim that nationalism is a modern phenomenon (Breuilly 1993; Gellner 1983; E. J.

Hobsbawm 2012; Mayall 1990). Others argue that although nationalism as a concept emerged fairly recently in modern history, nationalist sentiments have long historical roots (Geertz 1963; Hastings 1997; Shils 1957). The origins of nationalist ideas date back to the writings of the 18th century philosophers (in particular, Rousseau and Herder).

Although these philosophers did not specifically address nationalism, they emphasized the importance of cohesiveness and unity in any society. Their work focused on the importance of cultivating and preserving distinct customs, traditions and ideals in a state in order to maintain a harmonious society rooted in freedom and equality (Barnard 1983).

Cultural distinctiveness translated into the sentiments of respect and loyalty shared among group members (Mazzini 1887).

“Nation” as a concept was first introduced by the French in the 19th century as they advanced their political and cultural dominance in Europe (Plamenatz 1976; Weber

1976). The French Revolution and its ideals of freedom, unity and equality became the basis of nationalism in its modern sense (Weber 1976). The promotion of national consciousness among the masses in France marked the beginning of politicization of nationalism (Plamenatz 1976). The concept of nationalism has originated from groups’ realization of their cultural differences, cultural progress, and the comparison of this progress to that of other groups.

Nationalism refers to the category of phenomena in political science that have a high degree of complexity and ambivalence. The understanding of nationalism as a concept has been changing over time (Williams 1989). Originally, nationalism was 4 conceptualized in terms of state-building and unification; today it can also refer to the calls for greater autonomy, separatism, and independence. Similarly, in the realm of politics, nationalism used to be predominantly associated with political programs of the leftist parties, while today it is primarily discussed in the context of the far-right political movements (Dogan 1994). With the increasing interdependence of states, economies, and societies, many scholars have anticipated the decline of nationalism (Held 1999;

Hobsbawm 1977; Kedourie 1960; Nairn 2003). Yet, in light of recent rise in populism around the world, most scholars agree that nationalism is still relevant and cannot be dismissed (Anderson 1991; Mann 1995; Plamenatz 1976; Smith 2004). According to

Tamir (1995), globalization has produced “national movements (that) are motivated by a desire to assure the existence and flourishing of a particular community to preserve its culture, tradition, language” (xiii). Some scholars claim that in the era of globalization and interdependence, nationalism flourishes and we have yet to witness the proliferation of nationalist movements around the world (Smith 2004; Williams 1989).

In a general sense, nationalism involves assessing one’s distinctiveness and comparing one group’s status to the position of others. Nationalism can therefore be understood as a “desire to preserve or enhance a people’s national or cultural identity when that identity is threatened or the desire to transform or even to create it where it is felt to be inadequate or lacking” (Newman 1987, 56). National mobilization can be fueled by insecurity and uncertainty as group identities are threatened or contested (Delanty and

O’Mahony 2002). If a group (community, state) feels inferior or threatened, nationalism is likely to flourish (Plamenatz 1976). As a result, nationalism entails an emotional element to it. Some scholars believe that it is natural for an individual to identify with a 5 group and form emotional ties with it (Guibernau 2013; James 1996; Marx 2003).

Ultimately, a desire to transform, create or protect one’s national (cultural) identity often becomes primary and dominant among individuals or in a group (community).

Nationalism as a concept involves not only the idea of attachment to a nation or culture, but also a sense of pride in one’s group, community, and nation-state (Kacowicz 1998).

In this dissertation, I define nationalism as a political ideology that advances varying forms of attachment to a nation. This definition is closely linked to the conceptualization of nationalism proposed by Michael Billig (1995) who highlighted both political and cultural components of nationalism and suggested that nationalism should not be reduced to its “hot” forms. Billig (1995) argues that nationalism is a political ideology that creates and continuously reproduces the image of a nation from the elites and from the bottom (through banal or everyday expressions of nationalism). Thus, nationalism is viewed as a fluid ideology and as a form of individual sentiments that may reflect benign, malignant, neutral, or mixed expressions of attachment to a nation.

The investigation of the philosophical origins of nationalism highlights the inherent nature of nationalism that is not always negative and violent. In fact, nationalism can serve as a cohesive and unifying force in a society. At its core, nationalism does not carry a negative connotation, though it could potentially become aggressive and violent if there exists an actual or perceived threat to a nation or the well being of a nation. Still, nationalism is often conceptualized as a negative term that involves discrimination and violence. In my dissertation, I argue that nationalism in ECE should not be reduced to its cultural or “ethnic” forms. To uncover the causes of nationalist mobilization and understand why nationalism may turn aggressive or discriminatory, nationalism needs to 6 be examined on a continuum reflecting the intensity of sentiments of national attachments.

The academic literature contains a large number of typologies of nationalism. The most common typology reflects the dichotomy of civic vs. ethnic or “good” vs. “bad” manifestations of nationalism. While this typology may be instrumental when exploring the basic nature of the nationalist ideology advanced in a country, it is much too simplistic to explain the variation of nationalist sentiments. In my dissertation, I argue that the normative element is not useful when constructing the typology because it does not reflect the complexity and multidimensionality of nationalism as a phenomenon. Both ethnic and civic components might be present on an individual level. Therefore, it is more useful to think of a typology as a cumulative continuum with different degrees (levels of intensity). This approach would allow presenting the range of nationalist sentiments in a more accurate way and it would also facilitate the measurement of nationalist sentiments.

When it comes to the measures of nationalism in the literature, most scales and indices of nationalism rely on data obtained through public opinion surveys. While some of the existing measures of nationalism are quite detailed and may capture the variety of manifestations of nationalism in a country, they are also specific to a certain country or national group. There is a visible shortage of cross-country measures of nationalist sentiments. The weakness of most existing measures is in the fact that the component variables do not fully tap into the nature of nationalism. Instead, these measures either exclusively evaluate national consciousness, patriotism, or individual inclination towards xenophobia. The scale introduced by Dekker et al. (2003) seems to be the most efficient to date as it reflects six different degrees of nationalist sentiments based on a number of 7 statements for each degree. Still, these authors conceptualize the most extreme degree of nationalism as simply nationalism, which is inconsistent with the idea that nationalism may be of benign and mixed nature. In my dissertation, I design a new cross-country measure of nationalist sentiments based on the six intensity gradations of nationalism on a continuum (ranging from weak to strong manifestations of nationalism).

Theories of nationalism also abound. Some of them suffer from theoretical inconsistencies (primordialism and ethno-symbolism), others rely exclusively on history

(perennialism) or have difficulty explaining the power of history, myths, and symbols associated with the idea of a nation (constructivism). Modernism presents the most developed theory to date: however, there is a large variety of explanations among modernists as to the main drivers of nationalism. In addition, most modernists focus on explaining nation-building on the state level and have trouble explaining motivations behind nationalist mobilization among individuals. Specifically, constructivist scholars could potentially be successful in explaining motivations (embracing ideas, perceptions, culture that form a subjective national identity) behind recent nationalism (Anderson

1991; Gellner 1983). However, they too suffer from a lack of clarity while defining the exact mechanism behind nationalist mobilization.

Overall, a theory of nationalism should incorporate individual-level motivations and macro-level factors in order to provide a compelling explanation of this complex phenomenon. In my dissertation, I use the modernist approach to understanding nationalism. I argue that nationalism is a social construct that is promoted by the elites in pursuit of their interests (state-building, unification, separatism, legitimacy, electoral support). The origins of state-building nationalism can be traced to industrialization while 8 the roots of more recent nationalist movements in history can be associated with structural transformations that required political elites to promote new policies with a focus on nationalist sentiments.

The modernist approach in general and Gellner’s theory of nationalism, in particular, are compelling. First of all, the modernist approach explains why the concept of a nation has not appeared until the 18th century (Weber 1976). Gellner (1983) argues that industrialization has brought not only structural, but also cultural and political changes in states. Before industrialization, there was no need to unite culturally distinct agrarian societies within a state. The demands of industrialization, however, required a large mobile and literate working class coming from various ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Thus, nations were produced as a result of cultural homogenization, the

“invention” of national history, myths and traditions by the elites (Anderson 1991). Most modernist scholars associate nationalism with modernization, mass education, and advanced mobility of people (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1953; Hechter

2000). Some also emphasize the need of the new elites to establish their legitimacy as the revolutionary movements in Europe in the 19th century have undermined the divine basis of power for rulers (Hobsbawm 2012). According to the modernist theory proposed by

Hechter (2000) the main cause of nationalism has been associated with the introduction of a direct rule in Europe as a form of government. The need to control culturally distinct territories has pushed the elites to introduce nationalism. The latter two arguments can only be applied in the narrow context of Europe. However, the broader modernist theory introduced by Gellner can be used to explain nationalism in various regions of the world. 9

While being able to explain state-building nationalism, modernist approach also allows to explain more recent nationalist movements. Gellner (1983) associates conflicting nationalism with unequal benefits from industrialization for members of various ethnic groups that oppose assimilation to the national culture. Primordialist approach to nationalism, on the other hand, is unable to explain why despite the existence of culturally distinct traits, various ethnic groups coexist with each other for centuries in a single nation before deciding to engage in conflict for a state autonomy.

Another strength of the modernist approach is in its ability to explain why some ethnic groups aspire to their own nation and some do not. According to an alternative primordialist approach, nationalism is rooted in ethnicity, and cultural distinctions among ethnic groups push them to demand autonomy. However, there are a larger number of ethnicities in the world than there are nations. The modernist approach is able to explain why some nations today are multiethnic. According to Gellner (1983), the essence of a nation is in its exclusive right to an autonomous state, regardless of its ethnic composition. Attempts to preserve the ethnic autonomy within the nation-state are viewed as reactionary, preventing the modernization of society. Thus, a common standardized education and a common language were introduced by the elites to promote assimilation of culturally distinct groups into national (high) culture. Citizens from various backgrounds were, therefore, pressured to assimilate in order to compete for jobs, status, and resources. As the benefits of industrialization always spread unevenly, the disadvantaged groups might also be culturally distinct groups. Gellner (1983) claims that if disadvantaged groups associate their position with their ethnic distinction, they might demand autonomy and independence. However, if ethnic groups are benefitting from the 10 economy as much as other groups in a nation, they are more likely to peacefully coexist with other groups.

Another important advantage of the modernist approach over others is in the fact that it is able to explain the dominance of national identity over all other types of identity

(ethnic, religious, linguistic). According to Gellner’s theory, national identity has become primary for individuals because throughout history any other type of identity that comes from cultural and ethnic distinction could become the basis for discrimination in terms of jobs, education, and various rights associated with citizenship. The source of nationalism comes from everyday experiences. National identification thus becomes primary in terms of collective benefits that an individual receives by being a member of a nation.

In the dissertation, I explain the mechanism behind nationalist mobilization using saliency theory, which allows accounting for both levels of analysis (elites and individuals). I use saliency theory to show how political elites intentionally intensify nationalism to gain legitimacy or advance to power. I find that the nature of nationalism is shaped by the salience of issues that individuals or the state may face.

Overview of the Component Articles

The first article presents a theoretical reexamination of the origins and manifestations of nationalism in the context of East-Central Europe based on saliency theory. The article seeks to clarify the nature of nationalism by exploring its forms on a single continuum while refining the mechanism behind the intensification of nationalism.

In doing so, this article highlights weak, moderate, and strong expressions of nationalism that often get neglected in the context of Eastern European states. The article applies saliency theory to highlight the mechanism of how nationalism can develop into more 11 intense and malignant manifestations. Once the nature of concerns of the public changes from socio-political to socio-economic, nationalism may transform from its weaker manifestations to stronger and even aggressive gradations. After this tipping point, the nature of a perceived threat becomes more personal, directed at each individual as a member of a nation. I advance a continuum of nationalism reflecting a wide range of forms that nationalism can take. The article provides examples of typical cases representing different gradations of nationalism on a continuum in the context of ECE. In each example, I explore the role of political elites and local individuals in further intensifying nationalist sentiments.

The second article compares the nature and the patterns of nationalist rhetoric advanced by political leaders in two countries engaged in conflict to clarify the conditions under which political elites may be successful in enhancing nationalism in nondemocratic regimes. Drawing on the existing literature that connects nationalism and saliency theory, the research highlights why despite similar political, cultural, and socio- economic conditions, including the presence of a military conflict between states, some states are more successful in promoting nationalism than others. The article examines how state leaders may use state-controlled media to advance nationalism for political purposes. I explore mainstream news coverage in Russia and Ukraine with a particular emphasis on how political leadership frames nationalist rhetoric in the two countries to emphasize certain issues over others. I focus on relevant media content that contains nationalist rhetoric before and after the invasion of Russia into Ukraine’s territory in the spring of 2014. The analysis shows that over the course of the year, president Putin was much more active in his nationalist rhetoric over the state-controlled media compared to 12 the Ukrainian leaders, which might partially explain why his nationalist rhetoric was more effective. The analysis also shows that state leaders can successfully promote nationalism if their nationalist rhetoric is couched in cultural issues and concerns. The article highlights the differences in the dynamic of nationalist rhetoric over time, suggesting that the key period of the annexation of Crimea was associated with a rise of nationalist rhetoric in Russia and a decline of this rhetoric in Ukraine.

The third article presents one of the first attempts to measure nationalist sentiments across multiple states in ECE using survey data. The measure reflects the fluid nature of nationalism and represents the cumulative index that includes measures of six dimensions of nationalism along the intensity continuum presented in Article 1. This new index allows examining the patterns of nationalist sentiments in ECE across 18 years from 1995 to 2013. The measure is instrumental in advancing cross-national research on nationalism in the region that has been recently associated with rising xenophobia and isolationism. The article shows that the patterns of both weak and strong manifestations of nationalism are different across ECE countries over time, with some states exhibiting growing trends for weak nationalism dimensions, while other states exhibiting declining trends for strong and malignant dimensions of nationalism. These changes in the dynamic nature of nationalism over time may be associated with multiple factors. Some of them include socio-economic transformations in countries and how the public perceives these changes. Others revolve around the policies and rhetoric of political elites, and whether the public accepts or rejects these policies and rhetoric.

Article 1. The Continuum of Eastern European Nationalism

Abstract

The article presents a theoretical reexamination of the origins and types of nationalism in the context of Eastern Europe based on a richer theory of nationalism. It advances a continuum of nationalism reflecting a wide range of forms that nationalism can take. Saliency theory is applied as an instrument to explain how nationalism may intensify and evolve from weak degrees to more intense malignant and aggressive manifestations. The article provides examples of typical cases for each gradation of nationalism on a continuum in the context of Eastern Europe and explores the role of elites and the masses in further intensifying nationalist sentiments.

Keywords: nationalism; Eastern Europe; elites; saliency theory

Introduction

There is a diversity of nationalism in Eastern Europe that has caught the attention of scholars and policymakers. However, this diversity of nationalism is not adequately explored in academic literature. In Russia, 68% of people express pride in their country, while 51% of the public supports the idea of ‘Russia for Russians’ (Pipia 2015). A recent survey noted that in Hungary, over 45% of the population is openly xenophobic (Juhasz and Kreko 2015). A significant number of citizens in Poland and Slovakia have become increasingly nationalistic with far-right parties elected to both legislatures (Foy 2015).

Ukraine’s nationalism has garnered more support starting with the Euromaidan protests and Russia’s involvement in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (‘Coming After You’ 2015).

While the rise of nationalism has been a long and complicated process, the recent events surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis and the crisis in eastern Ukraine have made it more important to examine the nature and diversity of nationalism in Eastern Europe. Thus, the objective of this research is to explain how nationalist sentiments can turn from relatively weak and benign to more intense and aggressive manifestations of ideology. 14

In its more virulent forms, the term ‘nationalism’ is associated with discrimination and violence. This understanding of nationalism is even more relevant in the context of

Eastern Europe where research most often focuses on discriminatory and aggressive manifestations of ethnic nationalism (Kohn 1944; Plamenatz 1976; Hockenos 2013;

Harris 2012; Ariely 2013; Jaskulowski 2010). Despite this perspective, nonviolent, and non-ethnic forms of nationalism have always existed and continue to exist in the region.

Thus, I present a theoretical re-examination of the diverse nature of nationalism in the context of Eastern Europe. I advance a new continuum of nationalism, which is more appropriate than existing typologies of nationalism. In doing so, I rely on the existing saliency theory as an instrument to understand the origins of nationalist sentiments.

Saliency theory explains party support among voters positing that parties differentiate themselves by assigning varying degrees of importance to voter concerns, including economic and foreign policy issues (Budge 1994; Klingemann et al. 1994;

Pelizzo 2003; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006). Parties and candidates therefore manipulate the salience of some issues over all others. Political elites1 switch from focusing on one relevant issue to another, depending on what they think would get them more support from voters (Klingemann et al. 1994; Budge 1994). According to the “cue-taking” theory of representation, political parties might offer cues that shape voter preferences and beliefs. As political parties take positions on particular issues, they are able to convince voters that their preferences reflect what party positions are (Popkin 1991; Zaller 1992;

Lupia and McCubbins 1998). At the same time, the voters also send cues to political

1 I define ‘political elites’ as political leadership in a country (members of executive and legislative branches of government). The term ‘masses’ refers more generally to the population of a country. 15 parties as to what their most pressing concerns are. With this theoretical foundation, I explore how saliency theory can be applied to nationalist mobilization and the emergence of more intense forms of nationalism in the countries of Eastern Europe.

There are multiple and even contradictory definitions of nationalism as a term in the academic literature; hence, trying to define nationalism in a precise way might be a futile act. The focus here is to advance the literature on the nature and diversity of nationalism. The research questions posed are the following. 1) What typology of nationalism might reflect the diversity of nationalist sentiments in Eastern Europe? 2)

How can more intense nationalism evolve out of its weaker and benign forms? I begin by exploring the nature of nationalism, specifically nationalism in Eastern Europe. Thus, I provide a brief literature review on nationalism as a concept. Next, I explain my theoretical framework of how nationalism emerges and how it may intensify on the continuum. The final part of the article applies the continuum of nationalism to the historical context of Eastern Europe.

The Conceptualizations of Nationalism

Scholars define nationalism in multiple ways, focusing on its peaceful or violent nature, its objective or subjective foundations, its inclusive or exclusive character, and its end goals (Calhoun 1997; Tamir 1995). Definitions of nationalism primarily view it as a type of political ideology (Gellner 1983; Billig 1995; Smith 2004) or as a cultural construct (Freeden 1998; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Brubaker 2004). Nationalism as a political ideology is a form of state policy, or a political movement aimed at advancing the idea of an independent nation, its priority, or its superiority (Beissinger 2002; Breuilly

1993; Hechter 2000; Tilly 2002). According to this conceptualization, nationalism as an 16 ideology can become normative because it sets certain standards, norms, and orientations in a society (Brubaker 1996; Anderson 1991; Smith 1986; Gellner 1983). The literature also presents nationalism as an element of culture, as a reaction of individuals and groups who feel disadvantaged culturally compared to others (Plamenatz 1976). In line with this conceptualization, scholars have offered an understanding of nationalism as being closely tied to ethnicity, rooted in similar traditions, language, and symbols (Anderson 1991;

Fabre and Cassia 2007; Gellner 1983).

In addition, nationalism is conceptualized on multiple levels. Some scholars study nationalism as a form of individual attachment (Alstyne 2001; Kemmelmeier and Winter

2008; Li and Brewer 2004), others explore it as sentiments or actions expressed by a particular group/community (Anderson 1991; Fabre and Cassia 2007; Gellner 1983;

Weber 1976), or a feature of state policy (Hechter 2000). Consequently, depending on the definition, nationalism can take many forms and might be explained in various ways

(Breuilly 1993; Özkırımlı 2000). Some see it as essentially illiberal and violent (Acton

1974; Kedourie 1960), others think nationalism can be unifying and benevolent

(Plamenatz 1976). The definitions of nationalism also range from broad generalizations

(as a form of identification with a nation) to specific ones (perception of ethnic or cultural dominance) (Plamenatz 1976; Gellner 1983). These disagreements among scholars result in conceptual stretching and the existence of theories of nationalism that contradict each other. For example, some theoretical approaches to nationalism (primordialism, perennialism and ethno-symbolism) emphasize the importance of national (or ethnic) identities that each individual possesses at birth, which essentially represents a bottom-up approach to nationalism. Instrumentalist (modernist) approaches reflect a top-down view 17 of nationalism because they see the government (political elites) as the driver of nationalism through education, media, and language. The vagueness of nationalism as a concept has led a number of scholars to the idea that it is impossible and futile to agree on a single definition of nationalism, thus academic efforts should instead be directed at the study of existing types of nationalism (Anderson 1991; Brubaker 2004).

What is lost in these academic debates is that the concepts of nationalism as a political ideology and as an element of culture are interconnected. An individual is not born with an intuitive understanding of what the nation is and what its characteristics are.

Through socialization, culture, and institutions, the concept of a nation becomes embedded in the minds of individuals. Political elites promote the idea of a nation that has a rich historical legacy to create an emotional attachment to a nation and to gain political support from the masses (Marples 2007). If successful, this bridging of culture and ideology allows the elites to mobilize the masses, often by emphasizing threats to a nation and its welfare. Therefore, the political ideology of nationalism embodies culture, traditions, and institutions. At the same time, forms and expressions of nationalism differ depending on whether and how political elites advance nationalism. Thus, a single all- encompassing definition of nationalism is nearly impossible to achieve.

Part of the diversity of nationalism is the relationship between patriotism and nationalism. Much like the broader research on nationalism, research on both nationalism and patriotism suggests that the two concepts are either fundamentally similar (Billig

1995; Brubaker 2004), or completely distinct (Connor 1978; Plamenatz 1976; Davidov

2010). In her study of nationalist sentiments in Bulgaria, Latcheva (2010) found that both nationalism and patriotism are positively associated with national superiority. Other 18 scholars argue that although the two concepts are different, patriotism can turn into more aggressive nationalism (Li and Brewer 2004; Mummendey et al. 2001). Finally, some research finds that patriotism itself can be hostile and extreme (Schatz et al. 1999;

Nathanson 1997; Billig 1995). Since nationalism often takes on a negative connotation, individuals (groups) prefer to call it patriotism even though they might feel that their country is superior to others (Billig 1995).

Scholars who consider patriotism to be distinct from nationalism generally argue that patriotism does not involve a discriminatory or ethnocentric component (De

Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Li and Brewer 2004; Viroli

1995). However, nationalism also does not always have discriminatory or malignant elements. Some argue that the concepts are different because nationalism is understood as a perception of superiority of one group over others, while patriotism is associated with affection, loyalty and devotion to one nation (group) (Plamenatz 1976; Adorno et al.

1950; Latcheva 2010; Mummendey et al. 2001). This idea is not logically sound, since the two characteristics are not mutually exclusive. The argument implies that an individual who believes his/her country is superior to others may not feel attached to his/her country.

The distinction between patriotism and nationalism is unclear (Billig 1995). As nationalism often takes on a negative connotation, individuals (groups) prefer to call it patriotism even though they might feel that they country is superior to others. Habermas

(1992) argues that while nationalism is based on identification with a country’s history and culture, patriotism does not have to be. One can argue that patriotism is often rooted in identification with history, culture and national symbols (e.g., American patriotism, 19

British patriotism). Scholars also claim that unlike some extreme forms of nationalism, national pride and patriotism have no roots in xenophobia (Anderson 1991; Herrera and

Kraus 2012; MacIntyre 1984). This claim is based on narrow and imprecise conceptualizations of patriotism with no explanation of how and why nationalism becomes rooted in xenophobia. Gries et al. (2011) present a mixed opinion by claiming that the two phenomena can be similar in some countries (e.g., the US) but conceptually distinct in others (e.g., China). The authors find that in China patriotism is associated with internationalism, while in the US patriotism goes hand in hand with nationalism

(Gries et al. 2011). This difference is explained through the difference in historical development of the two nations. In particular, the Chinese nationalism has been constructed through humiliation by the West. This argument is highly speculative as the authors do not empirically test their claims regarding the origins of nationalism in the two countries.

In this article, I argue that scholars that make a clear distinction between patriotism and nationalism associate nationalism exclusively with its negative and malignant forms. The expressions of patriotism and nationalism are time-dependent and context dependent, which explains the different opinions of scholars regarding the relationship between the two concepts. Intergroup prejudice and in-group favoritism are not mutually exclusive on the individual level. Patriots and xenophobic nationalists alike may compare their nation to others and identify their nation as a superior one. Thus, the argument advanced in this article is that patriotism should be treated as one of the gradations of nationalism.

The literature often equates nationalism with xenophobia, the sentiment of 20 animosity and hate towards the representatives of other ethnic, social, or religious groups and nationalities (Gellner 1983; Hechter 2000; Mann 1995). Violent events in history such as the Nazi movement in Germany and the genocide in Bosnia have been associated with extreme forms of nationalism, which gave the term “nationalism” a negative connotation. In reality, nationalism is not always extreme, violent, and irrational. Such conceptualization is misleading, since it disregards the benign forms of nationalism

(national pride) and ignores the everyday expressions of nationalist sentiments (e.g., saluting the flag, reciting the Pledge of Allegiance) (Billig 1995; Gellner and Gellner

1994; Reicher and Hopkins 2001).

In trying to broaden the conceptualization of nationalism, researchers have long attempted to develop a single typology of nationalism (Gledhill 2005; Hroch 1993; Kohn

1944; Plamenatz 1976). These attempts have produced more than a dozen typologies to date (civic, ethnic, cultural, political, patriotic, religious, separatist, liberal, irredentist, to name just a few). The dominant distinction is between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, also known as “good” vs. “bad” nationalism (Brown 1999; Hroch 1993;

Gledhill 2005; Kohn 1944). Civic nationalism is based on more inclusive criteria for membership in a nation such as citizenship, common territory, multiculturalism, and internationalism (Castles and Miller 1998; Brown 1999). Conversely, ethnic nationalism advances a more narrow view of membership in a nation based on ethnicity, shared culture, religion, and history regardless of citizenship or the country of residence (Brown

1999; Gledhill 2005).

