(CUWS) Outreach Journal # 1246

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(CUWS) Outreach Journal # 1246 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal CUWS Outreach Journal 1246 6 January 2017 Feature Item: “North Korea’s Musudan Missile: A Performance Assessment.” Authored by Ralph Savelsberg and James Kiessling; Published by 38 North; 20 December 2016. http://38north.org/2016/12/musudan122016/ During a military parade in 2010, a mockup of a new North Korean ballistic missile was driven through Pyongyang on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). This missile has since been called by many names depending on the public source: North Korean labels correspond to “Hwasong-10,” stories speculating about sales refer to the “BM-25” and US sources frequently refer to it as a “Musudan.” Superficially, the missile looks like a lengthened version of the Soviet R-27 Zyb/SS-N-6 “Serb,” a retired submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a listed range of 2,400 to 2,500 km. U.S. Nuclear Weapons 1. B-2 set to Carry Far Deadlier Nuclear Weapons to Justify Existence until the 2060s 2. US Tests Upgraded Nuclear-Armed, Submarine-Launched Trident II D5s 3. Fact: America's New Nuclear-Armed Submarines Must Serve for 42 Years (Until the 2080s) 4. Fleet of 12 Nuclear Submarines in Line for Pentagon Approval U.S. Counter-WMD 1. China's Missile Deployment in South China Sea Completely Reasonable: Expert 2. China Urges Proper Settlement with ROK on THAAD Issue 3. China and “Adjusting the Speed” of THAAD Deployment U.S. Arms Control 1. Putin Orders to Develop Missiles Capable of Penetrating any Defense Systems 2. Donald Trump Signals US Nuclear Arsenal Expansion until 'World Comes to Its Senses' 3. US Makes Basis for New Arms Race by Leaving Anti-Ballistic Missile Deal - Putin 4. Russia to Float Out 2 Nuclear Submarines in 2017 5. Borei-Class Submarines: Principal Component of Russia's Nuclear Triad 6. Diplomat Says Washington Seeks to Disrupt Nuclear Parity with Moscow Asia/Pacific 1. US Intel Images Suggest Another N. Korean Missile Launch Site 2. NK Leader Claims to Be in Last Phase of ICBM Testing 3. 'N. Korea SLBM with 1-Ton Nuclear Warhead Covers Entire S. Korea' 4. Trump Misguided, Ignorant over NK Nuke Issue: Experts 5. Trump: No DPRK Missile Will Be Capable of Reaching U.S. Issue No.1246, 6 January 2017 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama 6. North Korea Cannot ‘Tip’ Missile with Nuclear Warhead, US State Department Says 7. U.S. Warns N. Korea’s N-Capability ‘Improving’ 8. Jong-un Fixated on Protecting ICBM Program, Says Thae 9. N. Korea Completes Dock for Construction of 10,000-Ton Sub Europe/Russia 1. Russia’s Missile Forces to Fully Switch to Digital Data Transmission Technology by 2020 Middle East 1. 'Unrecoverable': Revealed N-Documents Show Iran Can Not Make Nuclear Weapons 2. Selling 70 Tons of Heavy Water Barometer of Iran's Nuclear Capabilities: Senior MP India/Pakistan 1. Nuclear-Capable Nirbhay Cruise Missile's Test Fails for the Fourth Time 2. EXCLUSIVE: DRDO's Cruise Missile Project Nirbhay on Verge of Closure 3. India’s Successful Test of Nuclear-Capable Agni 5 Leaves China Worried 4. Indian Strategic Forces Command Test-Fires 2,500-Mile Agni IV Ballistic Missiles 5. If India Makes More Long-Range ICBMs, Beijing May Help Pakistan Do the Same, Says Chinese State Media Commentary 1. An Arms Race Russia Will Not Run 2. 2017: Year of the North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missile? 3. India Needs to Cool its Missile Fever 4. Expert: ROK Shouldn't Imagine China Accepting THAAD Return to Top Issue No.1246, 6 January 2017 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal Yibada.com – New York, NY B-2 set to Carry Far Deadlier Nuclear Weapons to Justify Existence until the 2060s By Arthur Dominic Villasanta December 31, 2016 New and upgraded nuclear weapons will soon arm the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit strategic stealth bomber, extending the bomber's usefulness until the 2060s at least. Introduced in service with the U.S. Air Force in 1997, the B-2 will also receive the most modern and smartest conventional missiles in the Air Force inventory. The effective delivery of these weapons will be the task of the new Defensive Management System (DMS) that informs the two-man flight crew of the location of enemy air defenses. DMS is capable of automatically assessing the detection capabilities of identified threats and indicated targets. The upgraded nuclear weapons, however, will ensure the viability of the B-2 as a lethal strategic deterrent. One of these nukes is the B61 intermediate-yield