DOCSLIB.ORG

The Weaponization of Trade a Study of Modern Trade Conflicts from the Mid-1900S to Present

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Weaponization of Trade a Study of Modern Trade Conflicts from the Mid-1900S to Present The Weaponization of Trade A study of modern trade conflicts from the mid-1900s to present Prepared for Eurasia Group Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs Capstone Report, Spring 2020 Advisor: Markus Jaeger [email protected] Lukas Feldhaus [email protected] Yuxin Huang [email protected] Sherry Kim [email protected] Wonjae Kim [email protected] Joon Sung Lee [email protected] Daniel Marechal [email protected] Xinyi Sun [email protected] Samantha Weiss [email protected] 1 Acknowledgement This report was produced for Eurasia Group as a Capstone Consultancy project of Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). The authors Lukas Feldhaus, Yuxin Huang, Sherry Kim, Wonjae Kim, Joon Sung Lee, Daniel Marechal, Xinyi Sun, and Samantha Weiss are graduate students in SIPA concentrating in Energy and Environment, International Finance and Economic Policy, and International Security Policy. We would like to extend our gratitude to our advisors who made our research possible. Dr. Markus Jaeger, Adjunct Associate Professor at Columbia SIPA, whose advice and feedback helped and guided us throughout this project. Suzanne Hollmann and Saleha Awal for their logistical support during the project. Our client, Ian Bremmer, President of the Eurasia Group and Leon Levy, Senior Analyst in Eurasia Group's Global Macro practice, who provided us with a wealth of information to understand trade weaponization.Table of contents 2 Table of contents Section Page number 1. Introduction 3 2. Literature review 5 3. Analytical framework 19 4. Historical case studies and analysis 24 I. Geopolitically-motivated case studies 28 A. US-Japan 1940s 28 B. Chicken War 1960s 34 C. Oil Crisis 1970s 39 D. US-Japan 1980s 45 E. Natural Gas and Energy 1980s 49 F. Rare Earth 2010s 54 II. Economically-motivated case studies 58 A. Pasta War 1980s 58 B. Textile Conflict 1980s 60 C. Computer and Software 1980s 61 D. Banana War 1990s 63 E. Steel Tariffs 200s 64 III. Summary and analysis 67 5. The future of trade regimes and weaponization 72 I. Summary and projections 87 6. Conclusion 88 7. Bibliography 90 3 1.0 Introduction 1.1 Abstract Despite the historical trend towards trade liberalization, states have increasingly implemented protectionist trade policies, often to induce some political change. This report analyzes historical case studies of trade conflict since the 1940s, to distill insights regarding the introduction, evolution, and development of trade weaponization. Said insights are subsequently applied to present-day conflicts, to better understand this trend’s continued evolution in geopolitics. Countries weaponize trade tools to impose economic pressure on a target, inducing a change in trade patterns in service of political or broadly-economic objectives. If the target country retaliates by also weaponizing trade, the conflict potentially escalates into a trade war. To understand the motives underlying trade wars, we have organized our case studies by the following variables: country leadership, administratively-led vs. public-led policies, political and geo- strategic goals vs. economic concerns, and implications for technical development. Other variables considered for an analysis of the results include: within vs. across alliances, symmetric vs. asymmetric economic/political/military capabilities. We will consider trade weaponization within the institutional context of international trade organizations and regimes, namely the WTO and GATT. With these variables, we aim to specify the factors that provided the winners with an upper hand, thereby creating a foundation for the team to assess ongoing and future trade wars. 1.2 Executive summary Over the last three years, rhetoric about trade wars has become more salient as the United States (US) and China - two major economic powers - have engaged in tariff escalations within the context of broader economic and financial conflict. Although disputes involving trade have been taking place periodically since Ancient Greece, there has been growing concern that the current structure of global trade is more conducive to trade weaponization, defined as the employment of trade tools to induce a trade partner to change its practices in any issue-area (including economic policy and diplomatic relations) by exploiting its economic vulnerabilities. Albeit usually welfare-enhancing, international trade also generates relations of asymmetric interdependence; one party may accordingly lose more than the other if economic ties are suspended. This makes the weaponization of trade possible. This report proposes a theoretical framework to analyze the weaponization of trade, which draws mainly from the Realist perspective of trade and interdependence. We employ quantitative analysis to bolster the insights gleaned from an extensive literature review. Compiled data reflects potential power sources of the involved parties – such as GDP, population size, and bilateral trade as a share of GDP – as a proxy for the level of vulnerability. As corroborated by the case studies, trade weaponization is usually initiated by the less vulnerable party, except when the aggressor holds a dominant position in the market of certain strategic goods (i.e. oil and rare earth). A quantitative approach alone is insufficient for analyzing the outcomes of trade weaponization. Therefore, we introduce four axes of qualitative analysis: actors’ vulnerability, objectives, diplomatic ties, and international institutions. First, to assess the parties’ vulnerability 4 to trade weaponization, we analyze the political strength of domestic interest groups negatively affected by trade restrictions – the “commercial fifth-columns.'' Second, we categorize objectives as predominantly economic or geopolitical. We argue that when it comes to geopolitical issues, especially security-related ones, the “pain threshold” of the aggressee tends to be higher, and so the weaponization of trade is more likely to escalate to other areas of bilateral relations and even lead to war. Purely economic disputes, however, tend to be settled within an institutional framework. Third, we assess the status of diplomatic relations between the parties and classify it as either inter-alliance or across-alliance. States tend to consider “security externalities'' when it comes to weaponizing trade. This explains why trade conflict between allied countries is less likely to escalate, as the parties are not willing to inflict too much economic pain on a partner on whom its national security relies. Finally, we consider that a strong multilateral trade regime can facilitate negotiations. This is more likely in low-stakes economic conflicts with no relevant geostrategic repercussions. To test our framework, we selected eleven trade disputes that occurred throughout the 20th century. Our objective was not to draw a random sample, but rather to choose a group of cases with enough variation in the aforementioned variables. Since our framework includes several non- hierarchical components, it is not meant to predict the onset or the outcomes of episodes of trade weaponization. Still, it proved successful in helping explain the selected cases. We found that states weaponize trade when they feel strongly about their objective - either due to pressure from domestic interest groups or because of high-level strategic interest. Moreover, weaponization is likely when the asymmetric interdependence plays in their favor. Historical evidence corroborates the relevance of our four analytical axes in the evolution of trade disputes. With a theoretical framework and the conclusions we derived from the case studies, we briefly present an assessment of the evolution of structural variables in the international system, before proceeding to an analysis of two on-going trade conflicts: the US-China trade war and the Japan-Korea trade war. Our view is that international trade is now much more complex than it was until the early-2000s, with high-level economic interdependence among countries in different security alliances and in different stages of economic development. This is different from the mainly Transatlantic trade during the early years of the GATT. This situation is inherently unstable - reflecting a unipolar world that emerged from the Cold War that no longer exists. Eventually, countries will seek to reduce their vulnerabilities. However, while the adjustment takes place, trade weaponization tends to occur more often leading to less predictable outcomes, especially when high-stake political objectives are on the table. The US-China trade war exemplifies this trend. As the conflict includes high stake objectives - potentially, economic and technological dominance - and involves non-allied countries, it tends to escalate in spite of periodic truces, with almost no influence of the WTO. The case of Japan and South Korea is different since, albeit rivals in some specific issues like historical grievances, both parties are in the same security alliance. Their willingness to inflict reciprocal damage is limited. Moreover, as medium-sized countries in the system that rely a lot on an open trade system, they are more likely to accept WTO arbitration rather than break up with the multilateral trade regime. 5 1.3 Introduction Rhetoric regarding trade wars has become more salient in recent years. Nonetheless, disputes involving restrictions on cross-border exchanges of goods and services are not novel phenomenon. In fact, trade conflict can be traced
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Agricultural Policy for the 21St Century
