Protective Decision-Making in Bushfire Part 1
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Roadside Fire Management Guidelines Contents CONTENTS
Roadside Fire Management Guidelines contents CONTENTS PART A: INTRODUCTION 2 LEGISLATION 2 ROADSIDE MANAGEMENT PLANNING 3 MUNICIPAL FIRE PREVENTION PLANNING 3 PART B: ROADSIDE FIRE MANAGEMENT 5 OBJECTIVES OF ROADSIDE FIRE MANAGEMENT 5 Objective 1: Prevent Fires on Roadsides 8 Objective 2: Contain Roadside Fires 12 Objective 3: Manage Safety of Road Users 20 Objective 4: Provide Control Lines 24 Objective 5: Recovery From Roadside Fires 27 PART C: ROADSIDE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS 29 THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS 29 SUMMARY OF RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS 29 SELECTING TREATMENT OPTIONS 30 Roadside Reserve Categories 31 ROADSIDE RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 32 PART D: APPENDICES 34 Appendix 1: CFA Regions 34 Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms 35 REFERENCES 37 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS These guidelines have been developed by the Country Fire Authority Victoria (CFA), after consultation with the Rural and Urban Fire Brigades Associations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DNRE), VicRoads and the Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV). Roadside Fire Management Guidelines 1 PART A part a INTRODUCTION Traditionally, roadsides have been used extensively for the implementation of fire prevention programs. With changes in land and resource management and a shift to risk based emergency management, there is a need to review fire prevention on roadsides to keep pace INTRODUCTION with community expectations and ensure a consistent approach to fire management. LEGISLATION Conservation values of national significance are protected under the Commonwealth’s Environment -
And Inquests Into a Wildfire and the Deaths of Five Firefighters at Linton on 2 December 1998
R eport of the Investigation and Inquests into a Wildfire and the Deaths of Five Firefighters at Linton on 2 December 1998 STATE CORONER’S OFFICE, VICTORIA Preface Introduction The Coronial Inquest hearings into the December 1998 Linton fire and the tragic deaths of five Geelong West volunteer firefighters (Messrs. Stuart Davidson, Garry Vredeveldt, Christopher Evans, Jason Thomas and Matthew Armstrong) took 106 hearing days and produced in excess of 11,500 pages of transcript. Over 28,000 pages of exhibit and other documents were produced during the running of the Inquests. There were over 1500 pages of submissions and replies by the legal representatives for the interested parties. The Coronial Investigation into how the deaths occurred and the fire was managed raised many questions that required detailed examination. A coronial inquest hearing forms part of this overall investigation process. A significant number of issues canvassed at the Inquest hearings and raised in the documentation produced during the Investigation were critical to the safe management of the fire and for the future safety of firefighters. Apart from the entrapment that took the lives of the Geelong West Crew, a number of other incidents occurred earlier in the management of the fire, which placed the lives of many other firefighters at serious risk. Ultimately, the failures of training, supervision, communication, enforcement of operational and safety systems lay behind the deaths of the volunteer firefighters and the serious risks to the lives of many other firefighters in the wildfire that has come to be known as “Linton.” The Coronial Investigation was undertaken in order to determine how the deaths and fire occurred, who contributed to the deaths and fire and what could be done to prevent such occurrences in the future. -
Causes of Bushfire Is Australia – a Response
Causes of bushfire is Australia – A response Colleen Bryant ©2020 Preamble A recent video shared on Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=837989649986602) is symbolic of a broader meme that has emerged in political, media, and social media circles regarding the role of arson in the current bushfire season. The above clip states that: “The popular narrative is that Australia’s fires are caused by climate change but the facts say otherwise”. It goes onto say that “since November 8, 2019 nearly 200 arsonists have been arrested for starting brush fires in Australia”. It then forwards “the arsonists were responsible for about 50% of the brushfires1”, before concluding that it is not climate change but arsonists that are responsible for Australia recent bushfires. The above statistic of 50% reportedly derives from an article published in “The Australian” newspaper (Ross & Reid, 2020) which states “Swinbourne University Professor James Ogloff said about 50 per cent of bushfire were lit by firebugs and impending seasons excited them.” The figure he quoted reportedly came from a study a fire statistics released 12 years ago, which would imply that that the professor was not speaking about the 2019‐20 season specifically. Articles similarly highlighting the role of arson have emerged in the Spectator (Chrenkoff, 2020) and Sydney Morning Herald (Rawsthorne, 2020). However, the above narrative is countered by a recent article published by Nguyen et al. (2020) for the ABC (Australian Broadcasting Commission), which examined the cause of many of the large fires on a state‐by‐state basis. Ultimately they concluded that deliberate fire‐setting did not play a significant role in the recent bushfires in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, or even Queensland. -