The dichotomy of civic-ethnic nationalism is too simplistic to explain the variety of manifestations nationalism can take in a single country, and even more so in a diverse 21 region of Eastern Europe (Gellner 1983; Hechter 2000; Jaskulowski 2010). It does not account for the fact that nationalism in one country may incorporate the elements of both, multiculturalism and discrimination towards a certain minority group. For instance,

Kuzio (2002) and Shevel (2011) argue that nationalism in Ukraine incorporates both civic and ethnic elements concurrently. Viewing nationalism in a country simply as a combination of the two types of nationalism is problematic considering the contrasting disparities in the nature of the two. The alternative idea in this research advances a continuum built on the degrees2 of intensity that nationalism can take from really weak to extremely intense gradations.

The Nature of Eastern European Nationalism

Research on Eastern European nationalism has largely neglected multiple strains of nationalism that are present and even more dominant than the aggressive manifestations of nationalism. A core assumption is that diversity of nationalism in a country emerges from a combination of top-down and bottom-up processes through salient issues that are important to the masses and emphasized by political elites. From the top, nationalism can be framed by political elites through the issues of saliency and transmitted to the masses via media and education. From the bottom, individuals (or groups) can adopt nationalist sentiments based on their perceptions of a nation and potential threats to that nation. Further, individuals may either accept or reject nationalist ideology from the top depending on whether nationalism is associated with issues that are important to them and whether the masses have a common basis for national identity construction. The latter condition is important in the context of some Eastern European

2 In this article, I use the terms ‘degrees’ and ‘gradations’ interchangeably. 22 states that experience issues with national identification. For example, youth living in

European Union member countries today may not identify strongly as members of their specific nations because they identify primarily as European. This identification depends on the socialization of individuals and their individual preferences (Political Capital

Policy Research and Consulting Institute 2013).

Nationalism often grows and intensifies as a result of individual concerns that have nothing to do with the well-being of the nation as a whole. Weaker forms of nationalism are associated with goals, aspirations, threats to a nation, sentiments of attachment, and pride in a nation. Stronger and more aggressive manifestations of nationalism emerge as a result of mass perceptions of personal socio-economic threats.

Religious and cultural differences alone are not necessarily the basis for aggressive nationalism. Socio-economic status, which poses a more personal threat to individual well-being pushes individuals toward more intense forms of nationalism.

Weaker manifestations of nationalism emerge through socialization. As individuals develop from children into adult citizens, they are influenced by a variety of socialization agencies (family, school, work, church, mass media, peer groups, etc.).

National values, loyalty, appreciation of one’s national culture, language, history, and symbols get instilled in the young generation through family and social ties (Dawson et al. 1969; Billig 1995; Kemmelmeier and Winter 2008). Hence, political socialization can build an emotional bond between young individuals and their nation.

Political Elites and Saliency Theory

Saliency theory is instrumental in understanding how and why the intensity of nationalism may grow. Political elites might be interested in promoting nationalist 23 rhetoric to obtain legitimacy or advance to power. They emphasize salient issues and tie them to the mass ‘anger of the moment,’ thus enhancing general concerns over security, economic well-being, or culture to the level of personal threats. Through nationalist rhetoric in mass media, nationalist ideas, messages, and symbols become associated with the pressing economic, political, social, or cultural issues in society, which increases the intensity of nationalism and may even turn into xenophobia and violence. As figure 1A in

Appendix A demonstrates, the process of interaction between political elites and the masses in terms of cues and concerns forms a feedback loop system. Political elites do not simply promote nationalist ideas hoping they will be embraced, and the masses do not by default accept nationalist ideas ‘from the top.’ Instead, salient issues and concerns become a medium that allows the elites to promote nationalist messages effectively, while also serving as cues that the masses send to the elites in terms of what issues are the most pressing. The elites pick up on these cues and use salient issues as guidelines for their own political ideology, party programs, and public rhetoric. The issues therefore become even more salient in the eyes of voters, especially if the saliency is reinforced in the mass media.

Saliency theory has been empirically tested in the context of developed competitive democratic systems of Western Europe (Klingemann et al. 1994; Dolezal et al. 2014). This theory can be extended to understanding nationalism in the Eastern

European context, where some states have authoritarian or hybrid regimes. Political elites in non-democratic regimes also care about public opinion to some extent. Authoritarian leaders are able to stay in power because they pay attention to the needs and concerns of the masses (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Fearon 1994; Weeks 2008). These masses 24 represent the members of the electorate who participate in regular elections and decide whether to support a leader based on the level of welfare and public goods that they receive from the state (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). In this regard, saliency theory may be instrumental in understanding how the regime successfully promotes nationalism and gains legitimacy by emphasizing relevant issues that concern the public or taps into veins of discontent.

When it comes to the implementation of policies related to salient issues, it is difficult to make generalizations regarding the agenda setting in the diverse region of

Eastern Europe, where the structures of political systems vary widely. For example, in parliamentary systems (e,g., Bulgaria) political parties push the agenda, while in semi- presidential systems (e.g., Russia) the agenda-setting process is primarily controlled by the president (Albæk et al. 2007). Still, public policy literature on agenda setting helps highlight the key elements of the implementation process.

Once the set of salient issues has been defined by political elites, the process of agenda setting revolves around gaining public attention. Media is the major channel of enhancing public awareness on key salient issues. This process is particularly important in the democratic regimes of East-Central Europe with their strong electoral accountability. Political elites seek to focus public attention on the issues and concerns that they highlighted as the most salient at the time. Even in non-democratic regimes, political elites benefit from mobilizing the public behind their policy agenda. Thus, they define and interpret the issues on their agenda in ways that appeal to the widest audiences. Here, issue framing becomes an important strategy for arousing public interest and galvanizing support (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). For example, the issue of 25 immigration can be framed as a top security concern by linking immigration to terrorism and highlighting the past cases of terrorism perpetrated by immigrants in other countries.

Agenda-setters often rely on strategies that promote controversy and wide debates in society in order to politicize the issues on the agenda. Often, these debates advance to the discussion of moral questions and values within society in order to highlight the fundamental nature of the debate and enhance issue saliency. Political elites may also initiate research in the issue area, organize public conferences and forums, and run advertizing campaigns to highlight the policy priorities for the public (Princen 2011).

The process of policy implementation tends to be more complicated in parliamentary systems with their competitive multi-party structures. If parties have to compete to put their policies on the agenda of the domestic legislative institutions, these parties need to mobilize not only the public, but also policy-makers from other parties

(Albæk et al. 2007). At the same time, according to the premises of saliency theory, political elites are interested in gaining support for their policy agenda without encouraging their political competitors to set similar policy priorities (Dolezal et al.

2014). Thus, political elites need to arouse interest in the issues they consider salient and gain enough potential support among policy-makers to push the agenda forward.

Gradations of Nationalism in the Eastern European Context

I build the continuum of nationalism based on the typology of national attachments developed by Dekker et al. (2003). In their research, Dekker et al. (2003) argue that intensity of national attachment can grow in stages from a national feeling

(neutral attachment) to more intense positive or negative categories of nationalism. They develop separate scales for benign and malignant nationalism dimensions. Alternatively, I 26 develop a single continuum that reflects the intensity of nationalism in a country along gradations ranging from weak and moderate to strong degrees of nationalism (figure 2A of Appendix A). The empirical markers for each gradation on the continuum are listed in table 1A of Appendix A.

Nationalism may intensify and grow from weak degrees to more intense moderate gradations and further to malignant and aggressive forms of nationalism. The first four gradations, national identity, national consciousness, patriotism, and national pride develop through political socialization and can be intensified by perceived socio-political threats. Political socialization represents the process of internalization of the political system, political culture, and norms into individuals (Marshall 1996; Harambos and

Holborn 2000). As individuals develop from children to adults, multiple agencies of political socialization, such as family, school, work, church, mass media, and peer groups exert influence on people. Therefore, socialization builds an emotional bond between individuals and their country from a young age, helping to create and sustain weaker forms of nationalism among citizens (Dawson et al. 1969). The first four gradations of nationalism have no traits of hostility or aggression toward members of the out-groups.

These weak and moderate manifestations of nationalism may emerge in response to perceived socio-political threats to the nation, its security, culture, and way of life.

Through manipulation of issue saliency by political elites, nationalism at these stages may intensify further. National pride can be transformed into national superiority if the masses perceive that their socio-economic status may be threatened by members of an out-group. The transition from socio-political nature of concerns to socio-economic threats represents the tipping point where nationalism transforms from being more benign 27 and objective to its more aggressive and violent gradations. After this tipping point, the nature of a perceived threat becomes more personal, directed at each individual as a member of a nation. The ‘frustration-aggression’ theory developed in psychology suggests that individuals experiencing frustration will turn to aggression only if

‘triggered’ by an event or an instigator (Berkowitz 1978). Gurr (1970) extends this theory further by introducing the concept of relative deprivation, suggesting that groups become aggressive if they perceive they are not getting what they deserve. The trigger for the tipping point may be linked to events, such as an economic crisis, a new policy on immigration, crimes perpetuated by immigrants.

The saliency of these events may be further enhanced through information manipulation by political elites (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Wood and Doan 2003).

According to Wood and Doan (2003), the government can push the masses closer to the tipping point by manipulating public education, media, history, national symbols, and images. Political elites might be interested in instigating stronger manifestations of nationalism for a number of reasons. Political entrepreneurs may see stronger nationalism as an opportunity to emphasize or exaggerate key issues that will get them electoral support. The ruling elites may use nationalism to blame external or internal enemies

(‘others’) for policy failures, to mobilize the public against domestic opposition or foreign criticism of the government. Through nationalist rhetoric expressed in political speeches, educational materials, and media announcements, political elites are able to gain legitimacy and control over public opinion. If the masses redefine and reevaluate the threat as salient and personally affecting them, nationalism is likely to turn to more violent manifestations. This marks the tipping point where nationalism turns from its 28 moderate degrees to strong ones. Being more personal, the nature of the threat is less associated with socio-political concerns in the country or cultural concerns for the in- group and becomes more socio-economic in nature. The next section offers an application of the continuum of nationalism in the context of Eastern European states.

Table 2A (Appendix A) illustrates how nationalism in some Eastern European countries during particular historical periods may be placed onto the proposed continuum.

Weak Manifestations of Nationalism

The weakest manifestations of nationalism are national identity and national consciousness. National identity reflects the initial, most basic form of nationalism.

Identification with a particular nation refers to one’s awareness of the membership in a nation. Essentially, once individuals identify with a nation, they realize that they share particular values, interests, and characteristics with other members of the nation (Gurin et al. 1980; Miller et al. 1981; Dekker et al. 2003). National identity is associated not only with cognitive sentiments of belonging but also with emotional attachments to a specific political community (Gaber 2006). This form of national attachment is the most basic and universal, yet it does not supplant other forms and types of social identities (Suny 2000).

National identity is often rooted in national history, culture, national symbols, and historical narratives. It provides a sense of belonging, stability, a sense of collective destiny and meaning to the members of a nation. Yet, just like any other type of identity, national identity is also subject to gradual change and evolution as individuals and groups re-evaluate their past in order to better understand their present and future (Suny 2000).

Political elites can reconceptualize national identities as they see fit in order to alleviate social and political tensions in society, to promote peace and the idea of a common 29 destiny (Suny 2000). National identities can vary among members of the same nation at a single point in time (Hjerm 2003; Gellner 1983; MacCormick 1996).

National identity may be further enhanced to the point where individuals obtain national consciousness. National consciousness implies the realization that all members of the nation share similar characteristics, concerns, and common fate (Chong and Rogers

2005; Fanon 1961). Therefore, national consciousness is often associated with an interest in politics, identification of common political goals and aspirations (Gurin et al. 1980;

Chong and Rogers 2005). Miller et al. (1981) suggest that political mobilization is possible with group consciousness. Thus, political elites may start manipulating the masses even before the majority in a country develops a sense of patriotism. By addressing the commonality of concerns, issues, and aspirations that the members of a nation share, political elites may gain legitimacy and support for their programs.

The mechanism of shifting from national identity to national consciousness may also be driven from the bottom. As individuals have a realization of their distinctive attributes as members of a single nation, they begin to be apprehensive of the common concerns, demands, and goals (Chong and Rogers 2005). This realization of common political aspirations elevates national identity to the level of national consciousness.

Similarly, the elites may emphasize common socio-political issues shared by members of a nation and propose strategies to solve these issues.

National Identity: Russian Nationalism in the 1990s

In the early 1990s, the development of the post-Soviet national identity in Russia became a major concern for Russia’s elites. After 74 years of the communist rule,

Russians largely lost their sense of national identity (Suny 1998). They questioned their 30 place in the world, suffering from a superiority complex in a country that was politically and economically decimated. National identities at this time ranged from identification with the new Russian state and the Western ideas of capitalism to the ongoing identification with Russia’s Soviet or even Tzarist past (Tuminez 2000). Government elites had no clear vision of what it meant to be Russian, what Russia’s sphere of influence was, and what national attributes and state symbols should be promoted (Suny

2000). The new political elites represented multiple groups. These groups worked to either preserve Russia’s Communist legacy, return Russia to its imperial identity, emphasize Russia’s European future, or focus on the idea of Slavic roots. Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, did not have a clear vision of a national identity (Rutland 2010).

In the early 1990s, much of the political rhetoric focused on Russia’s independence, statehood, and the turn to Western values. This trend shifted over the next decade with political elites emphasizing Russia’s unique culture, religion and its own development path, different from the Western model of development (Kanet 2008). National identity formation served as fertile ground for developing stronger national attachments among the masses.

Western Ukrainian Nationalism in the Early 19th Century

Ukraine in the early 19th century provides a historical example of the elites elevating national identity to the level of national consciousness in the western part of the country by emphasizing socio-political threats to the Ukrainian nation. At the time, the territories of Galicia, modern-day western Ukraine, were under Austrian rule. Austria allowed considerable freedom of cultural expression for its minority groups, including ethnic Ukrainians. Yet politically, Ukrainians were underrepresented in the legislature, 31 the Galician Diet, compared to other minority groups (Rudnytsky 1987). In response to political and cultural threats to ethnic Ukrainians in Galicia, minority elites advanced

Ukrainians’ national consciousness in the region. Ukrainians living in Galicia before

World War I generated ‘the Ukrainian conquest’ through increased civic participation and political activism (Suny 2000; Rudnytsky 1987). This conquest involved ‘the imbuing of the Ukrainian masses with a modern national consciousness’ (Rudnytsky

1987, 380). Civil society organizations (professional, educational, cultural) developed not only in the urban centers but also in villages, making it possible to establish and maintain links among all members of the Ukrainian ethnic group who resided within the Austrian territory. Thus, national consciousness was partly achieved through the advancement of common political goals in the struggle to reform electoral rules in Galicia.

By contrast, no national consciousness developed in the eastern regions of

Ukraine at this time. Being part of the Russian empire, eastern Ukraine enjoyed a brief period of revival of its national identity before the 1860s. Russia had given more freedoms to Ukrainian intellectuals who began advancing the distinctive characteristics of the Ukrainian culture to the masses. The Ukrainian language developed through works of

Ukrainian writers such as Shevchenko and Kulish. However, in 1863, Poland rebelled against Russian rule, which brought tighter Russian control over its borderland territories and intensified Russification (Suny 2000). The Russian government outlawed the

Ukrainian language and restricted the spread of Ukrainian culture in the Russian empire.

Moderate Manifestations of Nationalism

Patriotism and national pride represent moderate gradations of nationalism.

Patriotism represents love and respect for one's people and country (Kosterman and 32

Feshbach 1989; Davidov 2010). It is a more intense form of national attachment than national consciousness because it includes not only the realization that members of the nation share similar concerns and goals, but also the feelings of responsibility and a sense of devotion to the nation (Bar-Tal 1993; Staub 1997). Patriotism develops in individuals through socialization from childhood years when family values, school curriculum, and everyday life social interactions instill respect for a nation’s past and present. Through education, sports, and literature, patriotism becomes embedded in multiple areas of public life (Blum 2006). Thus, patriotism becomes associated with affection, loyalty, and devotion to one nation (Plamenatz 1976; Latcheva 2010; Mummendey et al. 2001).

Although patriotism involves an overall support for the state and its political institutions

(de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003), patriots do not completely idealize their nation and are able to have a critical view of the state (Easton 1975; Blank 2003; Blank and Schmidt

2003).

This degree of nationalism is reached when individuals become attached to the nation to the point that they no longer place their personal interests above those of the group (nation). Viroli (1995) argues that patriotism involves an emotional element of attachment to a nation. At the same time, this level of attachment is ‘healthy’ in the sense that patriots tend to be peaceful, cooperative, and inclusive towards members of other nations. Patriotism is not militaristic and does not involve hostility, ethnocentrism, or prejudice towards outgroups (Druckman 1994). Patriotism also does not involve any outward orientations or comparisons with members of other nations (Mummendey et al.

2001; de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). However, patriotism can develop and grow in response to past or present security threats, the rhetoric emphasizing the need for a strong 33 military and better security. A high level of patriotism in a country can be associated with positive views on immigration and the desire to integrate immigrants into a single nation

(Blank and Schmidt 2003). Therefore, patriotism plays “‘the role of the ‘cement’ of society that motivates citizens to limit their individualism for the sake of the Common

Good” (Papastephanou 2013, 25).

National pride represents an enhanced, more outward-looking form of patriotism

(Papastephanou 2013). National pride involves a sense of value and esteem that an individual has for his/her nation and a sense of pride that one has from identifying with their nation. Individuals expressing national pride compare their nation, its people, and their achievements to the achievements of other states. They not only have a more positive view of their nation compared to others, but they also have an expectation that other outgroups (countries) will have favorable attitudes towards their nation (Fabrykant and Magun 2015). In other words, people from other countries are expected to have a liking for the nation and its achievements. At the same time, national pride does not involve the feeling of national superiority (Doob 1964; Smith and Jarkko 1998).

Individuals may be proud of different elements of their nation when it comes to national pride. Scholars distinguish between two major types of national pride, depending on its source (Hjerm 2003; Solt 2011; Fabrykant and Magun 2015). National pride can be either pride in the achievements of a nation and its people or pride in the nation’s socio- political institutions (Hjerm 2003). Pride in the nation’s achievements involves being proud of a country’s history, sports, science, arts, and military (Solt 2011; Grigoryan

2014). This type of national pride usually evolves naturally in the process of individuals comparing their nation’s achievements to the performance of other states. Socialization 34 plays a key role in advancing the sentiments of national pride as individuals bond with their nation through national symbols, traditions, and rituals (Heath and Tilley 2007).

Pride in socio-political institutions is usually more abstract and symbolic. It usually flows out of preconceived ideas and symbols of national pride that dominate the media or are engrained in the educational system of the country.

National pride may evolve out of patriotism on the individual level or it can be instilled from the top through the efforts of political elites. Individuals may develop a sense of national pride on their own through rational evaluation of their nation and the nation’s achievements (Fabrykant and Magun 2015). At the same time, the government may impose a set of views on the masses. It can be done by emphasizing the nation’s strengths by comparing the nation’s achievements to those of others. Evans and Kelley

(2002) note, “national pride involves both admiration and stake holding – the feeling that one has some kind of share in an achievement or an admirable quality” (303). The elites are able to make national pride a social norm by using state media (Anderson 1991), formal education (Gellner 1983), everyday language (Billig 1995), literature, music, or museums. National pride helps unite people divided along socio-economic lines (Solt

2011; Grigoryan 2014). At the same time, national pride is considered to be a foundation for more aggressive and exclusive forms of national attachment (Smith and Jarkko 1998).

Patriotism: Poland in the 1980s

Poland is a country with distinct historical roots of patriotism and a subverted statehood going back to the 10th century (Walicki 1991; Davies 2001). In the 17th century, Poland suffered from aggressive attacks by Russians, Ottomans, Swedes, and

Cossacks. Further expansion of Russia in the 18th century brought Russian intervention 35 in Polish affairs both militarily and politically. As a result, Poland went through a series of partitions and essentially ceased to exist as a sovereign state for 123 years (Lewitter

1965). The Nazi regime and the Soviets also occupied and partitioned the country in the

20th century (Davies 2001). Thus, the collective memory of statelessness, the perceptions of security threats, as well as a strong sense of Catholic identity produced powerful sentiments of patriotism among the Polish people. The Solidarity movement illustrates the significance of patriotism in Poland (Jakubowska 1990). During this time, mass patriotism of the Poles became “a force for disorder…a potential spark for revolution”

(Porter 2000, 108). The leaders of the Solidarity movement promoted patriotism by successfully emphasizing socio-political concerns of the Poles while using historical narratives of glory and sacrifice.

Politically, Polish patriotism in the 1980s became a response to the perceived security threats and the existing Soviet oppression. Solidarity leaders emphasized the responsibility of every Pole to free Poland from Soviet control and to create a better future for their country (Jakubowska 1990). Solidarity’s leader, Lech Walesa encouraged

Poles to vote in elections arguing, “you must join the effort to build a new Poland, or else a new Poland will be built by others” (Filipowicz 2015, 642). The Solidarity movement also glorified Poland’s military and history (Ash 2002). Walesa, in particular, often sang military songs or patriotic hymns before crowds of Solidarity supporters. Solidarity movement leaders thus used culture and national symbols to promote patriotism, unite different social classes, and delegitimize the ruling Communist party to gain further support for their program (Filipowicz 2015). To this day, the Poles view their country’s independence as a supreme value (Nijakowski 2008). 36

National Pride: Bulgarian Nationalism in the 1990s

Both individual-led and elite-led mechanisms of growing national pride can be examined in Eastern European states following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. One such case is Bulgaria and the resurgence of its national pride in the 1990s (Katsikas

2011). Prior to the 1990s, Bulgaria was under the Communist control for more than 40 years (Crampton 2005). For decades, ethnic Turks in Bulgaria suffered discrimination under the communist regime (Karp 1993). With independence from the Soviets in 1991, ethnic divisions deepened in Bulgaria, especially in the regions heavily populated by

Muslims. Bulgarians perceived that the Turks had better economic and educational opportunities than ethnic Bulgarians (Buchanan 2009). Some Bulgarians also expressed resentment towards the Turkish diaspora, emphasizing cultural and religious differences and the need for forceful assimilation of the Turks (Spirova 2008). The new political elites further advanced nationalist rhetoric to gain political support and to distract the masses from relevant socio-economic issues. The masses that suffered from Bulgaria’s political and economic instability after 1989 embraced these populist narratives (Katsikas

2011).

National pride also grew as a result of Bulgaria’s inferiority complex (Katsikas

2011). Bulgaria traditionally lagged behind other European countries in terms of economic growth and development. Thus, the sentiments of inferiority may have led to the tendency of individuals to exaggerate the exceptional nature of their nation. Bulgarian historians and writers continuously emphasized Bulgaria’s exceptionalism and its glorious history (Latcheva 2010). Through continuous efforts of political elites to advance nationalism, national pride may evolve into more aggressive and xenophobic 37 forms of nationalism. These themes rose to the surface with the success of the extreme right-wing ATAKA party in 2005, 2009, and 2013 elections (IFES Election Guide 2013).

Strong Manifestations of Nationalism

National superiority and xenophobic nationalism represent the strongest manifestations of nationalism on the continuum. National superiority can be defined as the feelings of national dominance, excessive and prejudiced loyalty to one's national group. This degree of national attachment reflects ethnocentrism, discrimination, and prejudice towards members of an out-group (Druckman 1994; Schatz et al. 1999;

Grigoryan 2014). While national pride involves comparing achievements of one’s own country to achievements of other states in a rational and objective way, national superiority is associated with the idealization of one’s nation. Individuals with sentiments of national superiority are opposed to any criticism of their nation, instead they actively criticize other states (Blank and Schmidt 2003). They perceive their country as better than all others and at times seek dominance over other groups. Thus, national superiority involves elements of competition and aggressiveness towards other states and out-groups

(Druckman 1994).

National superiority is often associated with more exclusive criteria for membership in a nation based on origins and ethnicity. Those who express the sentiments of national superiority tend to strive for ethnic homogeneity and ‘purity’ by limiting membership in a nation. They emphasize the similarity of cultural background, ethnic ties, and ancestry that promote national unity. Outsiders and immigrants are usually viewed as a potential threat to a nation’s prosperity and survival (Blank and Schmidt 38

2003; Coenders and Scheepers 2003).

The sentiments of national superiority reflect a “threat and the sense of competition” (Poppe and Hagendoorn 2001, 88). Internal threats often reflect a size of an immigrant community while external threats are associated with the possibility of aggression by another country. The more ethnically homogenous the state is, the more likely its people are to express national superiority (Hjerm and Schnabel 2010). This tendency suggests that political elites may elevate the intensity of nationalism to the level of national superiority by advancing the idea of an imminent threat that a nation is facing.

By promoting national superiority, political elites mobilize the masses and even promote hostility toward members of an out-group. Hostility becomes a natural response to the socioeconomic issues that elites are emphasizing.

Xenophobic nationalism represents the most intense gradation of nationalism. It can be generally defined as fear, hatred, and hostility toward foreign nationals or immigrants (Mudde 1995; Hjerm 2003). Throughout history, xenophobic nationalism has been linked to intolerance, wars, and fascism (Mann 2005). Xenophobia reflects the intent to purify the nation, ensure the domination of one ethnic group over others in all aspects of public life, and prevent assimilation with other ethnic communities (Lewin-

Epstein and Levanon 2005; Dekker et al. 2003). Thus, in extreme cases, xenophobic nationalism may lead to violent forms of ethnic cleansing and genocide (Jones 2006).

Xenophobic nationalism can be built upon the sentiments of national superiority.

