A Georgian military truck drives in the region of South Ossetia. (Credit: Special Report bortnikau/Bigstockphoto.com)

Hybrid challenges to integration processes

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Hybrid challenges to integration processes

Gagik Harutyunyan, Ashot Tavadyan, and Aghasi Tavadyan

Abstract

There are both supporters and opponents to processes of rapprochement between countries and peoples. Hence, the success of integration in many ways depends on the given society’s ability to adequately perceive the challenges posed by the opponents and the skills required to counter those challenges. In the current multi-polar epoch, the challenges to integration processes are complex in content and have become important elements of hybrid confrontation. Therefore, there appears to be an urgent need to study integration processes in the context of hybrid challenges. This study attempts to briefly present the trends of integration and disintegration processes in the Eurasian continent in three interrelated areas: military-political, economic, and humanitarian-informational. Such a multidisciplinary approach allows us to assess the integration developments in a more comprehensive and wide manner. It has to be noted that the humanitarian-informational factor does not always receive due attention from scholars and, therefore, this study reviews in somewhat more detail the methods and tools of information warfare, which often are a key element in hybrid operations aimed at the destruction of integration associations. At the same time, although there are many valuable studies of hybrid wars, many aspects of this complex phenomenon still contain uncertainties that make it difficult to objectively assess their impact on the integration processes. Thus, this study attempts to make sense of the concepts of ‘peace’ and ‘war’ in hybrid realities in the context of permanent hybrid confrontations.

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1. Integration vectors

‘Integration’, ‘empires’, and ‘colonies’

The Latin word integratio may have two meanings: integrum – whole, complete; and integratio – restoring, renewal. Both concepts are positive and in harmony with each other.

The integration processes were the basis for shaping ethnicities and countries, and the concept of integration also contains the notion of complementing each other in practically all areas of human activities between countries, ethnicities, and societies. In certain cases, the shaping of empires with civilisational content may also be considered integration. Media often present these in exclusively grim tones and characterise them as evil exploiters of conquered countries and peoples. However, sometimes empires became locomotives of integration and development. Unsurprisingly, some scholars consider that processes in certain aspects similar to modern globalisation and integration had already started in the epoch of Alexander the Great. As far as the negative epithets for empires are concerned, it has to be noted that, unfortunately, so far no country has developed an ideal governance system, and this objective circumstance has prompted philosophers to introduce the concept of a “utopian country”.

In the light of the aforementioned considerations, it is hard to agree with recent ideas stating that trends toward inter-country integration processes appeared only in contemporary history. There are even such statements as “just half a century ago integration projects looked like some risky, if not adventurist political experiments”.1 Without starting a polemic on this topic, our further narrative will be based on the strict definition of the term

“integration” formulated by Gonidec and Charvin (1984, p. 435): “Integration is both a process and a state that has a tendency to replace the fragmented international relations,

1Интеграционные процессы в современном мире: новые тенденции и вызовы https://www.webeconomy.ru/index.php?page=cat&cat=mcat&mcat=133&type=news&newsid=1646, Интеграционные процессы в современном мире, https://studbooks.net/2211248/ekonomika/integratsionnye_protsessy_sovremennom_mire Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 3 composed of independent units with new, more or less wide associations, endowed with a minimum of decision-making powers, or in one or more specific areas, or in all the areas that fall within the competence basic units”.

Returning to the current epoch, we will attempt to review the patterns of integration processes in Greater Eurasia, which had always been an epicentre of global developments and where over 5 billion people live in 99 countries (of which 50 are in Europe).

After World War I, the successor of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union (USSR), became an example of a large, multiethnic and maximally integrated state in Greater

Eurasia. At its peak, the integration capabilities of the USSR stretched from East Berlin to

Beijing. After losing the Cold War, the USSR was replaced by its minimised and liberalised successor, the Russian Federation. In the second half of the 20th century, the European

Union became an example of a large-scale integration megaproject, which in some sense can be called a liberal-democratic and pacifist version of the USSR.

The upsides of integration can be shown even through the example of the USSR, which is often called an empire in its exclusive negative sense (often quite justifiably). For example, the core of the empire, the Russian Soviet Federal Republic, produced a lot more than it consumed, and part of these revenues were provided to other republics of the Union

– “the exploited colonies” (Sulakshin and Baghdasaryan, 2018). Consequently, many of these republics developed scientific, technological, cultural, and educational infrastructures, while the living standards of their populations were higher than those of the “imperial nation”.2 This tradition continues in modern . For example, the Republic of Sakha

(Yakutia) has a population of just 1 million, yet runs eight theatres, two large museums and

11 higher education institutions. These institutions publish monographs and journals, some

2 Currently, the GDP of some ex-Soviet republics has still not reached the levels of the 1980s. 4 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute of which are quite renowned (e.g., Mathematic Notes).3 Thus, the relationship between

“empires” and their “colonies” largely depend on the civilisational code and traditions of the

“colonisers”. In this context it is appropriate to recall that the native Indian populace of the

United States (about 5 million) live in reservations and possess practically no economic and cultural resources.

Due to various objective and non-objective circumstances, the integration processes often are affected by both external and internal forces. The effectiveness of unifying efforts to solve whatever issues largely depends on the strength proportions of integration and disintegration processes. It has to be also noted that today virtually the whole arsenal of the so-called hybrid confrontations is used to promote disintegration trends, which will be discussed later. Hybrid technologies are quite effective, which creates a pressing need to study the mechanisms of disintegration challenges in a more detailed manner, which in turn implies adequate understanding of the environment where both integration and disintegration processes occur. Interdisciplinary methods are required to investigate this combination of issues, which will be attempted below.

The ‘triad’ of integration and disintegration vectors

In practice, as well as sometimes in the scholarly literature, the effectiveness of economic and military-political cooperation is considered the main indicator for the characteristics of integration processes. However, these dimensions of cooperation, although extremely important and quantitatively measurable, do not fully reflect the purpose and essence of an integration process. Unfortunately, when studying the phenomenon of integration, the analyst community often ignores the humanitarian component, the significance of which in certain conditions may even prevail over pragmatic factors. At the same time, all the

3 Арутюнян, Г., «Колонии», «империи», цивилизации и безопасность. Доклад на конференции «Четыре года участия Армении в ЕАЭС: реалии и перспективы Евразийской интеграции», Ереван, 22.12.2018 г. http://www.noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=17851&sphrase_id=71919. Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 5 mentioned components are closely interrelated and complement each other. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of integration processes is possible only if the following three dimensions are considered: military-political; economic; humanitarian.

The humanitarian component is a quite far-reaching, multi-faceted, and in some cases even an irrational concept since the relationships between the subjects are not strictly regulated. That is why, unlike the other two, the humanitarian factor is considerably harder to quantify and present in the form of calculated data or clear patterns. Based on a wider definition of the term “information”, this study reviews only the informational segment of the humanitarian component, as in the initial and more comprehensive sense the Latin word informare, which means to teach, think, imagine, and shape. This approach allows us to encompass (sometimes indirectly) intellectual and civilisational issues in the information area. In this context we should emphasise that global development patterns in military- political and economic areas in many ways depend on the decision-making officials’ respective level of awareness (in the sense of knowledge). Worded differently, the information area in integration processes can be considered a critical one.

It can thus be assumed that the adequate perception and accurate assessment of the integration processes (especially their humanitarian component) implies the use of interdisciplinary approaches. Particularly, such approaches should be applied when decisions are made at the government level and here, as was already mentioned, a lot depends on the intellectual and professional level of the political elites. The state of these elites, in turn, depends on the development level of the society as a whole, as well as the existence of regenerative feedback between the elites and think-tanks, which are also called

“producers of the national interest”.4 The effectiveness of a think tank’s work depends on its

4 See, for example, Арутюнян Г., Распад «системы» и прогнозирование будущего, Научно- образовательных фонд «Нораванк», Ереван, 2011, Арутюнян Г., Мозговые центры и национальная безопасность, «21-ий Век», #1(17), с.3, 2011. 6 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute ability to carry out interdisciplinary, applied R&D based on the results of fundamental science.

Obviously, disintegration technologies also imply deep knowledge about integration processes and the society of the adversary. The development of such technologies is possible only with the active participation of think tanks and other competent structures.

At the same time, the direction of integration vectors is largely predefined by the existing conditions in the world and capabilities of the global actors that determine the rules of the game (or devalue and transform these rules) in the modern world order. Under such circumstances, in order to accurately take into account the factors that accompany integration and disintegration processes, it is necessary to first imagine the “environment” where these processes occur, which is shaped by geopolitical developments. We will examine this task schematically and limit it to a brief political review of happenings in Greater

Eurasia, with consideration of the influence on geopolitical and geo-economic developments exerted by the global leader, the USA.

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2. The military-political landscape of the integration and disintegration trends

Shaping the polycentric world order: Change of vectors and terminology

During the unipolar world order, when the political and economic developments were largely subordinated to the and the “Western community”, some analysts assumed that a polycentric world order of the future would allow nations to follow their own civilisational and ideological traditions and develop in a more harmonious manner.5.

However, the transition period tendencies that emerged with the entrance of and

Russia into the global political and economic arena (also accompanied by the strengthening of regional players such as Iran and Turkey) dissipated the hope for a “bright future”.

