Compare and Contrast 1

Running head: COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE

Compare and Contrast Counterinsurgency in the and the

MSG Carrie R. Glover

United States Army Sergeants Major Academy

Class #58

Group Room R10

WO1 Kees Bak

March 18, 2008 Compare and Contrast 2

Abstract

This paper will compare and contrast counterinsurgency in the American Indian Wars and the

Vietnam War; including three examples from each, and offer insights that can apply to the

Global War on Terrorism. As senior military leaders it is imperative we always relook past experiences and see where we can apply them to situations facing us today. So many times, the

Army has been guilty of reinventing the wheel. Many past wars and skirmishes provide ideas of what to do and what not to do in order to be successful. These two wars provide us relevant lessons learned to apply to the modern Army of today. Compare and Contrast 3

Compare and Contrast Counterinsurgency in the American Indian Wars and the Vietnam War

The Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine identifies winning the hearts and minds by gaining and maintaining the support of the domestic population in order to isolate the insurgents as the key to success. For most of the 20th century, the U.S. military thought it would fight a force on force conventional war and for the most part disregarded small wars and

insurgency doctrine. So, instead of the Army learning from their experiences in the American

Indian campaigns and Vietnam, the Army for most of the last 100 years viewed these

experiences as flukes. This paper will compare and contrast counterinsurgency in the American

Indian Wars and the Vietnam War, including three examples from each, and offer insights that

can apply to the Global War on Terrorism.

American Indian Wars

The post-Civil War Army inherited a rich heritage in Indian warfare dating back to the

colonial area. The various political and cultural differences between Indian tribes made it

difficult to apply any one method of warfare against the Indians. Finally, the Army developed conventional and unconventional techniques to attack the social and economic resources of the

Indians (Birtle, 2004).

At the outset of hostilities, the Army used the traditional column method to defeat the

Indians; however, commanders soon figured out the vastness of the terrain and the nomadic

nature of the Indians made it almost impossible for the traditional method to work. The Army

decided to use multiple columns that would converge on an area in order to prevent the Indians

from escaping. This technique was somewhat successful; however, the Indians were still able to

outmaneuver the Army. Several disadvantages existed by using the multiple column approach.

Coordination was hard to establish and each column was exposed to being attacked. A good Compare and Contrast 4

illustration of this problem occurred in 1876 at Little Big Horn. The Indians first repulsed three

of General Crook’s converging columns before trouncing a portion of LTC Custer’s second

column (Birtle, 2004). The main purpose of this approach was to destroy Indian food supplies

hoping it would break the Indians morale and will to fight.

Another challenge of the Indian campaigns was finding the Indian as they moved around

the West. Local commanders tried to monitor the indigenous population’s activities through

patrols. The patrols consisted of a company-size element which took the form of armed reconnaissance and would stay out for weeks or months at a time. Scouting became very important and the Army started using the term “scout” to describe any type of patrol or reconnaissance mission (Birtle, 2004). General Crook used his scouts not only as guides but as combat auxiliaries. He regularly used scouts in combination with regular troops, but he did use them on independent missions as well. General Crook insisted that his officers build a personal relationship with their scouts based upon mutual trust and respect (Birtle, 2004).

The Army modified its logistical system and force structure to the requirements of fighting the Indians on the frontier. The Army became resourceful and thought up ways to adapt to this way of fighting. They adopted the use of pack mules and also changed the type of horses they used to California mustangs. The Army’s level of mobility was still inferior to the Indians, but it was enough to keep the Indians on the run.

Most Army officers thought the Indian policy was a failure. The government broke numerous promises to the Indians. Army leaders thought is was necessary to break the Indians’ will to resist. The Army’s limited role in the formation of Indian policy prevented it from having much impact on the course pacifying the Indians. General Crook believed pacification resulted from more than just fighting, but from winning the hearts and Compare and Contrast 5

minds of the population. He promised good treatment to those Indians who followed his rules

and harsh penalties for those who did not. He ordered humane treatment of Indian prisoners and

avoid killing women and children when possible. General Crook was tough on those who

resisted and the population that supported them by burning their property and food (Birtle, 2004).

A final lesson for the Army to learn was figuring out the class of fighter the Army was

fighting. Indian warriors, as guerilla fighters, were well trained and disciplined. Indian warriors

would only fight when the conditions were set for victory. The Indians use of hit and run tactics

resulted in the Indian Wars continuing for some three decades. The Army relearned this lesson

almost a century later fighting the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (Yarbrough,

2002).

Vietnam War

The American Indian Campaign provided the Army with experience in handling

counterinsurgency operations, and the Vietnam War expounded on this experience. For most of

the Vietnam War, the 5th Special Forces Group trained and led Civilian Irregular Defense Groups

(CIDG) mobile strike forces and reconnaissance companies that consisted of ethnic minority and

groups from the mountain and border regions. The war effort received considerable contributions

from the CIDG program. The 5th Special Forces Group, consisting of 2,500 Soldiers, basically built and led an army of 50,000 tribal fighters to fight in some of the most difficult and dangerous terrain in Vietnam. CIDG patrols along the border provided reliable tactical intelligence and helped secure civilian populations in areas of Vietnam that could have accepted

to the Viet Cong (Cassidy, 2004). The CIDG program had two major issues. One problem was

constant aggression existed between the South Vietnamese and the ethnic minority groups who

made up the CIDG strike forces. This issue resulted in slowed U.S. efforts to have Republic of Compare and Contrast 6

Vietnam (RVN) Special Forces take over the CIDG program. The second problem was the 5th

Special Forces Group failed to develop an effective indigenous counterpart organization to lead the CIDG. The RVN Special Forces was supposed to lead the CIDG, but were unable to do so.