The elites have a key role in promoting xenophobia by emphasizing socio-economic threats to the members of an in-group. Socio-economic drivers of xenophobia often include low income and high unemployment levels (Gang et al. 2002; Zarate et al. 2004). 39

Economic downturns may intensify competition for jobs and resources among different ethnic groups in a country. The size of the ethnically or religiously ‘foreign’ group may also be an important factor leading to xenophobia (Gang et al. 2002; Fomina and Frelak

2011; Quillian 1995). As the number of immigrants or ethnic minorities increases, the perceived socio-economic threats may seem more serious and urgent. At the same time, the elites often use the rhetoric that makes socio-economic threats more personal and urgent for the members of the in-group.

National Superiority: Slovenian Nationalism in the 1990s

Nationalism in Slovenia was mainly directed against the ethnic minorities from the former Yugoslavia who remained in Slovenia. After Slovenia’s independence in

1991, the government did not grant legal status to ethnic Croats, Bosnians, Serbs,

Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Albanians (Kuhelj 2011). These groups represented economic migrants who could live and work in Slovenia but were unable to receive citizenship or permanent residency status (Vučko 2013, 7). For many economic migrants, the absence of a legal status led to unemployment, lack of medical care, exclusion from social programs, and even eviction from homes (Kuhelj 2011).

The rhetoric of the far-right politicians in Slovenia further deteriorated the position of economic migrants from the former Yugoslav nations. Specifically, the members of the Slovenian National Party (SNS) targeted migrants as the lead cause of

Slovenia’s economic problems, such as unemployment and economic recession (Bajt and

Pajnik 2010). The SNS, a populist party with no clear economic platform, placed the non-

Slovene immigrants at the center of its political rhetoric. Populist politicians portrayed immigrants as groups inferior to ethnic Slovenians and blamed for Slovenia’s socio- 40 economic problems. The leader of SNS, Zmago Jelincic, used openly xenophobic rhetoric in addressing the migrants, who had no legal residency status. He advanced the idea of denying any social or economic rights to the migrants, arguing, “[...] democratic Europe would throw those people on trucks, train wagons or planes and send them back to their home countries” (Gregorcic 2008, 233). The far-right politicians portrayed the immigrants as an economic burden and a personal threat to every Slovene’s job security

(Bajt and Pajnik 2010). The mass media also portrayed ethnic Slovenians as being a more advanced and superior ethnic group compared to others. Movies and television series portrayed migrants as low-income, uneducated, unattractive, and poorly assimilated into

Slovenian society (Gorup 2013).

In addition to discrimination and prejudice rhetoric aimed at particular groups of non-Slovenes, Slovenia’s political leaders promoted Slovenian culture as superior to all others in Europe. Idealizing the Slovene nation, political leaders referenced the popular myth of Slovenia as the birthplace of European democracy. According to government literature, the roots of Slovenian national identity dated to the 6th century when the

Slovenian kingdom of Carantania had an early democratic system (Lindstrom 2003).

Thus, Slovenia was the birthplace of democracy in Europe, which justified the need to protect Slovenian culture and national identity from all outside influences.

Xenophobic Nationalism: Present-day Hungarian Nationalism

Hungary’s buffer location between Western and Eastern Europe has made it a major transition route for migrants, creating anxiety among the Hungarian population.

Ethnic Hungarians fear that the immigrants threaten their economic status and their culture (Csepeli and Orkeny 1996). The rhetoric of political elites has been a major force 41 in enhancing the anxieties and insecurities among the Hungarians. Populist political leaders have used public concern over immigration to get electoral support, which propelled the recent success of the far-right Fidesz party and the neo-fascist anti-Semitic

Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) party in elections (Larsen 2014). The

Hungarian Prime minister Viktor Orban, a member of the Fidesz party has openly promoted xenophobia by linking immigration to terrorism and portraying the immigrants as an economic threat to ethnic Hungarians (Byrne 2015). In particular, Orban has organized campaigns in Hungary with slogans such as “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away Hungarians' jobs” (Dunai 2015).

While immigrants remain the main target of xenophobia in Hungary, local Jewish and Roma minorities have also been marginalized in the country. Thousands of Roma who live in Hungary are the common targets of political “ethnicization” of poverty and crime (Halasz 2009). In particular, the elites have advanced social programs to fight

“Gypsy crime” and linked Roma with the abuse of Hungary’s welfare programs. One of these social programs involved the creation of “Hungarian Guard”, an anti-Roma and anti-Semitic paramilitary group engaged in propaganda and patrol of Roma neighborhoods in rural Hungary (‘Frequently Refuted Lies’ 2015).

Hungary’s political elites also promoted an image of what it means to be

Hungarian, based on a narrow criterion of ethnic background. In his speeches, Orban has emphasized the greatness and superiority of the Hungarian nation, as well as the threat that other nations and cultures (including European states) pose for Hungary. In an attempt to make immigrant threats more personal Orban notes, “They (Hungarians) do not want to see their country thronging with people from different cultures, with different 42 customs, who are unable to integrate; people who would pose a threat to public order, their jobs and livelihoods” (Durocher 2015). The xenophobic rhetoric of the elites has been effective, prompting the rise in xenophobic violence in Hungary. According to the survey research in 2015, a record number of Hungarians (46%) are xenophobic, with only

9% of the population viewing immigration in a positive way (‘Research: Xenophobia at a

Record High’ 2015). Thus, aggression and violence have become a reaction of ethnic

Hungarians to the socioeconomic issues that elites have emphasized.

Conclusion

While there is no clear definition of nationalism, researchers rely on nationalism as an explanatory variable in a vast body of literature. This research has sought to clarify the nature of nationalism by exploring its forms on a single continuum while refining the mechanism behind the intensification of nationalism. In doing so, this research highlights both benign and malignant expressions of nationalism that often get neglected in the context of Eastern European states. The continuum highlights the mechanism of how nationalism can develop into more intense and malignant manifestations. Once the nature of concerns of the public changes from socio-political to socio-economic, nationalism transforms from its moderate manifestations to stronger and even aggressive gradations.

After this tipping point, the nature of perceived threats becomes more personal, directed at each individual as a member of a nation.

In analyzing the continuum that nationalism can form, I argue that nationalism may intensify and grow from weak degrees to more intense gradations. Weak and moderate gradations of nationalism (national identity, national consciousness, patriotism and national pride) are driven primarily by socio-political threats that originate from the 43 bottom (individual level) or are imposed from the top (elite level). Strong gradations of nationalism are driven by socio-economic threats that political elites are emphasizing in their nationalist rhetoric. The continuum provides the ability to compare nationalist sentiments within and between states. The underlying assumption is that nationalism is not static and varies geographically and temporally.

The comparison of cases of nationalism in Eastern Europe at different historical periods illustrates that manipulation of issue saliency plays a key role in further promoting and intensifying nationalism. This element of issue saliency in the nationalist rhetoric of political elites contributes to our understanding of why nationalism may be intensifying in a country over time.

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Appendix A

Table 1A. Empirical Markers for Gradations of Nationalism

Gradation Characteristics awareness of membership in a nation; recognition of shared National identity characteristics/values/interests/history with members of the nation awareness of the common fate, shared concerns, political demands National consciousness and goals; interest in politics love and respect of the nation; feelings of responsibility and devotion to the nation; support for the state and its political institutions without idealizing the nation; absence of militarism, Patriotism hostility, prejudice or comparison with other nations; positive or neutral views on immigration; the desire to integrate immigrants into the community comparison of the nation, its people, achievements to achievements of other nations; emphasis on the nation’s positive achievements in National pride comparison with other nations; an expectation that other groups will have favorable attitudes to the nation; pride in country’s history, sports, science, military feelings of national dominance, prejudice and excessive loyalty to one’s nation; ethnocentrism, discrimination against outgroups; National superiority idealization of the nation; exclusive criteria for membership in a nation based on origins of birth, ethnicity, ancestry, views on immigration as a potential threat to the nation fear, hatred, hostility toward foreign nationals or immigrants; intent Xenophobic to purify a nation, to ensure domination of one ethnic/religious nationalism group over others, and to prevent assimilation with other ethnic/religious groups

Table 2A. Typical Cases of Gradations of Nationalism in Eastern Europe

Weak Moderate Strong national identity patriotism national superiority Russia (1990s) Poland (1980s) Slovenia (1990s) national consciousness national pride xenophobic nationalism western Ukraine (early 19th Bulgaria (1990s) Hungary (2010-2016) century)

Figure 1A. Feedback Mechanism of Nationalist Mobilization

Socialization + Socio-Political Threats Socio-Economic Threats

National National National National Patriotism Xenophobic identification consciousness pride superiority nationalism

WEAK MODERATE STRONG

Tipping Point

Figure 2A. Gradations of Nationalism

Article 2. State-Sponsored Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine

Abstract

This article leverages saliency theory to explore how regimes may use state- controlled media to intensify nationalism and gain legitimacy. I explore mainstream news coverage in Russia and Ukraine with a particular emphasis on how political leadership frames nationalist rhetoric in the two countries to emphasize certain issues over others. I focus on relevant media content that contains nationalist rhetoric before and after the invasion of Russia into Ukraine’s territory in the spring of 2014. Content analysis suggests that political leaders in both countries have focused on political issues, while largely ignoring economic issues in their nationalist rhetoric. The analysis also shows that state leaders can successfully promote nationalism by emphasizing cultural issues and concerns. Historical analysis traces the continuation of longer historical trends when it comes to advancing nationalism in Russia and Ukraine. The analysis suggests that these historical trends reflect a similar nature of nationalist rhetoric in contemporary media.

Keywords: media; nationalism; issue saliency; Russia; Ukraine

Introduction

In February of 2014, armed and uniformed Russian soldiers entered Crimea, the

Ukrainian territory. They seized control of the Crimean parliament and shortly after a controversial referendum on the status of Crimea, President Putin signed the executive order on the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation. This event marked the beginning of the diplomatic conflict between Ukraine and Russia, which has evolved into a military conflict in the east of Ukraine between the Ukrainian military and the Russian- backed separatists. The annexation of Crimea has also renewed tensions between Russia and the West, forcing Western governments to impose sanctions on Russia (BBC 2014

“Ukraine Crisis: Timeline”). 55

Nationalist rhetoric in this article implies the use of symbols associated with a nation, calls for national unity, national revival, and appeals to patriotism. More broadly, nationalism in this article is defined as a political ideology that advances varying degrees of individual attachment to a nation from weak forms of national identification to the most intense forms of xenophobic nationalism. Since the start of the conflict between

Ukraine and Russia in early 2014, nationalist rhetoric in the mass media space of both countries has been on the rise (Luhn 2014; Yudina 2014). However, the public response to this rhetoric was different in the two countries. In Russia, nationalism is continuously growing among the public, along with the increasing levels of aggressive xenophobia and radicalism (Yudina and Alperovich 2015). The results of nationally representative surveys (Table 2.1) suggest that nationalism was already a growing trend in Russia

(shown by the VCIOM data) and that it may have been accelerated by the nationalist media since the start of the conflict (shown by the NEORUSS data).

Table 2.1 Survey Results for Support of Russian Nationalism Nationalist Sentiment/Activity (VCIOM)3 2005 2014 Change (over 9 years) Support the “Russian March” 12% 24% +12% Find the idea of the “Russian March” acceptable 23% 38% +15% Nationalist Sentiment/Activity (NEORUSS)4 2013 2014 Change (over 1 year) Support deportation of all immigrants from 44% 51% +5% Russia, both legal and illegal

In Ukraine, however, nationalism did not increase as a result of the conflict with

Russia. Although nationalist parties, Svoboda and the Right Sector, gained public support

3 Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) surveys: •November 12-13, 2005 - a nationally representative sample of 1600 respondents interviewed face-to-face in 153 cities in 46 oblasts and republics of Russia. •November 2-3, 2014 - a nationally representative sample of 1600 respondents interviewed face-to-face in 130 cities in 42 oblasts and republics of Russia. 4 The NEORUSS surveys: •May 8-27, 2013 - a nationally representative sample of 1,000 respondents interviewed face-to-face. •November 5-18, 2014 - a nationally representative sample of 1,200 respondents. 56 during the Euromaidan protests and the invasion of Crimea in early 2014, these parties did not do well in the 2014 parliamentary election (Kuzio 2015). Nationalism in Ukraine became more radicalized, with only a small minority of Ukrainians supporting the far- right nationalist parties. The results of nationally representative surveys (Table 2.2) suggest that nationalism in Ukraine has not been increasing over the years. While the timeframe of survey data for 2006 and 2015 is broad, the additional survey data from

2012-2016 provide support for the argument that nationalist sentiments are not growing in Ukraine after the start of the conflict with Russia.

Table 2.2 Survey Results for Support of Ukrainian Nationalism Nationalist Sentiment/Activity (Razumkov 2006 2015 Change (over 9 years) Center)5 Support the idea that ethnicity determines 14.2% 7.7% -6.5% membership in the Ukrainian nation Support the idea that ethnicity and citizenship 19.8% 11.2% -8.6% determine membership in the Ukrainian nation Nationalist Sentiment/Activity (Analytical 2012 2016 Change (over 4 years) Agency RATING Pro)6 Support the idea of limiting or outlawing labor 67% 67% 0% immigration

One explanation for these contrasting trends in nationalist sentiments in Russia and Ukraine may lie in the difference of how political leaders used nationalist rhetoric in the mainstream media in the two states. Political elites often manipulate public opinion and promote nationalism through the use of media to reach their political goals (Snyder and Ballentine 1996; Van Evera 1994; Gagnon 1996; Ryabinska 2014; Szostek 2014;

5 Razumkov Center surveys: •May 31-June 18, 2006 - a nationally representative sample of 1600 respondents interviewed face-to-face in 212 cities and in 191 villages of Ukraine •December 11-23, 2015 - a nationally representative sample (except Crimea, occupied Donetsk and Lugansk territories) of 10071 respondents interviewed face-to-face 6 The NEORUSS surveys: •May 8-27, 2013 - a nationally representative sample of 1,000 respondents interviewed face-to-face. •November 5-18, 2014 - a nationally representative sample of 1,200 respondents. 57

Moen Larsen 2014). Non-democratic regimes may be particularly interested in promoting nationalism as a means of securing their legitimacy and obtaining public support for their policies. Nationalism also becomes an effective tool of mobilization in times of conflict or a looming external threat (Van Evera 1994). However, it is unclear why some leaders succeed in promoting nationalism and others do not. For example, the Russian leadership’s use of nationalism may have helped to control public opinion and create a sense of accountability of the regime to the Russian people, particularly in a moment of conflict when Russia was viewed as powerful. In Ukraine, however, the leadership’s use of nationalism to respond to the everyday concerns of the masses and mobilize the

Ukrainian people in times of political and economic crisis may have been ineffective and was therefore not embraced by the public.

Considering that both Ukraine and Russia have largely state-controlled media7 and the two countries have been engaged in conflict, it is worth exploring how the

Russian government is different from the Ukrainian government in advancing its nationalist rhetoric. This article addresses the following research questions: 1) How do leaders in Russia and Ukraine use nationalist rhetoric differently? and 2) How do leaders in Russia and Ukraine frame nationalism in the media to control public opinion?

Top-down Nationalism in the Media

Scholars have long advanced the idea of nationalism as an instrument of political elites (Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1966; Gellner 1983; Breuilly 2001, Riabov and Riabova

2014; Shakhrai 2015). Nationalism allows the elites in power or those seeking power to

7 Reporters Without Borders. 2015. “2015 World Press Freedom Index.” Accessed January 15, 2016. http://index.rsf.org/#!/ 58 express their goals in the name of the whole nation. Thus, the elites do not have to make commitments to solve all the issues that the masses are concerned with, such as an increase in social welfare and wealth redistribution. By appealing to the goals of protecting the nation, they aim to address the interests of all citizens in a state, regardless of their socio-economic status (Barkey and von Hagen 1997; Suny 1993). Scholars also agree that nationalism is a powerful tool for gaining legitimacy or mass mobilization in times of war (Cederman et al. 2011; Eatwell 2003; Breuilly 1994; Snyder 2000).

Legitimacy is crucial for stability and compliance in nondemocratic regimes.

Although political leadership largely controls mass media in authoritarian or hybrid regimes, they cannot gain legitimacy unless the public perceives the regimes as responsive to their issues and concerns. State-promoted nationalism can be an effective tool for emphasizing key issues of national importance that the masses feel passionate about, blaming external or internal enemies (“others”) for policy failures and mobilizing the people against domestic opposition or foreign criticism of the ruling elites (Cederman et al. 2011; Eatwell 2003; Breuilly 1994; Snyder 2000). Through nationalist rhetoric expressed in political speeches, educational materials, and media announcements, political elites in nondemocratic regimes are able to gain legitimacy and control over the public opinion.

Political leadership may also promote nationalism for the purposes of mass mobilization. According to Cederman et al. (2011), nationalism has brought “the ease with which rulers could extract currency, capital, and labor from their subject populations” (610). In the presence of an external threat from abroad (real or imagined), security concerns permeate the masses (Posen 1993). The elites promote the idea of a 59 threat to a nation in order to unite distinct groups and mobilize them in the name of one nation against a real or potential enemy.

The literature on nationalism emphasizes the role of media in constructing, transforming, and intensifying national identification. Scholars emphasize the role of media in creating national identities (Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1966; Hobsbawm 1991;

Gellner 1983; Smith 1991). Deutsch (1966) argued that advancement of nationalism involves “the attachment of secondary symbols of nationality to primary items of information moving through channels of social communication…” (146). This idea suggests that a consumer of highly nationalist media may eventually start identifying with his/her nation, which is particularly relevant when it comes to state-controlled media space. Media sources might intentionally or unconsciously encourage identification with a nation even when reporting day-to-day news that is completely unrelated to ideology

(Brookes 1999; Billig 1995). Media consumers absorb either direct propaganda or subtle nationalist ideas on a regular basis, which helps promote attachments to the nation and, at times, even the sentiments of animosity towards other groups/nationalities. The presence of a military conflict tends to serve as an additional impetus for the media to promote nationalism and for the public to be more susceptible to nationalist messages (Mueller

1973; Bennett and Paletz 1994). This idea is associated with the “rally ‘round the flag” thesis, suggesting that during the periods of military threat or conflict, the levels of mass patriotism and public approval of state leaders increase dramatically (Mueller 1973).

Contemporary media in Russia and Ukraine are not fully state-controlled, yet the governments control national television news channels that have the widest coverage. In both countries, the political leadership is able to manipulate media coverage on a regular 60 basis (Hutchings and Tolz 2012; Ryabinska 2014). Moreover, public opinion polls indicate that television remains the main source of news for the majority of the population in both countries. 96.8% of Ukraine’s population obtains news from TV channels, while 90% of Russia’s population relies on TV as a news source (KIIS 2014;

Levada 2014; FOM 2009). In addition, the public also tends to have more trust in TV news, rather than news from newspapers, radio, or the Internet (FOM 2009). Thus, television becomes the main tool of government control and presents the top-down strategy of manipulating public opinion (Lipman 2005). The high levels of public trust in

TV news are important because they signify the regime’s ability to control public opinion for a long time into the future. Still, it is unclear what determines the success of political elites in promoting nationalism through state-controlled media.

Since the Kremlin has a firm control over the main television channels in Russia, the government is able to manipulate media coverage on a regular basis (Gehlbach 2010).

Mainstream television channels serve as a link between the ruling elites and the public delivering the value-laden messages to the viewers (Hutchings and Tolz 2012). In Russia, the trust in television media may be the result of the regime’s control over mass media for decades. The government has been promoting the idea that Western media and Internet media are not trustworthy and serve to undermine Russia’s stability. The media space in

Ukraine is similarly captured by the state and the business elites loyal to political leadership (Ryabinska 2014). At the same time, local television channels with low ratings may remain independent (Etling et al. 2010).

When it comes to the Internet as a media source, until recently both Russia and

Ukraine had relatively free and open online media space (Tkacheva et al. 2013; Duffy 61

2015). In 2014, 71% of the Russian population used the Internet on a daily basis with only 24% of all Internet users receiving news online (Volkov and Goncharov 2014). In

Ukraine, around 50% of the population used the Internet regularly with 25% following news online (BBG 2014; Freedom House 2015). In Russia, for many years the regime did not exercise control over the Internet and online media content (Duffy 2015). However, the mass protests of 2011 organized largely through social media, prompted the regime to rethink their approach to the Internet. Starting in early 2012, President Putin began a campaign to gain an absolute control over online media by restricting access to online content and censoring the Internet (Parker 2014). This campaign included steps to blacklist websites with “extremist materials,” censor online content on domestic opposition to the regime, political events in Ukraine, and calls for mass rallies. The regime has also passed a law that mandates all Internet companies operating in Russia to store data on local servers (Duffy 2015, Freedom House Russia 2015). Ukraine’s online media space is less controlled, yet the 2015 Freedom House notes the regime’s “growing intolerance for critical content online.” In 2014-2015 the Ukrainian government has temporarily shut down thousands of websites for containing “anti-Ukrainian” content, unlawfully detained journalists and bloggers (Freedom House Ukraine 2015).

While regimes can use media to promote various forms of nationalism from weak expressions of national consciousness and benign patriotism to more intense forms of xenophobic nationalism, a complete state control over mass media is typically associated with state propaganda (Welsh 2013; Hobsbawm 2012; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Van

Evera 1994; Gagnon 1996; Kennedy 2009). Throughout history, governments have used propaganda to promote aggressive nationalist ideology among the masses (Welsh 2013; 62

Herb 1997; Papic 1994; Zhao 1998). Yet propaganda alone is not sufficient to build a regime’s legitimacy. Political elites, even in non-democratic regimes care about public opinion to some extent. Authoritarian leaders are able to stay in power because they pay attention to the needs and concerns of the masses (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Fearon

1994; Weeks 2008). In this regard, saliency theory may be instrumental in understanding how the regime can successfully promote nationalism and gain legitimacy through media by emphasizing relevant issues that concern the public.

The public may support even the most extreme policies if the authoritarian regime promises to resolve the pressing concerns of individuals (Collier 1992; Acemoglu and

Robinson 2001; Alesina et al. 2001). Political entrepreneurs may use these concerns to advance their populist ideas and programs. Television networks, newspapers, and the

Internet might play a significant role in advancing extreme parties (candidates) to power by focusing the attention of the public on the issues that these parties emphasize (Eatwell

2003). In states where the governments control mainstream media, political elites get an opportunity to receive public support by bringing attention to the issues that the masses care about. At the same time, the use of state-controlled media allows political elites to distort information and emphasize the urgency of issues that are not truly important while placing the blame for failed or inadequate policies on domestic opposition or foreign

“enemies.” Thus, the news is often presented in the “us” versus “them” format by introducing nationalist rhetoric (Dayan 1998; Shoemaker and Reese 2011).

Application of Saliency Theory

Scholars have traditionally relied on saliency theory to explain party support among voters in competitive democratic systems (Budge 1994; Klingemann et al.1994; 63

Pelizzo 2003; Laver 2001, Volkens 2001; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006). When campaigning, parties emphasize a similar set of issues that are relevant to voters (e.g., welfare, education, health, etc.). According to Budge et al. (2001), “all party programmes endorse the same position, with only minor exceptions” (82). What makes a particular party stand out to voters is how the party resolves to solve the issues through a set of available measures. Since the limited resources would only allow focusing on a narrow set of relevant issues, parties differentiate themselves by assigning varying degrees of importance to different voter concerns. Parties, therefore, manipulate the salience of some issues over all others. Political elites are able to switch from focusing on one relevant issue to another, depending on what they think would get them more support from voters

(Klingemann et al. 1994; Budge 1994; Budge et al. 2001). The “cue-taking” theory of representation goes further in arguing that political elites (parties) take positions on particular issues that shape voter preferences and beliefs (Popkin 1991; Zaller 1992;

Lupia and McCubbins 1998). At the same time, voters also send cues to political parties about their most pressing concerns (Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien 1994; Inglehart,

Rabier, and Reif 1991; Feld and Wildgen 1976; Gabel 1998).

The communication between political elites and the masses in terms of salient issues takes place in competitive democratic systems where political elites are accountable to voters and have to compete in free, fair, and frequent elections. However, this form of communication still takes place to some degree in nondemocratic regimes, where political elites need to create a sense of being tuned in to the concerns of the masses. For instance, in the context of nondemocratic regimes of Russia and Ukraine, state elites cannot rely on propaganda alone to advance their rhetoric. There are 64 alternative media sources and opposition forces in both states with Internet media remaining partly free from the government control. Thus, political elites will be more successful in promoting nationalism if they are able to incorporate issue saliency into their nationalist rhetoric.

The success of top-down nationalist rhetoric is contingent on the saliency of issues that the elites discuss and promise to resolve. For instance, if the public is concerned with unemployment, state leaders may be successful in promoting nationalism if they emphasize the issue of unemployment as the barrier to prosperity and well-being of the nation while blaming foreign nationals for taking away jobs in a country. The majority of the population will not accept nationalist rhetoric advanced by the government unless political elites tie this nationalist rhetoric to the issues perceived as salient. Salient issues and concerns serve as a medium that allows political elites in these regimes to promote nationalist messages effectively, while also serving as cues that the masses send to the elites in terms of what issues the nation is facing. Political entrepreneurs may sense what issues are important to the masses and use these issues as the guidelines for their political party programs and political agendas. The issues, therefore, become even more salient in the eyes of the public, especially if the saliency is reinforced in the mass media.

Saliency theory provides a mechanism to explore how a government may use state-controlled media in order to intensify nationalism and gain legitimacy. Although saliency theory has been developed in the context of competitive multiparty democratic regimes, this theory can provide insight in the context of non-democracies and hybrid regimes within particular limits. For example, saliency theory may explain how 65 nondemocratic regimes can be flexible in using media to emphasize certain key issues relevant to the masses in their nationalist rhetoric.

Based on the information presented above, the following proposition is put forward in the research: a nondemocratic regime is likely to be successful at advancing nationalism if the regime is using nationalist rhetoric to emphasize salient issues that are relevant to the masses.

