Book Reviews 03.1.1

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Book Reviews 03.1.1 Return of a King The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-42 By William Dalrymple New York: Random House LLC, 2013, 515 pages, ISBN 9780307948533. Reviewed by Sabeen Ahmed William Dalrymple, famed British counts from British and Russian in- historian and writer, is widely con- telligence officers and generals, and sidered as the leading modern schol- letters and journal entries penned by ar on South Asia and, especially, the Afghan political figures and Western British East India Company. His travelers – that paints vivid images scholarly journey takes him north of the beauty and humility of the Af- in his latest work, Return of a King: ghan people and countryside against The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-42, the horrors of British occupation. in which he narrates the events sur- rounding the first Anglo-Afghan War and de- The book’s opening chapters examine the tails one of the largest strategic and diplomatic social and political climate of Afghanistan disasters in the East India Company’s history. leading up to the 1839 War, from Shah Shuja Durrani’s fall and exile to the subsequent rise At its core, the novel is a sweeping epic that of Dost Mohammad Khan and the Barakzais. narrates the lives of Shah Shuja and Dost Mo- Alongside the emergence of Ranjit Singh’s Sikh hammad Khan, intricately and inadvertently Empire in Peshawar, Afghanistan quickly de- caught in the middle of the Great Game: the volves into a land of tribal conflict and regional imperial rivalry between the Russian and Brit- discord, ripe for interference from British and ish Empires as each vies for control of Central Russian forces, or the “Battle for Afghanistan.” Asia. Dalrymple manages to deliver a human- izing account of the Afghan rulers, outlining Much of the Anglo-Russo competition for Af- their struggles and failures, the disintegration ghanistan emerges as a product of paranoia, of the great Durrani Empire, and the subse- through competing intelligence reports gath- quent emergence of the Sadozai-Barakzai ri- ered by dashing Scotsman Alexander Burnes valry (a poignant parallel to the larger Russo- and Polish-turned-Russian-spy Ivan Vikto- Anglo rivalry) that stands as the central power rovitch Vitkevitch, two of the Great Game’s struggle of the War. This period in history, in earliest players. Burnes and his brilliantly in- which the Afghans were no more than “mere valuable Indian secretary and counselor, Mo- pawns on the chessboard of western diploma- han Lal Kashmiri, advise London on the po- cy, to be engaged or sacrificed at will,” is a bril- litical and social climate of Central Asia and liant echo of a modern Afghanistan, riddled urge the British to support Dost Mohammad with internal discord amid efforts to establish as Amir. Their counsel is ignored, however, a stable unity against external intervention (p. against Major Claude Wade’s appeal to restore 10). The book often reads more as a story than the Sadozais to the throne. The central chap- a historic narrative – colored by firsthand ac- ters follow Britain’s efforts to ally with and re- 2014 Summer 239 BOOK REVIEWS instate the exiled Shah Shuja – headed by Sir the hands of Afghan rebels led by Dost Mo- William Macnaghten, Major-General Wil- hammad’s ruthless son, Akbar Khan. While liam Elphinstone, and Lord Auckland – in the the British generals flounder in a remarkable hopes of using him to unify and exert British inability to salvage their position, Dalrymple’s influence over the region. The British army of Shah Shuja perseveres as a capable leader of a 20,000 traverse across the Indus and through failing regime, dedicated and determined to the Khyber Pass to Kabul, where they eas- the very end. ily remove the Amir and proceed to occupy the region for the next two years. It becomes “Shuja’s reign was brought down not by his quickly apparent, however, that overconfi- own faults but by the catastrophic mishandling dence, lack of regard for Afghan culture and of the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan society, and sheer tactical ignorance doom as managed by Auckland and Macnaghten, the British to a series of gross strategic er- and as lost by General Elphinstone” (p. 378). rors. As such, it is the Shuja-led British revolt against Dost Mohammad that comprises the Dalrymple’s treatise gives the reader a glimpse heart of the book, not for its political signifi- into a historical event