National Efficiency and Social Planning in Britain, 1914-1921
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Portland State University PDXScholar Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses 2-18-1975 National efficiency and social planning in Britain, 1914-1921 Norman Richard Eder Portland State University Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds Part of the European History Commons, and the Social History Commons Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Eder, Norman Richard, "National efficiency and social planning in Britain, 1914-1921" (1975). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 2376. https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.2373 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Norman Richard Eder for the Master of . Arts in History presented February lB, 1975. Title: National Efficiency and Social Planning in Britain, 1914-1921. APPROVED BY ME.'IBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: Charles leGuin, Chairman Charles White Traditionally, improvements in the quality of life in Britain i~:!sul.ted from the temporary fusion of sometimes opposite interests which spurred Parliamentary action. Therefore, refonn was rarely a party iasue.. Each refor:n question was t.reated separately and nev9r as a part of a body of similar measures. Individuals were :free to support or oppose particular reforms according to their own intereats and motivations. The result of this lack of ::itrong consistent reform- ist sentiment was a pattern of piece-meal legislative action with a notable absence of comprehensive social planning. The First World War, however, brought new challenges to British society. As the traditional, haphazard method of dealing with problems of social organization failed to meet the needs of a nation enga§ed in a total war, British society came to accept a high degree of central control and guidance under the banner of national efficiency. This acceptance of social planning opened up new opportunities to those reformers who had long sought to undertake the cure or Britain's social ills on a massive scale. The reformers saw the establishment of a ministry or health as the key to their success in the struggle against poverty and disease. After more than two years of political infighting the ministry- was-finally established in June 1919, and a housing program which promised to provide 500,000 new homes was placed under its authority. Launched with the approval of every political interest in the nation, the housing scheme proved to be a rout from the beginning and by the spring of 1-921 the project came to an ignoble end. With it came the end of the national commitment to social planning. The movement for planning failed because old political and social differences proved to be a much more potent force than what remained of war-time harmony. While the nation was willing to tolerate rigid economic and social control in the name of victory over the Kaiser, no matter how much reform was desired, it would not accept centralized control and be swayed by appeals for national sacrifice in peacetime. Without the impetus provided by total warfare, massive social planning, rooted in a desire to use all the nation's resources efficiently, collapsed, drained of its political vitality. The research and the writing of this study was carried out during the summer of 1974 in th6 Ur1iversity of Washington library system. The university's libraries offered all of the most important prim&ry source reaterial needed for the completion of the thesis, either in bol.Uld copy or on microfilm. Wide use waa made of contemporary .1ournals ar.d ne~s..,. papers. In addition$ personal diaries and memoirs of several of the central characters of the period pro7ided a wealth of material. The libr~ry also ma.de availabl1t a large variety of official British Govern ment documents without which this study could not have been completed. The only source materials not avail.able- were tre officia.l cabinet records of the period and certain private papers which are ae yet unpublished or unavailable in this country. Fortunately, secondary works provided enough information to bridge major gaps between available prim&ry source materials or point to new routes around unans~erable questionse NATIONAL .EFFICIE~C:Y Ju\TD ~OCIJJ" FLAH1HNG IN BRITAIN, 1914-1921 by NORV.i.AN RICH.L\RD EDER A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in HISTORY Portland State University 1975 TO THE OFFICE OF GR.ADUA'rE STUDIES A..ND RESEARCH : The members of the Committee approve the thesis of Norman Richard Eder presented February 18, 1975 . Charles LeGuin , Chairman Charles M. White -Sh-ir_l_e_y M. ZK:enn.edy 7 ·----·----- APPR OVED: / esse Gillv.ore , ChairrnB-n , Depar<m•m; of History Studies ruid Re--s-e--2-,.r_c_h_. ------ February 18, 1975 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis grew out of a series of classes and private dis cussions with Dr. David Smith of the University of Puget Sound and Drs. Charles LeGuin and Charles M. White of Portland State University. Without their help and gentle guidance my work would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. I am also indebted to my good friend, Chris Rideout, who, during the summer of 1974, pretended to listen intently as I rambled through each day's problems at the Red Robin. Above all, I thank my wife, Sher, who has pointed out many a fuzzy thought and disjointed sentence, while supporting me with her optimism and patience. PREFACE .A.ny attempt to evaluate the impact of the First World War on British society is perhaps a futile effort to measure the immeasurable. 'Ihe sheer magnitude of the struggle, the sacrifice of life and the loss of wealth overwhelm even the most casual observer. Despite this, h::.s torians have been unable to escape the "siren song" produced by the unmistakable death of one world and the birth of another in four short years. As a result uncountable studies have been done which attempt to retell the losses to Britain and the vorld duriLg those bloody years. Yet while mourning the terricle waste of modern warfare, few have recog nized the war as an agent for domestic social reforJil in Britain. Traditionally, improvements in the quality of life in Britain stemmed from the temporary fusion of sometimes opposite interests which spurred Parliamentary action. Therefore, reform was rarely a party issue. Each reform question was treated separately and never as part of a body of similar measures. Individuals were free to support or oppose particular reforms according to their own ir.terests and motivations. The result of this lack of strong consistent reformist s~ntiment was a pattern of piece meal legislative action with a notable absence of comprehensive social planning. The First World War, however, brought new challenges to British society. As the traditional haphazard method of dealing with problems of social organization failed to meet the needs of a nation engaged in a total ·...-ar, British society came 'tO accept a high degree of central control and v guidance under the banner of national efficiency. This acceptance of social planning opened up new opportunities to those reformers who had long sought to undertake the cure of Britain's social ills on a massive scale. The aim of this present study is to trace, during the war years and after, the struggle for social pl&nning which received its impetus from the wartime desire for national efficiency. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii PREFACE . iv CHAPrER I BUSINESS AS USUAL 1 II THE END OF BUSINESS AS USUAL 34 III TOWARDS AN EFFICIENT AND PLANNED NATION 75 r:v THE STRUGGLE FOR THE .MINISTRY OF HEALTH 115 v THE FAILURE OF SOCIAL PLANNING , •••• 148 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 168 CHAPTER I BUSINESS AS USUAL Britain entered the First World War completely unprepared to meet its demanc1.s on her military forces, industrial machinery, or civilian population. In response to the emergency created by the war, the Liberal government, serving under Herbert Asquith, devoted the bulk of its ener gies to the task of recruiting and training additional men for the army's expeditionary force. In August 1914, British land forces numbered little more that 250,000 regular troops, the bulk of which were spread ~hinly around the world in the various crown colonies. The active territorial force was limited to a garrison of 63,000 soldiers backed up by a 150,000 man reserve force and a separate ready reserve army that a.mounted to no mor.e than another 63,000 trained officers and men.l Conscription, modeled after the continental system, was not the "British way", and the cabinet realized that all new recruits had to be volunteers. Traditionally the War Office had been responsible for the raising of new recruits. However, the resignation of J. E. B. Seely during the Currah trouble in Ireland left the nation without a Secretary of State for War. Upon Seely's departure, Asquith had himself taken the War Office temporarily to avoid making a new appointment tmtil the lnternal trouble was over, but the outbreak of hostilities made a new appointment im- lArthur Marwick, The Deluge (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1970), p. 15. 2 . 2 perat ive. In order to fill the ranks of the royal army, a full-time secretary for war who could inspire confidence in victory and attract volunteers to the colors was needed. Asquith's first thought was to send R. B. Haldane back to the War Office. Haldane had been responsible for organizing the expeditionary force under a general staff and Asquith felt that his experience and proven ability would be ideal for the post.