Understanding Russian and Ukrainian Nationalism Historically

Modern-day Russia and Ukraine share a long history going back to the 9th century with the origins of the Russian state in the Kievan Rus, the territory of contemporary

Ukraine. The two states also share similar cultural and religious backgrounds. Over time, a new national project began to develop in Ukraine as a response to external threats, particularly during the period of the Soviet rule (Pipes 1992). While other states in

Eastern Europe such as Poland and Russia often considered Ukraine as a borderland that had no sovereignty and should be appropriated, over the years “the project of special

Ukrainian ethno-cultural identity developed, different and opposed to Russian (and

Polish) identity” (Kiryukhin 2015). With the end of the Cold War, the two countries have regained their efforts at national identity construction, resulting in a mix of national identities that exist in contemporary Russia and Ukraine. This can be seen in how Russia and Ukraine developed the meaning of a nation, sought nationalist ideology, and built a cultural basis for nationalism during three distinct periods: the Soviet era, the period of early post-Soviet independence, and the contemporary period.

1) The Soviet Period (1922–1991)

The creation of the Soviet Union was associated with ambivalent policies on nationalities and evolving attitudes toward nationalism. The 15 republics of the Soviet

Union were formally independent, with their own national governments and national

Communist parties in each republic. Yet, the Communist Party of Russia, in essence, controlled all of the Communist parties in the separate republics of the USSR. The Soviet leadership centralized all the political and economic power of the 15 republics in the hands of the Russian government in Moscow (Kasianenko and Ostergard 2017). All major political and economic decisions in the People’s Republics were made by the

Russians. Initially, the Communist ideology did not incorporate nationalism because communism aspired to promote the power of the working class without any regard for national identity or national differences. However, over time the Soviets have officially claimed support for ethnically-based identities in distinct Soviet republics through the policy of indigenization. While this policy was recognized on paper, in reality, the Soviet leaders in Moscow advanced the power of ethnic Russians over all other groups. This trend was particularly noticeable when it came to government jobs, language policies, and educational opportunities in the Soviet Union. Ethnic Russians were portrayed as a

“big brother” to all other ethnic groups in the USSR that were often considered backward. This trend helped reinforce the Russian nationalism. At the same time, it helped foster nationalist movements in the borderland regions and republics of the Soviet

Union. Although nationalist movements in the Soviet Union were initially rather weak, borderland nationalism gained prominence in some Soviet republics (the Baltics, 67

Ukraine, Georgia) in the late 1980s as a result of the opposition to the communists (Pipes

1992).

The Ukrainian republic has always been multi-ethnic and multicultural. Prior to the establishment of the USSR, the western part of Ukraine was long under the influence of Austro-Hungary and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, while the eastern part of

Ukraine belonged to the Russian Empire. Therefore, the western regions of Ukraine were primarily anti-Russian and anti-Soviet, while the eastern regions of modern-day Ukraine had closer ties with Russia (Gulamov 2014). The Soviet rule had a degrading effect on

Ukraine’s national culture, language, and history. Although the Soviets did not place official restrictions on the use of the Ukrainian language, it became the language associated with a low social status, a lack of education, and backwardness (Kuzio 2002).

At the same time, the Ukrainian history and culture were viewed as integral elements of the greater Russian culture (Kuzio 2002; Wilson 2002).

2) Early Independence (1991-2000)

As the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Russians found themselves in a new country.

Russia was no longer a superpower, but a country riddled with economic decline, crime, political instability, and interethnic tensions. The Russian government had to find a way to consolidate the Russian people and appeal to the unity of the Russian citizens by redefining what it means to be Russian. Most people living in Russia in the 1990s were experiencing the superiority complex linked to the greatness of Soviet Russia in the past and the sentiments of humiliation with the post-Soviet status of Russia (Herrberg 1998;

Tuminez 2000). The failure of the Soviet ideology, the collapse of the Russian economy, and the financial dependence on the West have contributed to mass political 68 disillusionment and apathy. Many Russians felt betrayed by their government and sought immigration as a way to escape poverty and instability. This time period in the country is associated with a lack of a single national idea where some Russians still identified as members of the Soviet state, while others felt like members of a new Russian nation

(Yakunin et al. 2013; Tuminez 2000). National identities were often mixed ranging from apathy and detachment to national patriotism and pro-Western nationalism (Tuminez

2000).

Ukraine’s independence in 1991 marked the beginning of state efforts toward a national identity construction (Wilson 2002). Faced with the possibility of obtaining independence in the early 1990s, the vast majority of Ukraine’s population has voted in support of Ukrainian independence. Even the majority of ethnic Russians living in

Crimea voted in favor of independence (Kubicek 2008). However, the idea of independent Ukraine was not the same for all Ukrainian citizens. For many people, the independence did not translate into leaving Russia’s sphere of influence. A large percentage of those living in the east and south of the country continued to speak Russian as their primary language and identifying with the Russian culture and ethnicity. With the economic crises that followed shortly after Ukraine declared independence, those

Ukrainians who identified as ethnic Russians or Russian language speakers expressed an even stronger support for maintaining close ties with Russia (Kiryukhin 2015). Since the first round of elections, independent Ukraine has been divided along ethnic lines with the ethnic Russian population in the east and south voting for pro-Russian candidates and the ethnic Ukrainians in the west supporting candidates that sought to leave Russia’s sphere of influence (Gulamov 2014; Kiryukhin 2015). 69

3) Modern Period (2000-2018)

Historians suggest that modern-day Russia follows the same historical pattern in its foreign affairs as Tsarist Russia and Soviet Russia (Aggarwal and Govella 2011;

Mankoff 2011). Today, both the international community and the majority of Russians see the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin as a strong leader who is reinforcing the image of Russia as a great power nation on the world stage (Levada 2015). However,

Putin is simply continuing the historical pattern of Russian politics, promoting the security of its vast territory by projecting its power over the neighboring states. When it comes to nationalism, contemporary Russia is still a country largely without a single national identity. The government is advancing ambivalent nationalist rhetoric, promoting two variations of national identity. One form of nationalism advances the idea of Russia that is multi-cultural and multi-religious with an inclusive view of membership in the Russian nation based on Russian citizenship (Shevel 2011). Another form of national identity advanced by the Russian leadership is less inclusive and may be the result of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy orientations. It advances the idea that a true Russian is an ethnic Russian with an Orthodox religion and Slavic roots, thus advancing the policies of more stringent immigration controls. While this view of national identity is mainly supported by the far-right nationalist and ultra-nationalist groups denounced by the government, the Russian political establishment at times resorts to similar nationalist rhetoric (Laruelle 2009). Russia’s leaders often emphasize the unique nature of the Russian culture, the unique genetic code of ethnic Russians, and the need to maintain the unique historical path of Russia that may run counter to the Western policies and ideologies (Kasianenko and Ostergard 2017). 70

When it comes to contemporary Ukraine, there is similarly no consensus in society on a single national identity. In her research, Korostelina (2013) explores the lack of a common national identity among Ukrainians. In the process of elite interviews, she discovers five distinct forms of national identity in the country. These are dual, pro-

Soviet, Ukrainian, Russian, and multicultural identities. The author claims that these distinct identities are in conflict and in constant competition (Korostelina 2013).

Therefore, many Ukrainians today face the issue of self-identification (Kiryukhin 2015).

The recent political events like the Euromaidan anti-government protests have further exacerbated ethnic and cultural divisions among the Ukrainian people. As a response to the Euromaidan in early 2014, the new Ukrainian government passed a number of controversial laws regarding the rights of ethnic minorities, which has further alienated ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians living in the south-east of the country

(Gulamov 2014). In the summer of 2014, the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko suggested that the European integration might become a new basis for national consolidation in Ukraine.8 However, for this political goal to be successful, there should be some common basis for cultural unity among the Ukrainian people. Nationalism is multidimensional; it involves not only a political ideological component but a cultural element of belonging as well.

According to Mazrui (1963), “a nation is more than a geographical arrangement"

(122). Distinct ethnic, religious, and cultural groups need to reach an agreement as to their common membership in a single nation. This agreement, in essence, presents a

8 UNIAN. 2014. “Evrointegraciya Mozhet Stat Natsionalnoy Ideey i Obyedinit Ukrainu – Poroshenko.” Accessed March 7, 2016. http://www.unian.net/politics/919464-evrointegratsiya-mojet-stat-natsionalnoy- ideey-i-obyedinit-ukrainu-poroshenko.html 71 national identity consensus. According to Rustow (1970), having a common national identity “simply means that the vast majority of citizens…must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to” (350). Ukraine’s territory and the people that lived in it have been divided for centuries. Half of the country belonged to the Russian empire, while the other half used to be part of Polish, Hungarian, and Lithuanian territories (Yekelchuk 2007). Before 1991, the people of Ukraine were not allowed to have their own nation, distinct culture, and history. After gaining its independence, Ukraine had to re-invent its national identity, national symbols, re-write its history, and promote its national culture. The problem with the common national identity emerged as different ethnic groups (mainly the Ukrainians and the Russians) were unable to agree on the same history, same symbols, and same national heroes (Marples 2007).

Even during the Euromaidan anti-government protests that started in November of 2013,

Ukrainian ideas of nationalism were not picked up by the majority of the population

(Darden and Way 2014). Thus, the lack of a common cultural foundation for national identity may be a major challenge in the efforts of political elites to promote nationalism in Ukraine.

Methodology

In this research I am treating Russia and Ukraine as most similar systems that vary on one major account: the trend in nationalism (Way 2005; Popova 2012). Table 2.3 provides the details of the most similar design in this research.

Table 2.3 Comparison of Russia and Ukraine: Most-Similar Design Marker Russia Ukraine Government need for legitimacy √ √

Government control over media √ √

Economic downturn √ √ Slavic culture, Orthodox religion, √ √ Soviet history Conflict √ √ Growing nationalism √

In terms of the political structure in 2013-2014, Freedom House (2013) characterizes both countries as nondemocratic regimes. Russia is viewed as a consolidated authoritarian regime, while Ukraine is recognized as a hybrid regime.

Although the political regime in Ukraine is less authoritarian than the regime in Russia, my focus in this research is on state-controlled media in the context on nondemocratic states more broadly. According to the Polity IV (2013) index, both countries have a

Polity score of 4 ranking them as anocracies or hybrid regimes. In these political conditions, the leaders of both Russia and Ukraine are interested in gaining political legitimacy and may benefit from nationalism. In both countries, the national media with the widest coverage are controlled either by the government or captured by the business elites loyal to political leadership.

While Russia has a higher GDP per capita than the GDP per capita in Ukraine, the socio-economic conditions in the two countries were similar during 2013-2014 period with both states experiencing an economic downturn. The Russian economy suffered from the Western economic sanctions and the drop in oil prices in 2014, while the

Ukrainian economy similarly suffered from the loss of Crimea and the economic costs of 73 waging the war in the east. Table 2.4 contains the comparison of the political and economic conditions in the two countries for 2013.

Table 2.4 Political/Economic Environment in Russia and Ukraine9 Country/Indicator Russia Ukraine GDP/capita US$15,543 US $4,030 FH Democracy Score 6.21 (1 = best, 7 = worst) 4.86 (1 = best, 7 = worst) Polity IV Score 4 (anocracy) 4 (anocracy) Regime Classification Consolidated Authoritarian Transitional Government or Regime Hybrid Regime Independent Media 6.25 (Not Free) 4.00 (Partly Free)

In terms of the cultural background, both countries are multi-ethnic and multi- religious with no single national identity. The two countries share the Slavic culture, the

Orthodox religion, and the historical legacy of the Soviet Union. Most importantly, starting March of 2014, the two countries are essentially locked in a conflict. Yet, the survey results and the results of the 2014 elections in Ukraine indicate that nationalism keeps rising in Russia, while in Ukraine it seems to be in decline immediately after the

Euromaidan protests. Part of the explanation for this difference might lie in the way political elites promote nationalism in both countries.

In this research, I analyze nationalist rhetoric in the mainstream state-controlled news media in Russia and Ukraine. I examine the nationalist rhetoric of presidents in both countries. In Russia, it is the rhetoric of president Vladimir Putin, while in Ukraine there were three presidents during the time period under study: Victor Yanukovych,

Alexandr Turchynov, and Petro Poroshenko.

9 Freedom House. 2013. “Freedom in the World 2013.” Accessed February 16, 2016. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet.pdf The World Bank. 2013. “World Development Indicators.” Accessed February 16, 2016. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/WDI-2013-ebook.pdf 74

Data Collection

The unit of analysis in this research is political leadership of Russia and Ukraine, specifically their use of nationalist rhetoric. I acquired the data by searching for key words in the direct speeches of leaders on the main television channels and official websites of presidents from September 1, 2013 to August 31, 2014. Selecting news reports clips that contained messages or announcements directly from a country’s president allowed me to obtain two datasets, one on the Russian media and another one on the Ukrainian media. Over the time period analyzed, there were more media announcements made by the Russian president than by the presidents of Ukraine.

President Putin made 1,383 announcements on the main television news channel and his website, while the three Ukrainian leaders, Viktor Yanukovych, Oleksandr Turchynov, and Petro Poroshenko made 1,055 announcements combined on the leading news channels (and the presidential website) in Ukraine. At times, the same message appeared on the news multiple times throughout the day. The repeated messages were duplicated in the datasets as they indicate the emphasis of the leadership on specific rhetoric in the media.

The analysis of nationalist rhetoric involved the search for the following key words (and all their variations) intuitively associated with nationalism in the political leaders’ media speeches and announcements: “nation”, “nationality”, “national”,

“nationalism”, “people”, and “people’s.” I filtered out the key words if they were part of the proper names of government institutions, parties, companies and were irrelevant for further analysis. I have also excluded the key words if they represented the names of professions, such as narodniy deputat (people’s deputy or a member of parliament) in 75

Ukraine. The search for the additional key words intuitively associated with nationalist rhetoric, such as “compatriots”, “Motherland”, “patriots”, “citizens” did not result in a large number of search results in the media content of the two countries, thus adding these additional key words would not impact the results of the study significantly. The additional search for the key words “Russian” and “Ukrainian” would skew the results of the analysis since “Russian” has two variations in the Russian language (“russkiy” and

“rossiyskiy”) pertaining to the cultural and civic meanings of the term, while in

Ukrainian, there is a single term “ukrainskiy” representing “Ukrainian.”

Content analysis was conducted on television media since over 90% of Russians get news from television sources (Levada 2014). In Ukraine, over 80% of the population get news from television as well (Tovstyzhenko 2014). I picked one leading television news channel with the widest national coverage in each country: Podrobnosti news on

Inter Channel in Ukraine and News on Channel One in Russia. Both channels are captured by the government or business elites associated with the government. The details on the viewership and ownership for the two television sources are presented in

Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 Television Sources of Media Content Channel Channel One (Russia) Inter Channel (Ukraine) Characteristics Viewership 82% of Russians as a news leading national channel (over source (Levada 2014) 25% of population) (IREX 2015) Ownership 51% of shares of Channel One the majority of shares belong to in Russia belongs to the Serhiy Levochkin, former head of Russian government, other 49% Yanukovych’s administration, and are in the hands of private Dmytro Firtash, a businessman companies loyal to President who funded multiple political Putin (BBC 2014) parties (Ryabinska 2014)

In addition to television coverage, I also analyzed content from official announcements and speeches of presidents from their official websites. In the cases of the 76 ousted president Yanukovych and the interim president Turchynov in Ukraine, the official websites were unavailable, so I relied on the official announcements and speeches of leaders posted on the state news agency Ukrinform. Ukrinform is directly controlled by the Ministry of Information policy. The press service of President Yanukovych moved its press releases to this website after the president’s own website was shut down by hackers in February of 2014. Since December of 2014, Ukrinform is managed by Yuri

Stets, the Minister of Information Policy and a relative of Ukraine’s president

Poroshenko.10

The sampling timeframe was constructed to capture media coverage before and after the start of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine to account for the trends in nationalist rhetoric and the evolution of this rhetoric over time. News clips were selected from 1 September 2013 (about six months before the start of the conflict) to 31 August

2014 (about six months after the start of the conflict) from the presidential websites and from the leading national state-controlled television channels in Russia and Ukraine.

News clips that did not contain a direct speech of presidents were not included in the dataset. The clip counts for each media source are presented in Table 2.6. A total of 2,438 clips containing a direct speech of presidents were downloaded directly from online archives of each media channel and official website. This design allowed identifying the nature of salient issues emphasized in the nationalist rhetoric of presidents in both countries and whether the start of the conflict has changed the nature and the dynamic of this rhetoric.

10 Korol D., Y. Vinnychuk, and D. Kosenko. 2015. “Informatsiya –Zbroya: Komu Nalezhat Ukrainski ZMI.” Accessed January 12, 2016. http://www.theinsider.ua/infographics/2014/2015_smi/vlasnyky.html

Table 2.6 Media Sources and Clip Counts Media Source Audience Clip Counts Channel One (Russia) National 717 Official Website of President Putin (Russia) National 666 Inter Channel (Ukraine) National 400 Ukrinform (Ukraine) National 444 Official Website of President Poroshenko (Ukraine) National 211 Total 2,438

The coding was done manually. Two researchers coded the clips using a codebook that evaluated the type of issue context that each reference to nationalism was couched in. Both coders followed a standard set of procedures to establish intercoder reliability (Krippendorf 2004). The coding team met the standard (over 80%) for intercoder reliability for all clips and key words. Krippendorff’s Alpha of 0.836 was achieved, demonstrating a high level of consensus between coders.

Historical background is incorporated into the research to explore the previous regimes’ attempts at national identity construction in Ukraine and Russia.

Data Analysis

Once the relevant clips were collected, the textual data were grouped into three main categories (nodes) following Allen’s coding for news focus categories.11 All key words associated with nationalist rhetoric were placed into political, economic, and cultural (social) nodes depending on the context in which they were mentioned to explore what groups of salient issues might be tied to nationalist ideas. A total of 1,769 references to the nation (key words) and their context (node category) were analyzed for this study.

The political node included all key words mentioned in clips focusing on diplomatic relations of states, their foreign policies (e.g., European integration, Customs

11 Allen, Cleo. 2005. “Foreign News Coverage in Selected U.S. Newspapers 1927-1997: A Content Analysis”, PhD Dissertation, Louisiana State University. 78

Union, bilateral agreements), military activities (e.g., domestic and/or foreign threats to security and political stability), and domestic politics (e.g., protests, elections). The economic node included those key words mentioned in the context of domestic economic matters (e.g., financial and monetary policies, production, banking) and economic ties with other states. Finally, the cultural node in the content analysis included all key words mentioned in clips focusing on history, language, society, religion, arts/entertainment, and sports. Some key words were placed in more than one category. For example, the key word “national” would be placed in both political and economic nodes if it was mentioned in the context of economic ties between Ukraine and Russia being a key national priority for Ukraine. Here, the key term is used in the context of a foreign policy priority and as a goal of advancing Ukraine’s economy.

Content Analysis of Nationalist Rhetoric in the Russian Media

The results of content analysis of the Russian media are presented in Table 2.7.

With the start of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the Russian president did not significantly change the frequency of his nationalist rhetoric in the media. The number of references to the key terms associated with nationalism actually decreased by 7% in the leader’s speeches over the study period (Table 2.7).

Table 2.7 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Russian Media, % to the total number of references to the nation Before Conflict During Conflict (September 1, 2013- (March 1, 2014- Total February 28, 2014) August 31, 2014) References to the nation 751 700 1451 References to political issues 43.1 64.6 53.5 References to economic issues 12.5 8.9 10.8 References to cultural issues 45.5 41.6 43.6

Throughout the study period, nationalist rhetoric was mostly tied to cultural and

political issues in Russia. Before the conflict with Ukraine, president Putin mainly

emphasized both cultural and political issues in his nationalist rhetoric. With the start of

the conflict, Putin continued to emphasize these two issue contexts, with the political

context becoming central in his nationalist rhetoric. The discussion of economic issues

has been virtually absent in the president’s nationalist rhetoric across the study period.

The details on the volume and the dynamic of nationalist rhetoric in Russia and the nature

of salient issues that this rhetoric was couched in are presented in table 2.8 and figures

2.1-2.2.

Figure 2.1 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Russian Media, by type as a percentage of the total number of all key words associated with nationalist rhetoric

Table 2.8 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Russian Media, by number of references (September 2013-August 2014) Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Total References to 66 34 24 148 36 16 99 105 103 32 73 40 776 political issues References to 11 13 10 54 3 3 12 16 15 5 7 7 156 economic issues References to 85 54 31 85 29 58 70 60 61 18 51 30 632 cultural issues

Figure 2.2 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Russian Media, by type as a percentage of the total number of all key words associated with nationalist rhetoric

References to the Nation Associated With Political Issues

Throughout the study period, while making references to the key words associated with nationalist rhetoric, Russia’s president talked the most about political issues. There were a total of 776 political issues mentioned in the nationalist rhetoric. Political context was not as dominant prior to the conflict with Ukraine. After March 2014, the president increased his references to political issues by 40% while maintaining the focus on the cultural issues as well. In the first six months under analysis, the president has equally referenced domestic political issues and international political concerns. Domestically, the president has emphasized national security concerns, in particular the instability in the

Middle East that could affect Central Asia and the threat of extremist political groups in

Russia. Putin has also claimed that protection of civil society organizations, protection of the environment, and rebuilding the infrastructure in the eastern regions of the country are among the nation’s top priorities. In regards to international politics, the president has been discussing the future Customs Union and emphasizing the threat of extremists 81 taking over the government in countries like Ukraine. Through his rhetoric, Putin has also extensively talked about Russia’s image on the world stage and the need to strive for leadership in international affairs.

With the start of the hostilities between Ukraine and Russia in March 2014, there was a visible increase in nationalist rhetoric couched in the context of political issues.

Most of the political issues discussed were associated with the political situation in

Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. President Putin used key words associated with nationalist rhetoric in the context of politics on 452 different accounts in the last six months under analysis. In particular, the emphasis in the media messages was on the political instability and threats to a nation’s survival that extreme nationalism, Nazism, and coup d’états entail. Russia’s president continuously spoke about historical roots of nationalism in Ukraine, the propaganda of Nazism in the country and the direct involvement of the United States in the Ukrainian revolution. The key words were also found in Putin’s discussion of Crimea’s annexation. Using nationalist rhetoric, the president made reference to the legitimacy of the Russian intervention in Crimea.

Nationalist rhetoric was also used in the context of discussing Russia’s position on the world stage and the need to withstand the diplomatic pressure from the West. The president has noted that it is in Russia’s national interests to resist any outside influence and not give up any of its sovereignty.

The president used nationalist rhetoric in the context of domestic political issues as well. On multiple accounts, Putin talked about domestic security issues and interethnic regional stability. In particular, the president made multiple references to the threat of extremism and inter-ethnic violence in Russia. Violent nationalist threats inside Russia 82 were emphasized on different accounts. Through his rhetoric, Putin has been publicly responding to xenophobic crimes that have occurred earlier in 2013. These references to extremist threats may have been a foundation for the future laws restricting the activities of NGOs and media freedom in the country (Boghani 2015).

References to the Nation Associated With Economic Issues

The Russian leader mentioned key terms associated with nationalism in the context of economic issues on 156 accounts. Most of the references to nationalism and economics were made by the president prior to the start of the conflict in Ukraine. These messages primarily targeted the domestic economic issues. Before March 2014 Putin has emphasized the need to restore a favorable business climate in Russia, and resolve the issues of illegal labor immigration and unemployment. In terms of foreign economic relations, the president has warned that countries around the world continuously use the tools of economic protectionism. Therefore, Russia should respond to these measures in a similar vein, acting according to its economic interests.

With the start of the conflict in Ukraine, the Russian leader has reduced the focus on economic issues in his nationalist rhetoric. The president discussed the need to support the domestic economy and the plans to proceed with the organization of the Custom’s

Union, which would help harmonize monetary policies among the member-states and make currency markets more stable and predictable. Overall, economic issues were not tied to the nationalist rhetoric of the president in Russia.

References to the Nation Associated With Cultural Issues

The key terms associated with nationalist rhetoric in the context of cultural issues were mentioned on 632 accounts throughout the study period. The majority of these 83 accounts were made in the first six months under study. The president has made multiple references to the need to create a unified national identity for Russia. Putin has also emphasized the goal of interethnic peace as one of Russia’s main national interests. The questions of raising national education standards and teaching a unified version of history in schools was also used in Putin’s speeches. Finally, in light of the Olympic games in

Russia, the president also emphasized the unifying role of sports for the Russian people and the international community as a whole.

With the start of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, Russia’s leader was making multiple references to the greatness and exceptionalism of Russia, Russian ethnicity, Russian values, and culture. Putin specifically contrasted the values of the Russian people with the Western values. Multiple references were made to patriotism as a national trait of

Russians. At the same time, Putin continuously makes references to the Russian culture, history, and traditions as the core components of the Russian nation. The historical and cultural value of the Crimean territory has also been noted in the president’s rhetoric. The president continuously emphasized the need to protect the Russian speaking populations in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine from the ultranationalist government in Kiev. Finally, the Russian leader has been emphasizing the importance of sports, education, and religion for the nation’s prosperity and peace.

Content Analysis of Nationalist Rhetoric in the Ukrainian Media

The results of content analysis of media in Ukraine are presented in table 2.9.

With the start of the conflict, political leaders in Ukraine did not increase the use of nationalist rhetoric in the state-controlled media. The use of nationalist rhetoric in the leaders’ speeches has remained largely the same since March 2014. 84

Table 2.9 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian Media, percentage to the total number of references to the nation Before Conflict During Conflict (September 1, 2013- (March 1, 2014- Total February 28, 2014) August 31, 2014) References to the nation 168 150 318 References to political issues (%) 73.2 86.0 79.2 References to economic issues (%) 10.7 0.0 7.1 References to cultural issues (%) 17.3 18.0 22.2

Similar to Russia, nationalist rhetoric was mostly tied to political issues in

Ukraine. Economic issues were rarely used as a context for nationalist messages before the conflict with Russia but have been completely abandoned after the start of the conflict. The Ukrainian leaders barely used cultural issues as a context for promoting nationalism over the course of the study period. The details on the volume and the dynamic of nationalist rhetoric in Ukraine and the nature of salient issues that this rhetoric was couched in are presented in table 2.10 and figures 2.3-2.4.