The transformation of the unipolar system into a multipolar one is occurring in a chaotic manner, and currently there are reasons to believe that such a turbulent mode will continue to dominate the modern world order for quite some time (Harutyunyan, 2013a). It should also be mentioned that the emergence of new poles and centres of power makes it additionally difficult to forecast real scenarios in the foreseeable future. Among other things, one reason is that currently not only are nation-states the subjects of geopolitics and the geo-economy, but so too are large transnational corporations and non-governmental organisations, whose ideas are not always in line with the policies of one state or another

(Harutyunyan, 2017). The current situation significantly affects the content of geopolitical and geo-economic vectors of integration, as well as the political science terminology.

For example, the concept of the “West”, which is popular in the global information space, until recently was associated with some sort of unified ideological, political, and economic system, the two pillars of which were the USA and their ally the EU. However, two turning points significantly changed this perception: Brexit and Donald Trump’s election as the US President (which was dubbed ‘Brexit-2’). It turned out that the British have no

5 Тер-Арутюнянц Г., «Холодная война – 2» с геоидеологической перспективой // Голос Армении, 04.12.2003; Тер-Арутюнянц Г., Многополярная и ассиметричная Холодная война // Вестник Академии военных наук, М., #4(21), с. 23. 2007. 8 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute intention of sharing the hardships of ideological and immigration crises with their European allies, which according to forecasts might lead in the foreseeable future to a change of the religious and ethnic, and hence, the political fabric of continental Europe.6 Almost simultaneously, the Americans responded to such realities as well. A part of the establishment that advocated American-centric, sometimes almost isolationist policies, started to act in a particularly vigorous manner. As a result, Donald Trump was elected

President and carries out his own political agenda trying to overcome (sometimes unsuccessfully) the fierce resistance of his numerous opponents. In addition to all that,

Trump tends to depart from the ultraliberal modus operandi toward a more authoritarian form of governance (Posen, 2018). It can be stated that Anglo-Saxon societies once again turned out to be rather agile regarding new challenges and trends that emerge in the world.

Meanwhile, continental Europeans have been sceptical towards the Anglo-Saxons and, particularly, the global strategy of the USA. If anything, because of the “controlled chaos” created in the Middle East, the EU faces an immigration problem that has provoked a standoff between political and social forces that have different views in Europe (which is still dominated by ultraliberal dogmas). Also, Ukraine’s turning into a ‘black hole’ has created an additional barrier between the EU and Russia.

Today, the US accompanies all these developments by admonitions about relatively modest European financial contributions in NATO, and the situation is further aggravated by the policy of economic sanctions against Russia, which boomerang back onto European interests. It is also known that as Americans developed a taste for sanctions, they also unleashed a trade war with the Europeans by significantly increasing tariffs on metals imported from the EU, as well as having imposed sanctions on Russian natural gas imports.

6 See, for example, http://forum.syntone.ru/index.php?showtopic=14159. In this regard it has to be noted that sometimes the creative artistic imagination goes far beyond the scientifically-founded forecasts of experts, and one such example is the following book: Elena Chudinova, The Mosque of Notre Dame, The Remnant Press, 1st American Edition, 2015. Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 9

Naturally, the European elite are not thrilled about all these developments. Already in

2003 they were not happy with the US policies in relation to Iraq, which caused US State

Secretary Condoleezza Rice to promise to “punish France, ignore Germany”.7 However, these displays of discontent in the past never developed into real political forms. While currently, perhaps for the first time ever since de Gaulle, there are not just some frail protests, but quite serious disagreements between the Europeans proper and the Anglo-

Saxon community. This discord openly manifests itself, for example, in policies towards Iran, as the EU rejected the American sanctions on Iran, and in more “politically correct” forms in many other matters. Worded differently, the Western community no longer appears quite as united as it used to, and the antagonism between its certain segments is becoming rather tangible. In this context it has to be considered that separatist sentiments loom over Europe

(e.g., Catalonia, Corsica, and even some Italian provinces). A considerable disassociation also occurs between Western and Eastern European countries. Moreover, even in the UK separatist trends are apparent among the Scottish. It is thus no surprise that certain German military experts consider various scenarios of the EU dissolution, some of which even look quite catastrophic.8 All these trends allow speculation that the manifestations of the “pre-

Westphalian” fragmentation syndrome are marring Europe.9

However, despite existing controversies and a higher probability for “bad scenarios”, overall the Western – or worded differently – the European-American society is the most integrated, and by this criterion the strongest structure globally. In these terms the generalised West is hard to compare with the divided conditional “East”, where disintegration trends presently prevail.

7 Очарование и лед улыбки Кондолизы Райс, http://bit.ly/2OThGym 8С. Дебрер, Бундесвер: Евросоюз — не жилец, США идут к упадку, https://svpressa.ru/politic/article/185646 9Арутюнян Г., Фрагментированный или «довестфальский» миропорядок», http://www.noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=16546&sphrase_id=71920 10 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute

Undoubtedly, the West being in such a state is largely thanks to belonging to the common Christian civilisational culture and quite similar approaches to military-political security issues. However, the mentioned controversies between continental Europe and the

Anglo-Saxon community are still apparent. The most important modern integration and disintegration processes in the military-political area are briefly presented below.

Integration and disintegration trends in the military-political area

The cohesion of countries to ensure security is perhaps the most stable, strictly regulated, and mutually binding form of integration. Several dozens of countries around the world are militarily integrated to varying degrees and are part of military blocs or other associations with a military component. One of these worth mentioning is the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, the treaty for which was signed in 1373 and is still in force. In light of the developments in

Eurasia, this study will review only the integration resources of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the formally non-military Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

The US, Europe, and NATO

Among the mentioned organisations, NATO undoubtedly has the most resources with its members including USA, Canada, and 27 European countries (although geographically,

Turkey is only in part European), of which 22 are EU members. Before 1982, i.e., at the peak of the Cold War in the bipolar world order, NATO had only 16 members. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and NATO’s main adversary – the Warsaw Pact – 12 more countries of the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, former Czechoslovakia and other countries of the so-called “socialist camp” joined NATO. In 2017, Montenegro also joined.

Thus, NATO played an important role in integration for most of the European part of Greater Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 11

Eurasia, the countries of which were disassociated earlier due to the collapse of the USSR and “socialist camp” as a whole. Today NATO represents the military power of the West (in somewhat obsolete terminology), and its military expenditures are over $1 trillion, which constitutes over half of global military expenditures (these and other data on defence hereinafter come from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Global

Firepower (GFP)).10 The military-political power of the West is based on the colossal resources of the USA, which as a “centraliser” country (Huntingdon, 1993), in real time dictates to its allies its ideas about the strategy and tactics of the alliance in all situations.

In light of this reality it is not surprising that projects for creating sovereign armed forces appeared in continental Europe. For example, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the

European Commission, suggested this idea in 2015, and in 2018 Federica Mogherini, High

Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, supported it. However, despite the existence of concepts and signed protocols, this project is far from being implemented. Unsurprisingly, the USA and UK are against creation of a European army, while Russia keeps silent. In any case, signs of disobedience to the “military discipline” appear more often in Europe recently. For example, Germany rejected Washington’s demand to deploy troops in Syria and participate in patrolling of the Persian Gulf, which goes against Berlin’s earlier strict compliance to the rules.11 Another sign of dissent was the unconcealed pessimism about the US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear

Forces (INF) Treaty, which creates threats first and foremost to Europe. The EU called on

Russia to keep the treaty and comply with its provisions.

Meanwhile, not only European countries appear to wish to maintain their security on their own. Despite the ultimatum-like statements of the USA, Turkey purchased S-

10 https://www.sipri.org./, https://www.globalfirepower.com/ 11 https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=3173669&tid=113862 12 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute

400 Triumph air defence systems from Russia, and even expressed a desire to cooperate with Russia in the area of air defence.

The disintegration trend of Europe relative to the US is among other things a reaction to Anglo-Saxon autonomy in security. For instance, a special system of global signals intelligence called “Five Eyes” or “ECHELON” was created in 1960, operating under an agreement between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the , and the United

States. Mass media reports suggest that using satellites and other systems for monitoring and signal interception, the Five Eyes carefully keep their eyes not only on their adversaries, but also European NATO allies.

Russia and CSTO

In the European portion of Eurasia and Syria, it is Russia, with its second-largest military power, that stands off against NATO. Characteristically, almost immediately after its defeat in the Cold War, Russia initiated a military integration project in the practically disintegrated post-Soviet space: The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was created in

1992, which in addition to Russia, involved the post-Soviet republics of Armenia, Belarus,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It has to be noted that civilisational motives played a role here, considering the concepts of Sergey Kara-Murza about “Soviet civilisation” (Kara-

Murza, 2001). Yet the CSTO, with a total budget of just $6 million,12 can hardly compete against NATO. The guarantor of security for CSTO nations is Russia, but its military spending is 10 times smaller than that of the USA. In addition, Russia currently spends significant resources on its mission in Syria and supporting in the self-declared republics of Donetsk and Lugansk.

12 Шибутов М., ОДКБ – лишь бумажный тигр. Почему?, https://regnum.ru/news/2450511.html Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 13

SCO and the military-political integration of the ‘Eastern bloc’

As far as the integration prospects of the modern “Eastern bloc” are concerned, the

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation initiated by China (2001) deserves special attention.