    CONTENTS Introduction 1 Major Agricultural Subsidy Programs 2 Crop Insurance 2 ARC 3 PLC 3 Damage to Taxpayers 3 Environmental Damage 5 Trade Distortions 5 Stalled Liberalization and Damage to Developing Countries 5 WTO Violations 6 Policy Recommendations 7 Eliminate tariffs and cut subsidies 7 Expand international trade 7 Conclusion 7 About the Author 7 and ranchers. A year later, the administration levied “nation- R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 200 al security” tariffs on imported steel from virtually every July 2020 country in the world, including long-standing allies. Like- wise, the president began a two-year trade war with China over Beijing’s allegedly unfair and burdensome trade policy practices. The consequences of the president’s moves were entirely predictable as foreign retaliation fell heavily on AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR American agriculture and exports fell.3 THE 21ST CENTURY In response, President Trump directed the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to provide about $28 By Clark Packard billion in additional aid to beleaguered American agricul- ture producers who saw their foreign market access erode due to retaliatory tariffs.4 As a result, the USDA dusted off a INTRODUCTION New Deal-era program, the Commodity Credit Corporation he United States is one of the largest agriculture pro- (CCC), to facilitate payments to farmers. Yet, recent research ducers in the world. In fact, agriculture is so abun- shows that certain politically favored farmers received pay- dant in the United States farmers and ranchers are ments well in excess of their actual losses.5 Likewise, much able to export about 20 percent of what they produce of the aid was directed to wealthy, well-connected corporate Tfor foreign consumption.1 Much of the nation’s dominance farms rather than small, needier ones.6 in international agriculture markets is due to technological advantages, but all is not well with American agricultural In January 2020, the United States and China signed a policy.
    [Show full text]
  • Trade: Trade and Investment Frameworks
    The G20 Research Group at Trinity College at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy in the University of Toronto presents the 2017 G20 Hamburg Summit Final Compliance Report 8 July 2017 to 30 October 2018 Prepared by Sophie Barnett, Hélène Emorine and the G20 Research Group, Toronto, and Irina Popova, Andrey Shelepov, Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Ignatov and the Center for International Institutions Research of the Russian Presidential AcadeMy of National EconoMy and Public AdMinistration, Moscow 29 November 2018 www.g20.utoronto.ca [email protected] “The University of Toronto … produced a detailed analysis to the extent of which each G20 country has met its commitments since the last summit … I think this is important; we come to these summits, we make these commitments, we say we are going to do these things and it is important that there is an organisation that checks up on who has done what.” — David Cameron, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, at the 2012 Los Cabos Summit Contents Preface ................................................................................................................................................................... 3 G20 Research Group Research Team ............................................................................................................. 4 G20 Research Group Lead Analysts ........................................................................................................... 4 G20 Research Group Analysts ....................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing Trade Agendas in the US Presidential Campaign
    PIIE Briefi ng 16-6 Assessing Trade Agendas in the US Presidential Campaign Marcus Noland, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Sherman Robinson, and Tyler Moran SEPTEMBER 2016 CONTENTS Preface 3 1 Could a President Trump Shackle Imports? 5 Gary Clyde Hufbauer 2 Impact of Clinton’s and Trump’s Trade Proposals 17 Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tyler Moran 3 A Diminished Leadership Role for the United States 40 Marcus Noland Appendix A Disaggregation Methodology 45 © 2016 Peterson Institute for International Economics. All rights reserved. The Peterson Institute for International Economics is a private nonpartisan, nonprofit institution for rigorous, intellectually open, and indepth study and discussion of international economic policy. Its purpose is to identify and analyze important issues to make globalization beneficial and sustainable for the people of the United States and the world, and then to develop and communicate practical new approaches for dealing with them. Its work is funded by a highly diverse group of philanthropic foundations, private corporations, and interested individuals, as well as income on its capital fund. About 35 percent of the Institute’s resources in its latest fiscal year were provided by contributors from outside the United States. A list of all financial supporters for the preceding six years is posted at https://piie.com/sites/default/files/supporters.pdf. Preface International trade is a more prominent issue in this year’s presidential campaign than it has been in de- cades, if ever. Certainly, some of this attention is due to the combination of stagnating average incomes in the United States over the long term and the severe damage wrought by the American financial crisis of 2008–10.