Figure 2.3 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian Media, by type as a percentage of the total number of references to the nation

Table 2.10 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian Media, by number of references (September 2013-August 2014) Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Total References to 22 6 11 34 24 26 15 5 4 30 29 46 252 political issues References to 6 0 2 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 economic issues References to 2 4 5 4 9 5 4 4 1 4 3 11 56 cultural issues

Figure 2.4 Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian Media, by type as a percentage of the total number of references to the nation

References to the Nation Associated With Political Issues

While referencing the nation throughout the study period, political leaders in

Ukraine talked the most about political issues. There were a total of 252 political issues

mentioned in the nationalist rhetoric of presidents. Specifically, nationalist rhetoric in the

context of diplomacy came up as political leaders made announcements about the

integration with the European Union, the potential benefits of joining the Customs Union

with Russia and other CIS countries, and the issues surrounding the gas deal with Russia.

In particular, Ukraine’s president Yanukovych talked about the association agreement 86 between Ukraine and the European Union as being against Ukraine’s national interests at the time. The president also associated mass Euromaidan protests in the winter of

2013/2014 with threats to the nation’s security. He claimed that appeals for revolution and calls for the change of government posed direct threats to domestic security and stability of Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine’s leader continuously used nationalist rhetoric in order to gain legitimacy and obtain public support for his political decisions. Yanukovych also attempted to rely on nationalist rhetoric to deter the public from joining the

Euromaidan by calling it a security threat. These appeals to the nation have not been successful, as the public has lost confidence in Ukraine’s president, who fled the country in February of 2014.

With the overthrow of Yanukovych and the start of the conflict with Russia in

March of 2014, there was an increase in speeches referencing the nationalist rhetoric in the context of political issues. National security concerns became primary in the announcements of Ukraine’s presidents Turchynov and Poroshenko. In particular,

President Poroshenko who was elected in May of 2014 on the platform of bringing peace to the east of Ukraine and returning Crimea, regularly addressed the nation with updates on the status of Ukraine’s military draft and conflict escalation in the occupied regions.

Poroshenko delivered an extended speech on Ukraine’s Independence Day in August

2014 arguing that the conflict with Russia represented the birth of Ukraine’s national idea and marked the beginning of the nation’s true independence. Historically, the use of nationalist rhetoric in times of war and conflict was one of the most useful tools in the hands of political elites. Therefore, it is not surprising that the issues of security at these times became primary elements of nationalist messages. 87

References to the Nation Associated With Economic Issues

The key terms associated with nationalist rhetoric in the context of economic issues were mentioned least frequently. All of the references to nationalism and economics were made by President Yanukovych prior to the start of the conflict with

Russia. These messages have equally targeted domestic economy and Ukraine’s economic relations with other countries. Domestically, Yanukovych emphasized economic interests of maintaining trade relations with Russia as a key to Ukraine’s prosperity as a nation. At the same time, the need for economic modernization was cited as a goal of building a strong European Ukraine in the future. To regain legitimacy and explain the change of Ukraine’s economic course away from the economic association with the EU, Yanukovych noted the need to raise the competitiveness of Ukraine’s industries to the European level. Following the start of the Euromaidan protests in

November of 2013, Yanukovych attempted to justify his decision not to sign an

Association agreement with the European Union by arguing that this agreement would be against Ukraine’s national interests by turning Ukraine into Europe’s main source of raw materials and primary goods.

With the start of the conflict with Russia, the interim President Turchynov emphasized the “catastrophic” economic situation in Ukraine, citing problems with the monetary and banking systems as main issues to resolve in a country without making any appeal to the key words associated with the nationalist rhetoric. Economic issues were not tied to nationalist rhetoric since the start of Ukraine-Russia hostilities. This lack of emphasis on economic issues is strikingly different from the nature of nationalist rhetoric used by the nationalist far-right groups in Western and Central Europe (Capling 1997; 88 von Beyme 1988). In the EU countries, nationalists blame immigrants as the “others” who recently brought unemployment, lower wages and instability; however, in Ukraine and Russia economic issues were a relatively constant feature since the collapse of the

Soviet Union. The masses tend to blame political leaders in Russia and Ukraine for the economic struggles in their countries. Therefore, uniting people on the basis of economic issues would not bring support and legitimacy to the political regimes in place. Economic factors become less important than political and security issues, especially in times of conflict.

References to the Nation Associated With Cultural Issues

Political leaders in Ukraine mentioned key terms associated with nationalism in the context of cultural issues on 56 accounts in the course of the study period. Ukraine’s presidents used nationalist rhetoric while discussing various issues related to the country’s cultural unity, the rights of minorities, and the need for national consolidation.

With the start of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the Ukrainian leaders mentioned the cultural context of language issues and ethnic minority rights in emphasizing Ukraine’s need for national unity and consolidation. However, cultural issues were virtually insignificant in the rhetoric of all three presidents compared to the discussion of political issues. This trend might be one of the reasons why the nationalist rhetoric of Ukrainian leaders was not successful in advancing nationalism in Ukraine, even in times of conflict with the territorial integrity of Ukraine being violated by its neighbor state. The lack of attention to the context of cultural issues in nationalist rhetoric was exacerbated by the new law passed in February of 2014, stating that the Ukrainian language was the only official state language in the country. The Ukrainian government repealed this law two 89 weeks later and granted special rights to languages other than Ukrainian. However, part of the Ukrainian Russian-speaking population in the east and the south of the country has been alienated by the law making it a key impediment to national consolidation in early

2014. The language law has also been cited by the Russian president as one of the official causes for Russia's intervention into the Crimean peninsula12.

Results

The analysis showed that the Russian leader was much more active in his nationalist rhetoric than all of the Ukrainian leaders combined. Ukraine’s political leaders made references to the key terms associated with nationalist rhetoric 318 times over the course of the study period, while the Russian president referred to these key words more than four times as often (1,451 times). Surprisingly, the use of nationalist rhetoric in the speeches of state leaders in both countries has not increased after the start of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in March of 2014. In Russia, the use of this rhetoric declined by 7%, while in Ukraine it dropped by 11%.

Figure 1B in the Appendix B presents the comparison of the dynamic of nationalist rhetoric of presidents in Russia and Ukraine. The red box represents the most critical time in Ukraine-Russia relations, the start of the Russian invasion into Crimea and the beginning of the conflict in the east of Ukraine.

During the first few months after the annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainian government seemed too busy with the government transition inside the country and the security concerns to promote nationalism in state-sponsored media. This trend might

12 Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. 2014. “Vladimir Putin Otvetil na Voprosy Zhurnalistov o Situazii na Ukraine.” March 4. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366 90 partially explain why the nationalist hype of the Euromaidan largely died off with the end of the protests in February of 2014 and why none of the nationalist parties or candidates were successful in elections of May 2014.

There were also differences in the nature of the salient issues emphasized by the leaders of the two countries in their nationalist rhetoric. Figure 2B of the Appendix B presents the comparison of the nature of salient issues emphasized in the nationalist rhetoric of presidents in Russia and Ukraine. The Ukrainian leaders predominantly focused on the political issues in the country, starting with the mass protests, the ousting of president Yanukovych, the loss of Crimea, and the beginning of the military conflict in the east. Economic and cultural issues that could unite Ukrainians and strengthen the common national identity were largely ignored. President Putin, in contrast, paid particular attention to the cultural context in his nationalist rhetoric, emphasizing the strength of the Russian nation, the uniqueness of Russia’s historical path, and the nature of the collective identity of Russians that guides Russia’s domestic and foreign policy.

However, Putin ignored the international outcry and the economic sanctions imposed on

Russia by the West.

There was a lack of references to the economic issues in both countries. This tendency is potentially due to the fact that Ukraine’s economic issues were often blamed on the Yanukovych regime, which was supported in eastern Ukraine; thus, nationalist rhetoric in the context of economic issues might have alienated a large number of

Ukrainians in the east. In Russia, the government seemed to downplay the magnitude of economic issues brought on by the Western sanctions, which would oppose the nationalist rhetoric of strong independent Russia successfully resisting the West. 91

The example below demonstrates how political leaders in the two countries framed the same event, the annexation of Crimea. President Putin was emphasizing the cultural context of the event portraying it as the event of historical significance for

Russia. The president was pointing out the strength of the national spirit and the support among compatriots, without focusing on political implications or economic issues or benefits associated with this event. Specifically, Putin addressed the citizens of Crimea on March 18, 2014 in the following way:

“It is in such crucial historical moments that the strength of the nation's spirit is maturing. And the people of Russia showed such maturity and such power, by supporting their compatriots through their solidarity.” (Channel 1 TV news)

On this same day, the Interim President of Ukraine, Turchynov addressed the nation regarding the annexation of Crimea using different rhetoric. He was not making any appeals to the nation, the national unity, or the national spirit. He did not mention the

Ukrainian citizens or compatriots residing in Crimea at all. Instead, he emphasized political issues, specifically the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the aggressive Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine:

“Neither Ukraine nor the world recognize the annexation, and this process has no legal consequences…the aggression of the Russian Federation continues, and the political leadership of Russia is implementing the annexation of the territory of

Ukraine.” (Inter TV news)

These two excerpts exemplify the nature of presidential rhetoric in the state- controlled media in the two countries during the first three months following the annexation of Crimea. The Russian president was promoting nationalism by emphasizing 92 political and cultural issues, while the interim president of Ukraine virtually advanced no nationalist rhetoric, while primarily focusing on political issues and security threats.

Discussion

The analysis of the nationalist rhetoric of presidents in Russia and Ukraine is instrumental in explaining the growing nationalist sentiments in Russia, and the stagnation of nationalism in Ukraine in times of conflict. Political leaders in the two countries use state-controlled media to advance nationalist rhetoric in different ways. The first major difference lies in the framing of the nationalist rhetoric. In Russia, president

Putin couches nationalism in the context of political and cultural issues, while Ukraine’s leaders only use political context to advance nationalism. While cultural issues have been largely ignored by the Ukrainian leaders, these issues have been heavily emphasized in

Russia by president Putin. As a result, in 2013-2014 the Ukrainian people might have been even more divided along the national identity question than they were in the early

1990s. There is a lack of government efforts towards national identity construction based on common culture, values, and history. In contrast, president Putin continuously emphasizes the cultural context of national unity in his rhetoric. The analysis shows that the Russian leader has been referencing cultural issues mostly in the months prior to the start of the conflict in Ukraine. Since the Russian intervention in Ukraine was mostly justified by the need to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speaking residents of

Ukraine, the emphasis on both cultural and political issues helped address the most salient concerns for the Russian people. Thus, in Putin’s speeches, the topics of national consolidation, the unique character of the Russian people (regardless of their ethnicity or religion), and the rich nature of the Russian culture were mentioned frequently 93 throughout the study period. None of these topics have been mentioned by Ukraine’s leaders. The reference to cultural issues in leaders’ nationalist rhetoric might be one of the reasons nationalism has gained more prominence in Russia than among the Ukrainian people.

The second important distinction lies in the volume of nationalist rhetoric advanced by the leaders in the two countries. President Putin made appeals to nationalism four to five times more often than any of Ukraine’s leaders. Most importantly, the

Russian president was much more active in his nationalist rhetoric at the time when nationalism was most salient to the domestic public, in the spring of 2014 when Russia invaded Crimea. During this critical time, Ukraine experienced a vacuum of leadership with president Yanukovych fleeing the country and the interim president Turchynov dealing with the pressing political and security matters. Spring of 2014 represents the time when Ukraine’s leader was the least active in his nationalist rhetoric. These differences in the patterns and the nature of nationalist rhetoric advanced by the leaders of Russia and Ukraine can advance our understanding of the contrasting trends in nationalism in the two countries.

Conclusion

The article puts forward a new theoretical argument that clarifies why some regimes may be more successful in promoting nationalism than others under similar conditions. Drawing on the existing literature that connects nationalism and saliency theory, I explain why despite similar ability to control media and an interest in promoting nationalism, some regimes are more successful in promoting nationalism than others. I compare state-controlled media content in Russia and Ukraine to see whether nationalist 94 rhetoric in both countries has been tied to salient issues in the state-sponsored media space before the 2014 conflict and after the start of the conflict. Content analysis showed that political factors were the primary elements in the nationalist rhetoric of political leaders in both countries. The research has also allowed to uncover the importance of emphasizing cultural factors when it comes to top-down nationalism. While the Russian leader has been actively tying nationalist ideas to the culture-related salient issues, the

Ukrainian government has largely ignored any cultural elements. The historical analysis has traced the continuation of longer historical trends when it comes to national identity construction in Russia and Ukraine.

President Putin is continuing the historical pattern of Russia’s foreign policy, promoting the security of its vast territory and projecting Russia’s power over the neighboring states. Political factors have therefore been at the core of Russian nationalism. The Russian leaders have always promoted the image of a strong united country. When it comes to the cultural issues, president Putin is again following the same historical pattern of bringing the Russians together under the idea of a single national entity, with a common history, values, and destiny. Russia is a multiethnic and a multicultural state so its political leaders have always been interested in promoting unity and order to prevent irredentism and domestic conflict. Economic issues have traditionally been Russia’s core vulnerability. Therefore, today’s leader does not emphasize economic problems in his nationalist rhetoric. At the same time, the president brings attention to the attempts by the Western countries to undermine the Russian economy. With the current economic sanctions placed on Russia, one can expect an 95 increase in the President’s use of economic context to unite the Russian nation against the

“others.”

The Ukrainian leaders have historically been more concerned with political issues, securing Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity. This orientation explains the continuing trend of emphasizing diplomatic issues and security concerns in the nationalist rhetoric of Ukraine’s leadership in 2013-2014. The importance of security grew even more with the Russian annexation of Crimea and the militarized conflict in the eastern regions of the country. Ukraine’s leader is currently emphasizing the goal of security and peace to unite the people of Ukraine. Economic issues have been relevant over the country’s 27 years of history. However, the topic of Ukraine’s economy is traditionally at the center of debate among political powers with some parties and candidates seeking closer ties with Russia, while others focusing on the integration with

Europe. These debates continue to divide the people of Ukraine along ethnic lines.

Therefore, the current political leadership seems to avoid economic context in their nationalist rhetoric. When it comes to cultural factors, there is a continuing absence of a common cultural basis for nationalism in Ukraine. Political elites of Ukraine keep ignoring the need to promote the unity and inclusion of all ethnic groups in the country.

The power struggle among the political elites still revolves around the questions of national language, national history, and rights of minorities. Even in times of conflict, the cultural elements of national unity are not emphasized in the rhetoric of Ukrainian leaders. This phenomenon may explain why the Ukrainian people are not embracing nationalist rhetoric from the top. 96

The next steps in this research should involve the analysis of the nationalist rhetoric of political leaders in a broader sense, including the rhetoric emanating from the opposition as well. This analysis would include the media sources that are not mainstream and may be oriented towards regular Internet users. Previous research also shows that foreign media might have an influence on whether nationalism is embraced or not embraced by the masses (DellaVigna et al. 2014). The inclusion of foreign media into the analysis of nationalist rhetoric is also an important future step in research, especially in the context of eastern Ukraine, where a significant portion of the population speaks

Russian and regularly follows the Russian news sources.

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Appendix B

Codebook

Key word: 1) nation/al/ity (нация, национальн-); 2) people (народ-)

News focus: (can select more than one)13

a. Political: diplomatic and/or foreign policy activities that impact states politically; domestic political issues such as protests, elections; issues related to security, peace and political stability in a country. Issues related to human rights, public health, interethnic tensions, environmental situation may be included in this category if a leader emphasizes the resolution of this issue as a key political priority/policy goal.

b. Economic: events or issues related to domestic economy or economic ties with other countries; economic effects of events on individuals, groups, institutions, regions, or a country; discussion of potential economic consequences of adopting/not adopting a policy in the future.

c. Cultural/social: history; language; religion; arts/entertainment; society, culture and interethnic relations; education/science/technology; holidays; sports.

Table 1B. Clips Containing Direct Speech of Leaders in Russia and Ukraine, by number Countries/ 09/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 01/14 02/14 03/14 04/14 05/14 06/14 07/14 08/14 Total Month Russia 128 121 135 134 94 113 175 88 120 87 105 83 1383 Ukraine 74 86 89 128 37 69 106 87 56 111 109 105 1057

Table 2B. Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Russian and the Ukrainian Media, by number of references Countries/ 09/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 01/14 02/14 03/14 04/14 05/14 06/14 07/14 08/14 Total Month Russia 105 69 283 52 79 163 170 171 54 123 77 105 1503 Ukraine 29 10 17 42 36 34 18 8 5 34 32 53 318

Table 3B. Nationalist Rhetoric (Associated with “People”) and Issue Saliency in the Russian and the Ukrainian Media, by number of references Countries/ 09/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 01/14 02/14 03/14 04/14 05/14 06/14 07/14 08/14 Total Month Russia 69 26 27 183 31 29 66 86 90 22 54 41 724 Ukraine 17 7 12 16 21 23 17 5 5 31 27 39 220

13 Nodes were originally obtained from Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) study of news values. 105

Table 4B. Nationalist Rhetoric (Associated with “People”) and Issue Saliency in the Russian Media, by number of references References/ 09/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 01/14 02/14 03/14 04/14 05/14 06/14 07/14 08/14 Total Month Political 40 8 14 116 27 10 55 62 67 17 43 28 487 Economic 4 4 4 28 2 2 0 4 0 0 3 0 51 Cultural 27 14 9 42 16 15 14 18 23 6 10 13 207 Total 71 26 27 186 45 27 69 84 90 23 56 41 745

Table 5B. Nationalist Rhetoric (Associated with “People”) and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian Media, by number of references References/ 09/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 01/14 02/14 03/14 04/14 05/14 06/14 07/14 08/14 Total Month Political 16 4 8 12 15 20 14 4 4 30 27 38 192 Economic 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 Cultural 0 3 4 3 5 3 3 1 1 1 0 1 25 Total 17 7 12 16 21 23 17 5 5 31 27 39 220

Table 6B. Nationalist Rhetoric (Associated with “Nation”) and Issue Saliency in the Russian and the Ukrainian Media, by number of references Countries/ 09/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 01/14 02/14 03/14 04/14 05/14 06/14 07/14 08/14 Total Month Russia 88 79 42 100 21 50 97 84 81 32 69 36 779 Ukraine 12 3 5 26 15 11 1 3 0 3 5 14 98

Table 7B. Nationalist Rhetoric (Associated with “Nation”) and Issue Saliency in the Russian Media, by number of references References/ 09/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 01/14 02/14 03/14 04/14 05/14 06/14 07/14 08/14 Total Month Political 26 26 10 32 9 6 44 43 36 27 30 12 301 Economic 7 9 6 26 1 1 12 12 15 5 4 7 105 Cultural 58 40 22 43 13 43 56 42 38 13 41 17 426 Total 91 75 38 101 23 50 112 97 89 45 75 36 832

Table 8B. Nationalist Rhetoric (Associated with “Nation”) and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian Media, by number of references References/ 09/13 10/13 11/13 12/13 01/14 02/14 03/14 04/14 05/14 06/14 07/14 08/14 Total Month Political 6 2 3 22 9 6 1 1 0 0 2 8 60 Economic 5 0 2 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 Cultural 2 1 1 1 4 2 1 3 0 3 3 10 31 Total 13 3 6 26 15 11 2 4 0 3 5 18 106

106

References (#) References

Russia

References (#) References Ukraine

Figure 1B. Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian and Russian Media 107

Russia Ukraine

Percent (%) Percent Percent (%) Percent

Figure 2B. Nationalist Rhetoric and Issue Saliency in the Ukrainian and Russian Media, percentage to the total number of references to the nation

108

Article 3. Measuring Dimensions of Nationalism in East-Central Europe: A Cross- National Analysis

Abstract

Rising nationalism in East-Central Europe (ECE) has been an alarming trend for scholars and policymakers. Nationalism can be a powerful political ideology evoking strong emotional feelings among individuals. Regrettably, cross-national research measuring nationalism on the individual level has been limited, while the existing measures suffer from theoretical drawbacks. Some scholars focus solely on measuring ethnic nationalism, while ignoring any benign, neutral or everyday expressions of nationalism. Still, others measure nationalism along the dichotomy of civic and ethnic (“good” and “bad”) nationalism. However, these measures do not truly reflect the variety of forms that nationalism can take. The nature of nationalism involves a lot of grey areas, where strands of nationalism can be both benign and aggressive at the same time. Nationalism can also evolve from weaker to more intense manifestations over time. This research addresses the existing gap in the literature presenting one of the first attempts to measure nationalism across multiple states in ECE. Using ISSP data from 1995-2013 and Mokken scaling analysis, I create a new nationalism index measure that accounts for the intensity of nationalist sentiments based on measures for national identification, national consciousness, patriotism, national pride, national superiority, and xenophobia. The results of the analysis indicate that over the years Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia had some of the highest levels of nationalism while some of the lowest levels of nationalism in the region could be found in Slovakia, Latvia, and Slovenia.

Keywords: nationalism, indices, East-Central Europe, Mokken scaling procedure

Introduction

Nationalism, as a concept, can be associated with a set of government policies, with group sentiments, and with individual sentiments. As a form of political ideology, nationalism may have a strong effect on public opinion and mass attitudes in a country.

These effects can be positive, negative, or mixed. Some scholars consider nationalism to be a necessary foundation for state-building and emphasize the importance of national consciousness and national pride for good and responsible citizenship (Anderson 1991;

Budryte 2011; Gledhill 2005; Huddy and Khatib 2007). Growing nationalism may 109 mobilize the population of a country; encourage the public to support the government, to abide by the national laws, and to defend the country from foreign threats. Others view growing nationalism with skepticism since it may lead to antagonisms and inter-group hostility in a country (Bar-Tal 1997; Mann 1995). Regardless of the specific effects of nationalist ideology on the masses, it is generally agreed that nationalism can evoke strong emotional feelings on the individual level.

Since nationalism can entice people to express hostility toward other groups and cultures and even mobilize the masses to go to war, a lot of scholarly literature has been devoted to the study of nationalist mobilization. Scholars have examined different political, cultural, and economic factors that might be the causes of rising nationalism in a country (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1991; Breuilly 1993; Brubaker 1996; Kedourie 1993).

Yet, nationalism is primarily studied as a top-down approach. Thus, the literature mainly focuses on structural conditions, institutions, and the role of the elites as the drivers of nationalism (Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1966; Gellner 1983; Breuilly 2001).

Surprisingly, these studies seem to share an assumption that individuals just embrace nationalism if certain macro-level conditions are present. The masses themselves, their needs, and perceptions are not adequately explored even though, in essence, the nation is made up of its citizens. According to Whitmeyer (2002), there seems to be a consensus that nationalism is a “mass phenomenon”, yet the masses have been largely ignored in the academic literature. It is particularly relevant in the context of

East-Central Europe (ECE), the region with widespread nationalism, but no available cross-country measures of nationalism. This research addresses the existing gap in the 110 literature presenting one of the first attempts to measure nationalism across multiple states in ECE.

The focus of this article is on introducing a new measure of nationalism to evaluate the cross-country and individual variation in the levels of nationalism in ECE.

Using the existing survey data, I put forward the multi-item scale of nationalism that allows comparing 12 countries in the region on six dimensions of nationalism. These new measures contribute to our understanding of nationalism trends in the region that is characterized by much diversity. Over the years, as more states in ECE engaged in regional integration as members of the European Union, the expectation was that nationalism in the region would be declining. Yet, the success of the far-right, neo- nationalist, and populist parties and movements in countries like Hungary, the Czech

Republic, Poland, and Russia in recent years suggests that nationalism in the region is gaining momentum (Bershidsky 2016; Shekhovtsov and Pomerantsev 2016). As Eastern

Europeans face political and economic integration, new immigration trends, demographic changes and economic downturns, they seem to cling tighter to their national identities.

The research involves a statistical analysis of survey data to track the patterns of nationalist sentiments across different ECE countries over time. This article starts with the review of existing research on nationalism from below and the past efforts of scholars in quantifying nationalism. Next, I discuss the varieties of individual-level manifestations of nationalism and the procedures of Mokken scale analysis used to design the nationalism index. I present the results of Mokken scale analysis for three separate years reflecting varying levels of nationalism in the region over the course of 1995-2013. The analysis also includes the breakdown of the index along its six dimensions to compare 111 nationalism trends across ECE states. Finally, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the nationalism index in cross-country analysis.

The Study of Nationalism from Below

There is an extensive body of literature on the nature of nationalist sentiments.

Most scholars agree that nationalist sentiments emerged and developed as a form of individual attachment as a result of historical events and experiences (Smith 1995;

Calhoun 1997). In some cases, these events were the mass movements for sovereignty and national self-determination, in other cases nationalist sentiments emerged under the influence of political ideologies, party programs, mass media or public education systems. Regardless of the wide variety of manifestations nationalist sentiments can take, the defining feature of nationalism is the differentiation between the ingroup and the outgroup, or “us” versus “them” (Spencer and Wollman 2002). This differentiation may be weak and impartial toward outgroups on the one end of the spectrum or strong and discriminatory towards “others” on the opposite end of the spectrum. The basis for the sentiments of attachment to a nation can be ethnic roots, religious background, common history, culture, traditions, myths, or the idea of shared homeland (Hjerm 2008). The sentiments of attachment to a nation may, therefore, vary in their manifestations across time and space depending on the origins of nationalism and the environment in which nationalist sentiments evolve.

