Trump's Trade War Timeline: an Up-To-Date Guide
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Agricultural Policy for the 21St Century
CONTENTS Introduction 1 Major Agricultural Subsidy Programs 2 Crop Insurance 2 ARC 3 PLC 3 Damage to Taxpayers 3 Environmental Damage 5 Trade Distortions 5 Stalled Liberalization and Damage to Developing Countries 5 WTO Violations 6 Policy Recommendations 7 Eliminate tariffs and cut subsidies 7 Expand international trade 7 Conclusion 7 About the Author 7 and ranchers. A year later, the administration levied “nation- R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 200 al security” tariffs on imported steel from virtually every July 2020 country in the world, including long-standing allies. Like- wise, the president began a two-year trade war with China over Beijing’s allegedly unfair and burdensome trade policy practices. The consequences of the president’s moves were entirely predictable as foreign retaliation fell heavily on AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR American agriculture and exports fell.3 THE 21ST CENTURY In response, President Trump directed the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to provide about $28 By Clark Packard billion in additional aid to beleaguered American agricul- ture producers who saw their foreign market access erode due to retaliatory tariffs.4 As a result, the USDA dusted off a INTRODUCTION New Deal-era program, the Commodity Credit Corporation he United States is one of the largest agriculture pro- (CCC), to facilitate payments to farmers. Yet, recent research ducers in the world. In fact, agriculture is so abun- shows that certain politically favored farmers received pay- dant in the United States farmers and ranchers are ments well in excess of their actual losses.5 Likewise, much able to export about 20 percent of what they produce of the aid was directed to wealthy, well-connected corporate Tfor foreign consumption.1 Much of the nation’s dominance farms rather than small, needier ones.6 in international agriculture markets is due to technological advantages, but all is not well with American agricultural In January 2020, the United States and China signed a policy. -
Trade: Trade and Investment Frameworks
The G20 Research Group at Trinity College at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy in the University of Toronto presents the 2017 G20 Hamburg Summit Final Compliance Report 8 July 2017 to 30 October 2018 Prepared by Sophie Barnett, Hélène Emorine and the G20 Research Group, Toronto, and Irina Popova, Andrey Shelepov, Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Ignatov and the Center for International Institutions Research of the Russian Presidential AcadeMy of National EconoMy and Public AdMinistration, Moscow 29 November 2018 www.g20.utoronto.ca [email protected] “The University of Toronto … produced a detailed analysis to the extent of which each G20 country has met its commitments since the last summit … I think this is important; we come to these summits, we make these commitments, we say we are going to do these things and it is important that there is an organisation that checks up on who has done what.” — David Cameron, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, at the 2012 Los Cabos Summit Contents Preface ................................................................................................................................................................... 3 G20 Research Group Research Team ............................................................................................................. 4 G20 Research Group Lead Analysts ........................................................................................................... 4 G20 Research Group Analysts .................................................................................................................... -
Donald Trump Division and Union EPISODE TRANSCRIPT
Donald Trump Division and union EPISODE TRANSCRIPT Listen to Presidential at http://wapo.st/presidential This transcript was run through an automated transcription service and then lightly edited for clarity. There may be typos or small discrepancies from the podcast audio. LILLIAN CUNNINGHAM: Nearly a year ago, I started a journey back in time through the American presidency. I left the newsroom and drove down along the dark Potomac River to Mount Vernon, George Washington's home, on a cold winter night. There were crackling fires and reanactors. What I didn't mention back in that very first episode, though, was that there was also pop music piped in over the stereo system, making it really hard to record those little fire sounds. This whole project has kind of been that way. Things haven't gone as planned -- tape recorders have broken, Lyndon Johnson experts have fallen sick with laryngitis right before interviews. But even more than those unexpected twists and turns, is that the present has shown up over and over and over in the past. Fast forward 44 weeks to last night -- election night. And suddenly, all I could see was the past poking its way into the present. I watched the results roll in on the newsroom screens until early into the morning. And I thought about all the elections that have come before. George H.W. Bush sitting alone in his hotel room, mourning his loss to Bill Clinton in 1992. The Chicago Tribune going to press with the wrong headline about Dewey defeating Truman in 1948. -