of great significance; cance, but for its transformative and deeply one that, though almost 200 years past, sheds profound effect on Afghan politics, society, light on the political crises and social turmoil and stability. that have since plagued South and Central Asia. The author’s passion for the subject mat- “‘I have seen this country, sacred to the har- ter and dedication to his craft shine through mony of hallowed solitude, desecrated by the in the accessibility of his prose and use of ma- rude intrusion of senseless stranger boors, vile terial researched from British, Russian, and in habits, infamous in vulgar tastes, callous Persian sources, as well as his own visits to leaders in the sanguinary march of heedless the country in 2009 and 2010. The result is a conquests, who crushed the feeble heart and richly comprehensive picture of a fragmented hushed the merry voice of mirth, hilarity and Afghanistan caught in the midst of Western joy… To subdue and crush the masses of a na- imperialism. It is a sobering reminder of the tion by military force, when all are unanimous importance of cultural identity, societal his- in the determination to be free, is to attempt tory, and political traditions in shaping the the imprisonment of a whole people: all such motivations and complexities of a region and projects must be temporary and transient, and its people. Above all, it is a tragic and hum- terminate in a catastrophe…’” (p. 194). bling retelling of modern Afghanistan’s early history, a catalog of the wasted expenses and The Afghans – who for decades had witnessed lives on an “unnecessary war of dubious le- power transfers and general political unrest – gality,” and a testament to the perseverance of perceive their returned king as nothing more its flawed but ambitious rulers (p. 419). Shah than a puppet ruler on behalf of British self- Shuja’s vision for Afghanistan, as Dalrymple interest, and do not hesitate in declaring ji- writes, was not “an isolated and mountainous had against British presence in their country. backwater but instead as tied by alliances to The final chapter of the book details the blos- a wider world,” and although it is “sadly not soming distrust, resentment, and hate taking a vision that shows much sign, even today, root in the heart of the Afghan people, and of being realized,” it “has never completely the gory massacre of the British garrisons at died” (p. 378). 240 Insight Turkey.
Recommended publications
  • Pashtunistan: Pakistan's Shifting Strategy
    AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN PASHTUN ETHNIC GROUP PASHTUNISTAN: P AKISTAN ’ S S HIFTING S TRATEGY ? Knowledge Through Understanding Cultures TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER May 2012 Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? P ASHTUNISTAN : P AKISTAN ’ S S HIFTING S TRATEGY ? Knowledge Through Understanding Cultures TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER About Tribal Analysis Center Tribal Analysis Center, 6610-M Mooretown Road, Box 159. Williamsburg, VA, 23188 Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? The Pashtun tribes have yearned for a “tribal homeland” in a manner much like the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. And as in those coun- tries, the creation of a new national entity would have a destabilizing impact on the countries from which territory would be drawn. In the case of Pashtunistan, the previous Afghan governments have used this desire for a national homeland as a political instrument against Pakistan. Here again, a border drawn by colonial authorities – the Durand Line – divided the world’s largest tribe, the Pashtuns, into two the complexity of separate nation-states, Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they compete with other ethnic groups for primacy. Afghanistan’s governments have not recog- nized the incorporation of many Pashtun areas into Pakistan, particularly Waziristan, and only Pakistan originally stood to lose territory through the creation of the new entity, Pashtunistan. This is the foundation of Pakistan’s policies toward Afghanistan and the reason Pakistan’s politicians and PASHTUNISTAN military developed a strategy intended to split the Pashtuns into opposing groups and have maintained this approach to the Pashtunistan problem for decades. Pakistan’s Pashtuns may be attempting to maneuver the whole country in an entirely new direction and in the process gain primacy within the country’s most powerful constituency, the military.
