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1. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? Trans. W.B. Barton, Jr., and Vera Deutsch, with an Analysis by Eugene T

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1. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? Trans. W.B. Barton, Jr., and Vera Deutsch, with an Analysis by Eugene T NOTES INTRODUCTION 1. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? trans. W.B. Barton, Jr., and Vera Deutsch, with an analysis by Eugene T. Gendlin (Gateway ed.; Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1967). 2. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (2nd ed., enlarged; Chicago: The Univer­ sity of Chicago, 1970). 3. Ibid., p. 6. 4. Ibid., p. 10. 5. Ibid., p. 52. 6. Cf. esp. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Proceedin~ of the International Colloquium in the Philos­ ophy of Science, London, 1965, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 7. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought. Foreword by James M. Conant (Vintage Books; New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 129ff. 8. Owen C. Gingerich, "'Crisis' versus Aesthetic in Copernican Revolution," in Vistas in Astronomy, vol. 17, ed. Arthur Beer and K.Aa. Strand (New York: Pergamon Press, 1975), pp. 85-95. PART ONE 1. Sir Fred Hoyle, Astronomy: A History of Man's Investigation of the Universe (Crescent Books, Inc., 1962), p. 10. 2. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (Torchbook ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1957), p. 5. 3. Cf. Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion (2nd ed.; Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), pp. 254ff. 4. Cf. R.S. Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics: The Science of !?ynamics in the Seventeenth Century (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), p. 284. 5. Gerd Buchdahl, The Image of Newton and Locke in the Age of Reason (London: Sheed and Ward, 1961), p. 4. 190 A RELATIONAL METAPHYSIC 6. Westfall, p. 323. 7. Sir Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Great Books of the Western World, vol. 34 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 14. 8. For an excellent discussion of the conceptual struggle to understand "force," cf. Westfall. 9. Cited from an unrehearsed interview taped at The Institute of Theoretical Astronomy (now The Institute of Astronomy), Cambridge, England, in December of 1971. Professor Ovenden has kindly consented to this use of his remarks. 10. Max Jammer, Concepts of Space: The History of the Theories of Space in Physics (Harper Torchbook ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p.95. 11. Albert Einstein, "Autobiographical Notes," in Albert Einstein: Philos­ opher-Scientist, The library of living Philosophers, vol. 7, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (laSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1970), p. 31. 12. Ibid. 13. Westfall, p. 509. 14. Ibid. 15. In the context of an extensive note on this question, Alexandre Koyre states his conclusion as follows: "I am, thus, morally certain that Clarke communicated to Newton both Leibniz's letters and his own replies to them." From the Gosed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), p. 301. 16. I. Bernard Cohen, ed., Sir IsaacNewton's Opticks (New York: Dover Publi- cations, Inc., 1952). p. xxviii. 17. Ibid. 18. Cited from Cohen, p. xxx. 19. Cf. also Koyre, pp. 174ff; and Westfall, pp. S06ff. 20. Cohen, p. xxxiii. 21. For further details, plus an illuminating discussion of the differences between the Principia and the Opticks, cf. ibid., pp. xxxivff. 22. Westfall, p. 466. 23. Ibid., pp. 337ff. 24. Jammer, p. 96. 25. Ibid., p. 103. 26. Westfall, p. 445f. 27. Jammer, p. 114. 28. Ibid., p. 99. 29. Westfall, p. 38S. 30. Cohen, p. 400. 31. Newton,Principia; cited from Jammer, p. lOS. 32. Jammer, p. 106. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid., p. 107. 3S. Cohen, p. 403. NOTES 191 36. Jammer, p. 115. 37. Ibid., pp. 62, 66. 38. Cf. Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), esp. pp. 3f., 3lf., 37f. 39. Ian Hacking, "Individual Substance," in Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Harry G. Frankfurt (Anchor Book; New York: Doubleday and Company, 1972), p. 144. 40. Leroy E. Loemker, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 22. 41. Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), p.222f. 42. Ibid., p. 230. 43. Gottfried Martin, Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science, trans. P.G. Lucas (Manchester: University Press, 1953), p. 4f; cf.Monatioiogy, par. 87. 44. Beck, p. 231. 45. Loemker, p. 37. 46. Martin, p. 7; italics mine. 47. Ivor Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence, Muirhead Philosophical Library (New York: The Humanities Press, Inc., 1972), p. 243. 