The SCO currently includes Russia, China, , Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Observer states in SCO include Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia, whereas dialogue partner status was granted to Azerbaijan, Armenia,

Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey (remarkably, a NATO member), and Sri Lanka. Having such a wide membership of SCO countries that differ from each other so dramatically is due to the fact that this organisation is associated with the Chinese economic mega-project One Belt,

One Road.

Legally, the SCO is not a military structure, but its activities started with a convention against terrorism, separatism and, extremism. Beijing’s incentive for military cooperation with Moscow is its territorial issues with the neighbours and, of course, problems related to

Taiwan (relatively recently Beijing made a harsh announcement with regard to US arms export to Taiwan worth $2.2 billion).13 Strengthening Russian-Chinese military ties is evidenced, for example, by joint air patrols over the Sea of and the East China Sea, which prompted stark protests from South Korea and Japan.14 Indeed, military cooperation between Russia and China causes worries in the USA, and the matter is periodically referred to in their statements.15

As for the military integration of the other SCO countries, the situation would seem unfavourable: relations between India and Pakistan sometimes degrade into confrontation, while there are some controversies between India and China as well. However, global instability prompts SCO countries to converge for security. Importantly, they conduct joint

13 See, for example, Петровский В., Поставки оружия и «тайваньский фактор» в американо-китайских отношениях, http://www.rodon.org/polit-190715110420 14РФ и Китай впервые провели совместное воздушное патрулирование в АТР, http://bit.ly/33AXAgm 15 See for example, http://bit.ly/2MOLIkp 14 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute war games regularly. For example, in 2018 the large-scale Peace Mission 2018 exercise was conducted, while in 2019 at the SCO, member states’ Defence Ministers meeting in

Bishkek approved a program for further activities till 2021.16 As a result, it seems the military resources of NATO can be matched.

Tables 1 and 2 present the top five countries of the SCO and NATO according to the

Global Firepower (GF) ranking.17 Iran was added to the SCO states list, although it is an observer country, but it looks like it will join as a full member in the near future.

16 http://bigasia.ru/content/news/politics/ministry-oborony-stran-shos-utverdili-plan-sotrudnichestva/ 17 https://www.globalfirepower.com/ Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 15

Table 1: Resources of the top SCO countries in Global Firepower (GF) rankings Country Budget Nuclear Aircraft Aircraft Submarine Tank GF (billion warheads carriers s s ranking $) Russia 44.0 2,076 4,078 1 56 21,93 2 3 China 224.0 400 3,187 1 76 13,05 3 0 India 55.2 120 2,082 1 16 4 4,184 Pakistan 7.0 120 1,342 0 5 17 2,200 Iran 6.3 0 509 0 34 14 1,634 Total 336.5 2,716 11,198 3 187 43,00 1

Table 2: Resources of the top NATO countries in Global Firepower (GF) rankings Country Budget Nuclear Aircraft Aircraft Submarine Tank GF (billion warheads carriers s s ranking $) USA 716.0 1,350 23,398 24 68 1 6,287 France 40.5 280 1,248 4 10 5 406 UK 47.5 120 811 1 10 8 331 Turkey 8.6 0 1,076 0 12 9 3,200 Germany 49.1 0 613 0 6 10 900 Total 861.7 1750 27,146 29 106 11,12 4

As seen in the tables, the of the included NATO countries exceeds that of the SCO countries by 2.5 times. And even though some experts suggest that data on the military budget of China are significantly understated, it does not really change the 16 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute overall picture.18 Because of the USA, NATO has a considerable lead in the number of aircraft and aircraft carriers. However, more SCO countries possess nuclear weapons, and with Russian resources, their arsenal is larger than that of NATO. The top five SCO countries in aggregate also have more submarines and tanks. Overall, the West outmatches the

“Eastern bloc” due to greater technological levels and the well-developed infrastructure of the USA (over 700 military bases abroad). However, it appears this is not a decisive superiority and between these two conditional blocs there is a certain military-political balance, which in our opinion contains both integrating and disintegrating potential for

Greater Eurasia.

‘Euro-America against Eurasia’: Confrontation-disintegration scenario

The probability of such a scenario increases under the development of sanctions and trade wars, in which many Eurasian countries are involved. In this context, the attitude of various countries’ societies towards the main actors of the mentioned blocs plays an important role and hence, we will consider the data from WIN/Gallup International Annual Global End of

Year Survey. Within the framework of this project, the following question was asked to respondents in 68 countries: “There are 6 countries in the world with big military power:

USA, China, Russia, France, UК and India. Suppose in the case of a military threat to your own country you had to choose ONE of them as a partner, which one would you choose?”

The survey results were processed and their averages are presented in tables 3 and 4

(Harutyunyan and Marjanyan, 2017a).

18http://bit.ly/2OOvAlr Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 17

Table 3: (based on data from Gallup International)

USA Russia China UK France India none 41% 15% 10% 8% 5% 3% 9%

As Table 3 shows, 41% of respondents in 68 countries preferred to see the USA as an ally,

15% chose Russia, 10% China, 8% the UK, 5% France and 3% India. Interestingly, four

NATO countries, including Bulgaria, Greece, and Slovenia chose Russia (civilisational trend of integration).

The survey data also allow us to assess the “mutual attraction” between the six leading military powers of the world. Based on the Gallup International data, we created a matrix of “strategic attraction” between these countries. Table 4 shows that 43% of the US respondents chose the UK as an ally, while 58% of the UK respondents preferred the USA

(civilisational trend of integration). In the Russia-China pair, 44% of Russian respondents favoured China and 47% of respondents in China chose Russia.

Table 4: Mutual ‘strategic attraction’ of the six leading military powers of the world (based on data from Gallup International)

USA Russia UK France China India USA 43 7% 14% 4% % Russia 44% 4% UK 58% 8% France 54% 13 % China 47% India 50% 16%

18 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute

Table 4 shows that the average mutual “attraction” of the USA-UK pair is 51%, and for China-

Russia it is 46%. These two pairs have the highest mutual “attraction” than all the others.

For example, 54% of the French respondents chose the USA, but only 7% of the American respondents chose France, and hence, the average mutual attraction in this pair is 31%.

Thus, if these data are taken as a basis, then in the matter of military-political alliances there appears to be a trend for shaping a new version of bipolar world, which sometimes is dubbed as “Euro-America versus Eurasia”.

This development is a bad scenario because the bipolar configuration to a certain degree will follow the logic and rules of the Cold War times when disintegration processes prevailed. In modern realities it would mean at least an intensification of sanctions policies and trade wars. At the same time, we believe some optimistic scenarios are also possible.

‘Greater Eurasia and the US’: Integration scenario

In summary, the “good” scenario is possible under the following developments and conditions:

 Occurrence of integration trends embedded in One Belt, One Road, and SCO projects;  Peaceful settlement of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, stabilisation of situation in the post-Soviet space, and dialogue of EU with Eurasian Economic Union;  Strengthening of continental Europe’s geopolitical status.

As already mentioned, the SCO project is part of the One Belt, One Road initiative, which is based on the concept of increased free trade and economic cooperation. Financial institutions have been created for the project: in 2015, the agreement on the creation of the

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with a starting capital of $100 billion was signed by 57 countries (currently already over 70). Some analysts suggest that the strategic goal Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 19 of AIIB is to form a competition to the US dollar, which is evidenced, for example, by the agreement between central banks of China and Switzerland on creating a financial platform for transactions in yuan renminbi, and Gazprom Neft switching to settlements in yuan, etc.

The same analysts also point out the possibility of “shaping a geo-financial alliance between

Beijing and Moscow… which could establish a financial order parallel to the currency hegemony of the dollar”. Thus, the political ambitions of China and Russia are supported by some serious financial resources, too.19

However, with ongoing confrontation between Russia, and conditional on the

“Western bloc” position on the Ukrainian question, the prospects for the “Eastern” projects are not optimistic. In this context, the EU’s ambitions for a higher status in the military

(sovereign armed forces) and economic areas should be considered. It is possible that under such developments the politics of continental Europe may more adequately respond to military-political realities than before, and may adopt a milder mode of relations with Russia.

Perhaps the first real move in this direction was restoring Russia to the Parliamentary

Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which can be also perceived as a step toward a compromise solution in the Russia-Ukraine confrontation. In addition, a stronger Europe could play a role of a liaison between the USA and Eurasia, thus making a contribution to mitigating global turbulence in the multipolar system. In turn, Russia could be a liaison between China and the EU, again adding positively in this scenario. Shaping such ties could in future bring about implementation of the integration megaproject “Greater Eurasia” from

Lisbon to Beijing.

