Compare and Contrast 1
Running head: COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE
Compare and Contrast Counterinsurgency in the American Indian Wars and the Vietnam War
MSG Carrie R. Glover
United States Army Sergeants Major Academy
Class #58
Group Room R10
WO1 Kees Bak
March 18, 2008 Compare and Contrast 2
Abstract
This paper will compare and contrast counterinsurgency in the American Indian Wars and the
Vietnam War; including three examples from each, and offer insights that can apply to the
Global War on Terrorism. As senior military leaders it is imperative we always relook past experiences and see where we can apply them to situations facing us today. So many times, the
Army has been guilty of reinventing the wheel. Many past wars and skirmishes provide ideas of what to do and what not to do in order to be successful. These two wars provide us relevant lessons learned to apply to the modern Army of today. Compare and Contrast 3
Compare and Contrast Counterinsurgency in the American Indian Wars and the Vietnam War
The Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine identifies winning the hearts and minds by gaining and maintaining the support of the domestic population in order to isolate the insurgents as the key to success. For most of the 20th century, the U.S. military thought it would fight a force on force conventional war and for the most part disregarded small wars and
insurgency doctrine. So, instead of the Army learning from their experiences in the American
Indian campaigns and Vietnam, the Army for most of the last 100 years viewed these
experiences as flukes. This paper will compare and contrast counterinsurgency in the American
Indian Wars and the Vietnam War, including three examples from each, and offer insights that
can apply to the Global War on Terrorism.
American Indian Wars
The post-Civil War Army inherited a rich heritage in Indian warfare dating back to the
colonial area. The various political and cultural differences between Indian tribes made it
difficult to apply any one method of warfare against the Indians. Finally, the Army developed conventional and unconventional techniques to attack the social and economic resources of the
Indians (Birtle, 2004).
At the outset of hostilities, the Army used the traditional column method to defeat the
Indians; however, commanders soon figured out the vastness of the terrain and the nomadic
nature of the Indians made it almost impossible for the traditional method to work. The Army
decided to use multiple columns that would converge on an area in order to prevent the Indians
from escaping. This technique was somewhat successful; however, the Indians were still able to
outmaneuver the Army. Several disadvantages existed by using the multiple column approach.
Coordination was hard to establish and each column was exposed to being attacked. A good Compare and Contrast 4
illustration of this problem occurred in 1876 at Little Big Horn. The Indians first repulsed three
of General Crook’s converging columns before trouncing a portion of LTC Custer’s second
column (Birtle, 2004). The main purpose of this approach was to destroy Indian food supplies
hoping it would break the Indians morale and will to fight.
Another challenge of the Indian campaigns was finding the Indian as they moved around
the West. Local commanders tried to monitor the indigenous population’s activities through
patrols. The patrols consisted of a company-size element which took the form of armed reconnaissance and would stay out for weeks or months at a time. Scouting became very important and the Army started using the term “scout” to describe any type of patrol or reconnaissance mission (Birtle, 2004). General Crook used his scouts not only as guides but as combat auxiliaries. He regularly used scouts in combination with regular troops, but he did use them on independent missions as well. General Crook insisted that his officers build a personal relationship with their scouts based upon mutual trust and respect (Birtle, 2004).
The Army modified its logistical system and force structure to the requirements of fighting the Indians on the frontier. The Army became resourceful and thought up ways to adapt to this way of fighting. They adopted the use of pack mules and also changed the type of horses they used to California mustangs. The Army’s level of mobility was still inferior to the Indians, but it was enough to keep the Indians on the run.
Most Army officers thought the United States Indian policy was a failure. The government broke numerous promises to the Indians. Army leaders thought is was necessary to break the Indians’ will to resist. The Army’s limited role in the formation of Indian policy prevented it from having much impact on the course pacifying the Indians. General Crook believed pacification resulted from more than just fighting, but from winning the hearts and Compare and Contrast 5
minds of the population. He promised good treatment to those Indians who followed his rules
and harsh penalties for those who did not. He ordered humane treatment of Indian prisoners and
avoid killing women and children when possible. General Crook was tough on those who
resisted and the population that supported them by burning their property and food (Birtle, 2004).
A final lesson for the Army to learn was figuring out the class of fighter the Army was
fighting. Indian warriors, as guerilla fighters, were well trained and disciplined. Indian warriors
would only fight when the conditions were set for victory. The Indians use of hit and run tactics
resulted in the Indian Wars continuing for some three decades. The Army relearned this lesson
almost a century later fighting the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (Yarbrough,
2002).
Vietnam War
The American Indian Campaign provided the Army with experience in handling
counterinsurgency operations, and the Vietnam War expounded on this experience. For most of
the Vietnam War, the 5th Special Forces Group trained and led Civilian Irregular Defense Groups
(CIDG) mobile strike forces and reconnaissance companies that consisted of ethnic minority and
groups from the mountain and border regions. The war effort received considerable contributions
from the CIDG program. The 5th Special Forces Group, consisting of 2,500 Soldiers, basically built and led an army of 50,000 tribal fighters to fight in some of the most difficult and dangerous terrain in Vietnam. CIDG patrols along the border provided reliable tactical intelligence and helped secure civilian populations in areas of Vietnam that could have accepted
to the Viet Cong (Cassidy, 2004). The CIDG program had two major issues. One problem was
constant aggression existed between the South Vietnamese and the ethnic minority groups who
made up the CIDG strike forces. This issue resulted in slowed U.S. efforts to have Republic of Compare and Contrast 6
Vietnam (RVN) Special Forces take over the CIDG program. The second problem was the 5th
Special Forces Group failed to develop an effective indigenous counterpart organization to lead the CIDG. The RVN Special Forces was supposed to lead the CIDG, but were unable to do so.