strategic and tactical nuclear weapon. It's a "variable yield bomb" with a yield ranging from 0.3 to 340 kilotons. The bomb is 3.56 meters long and weighs some 320 kilograms. It can be dropped at a speed of Mach 2 or 2,500 km/h. The little known B61 is an air dropped gravity bomb, and one of only a few in the U.S. arsenal. The U.S. has produced 3,155 of these nuclear bombs since 1968. Of this total, some 200 are operational within the United States while 180 are deployed to NATO in Europe. A life-extension program for the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb (the latest version) will see this "dumb nuclear bomb" transformed into a smart nuclear bomb whose accuracy should rival bombs equipped with Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) GPS guidance kits. With the addition of a guided tail kit assembly, a smart B61-12 will have an accuracy, expressed in CEP (Circular Error Probability), of some 30 meters, which is far better than the CEP of 100 meters in its dumb bomb mode. The life extension program (LEP) for the B61-12 (or the B61 Mod 12), including the JDAM-like guided tail kit assembly, should come to $9.5 million, according to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA is a semi-autonomous department within the Department of Energy. NNSA said the B61-12 LEP "is the most complex B61-12 activity the nuclear security enterprise has undertaken in more than 20 years." Secretary of Defense Ash Carter said modernizing the B61 is part of the expensive and wide-ranging upgrades required to modernize the U.S. nuclear triad. Another new nuclear weapon for the B-2 will be the Long Range Stand-Off Missile or LRSO, an air- launched, nuclear cruise missile designed for America's strategic bomber fleet that includes the B-2, the B-52 and the Rockwell B-1 Lancer. LRSO will replace the AGM-86 Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) which is only carried by the B-52 bomber. http://en.yibada.com/articles/182306/20161231/b-2-set-carry-far-deadlier-nuclear-weapons- justify-existence.htm Return to Top Issue No.1246, 6 January 2017 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Scout Warrior.com – U.S. US Tests Upgraded Nuclear-Armed, Submarine-Launched Trident II D5s Nuclear-Armed Trident II D5 missiles rest in 44-foot long missile tubes built into ballistic missile submarines quietly patrolling the undersea domain - to ensure security and peace. By KRIS OSBORN Sunday, January 1, 2017 The US Navy is test-firing and upgrading its arsenal of Trident II D5 nuclear-armed submarine launched missiles designed to keep international peace -- by ensuring and undersea-fired second- strike ability in the event of a catastrophic nuclear first strike on the US. Firing from the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Florida several months ago, a specially configured non-armed “test” version of the missile was fired from the Navy’s USS Maryland. This was the 161st successful Trident II launch since design completion in 1989. The missile was converted into a test configuration using a test missile kit produced by Lockheed Martin that contains range safety devices, tracking systems and flight telemetry instrumentation, a Lockheed statement said. The Trident II D5 missile is deployed aboard U.S. Navy Ohio-class submarines and Royal Navy Vanguard-class to deter nuclear aggression. The three-stage ballistic missile can travel a nominal range of 4,000 nautical miles and carry multiple independently targeted reentry bodies. The U.S. and UK are collaboratively working on a common missile compartment for their next generation SSBNs, or ballistic missile submarines. The 130,000-pound Trident II D5 missile can travel 20,000-feet per second, according to Navy figures. The missiles cost $30 million each. The "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" futher describes the weapon -- "The Trident D5s carry three types of warheads: the 100-kiloton W76/Mk-4, the 100-kiloton W76-1/Mk-4A, and the 455-kiloton W88/Mk-5 warhead, the highest-yield ballistic missile warhead in the U.S. arsenal." Trident II D5 - Nuclear-Armed Missile Upgrade The Trident II D5, first fired in the 1990s, is an upgraded version of the 1970s-era Trident I nuclear weapon; the Trident II D5s were initially engineered to serve until 2027, however an ongoing series of upgrades are now working to extend its service life. The Navy is modernizing its arsenal of Trident II D5 nuclear missiles in order to ensure their service life can extend for 25 more years aboard the Navy’s nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet, service leaders said.
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