    [Show full text]
  • The Lost Generation in American Foreign Policy How American Influence Has Declined, and What Can Be Done About It
    September 2020 Perspective EXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE JAMES DOBBINS, GABRIELLE TARINI, ALI WYNE The Lost Generation in American Foreign Policy How American Influence Has Declined, and What Can Be Done About It n the aftermath of World War II, the United States accepted the mantle of global leadership and worked to build a new global order based on the principles of nonaggression and open, nondiscriminatory trade. An early pillar of this new Iorder was the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction, which British histo- rian Norman Davies has called “an act of the most enlightened self-interest in his- tory.”1 America’s leaders didn’t regard this as charity. They recognized that a more peaceful and more prosperous world would be in America’s self-interest. American willingness to shoulder the burdens of world leadership survived a costly stalemate in the Korean War and a still more costly defeat in Vietnam. It even survived the end of the Cold War, the original impetus for America’s global activ- ism. But as a new century progressed, this support weakened, America’s influence slowly diminished, and eventually even the desire to exert global leadership waned. Over the past two decades, the United States experienced a dramatic drop-off in international achievement. A generation of Americans have come of age in an era in which foreign policy setbacks have been more frequent than advances. C O R P O R A T I O N Awareness of America’s declining influence became immunodeficiency virus (HIV) epidemic and by Obama commonplace among observers during the Barack Obama with Ebola, has also been widely noted.
    [Show full text]
  • Automobile Industry: SUV Category
    Name: Loveesh Bhatt MMS-Marketing , 20 Automobile Industry: SUV Category Leader : Mahindra and Mahindra M&M with their recent launches have made it to the number one position in the SUV category in Indian market. M&M have been very precise and accurate in understanding the customer’s needs and what customer wants from a SUV. Since its launch of Scorpio, M&M have been consistent in their sales record. M&M have been strong internationally as well. Mahindra & Mahindra is a major automobile manufacturer of utility vehicles, passenger cars, pickups, commercial vehicles, and two wheelers in various countries. Its tractors are sold on six continents. It has acquired plants in China[10] and the United Kingdom,[11] and has three assembly plants in the USA. M&M has partnerships with international companies like Renault SA, France[12] and International Truck and Engine Corporation, USA. At the 2008 Delhi Auto Show, Mahindra executives said the company is pursuing an aggressive product expansion program that would see the launch of several new platforms and vehicles over the next three years, including an entry-level SUV designed to seat five passengers and powered by a small turbodiesel engine.[19] True to their word, Mahindra & Mahindra launched the Mahindra Xylo in January 2009, and as of June 2009, the Xylo has sold over 15000 units.[20] Also in early 2008, Mahindra commenced its first overseas CKD operations with the launch of the Mahindra Scorpio in Egypt,[21] in partnership with the Bavarian Auto Group. This was soon followed by assembly facilities in Brazil.
    [Show full text]
  • Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Industrial Fasteners, Machine Tools and Beyond David D
    Maryland Journal of International Law Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 4 Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Industrial Fasteners, Machine Tools and Beyond David D. Knoll Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation David D. Knoll, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Industrial Fasteners, Machine Tools and Beyond, 10 Md. J. Int'l L. 55 (1986). Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol10/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SECTION 232 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962: INDUSTRIAL FASTENERS, MACHINE TOOLS AND BEYOND By DAVID D. KNOLL B.Com., LL.B University of New South Wales; LL.M University of Michigan; Attorney, Solicitor and Proctor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales; Associate with Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue, Cleveland, Ohio. I. THE NEED FOR IMPORT CONTROLS AND NATIONAL SE- CURITY IN UNITED STATES LAW ....................... 55 II. THE NEED FOR IMPORT CONTROL PURSUANT TO SECTION 232 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT ................... 56 A . Legislative H istory ............................ 56 B. Deterrence, Security and Free Trade in the 1980s . 59 III. G.A.T.T. IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION 232 .............. 60 IV. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES FOR A SECTION 232 INVESTIGATION 61 V. THE PROCESS OF A SECTION 232 INVESTIGATION ....... 64 VI.