Estimating the Market Effect of a Trade War: the Case of Soybean Tariffs
Estimating the Market Effect of a Trade War: The Case of Soybean Tariffs Michael K. Adjemian, University of Georgia, Athens, GA1 Aaron Smith, University of California, Davis, CA Wendi He, University of California, Davis, CA Abstract: In 2018, China retaliated to U.S. trade actions by levying a 25% retaliatory tariff on U.S. soybean exports. That tariff shifted market preferences so that Chinese buyers—who make up a substantial share of total world consumption—favored Brazilian soybeans. We use the relative price of a substitute (RPS) method to estimate that the resulting trade disruption effectively drove a wedge into the world soybean market, lowering U.S. prices at Gulf export locations by $0.74/bu on average for about five months, and increasing Brazilian prices by about $0.97/bu, compared to what would have been observed without the tariff in place. By the end of that period, world markets adjusted and the soybean prices in both countries returned to the ex-ante state of near parity, although the U.S. export volume did not recover until the end of the following marketing year. Our price impact estimate is substantially lower than subsequent U.S. government “trade aid” payments to American soybean producers: although actual payments to producers varied based on county-level differences, USDA’s nominal calculation of the commodity- specific payment rate for soybeans under MFP summed to $3.70 for two bushels produced over the course of two years. We project that USDA’s near-$8.5 billion in trade aid to U.S. soybean producers exceeded the tariff damage by about $5.4 billion. -
Assessing Trade Agendas in the US Presidential Campaign
PIIE Briefi ng 16-6 Assessing Trade Agendas in the US Presidential Campaign Marcus Noland, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Sherman Robinson, and Tyler Moran SEPTEMBER 2016 CONTENTS Preface 3 1 Could a President Trump Shackle Imports? 5 Gary Clyde Hufbauer 2 Impact of Clinton’s and Trump’s Trade Proposals 17 Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tyler Moran 3 A Diminished Leadership Role for the United States 40 Marcus Noland Appendix A Disaggregation Methodology 45 © 2016 Peterson Institute for International Economics. All rights reserved. The Peterson Institute for International Economics is a private nonpartisan, nonprofit institution for rigorous, intellectually open, and indepth study and discussion of international economic policy. Its purpose is to identify and analyze important issues to make globalization beneficial and sustainable for the people of the United States and the world, and then to develop and communicate practical new approaches for dealing with them. Its work is funded by a highly diverse group of philanthropic foundations, private corporations, and interested individuals, as well as income on its capital fund. About 35 percent of the Institute’s resources in its latest fiscal year were provided by contributors from outside the United States. A list of all financial supporters for the preceding six years is posted at https://piie.com/sites/default/files/supporters.pdf. Preface International trade is a more prominent issue in this year’s presidential campaign than it has been in de- cades, if ever. Certainly, some of this attention is due to the combination of stagnating average incomes in the United States over the long term and the severe damage wrought by the American financial crisis of 2008–10. -
Developing Countries' Response to Trade Disputes
WPS8640 Policy Research Working Paper 8640 Public Disclosure Authorized Traders’ Dilemma Developing Countries’ Response to Trade Disputes Public Disclosure Authorized Shantayanan Devarajan Delfin S. Go Csilla Lakatos Sherman Robinson Karen Thierfelder Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Development Economics Development Prospects Group November 2018 Policy Research Working Paper 8640 Abstract If trade tensions between the United States and certain trade agreements (RTAs) with all regions outside the United trading partners escalate into a full-blown trade war, what States; and (iv) option (iii) and unilaterally liberalize tariffs should developing countries do? Using a global, gener- on imports from the United States. The results show that al-equilibrium model, this paper first simulates the effects joining the trade war is the worst option for developing of an increase in U.S. tariffs on imports from all regions to countries (twice as bad as doing nothing), while forming about 30 percent (the average non-Most Favored Nation RTAs with non-U.S. regions and liberalizing tariffs on tariff currently applied to imports from Cuba and the U.S. imports (“turning the other cheek”) is the best. The Democratic Republic of Korea) and retaliation in kind reason is that a trade war between the United States and its by major trading partners—the European Union, China, major trading partners creates opportunities for developing Mexico, Canada, and Japan. The paper then considers four countries to increase their exports to these markets. Liberal- possible responses by developing countries to this trade war: izing tariffs increases developing countries’ competitiveness, (i) join the trade war; (ii) do nothing; (iii) pursue regional enabling them to capitalize on these opportunities. -
