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Right Reasoning: S. I. Hayakawa, Charles Sanders Peirce and the Scientific Method

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Right Reasoning: S. I. Hayakawa, Charles Sanders Peirce and the Scientific Method Article 1 Right reasoning: S. I. Hayakawa, Charles Sanders Peirce and the Scientific Method “When assessing the truth or falsehood of an idea, Peirce held that what matters most is the consequences that follow from the idea, as distinguished from the idea itself.” SHAWN TAYLOR* IN “The Aims and Tasks of General Semantics: Implications has a distinct advantage over all others in addressing human- of the Time-Binding Theory,” S. I. Hayakawa (1906–1992) kind’s common problems, and that is the method of science. distinguishes between three orientations—prescientific, anti- scientific, and scientific—and what implication each orienta- tion holds for the prospect of human agreement (1951 & 2001). Peirce’s Four Methods of Fixing Belief Similar themes that Hayakawa’s article addresses can be found In his now famous 1887 article, “The Fixation of Belief,” in an essay written more than six decades earlier by the Peirce examines four ways that people form beliefs. For Peirce, nineteenth-century American logician and mathematician, “fixation” means quite literally the prevalent tendency of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). Peirce (pronounced people to “fix on” to certain opinions or beliefs. Similarly, “purse”) is widely considered to be one of the most original Peirce employs the word “belief” as “that which a man is pre- thinkers in the history of philosophy and the greatest philoso- pared to act” (Wiener 1958, p.91). pher the United States has ever produced (Brent 1993, p.xiv; Popper 1972, p.212). Among his many and varied accomplish- 1. Tenacity. The first method of fixing belief is what Peirce ments, he is best known for writing the founding documents of calls the method of tenacity. This method operates most American pragmatism, “a method,” Peirce tells us, “of ascer- simply and directly when a person forms an opinion and taining the meaning of hard words and abstract conceptions” 1 stubbornly clings to it, despite all external influences. Facts (CP, vol.5, par.464). and experiences that do not accord with one’s beliefs are Peirce sought to understand the meaning of words and con- discarded in favor of those with which one feels most com- cepts according to their practical significance. Hayakawa fortable. This is akin to what Hayakawa called “wishful sought to explore the relationship between words, human thinking” or what Mark Twain satirically referred to as thought, and practical action. Peirce’s original work in semi- “corn-pone” opinions (Anderson 1972, p.5). It can be seen otics is by far the most thoroughgoing and sustained early at- operating where fervent beliefs, once formed, permit little tempt to give an account of signs and their interrelations. When to no outer verification or falsification. Like that of the pro- assessing the truth or falsehood of an idea, Peirce held that what verbial ostrich with its head in the sand, this method is a matters most is the consequences that follow from the idea, as welcome refuge from the rigors of individual thought and distinguished from the idea itself. Peirce, like Hayakawa, be- decision. lieved that of all the methods available for analyzing various 2. Authority. The second method, the method of authority, dif- kinds of claims, assertions, beliefs, and ideas, only one method fers from the first in that it commands assent through insti- 1 ANNUAL EDITIONS tutional means. This method, Peirce explains, “has… been allows people to arrive at conclusions that they have any one of the chief means of upholding correct theological reason to think are true” (Thayer 1973, p.115). and political doctrines.” These kinds of beliefs are enforced through the “will of the state,” a ruling aristocracy, an organized guild, or a professional priesthood (CP, vol.5, Limitations of Three of the Methods par.379). The purpose of such institutions, in large measure, The other three methods fail to meet the test of experience. is to instill “correct” beliefs. This is accomplished through systematic indoctrination to keep the population in igno- 1. The method of tenacity, for instance, turns out to be unwork- rance of everything that may create doubt. The method of able because it isolates people within the narrow confines of authority is similar to Hayakawa’s orientation of dependen- their preconceived thoughts and is therefore at odds with the cy, in which statements are accepted based on some form of larger social life of the human community. In Peirce’s authority, be it a parent, sacred text, political or religious words: “The social impulse is against it… Unless we make leader (p.179). As history has shown, dissenters who ques- ourselves hermits, we shall necessarily influence each oth- tion such systems of belief are often dealt