However, countries participating in such an integration megaproject, due to their civilisational and historical features (which is minimised in the case of the European–Anglo-

Saxon community), will encounter a number of problems. Indeed, even relations between

19Комиссина И., АБИИ как инструмент международного финансового управления, http://www.rodon.org/polit-190814112103 20 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute

China and Russia, which are critical actors in the integration process, sometimes look problematic. For example, Russia, which is experiencing demographic difficulties, has problems in developing Siberia, which is rich in natural resources and borders China. Siberia occupies 77% of the territory of the Russian Federation, but contains just 25% of the country's population. Meanwhile, the situation in China is the opposite - a high population density and a shortage of natural resources, in particular, energy resources, which leads

China to pursue an appropriate economic policy in Siberia. As a result, a situation has formed that motivates some Chinese20 and Russian21 political circles to make radical statements. This allows the opponents of the “Eastern Alliance” to take steps in the spirit of the policy of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon in 1972, which “pulled” China to the west, and allowed relations between China and the USSR to further worsen. Today, the hybrid disintegration vector is directed more towards Russia, which was called to be reinstated in

G7, etc., with a “forgetfulness” towards the “Red East”. Thus, perhaps, a scenario platform is being prepared for the formation of the US-EU-RF triad against the PRC. In this context, let’s add a characteristic nuance: during the "colour events" in Hong Kong, some have called on "China to follow the example of the USSR and fall apart."

At the same time, changes have taken place over the past decades that allow a more optimistic assessment of the situation, and this primarily concerns the sphere of ideology, which, as Vyacheslav Yanko puts it, is “a set of instructions that provide the most effective mode of functioning and interconnectedness for ongoing processes.”22 This algorithm is especially effective once both universal ideologies - liberalism and socialism, and conservatism - reflecting the national specificity are comprehensively used when managing the society. Such a “triad of ideologies”, which is successfully applied, in particular, in the

20 https://inosmi.ru/politic/20180905/243154870.html 21 https://www.politforums.net/rmo/1520105004.html 22 Янко В.А., http://yanko.lib.ru Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 21

Anglo-Saxon community, today operates not only in China, but also is being gradually formed in Russia.23 This situation allows us to believe that the leaders of the PRC and the

Russian Federation, led by the “triad of ideologies”, will find an effective algorithm for solving problems in the foreseeable future. In turn, the logic of these decisions will, to one degree or another, affect the policies of the other countries of Greater Eurasia, which will ultimately create the necessary incentives for participation in integration processes.

At the same time, military-political integration is closely related to economic developments and some aspects in this area are presented below, along with suggestions for boosting interaction between the countries of Greater Eurasia.

23 Harutyunyan G, Critical Infrastructures and Ideology, 21-st Century, # 1(20), p.15, 2017. 22 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute

3. Economic integration issues

Globalisation and economic trends

Uncertainties and inequalities in the development of countries and regions play a key role in integration processes. Countries with low GDP per capita and negative trade balances turned out to be more vulnerable to global economic trends.

Integration processes are impeded by the following:

 Intensified competition between countries and associations that have a large share of GDP in the world;  Increased impact of political decisions on economic processes;  Significant socio-demographic and geographic differences between countries;  Different levels of technology development;  Availability of energy resources;  Fast propagation of crises, especially in the finance sector.

Globalisation directly influences economies and forms economic boundaries that do not match political borders. Globalisation leads to increased environmental and energy hazards, expansion of trade wars, and fiercer competition, especially for resources. Despite the WTO rules, countries actively use customs duties, quotas, trade embargos, administrative, technical, and sanitary barriers. Finance markets are more vulnerable. The influence of subjective factors on the emergence of financial bubbles has increased drastically.

Integration could be an effective instrument for countering global economic problems and achieving higher rates of economic growth, depending on what specific mechanisms and factors are involved as development drivers.

Integration processes increase the possibilities for export/import and technological exchange. At the same time, thanks to decreasing transportation costs and various optimisations of market players’ interactions, the economy may generate effects contributing Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 23 to economic growth. Relations between the EU and EAEU are considered below in this context.

Interactions between the EAEU and the EU

The EU is the largest economic and trade partner of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

In 2018 the trade between with EU countries constituted 44.1% ($243 billion) of the total

EAEU foreign trade turnover. In 2017, this number was 36.3% ($160 billion), and in 2016 it was 43.6% ($152 billion)24. In turn, the EAEU is the third-largest trade partner of the EU

(after the USA and China), so interaction of these two economic integration associations is an important integration factor in itself.

However, unfortunately there is no such dialogue, and this led to a reduction of imports to the EAEU from the EU, and instead imports increased from Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC) countries. Meanwhile, elimination of the non-tariff barriers, liberalisation of access to financial markets, goods and services trade, joint implementation of large-scale transportation infrastructure projects and many other things may become a basis for dialogue between the EAEU and EU.

Currently, the EAEU is one of the most interlinked interstate integration associations.

Its economic and industrial growth rates, as well as foreign and internal trade volumes are increasing. Agreements on the creation of a common market for services were a step forward, and by 2025 over 60% of all services produced in the EAEU will be offered within a unified market. The common services market in the EAEU contributes to business development and job creation in the five Eurasian countries.25 That is why cooperation between the EU and EAEU would be beneficial for the world economy.

24 UN Comtrade | International Trade Statistics Database, https://comtrade.un.org/data/ 25 Жаксылыков Т., «Активное взаимодействие ЕАЭС и ЕС открывает широкие возможности для ускорения экономического развития наших стран», http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/1-12-2017-2.aspx 24 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute

There are certain individual contacts between the EAEU and the EU at technical and expert levels, but these are by no means sufficient.26 In 2015, the EAEU sent an official proposal to start consultations for building the format of relationships, but received an answer that, based on the current political situation, the EU is not willing to negotiate. Yet the dialogue between the EAEU and the EU needs to start without any preconditions, despite the political disagreements mostly related to the Ukrainian question. For the EU, accepting the EAEU as a full-fledged economic formation would mean not only conducting negotiations on a collective and symmetrical basis, but also a change of policies carried out by Brussels since 1991, which is based on the principle that the EU is the only integration union west of the Ural Mountains, and that only the EU gets to determine the models and character of economic processes at a collective level. It has to be admitted that the reasons for the EU’s position are political: the intent to prevent Russia’s strengthening in Eurasia.

In turn, EAEU countries have to demonstrate their ability and readiness to act as a single mechanism not only in terms of organising the internal Eurasian market, but also in the struggle to enter new markets. However, the sanctions wars against Russia since 2014 have thwarted any existing attempts for integration between the EU and EAEU. The chill in relations is against the economic interests of both sides, which require the development of economic cooperation (Emyelina, 2016).

Currently it is obvious that there is an absence of effective and systemically operating dialogue platforms to boost interaction between the EU and the EAEU, whether they are at the supranational, business, or expert community levels. The relations with Eurasian countries and the development dynamism of such relations are the key to achieving a stable dialogue with the EU.

26 Валовая Т., Роль Армении важна для европейского и ближневосточного трека ЕАЭС, http://bit.ly/2MJ2XU5 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 25

The analysis presented below suggests possible EAEU-EU interaction formats, which would simultaneously allow the integration within the EAEU.

The EU countries are mostly developed, with powerful industry and/or services sectors, whereas EAEU countries (with the exception of Belarus) are mostly resource-based economies.

So far the EAEU has free trade agreements only with Vietnam, China, and Iran, whereas the EU’s free trade area includes about 30 countries outside the EU. Most of these countries are developed, whereas the EAEU’s current and potential partners are developing or rapidly developing countries. Thus, the EAEU needs to actively advance cooperation with developed countries.

Let us consider the possibilities of promoting EAEU competitive goods and its associated risks. One must first pay attention to eliminating the tariff and non-tariff barriers in the EU. It is desirable for EAEU countries to achieve agreements with the EU about the existing barriers of the EU. Especially important among these is the labelling of the country of origin, certification and other required information. However, not all goods are worth negotiating with the EU about a reduction of tariffs because not all of them are exported to the EAEU in significant volumes, while some goods already have zero customs duties.

Reviewing the import duties of the EU within the WTO framework, one may see that mostly two EAEU countries – Armenia and Kyrgyzstan – have some commodities with zero duties.

Relatively high customs duties are imposed on some major exports from Belarus and

Kazakhstan. The EAEU should take initiatives and be active in negotiating issues of tariff regulation for goods with high EU tariffs, and which EAEU countries are interested to export.

On the other hand, for the EU it is important to achieve lower tariff protection in EAEU countries in order to increase European exports.

In addition to opportunities, one has to also consider the risks related to reducing import duties in the EAEU Common Customs Tariff (CCT) in the case that free trade 26 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute agreement is achieved with the EU. As there are many industrial, developed countries among EU members, there is a high risk that EAEU producers will lose market shares due to their lower ability to compete. In negotiations on CTT reduction, special attention needs to be paid to the goods produced in the EAEU (e.g., jewellery, gems, synthetic fibres, organic dyestuff, etc.)

There are a number of negative forecasts, for example, by the Ifo Institute for

Economic Research in Germany, that a free trade policy may create losses to the automotive industry and agricultural sector of the EAEU countries, whereas in the EU these sectors will have the most gains.27 First of all, this is related to the exports structures of these two unions.

The EAEU countries mostly export resources, energy, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, grain, and fertilisers, while they import mostly engineering technology products and consumer goods. However, expert assessments of the manufacturing capabilities of EAEU countries indicate that not all of them may be sensitive.

In any case, a free trade agreement between the EAEU and the EU may pay off both of these unions. However, at the current competitiveness level of EAEU countries, the EU has more to gain from free trade.