Donald Trump 72 for Further Research 74 Index 76 Picture Credits 80 Introduction
Contents Introduction 4 A Bet Th at Paid Off Chapter One 8 Born Into a Wealthy Family Chapter Two 20 Winning and Losing in Business Chapter Th ree 31 Celebrity and Politics Chapter Four 43 An Unconventional Candidate Chapter Five 55 Trump Wins Source Notes 67 Timeline: Important Events in the Life of Donald Trump 72 For Further Research 74 Index 76 Picture Credits 80 Introduction A Bet That Paid Off n June 16, 2015, reporters, television cameras, and several hun- Odred people gathered in the lobby of Trump Tower, a fi fty-eight- story skyscraper in Manhattan. A podium on a stage held a banner with the slogan “Make America Great Again!” All heads turned as sixty-nine-year-old Donald John Trump made a grand entrance, rid- ing down a multistory escalator with his wife, Melania. Trump biogra- pher Gwenda Blair describes the scene: “Gazing out, they seemed for a moment like a royal couple viewing subjects from the balcony of the palace.”1 Trump fl ashed two thumbs up and took his place on the stage to proclaim his intention to campaign for the Republican nomination for president. Unlike the other politicians hoping to be elected president in No- vember 2016, Trump was a billionaire and international celebrity who had been in the public eye for decades. Trump was known as a negotia- tor, salesman, television personality, and builder of glittering skyscrap- ers. He was involved in high-end real estate transactions, casinos, golf courses, beauty pageants, and the reality show Th e Apprentice. Trump’s name was spelled out in shiny gold letters on luxury skyscrapers, golf courses, resorts, and other properties throughout the world. -
US Tariffs: EU Response and Fears of a Trade War
AT A GLANCE US tariffs: EU response and fears of a trade war On 1 June 2018, US tariffs entered into force for steel and aluminium imports from the EU, Canada and Mexico, following US President Donald Trump's decision not to extend temporary exemptions. Argentina, Australia, Brazil and South Korea managed to obtain permanent exemptions as a result of deals struck with the Trump Administration. For all other countries, the US tariffs had already taken effect at the end of March 2018. After talks with the Trump Administration failed to result in a permanent exemption, the EU responded to the new tariffs by lodging a complaint at the WTO and instituting rebalancing measures on specific US exports. A safeguard investigation on steel imports into the EU is also on-going. Other US trading partners have responded in similar ways, raising fears that this could be the start of a full-blown trade war that would harm economic growth. Background On 23 March 2018, US tariffs of 25 % on steel imports and 10 % on aluminium imports took effect, following two Section 232 investigations that had concluded that such imports threatened to impair US national security. One day earlier, however, President Trump had decided to grant exemptions until 1 May 2018 to the EU as well as to Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico and South Korea. The purpose of these exemptions was to provide these trading partners with an opportunity to discuss and address the Trump Administration's security concerns. On 30 April 2018, the US President decided to extend these temporary exemptions for another 30 days. -
Executive Summary • Since Taking Office, President Trump Has
Executive Summary • Since taking office, President Trump has unilaterally imposed numerous new tariffs on steel, aluminum, and a variety of goods from China, creating upward pressure on prices in the United States. • Based on 2019 import levels, U.S. and retaliatory tariffs currently impact over $460 billion of imports and exports, and President Trump’s tariffs are increasing annual consumer costs by roughly $57 billion annually. • The tariffs are having a notable impact on trade levels, decreasing both imports and exports, which reduces consumers’ options and further increases prices in the United States. Introduction One of President Trump’s most prominent policy actions since taking office has been to raise tariffs, which significantly harm the U.S. economy. Trade barriers such as tariffs increase the cost of both consumer and producer goods and depress the economic benefits of competition, inhibiting economic growth. Research suggests that the president’s tariffs have been directly responsible for reducing both imports and exports, raising prices, and reducing national welfare. Research also suggests that the entire cost of the tariffs has been borne by U.S. importers.1 The president’s tariffs, when combined with corresponding retaliation, threaten over $460 billion of traded goods annually. The following analysis calculates the overall impact these tariffs could have on the prices of goods in the United States. The Economic Cost of Current Tariffs This analysis focuses exclusively on the impact of tariffs unilaterally imposed by the president. These include tariffs—either enacted or officially ordered—under Section 232 or Section 301. Section 232 allows the president to impose trade barriers if the Department of Commerce finds that imports threaten U.S. -
Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations
Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations Updated July 6, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46236 SUMMARY R46236 Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations July 6, 2020 Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and fifth-most-populous country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the Peter J. Meyer potential to become a world power and periodically has been the focal point of U.S. policy in Specialist in Latin Latin America. Brazil’s rise to prominence has been hindered, however, by uneven economic American Affairs performance and political instability. After a period of strong economic growth and increased international influence during the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil has struggled with a series of domestic crises in recent years. Since 2014, the country has experienced a deep recession, record-high homicide rate, and massive corruption scandal. Those combined crises contributed to the controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). They also discredited much of Brazil’s political class, paving the way for right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro to win the presidency in October 2018. Since taking office in January 2019, President Jair Bolsonaro has begun to implement economic and regulatory reforms favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed hard-line security policies intended to reduce crime and violence. Rather than building a broad-based coalition to advance his agenda, however, Bolsonaro has sought to keep the electorate polarized and his political base mobilized by taking socially conservative stands on cultural issues and verbally attacking perceived enemies, such as the press, nongovernmental organizations, and other branches of government. -
Impeachment, Donald Trump and the Attempted Extortion of Ukraine
Pace Law Review Volume 40 Issue 2 Article 4 July 2020 IMPEACHMENT, DONALD TRUMP AND THE ATTEMPTED EXTORTION OF UKRAINE Lawrence J. Trautman [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Lawrence J. Trautman, IMPEACHMENT, DONALD TRUMP AND THE ATTEMPTED EXTORTION OF UKRAINE, 40 Pace L. Rev. 141 (2020) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact [email protected]. IMPEACHMENT, DONALD TRUMP AND THE ATTEMPTED EXTORTION OF UKRAINE Lawrence J. Trautman1 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 143 II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION FOR IMPEACHMENT ....................................................................... 144 A. Treason ......................................................................... 145 B. Bribery .......................................................................... 145 C. Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors ..................... 145 D. Impeachment Is An Emergency Measure .................. 146 III. HISTORY OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS ........................................................................ 148 A. President Andrew Johnson ......................................... 149 -
Impact of the U.S.-China Trade War on California Agriculture Colin A
Impact of the U.S.-China Trade War on California Agriculture Colin A. Carter and Sandro Steinbach The U.S. Administration’s attempt In a 2018 ARE Update article, Carter Overall, the trade war has done little to force economic policy reform analyzed the initial round of China’s to change Chinese policies but the in China by starting a trade war retaliatory tariffs and concluded that tariffs have harmed U.S. consum- has failed to meet its goals. China for wine, walnuts and table grapes, ers and reduced economic growth retaliated with import tariffs that there would be little export price in the United States. A recent study target U.S. agriculture. We review impact but a loss of market share for found that due to higher prices, U.S. the impact of China’s retaliatory California exporters in the Chinese consumers have lost $51 billion on tariffs on a collection of California market. For almonds and pistachios, purchased products such as textiles, agricultural products, including Carter concluded that the volume of apparel, furniture, leather goods, and fruits, nuts, and wine. For almonds U.S. exports would not be unduly other manufactured products. impacted. We show below that the and pistachios, the tariffs did not U.S. consumers of the seven agricul- export volume impacts on these com- reduce the volume of U.S. exports tural commodities analyzed in this modities turned out as anticipated by to China. However, the trade war article may have benefitted from Carter. With the retaliatory tariffs in diminished California exports of lower prices (due to diminished place, Chinese consumers ended up walnuts, wine, oranges, and table exports) if wholesale/retailers passed paying higher prices for almonds and grapes.