with harshly. Pun- er’s opinions; so that the problem becomes how to fix be- ishment can take various forms, from the public humiliation lief, not in the individual merely, but in the community” that results f rom being tarred and feathered, to the formal (CP, vol.5, par.378). Nor, as Hayakawa points out, does this ritual of an inquisition, to the ghastly horror of genocide method help to make human agreement possible. Circum- (CP, vol.5, par.379). stances inevitably arise in which purely traditional beliefs 3. A Priori. In addition to the methods of tenacity and authority are discredited by their manifest conflict with the facts of is the third method, what Peirce calls a priori. This method experience. rests on propositions from philosophical discourse that are 2. The method of authority is also unsustainable. First, no insti- thought up prior to experience. The extent to which this tution can possibly legislate public opinion on all questions. method works depends on what thinkers find “agreeable to Since people have to form their opinions on many different reason” (CP, vol.5, par.382). While the a priori method has and complex questions, they will necessarily have to do this the advantage of being more intellectual than the first two by some other method, a method which will in some cases methods, it also has the disadvantage of being based on come to compete with the official one. Thus Hayakawa “taste” or intellectual “fashion.” The notion that fashion agrees with Peirce: “Under this orientation widespread hu- alone should dominate opinion has an immediate benefit; it man agreement would be possible if, and only if, everybody makes thought unnecessary by putting the highest intelli- in the world accepted the same parent-figure as authority” gence in reach of everyone. Further, people who follow the (p.180). Second, as different communities come into con- a priori method choose to believe that which is plausible tact with one another, some of their inhabitants will discov- and reasonable, but do not consult experience to see wheth- er that one and the same method leads to one opinion at er their beliefs agree with the facts. Hayakawa calls this the home and the opposite opinion abroad, and this too will cre- “scholastic tradition,” whereby abstruse expression and ar- ate doubts about the method (CP, vol.5, par.381). This is cane language are employed for the purpose of claiming to similar to what Hayakawa means when he writes, “… peo- have penetrated the meaning of what is in truth devoid of ple throughout history have never been able to get together any (p.181). Or, as the British philosopher Bertrand Russell in the acceptance of a common father-figure” (p.180). once wrote, “The more profound the philosopher, the more intricate and subtle his fallacies be in order to produce in 3. Nor has history been kind to the a priori method. Through- him the desired state of intellectual acquiescence” (1995, out the centuries, this method has tended to isolate thinkers pp.56–57). and their systems. The reason lies, according to Peirce, in the assumption of a single principle from which all valid 4. Scientific Investigation. The forth and final method is that knowledge is supposed to be deduced prior to experience. of scientific investigation. The method of science is based Still, this is the method which most philosophers have fol- on “real things,” according to Peirce, “whose characters are lowed down through the ages. While it has resulted in some entirely independent of our opinions about them” (CP, of the most consoling one-answer systems, this method has vol.5, par.384). Only this method, Peirce asserts, allows for been less edifying when it comes to establishing belief. In- “bad reasoning” as well as “good reasoning,” by testing stead of creating lasting agreement, the a priori method has whether the reasoning fits with “rough facts” external to the produced only a succession of changing intellectual fash- feelings and purposes of the method (CP, vol.5, par.385). ions. Belief has been fixed for certain periods, only to be Peirce reasoned that of the four methods of forming and disrupted by the next change in fashion (CP, vol.5, par.383). maintaining belief, the scientific method has one important advantage over the others. Where the other three methods have no objective controls or criteria for assessing beliefs The Scientific Method as Right Reasoning and therefore little reason for thinking they are true, the method of science is the only one that is self-correcting be- Of all the methods available to humankind, the scientific cause it is open to refutation on the basis of factual evi- method is the only valid method of fixing belief, for it is the dence. “It is the only method,” as one observer put it, “that only method by which beliefs must be tested and corrected by 2 Article 1. Right reasoning: S. I. Hayakawa, Charles Sanders Peirce and the Scientific Method what experience presents.
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