Country Advice

Home , Census in Pakistan, Jamaat Ahle Sunnat

Country Advice

Pakistan Pakistan – PAK38764 – Hazaras – Shi‟ites – Quetta – Targeted Harm – Sipah-e- Sahaba Pakistan – Jamaat Ahle Sunnat – Lashkar-e-Jhangvi – Nasabi-Wahabi – Ahle Hadith – Police Impartiality – Judiciary – Law – State Protection – Relocation 27 May 2011

1. Country Advice PAK38635 contains information on Hazara Shia Muslims being targeted by extremist Sunni Muslim groups in Quetta, Baluchistan. Can you please provide information about the targeting of the general Shia Muslim population by the Sunni Muslim extremists in Quetta and in other parts of Pakistan?

Attacks on Shia communities throughout Pakistan by Deobandi extremist groups are part of a long-running campaign to create a Sunni Islamic state; extremist Deobandi doctrine classifies the various Shi‟ite branches as un-Islamic.1 Other targets of these extremists groups include Ahmadis and non-Muslims. More recently, reports indicate that Deobandi extremists have begun attacking Sunni targets associated with Sufism and the Barelvi school of Islam.2 Despite being associated with the Deobandi school of Hanafi Islam, Pakistan‟s Shi‟ite news sites collectively refer to these groups as Nasabi-Wahabi.3

The most active extremist group targeting Shia Muslims in Pakistan today is Lashkar-e- Jhangvi (LeJ), a splinter group of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).4 LeJ is widely believed to be associated with al-Qaeda, receiving funding, logistical help and emulating its decentralised cell structure. In November 2010, it was reported that LeJ had recently split into at least eight small cells. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal , “[t]he creation of the cells is aimed at coordinating the banned group‟s activities in the area ranging from the southern port city of Karachi to Waziristan in the restive tribal belt bordering Afghanistan… Each sub-group is responsible for carrying out activities in a specific geographic location”.5

1 There are three surviving branches of Shia Islam; the Twelvers, Zaidi, and Ismaili. The majority of Pakistan‟s Shi‟ite Muslims are Twelvers; however there are communities of Ismailis, residing largely in Hindu Kush regions. 2 Maqbool, A. 2010, „Deadly blasts hit Sufi shrine in Lahore‟, BBC News, 2 July http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10483453 – Accessed 25 May 2011 – Attachment 55 3 „Two Shia Men Martyred by the Terrorists in Sindh‟ 2011, Ahlul Bayt News Agency, 8 January http://www.abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=220237 – Accessed 26 May 2011 – Attachment 56 4 SSP is also known as Jamaat Ahle Sunnat. SSP has changed names a number of times since 2002 to overcome official bans on its activities. 5 „Lashkar-e-Jhangvi‟ (undated), South Asian Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm – Accessed 23 May 2011 – Attachment 1

Page 1 of 20 Quetta

Country Advice PAK38635 documented a number of significant attacks on both Hazari Shi‟ites and the wider Shi‟ite community in Quetta since 2003. It is well-established that Shia Muslims in Quetta of all ethnic backgrounds have been targeted for harm, particularly by groups such as LeJ and SSP. It is likely that many Hazaras have been attacked in Quetta based on their distinct physical appearance, which usually distinguishes them as Shi‟ites; the overwhelming majority of Hazaras are Shi‟ites of the Twelver branch.6

Attacks targeting the general Shi‟ite population in Quetta/Baluchistan over the past decade listed in Country Advice PAK38635 included:  September 2010 – approximately 73 Shi‟ites were killed and over 200 injured in a suicide bombing in the city.7 LeJ claimed responsibility for the attack.8  March 2005 – the bombing of a Shi‟ite shrine in Jhal Magsi killed 65.  March 2004 – an attack on a Shia Ashura procession in Quetta killed 38.  July 2003 – the bombing of a Shia mosque in Quetta left more than 50 people dead.9

Since the completion of Country Advice PAK38635, there have more deadly attacks on Hazaras/Shi‟ites in Quetta, including an attack on 18 May 2011 on a utility vehicle that killed 7 Hazari Shi‟ites. Once again, LeJ claimed responsibility for the attack.10

According to the Jamestown Foundation‟s Terrorism Monitor, approximately 95 percent of religious schools in Baluchistan are owned and administered by Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), a radical Deobandi organisation. Terrorism Monitor argues that the effect of this has been greater “intolerance among the youth who now refuse to coexist with members of rival religious sects.”11

Pakistan

Anti-Shi‟ite attacks by LeJ, SSP, and other Deobandi/Salafist/Wahhabist extremist groups have not been confined to Baluchistan. The scope of targeted attacks on Shi‟ite targets across Pakistan is too extensive to catalogue in this advice.12 Below is a snapshot of attacks since 2009, selected to highlight the geographic spread of targeted attacks across the country:  5 February 2009 – 30 people were killed and 20 injured in a bomb blast near a Shia mosque in Dera Ghazi Khan, Punjab.

6 Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade 2010, The Hazara Community, 20 May – Attachment 2 7 Hughes, M. 2010, „Suicide attack death toll reaches 73 in Quetta Pakistan‟, The Examiner, 4 September http://www.examiner.com/afghanistan-headlines-in-national/suicide-attack-death-toll-reaches-73-quetta-pakistan- video – Accessed 8 October 2010 – Attachment 3 8 Reporters Without Borders 2010, „Journalists killed and injured in Quetta bombing, reporter kidnapped in Islamabad‟, UNHCR Refworld, 6 September http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c8df29814.html – Accessed 11 October 2010 – Attachment 4 9 International Crisis Group 2009, Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, Asia Report no.164, 13 March, p.16 – Attachment 5 10 Shahid, S. & Kasi, A. 2011, „Terrorists kill Seven Hazaras in Quetta‟ 2011, Dawn, 18 May http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/19/terrorists-kill-seven-hazaras-in-quetta.html – Accessed 19 May 2011 – Attachment 6 11 Jamestown Foundation 2010, Terrorism Monitor, Vol VIII, Issue 21, 28 May, p.5 – Attachment 54 12 For more information on attacks on specific Shi‟ite communities see the MRT-RRT Country Advice Pakistan Index.

Page 2 of 20  5 April 2009 – 24 killed and 140 injured in a suicide bomb blast at a Shia mosque in Chakwal, Punjab.  September 2009 – at least 35 people died in an attack on Shia villages in Kohat District, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP).13  28 December 2009 – a suicide bombing attack in Karachi during a Muharram (Ashura) procession killed at least 93 people and injured at least 75 others, triggering riots and arson.14 The bomber was most likely a member of LeJ.15  In 2009 a total of 55 Shia were killed and 196 were injured in attacks in Dera Ismail Khan, KP.16  A campaign of targeted assassinations of Shi‟ite professionals claimed the lives of at least 85 Shi‟ite doctors across Pakistan in 2010.17 18 It is likely that this assassination campaign was perpetrated by a Wahhabist group associated with the Ahle Hadith.19  In Karachi at least 26 Shi‟ite doctors have been assassinated according to a 2010 report on violence in the city.20 The authors of The Open City: Social Networks And Violence In Karachi argue that these assassinations are part of “a systematic campaign to target educated professionals within the Shia community – presumably in the expectation that this would lower the community‟s morale and encourage its members to seek emigration.”21 A similar campaign in the 1990s claimed the lives of over 100 Shia professionals in Karachi, resulting in the migration abroad of many educated Shi‟ites.22  Other Shia technocrats have also been targeted according to respected author Ahmed Rashid, writing in The National Interest that “politicians, doctors, architects, bureaucrats and judges – have been singled out for assassination in all major cities”.23  On 1 September 2010, 43 persons were killed and another 230 were injured in two suicide attacks and one grenade attack on a Shia procession in Lahore. LeJ Al-alami