    [Show full text]
  • The Causes of the First Anglo-Afghan War
    wbhr 1|2012 The Causes of the First Anglo-Afghan War JIŘÍ KÁRNÍK Afghanistan is a beautiful, but savage and hostile country. There are no resources, no huge market for selling goods and the inhabitants are poor. So the obvious question is: Why did this country become a tar- get of aggression of the biggest powers in the world? I would like to an- swer this question at least in the first case, when Great Britain invaded Afghanistan in 1839. This year is important; it started the line of con- flicts, which affected Afghanistan in the 19th and 20th century and as we can see now, American soldiers are still in Afghanistan, the conflicts have not yet ended. The history of Afghanistan as an independent country starts in the middle of the 18th century. The first and for a long time the last man, who united the biggest centres of power in Afghanistan (Kandahar, Herat and Kabul) was the commander of Afghan cavalrymen in the Persian Army, Ahmad Shah Durrani. He took advantage of the struggle of suc- cession after the death of Nāder Shāh Afshār, and until 1750, he ruled over all of Afghanistan.1 His power depended on the money he could give to not so loyal chieftains of many Afghan tribes, which he gained through aggression toward India and Persia. After his death, the power of the house of Durrani started to decrease. His heirs were not able to keep the power without raids into other countries. In addition the ruler usually had wives from all of the important tribes, so after the death of the Shah, there were always bloody fights of succession.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan: Political Exiles in Search of a State
    Journal of Political Science Volume 18 Number 1 Article 11 November 1990 Afghanistan: Political Exiles In Search Of A State Barnett R. Rubin Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Rubin, Barnett R. (1990) "Afghanistan: Political Exiles In Search Of A State," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 18 : No. 1 , Article 11. Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol18/iss1/11 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ,t\fghanistan: Political Exiles in Search of a State Barnett R. Ru bin United States Institute of Peace When Afghan exiles in Pakistan convened a shura (coun­ cil) in Islamabad to choose an interim government on February 10. 1989. they were only the most recent of exiles who have aspired and often managed to Mrule" Afghanistan. The seven parties of the Islamic Union ofM ujahidin of Afghanistan who had convened the shura claimed that. because of their links to the mujahidin fighting inside Afghanistan. the cabinet they named was an Minterim government" rather than a Mgovernment-in ­ exile. ~ but they soon confronted the typical problems of the latter: how to obtain foreign recognition, how to depose the sitting government they did not recognize, and how to replace the existing opposition mechanisms inside and outside the country. Exiles in Afghan History The importance of exiles in the history of Afghanistan derives largely from the difficulty of state formation in its sparsely settled and largely barren territory.
    [Show full text]
  • Nation Building Process in Afghanistan Ziaulhaq Rashidi1, Dr
    Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Abbreviated Key Title: Saudi J Humanities Soc Sci ISSN 2415-6256 (Print) | ISSN 2415-6248 (Online) Scholars Middle East Publishers, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Journal homepage: http://scholarsmepub.com/sjhss/ Original Research Article Nation Building Process in Afghanistan Ziaulhaq Rashidi1, Dr. Gülay Uğur Göksel2 1M.A Student of Political Science and International Relations Program 2Assistant Professor, Istanbul Aydin University, Istanbul, Turkey *Corresponding author: Ziaulhaq Rashidi | Received: 04.04.2019 | Accepted: 13.04.2019 | Published: 30.04.2019 DOI:10.21276/sjhss.2019.4.4.9 Abstract In recent times, a number of countries faced major cracks and divisions (religious, ethnical and geographical) with less than a decade war/instability but with regards to over four decades of wars and instabilities, the united and indivisible Afghanistan face researchers and social scientists with valid questions that what is the reason behind this unity and where to seek the roots of Afghan national unity, despite some minor problems and ethnic cracks cannot be ignored?. Most of the available studies on nation building process or Afghan nationalism have covered the nation building efforts from early 20th century and very limited works are available (mostly local narratives) had touched upon the nation building efforts prior to the 20th. This study goes beyond and examine major struggles aimed nation building along with the modernization of state in Afghanistan starting from late 19th century. Reforms predominantly the language (Afghani/Pashtu) and role of shared medium of communication will be deliberated. In addition, we will talk how the formation of strong centralized government empowered the state to initiate social harmony though the demographic and geographic oriented (north-south) resettlement programs in 1880s and how does it contributed to the nation building process.
