Compare and Contrast the Counterinsurgency in the American
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Compare and Contrast 1 Running head: COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE Compare and Contrast Counterinsurgency in the American Indian Wars and the Vietnam War MSG Carrie R. Glover United States Army Sergeants Major Academy Class #58 Group Room R10 WO1 Kees Bak March 18, 2008 Compare and Contrast 2 Abstract This paper will compare and contrast counterinsurgency in the American Indian Wars and the Vietnam War; including three examples from each, and offer insights that can apply to the Global War on Terrorism. As senior military leaders it is imperative we always relook past experiences and see where we can apply them to situations facing us today. So many times, the Army has been guilty of reinventing the wheel. Many past wars and skirmishes provide ideas of what to do and what not to do in order to be successful. These two wars provide us relevant lessons learned to apply to the modern Army of today. Compare and Contrast 3 Compare and Contrast Counterinsurgency in the American Indian Wars and the Vietnam War The Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine identifies winning the hearts and minds by gaining and maintaining the support of the domestic population in order to isolate the insurgents as the key to success. For most of the 20th century, the U.S. military thought it would fight a force on force conventional war and for the most part disregarded small wars and insurgency doctrine. So, instead of the Army learning from their experiences in the American Indian campaigns and Vietnam, the Army for most of the last 100 years viewed these experiences as flukes. This paper will compare and contrast counterinsurgency in the American Indian Wars and the Vietnam War, including three examples from each, and offer insights that can apply to the Global War on Terrorism. American Indian Wars The post-Civil War Army inherited a rich heritage in Indian warfare dating back to the colonial area. The various political and cultural differences between Indian tribes made it difficult to apply any one method of warfare against the Indians. Finally, the Army developed conventional and unconventional techniques to attack the social and economic resources of the Indians (Birtle, 2004). At the outset of hostilities, the Army used the traditional column method to defeat the Indians; however, commanders soon figured out the vastness of the terrain and the nomadic nature of the Indians made it almost impossible for the traditional method to work. The Army decided to use multiple columns that would converge on an area in order to prevent the Indians from escaping. This technique was somewhat successful; however, the Indians were still able to outmaneuver the Army. Several disadvantages existed by using the multiple column approach. Coordination was hard to establish and each column was exposed to being attacked. A good Compare and Contrast 4 illustration of this problem occurred in 1876 at Little Big Horn. The Indians first repulsed three of General Crook’s converging columns before trouncing a portion of LTC Custer’s second column (Birtle, 2004). The main purpose of this approach was to destroy Indian food supplies hoping it would break the Indians morale and will to fight. Another challenge of the Indian campaigns was finding the Indian as they moved around the West. Local commanders tried to monitor the indigenous population’s activities through patrols. The patrols consisted of a company-size element which took the form of armed reconnaissance and would stay out for weeks or months at a time. Scouting became very important and the Army started using the term “scout” to describe any type of patrol or reconnaissance mission (Birtle, 2004). General Crook used his scouts not only as guides but as combat auxiliaries. He regularly used scouts in combination with regular troops, but he did use them on independent missions as well. General Crook insisted that his officers build a personal relationship with their scouts based upon mutual trust and respect (Birtle, 2004). The Army modified its logistical system and force structure to the requirements of fighting the Indians on the frontier. The Army became resourceful and thought up ways to adapt to this way of fighting. They adopted the use of pack mules and also changed the type of horses they used to California mustangs. The Army’s level of mobility was still inferior to the Indians, but it was enough to keep the Indians on the run. Most Army officers thought the United States Indian policy was a failure. The government broke numerous promises to the Indians. Army leaders thought is was necessary to break the Indians’ will to resist. The Army’s limited role in the formation of Indian policy prevented it from having much impact on the course pacifying the Indians. General Crook believed pacification resulted from more than just fighting, but from winning the hearts and Compare and Contrast 5 minds of the population. He promised good treatment to those Indians