13 „Pakistan: Shia IDPs fearful of being targeted‟ 2010, UNHCR Refworld, source: IRIN News, 11 February http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b7ba8db1a.html – Accessed 4 January 2011 – Attachment 7 14 US Department of State 2010, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August, p.159 – Attachment 8 15 US Department of State 2010, International Religious Freedom Report – Pakistan, 17 November – Attachment 9 16 Provincial Disaster Management Authority 2010, „Internal Security Situation; Presentation to the Prime Minister of Islamic Republic of Pakistan‟, Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa website, 4 March, p.16 http://www.pdma.gov.pk/PaRRSA/documents/Internal_Security_Situation.pdf – Accessed 12 January 2011 – Attachment 10 17 Shah, T.A. 2010 „Karachi Emerges as Pakistan‟s New Tinderbox of Violence and Extremism‟, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume VIII, Issue 26, 1 July, pp.5-6 – Attachment 11 18 „Sectarianism infects hospital wards‟ 2010, UNHCR Refworld, source: IRIN News, 24 October http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4cc673001e.html – Accessed 11 January 2011 – Attachment 12 19 Rakisits, C. 2009, „Urban Conflict in Pakistan‟, Geopolitical Assessment.com, 30 January, p.5 http://www.geopoliticalassessments.com/Urban_conflict_in_Pakistan.pdf – Accessed 19 May 2011 – Attachment 13 20 Budhani, et al 2010, The Open City: Social Networks And Violence In Karachi, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper no. 70, March, p.4 http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP70.2.pdf – Accessed 7 January 2011 – Attachment 14 21 Budhani, et al 2010, The Open City: Social Networks And Violence In Karachi, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper no. 70, March, p.7 http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP70.2.pdf – Accessed 7 January 2011 – Attachment 14 22 Abbas, H. 2010, „Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence‟, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 22 September, p.39 – Attachment 15 23 Rashid, A. 2010, „The Anarchic Republic of Pakistan‟, The National Interest, 24 August http://nationalinterest.org/article/anarchic-republic-pakistan-3917?page=show – Accessed 7 January 2011 – Attachment 16

Page 3 of 20 claimed responsibility for the three attacks that occurred minutes apart in Bhaati Gate area.24  In December 2010, an attack on an Ashura parade in Peshawar killed one child and injured several others.25  In December 2010 ten people were killed and at least fifteen were wounded when a car bomb was detonated outside the Al-Zahra Hospital in Hangu, KP, built by the local Shi‟ite community. Seven of the ten killed were Shi‟ite.26  Also in December 2010, rockets were fired on Shia neighbourhoods in Hangu city during Ashura, killing nine people.27  In March 2010, 12 people, seven of whom were believed to be Shi‟ite, were killed by a suicide bomber in Hangu, while en route to Parachinar in Upper Kurram.28

2. Is there a place in Pakistan where Shia Muslims live in large concentrations and are relatively safe from targeting by these extremist groups?

Identifying so-called Shia community safe-havens in Pakistan is problematic. Complicating research on this issue is the fact that the Census Division of the Pakistan Government does not record the sect/branch of the Islamic population when conducting censuses. The only sect recorded by the Census Division in past censuses is the Ahmadi sect, primarily due to the fact that it is no longer officially designated an Islamic sect. Published results from the most recent national census, conducted in 1998, do not differentiate between Shi‟ite and Sunni Muslims. The next national census in Pakistan is scheduled for August-September 2011. However, results from this census are unlikely to be made available until at least 2012. Furthermore, it remains to be seen as to whether the census will ask respondents to nominate their specific Islamic sect.

Unofficial estimates suggest that Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia population in the world after Iran, numbering approximately 30 million.29 However, unlike in India, there are no major cities in Pakistan which have predominantly Shi‟ite populations.30 A large number of sources indicate that Parachinar, a small city in Kurram Agency, is likely to be the only relatively large population centre with a Shi‟ite majority. Kurram Agency is also the only agency or province with a Shi‟ite majority. However, neither Parachinar nor Kurram can currently be described as safe-havens given the ongoing sectarian clashes between the Shia Turi tribe and Sunni members of the Bangash tribe. In the past decade, Sunni members

24 „Lashkar-e-Jhangvi‟ (undated), South Asian Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm – Accessed 23 May 2011 – Attachment 1 25 „Peshawar grenade attack on Shia parade kills toddler‟ 2010, Dawn, source: AFP, 16 December http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/16/low-intensity-explosion-at-yadgar-chowk-peshawar.html – Accessed 11 January 2011 – Attachment 17 26 „Suicide attack on Al- Zahra Hospital Hangu Pass Kalay‟ 2010, FATA Research Center http://www.frc.com.pk/Suicide%20attack%C2%A0on%20Al- %20Zahra%20Hospital%C2%A0Hangu%20Pass%C2%A0Kalay.htm – Accessed 11 January 2011 – Attachment 18 27 Dempsey, E. 2010, „Rockets Fired in Hangu, 9 People Killed‟, Digital Journal, 17 December http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/301509 – Accessed 12 January 2011 – Attachment 19 28 „Four women among 12 killed in Hangu suicide bombing‟ 2010, Daily Times, 6 March http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\03\06\story_6-3-2010_pg1_5 – Accessed 15 September 2010 – Attachment 20 29 Abbas, H. 2010, „Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence‟, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 22 September, p.7 – Attachment 15 30 Lucknow and Hyderabad in India have large, predominantly Shi‟ite populations.

Page 4 of 20 of the Bangash tribe have developed alliances with both the Haqqani Network and the TTP.31 32 33

It is perhaps not surprising that Punjab and Sindh, the two most populated provinces, reportedly have the largest Shi‟ite populations in Pakistan. News reports also indicate that the Kohat and Hangu districts of KP have large Shi‟ite minorities, largely comprised of Shia members of the Bangash and Turi tribes. However, like the Shi‟ite communities in neighbouring Kurram, the communities in Kohat and Hangu have experienced a large number of mass attacks and targeted killings over the past decade.34 35 36 37

Of the major cities, Karachi is estimated to have the largest proportion of its population belonging to the Shia sect, constituting somewhere between 25 and 30 percent of the city‟s 16 million+ population. Karachi has a vibrant Shi‟ite cultural life; “over 20,000 Shia processions and 45,000 majalis – religious gatherings mourning the tragedy of Karbala – are arranged during the first ten days of the Islamic month of Muharram.” Hassan Abbas of Columbia University reports that “[t]hese Shia immigrants are generally more educated than the local Karachiites – a contrast with Shia communities in the rest of the country, especially in rural areas of Punjab, which have lower literacy rates than the national average.”38

However, Karachi has not been immune to sectarian killings with SSP and LeJ both perpetrating attacks against Shi‟ite targets in the city.39 As indicated in the response to Question 1, Karachi has also witnessed a number of campaigns targeting Shi‟ite professionals.40

Pakistani journalist Khaled Ahmed argues that “most of the sectarian violence is restricted to portions of some cities like Karachi and Quetta and to the provinces of Punjab and NWFP