    [Show full text]
  • Beyond 'Tribal Breakout': Afghans in the History of Empire, Ca. 1747–1818
    Beyond 'Tribal Breakout': Afghans in the History of Empire, ca. 1747–1818 Jagjeet Lally Journal of World History, Volume 29, Number 3, September 2018, pp. 369-397 (Article) Published by University of Hawai'i Press DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/jwh.2018.0035 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/719505 Access provided at 21 Jun 2019 10:40 GMT from University College London (UCL) Beyond ‘Tribal Breakout’: Afghans in the History of Empire, ca. 1747–1818 JAGJEET LALLY University College London N the desiccated and mountainous borderlands between Iran and India, Ithe uprising of the Hotaki (Ghilzai) tribes against Safavid rule in Qandahar in 1717 set in motion a chain reaction that had profound consequences for life across western, south, and even east Asia. Having toppled and terminated de facto Safavid rule in 1722,Hotakiruleatthe centre itself collapsed in 1729.1 Nadir Shah of the Afshar tribe—which was formerly incorporated within the Safavid political coalition—then seized the reigns of the state, subduing the last vestiges of Hotaki power at the frontier in 1738, playing the latter off against their major regional opponents, the Abdali tribes. From Kandahar, Nadir Shah and his new allies marched into Mughal India, ransacking its cities and their coffers in 1739, carrying treasure—including the peacock throne and the Koh-i- Noor diamond—worth tens of millions of rupees, and claiming de jure sovereignty over the swathe of territory from Iran to the Mughal domains. Following the execution of Nadir Shah in 1747, his former cavalry commander, Ahmad Shah Abdali, rapidly established his independent political authority.2 Adopting the sobriquet Durr-i-Durran (Pearl of 1 Rudi Matthee, Persia in Crisis.
    [Show full text]
  • Spy Culture and the Making of the Modern Intelligence Agency: from Richard Hannay to James Bond to Drone Warfare By
    Spy Culture and the Making of the Modern Intelligence Agency: From Richard Hannay to James Bond to Drone Warfare by Matthew A. Bellamy A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (English Language and Literature) in the University of Michigan 2018 Dissertation Committee: Associate Professor Susan Najita, Chair Professor Daniel Hack Professor Mika Lavaque-Manty Associate Professor Andrea Zemgulys Matthew A. Bellamy [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0001-6914-8116 © Matthew A. Bellamy 2018 DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to all my students, from those in Jacksonville, Florida to those in Port-au-Prince, Haiti and Ann Arbor, Michigan. It is also dedicated to the friends and mentors who have been with me over the seven years of my graduate career. Especially to Charity and Charisse. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Dedication ii List of Figures v Abstract vi Chapter 1 Introduction: Espionage as the Loss of Agency 1 Methodology; or, Why Study Spy Fiction? 3 A Brief Overview of the Entwined Histories of Espionage as a Practice and Espionage as a Cultural Product 20 Chapter Outline: Chapters 2 and 3 31 Chapter Outline: Chapters 4, 5 and 6 40 Chapter 2 The Spy Agency as a Discursive Formation, Part 1: Conspiracy, Bureaucracy and the Espionage Mindset 52 The SPECTRE of the Many-Headed HYDRA: Conspiracy and the Public’s Experience of Spy Agencies 64 Writing in the Machine: Bureaucracy and Espionage 86 Chapter 3: The Spy Agency as a Discursive Formation, Part 2: Cruelty and Technophilia
    [Show full text]
  • Great Game to 9/11
    Air Force Engaging the World Great Game to 9/11 A Concise History of Afghanistan’s International Relations Michael R. Rouland COVER Aerial view of a village in Farah Province, Afghanistan. Photo (2009) by MSst. Tracy L. DeMarco, USAF. Department of Defense. Great Game to 9/11 A Concise History of Afghanistan’s International Relations Michael R. Rouland Washington, D.C. 2014 ENGAGING THE WORLD The ENGAGING THE WORLD series focuses on U.S. involvement around the globe, primarily in the post-Cold War period. It includes peacekeeping and humanitarian missions as well as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom—all missions in which the U.S. Air Force has been integrally involved. It will also document developments within the Air Force and the Department of Defense. GREAT GAME TO 9/11 GREAT GAME TO 9/11 was initially begun as an introduction for a larger work on U.S./coalition involvement in Afghanistan. It provides essential information for an understanding of how this isolated country has, over centuries, become a battleground for world powers. Although an overview, this study draws on primary- source material to present a detailed examination of U.S.-Afghan relations prior to Operation Enduring Freedom. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. Cleared for public release. Contents INTRODUCTION The Razor’s Edge 1 ONE Origins of the Afghan State, the Great Game, and Afghan Nationalism 5 TWO Stasis and Modernization 15 THREE Early Relations with the United States 27 FOUR Afghanistan’s Soviet Shift and the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Sir Alexander Burnes 1805 - 1841 'Bokhara Burnes'