    [Show full text]
  • Sector Specific Discussions and Negotiations on Goods in the Gatt and Wto
    WORLD TRADE TN/MA/S/13 24 January 2005 ORGANIZATION (05-0294) Negotiating Group on Market Access SECTOR SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS ON GOODS IN THE GATT AND WTO Note by the Secretariat1 I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................2 II. SECTOR SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS.....................................................................................3 III. SECTORAL NEGOTIATIONS ..............................................................................................4 A. KENNEDY ROUND (1964-1967).............................................................................................5 B. TOKYO ROUND (1973-1979) ..................................................................................................6 C. URUGUAY ROUND (1986-1994) ............................................................................................8 D. POST URUGUAY ROUND SECTORAL NEGOTIATIONS (1995 – TO DATE)................10 E. ACCESSIONS TO THE WTO.................................................................................................11 IV. ELEMENTS IN A SECTORAL NEGOTIATION..............................................................12 ANNEX 1 - SECTORAL NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE KENNEDY ROUND (1964-1967)............................................................................................................................................14 ANNEX 2 - SECTORAL NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE TOKYO ROUND (1973-1979)............................................................................................................................................16
    [Show full text]
  • The Making of a World Trading Power the European Economic Community (EEC) in the GATT Kennedy Round Negotiations (1963–67)
    The Making of a World Trading Power The European Economic Community (EEC) in the GATT Kennedy Round Negotiations (1963–67) Lucia Coppolaro THE MAKING OF A WORLD TRADING POWER Modern Economic and Social History Series General Editor: Derek H. Aldcroft Titles in this series include: Economics in Russia Studies in Intellectual History Edited by Vincent Barnett and Joachim Zweynert Mining Tycoons in the Age of Empire, 1870–1945 Entrepreneurship, High Finance, Politics and Territorial Expansion Edited by Raymond E. Dumett British Conservatism and Trade Unionism, 1945–1964 Peter Dorey The International Order of Asia in the 1930s and 1950s Edited by Shigeru Akita and Nicholas J. White Personal Capitalism and Corporate Governance British Manufacturing in the First Half of the Twentieth Century Myrddin John Lewis, Roger Lloyd-Jones, Josephine Maltby and Mark David Matthews A Decent Provision Australian Welfare Policy, 1870 to 1949 John Murphy Commerce and Culture Nineteenth-Century Business Elites Edited by Robert Lee The Eclipse of ‘Elegant Economy’ The Impact of the Second World War on Attitudes to Personal Finance in Britain Martin Cohen The American Reaper Harvesting Networks and Technology, 1830–1910 Gordon M. Winder Land, Proto-Industry and Population in Catalonia, c. 1680–1829 An Alternative Transition to Capitalism? Julie Marfany The Making of a World Trading Power The European Economic Community (EEC) in the GATT Kennedy Round Negotiations (1963–67) LUCIA COPPOLARO Institute of Social Sciences – University of Lisbon © Lucia Coppolaro 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
    [Show full text]
  • 10Chapter Trade Policy in Developing Countries
    M10_KRUG3040_08_SE_C10.qxd 1/10/08 7:26 PM Page 250 10Chapter Trade Policy in Developing Countries o far we have analyzed the instruments of trade policy and its objectives without specifying the context—that is, without saying much about the Scountry undertaking these policies. Each country has its own distinctive history and issues, but in discussing economic policy one difference between countries becomes obvious: their income levels. As Table 10-1 suggests, nations differ greatly in their per-capita incomes. At one end of the spectrum are the developed or advanced nations, a club whose members include Western Europe, several countries largely settled by Europeans (including the United States), and Japan; these countries have per-capita incomes that in many cases exceed $30,000 per year. Most of the world’s population, however, live in nations that are substantially poorer. The income range among these developing countries1 is itself very wide. Some of these countries, such as Singapore, are in fact on the verge of being “graduated” to advanced country status, both in terms of official statistics and in the way they think about themselves. Others, such as Bangladesh, remain desperately poor. Nonetheless, for virtually all developing countries the attempt to close the income gap with more advanced nations has been a central concern of economic policy. Why are some countries so much poorer than others? Why have some coun- tries that were poor a generation ago succeeded in making dramatic progress, while others have not? These are deeply disputed questions, and to try to answer them—or even to describe at length the answers that economists have proposed over the years—would take us outside the scope of this book.