31 Chandran, S. 2008, „Sectarian Violence in Pakistan‟s Kurram Agency‟, Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief Number 40, 22 September, p.3 http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief+40.pdf – Accessed 23 November 2010 – Attachment 21 32 Khan, M.I. 2010, „The Pakistani tribe that is taking on the Taliban‟, BBC News, 7 October http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11486528 – Accessed 14 October 2010 – Attachment 22 33 „Siraj Haqqani sheltering in Kurram, near area of US helicopter strikes‟ 2010, The Long War Journal, 22 October http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/10/siraj_haqqani_shelte.php – Accessed 11 November 2010 – Attachment 23 34 „Pakistan: Shia IDPs fearful of being targeted‟ 2010, UNHCR Refworld, source: IRIN News, 11 February http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b7ba8db1a.html – Accessed 4 January 2011 – Attachment 7 35 „Kohat and Hangu; Inter-Cluster Mission to Kohat & Hangu 28th January – 30th January‟ 2010, One Response website, 5 February, pp.7-8 http://oneresponse.info/Countries/Pakistan/Coordination/publicdocuments/FINAL- Inter%20cluster%20assessment%20Kohat%20Hangu%2028th%20Jan%202010.pdf – Accessed 12 January 2011 – Attachment 24 36 „Suicide attack on Al- Zahra Hospital Hangu Pass Kalay‟ 2010, FATA Research Center http://www.frc.com.pk/Suicide%20attack%C2%A0on%20Al- %20Zahra%20Hospital%C2%A0Hangu%20Pass%C2%A0Kalay.htm – Accessed 11 January 2011 – Attachment 18 37 Dempsey, E. 2010, „Rockets Fired in Hangu, 9 People Killed‟, Digital Journal, 17 December http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/301509 – Accessed 12 January 2011 – Attachment 19 38 Abbas, H. 2010, „Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence‟, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 22 September, p.14 – Attachment 15 39 Rakisits, C. 2009, „Urban Conflict in Pakistan‟, Geopolitical Assessment.com, 30 January, p.3 http://www.geopoliticalassessments.com/Urban_conflict_in_Pakistan.pdf – Accessed 19 May 2011 – Attachment 13 40 Budhani, et al 2010, The Open City: Social Networks And Violence In Karachi, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper no. 70, March, p.4 http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP70.2.pdf – Accessed 7 January 2011 – Attachment 14

Page 5 of 20 [Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa]”.41 It is therefore possible that Shia communities in rural Sindh are the least affected by sectarian violence. No recent reports have been located of attacks on Shi‟ite targets in rural Sindh, despite these communities constituting an essential powerbase for the Pakistan People‟s Party (PPP), the party of President Asif Ali al-Zadari. There have, however, been recent targeted killings of senior Shi‟ite political leaders in both Karachi and Hyderabad, the second largest city in Sindh.42

3. Aside from Quetta, in which other part(s) of Pakistan do ethnic Hazaras live? What is the situation like for them relative to the risks the Hazaras face from the Sunni Muslim extremists in Baluchistan?

Country Advice PAK38635 reported that while a majority of ethnic Hazaras in Pakistan live in Quetta, there are an estimated three hundred thousand Hazaragi-speaking ethnic Hazaras living in other regions of Pakistan. In May 2010, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) reported that “[o]ther Hazara settlements in Pakistan can be found in Karachi, Lahore and more recently in Multan.”43

A number of major cities have suburbs called „Hazara Colony‟, including Karachi and Rawalpindi. Hazara Division in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is not a district populated by Hazaragi-speaking ethnic Hazaras, but rather un-related Hindko-speaking people, often referred to as Hazaras or Hazarewal.44 Reports in the Pakistani media do not always provide a clear indication as to whether persons referred to in articles as Hazaras are Hazaragi- speakers or Hindko-speakers.

Sources do suggest that a relatively large number of ethnic Hazaras live in the Karachi suburbs of Hazara Moghul Goth, Hazara Colony Mangopir, Qasba Colony, Hussain Hazara Goth and Dadu Goth, and Naval Colony.45 Despite extensive research by RRT Country Advice, useful information regarding the welfare/security of these communities remains elusive. No useful information was located on Hazara communities in Lahore, Multan or Rawalpindi. There have been a small number of media reports of targeted killings of ethnic Hazaras in Karachi.46 Nevertheless, the number of incidents is small, relative to Quetta.

41 Abbas, H. 2010, „Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence‟, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 22 September , p.46 – Attachment 15 42 „Two Shia Men Martyred by the Terrorists in Sindh‟ 2011, Ahlul Bayt News Agency, 8 January http://www.abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=220237 – Accessed 26 May 2011 – Attachment 56 43 Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade 2010, The Hazara Community, 20 May – Attachment 2 44 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, The Hazara Community, 20 May – Attachment 2 45 Hazara, L.A. 2010, „Oath Taking Ceremony Of Hazara Moghul Yekjehti Forum (Registered), Pakistan‟, Hazara Nation, 15 December http://www.hazaranation.com/news1.htm – Accessed 24 May 2011 – Attachment 25 46 „Target Killing of Hazaras in Karachi‟ 2010, Hazara People website, 5 November http://www.hazarapeople.com/2010/11/05/target-killing-of-hazaras-in-karachi/ – Accessed 20 May 2011 – Attachment 26

Page 6 of 20 4. PAK38635 informs that Hazaras from Quetta are leaving the city en masse and 22,000 Hazara government employees have applied for transfer out of Baluchistan. Which areas in Pakistan are these Hazara government employees desiring or preferring to go to?

Country Advice PAK38635 quotes The News – Pakistan, which stated in 2009 that “[n]early 22,000 government employees have applied for the transfer out of the province.”47 The source does not state what ethnicity these public servants are, nor does it state which locations are common preference nominations. The source simply reports that many public servants in Baluchistan, such as university professors, are originally from Punjab or Karachi.

RRT Country Advice has not been able to independently establish where Baluchistan‟s public servants are seeking relocation. Governments are usually bound by privacy laws and are therefore not permitted to make public details of employee transfers. However, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) indicated in 2009 that at least some are heading to the heavily populated provinces of Punjab and Sindh; “[a]t least 20 Balochistan University teachers have got themselves transferred on deputation to Sindh or Punjab because of insecurity; 120 university teachers have requested to be transferred out of Balochistan; 10 professors take their classes with gunmen guarding them; and most teachers have shifted their families to Punjab or other parts of the country.”48

5. PAK38635 informs about state protection available to Hazaras in Quetta and elsewhere in Pakistan. Is this information applicable to the general Shia Muslim population in Quetta and elsewhere in Pakistan?

Information contained in Country Advice PAK38635 pertaining to the level of state protection provided to Hazaras in Quetta applies equally to the general Shi‟ite population of the city. Prima facie, authorities in Baluchistan do not take “all reasonable steps to eliminate the risk” of attacks on Shi‟ite targets. The main authorities in the province, the Balochistan Police Force, the Frontier Corps, and the local branch of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) do not have strong track-records investigating sectarian crimes, let alone arresting perpetrators of sectarian violence. As mentioned in Country Advice PAK38635, the Baluchistan Police have arrested or killed a small number of LeJ and SSP (aka Jamaat Ahle Sunnat) militants.49 50 However, most investigations into terrorist acts and targeted killings in Quetta remain unresolved, in part for reasons discussed in detail in the response to question 6.