    Forfarshire Masonic Celebrities Sir Alexander Burnes 1805 - 1841 'Bokhara Burnes' 'Text taken from the Montrose Standard and Angus and Mearns Register - 3rd March 1865' Transcribed and Reproduced by Iain D McIntosh [October 2016] Forfarshire Masonic Celebrities Sir Alexander Burnes Sir Alexander Burnes 1805 to 1841 Killed at Kabul in 1841 along with his Brother Lt Charles Burnes (1812 - 1841) at the beginning of the 1st Anglo Afghan War Sir Alexander Burnes - I.D. McIntosh 2016 Page 2 Text from the “Montrose Standard and Angus and Mearns Register – 3rd March 1865.” In the present number of ‘Good Words’ the following very interesting sketch of the life of the late Sir Alexander Burnes, a native of Montrose, and brother to Mr Adam Burnes, writer is given by Mr John William Kaye under the head of “Our Indian Heroes.” The article is introduced by referring to the brilliant career of the late Joseph Hume in India, the influence it exercised over the mind of young Burnes, and the intimacy which arose between Mr James Burnes and Mr Hume. The father of Sir Alexander, we need not tell our local readers was Provost of Montrose, and was closely related to our national poet Robert Burns. After giving his sons (of whom he had four who lived to be adults) a good education, he availed himself of the intimacy which had arisen between him and Mr Hume, and solicited his influence on behalf of his two sons James and Alexander, the former (the eldest) being destined for medical service. Alexander was promised a cadetship in the East India Company’s Service as soon as he was old enough for the appointment.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan - 100 Years of Independence
    In Depth - Afghanistan - 100 Years of Independence Introduction August 19, 2019 marked the 100th Independence Day for Afghanistan. On this day in 1919, Afghanistan gained its independence from Britain after the signing of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty which granted complete neutral relations between Afghanistan and Britain. For several weeks, the Afghan cities had been preparing to celebrate the 100th independence anniversary. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had also extended greetings to the Afghans while delivering his Independence Day speech on August 15th. But the sense of joy turned into grief when a series of explosions shook the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad, wounding dozens of people including children. According to latest reports, as many as 10 blasts were reported in and around the city in Nangarhar province, and casualty numbers appeared to be rising. Earlier, on Saturday, a terror attack on a wedding party in Kabul killed more than 60, and injured nearly 200. Wars with British Empire: 1747:Ahmad Shah Durrani unified Pashtun tribes. Afghanistan was not fully integrated colony of British Empire. 1919:Afghanistan’s War of Independence. First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842): The First Anglo-Afghan War (also known by the British as the Disaster in Afghanistan) was fought between the British East India Company and the Emirate of Afghanistan from 1839 to 1842. Initially, the British successfully intervened in a succession dispute between emir Dost Mohammad (Barakzai) and former emir Shah Shujah (Durrani), whom they installed upon conquering Kabul in August 1839. The main British Indian and Sikh force occupying Kabul along with their camp followers, having endured harsh winters as well, was almost completely annihilated while retreating in January 1842.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords June 2002
    Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords June 2002 I. Introduction As Afghan and United Nations officials prepare for the forthcoming loya jirga (grand national assembly), as called for in the 2001 Bonn Agreement to choose Afghanistan’s next government, ordinary Afghans are increasingly terrorized by the rule of local and regional military commanders – warlords – who are reasserting their control over large areas of Afghanistan. A mission by Human Rights Watch to southern Afghanistan in late May 2002 uncovered credible evidence of the reemergence of figures associated with the Taliban as well as the extremist Islamist movement led by former Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in several southern provinces.1 These warlords have been able to consolidate power because of the vacuum created when the U.S.-led military coalition and the U.N. Security Council refused to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul. Although U.S. forces are operating in these areas, they seem to be doing little if anything to address the insecurity experienced by ordinary Afghans. Indeed, according to persistent though unconfirmed reports received by Human Rights Watch, U.S. cooperation with certain of the local warlords seems to be aggravating the problem. Unconfirmed reports were also received of involvement in the region by Iran and Pakistan. Regardless of their ideology and the source of their support, these warlords are creating a climate of repression that once again threatens the security and well-being of the Afghan people. This return of the warlords is especially painful to Afghans committed to rebuilding civil society who now face the possible end of the hopeful respite that followed the fall of the Taliban at the hands of the U.S.-led military coalition.