(Cassidy, 2004).

The Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP) was another program used in

Vietnam. This program combined Marines and indigenous population personnel into a platoon- sizes element which trained, patrolled, defended, and lived in the village together. The CAP had a huge mission. The mission was to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure within the village and

protect the public’s security. The mission also consisted of maintaining law and order and to protect those individuals who were friendly. The CAP protected communications within the villages and organized indigenous intelligence nets (Cassidy, 2004). Civic action played a vital role in the efforts to destroy the Viet Cong because it gained essential intelligence about enemy activity from the local population. The CAP proved that an investment of U.S. forces at the village level could produce major improvements in local security and intelligence (Cassidy,

2004).

The third program used in Vietnam was Civil Operations and Revolutionary

Development Support (CORDS). The U.S. established CORDS to coordinate the U.S. civil and

military pacification programs. CORDS coordinated the effort of various U.S. military and

civilian agencies involved in the pacification effort. These agencies included the State

Department, the CIA, the USIA and the AID. This organization was dispersed throughout South

Vietnam’s 44 provinces and 250 districts (Bolte', 1994). The new focus on pacification consisted

of identifying and eliminating the Viet Cong infrastructure. The Phoenix program was developed

to help in neutralizing the Viet Cong infrastructure. This program received some negative Compare and Contrast 7

attention due to abuses; however its use of former Viet Cong to bring out the enemy’s shadow

government was very effective. The CORDS’ Accelerated Pacification Campaign focused on

territorial security, neutralizing Viet Cong infrastructure, and supporting programs for self-

defense and self-government at the local level (Cassidy, 2004).

The CIDG, CAP, and CORDS programs met with success in executing key issues of the

counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Each program expanded the quality and quantity of the forces

conducting pacification and counterinsurgency operations. The programs improved the capability

of small-unit patrolling and therefore enhanced actionable intelligence. If CORDS and the

Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) integrated both CAP and CIDG underneath them and worked together instead of separately, the results in Vietnam could have been much different (Cassidy, 2004).

The defeat suffered by the United States in the Vietnam War was a failure to have a good

strategy. No other war in American history demonstrates more plainly both the difficulties of making sound strategic decisions and the terrible results of a lack of a clear strategic plan. The

Vietnam War shows us the importance of American politicians and military decision-makers

comprehending the importance having a clear strategy. The American failure in Vietnam also

resulted from wanting to fight a conventional war when this conflict demanded a

counterinsurgency effort. Top military commanders refused to use a counterinsurgency strategy

despite evidence that it could work.

Applicability to Today

The diversity of the Indian tribes, using raids and ambushes, successfully fought a thirty-

year war against a superior military force. It would finally take the unorthodox tactics of several

commanders to bring an end to the fighting. The Indian’s used superb guerilla tactics against the Compare and Contrast 8

Army. The Army’s failure to develop a clear strategy to fight this type of war is what lengthened

the war against the Indians. The Indians themselves presented unique challenges to the

conventional Army. Each tribe had its own cultural standards, beliefs, war fighting styles, and

geographical advantages (Yarbrough, 2002). As the United States engages in the war on terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important that military leaders relook the lessons of

America’s Indian Wars. The Army’s experience in recent international conflicts shows that most

conflicts involve third world countries which involve issues including different factions, political

groups, and races.

The lessons learned and the successes of the programs in Vietnam are relevant today

because in both Afghanistan and Iraq, improving the quantity and capabilities of indigenous

forces, ensuring there is an integrated and unified civil-military approach, and the security of the

population all continue to be central goals. CAP was a very successful effort during the Vietnam

War which placed a Marine rifle squad with a Vietnamese Popular Forces Platoon. The U.S.

Armed Forces in Iraq adopted this method by placing more U.S. advisors and personnel with

indigenous Iraqi forces.

Conclusion

As senior military leaders it is imperative we always relook past experiences and see

where we can apply them to situations facing us today. So many times, the Army has been guilty

of reinventing the wheel. Many past wars and skirmishes provide ideas of what to do and what

not to do in order to be successful. These two wars provide us relevant lessons learned to apply

to the modern Army of today.

Compare and Contrast 9

References

Birtle, A. J. (2004). U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-

1941. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History .

Bolte', P. (1994, February). CORDS: Winning the hearts and minds in Vietnam. Retrieved March

21, 2008, from

http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/vietnam_war/3943936.html?page=1&c=y.

Cassidy, R. M. (2004, Summer). Back to the streets without joy: counterinsurgency lessons from

Vietnam and other small wars. Parameters, 73-83. Retrieved March 20, 2008, from

http://carlisle-www.us.army.mil/uaswc/Parameters/04summer/cassidy.pdf.

Yarbrough, S. (2002, April). Asymmetrical warfare on the , a review of the

American Indian Wars 1865-1891. Retrieved March 21, 2008, from http://carlisle-

www.us.army.mil/srp/ex_paper/Yarbrough_L_S_02.pdf.