In examining the adequacy of state protection elsewhere in Pakistan one has to examine whether there is “appropriate criminal law”, as well as the “provision of a reasonably effective and impartial police force and justice system”.51 In addition, is there evidence that

47 „On the run: Target killing in Balochistan is rising‟ 2009, The News – Pakistan, 8 November http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2009-weekly/nos-08-11-2009/dia.htm#4 – Accessed 31 January 2011 – Attachment 27 48 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2010, Pushed to the Wall: Report of the HRCP fact-finding mission to Balochistan (5-11 OCTOBER 2009), HRCP website, p.20 http://www.hrcp- web.org/pdf/Pushed%20to%20the%20wall.pdf – Accessed 23 May 2011 – Attachment 28 49 Akbar, M.S. 2009, „„Mastermind‟ of sectarian killings held in Quetta‟, Daily Times, 13 November http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C11%5C13%5Cstory_13-11-2009_pg7_3 – Accessed 29 March 2010 – Attachment 29 50 „On the run: Target killing in Balochistan is rising‟ 2009, The News – Pakistan, 8 November http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2009-weekly/nos-08-11-2009/dia.htm#4 – Accessed 31 January 2011 – Attachment 27 51 MRT-RRT Legal Services 2011, Guide to Refugee Law in Australia, April, chapter 8, p.8-9 – Attachment 30

Page 7 of 20 the various provincial and federal authorities pursue perpetrators of sectarian killings, including the organisations and institutions that sponsor them? These are issues discussed in detail in the response to question 6.

6. What sort of measures do the state security agencies take following incidents of violence on Hazaras and Shias? Is such action crime under its relevant law? Does the state take criminal law actions against the perpetrators? Does the state have an impartial police and criminal justice system?

Laws

Inciting racial hatred and unjustifiable killings of people in Pakistan are crimes codified in Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860).52 Each province has a Maintenance of Public Order Act, by which provincial authorities may detain persons deemed to be sponsoring/inciting sectarian attacks, including firebrand clerics.53 There is also a federal ordinance, known as The West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, which provides federal authorities with similar powers.54 Targeted killings of persons for the purposes of creating fear or terror within a particular community is defined as an act of terrorism under Section 6 of Pakistan‟s Anti-Terrorism Ordinance, 18 August 1997 (amended 29 April 1999):

A person is said to commit a terrorist act if he, (a) in order to, or if the effect of his actions will be to, strike terror or create a sense of fear and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people, does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive or inflammable substances, or such fire-arms or other lethal weapons as may be notified, or poisons or noxious gases or chemicals, in such a manner as to cause, or be likely to cause, the death of, or injury to, any person or persons, or damage to, or destruction of, property on a large scale, or a widespread disruption of supplies of services essential to the life of the community, or threatens with the use of force public servants in order to prevent them from discharging their lawful duties; or (b) commits a scheduled offence, the effect of which will be, or be likely to be, to strike terror, or create a sense of fear and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people, or to adversely affect harmony among different sections of the people; or (c) commits an act of gang rape, child molestation, or robbery coupled with rape as specified in the Schedule to this Act; or (d) commits an act of civil commotion as specified in section 7A.55

Police/Law Enforcement Agencies

Pakistan has a number of federal and provincial agencies charged with the investigating and apprehending sponsors of crimes, including preaching or practising sectarian violence and sectarian-related terrorism offences.

52 Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), October 6th, 1860, Pakistani.org, Articles 153, 300 http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html – Accessed 20 May 2011 – Attachment 31 53 The Punjab Maintenance Of Public Order Ordinance 1960, Provincial Assembly of Punjab website http://www.pap.gov.pk/uploads/acts/127.html – Accessed 24 May 2011 – Attachment 32 54 The West Pakistan Maintenance Of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, Mumtaz & Associates website http://www.ma- law.org.pk/pdflaw/WEST%20PAKISTAN%20MAINTENANCE%20OF%20PUBLIC%20ORDER%20ORDINAN CE.pdf – Accessed 24 May 2011 – Attachment 33 55 Pakistan Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 1999, South Asian Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/actsandordinences/anti_terrorism.htm – Accessed 20 May 2011 – Attachment 34

Page 8 of 20 Federal agencies include:  Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)  Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF)  Frontier Constabulary  Frontier Corps  Pakistan Rangers  National Highways and Motorways Police (NHMP)  Pakistan Railways Police  Islamabad Police, Islamabad Capital Territory

Provincial police include:

 Punjab Police  Sindh Police  Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police  Balochistan Police56

Impartiality

As mentioned in Country Advice PAK38635, the ICG argues that some police in Quetta are „Sunni radicals‟, who have actually perpetrated harm against Shi‟ites/Hazaras in the city.57 There is evidence of the presence of radical Sunnis in police branches elsewhere in Pakistan. In 2007, a retired assistant sub-inspector shot and killed an Ahmadi convert in a restaurant in Seerah, in the Punjab.58 In January 2011, the governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer was murdered by his own bodyguard, Malik Mumtaz Qadri, a member of an elite Punjab Police group “trained in counterterrorism work and the protection of important individuals”. The assassination of Taseer was supported by many Deobandi and Barelvi Sunni ulema (clerics/scholars). Equally of interest is the fact that “[w]hen the police brought the assassin to court a day later, hundreds of lawyers showered him with rose petals.”59

A recent article in the Pakistan based Shia news source, Ahlul Bayt News Agency (ABNA) argues that police in Sindh are biased against Shi‟ites. ABNA reported in May 2011 that Karachi police are trying to implicate Shia Muslims in the assassination of a Saudi diplomat in the city. However, ABNA may be overreacting; a police official in Karachi said in an interview with The Washington Post that investigators were trying to determine whether militants associated with al-Qaeda carried out the killing to avenge the killing of the Osama bin Laden, or whether it was conducted by Shiites “angry that the kingdom had sent troops to Bahrain to suppress Shiite protests there.”60 Whatever the motives of the investigative unit, it is clear that Shi‟ites themselves believe that Sindh police are not impartial.

Despite these examples, they are not sufficient to establish that there is a systemic sectarian bias within the various law enforcement agencies against Shia Muslims.

56 Jamal, A. 2010, Police Organisations in Pakistan, Human Rights Commission Pakistan, May, p.10 http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Police_Organisations_in_Pakistan[1].pdf – Accessed 27 April 2011 – Attachment 35 57 International Crisis Group 2009, Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, Asia Report no.164, 13 March, p.16 – Attachment 5 58 Asian Centre For Human Rights 2008, South Asia Human Rights Index – 2008, August, p.73 – Attachment 53 59 Jamestown Foundation 2011, „Sufi Militants Struggle with Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan‟, Terrorism Monitor, Vol 9, Issue 8, 24 February – Attachment 52 60 „Police Trying to Involve Shia‟s in Assassination of Saudi Diplomat‟ 2011, Ahlul Bayt News Agency, 18 May http://www.abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=242225 – Accessed 26 May 2011 – Attachment 57

Page 9 of 20 Counterterrorism

At present, all major criminal investigations in Pakistan are undertaken by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in each province (or the FIA in the case of Islamabad). Assisting CID/FIA investigations is intelligence provided by the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB). However, the ICG reports that the CID, FIA and the IB all depend on information from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and therefore “remain at the mercy of its strategic interests…The ISI‟s historical links to regional jihadi groups make its primacy in anti- terrorism at best questionable.”61

An example provided by the ICG of where ISI clearance hampers investigations is the fact that police “cannot access mobile phone records, the starting point of many investigations, without ISI clearance, which can take weeks.” The ICG quotes a former CID official who stated that “You don‟t sleep over phone data, or any kind of data. You need answers fast. You can‟t waste time on correspondence, and asking for permission. Otherwise, you lose the momentum of an investigation”. In the 1990s, the Punjabi police enjoyed great success arresting SSP militants, who were convicted largely on the evidence provided by phone records.62