    [Show full text]
  • The Legend of the Great Game
    ELIE KEDOURIE MEMORIAL LECTURE The Legend of the Great Game MALCOLM YAPP School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London A PERSISTENT THEME IN THE WRITINGS of Elie Kedourie was his mistrust of large, seemingly attractive concepts or ideas, ideas which were lightly advanced and quietly incorporated into political or historical folklore without being subjected to the close and critical scrutiny which he rightly believed to be an obligation of statesman and historian alike. One such concept is that of the Great Game and it is my intention in this lecture to examine the historical ethnology of this famous phrase and to offer some comments on its significance and value. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at Christmas 1979 gave the phrase a new lease of life. The association of Russia and Afghanistan was irresistible and the upheaval was pronounced to be another round in the Great Game, understood to be a contest for mastery in Central Asia which had begun in the early nineteenth century. We were regaled with some strange geography and some curious history. Pakistan’s Khyber Pass was awarded to Afghanistan, Dr Brydon rode inaccurately again and Roberts marched in the wrong direction at the wrong time. Subsequently, the term ‘the Great Game’ was applied to what was seen as a new contest between the USSR and the USA and to the struggle for control of oil resources in the region of the Caspian Sea.1 Read at the Academy 16 May 2000. 1 The Times, 26 Nov. 1999, 7 Feb. 2000; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (2000).
    [Show full text]
  • Durrani Empire, Popular Protests, 1747–1823
    C04.qxd_vol3 3/18/09 6:01 PM Page 1029 International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, ed. Immanuel Ness, Blackwell Publishing, 2009, p. 1029 Durruti, Buenaventura (1896–1936) 1029 the demands of the Pashtun. This resistance continued through 1789, when the Durrani ruler Timur Shah succeeded in suppressing the rebellion and establishing control in Southern Turkestan. However, while the Durrani leaders, known Durrani empire, as shahs, were continuously striving to control and restrain the non-Pashtun, these efforts were popular protests, complicated by internecine conflict among the Pashtun, as various regions sought autonomy from 1747–1823 the empire, especially when they perceived the central power to be overly domineering. Yury V. Bosin Support for the Durrani empire was only The Durrani empire emerged in 1747 as funda- achieved when regional Pashtun perceived the mentally a military confederation of Pashtun central government as a beneficial source of ethnic groups in the Central Asian region of economic and military protection. However, modern-day Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. when the Durrani sought local tribute, some While not a centralized state, at its peak of sought regional autonomy. Some of the largest expansion the Durrani empire covered an area uprisings occurred in 1801 when the Ghilzai of 780,000 square miles (2,000,000 square kilo- rebelled against Shah Mahmud. The uprisings meters). The empire stretched from Afghanistan were a first sign of growing ethnic separatism across Pakistan to within 60 miles of Delhi. As a which, accompanied by non-Pashtun movements, privileged ethnicity, the Pashtun dominated the undermined the Durrani empire and led to its royal court, bureaucracy, and army and gained disintegration in 1823.
    [Show full text]