The EU is an important partner for the EAEU, since the latter still needs European investments and technologies, and also to gain from the potential opportunity of becoming a “geo-economic” bridge between the EU and leading APEC countries. In addition, a key component in the cooperation between the EU and the EAEU is the transfer of technologies and European expertise from EU enterprises to EAEU ones. In turn, the EU is interested in

27 ЕС будет вынужден признать Евразийский союз, источник: Литер - Республиканская общественно- политическая газета, https://eabr.org/analytics/integration-research/cii-reports/evropeyskiy-soyuz-i-evraziyskiy-ekonomicheskiy- soyuz-/

Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 27 a stable supply of energy resources from the EAEU to ensure energy security. Altogether, this predetermines the interest of the EU in deepening cooperation with the EAEU.

As for EU-EAEU cooperation in the energy sector, it is important to understand that the Eurasian continent’s global demand for electricity will constitute more than 50% of global supply, and this will significantly influence the development of the global energy sector.

It is expected that despite disagreements on certain issues, the EU position related to the energy sector will grow more concerted. This will have some serious impacts on the

EAEU, where energy companies play an important role in the economy and account for a considerable share in export revenues.

Meanwhile, the Eurasian Economic Union also plans to harmonise and liberalise the energy market. According to the latest decisions of the Eurasian Economic Commission, the activities for creating a common electricity market must be completed by 2019, while the creation of a common market for oil and gas is planned for 2025. These planned reforms of the EAEU energy market are being developed based on WTO regulations, which would increase the compatibility of the European and Eurasian energy unions. European-Eurasian energy cooperation can be deepened using the instruments of the Energy Charter Treaty

(1998), which has been signed by all EU and EAEU countries. These instruments may help develop a political dialogue and cooperation in the area of regulations, and stimulate implementation of regional/trans-border energy projects, such as the energy cooperation between Armenia and Iran.

In the context of deepening EU-EAEU cooperation it is necessary to consider the prospects of international cooperation in the construction industry, modernisation, and further development of the Eurasian transport corridors for the period up to 2030. This is closely related to solving the issues of trans-border transport infrastructure development, funding large-scale infrastructure projects under geopolitical and geo-economic tensions.

28 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute

The EAEU’s integration potential in the area of transportation and infrastructure not only determines the program for cooperation, but also the long-term development scenario of EAEU development. The transport corridors have to become economic corridors in order to ensure development. The maximum economic effects are possible to achieve through the concentration of economic activities and capital investments in the regions adjacent to the main transport routes. However, it has to be noted that economic growth in development corridors should make these regions self-sufficient, and thus become one of the directions for technology and knowledge exchange between the EU and the EAEU.

Any meaningful discussion of the subject matter must start with transport infrastructure projects, yet the development of electricity and telecommunications infrastructures is equally important. This “infrastructure triad” (transport, electric power transmission, and telecom) plays a key role in the trans-Eurasian context, as well as the context of EU-EAEU cooperation.

Developing common electricity markets would allow an increase in trade volumes of electricity, which is a commodity with great internal commercial potential. This would create a significant synergetic effect, positively influencing both the prices and stability of electricity supply. The power generation and transmission infrastructure development may well be realistically accompanied with several regional and sub-regional common markets. Potential key partners for Northern and Central Eurasian countries in creating such markets are the

EU, China, India, and Iran.

The development of transcontinental fibre optic telecommunication lines opens huge opportunities. Currently, the landline potential is limited and most of the data transmission between Europe and Asia goes through underwater fibre optic communication channels.

The land-based fibre optic lines account only for 6% of traffic between the EU and East Asia.

This figure can be increased significantly.

Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 29

Despite the serious political complications in relations between Russia and the EU, private businesses continue working in many directions, including those under the EU’s jurisdiction, such as standardisation and technical compliance, simplification of trade procedures, investments, and digitalisation.

Cooperation in standardisation and technical compliance directly impacts international trade conditions. Russian businesses continue to develop cooperation with

European partners in this area, including through the implementation of joint actions and projects. Joint work is carried out together with the European Committee for Electrotechnical

Standardisation (CENELEC). Cooperation is also developed with such influential organisations as the European Business Association and German Eastern Business

Association (OAOEV). Further, a new project has started with the Federation of German

Industries (BDI) and the German Eastern Business Association for development of cooperation in the area of technical regulation and standards, where the main emphasis will be placed on the digital economy.28

Simplifying trade procedures that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the EAEU and the EU may become the cornerstone of a practical interaction between the two. Building a dialogue on supranational platforms would help clarify many controversial topics that are typical for the political relations between certain individual members of the unions.

Currently, almost all EAEU member states (except Belarus) are also members of the

WTO along with the EU countries, and hence are parties to the Trade Facilitation Agreement

(TFA). Many EAEU countries still have a lot of work to do for the implementation of this

Agreement in terms of trade barrier reduction indices of WTO/OECD, and this could be a good point for developing cooperation with European partners. Also, there is a serious potential for improving some individual procedures for trade.

28 ЕС – ЕАЭС: Есть ли потенциал развития взаимодействия? Марина Ларионова, вице-президент РСПП. Москва, 2018 г. http://eurasian-studies.org/archives/10029

30 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute

Eventually, such interactions can perhaps be included in a non-preferential type framework document on trade and economic cooperation between the EAEU and the EU.

Hardly anyone may deny that in the new realities a new foundation is needed to build a constructive cooperation that would be free of prejudices and reflect the changed situation, particularly the EAEU’s entrance to the international arena.

Digitalisation is a promising area where both the EU and the EAEU have similar goals.

In May 2015 the European Commission adopted “A Digital Single Market Strategy for

Europe”, which is founded on three pillars:

1. Better access for consumers and businesses to online goods and services across Europe; 2. Creating the right conditions for digital networks and services to flourish; 3. Maximising the growth potential of our European Digital Economy.

As a part of the mentioned strategy, the Digitising European Industry initiative was launched in April 2016, singling out certain areas such as legal regulations, education, etc. It is expected that the full implementation of the program would help increase the EU GDP by

€415 billion annually, as well as radically improve the efficiency of the whole European economy.

The EAEU has similar plans. Particularly, in October 2018 the Supreme Eurasian

Economic Council approved the Main Directions for the Implementation of the Digital

Agenda of the Eurasian Economic Union until 2025. The key areas of digital economy development in the EAEU countries were as follows: the digital transformation of common markets, sectoral and cross-sectoral transformation, the digital transformation of the management of integration processes, development of the digital infrastructure, and data/telecommunication channels security. Digital projects and initiatives may contribute up to 11% to the expected aggregated GDP growth in EAEU by 2025. Cooperation in these Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 31 areas and building a dialogue between the EAEU and the EU contain a considerable potential, and private businesses are already developing cooperation in this direction.29

Investment cooperation between Russia and European partners is complicated.

Russian companies are often discriminated against in implementation of these projects. An example of this is the situation with the large-scale Russian project Nord Stream 2, which aims at ensuring a reliable gas supply to the EU. This is especially important for the EU in light of the trend toward ensuring the environmental safety of European industries. However, this project regularly encounters serious pressure both from the EU/European Commission and USA.

In the context of the two unions’ cooperation, it is also important to consider the EAEU desire to obtain preferential trade beyond its influence area, given the EU’s well-developed system of trade agreements with a variety of countries and regions around the world.

The involved parties need to endeavour that common partnerships and neighbourhoods of the EU and EAEU serve the interests of the member states of both unions and their partners, instead of becoming bones of contention. Normalising and developing EU-EAEU relations should deserve more efforts in order to achieve, at some point in the long term, an integration agreement between the two unions. This is the assessment of the Centre for Integration Studies of the Eurasian Bank of Development.30

Such an agreement should cover many aspects of interaction: trade of goods and services, visa-free travel, development of transborder and transit infrastructures, institutional convergence, protection of intellectual property rights, and other issues of regulation.

Examples of these can be considered from bilateral agreements between the EU and China,

USA, India, Brazil, etc.

29 Итоги ВЕЭС: дан старт цифровому этапу евразийской интеграции, http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/12_10_17.aspx 30 See the previous footnote

32 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute

However, it is important to understand that in practice there were no precedents of signing agreements between integration unions, which proves the difficulty of such a task and the responsibility of the parties to the potential agreement.

Although European Commission executives are interested in developing trade between the EU and the EAEU, currently there are no noticeable actions from the EC to establish official dialogue with the Eurasian Economic Commission, despite the latter having made numerous attempts. The EU countries continue their economic relations with EAEU states bilaterally.

The Chinese factor in Greater Eurasia

The modern dynamic of the global economy, demographic changes, and the environment of the world’s markets for goods and services require active integration interactions. Certain conceptual approaches need to be reassessed with consideration to oil, gas, electricity market factors, sanctions against Russia, China, and some other fundamental conditions related to the developments in Greater Eurasia. As a target objective of the EAEU economic plan, “The Main Directions of Economic Development of the EAEU until 2030” needs to be combined with the One Belt, One Road, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and other similar projects implemented in Greater Eurasia.31

A powerful sub-continental zone of free trade is being formed. Currently, ASEAN unifies ten Southeast Asia countries with an aggregate GDP of $2.6 trillion and a foreign trade turnover of $2.5 trillion; it is also in negotiations about including China, Japan, and

South Korea in the free trade agreement. If the negotiations succeed, a preferential trade area in Southeast Asia may be created covering 30% of the Earth’s population, 24% of the global GDP, a 25% share of world trade, and a 47% share in global high technology products

31 Стратегия экономического развития ЕАЭС, http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_makroec_pol/seminar/Pages/default.aspx Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 33 exports. And if ASEAN+6 regional comprehensive economic partnership is created and includes India, Australia, and New Zealand, this mega-zone of free trade would cover half of the world’s population and 30% of global GDP.32

The EAEU is becoming a necessary participant for building a unified, or at least compatible economic space in Greater Eurasia. This territory is one of the most reliable transport corridors between Europe and Asia, free of military-political risks. Further, EAEU member states are becoming competitive producers and hubs to access markets of other countries. Under such circumstances, dialogue between the EAEU and other regional associations, groups of countries, and individual countries is especially important.