In Baluchistan the ISI almost certainly tolerate Sunni extremists as a counter-weight to Baluchi separatism, just as they maintain strong connections to the Afghan Taliban in order to retain leverage in the Afghan conflict. Members of the ISI have also been accused of being associated with the planning and execution of terrorist attacks, including the terrorist attack in Mumbai in November 2008 by members of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e- Mohammad (JeM).63

There is evidence that in the past the Pakistan government, the Armed Forces, and various civilian security organs turned a blind to training camps and madrasas (religious colleges), connected to international jihadist groups, particularly Lashkar-e-Toiba. However, following international pressure in the aftermath of the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, the government of Asif Ali al-Zadari launched a crackdown on such jihadi groups. The ICG states that the government reacted by “closing down training camps, schools, libraries, madrasas and extremist websites, and arresting 124 suspected militants under the Anti- Terrorism Act. It also detained 71 people under the Maintenance of Public Order Act.” The ICG adds that the primary fear among government ministers and authorities is that such crackdowns have in the past resulted in new campaigns of anti-state terrorism, as was the case following the operation on the Lal Masjid [Red Mosque] in Islamabad in 2007.64

There is no evidence, however, that the same argument can be made concerning banned groups waging domestic jihad on the state and sectarian targets since the end of the Zia ul- Haq junta in 1988. Indeed, the various agencies have a strong record of arresting or eliminating members of domestic jihadist groups, particularly members of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP):

61 International Crisis Group 2009, Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, Asia Report no.164, 13 March, p.19 – Attachment 5 62 International Crisis Group 2009, Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, Asia Report no.164, 13 March, p.19 – Attachment 5 63 Rotella, S. 2011, „Pakistan‟s terror ties at center of upcoming Chicago trial‟, Stars & Stripes, 8 May http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/pakistan-s-terror-ties-at-center-of-upcoming-chicago-trial-1.143092 – Accessed 23 May 2011 – Attachment 36 64 International Crisis Group 2009, Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, Asia Report no.164, 13 March, p.17 – Attachment 5

Page 10 of 20  The current Saalar-i-Aala (Commander-in-Chief) of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Muhammad Ajmal alias Akram Lahori, was arrested in Karachi in June 2002 and remains in custody. Lahori and several other LeJ activists were arrested following the arrest and interrogation of Shabbir Ahmed. Soon after these arrests, senior leader Qari Ataur Rahman alias Naeem Bukhari, was arrested, also in Karachi.

 Police have also killed other senior members of LeJ, including Lahori‟s predecessor, Riaz Basra, in 2002 in Faisalabad. Basra had been captured in the 1990s and placed on trial, however he had managed to escape police custody. The South Asian Terrorism Portal continually updates its catalogue of arrests, trials, killings and escapes of LeJ cards on its website.

 In August 2010, police arrested Mohammad Adnan and Shah Jahan alias Munna, in Karachi for their associations with LeJ and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) after an alleged encounter in Korangi, Karachi.

 In November 2010, police arrested six LeJ militants, and reportedly recovered “a huge cache of weapon”.

 In October 2010, police arrested seven LeJ militants allegedly plotting to kill Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani in a suicide attack at his house in Multan, Punjab. Some of those arrested were also reportedly involved in the December 2009 attack on the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) offices in Multan.65

 In August 2009, Quetta police shot dead two members of SSP (also known as Jamaat Ahle Sunnat or JAS), after they assassinated Shia religious leader Allama Maqsood Ali Donki in a grenade attack.66

 In April 2011, former SSP member Mohammed Nadeem was shot dead in Sharea Faisal. In March 2011, an SSP cadre known as Zeeshan was killed by police in the Iqbal Market Police Station in Karachi. Also in March, an SSP leader, Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Madni, brother of slain former chief Maulana Azam Tariq, was killed in Karachi.67

Both SSP and LeJ are associated with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the umbrella organisation of anti-Shi‟ite, anti-state Deobandi extremist groups in Pakistan. In November 2010, the Pakistani Government announced a reward of 10 million Pakistani rupees for information on TTP members, including SSP and LeJ. In making the announcement, Pakistan Interior Minister Rehman Malik stated that “[t]he government will make arrangements to settle the informers and their families anywhere in the country, even abroad, if they fear that the Taliban might hurt them”.68

65 „Lashkar-e-Jhangvi‟ (undated), South Asian Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm – Accessed 23 May 2011 – Attachment 1 66 „On the run: Target killing in Balochistan is rising‟ 2009, The News – Pakistan, 8 November http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2009-weekly/nos-08-11-2009/dia.htm#4 – Accessed 31 January 2011 – Attachment 27 67 „Incidents involving Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan‟ 2011, South Asian Terrorism Portal, 22 April http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SSP_tl.htm – Accessed 23 May 2011 – Attachment 37 68 „Incidents involving Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan‟ 2011, South Asian Terrorism Portal, 22 April http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SSP_tl.htm – Accessed 23 May 2011 – Attachment 37

Page 11 of 20 As of September 2010, Pakistan‟s law enforcement agencies were reportedly actively searching for 83 high profile terrorists. While some of these people would be better described as Baluchi separatists, a majority appear to be members of SSP, LeJ, and Sipah-e- Muhammad Pakistan (SMP).69

Reform

However, despite these notable successes, a large number of domestic and international observers argue that to be truly effective in counter-terrorism, the entire security apparatus of Pakistan requires substantial reform.

Hassan Abbas of Columbia University states that despite the counter-terrorism efforts of police agencies, “it is unlikely that Pakistan will be able to sustain this counterterrorism strategy in the absence of major structural changes in its law enforcement system and of a major overhaul of prosecution proceedings. Although in recent years a movement for the rule of law in Pakistan has emerged and strengthened, more time is needed for this movement to gain momentum and dividends, and become part of the solution to this problem.”70

Specific problems identified by Abbas include “[a] lack of coordination between police, the civilian-run Intelligence Bureau, and the military-run intelligence agencies (e.g., Inter- Services Intelligence, Military Intelligence, etc.)” and “poor data collection capability as regards crimes and criminals. Many criminals who joined militant religious groups are not traced and tracked efficiently. Even banned militant organizations are not well profiled… militant religious groups are not traced and tracked efficiently.”71 The International Crisis Group (ICG) reports that most of the police structures and regulations across Pakistan are still based on the Police Act of 1861, which they describe as “a colonial legal instrument designed primarily to keep imperial India‟s subjects under check”. In other words, the Act was designed to protect regimes, not civilians. General Pervez Musharraf promulgated a new Police Order in 2002 which, in the ICG‟s opinion, would have been sufficient for such a reform to get underway. However, the ordinance was never legislated. Furthermore, Musharraf himself “massively amended the Police Order in 2004, undoing the proposed reforms before they had been put in practice.”72 Unreformed and underfinanced, Pakistan‟s police forces remain “ill-equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicized, and chronically corrupt.”73 74 75 7677

69 „Incidents involving Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan‟ 2011, South Asian Terrorism Portal, 22 April http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SSP_tl.htm – Accessed 23 May 2011 – Attachment 37 70 Abbas, H. 2010, „Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence‟, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 22 September, p.50 – Attachment 15 71 Abbas, H. 2009, Police & Law Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, April, p.14 http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20- %20Police%20Reforms%20in%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf – Accessed 20 May 2011 – Attachment 38 72 International Crisis Group 2008, Reforming Pakistan’s Police, Crisis Group Asia Report No.157, 14 July, p.1 – Attachment 39 73 Abbas, H. 2009, Police & Law Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, April, p.7 http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20- %20Police%20Reforms%20in%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf – Accessed 20 May 2011 – Attachment 38 74 International Crisis Group 2008, Reforming Pakistan’s police, Asia Report N°157, 14 July – Attachment 39 75 Jamal, A. 2010, Police Organisations in Pakistan, Human Rights Commission Pakistan, May http://www.hrcp- web.org/pdf/Police_Organisations_in_Pakistan[1].pdf – Accessed 27 April 2011 – Attachment 35 76 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Pakistan („Defence, Security and Foreign Forces‟, updated 31 May 2007), cited in: UK Home Office 2008, Country of Origin information report: Pakistan, April – Attachment 40