(Cassidy, 2004).
The Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP) was another program used in
Vietnam. This program combined Marines and indigenous population personnel into a platoon- sizes element which trained, patrolled, defended, and lived in the village together. The CAP had a huge mission. The mission was to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure within the village and
protect the public’s security. The mission also consisted of maintaining law and order and to protect those individuals who were friendly. The CAP protected communications within the villages and organized indigenous intelligence nets (Cassidy, 2004). Civic action played a vital role in the efforts to destroy the Viet Cong because it gained essential intelligence about enemy activity from the local population. The CAP proved that an investment of U.S. forces at the village level could produce major improvements in local security and intelligence (Cassidy,
2004).
The third program used in Vietnam was Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support (CORDS). The U.S. established CORDS to coordinate the U.S. civil and
military pacification programs. CORDS coordinated the effort of various U.S. military and
civilian agencies involved in the pacification effort. These agencies included the State
Department, the CIA, the USIA and the AID. This organization was dispersed throughout South
Vietnam’s 44 provinces and 250 districts (Bolte', 1994). The new focus on pacification consisted
of identifying and eliminating the Viet Cong infrastructure. The Phoenix program was developed
to help in neutralizing the Viet Cong infrastructure. This program received some negative Compare and Contrast 7
attention due to abuses; however its use of former Viet Cong to bring out the enemy’s shadow
government was very effective. The CORDS’ Accelerated Pacification Campaign focused on
territorial security, neutralizing Viet Cong infrastructure, and supporting programs for self-
defense and self-government at the local level (Cassidy, 2004).
The CIDG, CAP, and CORDS programs met with success in executing key issues of the
counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Each program expanded the quality and quantity of the forces
conducting pacification and counterinsurgency operations. The programs improved the capability
of small-unit patrolling and therefore enhanced actionable intelligence. If CORDS and the
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) integrated both CAP and CIDG underneath them and worked together instead of separately, the results in Vietnam could have been much different (Cassidy, 2004).
The defeat suffered by the United States in the Vietnam War was a failure to have a good
strategy. No other war in American history demonstrates more plainly both the difficulties of making sound strategic decisions and the terrible results of a lack of a clear strategic plan. The
Vietnam War shows us the importance of American politicians and military decision-makers
comprehending the importance having a clear strategy. The American failure in Vietnam also
resulted from wanting to fight a conventional war when this conflict demanded a
counterinsurgency effort. Top military commanders refused to use a counterinsurgency strategy
despite evidence that it could work.
Applicability to Today
The diversity of the Indian tribes, using raids and ambushes, successfully fought a thirty-
year war against a superior military force. It would finally take the unorthodox tactics of several
commanders to bring an end to the fighting. The Indian’s used superb guerilla tactics against the Compare and Contrast 8
Army. The Army’s failure to develop a clear strategy to fight this type of war is what lengthened
the war against the Indians. The Indians themselves presented unique challenges to the
conventional Army. Each tribe had its own cultural standards, beliefs, war fighting styles, and
geographical advantages (Yarbrough, 2002). As the United States engages in the war on terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important that military leaders relook the lessons of
America’s Indian Wars. The Army’s experience in recent international conflicts shows that most
conflicts involve third world countries which involve issues including different factions, political
groups, and races.
The lessons learned and the successes of the programs in Vietnam are relevant today
because in both Afghanistan and Iraq, improving the quantity and capabilities of indigenous
forces, ensuring there is an integrated and unified civil-military approach, and the security of the
population all continue to be central goals. CAP was a very successful effort during the Vietnam
War which placed a Marine rifle squad with a Vietnamese Popular Forces Platoon. The U.S.
Armed Forces in Iraq adopted this method by placing more U.S. advisors and personnel with
indigenous Iraqi forces.
Conclusion
As senior military leaders it is imperative we always relook past experiences and see
where we can apply them to situations facing us today. So many times, the Army has been guilty
of reinventing the wheel. Many past wars and skirmishes provide ideas of what to do and what
not to do in order to be successful. These two wars provide us relevant lessons learned to apply
to the modern Army of today.
Compare and Contrast 9
References
Birtle, A. J. (2004). U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-
1941. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army.
Bolte', P. (1994, February). CORDS: Winning the hearts and minds in Vietnam. Retrieved March
21, 2008, from
http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/vietnam_war/3943936.html?page=1&c=y.
Cassidy, R. M. (2004, Summer). Back to the streets without joy: counterinsurgency lessons from
Vietnam and other small wars. Parameters, 73-83. Retrieved March 20, 2008, from
http://carlisle-www.us.army.mil/uaswc/Parameters/04summer/cassidy.pdf.
Yarbrough, S. (2002, April). Asymmetrical warfare on the Great Plains, a review of the
American Indian Wars 1865-1891. Retrieved March 21, 2008, from http://carlisle-
www.us.army.mil/srp/ex_paper/Yarbrough_L_S_02.pdf.