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SGOS Administration Guide (7.2.X) tion Guide e SGOS Administration Guide SGOS 7.2.x SGO.x SGOS 6.7.x i SGOS Administration Guide Broadcom, the pulse logo, Connecting everything, and Symantec are among the trademarks of Broadcom. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom Inc. and/or its subsidiaries. Copyright © 2021 Broadcom. All Rights Reserved. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom Inc. and/or its subsidiaries. For more information, please visit www.broadcom.com. Broadcom reserves the right to make changes without further notice to any products or data herein to improve reliability, function, or design. Information furnished by Broadcom is believed to be accurate and reliable. However, Broadcom does not assume any liability arising out of the application or use of this information, nor the application or use of any product or circuit described herein, neither does it convey any license under its patent rights nor the rights of others. Email: [email protected] Open source attributions are available in the ProxySG appliance online help. To view the attributions, click Help in the appliance to launch the help system, go to the TOC, and select Open Source Attributions for Blue Coat ProxySG. Document Number: 231-03113 Document Revision: SGOS 7.2.x—8/2021-L ii Contents Chapter 1: Introduction SGOS Documentation ...................................................................................................................... 22 Document Conventions ................................................................................................................... 24 Notes and Warnings......................................................................................................................... 25 About Procedures ............................................................................................................................. 26 Chapter 2: Accessing the Appliance Accessing the ProxySG Appliance Using the Management Console ....................................... 28 Accessing the ProxySG Appliance Using the CLI ....................................................................... 44 Section A: Configuring Basic Settings Configuring the ProxySG Appliance Name ................................................................................. 47 Changing the Login Parameters..................................................................................................... 48 Viewing the Appliance Serial Number ......................................................................................... 51 Configuring the System Time ......................................................................................................... 52 Synchronizing to the Network Time Protocol.............................................................................. 54 Appendix: Required Ports, Protocols, and Services .................................................................... 56 Chapter 3: Licensing Adding an Add-on License ............................................................................................................. 67 Enabling Automatic License Updates ........................................................................................... 68 Viewing the Current License Status............................................................................................... 69 Chapter 4: Controlling Access to the ProxySG Appliance Moderate Security: Restricting Management Console Access Through the Console Access Control List (ACL) .................................................................................................................... 77 Chapter 5: Backing Up the Configuration Section A: About Configuration Archives Section B: Archiving Quick Reference Archiving Quick Reference Table .................................................................................................. 87 Section C: Creating and Saving a Standard Configuration Archive Section D: Creating and Saving a Secure (Signed) Archive Section E: Preparing Archives for Restoration on New Devices Creating a Transferable Archive..................................................................................................... 97 Section F: Uploading Archives to a Remote Server Creating and Uploading an Archive to a Remote Server ......................................................... 106 Section G: Restoring a Configuration Archive 1 Section H: Sharing Configurations Section I: Troubleshooting Chapter 6: Explicit and Transparent Proxy Chapter 7: Managing Proxy Services Section A: Proxy Services Concepts Section B: Configuring a Service to Intercept Traffic Changing the State of a Service (Bypass/Intercept).................................................................. 136 Section C: Creating Custom Proxy Services Section D: Proxy Service Maintenance Tasks Section E: Global Options for Proxy Services Proxy Service Global Options ....................................................................................................... 149 Managing Licensed User Connection Limits (ProxySG to Server) ......................................... 156 Section F: Exempting Requests From Specific Clients Adding Static Bypass Entries........................................................................................................ 163 Section G: Trial or Troubleshooting: Restricting Interception From Clients or To Servers Restricted Intercept Topics............................................................................................................ 168 Section H: Reference: Proxy Services, Proxy Configurations, and Policy Chapter 8: Intercepting and Optimizing HTTP Traffic Section A: About the HTTP Proxy Section B: Changing the External HTTP (Transparent) Proxy Service to Intercept All IP Addresses on Port 80 Section C: Managing the HTTP Proxy Performance About the HTTP Object Caching Policy Global Defaults ......................................................... 191 Setting the HTTP Default Object Caching Policy....................................................................... 195 Section D: Selecting an HTTP Proxy Acceleration Profile Configuring the HTTP Proxy Profile ........................................................................................... 203 Section E: Using a Caching Service Enabling CachePulse...................................................................................................................... 206 Section F: Fine-Tuning Bandwidth Gain Allocating Bandwidth to Refresh Objects in Cache................................................................... 209 Section G: Caching Authenticated Data (CAD) and Caching Proxy Authenticated Data (CPAD) Section H: Viewing HTTP/FTP Statistics Viewing the Number of HTTP/HTTPS/FTP Objects Served.................................................. 221 Viewing the Number of HTTP/HTTPS/FTP Bytes Served ..................................................... 222 Viewing Active Client Connections............................................................................................. 223 2 Viewing HTTP/HTTPS/FTP Client and Server Compression Gain Statistics .................... 224 Section I: Supporting IWA Authentication in an Explicit HTTP Proxy Section J: Supporting Authentication on an Upstream Explicit Proxy Section K: Detect and Handle WebSocket Traffic How the ProxySG Appliance Handles an Upgrade Request................................................... 230 Feature Limitations......................................................................................................................... 232 Chapter 9: Managing the SSL Proxy Section A: Intercepting HTTPS Traffic Configuring the SSL Proxy in Explicit Proxy Mode.................................................................. 240 Warn Users When Accessing Websites with Untrusted Certificates...................................... 245 Section B: Configuring SSL Rules through Policy Section C: Offloading SSL Traffic to an SSL Visibility Appliance Section D: Viewing SSL Statistics Viewing SSL History Statistics...................................................................................................... 255 Section E: Using STunnel Configuring STunnel...................................................................................................................... 259 Viewing STunnel Results............................................................................................................... 262 Section F: Tapping Decrypted Data with Encrypted Tap Section G: Working with an HSM Appliance Working with the Thales Luna HSM........................................................................................... 269 Write HSM Policy ........................................................................................................................... 272 Section H: Advanced Topics Chapter 10: Managing the WebEx Proxy About Controlling the WebEx Application and File Uploads ................................................. 280 Enable HTTP Handoff.................................................................................................................... 281 Control Access to a WebEx Site with Policy............................................................................... 282 Control File Uploads with Policy ................................................................................................. 284 Control Desktop Sharing with Policy .......................................................................................... 287 WebEx Proxy Access Logging
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