Given the sanctions imposed on Russia by the West and the growth of trade and investment relations with China, all EAEU countries are very interested in interconnections with the One Belt, One Road initiative, particularly regarding Chinese investments. EAEU membership implies aggregation of the EAEU countries’ economic potentials, which would positively influence the development of economic relations with other countries, and above all with China. For Armenia, economic relations with Iran play an especially important role.

Indeed, they contain the largest opportunities to realise and develop the integration potential of the EAEU international activities.

Weak consonance of macroeconomic indices, particularly inflation and national currency exchange rates, hinder the coordination of economic policies not only within the

EAEU, but also with China. EAEU member states have bilateral agreements with China. A declaration about convergence of the EAEU with the One Belt, One Road initiative was signed by the President of Russia. Further coordination and joining of EAEU countries to this declaration is necessary. A significant increase of trade turnover growth between the

EAEU and China requires implementation of coordinated microeconomic and foreign trade

32 Евразийское партнёрство, 2018, источник: ЗАВТРА (ИА, РФ) https://eabr.org/press/news/evraziyskoe-partnyerstvo/ 34 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute policies by EAEU countries. Otherwise, there would be a risk of unfair competition between the businesses of these countries. Further, there is an agreement with Iran about free trade and a reduction or elimination of import tariffs for a number of commodities.

To assess the opportunities of convergence between the EAEU and the One Belt,

One Road initiative, the GDPs of EAEU countries and China are presented below, along with the USA.

Table 5: GDPs of EAEU countries, China and USA

Country GDP (nominal), GDP (PPP), GDP (nominal) GDP (PPP) per 2019 estimation 2019 estimation per capita, capita, 2018 (M US$) (M int$) 2018 (US$) (int$) USA 21,344,667 21,410,231 62,606 62,606 China 14,216,503 27,438,284 9,608 18,110 Russia 1,610,381 4,322,616 11,327 29,267 Kazakhstan 164,207 534,702 9,237 27,550 Belarus 60,951 195,078 6,306 20,003 Armenia 13,105 32,297 4,169 10,176 Kyrgyzstan 8,334 25,831 1,268 3,844 Source: The International Monetary Fund

When measured by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), China’s GDP tops the world.

Interestingly, Russia has the sixth largest GDP PPP. The potential of China and Russia, the fact that they are neighbours and the possible convergence of the EAEU and the SREB would allow all EAEU countries to increase their exports and investments. Significant growth of exports is possible first of all among those EAEU countries that are close to each other in terms of development and common goals, as well as in convergence between the EAEU and SREB, where it is a natural priority. Accepting this also implies the integration of Armenia not only with the EAEU, but also the active development of economic relations, particularly with China and Iran.

An agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the Eurasian Economic

Union and China was signed on May 17, 2018 within the framework of the Astana Economic Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 35

Forum. The trade volume between the EAEU and China constituted over $100 billion in

2018. Annual exports from the EAEU to China grew by 40%. For the member-states of the

EAEU, diversification of exports is extremely important. Currently this applies not only to resources, but also to engineering technology products.

Compared to Iran, with which tariff issues are practically resolved at this stage, EAEU countries need a clear consonance with China for an effective convergence with the One

Belt, One Road initiative. An agreement on customs tariffs and investments would require concordance to the priorities of the EAEU countries’ economic policies. Such an agreement between the EAEU and China is capable of laying a foundation to form a common economic space in Greater Eurasia that would welcome all interested parties in both the East and

West.

Regarding investments in the Armenian economy, China is not ranked high despite the large potential for Chinese investments there. Considering the EAEU and SREB convergence opportunities, the construction of copper smelting plants appears quite promising, given that about 60% of copper concentrate is exported to China anyway. After the meeting of the Armenian and Chinese leaders, a technical and economic feasibility study is being developed for the construction of a pure copper production plant. The Chinese state- owned corporation CITIC and the Armenian company Vallex Group are participating in the feasibility study. Another feasibility study is being conducted for the participation of Chinese companies in the construction of a North-South Highway in Armenia, which may be interesting for Chinese investors considering the Meghri Free Economic Zone prospects.

However, the Armenian side needs to submit a business plan approved by Chinese investors with clear justifications for investing in such a project, as well as their potential repayment in various scenarios of political and economic changes in the region. A joint group of experts is desirable to form for this task. It has to be noted that there are also opportunities of joint production of construction materials, investments in the development of tourism, 36 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute agriculture, nanotechnologies, the chemical industry, and pharmaceuticals (Tavadyan,

2017).

With the great potential of convergence between the EAEU and the SREB, key objectives include concerted economic policies for EAEU countries, as well as their coordination with China – particularly investment projects. The possibilities and logistics of linking the EAEU countries – particularly Armenia to the One Belt, One Road initiative – need to be clearly understood and evaluated. At a crossroad on the path from West to East,

Armenia has quite high educational levels, an active and inexpensive workforce, simplified procedures to obtain certificates and register a business, and a developed infrastructure of information technologies. Armenia is rapidly developing its road and transport infrastructures. Its membership in the EAEU, friendly diplomatic relations with China, as well as good relations with the EU, Iran, Georgia, and its large diaspora in Russia, Europe, Iran, and Georgia significantly increase the potential of the EAEU treaty in modernising the economy of Armenia and productive cooperation with the mentioned countries.

Meanwhile, the prospects of integration mainly depend on the abilities of the participants to adequately perceive and respond to the challenges of hybrid warfare. Some specifics of such confrontations are briefly presented below.

Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 37

4. Hybrid challenges and the information factor

Permanent ‘hybrid confrontations’

The term “hybrid warfare” was introduced by American and British experts. In the Military

Balance 2015, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the following definition is given for hybrid warfare:33

 The use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilising diplomatic means;  Sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action, and economic pressure.

This definition given by a reputable institution is quite comprehensive, but we believe it does not fully uncover the phenomenon of hybrid warfare. Perhaps this is because it is based on the traditional concepts about where the Clausewitz formula prevails, that is, the war’s

“objective is … forcing the enemy to sign whatever peace we please” (Howard and Paret,

1984).

Meanwhile, in multipolar realities achieving peace is not always the goal. For some participants of hybrid confrontations (some of which, as already mentioned, may not be nation-states), the state of permanent war may turn out to be more beneficial than peace.

Moreover, after “intermediate victories”, hybrid warfare continues in another format, but not less intensively. In our view, these very characteristics differentiate the hybrid confrontations from wars of the past.

Another matter of dispute in hybrid warfare definitions is that some experts assume such confrontations involve no significant casualties. Yet the developments of “Arab Spring”

33 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance, 2015: February 2015. Routledge; 2015. 38 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in the Greater Middle East and Euromaidan in Ukraine showed that the hybrid methodology of warfare may lead to massive human casualties (Harutyunyan, 2013b).

It is known that many methods of hybrid warfare (except cyber-operations) have been used in the past, which supports statements that such warfare is a mere extension of old approaches. However, one has to consider that currently the “old means” have reached very high technological levels and due to modern management methods are used in a complex manner. Therefore, the science and technology potential of one or another country are presently the criterion that predetermine its security in these hybrid realities. Below, certain elements are presented that emphasise the importance of the intellectual factor in the context of security.

Science and technology factor in hybrid warfare

Hybrid warfare requires great high professionalism of the political elites that make decisions, which in turn implies high intellectual levels of the society as a whole. It is also known that intellectual and spiritual resources are the “concentrated critical infrastructure” for the military, political, economic, and other critical infrastructures that the security of a nation depends on.34 All of this underlies the statement of American military strategists that in the new generation warfare, the main weapons are the cognitive abilities of the adversaries when it comes to the fight for information.35

One of the indicators of a society’s cognitive abilities is the amount of funds allocated to research and development. Table 6 shows the R&D expenditures of the top 10 countries, which account for 80% of all global R&D spending (including by governments, scientific

34 See, for example, Арутюнян Г., Единство духовно - интеллектуальных ресурсов как предусловие развития: в коллективной монографии «Критические инфраструктуры национальной безопасности», с.50, Научно – образовательный фонд «Нораванк» Ереван, 2018г. (на арм. языке). 35Иванов В., США должны готовиться к войне пятого поколения, Независимое военное обозрение, #31(962), 25-31, 08.2017. Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 39 institutions, businesses, and non-commercial organisations). The USA spend the most on

R&D, accounting for 27% of global expenditures. Interestingly enough, China, the second- largest spender, has R&D expenditures of only $100 billion less than USA, while US military spending exceeds that of China by over three times (see Tables 1 and 2). Moreover, according to some forecasts, China will soon overtake the USA in R&D spending

(Harutyunyan and Marjanyan, 2017b). However, it has to be considered that there are 4,000 researchers per one million people in the USA, whereas in China this number is about 1,000 per one million. Also, Russia, the second-largest military power in the world, is only the tenth in terms of R&D spending.