Scholars explore how and why individuals respond to nationalism by examining the relationship between political elites and non-elites, specifically looking at the elite discourse and its role in advancing nationalist ideas (Snyder and Ballentine 1996; Budge

2001). The modernist theory of nationalism specifically posits that nationalism as a set of 112 ideas was created by the elites through tools such as common language and public education (Kedourie 1993; Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983). Other scholars argue that the elites alone did not create nationalism, yet they may benefit from nationalist sentiments

(Smith 1998; Whitmeyer 2002; Breuilly 1993). Thus, the elites are often promoting and sustaining nationalist sentiments in their rhetoric and political programs.

While most studies of nationalism explore it from the top-down perspective (as a set of ideas advanced by the elites), a number of scholars emphasize the importance of studying nationalism as a bottom-up phenomenon (Hobsbawm 1991; Billig 1995;

Edensor 2006; Herzfeld 1997). Hobsbawm (1991) suggests that nationalism “cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist” (10). The bottom-up approach to nationalism suggests that individuals manifest their nationalist sentiments and the elites may incorporate these sentiments into political programs and ideologies to maintain legitimacy, mobilize the masses, or advance to power.

Nationalist sentiments in a country may also rise from the bottom in times of real crises or as a result of perceived threats to a nation and its people. In times of conflict or a security threat, individuals tend to unite and exhibit higher levels of nationalism (Herbst

1990; Triandafyllidou 1998; Collins 2012). This tendency was rather prominent after the

September 11 attacks in the United States with public opinion polls recording a sharp increase in national pride, growing public support for the government, mass approval of military action overseas, and growing public displays of the American flag (Skitka 2005;

Feinstein 2016a; Feinstein 2016b). Scholars argue that the levels of nationalism in a 113 country may also be associated with the number of ethnic minorities or immigrants inside the country (Anderson 2002; Stephan and Stephan 2000). The growing diversity of ethnicities, religions, languages, and cultures in one state may be viewed as a threat to the survival of a nation. Francis and O’Grady (2015) explored the effects of the European refugee crisis and the increased number of terrorist attacks in Europe on the rise in nationalist sentiments in Europe and the United States. These perceived fears of refugees translated into the electoral success of nationalist politicians and the adoption of more restrictive national policies related to immigration and border control.

In studying nationalism as an individual-level attachment to a nation, most scholars focus exclusively on the effects of discriminatory and aggressive forms of nationalism (Li and Brewer 2004; Escandell and Ceobanu 2010; Pehrson et al. 2009;

Francis and O’Grady 2015). Nationalism is generally believed to be positively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes because the sentiments of attachment to a nation suggest that individuals prioritize the members of the nation over all foreign nationals (Gellner

1983; Hechter 2000). Yet, some scholars believe that nationalism is a distinct construct from chauvinism and xenophobia (Allport 1954; Herring, Jankowski, and Brown 1999;

Solt 2011). More recently, the research focus has shifted to the study of benign manifestations of nationalism (Smith and Kim 2006; Solt 2011). Thus, the rise in nationalist sentiments has been linked not only to inter-ethnic violence and xenophobia but also to the growth in social cohesion and the expansion of political rights (Hjerm

1998; Moore 2001; Reeskens and Wright 2013; Norman 2006).

Authors have also been exploring everyday expressions of nationalism manifested in public ceremonies, sporting events, cultural practices, and teaching materials in 114 schools (Billig 1995; Edensor 2006; Jones and Merriman 2009; Surak 2011; Benwell

2014). In some countries, there has been a decline of hostile and discriminatory nationalism, but a continuous growth in everyday or banal nationalism (which may further evolve into more exclusive forms of nationalism) (Billig 1995). Some studies are specifically devoted to how nationalism promoted by the elites might be redefined and modified on the individual level leading to different patterns and variations of nationalism across states (Herzfeld 1997; Brubaker et al. 2006; Fox 2004; Francis and

O’Grady 2015).

The studies of nationalism on the individual-level suggest that there are a number of existing measures of nationalist sentiments. Yet, due to the nature of nationalism, most of these measures are country-specific. The following section presents the analysis of the existing measures and shows a large diversity in how scholars conceptualize and measure individual-level nationalism.

Individual-level Measures of Nationalism

The differences in the conceptualization of nationalism translate into a number of different approaches that scholars use to measure nationalist sentiments. A number of studies treat nationalism as a distinct concept from patriotism, national pride, and national identity (Latcheva 2010; Solt 2011; Wagner et al. 2012). Other studies adopt an approach where national identity can be manifested in two major forms, patriotism and nationalism or as an alternative, civic and ethnic forms of nationalism (Tilley and Heath 2007;

Davidov 2009; Grigoryan 2013; Ariely 2012). Still, other scholars measure nationalism through the sentiments of national pride (Solt 2011; Blank and Schmidt 2003). Thus, the definition of the concept of nationalism plays a key role in determining the approach to 115 measuring nationalism on the individual level. Additionally, scholars are limited in data available for cross-country measures of nationalist sentiments. Bonikowski (2016) highlights this issue by arguing that the existing surveys do not contain all the questions necessary to measure nationalism in an accurate way. He also brings up the practice of using the same set of survey questions over the years for the purposes of comparability, which further complicates the task of designing better measures of nationalism.

The past efforts of scholars in measuring individual-level nationalist sentiments were primarily based on data from public opinion surveys. Nationalist sentiments were measured through a number of survey questions built into Likert scales. Some scales focus exclusively on evaluating individuals’ attitudes toward their in-group (nation, culture, people) as the superior one. Thus, scholars often use nationalism scale and survey questions devised by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) (van Alstyne 2001; Kemmelmeier and Winter 2008; Li and Brewer 2004). The scale by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) is similar to the one developed by Pratto et al. (1994) and presents a number of statements that emphasize the dominance and superiority of the United States in various domains

(political, cultural, economic, etc.). The statements range from “In view of America's moral and material superiority, it is only right that we should have the biggest say in deciding United Nations policy" to "Other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as possible” and "People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong" (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). These scales might be effective for individual-level measures of nationalism in a single country, but their weakness lies in their inability to produce a cross-country measure of nationalism. In 116 addition, these measures still use separate scales of nationalism as an aggressive sentiment of superiority and nationalism in its benign form.

Some studies specifically focus on measuring nationalism along the typology of civic and ethnic nationalist sentiments, or “good” versus “bad” nationalisms (Robinson

2009; Tilley and Heath 2007; Davidov 2009; Grigoryan 2013; Ariely 2012; Reeskens and

Wright 2013). Some literature makes a distinction between an attachment to a nation and an attachment to an ethnic group (Robinson 2009). Other works distinguish between separate measures for the sentiments of superiority and for the sentiments of pride

(Davidov 2009; Grigoryan 2013), as well as distinct measures for national identity and xenophobia (Ariely 2012). I argue that the measures of nationalism that produce the dichotomous view of nationalism or that reduce nationalism to xenophobia and national superiority do not truly reflect the variety of forms and manifestations that nationalism can take.

A few scholars conceptualized nationalism as the sentiments of national pride as opposed to patriotism, chauvinism, and xenophobia (Latcheva 2010; Solt 2011; Wagner et al. 2012). In particular, Latcheva (2010) conducts research on national identification in

Bulgaria and distinguishes between pride in the country’s institutions (constructive patriotism) and pride in the country’s culture, history, sports, etc. (nationalism). At the same time, the author defines patriotism as “critical loyalty towards the nation” and suggests that both patriotism and nationalism are positively related to chauvinism

(national superiority) in the case of Bulgaria. These findings run counter to the theoretical conceptualization of patriotism and national superiority as distinct constructs in the research. Solt (2011) measures nationalism by primarily relying on a single survey 117 indicator asking “How proud are you to be [Nationality]?” The weakness of this measure lies in the fact that pride in a nation is not the only component of nationalism. These types of measures might not reflect other manifestations of nationalism, leaving out weaker forms of national attachment and the more intense (and aggressive) forms of nationalist sentiments.

There have been efforts to tailor the measures of nationalist sentiments to specific countries, people, and cultures (Brudny 1998; Blank and Schmidt 2003; Herrera and

Kraus 2012). Thus, in Herrera and Kraus (2012) the measures of Russian nationalism reflected the willingness to potentially vote for famous Russians throughout history

(Stalin and Sakharov) and the individual degree of religiosity. These country-specific measures might be useful for studying nationalism in one particular state. However, one has to carefully select the survey questions so that all respondents are familiar with their content. Specifically, in the measures proposed by Herrera and Kraus (2012), one of the questions was associated with Andrei Sakharov. It is possible that not many Russians know who Sakharov is since he is mostly famous in the West. In addition, just because individuals would choose to elect someone like Sakharov to the legislature, does not mean they are exhibiting nationalism.

Krasznay (2010) has built nationalism scales based on surveys where individuals indicated their self–perception of being more or less nationalist (ranging from 0 to 10).

The problems with the self-report measures are striking since people might overemphasize or under-report their true sentiments. This issue is particularly evident when asking individuals to report how nationalist they are because most individuals associate nationalism with its negative connotations. Finally, it might be difficult to 118 present a clear scale of 10 different degrees of strength for nationalism that individuals can use for self-reporting.

Dekker et al. (2003) have designed a measure that reflects the intensity of national attitudes. Specifically, they designed separate measures for neutral-positive and for negative forms of national attitudes. These authors conceptualized nationalism as the most intense positive manifestation of national attitudes. This idea is rather problematic considering the exclusive, discriminatory, and aggressive character that nationalism might take. Similarly, national superiority is also presented as a positive manifestation of national attitudes, which runs contrary to the idea of superiority as an expression of discrimination toward the members of an outgroup. This article suggests that an effective measure of nationalism should reflect a scale that represents the strength of nationalist sentiments ranging from weak to more intense gradations, without separating these measures into neutral, benign, and aggressive manifestations of nationalism.

Theoretical Approach

As discussed in article 1, I build on the work of Dekker et al. (2003) to construct a continuum of nationalist sentiments that allows assessing the levels of nationalism in a country and permits cross-country comparisons of nationalism levels. The measures developed by Dekker et al. (2003) evaluate the range of national attitudes through a cumulative hierarchy. According to these measures, national attitudes vary based on the attitude type (positive or negative) and its intensity (from moderate to extremely strong affection). These authors have developed separate measures for positive and negative expressions of national attitudes. Under the positive expressions, Dekker et al. (2003) group all manifestations of nationalism from neural sentiments of national belonging to 119 benign expressions of national pride and more aggressive expressions of national superiority. At the same time, the negative expressions of national attitudes involve a range of sentiments that reject the idea of belonging to a nation, ranging from national alienation to national hate. While I agree with Dekker et al. (2003) that nationalist sentiments are fluid and can be best expressed through a cumulative hierarchy or scale, I disagree with the idea that the measure of nationalism should include all forms of alienation from membership in a nation. This approach would impact the construct validity of a measure since it is akin to measuring the levels of individual greed by including the measures of how generous an individual is. Generosity is a completely opposite construct in relation to greed. Similarly, nationalism represents the sentiments of individual attachment to a nation, which should theoretically range from no attachment to the most intense levels of attachment. If an individual is expressing national hate or national shame, these sentiments reflect the lack of nationalism (the absence of individual attachment to a nation) and instead represent a certain level of political or social alienation.

Alternatively, I propose measuring nationalism on a single continuum that might include different dimensions reflecting the levels of intensity national attachments can take. The measure would include the variations of weak, moderate, and strong attachments to a nation (Figure 2A in Article 1). Therefore, the focus in this article shifts away from measuring nationalism in a dichotomous way by evaluating good and bad nationalism and instead turns to the uniform measurement of nationalism based on the intensity of the individual sentiment. The description of the empirical markers for each dimension of nationalism can be found in Table 1A (Article 1). 120

Nationalist sentiments may grow cumulatively from weak expressions (national identity and national consciousness) to moderate manifestations (patriotism and national pride) to the most intense expressions of nationalism (national superiority and xenophobic nationalism). Weak and moderate manifestations of nationalism emerge as a result of socialization, personal observations, individual experiences, as well as rhetoric, messages, and ideas advanced by others. Socialization of individuals begins in early childhood as individuals are influenced by their families, peers, school, church, government, and the media (Dekker et al. 2003). These agencies help children learn about their nation, national symbols, history, and national holidays (Marshall 1996; Harambos and Holborn 2000). Socialization creates an emotional link between an individual and a nation from an early age (Dawson et al. 1969). Personal experiences (such as negative interactions with ethnic minorities or service in the armed forces) may also impact the strength of individual attachments to a nation. At times, key events, such as an economic crisis in a country, a new policy on immigration, or an increase in crimes perpetuated by immigrants may serve as triggers for nationalism in a country. Finally, the rhetoric of political elites, elite manipulation of information, news framing may further intensify the levels of nationalism among individuals (Deutsch 1966; Baumgartner and Jones 1993;

Wood and Doan 2003). The government elites and political entrepreneurs may be interested in advancing nationalism by emphasizing past historical injustices, promoting national symbols and images, and emphasizing existing or looming threats to a nation.

The intensity of nationalism may increase as a result of real or perceived political, economic, or social/cultural threats to individual and national wellbeing. 121

The first two dimensions of nationalism on the continuum (national identity and national consciousness) reflect the most basic forms of attachment to a nation. National identity is a primary expression of nationalism. It evolves out of an individual’s sentiment of identification with a nation and the awareness that all members of one nation share similar characteristics, values, past history, symbols with each other (Miller et al. 1981;

Dekker et al. 2003). National identity may grow and further evolve into national consciousness. This next manifestation of nationalism implies not only one’s awareness of membership in a nation but also one’s understanding of issues, challenges, and goals that a nation faces. National consciousness is associated with an interest in potentially advancing the common interests and aspirations of the members of the nation (Chong and

Rogers 2005; Gurin et al. 1980; Fanon 1961).

The moderate manifestations of nationalism are patriotism14 and national pride.

Patriotism builds on national consciousness in that it represents not only the awareness of interests, goals, and aspirations of a nation, but the sentiments of love, respect, and devotion to this nation’s people, history, and culture. This devotion can reach the point where individuals are ready to actively advance the goals of a nation, defend their country, and even give their lives for a country (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Davidov

2010). Patriotism reflects an emotional attachment to a nation that is “healthy” without any prejudice or hostility toward members of other nations (Druckman 1994; de

14 While some scholars (Connor 1978; Plamenatz 1976; Davidov 2010) advance the idea of patriotism as a separate theoretical construct from nationalism, I challenge this argument in Article 1. I argue that the premises of patriotism (such as attachment to a country and love of one’s people) do not run counter to my conceptualization of nationalism (generally, a political ideology that advances the attachment to a nation or individual sentiments of attachment to a nation). This idea is supported by past empirical research (Billig 1995; Nathanson 1997; Brubaker 2004) suggesting that I can include patriotism as one of the dimensions on a nationalism continuum.

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Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). Patriotism may intensify and grow into the sentiments of national pride, which presents an outward-oriented manifestation of nationalism. National pride involves comparing one’s nation to other nations, the perception of one nation’s achievements, and the pride over the accomplishments of the nation and its members

(Papastephanou 2013). At the same time, the sentiments of national pride are associated with individuals making comparisons in an objective manner. Thus, national pride does not represent blind adoration of one’s country nor a rejection of any criticism associated with a nation (Doob 1964; Smith and Jarkko 1998; Fabrykant and Magun 2015).

The most intense manifestations of nationalist sentiments on a continuum are national superiority and xenophobic nationalism. National superiority may evolve out of strong sentiments of national pride. It involves the idealization of a nation and its achievements. Individuals who exhibit national superiority compare their nation to other nations in a subjective manner and do not accept any criticism of their country, people, culture, etc. National superiority involves the sentiments of ethnocentrism, prejudice toward other nations, distrust of ethnic minorities and immigrants (Druckman 1994;

Grigoryan 2014; Blank and Schmidt 2003). This manifestation of nationalism may further grow into xenophobic nationalism, the strongest dimension of nationalist sentiments of the continuum. Xenophobic nationalism represents the sentiments of hate and hostility toward immigrants, minority groups, and foreign nationals (Mudde 1995;

Hjerm 2003). The sentiments of xenophobia involve the intent to prevent the assimilation of immigrants or ethnic minorities into one’s nation. It may include efforts to purify the nation by using deportation, immigration controls, restrictions on citizenship and employment for the immigrants and foreign nationals (Dekker et al. 2003; Lewin-Epstein 123 and Levanon 2005). The strongest manifestations of xenophobic nationalism in a country may be associated with violence, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide.

Data

The research is based on the data from the National Identity modules of the

International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) surveys from 1995, 2003, and 2013. I chose the ISSP data over data from World Values Study (WVS), the European Values

Survey (EVS), and the European Social Survey (ESS) because I was interested in the survey that covered the countries of East-Central Europe (unavailable in WVS) and included a range of questions on respondents’ identity and national attachments (limited availability in the ESS and the EVS). The ISSP data are collected through face-to-face interviews of respondents in their homes. Random multi-stage sampling is performed to select respondents who are 18 years and older. The interview questions in the National

Identity module focus exclusively on group membership, identification, nationality, attitudes toward immigrants and foreign cultures, and the socio-economic background of respondents. The ISSP collects surveys on the specific topic of “National Identity” every eight to ten years, with the majority of questions in the dataset replicated over the years.

The National Identity module for ISSP is available for years 1995, 2003, and 2013. It contains 386 variables in 1995, 245 variables in 2003, and 386 variables in 2013. The countries represented in the dataset vary only slightly over the three years. Thus, in 1995 and in 2003 the data is available for eight ECE countries (the Czech Republic, Poland,

Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and in 2013, ten ECE countries were included in the dataset (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia,

Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia). The sample sizes for each 124 country range from 1000 to 1,500 respondents, with a few exceptions (e.g., the sample for Russia for 2003 was larger with 2,383 respondents). The samples used for analysis might have been slightly smaller due to missing variables. “Do not know” and “Can’t choose” options in the original dataset were treated as missing values and deleted listwise.15

A number of issues are associated with using survey data for research on nationalism. First, it is hard to measure complex sentiments such as patriotism and xenophobic nationalism through a single survey question. Therefore, there is a need to integrate several questions into an index to measure each concept under investigation.

The second issue lies in the sensitive nature of the phenomena under study. Although respondents are guaranteed anonymity, some might wish to underplay their xenophobic sentiments and appear more tolerant in order to please the interviewer. This tendency might create problems with the reliability of the data. Finally, Svallfors (1996) points out that ISSP surveys are limited by the fact that they are context-dependent. Since the interviews are conducted in different languages by different interviewers, the same question might be phrased or read slightly differently in different countries. The aggregation of questions into indices to measure the phenomena under study helps alleviate the issue of context-dependency to a certain degree. However, the potential threat to the reliability of the data remains.

At the same time, the ISSP data contain the questions and the country sample that are fitting for designing a new cross-country measure of nationalism. The countries

15 To limit the potential effects of missing data, I conducted all stages of the analysis with and without missing data imputation. The results showed no significant changes in the scales produced as a result of the multiple imputation of missing values (performed in STATA).

125 included in the survey are quite diverse politically (e.g., EU member states and non-EU member states), economically16 and culturally17. This diversity of states in a single region provides a good setting for the major goal of this article, creating a uniform cross-country measure of nationalism.

Scale Construction

In developing a multi-item, multi-subscale measure of nationalism, I followed the following steps:

1. Item generation

In assessing a composite measure of nationalism, I relied on past research and deductive reasoning to evaluate what survey questions might be fitting for each dimension of nationalism on a scale. The development of a deductive scale relies on a theoretical definition of a term/phenomenon to construct an appropriate measure (Schwab

1980). Since there is a large volume of literature on nationalism describing its variations and forms, a deductive approach seemed most fitting in composite scale construction. I relied on the empirical markers for gradations of nationalism on a continuum (Article 1,

Table 1A) to select questions from the existing ISSP survey that might be instrumental in measuring each dimension.

2. Mokken Scaling Analysis

While scholars use multiple procedures to create scales and indices from survey data, such as factor analysis, principal component analysis, structural equation modeling,

16 In 2013, GDP per capita in Czech Republic was 30,485 USD, while in Ukraine GDP per capita was 8,630 USD (World Bank 2013). 17 In 2000, international migrants constituted 1% of the population in Bulgaria and 18% of the population in Latvia (UN Migration Report 2015). 126 and Guttman scaling, I chose Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA) for this research. MSA was selected because it fits the multidimensional nature of nationalism and is appropriate for the analysis of raw data and index creation from ISSP surveys. These surveys contain interval level data obtained through Likert scales questionnaires. The scaling procedure in

MSA relies on Guttman scaling procedures rooted in Item Response Theory. Thus, MSA was specifically designed to use multiple variables/items to create a one-dimensional continuum by identifying one latent attribute in all of the items (van Schuur 2003). The scaling method behind MSA is hierarchical, which allows ordering items on a scale by the degree of difficulty. This method has been widely used in psychiatric research, education research, and political science research, including studies of public opinion and human rights (Lee and Ostergard 2017; Cingranelli and Richards 1999).

MSA can address different types of variables, which is instrumental in working with data from ISSP surveys that contain variables with two distinct categories

(dichotomous) and more than two categories (polytomous). Using MSA, I could incorporate both types of variables into a single index. In addition, the MSA procedure involves a set of requirements that can be instrumental in better understanding the nature of each dimension of nationalism. According to MSA, the variables will form a single scale only if they fit certain requirements, such as monotone homogeneity (a single latent attribute that links all items in a scale), high coefficient of homogeneity for all items in a scale, and a certain order to all items according to popularity or difficulty (van Schuur

2003).

First, the requirement of monotone homogeneity model suggests the existence of a latent continuum that captures the associations among all of the items in a scale, 127 implying that these items are stochastically independent and do not collectively measure another attribute (van Schuur 2003). MSA produces a diagnostic called ‘crit’, which allows assessing the monotone homogeneity and double monotonicity of a scale (van

Schuur 2011). ‘Crit’ values are calculated from scale coefficients H for each item combined into a single value. The values below 40 are acceptable as they are attributed to sampling error, while values above 80 indicate violations of the monotone homogeneity and double monotonicity assumptions (van Schuur 2011).

Second, MSA produces item Hj scalability coefficient to assess how each item in a scale relates to other items. The procedure also produces a total H coefficient to evaluate how strong the overall scale is. The goal in MSA is to obtain a scale with items that have Hj and H values of .3 and higher. The H values between .3 and .4 reflect a weak scale, the values between .4 and .5 suggest that a scale has medium strength, and H values above .5 reflect a strong scale.

Third, MSA has an ability to assess the reliability of a scale through a square matrix, also called the P(+,+) matrix. The matrix allows estimating the proportion of having the same response to an item twice for each pair of variables. These proportions can be viewed on the diagonal of the P(+,+) matrix. In order for the scale to conform to the requirement of double monotonicity, the proportions in the matrix should be increasing in each row or in each column. At the same time, the differences in proportions should not exceed 0.03 (van Schuur 2011).

These three main requirements of the MSA procedure suggest that raw data might be used to build scales representing dimensions of nationalism. The properties of MSA also allow assessing the strength of each scale while ranking the strength of each item in 128 a scale. To create scales through latent continuum analysis, I used Mokken scaling procedure (MSP) built into statistical software Stata (version 13.0) (Hardouin 2013).

I initially began with factor analysis (FA) to evaluate whether the variables that theoretically should be included into the measure of nationalism fit together on a single scale. Factor analysis confirmed that there are different dimensions of nationalism that reflect two to three separate dimensions depending on the country under analysis and the time frame. I did not use the results of FA to create measures of nationalism because the analysis grouped together a large number of variables that could not be combined into a single measure theoretically. For example, one of the three factors included about 12 variables that were quite distinct when it came to the intensity of nationalist sentiments.

Principal component analysis (PCA) was also conducted with the data that included all of the variables of interest for all three years. PCA included the data for the six ECE countries consistently present in the ISSP National Identity modules across the three years. The analysis showed that there were six components suggesting that there are six dimensions (patterns) among the variables of interest. PCA conducted with the data from a single year (1995, 2003, and 2013) indicated that there were five to eight components depending on the year under analysis. Thus, PCA once again indicated the multidimensional nature of the construct under investigation (nationalism), yet this method was not chosen as the main instrument for index creation because PCA results were not uniform, producing a different number of components across the years. At the same time, the purpose of this research was to create a cross-country measure of nationalism, therefore, I mainly relied on the scales produced consistently in the course of

Mokken scaling analysis across separate years. 129

I started the analysis with an exploratory Mokken scaling procedure to evaluate whether all of the variables in the dataset that should theoretically be included into the measure of nationalism on a continuum conformed to a single cumulative scale (van

Schuur 2011). This exploratory analysis produced a large number of separate scales confirming that the nature of nationalism as a construct is complex, multi-dimensional, and time-dependent. MSA results showed that one cannot measure nationalism in a country through raw data on a single continuum. Instead, it might be useful to measure separate dimensions of nationalism before combining these measures into a cumulative measure of nationalism in a country. After the exploratory stage of MSA, I grouped variables of interest theoretically into dimensions of nationalism on a continuum and used confirmatory MSA to assess how these groups of variables conformed to each scale.

I utilized confirmatory MSA to create scales that would be consistent in a dataset that included all ECE countries and all three years, and in separate datasets that included all ECE countries for each separate year available for analysis (1995, 2003, 2013). The resulting scales showed consistency in a cross-national analysis regardless of a year under study. The results of MSA are presented in Tables 1C-18C in Appendix C. These scales do not violate the requirements of Mokken scaling procedure and show the strength of each item for different dimensions of nationalism (van Schuur 2011).

Variables of Interest

The ISSP National Identity modules contain a number of variables of interest that could be used to measure nationalism on a scale. The variables that were specifically selected for the analysis are consistent across the three datasets (1995, 2003, and 2013).

