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Twitter Accounts Applied filters:active is TrueCountry is Russian Federation Country active Category User Account name Russian Federation TRUE Media @actualidadrt RT en Español Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @aksenov_sv Сергей Аксёнов Russian Federation TRUE Media @alexsalmondshow Alex Salmond Show Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @Amb_de_Russie РЗУ на Мадагаскаре Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @Amb_Ulyanov Mikhail Ulyanov Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @amb_yakovenko Alexander Yakovenko Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @AmbasadaRusije Russia in Serbia Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @AmbRus_Algerie Ambassade de Russie Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @ambrusburundi Amb Russe au Burundi Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @AmbRusCz Посольство России в Чехии Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @AmbRusFrance Russie en France Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @ambrusme Russia in Montenegro Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @AmbRusRCI Russie en RCI Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @AmbRusSenegal AmbRusSenegal Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @AmbrusSlo Russian Emb/Slovenia Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @AmbRusTun Посольство России в Тунисе �Ambassade de Russie Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @amrusbel Ambassade de Russie en Belgique Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @AntonChesnokov1 Anton Chesnokov Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @ASEANRussia Russian Mission to ASEAN Russian Federation TRUE Media @BoomBustRT RT Boom Bust Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @BRICSRussia2020 BRICSRussia2020 Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @camborusemba Russian Embassy, KHM Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @CG_Russia_Brno ГК России в Брно Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @CIS_Russia Роспостпредство СНГ Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @CoE_Russia RussianMissionCoE Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @consecrusemb_nz Консульский отдел, Веллингтон Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @ConsLv RusConsLV Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @ConsolatoRusso ConsolatoRussoMilano Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @consuladorussia ConsuladoRussiaRio Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @ConsulatulRus Russian Consulate General in Constanța �� Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @DaugavpilsRF ГК РФ в Даугавпилсе Russian Federation TRUE Media @de_sputnik Sputnik Deutschland Russian Federation TRUE Media @dinaratok_rt Dinara Toktosunova Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @DipacademyMID Дипломатическая академия МИД России Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @dmitrybalakin Дмитрий Балакин Dmitry Balakin Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @dpol_un Dmitry Polyanskiy Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @Ekatmid MFA of Russia � Yekaterinburg Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @emb_rus RusEmbVatican Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbaixadaRusPt Embaixada da Rússia Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @embaixadarussa Rússia no Brasil Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbajadaRusaES EmbajadaRusaES Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbajadaRusaVen EmbajadaRusaVEN Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @embassyofrussia Russia in RSA � Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @embrus_az Посольство России в Азербайджане Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @embrus_md Посольство России в Молдавии Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbRusaGuate EmbRusaGuate - Посольство России в Гватемале Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbRusBoliviaEs EmbRusBoliviaEs Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbRusBotswana RusEmbassy, Botswana Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbRusChile EmbRusChile Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbRusCuba Посольство России на Кубе Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbRusiaEnArgEs Embajada de Rusia,AR Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbRusiaMexico Embajada de Rusia en México Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbRusMoz Rússia em Moçambique Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbRusNicaragua Rusia en Nicaragua Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbRusPan Rusia en Panamá � Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbRusUruguay Rusia en Uruguay Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @EmbSergio EMB₽V_Sergio Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @en_forumafrica en_forumafrica Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @en_forumsochi Forum Sochi Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @en_forumvostok EEF Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @GazpromEN Gazprom Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @genconrfodessa ГК РФ в Одессе Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @gk_narva ГК РФ в Нарве Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @gk_russia_haifa Генконсульство РФ в Хайфе � Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @governmentrf Government of Russia Russian Federation TRUE Media @icymivideo ICYMI Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @in_embassy Chinese Embassy in Malta Russian Federation TRUE Media @InQuestionRT InQuestion Russian Federation TRUE Media @InTheNow In the NOW Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @irakly_rt Irakly Gachechiladze Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @israel_mid_ru Russia� in Israel Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @ItalyinRussia Italy in Russia Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @KazanMid МИД России Казань Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @KremlinRussia Президент России Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @kremlinrussia_e President of Russia Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @kultura_rsvk RSVK v Praze Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @LV_RUSEMBAS Посольство РФ в ЛР Russian Federation TRUE Media @m_simonyan Маргарита Симоньян Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @mae_rusia MAE de Rusia � Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MedvedevRussiaE Dmitry Medvedev Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @mfa_russia MFA Russia � Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @mid_amur МИД РФ Благовещенск Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @mid_astrakhan МИД РФ Астрахань Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_Kaliningrad Russian MFA in Kaliningrad � Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @mid_kamchatka МИД РФ Камчатка Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_Krasnodar МИД � Краснодар Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_OMSK МИД России в Омске Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_Orenburg МИД Оренбург Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_RF МИД России � Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_RF_ULANUDE МИД РФ Улан-Удэ Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_RnD Russian MFA in Rostov-on-Don Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_SAMARA МИД РФ_Самара Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_SARATOV МИД САРАТОВ Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_SPb МИД России в СПб Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_travel МИД России � ДСКЦ Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_Ufa МИД РФ_Уфа � Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_Vladivostok МИД РФ Владивосток Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MID_YS МИД РФ Ю-Сахалинск� Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MIDArkh МИД РФ Архангельск Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @midbarnaul Представительство МИД России в г.Барнауле Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MidMurm MIDMurm Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MIDNovosibirsk МИД Новосибирск Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MIDPetrozavodsk МИД РФ Петрозаводск Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @MidSmol МИД РФ Смоленск Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @mission_rf Russian Mission Vienna Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @mission_russian Russian Mission in Geneva Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @mod_russia Минобороны России Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @natomission_ru Russian Mission to NATO � Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @NKudashev Nikolay Kudashev Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @olympic_russia Olympic Russia Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @OSH_GENKON ГК России в Оше, КР Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @pc_mid_rf В помощь инкорам Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @pmsimferopol Russia's MFA in Crimea� Russian Federation TRUE Media @PortableTVApp Portable.TV App: Home of Thousands of Shows Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @pskovmid МИД � Псков MFA Pskov Office Russian Federation TRUE Media @rbth_es Russia Beyond ES Russian Federation TRUE Media @rbth_fr RUSSIA BEYOND (Fr) Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @RCCinTelAviv РКЦ в Тель-Авиве Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @rccusa Russian Cultural Centre in Washington, D.C. Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @rcgnewyork Consulate General of Russia in New York Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @rcnk_bishkek РЦНК в Бишкеке Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government @RCNKBrest RCNK Brest Russian Federation TRUE Diplomatic/Government
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