48. Ibid., p. 247. 49. Ibid., p. 245. 50. Ibid., p. 246. 51. Ibid., p. 247. 52. Cited from Leclerc, p. 250; for his source, cf. Loemker, p. 583. 53. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (Harper Torchbook ed., New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 108f. [cor. ed., p. 70] (See also Torrance, pp. 38ff., and Beck, p. 231). I am taking the liberty of supplying the page numbers from the new, contro­ versial edition of Process and Reality, ed. David Ray Griffm and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1978), even though no passages I cite from Process and Reality differ in the Corrected Edition. 54. H.G. Alexander, ed., The Leibniz-Garke Correspondence (Manchester: University Press, 1956), p. 26. 55. Ibid., p. 36. 56. Ibid., p. 43f. 57. Cohen, p. 402. 58. From his "Essay on Dynamics," New Essays; cited from Westfall, p. 288. 59. Alexander, p. 43. 60. Ibid., p. 92. 61. Ibid., p. 118. 62. On this idea, cf. infra p. 45. 63. Leibniz, "Principles of Nature and Grace"; cited from Westfall, p. 312. 64. KoynS, p. 274. 65. Ibid. 66. Einstein, p. 31. 192 A RELATIONAL METAPHYSIC 67. Ibid. 68. Jammer, p. xiv. 69. Westfall, p. 505. 70. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (3rd ed.; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 94. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid., p.I77. 73. Ibid., p. 180. 74. Ibid., p. 180, n. 17. 75. Ibid., p. 94. 76. Ibid., pp. 184ff. 77. Ibid., p. 184. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid., p. 191. 81. Ibid. 82. Cf. Beck, p. 432.: often called "the silent decade," it is "the period in Kant's life about which there is the least evidence and the most dispute, since we have large amounts of undatable writings presumably done during this decade, but few hard facts to guide us in tracing the course of his thought." 83. Letter toC. Garvie, 21st September 1798; cited from Popper, p. 177, n.lO. 84. Martin, p. 1. 85. Ibid., p. 16. 86. Ibid., p. 90. 87. Leclerc, p. 280. 88. In the exposition of Kant's pre-critical thought I am following Leclerc, pp.276ff. 89. Ibid., p. 277. 90. Kant's Monad%gia physica, sec. III, Prop. 12; cited from Leclerc, p. 278 91. Leclerc, p. 279. 92. Martin, p. 28. 93. Beck, pp. 44lff. 94. Ibid., cf. Table 2. 95. Ibid., p. 446. 96. Ibid., p. 447. 97. Ibid., p. 457, and n. 86. 98. This position was stressed recently by Martin, p. 44. 99. Norman Kemp Smith, ed., Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1963 reprint of 2nd impression with corrections, 1933), p. 78 [A35--36, B52]. 100. Ibid., p. 72 [A28, B44]. 101. Martin, p. 38. 102. Ibid. 103. Ibid., p. 41. NOTES 193 104. Ibid., p. 11. 105. Ibid., p:38. 106. Ibid., p. 92. 107. Ibid., p. 97. 108. Ibid., p. 95. 109. Ibid. 110. Ibid., p. 67. 111. Ibid., p. 89. 112. Ibid., p. 124. 113. Heidegger, p. 56. 114. Ibid., p. 77. 115. Ibid., p. 55. 116. Ibid., p. 104. 117. Ibid., p. 104f. 118. Ibid., p. 128. 119. Ibid., pp. 139ff. 120. Cf. also Heidegger, p. 140, for the following schema: "Now summarizing Kant's basic interpretation of knowledge, we say: 1 Knowledge for Kant is human knowledge. 2. Human knowledge is essentially experience. 3. Ex­ perience realizes itself in the form of mathematical physical science. 4. Kant sees this science and with it the essence of real human knowledge in the historical form of Newtonian physics, which today one still calls 'classical.' " 121. Ibid., p. 164. 122. Ibid., p. 163. 123. Ibid., p. 178. 124. Ibid., p.182f. 125. Ibid., p. 180. 126. Caption in Heidegger, p. 184. 127. Ibid., p. 194. 128. Smith, p. 238 [A216, B267]. 129. Heidegger, p. 204. 130. Ibid., p. 206. 131. Ibid., p. 223. 132. From d' Alembert's Elements ofPhilosophy; cited from Buchdahl, p. 7. 133. Ibid., p. II. 134. W.C. Dampier, A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy and Religion, Postscript by I. Bernard Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1st paperback ed., 1966), p.18lf. 135. Ibid., p. 3. 136. Ibid., p. 198. 137. Beck, p. SOL 138. J.D. North, The Measure of the Universe: A History of Modem Cos­ mology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 16-50. 139. Ibid., p. 19. 140. Cf. ibid., p. 24. 194 A RELATIONAL METAPHYSIC 141. H.A. Lorentz, A. Einstein, H. Minkowski, and H. Weyl, The Principle of Relativity: A Collection of Original Memoirs on the Special and General Theory ofRelativity (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952), p. 37. 142. The Quixotic effort of Herman Dingle to discredit it continues, but without devotees; cf. "The Case against Special Relativity," Nature 216 (1967): 119-122. 143. Lorentz et aI., p. 75. 144. Ibid., p. 76. 145. A. d' Abro, The Rise of the New Physics: Its Mathematical and Physical Theories, vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1951), p. 80. 146. Also in the Annalen der Physik; cf.
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