Page 12 of 20 In certain regions, police tend to be overwhelmingly from a particular ethnic and religious background. In Karachi, the most ethnically and religiously diverse city in Pakistan, police are overwhelmingly from Sunni Pashtun backgrounds. While this force is not described as harbouring a strong sectarian bias, it is routinely described as “corrupt, incompetent, under trained and poorly equipped.” Subsequently, in a country beset by crimes, “Karachi has the highest crime rate nationwide.”78

These issues conspire to undermine the capacity and willingness of Pakistan‟s police forces to provide state protection to individuals. However, given the variation in police organisations from province to province it would be accurate to also suggest that the level of state protection one receives would also vary from province to province and region to region.

Ultimately, the degree of state protection that can be provided to individuals within population centres as large as those in Pakistan is determined by actual police numbers. In 2008 in Lahore, a city of approximately ten million, there was one policeman for every 398 residents. In the same year in Karachi, a city whose population exceeds sixteen million, there was approximately one policeman for every 598 residents.79 A lack of manpower may be the reason why there have been some reports that members of vulnerable minority groups seeking police protection have been advised by police to hire private security.80

Judiciary

Pakistan‟s judiciary has enjoyed a reputation of fierce independence, even during military dictatorships. The New Delhi based Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) reports that while the Supreme Court of Pakistan was seen by some as supporting various military regimes, the High Courts81 and lower courts frequently acted to highlight or overturn human rights violations by the security forces. The ACHR reported that it had documented at least 9 cases “where bailiffs/raid commissioners/lower court judges themselves raided the detention centers and rescued 33 persons from the illegal detention of the law enforcement personnel.”82

However, the courts are not as bold when conducting trials of Islamic extremists. The US Department of State argues that despite its official impartiality, “in practice the judiciary was often subject to external influences, such as fear of reprisal in terrorism cases.”83 The same has also been said about the courts in relation to persons charged with blasphemy, with judges fearing being targeted if they dismiss such charges against religious minorities. The assassination of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer in January 2011 for his opposition to the blasphemy law in many ways justifies judicial fear of religious fanatics.

77 US Department of State 2010, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2009 – Pakistan, 11 March, Section C – Attachment 41 78 Rakisits, C. 2009, „Urban Conflict in Pakistan‟, Geopolitical Assessment.com, 30 January, p.4 http://www.geopoliticalassessments.com/Urban_conflict_in_Pakistan.pdf – Accessed 19 May 2011 – Attachment 13 79 International Crisis Group 2008, Reforming Pakistan’s police, Asia Report N°157, 14 July, pp.17-18 – Attachment 39 80 „Slain Ahmadis had sought police protection‟ 2010, Dawn, 3 April http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn- content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/national/slain-ahmadis-had-sought-police-protection-340 – Accessed 24 May 2010 – Attachment 42 81 Each province has a High Court. 82 Asian Centre for Human Rights 2006, SAARC Human Rights Report, 4 December, p.9 – Attachment 43 83 US Department of State 2011, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010 – Pakistan, 8 April, Section 1.e – Attachment 44

Page 13 of 20 Pakistan has established courts specifically for the trial of suspects in terrorist cases. The Anti-Terrorism Ordinance, 18 August 1997 (amended 29 April 1999), allows the state to employ “special streamlined courts to try persons charged with violent crimes, terrorist activities, acts or speech designed to foment religious hatred, and crimes against the state.”84 These courts continue to indict persons on charges of terrorism and conduct trials. There have been recent examples of indictments of members of LeJ, the main perpetrators of violence against Shia Muslims in Pakistan. A recent example includes the indictment in Karachi of Abdul Baqi, Mohammad Ismail and Yousuf on charges of possessing explosive substances and illicit weapons, as well as being associated with a banned organisation.85

Country Advice has not been able to establish the degree to which Pakistan prosecutes perpetrators of terrorist acts, nor employs terrorism courts. A recent, high profile court case in the terrorism court is the trial of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operations commander, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, in relation to the Mumbai attacks of November 2008.86

7. Which groups among the Hazaras and generally Shias are most vulnerable to being targeted by the extremists groups in Balochistan, and elsewhere in Pakistan, if this is the case?

As Country Advice PAK38635 indicated, Hazara policemen, businessmen and politicians have been major targets of Sunni radicals and Baluchi separatists in Baluchistan. Information provided in the response to question 1 also indicates that Shi‟ites in Baluchistan and elsewhere in Pakistan are particularly vulnerable to targeted attacks when attending mass rallies, Friday prayers, or large religious ceremonies, particularly those staged during Ashura parades during the month of Muharram; all common practices in Shi‟ite cultural/religious life.

Elsewhere in Pakistan, some of the most vulnerable Shi‟ite communities include Shi‟ite internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, members of the Turi tribe in Upper Kurram, and Shi‟ite professionals, particularly in Karachi. As mentioned in the response to question 1, a recent campaign of targeted assassinations of Shi‟ite professionals in Karachi has claimed the lives of at least 26 Shi‟ite doctors.87 A 2010 report titled The Open City: Social Networks And Violence In Karachi argued that these assassinations are part of “a systematic campaign to target educated professionals within the Shia community – presumably in the expectation that this would lower the community‟s morale and encourage its members to seek emigration.”88 A similar campaign in the 1990s claimed the lives of over 100 Shia professionals in Karachi, resulting in the migration of many Shia professionals.89

84 US Department of State 2011, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010 – Pakistan, 8 April, Section 1.e – Attachment 44 85 „Lashkar-e-Jhangvi‟ (undated), South Asian Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm – Accessed 23 May 2011 – Attachment 1 86 „26/11 case: Pakistan court adjourns trial till Feb 17‟ 2011, The Times of India, 4 February http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-02-04/india/28375168_1_kasab-and-ansari-pakistan-court-anti- terrorism-court – Accessed 23 May 2011 – Attachment 45 87 Budhani, et al 2010, The Open City: Social Networks And Violence In Karachi, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper no. 70, March, p.4 http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP70.2.pdf – Accessed 7 January 2011 – Attachment 14 88 Budhani, et al 2010, The Open City: Social Networks And Violence In Karachi, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper no. 70, March, p.7 http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP70.2.pdf – Accessed 7 January 2011 – Attachment 14 89 Abbas, H. 2010, „Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence‟, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 22 September, p.39 – Attachment 15

Page 14 of 20 Shi‟ite professionals, particularly doctors, have been targeted throughout Pakistan; at least 85 Shi‟ite doctors across Pakistan in 2010.90 91 It is likely that this assassination campaign has been perpetrated by the Wahhabist group, Ahle Hadith.92

8. What is the population of Quetta? Please include the percentage of Sunnis, Shia and Hazara?

The current official population of Quetta is not known, nor is the precise ethnic makeup of the city; Pakistan has not conducted a census since 1998. A nation-wide census is scheduled in Pakistan for August-September 2011. In the 1998 census, Quetta was recorded as having a population of 565,677.93 However, the war in Afghanistan has since meant that enormous numbers of refugees of various ethnic and religious backgrounds have flooded into the city, dramatically swelling its population and altering its ethnic and religious composition.