The details about the questions and the response options are included in table 3.1. 130

Table 3.1 The Variables of Interest for Nationalism Scales Dimension of Questions/variables Choice of Responses Nationalism Some people say the following things are important for being (e.g. For all three questions: truly Hungarian). Others say they are not important. How important 1. Very important National do you think each of the following is … 2. Fairly important identity 1. … to have been born in (R’s country)? 3. Not very important 2. … to have (R’s country) citizenship? 4. Not important at all 3. … to have lived in (R’s country) for most of one’s life? Some people say the following things are important for being (e.g. For all three questions: truly Hungarian). Others say they are not important. How important 1. Very important National do you think each of the following is … 2. Fairly important consciousness 1. … to be able to speak (R’s country dominant language(s))? 3. Not very important 2. … to respect (R’s country’s) political institutions and laws? 4. Not important at all 3. … to feel (e.g. Hungarian)? How proud are you of (R’s country) in each of the following? For all four questions: 1. The way democracy works. 1. Very proud Patriotism 2. Its political influence in the world. 2. Somewhat proud 3. (R’s country) economic achievements. 3. Not very proud 4. Its social security system. 4. Not proud at all How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? For all three questions: 1. I would rather be a citizen of (R’s country) than of any other 1. Agree strongly country in the world. 2. Agree National pride 2. The world would be a better place if people from other countries 3. Neither agree nor disagree were more like the people in (R’s country). 4. Disagree 3. Generally (R’s country) is a better country than most other 5. Disagree strongly countries. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: For both questions: 1. (R’s country) should limit the import of foreign products in order 1. Agree strongly National to protect its national economy. 2. Agree superiority 2. (R’s country) television should give preference to (R’s country) 3. Neither agree nor disagree films and programmes. 4. Disagree 5. Disagree strongly How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following For all four questions: statements? 1. Agree strongly 1. Immigrants increase crime rates. 2. Agree 2. Immigrants are not generally good for (R’s country’s) economy? 3. Neither agree nor disagree Xenophobic (Reverse coded from “generally good”) 4. Disagree nationalism 3. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in (R’s 5. Disagree strongly country). 4. Immigrants do not make (R’s country) more open to new ideas and cultures. (Reverse coded from “make country more open”)

The variables of interest were reverse coded from 0 to 3(4) in each dataset so that

higher values would represent higher levels of nationalism in an index.

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Nationalism Scales

The first dimension of nationalism includes variables that represent national identity. The variables in this continuum include the importance of being born in a respondent’s country, the importance of having citizenship in a country, and the importance of living for most time of life in a country.

The second dimension represents national consciousness. The variables in this continuum include the importance of being able to speak the national language, the importance of respecting a country’s institutions (law), and the importance of feeling like a member of a respondent’s country.

The third dimension reflects patriotism. The variables in this continuum include being proud of the way democracy works in a country, being proud of a country’s political influence in the world, being proud of a country’s economic achievements, and being proud of a country’s social security system.

The fourth dimension reflects national pride. The variables in this continuum include the preference to be a citizen of a respondent’s country than being a citizen of any other country, agreeing that the world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like people from a respondent’s country, and agreeing that a respondent’s country is a better country than most other countries.

The fifth dimension reflects national superiority. The variables in this continuum include agreeing that a respondent’s country should limit the import of foreign products and agreeing that a respondent’s country television should give preference to this country’s films and programs. Initially, the dimension included the variable “agreeing 132 that foreigners shouldn't be allowed to buy land”, yet the variable was not conforming to the scale for years 1995 and 2013. The potential explanation for this result may be associated with the fact that some ECE countries in this time period had strong political campaigns addressing the issue of land ownership by foreign nationals that have skewed public opinion (Bulgaria in 199318, Georgia in 201319, Russia in 201320).

The sixth dimension reflects xenophobic nationalism. The variables in this continuum include agreeing that immigrants increase crime, agreeing that immigrants are not good for the economy, agreeing that immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in a respondent’s country, and agreeing that immigrants do not make a respondent’s country open to new ideas and cultures.

These dimensions are confirmed through MSA for years 1995, 2003, and 2013

(separately and for all years combined). For each year under study, the six dimensions never showed ‘crit’ values above 30. The measures for scale H coefficients and

Loevinger’s item H coefficients confirm scalability of each continuum. The coefficients for all six scales are above the .3 threshold, with the strongest coefficient of H at 0.5998 representing the scale for the national identity dimension in 2013. The item H coefficients in each dimension show how well each item fits on a scale along with all the other items reflecting item homogeneity. The item H coefficients in each scale are above the .3 threshold, with the strongest item H coefficient at 0.62 representing “the importance of

18 Landjev, Boris Bogdanov. 1993. “Legislation on Foreign Investments in Bulgaria: Historical Background and Current Developments”, 19 Review of Central and East European Law 541. 19 Varshalomidze, T. (2013) ‘Georgia's Backlash Against Foreign Landowners’, 14 August, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/2013811125720720256.html, accessed December 22, 2017. 20 ‘Russia Publishes Draft Law Restricting Foreign Land Ownership – Paper.’ (2013) Sputnik, 20 November, available at https://sputniknews.com/russia/20131120184821633-Russia-Publishes-Draft-Law- Restricting-Foreign-Land-Ownership-/, accessed December 25, 2017. 133 having citizenship in a country” item for the national identity dimension in 2013. Given the consistent nature of the item and scale H coefficients across all years and all countries, there is a strong basis for the existence of six separate continuums of nationalism in ECE countries. In addition, P (+, +) matrices show only minor violations

(within accepted ranges) of the double monotonicity in MSP.

The order of variables listed for each scale created through MSA shows key patterns in the nature of nationalism in the region. The order of variables may vary depending on the year and the countries included in the analysis. However, the most common trends can be traced over 18 years. In the national identity dimension, the least probable manifestation of national identity is living in the country for most of one’s life.

At the same time, the most likely form of national identity is having citizenship of a country. This dimension ranges on a scale from 0 to 9, with 0 representing little to no expression of national identity and 9 representing the sentiments of strong national identity in a country.

In the national consciousness dimension, respect for a country’s institutions and law represents the least probable aspect of national consciousness. The most likely expression of national consciousness is feeling like a member of a country. This dimension also ranges on a scale from 0 to 9, with 0 representing little expression of national consciousness and 9 representing strong sentiments of national consciousness.

In the patriotism dimension, pride in the way democracy works in a country represents the least probable manifestation of patriotism. The most likely expression of patriotism is being proud of the social security system in a country. This dimension ranges on a scale from 0 to 12, with 0 representing little expression of patriotism and 12 134 representing strong sentiments of patriotism in a country.

In the national pride dimension, preference for being a citizen of one’s country over all other countries represents the least probable aspect of national pride. The most likely manifestation of national pride is feeling like one’s country is better than most other countries. This dimension ranges on a scale from 0 to 12, with 0 representing little expression of national pride and 12 representing strong sentiments of national pride in a country.

In the national superiority dimension, limiting the import of foreign products is the least probable manifestation of national superiority. The most likely expression of national superiority is giving priority to country’s films and programs. This dimension ranges on a scale from 0 to 8, with 0 representing little expression of national superiority and 8 representing strong sentiments of national superiority in a country.

In the xenophobic nationalism dimension, agreeing that immigrants do not make country open to new ideas and cultures represents the least probable aspect of xenophobic nationalism. The most likely expression of xenophobic nationalism varies over the years depending on the country trends. Some of the most likely expressions of xenophobic nationalism included the agreement that immigrants increase crime in a country and agreeing that immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in a country. This dimension ranges on a scale from 0 to 16, with 0 representing little expression of national superiority and 16 representing strong sentiments of xenophobic nationalism in a country.

Scale Analysis

While the MSA procedure highlights six dimensions of nationalism, representing six measures of nationalism on a continuum in each country, these six scores can be used 135

to obtain the total measure of nationalism in a country (nationalism index). Since the

measures represent individual-level data combined into six country-level indicators, the

total level of nationalism can be obtained by adding each measure together to produce a

single index for each individual country (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Finke and

Adamczyk 2008). Previous studies acknowledged that producing aggregate country-level

indices based on central tendencies in individual-level data might lead to reliability errors

(Castro 2002; Denison 1996). Yet, this approach is acceptable in cross-national research

because aggregating individual-level data to the country level leads to the elimination of

random measurement error common in survey data (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 237).

Table 3.2 presents the average indices for the six dimensions of nationalism and the

average combined index of nationalism for all ECE countries for the three years (1995,

2003, 2013). However, considering the fluid nature of nationalism, it is more fitting to

examine nationalism on the regional and country levels for separate years.

Table 3.2 Average Scores for All Countries Year/ National National Patriotism National National Xenophobic Nationalism Dimension Identity Consciousness (0-12) Pride Superiority Nationalism Index (0-9) (0-9) (0-12) (0-8) (0-16) (0-66) 1995 6.48 7.45 3.88 6.81 5.23 10.18 40.03 2003 6.5 7.14 3.79 6.77 5.34 9.56 39.1 2013 6.4 7.13 4.12 6.65 5.02 9.23 39.39

Analysis of Regional Trends

The analysis suggests that on a regional level over the years the total level of

nationalism has not changed much. There is a slight decline in the index from 40.03 in

1995 to 39.39 in 2013 (Table 3.2). When it comes to the dimensions of nationalism,

almost all of the dimension indices, except the index of patriotism, show a downward

trend in the 18 years from 1995 to 2013. The levels of patriotism across the region have 136

gone up from 3.88 to 4.12. These trends suggest that despite the more recent concerns

with growing nationalism in the countries of ECE21, during 1995-2013 overall

nationalism levels in ECE have not increased.

Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for each scale representing the dimensions

of nationalism and the total index of nationalism. For the nationalism index scale, the

data is skewed to the left with a median score of 39.64 and a mean score of 39.18 on a

scale of 0-66 (Table 3.3). Most countries in the region (in years 1995, 2003, 2013) score

above the mean value on nationalism (Figure 3.1).

Table 3.3 Summary Statistics for Scales Year/ National National Patriotism National National Xenophobic Nationalism Dimension Identity Consciousness (0-12) Pride Superiority Nationalism Index (0-9) (0-9) (0-12) (0-8) (0-16) (0-66) Median 6.45 7.28 3.97 6.77 5.22 9.63 39.64 Mean 6.46 7.23 3.94 6.74 5.19 9.63 39.18 Standard 0.51 0.38 0.68 0.71 0.51 0.88 2.39 Deviation Skewness -0.21 -0.70 -0.51 0.18 -0.35 0.13 -0.25

21 Hungary (2014), Poland (2015), and Czech Republic (2017) elected more representatives of the far-right parties into government Wagener, V. (2018) ‘Rising nationalism and the EU's split with the East’, Deutsche Welle, 8 January, available at http://www.dw.com/en/rising-nationalism-and-the-eus-split-with-the-east/a-42073959, accessed January 12, 2018.

137

Figure 3.1 Frequency of Countries by Nationalism Index (the scale ranges from 0 to 66)

Only the dimensions of national pride and xenophobic nationalism are skewed to the right, suggesting that more countries exhibit lower levels of national pride and xenophobic nationalism than countries that score higher on these two dimensions (Table

3.3). When it comes to the dimensions of national identity, national consciousness, patriotism, and national superiority, they are all skewed to the left, which suggests that there are more countries that score higher on these dimensions than the number of countries that score lower on the four dimensions.

Analysis of Country Trends

Despite the slightly declining trend for the total level of nationalism for the ECE region, over the years some countries witnessed the rising trends of nationalism, while others experienced the decline in nationalist sentiments. Although the data were not available for all twelve ECE countries under analysis across the three survey waves, comparisons across time can be made for the eight ECE countries (Figure 3.2). The 138

Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, and Slovakia exhibit growing nationalist levels from

1995 to 2013, while in Poland nationalism is growing from 1995 to 2003 (data are not available for Poland in 2013). At the same time, Slovenia and Latvia witness the decline in nationalism from 1995 to 2013, while in Bulgaria nationalism is on the declining trend from 1995 to 2003 (data are not available for Bulgaria in 2013).

Figure 3.2 Distribution of Nationalism Scores by Country in 1995, 2003, and 2013

From 1995 to 2013, different countries dominated the region along the levels of nationalism. In 1995, out of the eight ECE countries in the survey, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria had the highest levels of nationalism overall (Table 3.4). The higher levels of nationalism in the Czech Republic at this time compared to other ECE countries might be explained by the 1993 dissolution of Czechoslovakia largely on the platform of economic nationalism (Balabanis et al. 2001). The dimension of nationalism where the

Czech Republic scores the highest, compared to other states, is patriotism. At the same time, the Czechs do not exhibit high levels of national superiority or xenophobic 139

nationalism. In fact, the results of 1992 Parliamentary elections show that the extreme

far-right Republican Party won only 6% of votes (Fawn 2005).

Bulgaria exhibited the highest level of nationalism, compared to other states, in

1995, while also scoring the highest on the dimensions of national pride, national

superiority, and xenophobic nationalism. This trend can be explained by the mass anti-

Turkish nationalist sentiments in the early 1990s. The Communist elites in Bulgaria have

been emphasizing the saliency of the threats from the Turkish minority in the country in

order to divert public attention from the more pressing political and economic issues

(Eminov 1997).

At the same time, Slovakia and Russia showed the lowest levels of nationalism in

the region in 1995. In particular, Slovakia exhibits the lowest scores for national pride

and national superiority. Russia scores the lowest on national consciousness and

patriotism, compared to other states.

Table 3.4 Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 1995 (sorted by Nationalism Index) Country Sample Nation. Nation. Patrio- Nation. Nation. Xenoph. Nationalism size Id. Cons. tism Pride Super. Nat. Index (0-9) (0-9) (0-12) (0-12) (0-8) (0-16) (0-66) Slovakia 1388 6.28 7.58 3.84 6.04 4.37 10.56 38.67 Russia 1585 6.45 7.23 2.93 6.94 5.62 9.72 38.89 Latvia 1044 6.14 7.52 4.04 6.45 5.36 9.91 39.42 Slovenia 1036 6.44 7.48 4.55 6.66 4.72 9.7 39.55 Poland 1598 6.66 7.3 4.12 7.43 5.23 8.93 39.67 Hungary 1000 6.28 7.37 2.94 6.82 5.37 11.15 39.93 Czech Republic 1111 6.48 7.53 4.78 6.31 5.03 10.29 40.42 Bulgaria 1105 7.1 7.57 3.83 7.85 6.17 11.2 43.72

In 2003, out of the eight ECE countries in the survey, Russia and Hungary had the

highest levels of nationalism overall (Table 3.5). In the case of Russia, the election of

Vladimir Putin as president in early 2000 and Russia’s renewed military campaign in

Chechnya (started in 1999) have been associated with an active nationalist rhetoric of 140

Russia’s political elites and the rally ‘round the flag effect in the Russian society

(Tanrisever 2001). In Hungary, the high levels of nationalism in 2003 can be explained

by the rising popularity of the ultranationalist anti-Semitic Jobbik movement (founded in

2002) that promoted its nationalist rhetoric among the Hungarian people (Stratfor 2012).

At the same time, Slovakia and Latvia showed the lowest levels of nationalism in the

region in 2003. The trend for Slovakia is ongoing from 1995 with the lowest scores on

national identity and national consciousness compared to other ECE states. In the case of

Latvia, the scores for national pride and xenophobic nationalism are among the lowest,

compared to other countries in ECE.

Table 3.5 Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 2003 (sorted by Nationalism Index) Country Sample Nation. Nation. Patrio- Nation. Nation. Xenoph. Nationalism size Id. Cons. tism Pride Super. Nat. Index (0-9) (0-9) (0-12) (0-12) (0-8) (0-16) (0-66) Slovakia 1152 5.54 6.26 3.32 6.12 5.2 9.36 35.8 Latvia 1000 6.1 6.85 3.7 5.58 5.04 8.66 35.93 Slovenia 1093 6.17 7.21 5.04 6.57 4.68 8.54 38.21 Czech Republic 1276 6.6 6.93 3.8 6.72 4.95 10.61 39.61 Bulgaria 1069 7.23 7.72 2.17 7.21 6.02 9.55 39.9 Poland 1277 7.03 7.32 4.21 7.19 5.37 9.17 40.29 Russia 2383 7.14 7.21 3.34 7.4 5.89 10.44 41.42 Hungary 1021 6.19 7.59 4.74 7.36 5.59 10.17 41.64

In 2013, out of the ten ECE countries in the survey, Georgia and Russia had the

highest levels of nationalism overall (Table 3.6). The trend for Russia is ongoing from

2003 and is linked to the leadership of president Putin, who engaged in an active

advancement of nationalism in the country (Satter 2012). In the case of Georgia,

nationalism has been rising since 2003 with the successful Rose Revolution and the

election of president Saakashvili, who actively promoted nationalist sentiments and

symbols (Wales 2017). In both Georgia and Russia, the far-right nationalist groups

gained more public support between 2003 and 2013, in part due to perceived fears over 141

the loss of national identity, culture, and sovereignty resulting from Western influence

and the prospect of further European integration (Wales 2017).

At the same time, Slovenia and Estonia showed the lowest levels of nationalism in

the region in 2013. Slovenia had the lowest levels of national identity and xenophobic

nationalism, compared to other ECE states. In Estonia, the levels of national pride and

national superiority were among the lowest for the region in 2013.

Table 3.6 Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 2013 (sorted by Nationalism Index) Country Sample Nation. Nation. Patrio- Nation. Nation. Xenoph. Nationalism size Id. Cons. tism Pride Super. Nat. Index (0-9) (0-9) (0-12) (0-12) (0-8) (0-16) (0-66) Slovenia 1010 5.57 6.87 3.61 5.75 4.94 8.07 34.81 Estonia 1009 5.58 7.41 4.21 5.7 3.93 8.76 35.59 Croatia 1000 5.75 6.5 3.4 6.13 5.44 8.77 35.99 Lithuania 1194 6.27 6.68 4.03 6.19 4.41 8.57 36.15 Latvia 1000 6.25 7.1 3.64 5.83 5.09 8.81 36.72 Slovakia 1156 6.89 7 4.28 6.98 5.1 9.94 40.19 Hungary 1007 6.81 7.35 4.97 7 5.3 9.34 40.77 Czech Republic 1909 7.01 7.26 3.91 6.95 5.01 10.67 40.81 Georgia 1498 6.7 7.93 4.42 8.26 5.54 8.91 41.76 Russia 1516 7.17 7.22 4.74 7.71 5.45 10.45 42.74

The total index of nationalism does not have a compounded effect and cannot be

substituted for its component parts (individual indices) representing the dimensions of

nationalism. For example, just because in 2013, Hungary has a lower score of nationalism

than Georgia does not mean that nationalism in Hungary is less malignant. In fact, the

indices for xenophobic nationalism dimension show that nationalism in Hungary is of a

more discriminatory nature than nationalism in Georgia. Instead, Georgia is exhibiting a

higher nationalism score because it scores higher on the dimensions of national pride and

national superiority. Because of the non-compounded nature of the nationalism index, it

might be more useful to compare nationalism trends in the region along the dimension

categories (representing weak, moderate, and strong manifestations of nationalism). 142

Comparing the Dimensions of Nationalism

Figure 3.3 shows the indices for the national identity dimension across ECE states. In both 1995 and 2003, Bulgaria had the highest levels of national identity, compared to other ECE states. In 2013, Russia ranked the highest on the national identity score (while the data on Bulgaria were not available for 2013). From 1995 to 2013, most countries exhibit the growing levels of national identity score (except Slovenia).

Figure 3.3 Distribution of National Identity Scores by Country in 1995, 2003, and 2013

Figure 3.4 shows indices for the national consciousness dimension across ECE states. Slovakia (1995), Bulgaria (2003), and Georgia (2013) had the highest levels of national consciousness over the years. The data on Georgia were not available for 1995 and 2003. From 1995 to 2013, the trends for the national consciousness levels differ across states. Countries like Slovakia, Latvia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic exhibit the declining levels of national consciousness. The scores for Russia and Hungary remain 143 near the same level from 1995 to 2013. Poland and Bulgaria witness the growing trend in national consciousness from 1995 to 2003.

Figure 3.4 Distribution of National Consciousness Scores in 1995, 2003, and 2013

Figure 3.5 shows indices for the patriotism dimension across ECE states. The

Czech Republic (1995), Slovenia (2003), and Hungary (2013) had the highest levels of patriotism. From 1995 to 2013, the trends for patriotism levels differ across states.

Countries like Slovakia, Russia, Poland, and Hungary exhibit the growing levels of patriotism. Latvia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic witness the declining trend in patriotism from 1995 to 2013. In Bulgaria, patriotism is also on the decline from 1995 to

2003.

144

Figure 3.5 Distribution of Patriotism Scores by Country in 1995, 2003, and 2013

Figure 3.6 illustrates the scores for the national pride dimension across ECE states. Bulgaria (1995), Russia (2003), and Georgia (2013) had the highest levels of national pride over the years. The data on Georgia were not available for 1995 and 2003.

From 1995 to 2013, the trends for the national pride levels differ across states. Slovakia,

Russia, and the Czech Republic witness the growing trend in national pride from 1995 to

2013. Latvia, Slovenia, Poland (1995-2003), and Bulgaria (1995-2003) exhibit the declining levels of national pride, while the score for Hungary remains near the same level from 1995 to 2013.

145

Figure 3.6 Distribution of National Pride Scores by Country in 1995, 2003, and 2013

Figure 3.7 shows scores for the national superiority dimension across ECE states.

Bulgaria in 1995 and 2003 and Georgia in 2013 had the highest levels of national superiority. From 1995 to 2013, the trends for national superiority levels differ across states. Countries like Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland exhibited the growing levels of national superiority. The scores for Hungary and the Czech Republic remain near the same level from 1995 to 2013. Russia, Latvia, and Bulgaria (1995-2003) witness the declining trend in national consciousness.

In 2013, Georgia was excluded from the Mokken scaling analysis (national superiority model) as an outlier. Georgian respondents in the 2013 survey were strongly in support of the idea that their country’s television should give preference to Georgian films and programs. Over 50% of respondents in Georgia expressed strong agreement with the idea, compared to 10-20% of respondents in other countries. This pattern of data might be explained by the new Georgian Law On Broadcasting that was adopted in the 146 summer of 2013 after much discussion and debate in Georgian society. In particular, the new law has increased government funding for all public television channels in Georgia and created a new public television channel in Ajaria, the autonomous republic of

22 Georgia.

Figure 3.7 Distribution of National Superiority Scores by Country in 1995, 2003, and 2013

Figure 3.8 provides information for the xenophobic nationalism dimension across

ECE states. Bulgaria (1995) and the Czech Republic (in 2003 and 2013) had the highest levels of xenophobic nationalism score over the years. From 1995 to 2013, most ECE states in the sample witnessed a decline in the levels of xenophobic nationalism. Russia,

Poland, and the Czech Republic are the only countries with the growing trends in xenophobic nationalism between 1995 and 2013.

22 National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia. Library. “Georgian Law on Broadcasting,” available at http://www.parliament.am/library/radio/vrastan.pdf, accessed January 10, 2018. 147

Figure 3.8 Distribution of Xenophobic Nationalism Scores in 1995, 2003, and 2013

In 1995, Poland and Russia were excluded from the Mokken scaling analysis

(xenophobic nationalism model) as outliers. The two countries had the highest rates of unemployment in 1995 (according to ISSP survey respondents’ reporting their employment status) compared to all other ECE states in the sample, thus the results of

Mokken scaling analysis were skewed by the survey questions related to attitudes on immigration and the effects of immigration on jobs in a country.

In 2003, Poland was excluded from the Mokken scaling analysis (xenophobic nationalism model) as an outlier. In 2003, Poland had the largest number of survey respondents who self-reported as being unemployed. Only 37% of respondents in Poland stated that they were employed full-time. This trend might have skewed the results of

Mokken scaling analysis by the survey questions related to immigration attitudes and immigration effects on jobs. 148

Discussion and Conclusion

This article presents the new cross-country measure of nationalism based on the data from ISSP modules on National Identity from 1995, 2003, and 2013. The measure is designed based on the sample of 12 countries in ECE. I highlight the multidimentional nature of nationalism and create six measures for the following six dimensions of nationalism: national identity, national consciousness, patriotism, national pride, national superiority, and xenophobic nationalism. The dimensions reflect the growing intensity of nationalist sentiments on the individual level.

When it comes to the patterns of nationalism, there are countries in the region that witness continuous growing trends for nationalism from 1995 to 2013, countries where nationalism is on the declining trend during the same time period, and countries where nationalism scores decline (or increase) from 1995 to 2003, then change in the opposite direction from 2003 to 2013. Rather than explain trends for each dimension of nationalism, I explored the changes in the compound scores for weak, moderate, and strong dimensions across states and over time. The score trends for each category of nationalism dimensions are presented in tables 1C-18C of the Appendix C.

The analysis suggests that in the case of weak dimensions of nationalism, some projects of political elites in the 1990s in ECE directed at national identity construction have been either delayed or have failed completely as a result of economic crises, political crises, or the exclusion of minorities residing in a country from membership in a nation. When it comes to moderate dimensions of nationalism, economic factors such as unemployment and economic growth (or decline) in a country may be the driving factors behind changes in patriotism and national pride. In explaining the changes in strong 149 nationalism dimensions, factors such as membership in international organizations, economic crises, and the rise (or the fall) of the far-right and ultranationalist parties are central.

Weak Dimensions

Table 22C of the Appendix C shows compound scores for weak dimensions of nationalism (national identity and national consciousness). From 1995 to 2013, Bulgaria,

Poland, and Russia witness a continuous growth in weak nationalism dimensions. This growth can be partially explained by the active role of political elites in reconstructing and redefining national identity throughout the 1990s (Dimitrova et al. 2013; Panov

2010). State-led nation-building projects continued into the 2000s with the new political parties (Ataka in Bulgaria, Rodina in Russia, Polish National Party) that continuously emphasized the importance of strong national identities. Conversely, one country,

Slovenia, witnessed a continuous decline in weak nationalism dimensions from 1995 to

2013. In the early 1990s, the Slovenian government attempted to create a new national identity that contrasted Slovenes with all other national identities in the Balkans. Any reference to the Balkan roots carried a negative connotation in Slovenia. However, this national identity construction project failed as Slovenia experienced a series of political and economic crises (corruption scandals, growing unemployment and poverty), while its neighbors in the Balkans carried out more successful political and economic transitions from Communism. Slovenes became disillusioned with the political elites in the country and largely did not want to identify with the Slovene state (Perkovic and Usakar 2017).