Table 6: R&D spending (based on UNESCO data36)

Country R&D spending, ($ billion) 1 USA 476.5 2 China 370.6 3 Japan 170.5 4 Germany 109.8 5 South Korea 73.2 6 France 60.8 7 India 48.1 8 UK 44.2 9 Brazil 42.1 10 Russia 39.8

From the perspective of the concept that security in hybrid warfare is largely ensured by intellectual resources, what appears worthy of attention is that in the top 10 countries that spend over 3% of their GDP on R&D, countries like Denmark, Switzerland, and Austria, spend little on military defence.37 This may mean these countries are less vulnerable to

36UNESCO Institute for Statistics, http://uis.unesco.org/en/topic/research-and-development 37 See for example, Сhttps://icss.ru/vokrug-statistiki/rasxodyi-na-niokr 40 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute hybrid challenges than those with large military budgets. Thus, changes in concepts about security also change the understanding of defence capabilities of the smaller countries.

At the same time, the foundation of a society’s intellectual potential is laid on the information component, and that is why Daniel Bell calls the post-industrial societies

“information” societies38. It is then logical that the main method used in hybrid confrontations is information operations, the conceptual bases of which have drastically changed in the recent years. As information operations are also a major instrument in managing both integration and disintegration processes, the ideology and methods of such operations are presented below.

New generation information wars

In the modern information revolution, some powerful information-generation sources have appeared such as the internet, social media, and special applications, which have exponentially increased the role of information. In 2018, there were 4.021 billion internet users, 3.196 billion social media users, and 5.135 billion mobile phone users.39 The global information network is a powerful integration instrument helping millions of people find like- minded persons around the world. However, the same network is an instrument that can destructively impact whole societies, which means the destructive ability of the information weapon is comparable to that of the nuclear one.40

The first canonical definitions of information warfare (IW) appeared in the 20th century and reflected the concept that information operations are important, but they just

“accompany” the actual combat actions (as it was, for example, during the both World Wars).

38 Bell, D., 1976, May. The coming of the post-industrial society. In The Educational Forum (Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 574-579). Taylor & Francis Group. Also see: Арутюнян Г., Информационные и деиндустриализованные общества, «21-й Век», # 4(45), с. 5, 2016. 39 https://wearesocial.com/blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018. 40 Harutyunyan G., «Homo virtualicus» in the context of postdemocracy and Information security, 21-st Century, #1(9), p. 3, 2011. Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 41

The modern understanding of IW is that it is a self-contained activity, regardless of whether there are ongoing military actions or not. Moreover, if in the past the so-called “opposing force” was well defined, then today it would not only be a country with which there are controversies and conflicts of interests, but also simply economic competitors or even allies

(as was the case with ECHELON). The huge potential of modern IW allows us to reformulate

Clausewitz’s statement that “war is the continuation of politics by other means” because in modern realities there are many situations when “politics is the continuation of information war by other means.”41

The concepts of the new, so-called “second generation IW” were developed in the

US. The methods and arsenal of IW are quite versatile, including cyber-operations, psychotronic weapons, psychotropic agents, and many more.42 Only some of the generalised concepts of IW are concisely presented below (Harutyunyan, Grinyaev and

Arzumanyan, 2016):

1. Establishing an immoral atmosphere in the adversary’s society and developing a negative attitude towards its own cultural legacy. 2. Manipulation of the society’s conscience and civilisational orientation of the country’s subpopulations to create political tensions and chaos. 3. Embedding one’s own cultural “code” in the consciousness of the adversary’s society through manipulation technologies. 4. Harming vital political, economic, defence and other interests of the state. 5. Destabilising relations between political parties, provoking violence against the opposition in order to create confrontations, a lack of trust, sowing suspicions, and intensifying political struggles. 6. Reducing the information security level of government structures and prompting wrong decision-making in governance.

41 For example, as happened after the “Russian information interference in the US elections”. 42 See, e.g., Information Security, Harutyunyan G.A. (ed.) – Yerevan: Noravank, 2017. – 320 p. (in Armenian language), and Koustopoulos G., Cyberspace and Cybersecurity, CEC Press, 2013. 42 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute

7. Misinformation about the work of government agencies, compromising and discrediting the governing bodies.43

One should pay attention to the first three items of the mentioned list, which relate to such crucial and sensitive aspects as culture, civilisational values and historical memories.

Obviously, deforming these categories may principally change the humanitarian vector of integration. For example, in modern hybrid warfare mass media and social networks are widely used to carry out so-called “history politics”, which aims at forsaking and denigrating history, eventually leading to severed ties between generations. In this context, the most protected, active, and successful actor of IW is the USA, and unsurprisingly, the “Anglo-

Saxon World” is the most tightly-knit one in civilisational terms (Harutyunyan and Marjanyan,

2017b). Meanwhile, an Anglo-Saxon competitor, China, has complicated relations with

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan within the “World of Hieroglyphs”. Another competitor,

Russia is doing no better in the “Slavic World”, with a fierce confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, which is the result of a “colour revolution” in Ukraine (Harutyunyan and

Marjanyan, 2017a).

Another important task of the modern IW is reducing the information security level of government structures to prompt wrong decision-making in governance. Further, degradation of a society’s spiritual and intellectual resources leads to a weakening of the state, a loss of sovereignty, and an inability to effectively resist the strategy of the information aggressor.

However, use of the mentioned methods is only the intermediate and preparation stage in IW strategy. One of the main objectives of modern permanent hybrid warfare is establishing external control of the country under information intervention. This is best done

43 It is easy to notice that “second-generation IW” concepts are reminiscent of some strategems of Sun Tzu, who was perhaps the first one to foretell the importance of “soft power” in politics. Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 43 by organising so-called “colour revolutions”, the results of which have decisive significance in the context of integration and disintegration processes. Below we will attempt to present the basic technologies and ideologies of such operations.

‘Intermediate victories’ in hybrid warfare

In hybrid confrontations one of the main goals is to weaken the competing integrated association and strengthen one’s own integration system by attracting new members. In the past, confrontations between the “centraliser” countries of different associations often transformed into “hot” wars. Today, the struggle between the leading powers is mostly positional, although modern technologies help win intermediate victories, the significance of which is comparable to those of wars of the past. For example, it is possible to pull away one or another country from a competing alliance and establish external control.

One radical method for implementing such a plan is organising a coup to bring to power those people who for various reasons are the adherents of the geo-ideological or geopolitical line of the influencer (Houshofer, 2001). After seizing power, such cliques decisively oppress any dissenting opponents and ensure an “intermediate victory” for the information/hybrid warfare. However, “intermediate” does not mean that informational pressure on the society is reduced after such a victory, but to the contrary, it increases because the country’s new government joins the process.

In the media, these coups are commonly called “colour revolutions”, during which mass protests culminate in overthrowing the political leadership of a country. This term will be used hereinafter, but it has to be emphasised that such “revolutions” are just large-scale strategic hybrid operations. In the context of foreign influence on a revolution very similar to a “colour” one, the Russian liberal revolution in 1991 is a good example. Foreign intervention was quite blatant during those years, and the collapse of the USSR heralded the victory of 44 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute the West in the Cold War. In the modern multipolar reality, the main objective of these revolutions is to weaken the conditional “Eastern integration bloc”, that is, China and Russia.

“Colour revolutions” are designed and implemented not only by the Western government agencies or intelligence structures, but also transnational corporations, non- government organisations and of course, large media holdings. In the Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region, mass protests and rallies started in June 2019, which obviously repeat the scenario of the Umbrella Revolution of September 2014. Significantly more support is also now provided to the Uighurs of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, known for their externally stirred up separatism and struggle for religious freedoms.44 It has to be noted that publishing predictions about “colour revolutions” in itself is an element of informational and psychological pressure on the societies of these countries, as it underscores that

“revolutionary” developments are predictable.

Critical infrastructures

For a “revolution” to happen, serious problems must exist in the critical areas of a society, and these are in the main focus of the organised operation. If there are not enough problems, then the modern hybrid political technologies help form and deepen them. The phenomena in the society that allow the successful implementation of a “colour strategy” are briefly presented below.

High levels of corruption: The most materialised factor that causes justified resentment in a society is widespread corruption. Corrupt practices are inevitable in consumerist societies and are an integral part of modern economy, and for this reason some economists contend that corruption in small doses may even boost the economy.

Apparently, when living standards are high, corruption is perceived as a mere criminal

44 In this regard it has to be noted that there are over 24,400 mosques operating in Xinjian, so it is pretty hard to talk about religious oppression. Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 45 activity and does not cause much of a heated debate. For example, in the EU, annual losses from corruption are estimated at €120 billion.45 However, when the economy is not doing well (for example, Armenia is the 114th economy in the world by the GDP per capita46), people in the society tend to relate their economic hardships directly to corrupt financial schemes in the government.