The 2011 census may present a more accurate indication of Quetta‟s demography, however the 1998 census did not ask respondents to nominate their Islamic sect or their ethnicity. The 1998 census only recorded a person as Muslim, with only Ahmadiyya recorded as a separate category.94 However the size of major ethnic groups may be estimated by examining the nominated „mother tongue‟ listed. However, these results are only published under the category of urban and rural; statistics are not given for individual cities. The mother tongues of urban-dwelling people in Baluchistan in 1998 are tabulated by percentage below: Urdu Punjabi Sindhi Pashto Balochi Saraiki Others 3.42 9.16 6.57 21.61 45.84 4.16 9.24

Table 1: Balochistan Urban Population by Mother Tongue 199895

These data indicate that in 1998, Baluchistan‟s main urban centres, which included Quetta, were demographically dominated by ethnic Baluchi, followed by Pashtuns and Punjabis (Saraiki is a language predominantly spoken in southern Punjab). Hazaras mostly speak a dialect of Dari and would therefore be included as „others‟.

9. Is there any legal or other form of impediment to internal relocation in Pakistan for Pakistani nationals?

There appear to be few legal obstacles in Pakistan preventing citizens relocating to other regions in Pakistan. Article 15 of the Pakistan Constitution states: “Every citizen shall have the right to remain in and, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest, enter and move freely throughout Pakistan and to reside and settle in any part

90 Shah, T.A. 2010 „Karachi Emerges as Pakistan‟s New Tinderbox of Violence and Extremism‟, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume VIII, Issue 26, 1 July, pp.5-6 – Attachment 46 91 „Sectarianism infects hospital wards‟ 2010, UNHCR Refworld, source: IRIN News, 24 October http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4cc673001e.html – Accessed 11 January 2011 – Attachment 12 92 Rakisits, C. 2009, „Urban Conflict in Pakistan‟, Geopolitical Assessment.com, 30 January, p.5 http://www.geopoliticalassessments.com/Urban_conflict_in_Pakistan.pdf – Accessed 19 May 2011 – Attachment 13 93 Population Census Organisation 1998, „Population Size And Growth Of Major Cities‟, Govt of Pakistan website http://www.census.gov.pk/MajorCities.htm – Accessed 19 May 2011 – Attachment 47 94 Population Census Organization 1998, „Population By Religion‟, Govt of Pakistan website http://www.census.gov.pk/Religion.htm – Accessed 19 May 2011 – Attachment 48 95 Population Census Organization 1998 „Population By Mother Tongue‟ Govt of Pakistan website http://www.census.gov.pk/MotherTongue.htm – Accessed 13 January 2011 – Attachment 49

Page 15 of 20 thereof.” 96 The internal movement of Pakistan citizens seeking employment, safety, or for other reasons is considerable, causing the population of its major cities to swell in population.

The US Department of State does suggest that the right to freedom of movement is restricted in practice, however the only examples cited in its most recent human rights report are restrictions placed on some people to travel abroad.97

In its most recent annual report, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that in 2010, the free movement of citizens was restricted in several regions. Most of these regions have been associated with large scale conflicts in recent years, namely the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Swat), and Balochistan. State authorities also employed „Maintenance of Public Order‟ (MPO) to restrict the movement of the people “that it considered a threat to public safety at certain places during times such as the Shia mourning month of Muharram.”98

The HRCP Annual Report also suggests that “some areas of Karachi” are also subject to restrictions, however these are restrictions imposed by non-state actors, largely “criminal gangs organised along ethnic lines”. In particular, non-Pashtuns were being prevented from entering Pashtun-dominated areas and non-Balochi were prevented residence in Lyari areas of the city.99

In the absence of any effective controls on the internal migration of residents, the main impediments to relocation would be social issues, such as employment, housing, and language. The degree to which any of these issues serve as impediments to internal relocation would depend on an individual‟s characteristics, and the locality of the planned resettlement.

Attachments

1. „Lashkar-e-Jhangvi‟ (undated), South Asian Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm – Accessed 23 May 2011.

2. Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade 2010, The Hazara Community, 20 May. (CISNET Pakistan CX243899)

3. Hughes, M. 2010, „Suicide attack death toll reaches 73 in Quetta Pakistan‟, The Examiner, 4 September http://www.examiner.com/afghanistan-headlines-in-national/suicide-attack-death- toll-reaches-73-quetta-pakistan-video – Accessed 8 October 2010.

96 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2005, The State of Human Rights in 2005, HRCP website, p.1 http://www.hrcp-web.org/images/publication/annual_report/pdf_2005/3-1.pdf – Accessed 14 May 2007 – Attachment 50 97 US Department of State 2011, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010 – Pakistan, 8 April, Section 2.d – Attachment 44 98 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2011, Annual Report 2010, April, pp.115-116 http://www.hrcp- web.org/Publications/AR2010.pdf – Accessed 27 April 2011 – Attachment 51 99 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2011, Annual Report 2010, April, p.115 http://www.hrcp- web.org/Publications/AR2010.pdf – Accessed 27 April 2011 – Attachment 51

Page 16 of 20 4. Reporters Without Borders 2010, „Journalists killed and injured in Quetta bombing, reporter kidnapped in Islamabad‟, UNHCR Refworld, 6 September http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c8df29814.html – Accessed 11 October 2010.

5. International Crisis Group 2009, Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, Asia Report no.164, 13 March.

6. Shahid, S. & Kasi, A. 2011, „Terrorists kill Seven Hazaras in Quetta‟ 2011, Dawn, 18 May http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/19/terrorists-kill-seven-hazaras-in-quetta.html – Accessed 19 May 2011.

7. „Pakistan: Shia IDPs fearful of being targeted‟ 2010, UNHCR Refworld, source: IRIN News, 11 February http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b7ba8db1a.html – Accessed 4 January 2011.

8. US Department of State 2010, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August.

9. US Department of State 2010, International Religious Freedom Report – Pakistan, 17 November.

10. Provincial Disaster Management Authority 2010, „Internal Security Situation; Presentation to the Prime Minister of Islamic Republic of Pakistan‟, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa website, 4 March http://www.pdma.gov.pk/PaRRSA/documents/Internal_Security_Situation.pdf – Accessed 12 January 2011.

11. Shah, T.A. 2010 „Karachi Emerges as Pakistan‟s New Tinderbox of Violence and Extremism‟, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume VIII, Issue 26, 1 July.

12. „Sectarianism infects hospital wards‟ 2010, UNHCR Refworld, source: IRIN News, 24 October http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4cc673001e.html – Accessed 11 January 2011.

13. Rakisits, C. 2009, „Urban Conflict in Pakistan‟, Geopolitical Assessment.com, 30 January http://www.geopoliticalassessments.com/Urban_conflict_in_Pakistan.pdf – Accessed 19 May 2011.

14. Budhani, A. A. et al 2010, The Open City: Social Networks And Violence In Karachi, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper no. 70, March http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP70.2.pdf – Accessed 7 January 2011.

15. Abbas, H. 2010, „Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence‟, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 22 September.

16. Rashid, A. 2010, „The Anarchic Republic of Pakistan‟, The National Interest, 24 August http://nationalinterest.org/article/anarchic-republic-pakistan-3917?page=show – Accessed 7 January 2011.

17. „Peshawar grenade attack on Shia parade kills toddler‟ 2010, Dawn, source: AFP, 16 December http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/16/low-intensity-explosion-at-yadgar-chowk- peshawar.html – Accessed 11 January 2011.

