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Vietnamese War: U.S. Mission to Cambodia Issue Date: January 10, 1968 Vietnamese War: U.S. Mission to Cambodia U.S. Ambassador-to-India Chester Bowles began talks with Cambodian officials in Pnompenh January 9 on the strained relations between the U.S. and Cambodia. The major topic on the agenda was the possible "hot pursuit" by U.S. and allied forces into Cambodia to attack Viet Cong or North Vietnamese troops suspected of using Cambodian territory as sanctuary. [See 1967 Vietnamese War: U.S. Denies War Expansion] Following a meeting with Bowles January 10, Cambodian Chief of State, Norodom Sihanouk, said he and President Johnson's envoy had agreed on the strengthening of the 3-nation International Control Commission (India, Poland and Canada) to police the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border to prevent incursions by foreign forces. Sihanouk, a Khmer prince, said the U.S. had agreed not to pursue Communist forces into Cambodia. Instead, he said, the U.S. would inform Pnompenh of any Viet Cong/North Vietnamese movement into Cambodia and thus enable Cambodian troops or ICC observers to check on the border violations. Sihanouk said he would also accept information from the Chinese Communists or North Vietnamese on U.S. incursions into Cambodia. Sihanouk said he would not publicly denounce the violation of his country's frontiers in order not to compromise Pnompenh's friendship with foreign powers "unless they install themselves in our country." (The Wall Street Journal reported January 10 that "some small American units have been crossing into Cambodia for years on secret raids." Such incursions had been widely reported for months.) Sihanouk said he and Bowles disagreed on the general situation in Vietnam. Sihanouk said: "I asked for a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam, but the Americans demand in exchange a halt in the shipment of North Vietnamese reinforcements to the South. They forget that their aerial escalation has brought about the de facto reunification of Vietnam." Sihanouk said he had urged the Americans to support a neutralized, reunified Vietnam and to "attach importance to the program of the National Liberation Front." Bowles had held preliminary discussions January 9 with Cambodian Premier Son Sann. In an interview published in the New York Times January 6, Sihanouk had said of Bowles' impending visit: If Bowles brought U.S. "recognition of our present borders, we shall immediately re-establish diplomatic relations with the United States. If he does not... Mr. Bowles' mission will at least permit, if Mr. Johnson is willing to prevent aggression against our country, a reduction in tension between the United States and Cambodia." Sihanouk reiterated his support for expansion of ICC powers to carry out surveillance of the Cambodian-South Vietnamese borders. But he noted that the Soviet Union, co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, and Poland opposed such expansion. If U.S. forces invaded Cambodia, Pnompenh would first call on Communist China for "material aid," Sihanouk warned. "If American pressure became too strong," he said, his government would appeal for Communist Chinese "volunteer combatants to be placed under Khmer [Cambodian] command [and] who would be subject to repatriation at any time." Sihanouk ruled out a request for Communist volunteer soldiers from North or South Vietnam because "we have learned from experience through the previous Viet Minh occupation, after the departure of the French in 1953." Communist China had warned January 3 that it would "not look on with folded arms" if U.S. troops entered Cambodia in pursuit of Communist troops. An Indian government spokesman in New Delhi had noted January 4 that the ICC's military components had been withdrawn from Cambodia and that it therefore was impossible for the ICC to supervise the border with South Vietnam. Meeting with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in New Delhi January 1, Bowles had suggested that India take the lead in strengthening the ICC in Cambodia. Mrs. Gandhi reportedly told Bowles that her government would not commit itself until it consulted with Cambodia. © 2011 Facts On File News Services Modern Language Association (MLA) Citation: "Vietnamese War: U.S. Mission to Cambodia." Facts On File World News Digest: n. pag. World News Digest. Facts On File News Services, 10 Jan. 1968. Web. 2 Aug. 2011. <http://www.2facts.com/article/1968054760>. For further information see Citing Sources in MLA Style. Facts On File News Services' automatically generated MLA citations have been updated according to the MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, 7th edition. American Psychological Association (APA) Citation format: The title of the article. (Year, Month Day). Facts On File World News Digest. Retrieved Month Day, Year, from World News Digest database. See the American Psychological Association (APA) Style Citations for more information on citing in APA style. .
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