Still, most of the countries in the sample (Slovakia, Latvia, the Czech Republic,

Hungary) experienced a decline in weak dimensions of nationalism from 1995 to 2003, 150 then a growth of these weak dimensions from 2003 to 2013. In the cases of the Czech

Republic and Slovakia, national identity construction might have been delayed by the

1995 dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the project that most people in the two countries were opposed to (Drazanova 2015). In Latvia, in the early 1990s, the elites have redefined the national identity in narrow terms by excluding a large number of Russian ethnic minorities that resided in the country. Thus, the ISSP survey data reflects the fact that it took a long time for ethnic Russians and other minorities to identify with the

Latvian nation (European Commission 1998). In the case of Hungary, in the early 1990s, political elites promoted the idea of national identity based primarily on the Hungarian ethnicity, regardless of citizenship or the country of residency. This idea was associated with the historical losses of Hungarian territory after the Trianon Treaty and did not gain support among the Hungarian public (European Commission 1998). The failure of this early national identity project in Hungary might have contributed to the decline in weak dimensions of nationalism prior to 2003.

Moderate Dimensions

Table 23C of the Appendix C provides details on the compound scores for moderate dimensions of nationalism (patriotism and national pride). Country trends for moderate nationalism dimensions differ but seem to correlate with the unemployment trends in the countries of ECE. From 1995 to 2003, Poland saw a sharp increase in moderate nationalism dimensions. In the same time period, Bulgaria witnessed a sharp decline in moderate nationalism dimension scores. In the 18 years from 1995 to 2013, countries like Slovakia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Russia initially experienced a decline in moderate dimensions of nationalism (from 1995 to 2003), then a growth in 151 these moderate dimensions from 2003 to 2013. Slovenia and Hungary are the only two countries that initially saw moderate dimensions of nationalism grow (before 2003), then witnessed their decline by 2013. These trends reflect the dynamic nature of unemployment rates in the region. Specifically, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, Russia, and the Czech Republic witnessed the growth in unemployment rates from mid-1990s until early 2000s.23 After 2004, all these countries saw a dramatic drop in unemployment rates,24 until it was interrupted by the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, which raised unemployment rates in all of the ECE states. Still, by 2013 Latvia, Slovakia, Russia, and the Czech Republic had lowered their unemployment rates significantly. Conversely,

Slovenia, Hungary and Poland did not experience significant spikes in unemployment in the 1990s.25 However, starting 2003, Slovenia and Hungary showed growing unemployment rates that continue to rise after the 2008-2009 crisis.26

While unemployment rates may not be the direct cause of changes in moderate dimensions of nationalism in ECE, the patterns of unemployment levels in the region are similar to the patterns of changes in moderate dimensions of nationalism. This similarity suggests that individual nationalist sentiments may increase or decrease as a result of perceptions of growing or declining socio-economic welfare in a country.

23 Bulgaria (11.5% in 1995 to 18% in 2000), Czech Republic (4% in 1995 to 9% in 2000), Slovakia (12% in 1998 to 19.5% in 2001), Russia (8.5% in 1995 to 13% in 1999) 24 Slovakia (17.7% in 2004 to 14.2% in 2013), Czech Republic (7.8% in 2003 to 6.9% in 2013), Russia (8.2% in 2003 to 5.5% in 2013), Latvia (10.5% in 2004 to 5.6% in 2007, then to 11.8% in 2013), 25 Poland (16% in 1993 and 16% in 2001); Slovenia (7% in 1995 to 6% in 2001), Hungary (10% in 1995 to 5.5% in 2001) 26 Hungary (5.5% in 2003 to 10.2% in 2013), Slovenia (6.7% in 2003 to 10.1% in 2013) Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database

152

Strong Dimensions

Table 24C of the Appendix C provides details on the compound scores for strong dimensions of nationalism (national superiority and xenophobic nationalism). From 1995 to 2003, most countries in the sample witnessed a decline in the strong dimensions of nationalism. This trend correlates with the timing of the accession of some ECE countries to the European Union. Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Latvia all joined the EU in

2004 and witnessed a decline in strong nationalism dimensions prior to 2003. Bulgaria was one of the exceptions in this trend showing a sharp increase in strong nationalism dimensions in 2003. Prior to 1989, the communist regime promoted the policy of forced assimilation of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. Discrimination and racism against ethnic and religious minorities continued during the post-communist transition in the country with the government openly instigating xenophobic attitudes. This trend continued until 2004 when Bulgaria began to harmonize its laws with those of the European Union

(Zhelyazkova and Angelova 2007). The country joined the EU in 2007.

The Czech Republic is another exception in the trend of declining strong dimensions of nationalism prior to the EU accession. One potential explanation for this trend may lie in the rapid rise in the number of immigrants into the Czech Republic after the 1993 immigration reform. The country became the epicenter of both legal and illegal immigration for people who intended to immigrate to the countries of Western Europe

(Drbohlav 2005).

Russia initially saw strong dimensions of nationalism grow (before 2003), then witnessed their decline by 2013. Strong dimensions of nationalism were on the rise in

Russia in the early 2000s because the government began to actively promote both 153 moderate and strong dimensions of nationalism with leading politicians expressing anti- immigrant attitudes. After the 2011-2012 anti-governmental protests, president Putin turned against the ultranationalist parties and movements because they presented a threat to the political regime. A number of groups were outlawed and the government has adopted a series of anti-extremism laws (Laruelle 2017).

When it comes to 2003-2013 trends, most EU countries in the sample witnessed growing strong nationalism dimensions (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia). This dynamic can be explained by the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 that hit the economies of ECE countries. As a result, most countries in the region saw the rise in unemployment, Euroskepticism, and the anti-establishment movements in politics, along with the growing success of populist leaders and parties. Only Hungary witnessed a slight decline in the strong dimensions of nationalism. While Hungary had one of the highest scores for strong dimensions of nationalism in ECE, these scores have been in decline from 2003 to 2013. Potential explanations for this decline involve nationalist party dynamics in Hungary before the 2014 parliamentary elections. Some Hungarian nationalists (Jobbik party) have started to move towards the center of the ideological spectrum with the goal of securing a broader base for public support. Another far-right party (Fidesz) enjoyed wide electoral support from 1998 until 2014. In 2014, the party lost multiple seats in the parliament, yet still managed to keep its majority in the legislature (Juhász et al. 2015). The internal divisions among the ultranationalists and the radicalization of their agenda have alienated some of the public from these groups. These divisions were among the factors contributing to the temporary decline of the far-right parties in Hungary in 2014. 154

In general, accession to the EU is one potential explanation for the declining trends in strong nationalism dimensions prior to 2003. The effects of the global financial crisis and the growing success of the far-right nationalist parties in ECE might explain the general trend of growing strong dimensions of nationalism in the post-accession period of

2003-2013.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Nationalism Index

The index of nationalism developed in this article has a number of strengths. The measure allows comparing the level of nationalism across multiple states, which is different from most previous attempts to quantify nationalism. While I agree that in-depth qualitative studies of nationalism along with the country-specific measures of nationalism are valuable to fully grasp the nature and the dynamics of nationalism in a specific country, my goal in this article was to develop a cross-country and generalizable (albeit imperfect) measure of nationalism that could be used to compare nationalism trends across states and over time.

The new index of nationalism also allows to trace nationalism patterns in East-

Central Europe, the region that has been raising concerns more recently with political elites in some ECE states advancing anti-immigrant and utranationalist rhetoric. The results of the cross-country analysis suggest that the patterns of elite behavior in a country (along with the policies that elites advance) might be quite different from the nature of nationalist sentiments manifested by the general population of the country. For example, in recent years Hungary has been considered a hotbed of xenophobic nationalism in Eastern Europe. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, the ultranationalist 155

27 Jobbik party won over 16% of the vote (compared to only 2% of the votes in 2006).

Yet, by 2013 the index of xenophobic nationalism was not rising in the country

(compared to 2003). In fact, Hungary shows continuous declining trends for this dimension of nationalism from 1995 to 2013. One other potential explanation for this diffeerence is the time lag. As elites become more aggressive in promoting xenophobic sentiments, it may take time before these ideas are embraced by the masses.

Finally, the new measure of nationalism developed in this article allows to assess nationalism in a country in its complexity and intensity along the dimensions of nationalism. The total nationalism index in a country is composed of six measures representing the dimensions of intensity that nationalism can take on a continuum from national identity to xenophobic nationalism. Thus, we can trace different patterns of nationalist sentiments that the population exhibits in a single country over the years.

Since nationalism is fluid and can intensify or weaken as a result of certain events, policies or mass perceptions, it is important to trace the changes in the dimensions of nationalism over time. This deconstruction of nationalist sentiments along multiple dimensions can help explain public opinion or help anticipate state responses to changes in public attitudes.

At the same time, the measures of nationalism have several drawbacks. First of all, the ISSP surveys did not include data on all of the countries in ECE. The variables available through the ISSP survey also did not reflect all the theoretical components of each dimension of nationalism in a precise way. Secondly, limited data availability may

27 Liphshiz, C. (2013) ‘Recession, Xenophobia Prompting Jews to Ditch Hungary’, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 19 February, available at https://www.jta.org/2013/02/19/life-religion/recession-xenophobia- prompting-jews-to-ditch-hungary, accessed January 9, 2018. 156 have impacted the measurement of each dimension. Some of the key questions were not included because they were not replicated in all three waves of ISSP National Identity module. Yet, despite the issues with measurement, the scales produced in this article allow comparing the levels of nationalism across multiple countries in the region.

Future research will benefit from the original survey data specifically devoted to nationalism and salient concerns of individuals in ECE. Existing datasets that cover ECE leave out many key countries in the region (e.g., Romania, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus) and many questions important for the measurement of nationalism. Thus, surveys specifically designed for cross-country measurement of nationalism would provide pathways for new research opportunities. The next step in this line of research will be to obtain data that would permit not only measuring nationalism across ECE states but also potentially uncovering the causal links regarding the factors that contribute to the changes in nationalism levels in ECE.

The original data that include questions related to nationalism and questions on the issues of saliency would allow exploring whether nationalism dimensions across multiple states in the region have any set of individual-level concerns attached to them.

This research could identify whether weaker and stronger dimensions of nationalism are associated with separate sets of issues or whether they reflect the degree of saliency of the same concerns among individuals.

157

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Appendix C

Results of Mokken Scaling Analysis for 1995, 2003 and 2013

1995 Countries: Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, Latvia, Slovakia

Table 1C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 1 (National Identity) 1995

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Important – most time of 2.1816 0.49717 life in country Important born in (R’s 2.0537 0.54490 country) Important – have 2.2590 0.55479 citizenship in a country Scale H=0.5323; N= 9327

Table 2C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 2 (National Consciousness) 1995

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Important – respect 2.2657 0.30627 institutions (law) Important able to speak 2.5406 0.32800 language; Important to feel member 2.6517 0.36381 of (R’s country) Scale H=0.3315; N= 9164

Table 3C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 3 (Patriotism) 1995

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Proud of: way democracy 1.0232 0.53873 works in country Proud of: country’s pol. 1.1272 0.57850 influence in world Proud of economic 0.9758 0.59114 achievements Proud of social security 0.7184 0.54081 system Scale H=0.5629; N= 7600

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Table 4C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 4 (National Pride) 1995

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Rather be a citizen of (Rs 3.1514 0.39889 country) World better place if 1.7011 0.49674 people from other countries were more like people from (country) Rs (country) better than 1.9189 0.51731 most other countries Scale H=0.4741; N= 7822

Table 5C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 5 (National Superiority) 1995

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient R’s country should limit 2.7920 0.37700 the import of foreign products R’s country television 2.4211 0.37700 should give preference to R’s country films and programs Scale H= 0.3770; N= 8930

Table 6C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 6 (Xenophobic Nationalism) 199528

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Immigrants take jobs away 2.5442 0.32260 Immigrants increase crime 2.8724 0.39066 Immigrants are not good 2.7172 0.38214 for the economy Immigrants don't make 2.3945 0.31650 country open to new ideas and cultures Scale H=0.3519; N= 5077

28 Poland and Russia are dropped from the sample as outliers with the highest levels of unemployment in the sample 167

2003 countries: Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, Latvia, Slovakia

Table 7C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 1 (National Identity) 2003

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Important – most time of 2.1900 0.53587 life in country Important born in (R’s 2.1463 0.59178 country) Important – have 2.2644 0.59824 citizenship in a country Scale H= 0.5751; N= 9786

Table 8C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 2 (National Consciousness) 2003

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Important – respect 2.1670 0.39728 institutions (law) Important able to speak 2.4940 0.39188 language; Important to feel member 2.4929 0.43661 of (R’s country) Scale H= 0.4086; N= 9731

Table 9C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 3 (Patriotism) 2003

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Proud of: way democracy 0.9867 0.51178 works in country Proud of: country’s pol. 1.1121 0.52441 influence in world Proud of economic 0.9506 0.54030 achievements Proud of social security 0.7003 0.51605 system Scale H= 0.5234; N= 8317

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Table 10C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 4 (National Pride) 2003

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Rather be a citizen of (R’s 2.9414 0.44226 country) World better place if 1.8545 0.52269 people from other countries were more like people from (country) R’s (country) better than 2.0355 0.51583 most other countries Scale H= =0.4941; N= 8651

Table 11C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 5 (National Superiority) 2003

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient R’s country should limit 2.7264 0.35166 the import of foreign products R’s country television 2.6701 0.35166 should give preference to R’s country films and programs Scale H= 0.3517; N= 9483

Table 12C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 6 (Xenophobic Nationalism) 200329

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Immigrants don't make 2.1756 0.35656 country open to new ideas and cultures Immigrants are not good 2.4114 0.36956 for the economy Immigrants take jobs away 2.6362 0.40065 Immigrants increase crime 2.5101 0.36138 Scale H=0.3723; N= 6918

29 Poland is dropped from the sample as an outlier 169

2013 countries: Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Russia, Latvia, Slovakia, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania

Table 13C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 1 (National Identity) 2013

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Important – most time of 2.1402 0.57501 life in country Important born in (R’s 2.0625 0.60614 country) Important – have 2.3034 0.61925 citizenship in a country Scale H= 0.5998; N= 11949 Scores range from 0- disagree strongly to 3 – Agree strongly

Table 14C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 2 (National Consciousness) 2013

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Important – respect 2.1869 0.47315 institutions (law) Important able to speak 2.5323 0.47510 language; Important to feel member 2.4557 0.50641 of (R’s country) Scale H= 0.4850; N= 11847

Table 15C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 3 (Patriotism) 2013

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Proud of social security 0.9707 0.47016 system Proud of economic 1.0044 0.53866 achievements Proud of: way democracy 1.1076 0.51458 works in country Proud of: country’s pol. 1.0559 0.53575 influence in world

Scale H= 0.5147; N= 10715 Scores range from 0-Not at all proud to 3 – Very proud

170

Table 16C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 4 (National Pride) 2013

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Rather be a citizen of (Rs 2.7856 0.43277 country) World better place if 1.8606 0.47876 people from other countries were more like people from (country) Rs (country) better than 2.1461 0.53409 most other countries Scale H= = 0.4819; N= 10954

Table 17C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 5 (National Superiority) 201330

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient R’s country should limit 2.5803 0.34815 the import of foreign products R’s country television 2.4102 0.34815 should give preference to R’s country films and programs Scale H= 0.34815; N= 10801

Table 18C. Mokken Scaling Procedure of Nationalism Coded Variables, Dimension 6 (Xenophobic Nationalism) 2013

Item Mean Score Loevinger’s Item H coefficient Immigrants don't make 2.2072 0.33207 country open to new ideas and cultures Immigrants are not good 2.2461 0.37674 for the economy Immigrants increase crime 2.4182 0.36546 Immigrants take jobs away 2.5465 0.39116 Scale H= 0.3665; N=10768 Scores range from 0-disagree strongly to 4 – Agree strongly

30 Georgia is dropped from the sample as an outlier 171

Figure 1C. Distributions of National Identity Estimates (the scale ranges from 0 to 9)

Figure 2C. Distributions of National Consciousness Estimates (the scale ranges from 0 to 9)

172

Figure 3C. Distributions of Patriotism Estimates (the scale ranges from 0 to 12)

Figure 4C. Distributions of National Pride Estimates (the scale ranges from 0 to 12)

173

Figure 5C. Distributions of National Superiority Estimates (the scale ranges from 0 to 8)

Figure 6C. Distributions of Xenophobic Nationalism Estimates (the scale ranges from 0 to 16)

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Figure 7C. Distributions of Nationalism Estimates (the scale ranges from 0 to 66)

Table 19C. Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 1995 (sorted by Nationalism Index) Country Weak (0-18) Moderate (0-24) Strong (0-24) Country Nat. Nat. Patr. Nat. Nat. Xen. Id. Cons. (0-12) Pride Super. Nat. (0-9) (0-9) (0-12) (0-8) (0-16) Slovakia 13.86 9.88 14.93 Latvia 13.68 9.87 15.34 Slovenia 13.66 10.49 15.27 Czech Republic 13.92 11.21 14.42 Bulgaria 13.96 11.55 14.16 Poland 13.65 9.76 16.52 Russia 14.01 11.09 15.32 Hungary 14.67 11.68 17.37

Table 20C. Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 2003 (sorted by Nationalism Index) Country Weak (0-18) Moderate (0-24) Strong (0-24) Country Nat. Nat. Patr. Nat. Nat. Xen. Id. Cons. (0-12) Pride Super. Nat. (0-9) (0-9) (0-12) (0-8) (0-16) Slovakia 11.8 9.44 14.56 Latvia 12.95 9.28 13.7 Slovenia 13.38 11.61 13.22 Czech Republic 13.53 10.52 15.56 Bulgaria 14.95 9.38 15.57 Poland 14.35 11.4 14.54 Russia 14.35 10.74 16.33 Hungary 13.78 12.1 15.76

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Table 21C. Scale Dimension Scores by Country, 2013 (sorted by Nationalism Index) Country Weak (0-18) Moderate (0-24) Strong (0-24) Country Nat. Nat. Patr. Nat. Nat. Xen. Id. Cons. (0-12) Pride Super. Nat. (0-9) (0-9) (0-12) (0-8) (0-16) Slovenia 12.44 9.36 13.01 Estonia 12.99 9.91 12.69 Croatia 12.25 9.53 14.21 Lithuania 12.95 10.22 12.98 Latvia 13.35 9.47 13.9 Slovakia 13.89 11.26 15.04 Hungary 14.16 11.97 14.64 Czech Republic 14.27 10.86 15.68 Georgia 14.63 12.68 14.45 Russia 14.39 12.45 15.9

Table 22C. Weak Dimension Score Trends by Country (0-18) Country 1995 2003 2013 Trends Slovakia 13.86 11.8 13.89 ↓ ↑ Latvia 13.68 12.95 13.35 ↓ ↑ Slovenia 13.66 13.38 12.44 ↓ ↓ Czech Republic 13.92 13.53 14.27 ↓ ↑ Bulgaria 13.96 14.95 ↑ Poland 13.65 14.35 ↑ Russia 14.01 14.35 14.39 ↑ ↑ Hungary 14.67 13.78 14.16 ↓ ↑

Table 23C. Moderate Dimension Score Trends by Country (0-24) Country 1995 2003 2013 Trends Slovakia 9.88 9.44 11.26 ↓ ↑ Latvia 9.87 9.28 9.47 ↓ ↑ Slovenia 10.49 11.61 9.36 ↑ ↓ Czech Republic 11.21 10.52 10.86 ↓ ↑ Bulgaria 11.55 9.38 ↓ Poland 9.76 11.4 ↑ Russia 11.09 10.74 12.45 ↓ ↑ Hungary 11.68 12.1 11.97 ↑ ↓

Table 24C. Strong Dimension Score Trends by Country (0-24) Country 1995 2003 2013 Trends Slovakia 14.93 14.56 15.04 ↓ ↑ Latvia 15.34 13.7 13.9 ↓ ↑ Slovenia 15.27 13.22 13.01 ↓ ↓ Czech Republic 14.42 15.56 15.68 ↑ ↑ Bulgaria 14.16 15.57 ↑ Poland 16.52 14.54 ↓ Russia 15.32 16.33 15.9 ↑ ↓ Hungary 17.37 15.76 14.64 ↓ ↓

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CONCLUSION

In three articles, my dissertation advances a number of arguments and makes important contributions to the field of comparative politics. The primary argument advanced in all three articles is that nationalism is not a dichotomous condition; it has gradation that varies with local conditions and from the individual to the state.

The first article is dedicated to theoretically taking nationalism out of this typical dichotomous condition and making the argument for a complex continuum that ranges across the states of Eastern Europe. Building off of a long history of research on nationalism, I make an argument that the nature of nationalism is shaped by the saliency of issues that individuals and even the state may face. These issues may not be the typical issues of just economic problems that can give rise to nationalism; instead, these issues may be more personal, with feedback loops occurring between local individuals and elites who take their cues from local conditions. Stronger and more malignant forms of nationalism, however, tend to originate with elites and are then picked up by local individuals who map their own problems and nationalism with elite nationalist rhetoric.

In my second article, I examine the rhetoric of elites in Russia and Ukraine to highlight the nature of nationalism coming from elites in these countries. Using content analysis, I find that the leader of Russia may be more successful at advancing nationalism because he can better tap into the concerns of the public. Thus, in Russia, the president emphasized cultural nationalism and nationalist exceptionalism in state-controlled media to drive strong nationalist support, while in Ukraine, political leaders largely ignored cultural issues in their nationalist rhetoric. 177

Finally, in my third article, I create one of the first cross-national measures of nationalism across countries using Mokken scaling analysis that taps into multiple aspects of nationalism through survey research. This measure is cumulative and represents six dimensions of nationalism on the continuum introduced in Article 1.

While the causes behind nationalist mobilization are sometimes time-dependent and context-dependent, the key findings of the dissertation can be applied to other regions of the world and other contexts, such as the study of social movements, regime change, and authoritarianism. Research on the mechanisms behind nationalist mobilization is not only key to understanding the recent rise in populist, anti-immigrant, protectionist, and xenophobic rhetoric in Europe, but also social movements more broadly. Since nationalism is linked to identity, community, and citizenship policies, nationalism research contributes to the study of human rights, democratization, and authoritarianism.

This research matters in the increasingly unstable political and economic environment of regimes inside and outside of Europe where mass migration, security threats, and economic downturns may push people towards isolationism and hostile political ideologies. By better understanding the links between the elites and the masses and the role of salient issues in advancing nationalist rhetoric, policy makers will be better equipped with tools and prescriptions for fostering cohesive and inclusive communities.

The dissertation also addresses and challenges the idea of Eastern European exceptionalism. The premise of “eastern” nationalism being fundamentally different from nationalism in Western Europe has been prominent in the academic literature since 1944 when Hans Kohn fist introduced the geographical criteria in the dichotomy of “good” and

“bad” nationalism types (Kohn 1944). After 1989, there was a resurgence in the academic 178 literature on nationalism in Eastern Europe, yet the term “eastern” nationalism persevered. The critics of the idea that nationalism in the region has unique qualities suggest that the studies of nationalism in the West do not focus on historical background and treat aggressive forms of nationalism in the West as exceptions to the norm. At the same time, the studies of nationalism in Eastern Europe view aggressive manifestations of nationalism as a natural consequence of the region’s turbulent history, ethnic tensions, and power struggles among ethno-religious groups (Todorova 1997; Dungaciu 1999). In the dissertation, I argue against the idea of unique “eastern” nationalism because both civic and ethnic forms of nationalism can be found in both Western Europe and Eastern

Europe. The continuum of nationalism advanced in the dissertation can be applied outside of the Eastern European region. Still, while the forms of nationalism and the mechanisms behind the intensification of nationalism may not be unique to Eastern

Europe, the region has experienced intensified nationalist sentiments in the last 27 years compared to other regions of the world. The increased relevance of nationalism in the region may be associated with the fall of the Soviet Union and the proliferation of government-led projects as well as grassroots movements dedicated to national identity construction. Ultimately, this question of exceptionalism of nationalism in Eastern

Europe may require a global analysis of nationalism.

Directions for Future Research

Future research should focus on highlighting the driving factors behind nationalism in ECE and identifying the tipping points where nationalism may turn from its weaker and benign manifestations to more intense discriminatory or even violent forms. More specific research goals may include identifying the causal links between 179 individual grievances and different forms of nationalism. This research program would examine the issues of saliency among individuals that could be aggregated into political programs of the elites in power. It would allow exploring a variation of nationalist sentiments on the individual level to identify whether weak, moderate, and strong forms of nationalism are associated with distinct issues or whether they reflect the degree of saliency of the same issues in the countries of ECE. This research would require a statistical analysis of original survey data to explain what issues in different countries may be associated with varieties of nationalism among individuals.

Future comparative studies of nationalism will ultimately benefit from new original survey data from ECE countries. Most existing datasets are limited in terms of variables of interest to nationalism studies and the countries these datasets cover. The next important step in this research field would be to obtain original data that allows scholars to create more accurate measures of nationalism on a continuum across multiple states in ECE. The data should also include questions that relate to individual perceptions of political and socio-economic environment across multiple countries and regions to identify the driving factors behind the different forms of nationalism in ECE.

Another important direction of future studies revolves around the top-down element of nationalism, specifically addressing the psychology of leadership and leaders’ communication styles in understanding why some leaders are more successful than others in advancing nationalism.