Page 17 of 20 18. „Suicide attack on Al- Zahra Hospital Hangu Pass Kalay‟ 2010, FATA Research Center http://www.frc.com.pk/Suicide%20attack%C2%A0on%20Al- %20Zahra%20Hospital%C2%A0Hangu%20Pass%C2%A0Kalay.htm – Accessed 11 January 2011.

19. Dempsey, E. 2010, „Rockets Fired in Hangu, 9 People Killed‟, Digital Journal, 17 December http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/301509 – Accessed 12 January 2011.

20. „Four women among 12 killed in Hangu suicide bombing‟ 2010, Daily Times, 6 March http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\03\06\story_6-3-2010_pg1_5 – Accessed 15 September 2010. (CISNET Pakistan CX249276)

21. Chandran, S. 2008, „Sectarian Violence in Pakistan‟s Kurram Agency‟, Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief Number 40, 22 September http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief+40.pdf – Accessed 23 November 2010.

22. Khan, M.I. 2010, „The Pakistani tribe that is taking on the Taliban‟, BBC News, 7 October http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11486528 – Accessed 14 October 2010.

23. „Siraj Haqqani sheltering in Kurram, near area of US helicopter strikes‟ 2010, The Long War Journal, 22 October http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/10/siraj_haqqani_shelte.php – Accessed 11 November 2010. (CISNET Pakistan CX253234)

24. „Kohat and Hangu; Inter-Cluster Mission to Kohat & Hangu 28th January – 30th January‟ 2010, One Response website, 5 February http://oneresponse.info/Countries/Pakistan/Coordination/publicdocuments/FINAL- Inter%20cluster%20assessment%20Kohat%20Hangu%2028th%20Jan%202010.pdf – Accessed 12 January 2011.

25. Hazara, L.A. 2010, „Oath Taking Ceremony of Hazara Moghul Yekjehti Forum (Registered), Pakistan‟, Hazara Nation, 15 December http://www.hazaranation.com/news1.htm – Accessed 24 May 2011.

26. „Target Killing of Hazaras in Karachi‟ 2010, Hazara People website, 5 November http://www.hazarapeople.com/2010/11/05/target-killing-of-hazaras-in-karachi/ – Accessed 20 May 2011.

27. „On the run: Target killing in Balochistan is rising‟ 2009, The News – Pakistan, 8 November http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2009-weekly/nos-08-11-2009/dia.htm#4 – Accessed 31 January 2011. (CISNET Pakistan CX257353)

28. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2010, Pushed to the Wall: Report of the HRCP fact- finding mission to Balochistan (5-11 OCTOBER 2009), HRCP website http://www.hrcp- web.org/pdf/Pushed%20to%20the%20wall.pdf – Accessed 23 May 2011.

29. Akbar, M.S. 2009, „„Mastermind‟ of sectarian killings held in Quetta‟, Daily Times, 13 November http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C11%5C13%5Cstory_13-11- 2009_pg7_3 – Accessed 29 March 2010.

30. MRT-RRT Legal Services 2011, Guide to Refugee Law in Australia, April.

Page 18 of 20 31. Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), October 6th, 1860, Articles 153, 300 http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html – Accessed 20 May 2011.

32. The Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance 1960, Provincial Assembly of Punjab website http://www.pap.gov.pk/uploads/acts/127.html – Accessed 24 May 2011.

33. The West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, Mumtaz & Associates website http://www.ma- law.org.pk/pdflaw/WEST%20PAKISTAN%20MAINTENANCE%20OF%20PUBLIC%20O RDER%20ORDINANCE.pdf – Accessed 24 May 2011.

34. Pakistan Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 1999, South Asian Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/actsandordinences/anti_terrorism .htm – Accessed 20 May 2011.

35. Jamal, A. 2010, Police Organisations in Pakistan, Human Rights Commission Pakistan, May http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Police_Organisations_in_Pakistan[1].pdf – Accessed 27 April 2011.

36. Rotella, S. 2011, „Pakistan‟s terror ties at center of upcoming Chicago trial‟, Stars & Stripes, 8 May http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/pakistan-s-terror-ties-at-center-of- upcoming-chicago-trial-1.143092 – Accessed 23 May 2011.

37. „Incidents involving Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan‟ 2011, South Asian Terrorism Portal, 22 April http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SSP_tl.htm – Accessed 23 May 2011. (\\ntssyd\refer\Research\2011\Web\Incidents involving Sipah e Sahaba.doc)

38. Abbas, H. 2009, Police & Law Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, April http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20- %20Police%20Reforms%20in%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf – Accessed 20 May 2011.

39. International Crisis Group 2008, Reforming Pakistan’s Police, Crisis Group Asia Report No.157, 14 July.

40. Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Pakistan („Defence, Security and Foreign Forces‟, updated 31 May 2007), cited in: UK Home Office 2008, Country of Origin information report: Pakistan, April.

41. US Department of State 2010, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2009 – Pakistan, 11 March.

42. „Slain Ahmadis had sought police protection‟ 2010, Dawn, 3 April http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the- newspaper/national/slain-ahmadis-had-sought-police-protection-340 – Accessed 24 May 2010.

43. Asian Centre for Human Rights 2006, SAARC Human Rights Report, 4 December.

44. US Department of State 2011, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010 – Pakistan, 8 April.

Page 19 of 20 45. „26/11 case: Pakistan court adjourns trial till Feb 17‟ 2011, The Times of India, 4 February http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-02-04/india/28375168_1_kasab-and-ansari- pakistan-court-anti-terrorism-court – Accessed 23 May 2011.

46. Shah, T.A. 2010 „Karachi Emerges as Pakistan‟s New Tinderbox of Violence and Extremism‟, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume VIII, Issue 26, 1 July.

47. Population Census Organisation 1998, „Population Size And Growth Of Major Cities‟, Govt of Pakistan website http://www.census.gov.pk/MajorCities.htm – Accessed 19 May 2011.

48. Population Census Organization 1998, „Population By Religion‟, Govt of Pakistan website http://www.census.gov.pk/Religion.htm – Accessed 19 May 2011.

49. Population Census Organization 1998 „Population By Mother Tongue‟ Govt of Pakistan website http://www.census.gov.pk/MotherTongue.htm – Accessed 13 January 2011.

50. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2005, The State of Human Rights in 2005, HRCP website http://www.hrcp-web.org/images/publication/annual_report/pdf_2005/3-1.pdf – Accessed 14 May 2007.

51. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2011, Annual Report 2010, April http://www.hrcp- web.org/Publications/AR2010.pdf – Accessed 27 April 2011.

52. Jamestown Foundation 2011, „Sufi Militants Struggle with Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan‟, Terrorism Monitor, Vol 9, Issue 8, 24 February.

53. Asian Centre For Human Rights 2008, South Asia Human Rights Index – 2008, August.

54. Jamestown Foundation 2010, Terrorism Monitor, Vol VIII, Issue 21, 28 May.

55. Maqbool, A. 2010, „Deadly blasts hit Sufi shrine in Lahore‟, BBC News, 2 July http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10483453 – Accessed 25 May 2011.

56. „Two Shia Men Martyred by the Terrorists in Sindh‟ 2011, Ahlul Bayt News Agency, 8 January http://www.abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=220237 – Accessed 26 May 2011.

57. „Police Trying to Involve Shia‟s in Assassination of Saudi Diplomat‟ 2011, Ahlul Bayt News Agency, 18 May http://www.abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=242225 – Accessed 26 May 2011.

Page 20 of 20