who followed his rules and harsh penalties for those who did not. He ordered humane treatment of Indian prisoners and avoid killing women and children when possible. General Crook was tough on those who resisted and the population that supported them by burning their property and food (Birtle, 2004). A final lesson for the Army to learn was figuring out the class of fighter the Army was fighting. Indian warriors, as guerilla fighters, were well trained and disciplined. Indian warriors would only fight when the conditions were set for victory. The Indians use of hit and run tactics resulted in the Indian Wars continuing for some three decades. The Army relearned this lesson almost a century later fighting the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (Yarbrough, 2002). Vietnam War The American Indian Campaign provided the Army with experience in handling counterinsurgency operations, and the Vietnam War expounded on this experience. For most of the Vietnam War, the 5th Special Forces Group trained and led Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) mobile strike forces and reconnaissance companies that consisted of ethnic minority and groups from the mountain and border regions. The war effort received considerable contributions from the CIDG program. The 5th Special Forces Group, consisting of 2,500 Soldiers, basically built and led an army of 50,000 tribal fighters to fight in some of the most difficult and dangerous terrain in Vietnam. CIDG patrols along the border provided reliable tactical intelligence and helped secure civilian populations in areas of Vietnam that could have accepted to the Viet Cong (Cassidy, 2004). The CIDG program had two major issues. One problem was constant aggression existed between the South Vietnamese and the ethnic minority groups who made up the CIDG strike forces. This issue resulted in slowed U.S. efforts to have Republic of Compare and Contrast 6 Vietnam (RVN) Special Forces take over the CIDG program. The second problem was the 5th Special Forces Group failed to develop an effective indigenous counterpart organization to lead the CIDG. The RVN Special Forces was supposed to lead the CIDG, but were unable to do so. (Cassidy, 2004). The Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP) was another program used in Vietnam. This program combined Marines and indigenous population personnel into a platoon- sizes element which trained, patrolled, defended, and lived in the village together. The CAP had a huge mission. The mission was to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure within the village and protect the public’s security. The mission also consisted of maintaining law and order and to protect those individuals who were friendly. The CAP protected communications within the villages and organized indigenous intelligence nets (Cassidy, 2004). Civic action played a vital role in the efforts to destroy the Viet Cong because it gained essential intelligence about enemy activity from the local population. The CAP proved that an investment of U.S. forces at the village level could produce major improvements in local security and intelligence (Cassidy, 2004). The third program used in Vietnam was Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). The U.S. established CORDS to coordinate the U.S. civil and military pacification programs. CORDS coordinated the effort of various U.S. military and civilian agencies involved in the pacification effort. These agencies included the State Department, the CIA, the USIA and the AID. This organization was dispersed throughout South Vietnam’s 44 provinces and 250 districts (Bolte', 1994). The new focus on pacification consisted of identifying and eliminating the Viet Cong infrastructure. The Phoenix program was developed to help in neutralizing the Viet Cong infrastructure. This program received some negative Compare and Contrast 7 attention due to abuses; however its use of former Viet Cong to bring out the enemy’s shadow government was very effective. The CORDS’ Accelerated Pacification Campaign focused on territorial security, neutralizing Viet Cong infrastructure, and supporting programs for self- defense and self-government at the local level (Cassidy, 2004). The CIDG, CAP, and CORDS programs met with success in executing key issues of the counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Each program expanded the quality and quantity of the forces conducting pacification and counterinsurgency operations. The programs improved the capability of small-unit patrolling and therefore enhanced actionable intelligence. If CORDS and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) integrated both CAP and CIDG underneath them and worked together instead of separately, the results in Vietnam could have been much different (Cassidy, 2004). The defeat suffered by the United States in the Vietnam War was a failure to have a good strategy. No other war in American history demonstrates more plainly both the difficulties of making sound strategic decisions and the terrible results of a lack of a clear strategic plan.