Vote-rigging: Against a background of poor economic performance and corruption, a society becomes very sensitive to blatant vote-rigging during elections. It is obvious that any election, whether in the past or now, is hard to be called a free expression of the will of the people, and debates about this spring up now and then even in the countries where

“democracy has won”. Meanwhile, in many countries the political elite lacks the ability to utilise “clean” electoral technologies, and this leads to protests and a conviction that the elected government is illegitimate.

Non-government organisations (NGO) with targeted financing from abroad:

One of the effective methods to form protest sentiments is creating a critical number of

NGOs that focus the attention on human rights and other attributes of the so-called civil society.47 In the post-Soviet countries these NGOs are funded from external sources. For example in Ukraine there were 50,000 NGOs in 2014 and more than 40,000 people received monetary remunerations from foreign grants,48 while in Armenia there are over 2,000 NGOs most of which are financed from abroad.49 The NGO activists were the most energetic of the

“Velvet coup” in 2018.

45 «Еврокомиссия: коррупция в ЕС «поражает воображение», https://www.bbc.com/russian/business/2014/02/140203_europe_breathtaking_corruption_report 46 ВВП на душу населения стран мира 2018, http://fincan.ru/articles/51_vvp-na-dushu-naselenija-stran- mira-2018/ 47 The current ideological situation very much resembles the Soviet totalitarian era, when building a “socialist” or “communist society” was an ultimate value. 48http://novostiua.net/main/42089-v-ukraine-rastet-kolichestvo-obschestvennyh-organizaciy.html 49 «Общественные организации Армении», Институт «Сетевых исследований», Ереван, 46с., 2019г. 46 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute

In the context of foreign intervention, it has to be noted that legal acts that restrict the activities of NGOs had been in effect in the UK since the 19th century. In the USA the Foreign

Agents Registration Act (FARA) has been in force since 1938. In Russia the law on foreign agents was adopted only in 2012, and according to the Russian Ministry of Justice there are over 100 “foreign agents” in the country.

Meanwhile, a number of post-Soviet countries, including Armenia, totally lack any legislation to regulate the activities of the externally funded NGOs. There are all signs that in addition to NGOs that openly operate in Armenia, there are also so-called agents of influence in the government structures. It is no coincidence that lists of Armenian government officials who factually serve other countries are periodically published.50

Combining ‘soft power’ with brute force

It is commonly thought that Gene Sharp, a “colour revolution” ideologist, wrote his concepts under the influence of Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy, who was an adept of non-violence principles. It is rarely mentioned though, that Sharp was also fascinated by Lev Trotsky’s writings about permanent revolutions; Trotsky was extremely intolerant toward the “enemies of revolution”. It would seem that Gandhi’s ideas based on humanism are incompatible with

Trotsky’s, which are polar opposites. Many nonviolent actions suggested by Sharp (rallies, petitions, strikes, hunger strikes, etc.) are quite common, but there are also some “novelties”, including varying degrees of self-harm.

In this context it has to be noted that many “colour revolutions” were accompanied by blatantly violent actions, as for the set objectives together with “peaceful protesters” some radical gangs were formed to carry out special tasks. A classic example of that is the Arab

50 Агенты США в высшем руководстве Армении, https://irongamers.ru/post-group/agenty-ssha-v- vysshem-rukovodstve-armenii, Армении пора ограничить деятельность западных агентов влияния, https://gradator.ru/news/world/1189.html Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 47

Spring that gave birth to ISIS, and another example is Euromaidan in Ukraine, when several hundred radical groups were formed in parallel.51 In Georgia, some successors of the Rose

Revolution were unified around the ultra-nationalistic Georgian March coalition.52 During the

Armenian “Velvet Revolution” a more sophisticated technology was used, namely, effects- based operations (EBO), which are applied to “influence [the] adversaries in a manner that they change their behaviour towards a more desirable one for the influencer” (Grinyaev,

2004).” In this context, in 2016 a radical group in Yerevan killed policemen and seized the police patrol regiment station. As per EBO tenets, this action strongly impacted the society and removed the “taboo” on permissiveness. After the “Velvet Revolution” all participants of this action were released from prisons, and one of the leaders of the group claimed that without their “uprising”, the revolution of 2018 would not be possible.53 Thus, “soft power” in hybrid operations is often combined with brute force, while ultraliberal ideology is combined with ultra-nationalism. Moreover, the strategists of colour projects often pull the country where “democracy has won” into hot conflicts.

Disintegrating effects of hybrid warfare

As already mentioned, the objective of “colour revolutions” is to pull the subject of intervention away from the integration zone where the main adversary of the influencer dominates. As the events in Georgia and Ukraine demonstrated, the most radical method to achieve this objective is to create a conflict situation between the country where a “colour revolution” occurred and the adversary, in this case Russia. For example, the Rose

Revolution headed by Saakashvili happened in Georgia in 2003; and in August 2008, shortly after the visit of Condoleezza Rice, US State Secretary, a military conflict started with Russia

51https://vesti-ukr.com/strana/296084-kto-finansiruet-radikalov-v-ukraine-rassledovanie-vestej 52 https://inosmi.ru/politic/20180529/242334800.html 53 See, for example, http://armenianreport.com/pubs/222762/, https://gradator.ru/news/analytics/2259.html 48 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute over South Ossetia, which ended relations between Georgia and Russia.54 Once

Saakashvili was ousted in 2013, relations between the two countries somewhat improved, but in 2019 after the events at the session of the Inter-parliamentary Assembly on

Orthodoxy, the well-prepared supporters of the ex-president hit the streets and organised riots, once again complicating the already uneasy relations with Russia. Characteristically,

Georgia’s severed relations with Russia resulted in dire consequences in science and technology. During Saakashvili’s rule in 2004-2013, the share of R&D in the country’s GDP decreased about threefold.55

Whereas the war between Georgia and Russia lasted five days, the de facto war of another “colour revolution” country, Ukraine, against Russia has lingered on for five years.

This is a significantly larger-scale conflict compared to the Georgian one. During the hostilities in Donbass and Lugansk, the casualties numbered in the tens of thousands.56

Disintegration process strongly shattered the Ukrainian economy, as demonstrated in Table

7: during the four “revolutionary years” the GDP of Ukraine decreased by 38.4% and GDP

PPP by 9.4%.57

Table 7: GDP of Ukraine in 2013 - 2017

GDP GDP PPP Year (US$ billion) (US$ billion) 2013 177.834 392.619 2014 130.908 371.812 2015 90.524 341.489 2016 93.812 352.339 2017 109.321 368.784

54 During this five-day war Georgia had 397 KIA and 1469 were injured, https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 55 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XD.RSDV.CD.ZS?end=2013&start=1998 56 See, for example, «Потери участвующих сторон в войне на Донбассе», https://jeteraconte.livejournal.com/362722.html 57 Based on data from http://bit.ly/2OOzWZP Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 49

Characteristically, if R&D expenditures in Ukraine comprised 0.8% of GDP in 2013, then in

2017 they dropped to 0.4%.58 According to data from the State Statistics Committee of

Ukraine, in 2013 scientific and research institutions employed 155,400 people, while in 2016 this number dropped to 97,900.

Thus, it can be stated that hybrid operations against Russia carried out in Georgia and Ukraine led to the following disintegration effects:

1. A significant civilisational and spiritual breach occurred between Orthodox nations; 2. In military-political and economic terms, both countries were turned into outposts of struggle against their former ally, but at the same time they were not integrated into the military-political system of the new “centraliser” power; 3. Considerable intellectual and information resources were lost, which hinders the development of these countries and establishes their marginal status within the new “centraliser’s” system.

Summary

This study suggests that in the modern multipolar reality, the challenges and actual threats to integration processes are an important component of hybrid confrontations. The definitions of hybrid confrontation in the literature are based on classic formulations.

Meanwhile, our approach is that the most important characteristic of hybrid warfare is that they are permanent. Such confrontations imply intensive activities in practically all areas of human life, among which the most critical ones are the targeted and interlinked actions in the military-political, economic, and humanitarian areas, which in turn indicates the need to use interdisciplinary approaches for the accurate investigation of integration and disintegration processes. Based on this methodology, the aggregated resources of global actors and their allies responsible for the developments in Greater Eurasia have been

58 В Украине тратят на научные исследования и разработки менее 0,5% ВВП, http://vybor.ua/article/economika/v-ukraine-tratyat-na-nauchnye-issledovaniya-i-razrabotki-menee-0-5- vvp.html 50 Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute compared for an adequate understanding of integration and disintegration processes. The conducted analysis allowed us to outline the dominant current trends and possible scenarios for the future.

The study focuses on the hybrid technologies of disintegration: coups and “colour revolutions”. These methods help establish an external control over one or another society using a combination of both “soft power” and “brute force”. Consequently, such a country severs relations with the influencer’s “adversary”, which previously played the role of a

“centraliser” in an integrated association. In this context, this study reviews in somewhat more detail the methods and tools of information warfare, which often are a key element in hybrid operations aimed at the destruction of integration associations. It is also noted that in countries with “external control”, the intellectual potential of the society is reduced in a targeted manner, and this helps to more effectively implement the disintegrating “external control”.

Gagik Harutyunyan Director, Research Network Institute, Armenia

Ashot Tavadyan Research Network Institute, Armenia

Aghasi Tavadyan Research Network Institute, Armenia

Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute 51

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