    [Show full text]
  • Problem 1 on Infant Industry Argument Ha-Joon Chang, an Economist At
    Homework 2 International Economics Problem 1 On infant industry argument Ha-Joon Chang, an economist at Cambridge University, in his 2002 book, “ Kicking Away the Ladders: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective” , argued that just like yesterday’s Britain, today’s US’ preaching free trade to less advanced countries was like someone trying to “kick away the ladder” with which he had climbed to the top. He concluded that since developed countries today almost all once adopted protectionist policies when they were developing countries, and they became rich, thus today’s developing countries are justified to use the same protectionist industrial policies. Assuming all the facts stated by Chang are right, do you agree with his reasoning and policy recommendation? Explain. (A brief description of his book and main arguments is attached at the end) Problem 2 Interest Parity Condition and Exchange Rate Determination Do problem #9 of Chapter 13 (on page 345). 1 Homework 2 International Economics Attachment - Kicking Away the Ladder : How the Economic and Intellectual Histories of Capitalism Have Been Re- Written to Justify Neo-Liberal Capitalism Ha-Joon Chang (Cambridge University, UK) There is currently great pressure on developing countries to adopt a set of “good policies” and “good institutions” – such as liberalisation of trade and investment and strong patent law – to foster their economic development. When some developing countries show reluctance in adopting them, the proponents of this recipe often find it difficult to understand these countries’ stupidity in not accepting such a tried and tested recipe for development. After all, they argue, these are the policies and the institutions that the developed countries had used in the past in order to become rich.
    [Show full text]
  • Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and Its Role in U.S
    Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy J. F. Hornbeck Specialist in International Trade and Finance August 5, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R41922 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy Summary Congress created Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to help workers and firms adjust to dislocation that may be caused by increased trade liberalization. It is justified now, as it was then, on grounds that the government has an obligation to help the “losers” of policy-driven trade opening. TAA is also presented as an alternative to policies that would restrict imports, and so provides assistance while bolstering freer trade and diminishing prospects for potentially costly tension (retaliation) among trade partners. As in the past, critics strongly debate the merits of TAA on equity, efficiency, and budgetary grounds. Nonetheless, finding agreement on TAA remains important for forging a compromise on national trade policy. TAA program authorizations are scheduled to expire on December 31, 2013. The Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2013 (S. 1357) was introduced in the 113th Congress. It would extend TAA programs through 2020. President Obama also supports TAA reauthorization, linking it to renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which Congress may also take up this year. This report discusses the role of TAA in U.S. trade policy from its inception as a legislative option in the early 1950s to its core role as a cornerstone of modern trade policy that many argue has served to promote the long-term U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • February . 1.1, E X T E N S I 0 N S 0 F R E· M a R
    2374 CONGRESSIONAL ~ RECORD-· SENATE February . 1.1, we are hypnotized by' this", -and by overly ,.. It is up- to ..us- who now occupy .om.ce ·· Lt. Gen. Alfred Dodd Starbird, 018961, meticulous: attention-to the question of in the legislative.. and executive branches Army of the United States (brigadier gen­ of all who 'Of­ e:tal, U.S. Army). whether or- not the military menace to the Government, ·and have Maj. Gen. William Jonas Ely, 018974, Army us Is inereased or decreased fractionally ficial responsibilities, earnestly to search o! the United States (brigadier general, U.S. by the l)reseoce or absence of certain for an answer to·the problem, and ear­ .Army). tYPes -or quantities of military forces, nestly and ' honestly apply ourselves in Maj. Gen. Harold Keith Johnson, 019187, it tna.y very well be that we will fail to o.ur respective ways and in keeping with Army of the United States (brigadier gen­ face up to the basic problem-the fact our obligations to apply policies that eral, U.S. Army) • that international communism has been will meet the problem and bring about a Maj. Gen. Ben Harrell, 019276, Army of is the United States (brigadier general, U.S. established and being maintained in remedy. I know that we can do it. I Arm.y). the Western Hemisphere. believe that we shall do it. I also. believe Maj. Gen. Alden Kingsland Sibley, 018964, The American people, I believe, look that there is no time to ·be lost. Army of the United States (brigadier gen- for a very simple and' fundamental thing Mr.
    [Show full text]