Submission To: Victorian Bushfire Inquiry
Submission to: Victorian Bushfire Inquiry Addressed to: Tony Pearce; Inspector-General Emergency Management, Victoria Submission from: Emergency Leaders for Climate Action https://emergencyleadersforclimateaction.org.au/ Prepared on behalf of ELCA by: Greg Mullins AO, AFSM; Former Commissioner, Fire & Rescue NSW May 2020 1 About Emergency Leaders for Climate Action Climate change is escalating Australia’s bushfire threat placing life, property, the economy and environment at increasing risk. Emergency Leaders for Climate Action (ELCA) was formed in April 2019 due to deep shared concerns about the potential of the 2019/20 bushfire season, unequivocal scientific evidence that climate change is the driver of longer, more frequent, more intense and overlapping bushfire seasons, and the failure of successive governments, at all levels, to take credible, urgent action on the basic causal factor: greenhouse gas emissions from the burning of coal, oil and gas. Greenhouse emissions are causing significant warming, in turn worsening the frequency and severity of extreme weather events that exacerbate and drive natural disasters such as bushfires. ELCA originally comprised of 23 former fire and emergency service leaders from every state and territory and every fire service in Australia, from several State Emergency Service agencies, and from several forestry and national parks agencies. At the time of submission, ELCA continues to grow and now comprises 33 members, including two former Directors General of Emergency Management Australia. Cumulatively, ELCA represents about 1,000 years of experience. Key members from Victoria include: • Craig Lapsley PSM: Former Emergency Management Commissioner; Former Fire Services Commissioner; Former Deputy Chief Officer, Country Fire Authority. • Russell Rees AFSM: Former Chief Fire Officer, Country Fire Authority Victoria. -
Gippsland Bushfire Management Strategy 2020
Gippsland Bushfire Management Strategy 2020 Fuel management Bushfire Risk Engagement Areas Prevention of human-caused ignition strategy (pilot) First-attack suppression strategy (pilot) Acknowledgements We acknowledge and respect Victoria’s Traditional Owners as the original custodians of the state’s land and waters, their unique ability to care for Country and deep spiritual connection to it. We honour Elders past and present, whose knowledge and wisdom has ensured the continuation of culture and traditional practices. We are committed to genuinely partner and meaningfully engage with Victoria’s Traditional Owners and Aboriginal communities to support the protection of Country, the maintenance of spiritual and cultural practices and their broader aspirations in the 21st century and beyond. We thank our colleagues and partners in the Gippsland Safer Together Executive Team, Gippsland Regional Strategic Fire Management Planning Committee and Gippsland Strategic Bushfire Management Planning Working Group for their support developing the strategy. We would like to acknowledge all the workshop participants and the agencies who provided staff to attend each session for their contributions to the working group. We would also like to acknowledge those who participated in the Engage Victoria surveys for their comments. Authors Prepared by members of the Gippsland Strategic Bushfire Management Planning Working Group. Analysis was undertaken by the Risk and Evaluation Team, Gippsland. Aboriginal people should be aware that this publication may contain images or names of deceased persons in photographs or printed material. Photo credits Risk and Evaluation Team, Gippsland © The State of Victoria Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence. -
Bushfires in Our History, 18512009
Bushfires in Our History, 18512009 Area covered Date Nickname Location Deaths Losses General (hectares) Victoria Portland, Plenty 6 February Black Ranges, Westernport, 12 1 million sheep 5,000,000 1851 Thursday Wimmera, Dandenong 1 February Red Victoria 12 >2000 buildings 260,000 1898 Tuesday South Gippsland These fires raged across Gippsland throughout 14 Feb and into Black Victoria 31 February March, killing Sunday Warburton 1926 61 people & causing much damage to farms, homes and forests Many pine plantations lost; fire New South Wales Dec 1938‐ began in NSW Snowy Mts, Dubbo, 13 Many houses 73,000 Jan 1939 and became a Lugarno, Canberra 72 km fire front in Canberra Fires Victoria widespread Throughout the state from – Noojee, Woods December Point, Omeo, 1300 buildings 13 January 71 1938 Black Friday Warrandyte, Yarra Town of Narbethong 1,520,000 1939 January 1939; Glen, Warburton, destroyed many forests Dromona, Mansfield, and 69 timber Otway & Grampian mills Ranges destroyed Fire burnt on Victoria 22 buildings 34 March 1 a 96 km front Hamilton, South 2 farms 1942 at Yarram, Sth Gippsland 100 sheep Gippsland Thousands 22 Victoria of acres of December 10 Wangaratta grass 1943 country Plant works, 14 Victoria coal mine & January‐ Central & Western 32 700 homes buildings 14 Districts, esp >1,000,000 Huge stock losses destroyed at February Hamilton, Dunkeld, Morwell, 1944 Skipton, Lake Bolac Yallourn ACT 1 Molongolo Valley, Mt 2 houses December Stromlo, Red Hill, 2 40 farm buildings 10,000 1951 Woden Valley, Observatory buildings Tuggeranong, Mugga ©Victorian Curriculum and Assessment Authority, State Government of Victoria, 2011, except where indicated otherwise. -
Cold-Frontal Bushfire Winds and Computer Forecast Models
ISSUE 54 MARCH 2010 COld-frONTAL BUSHFIRE WINDS AND COMPUTER FORECAST MODELS SUMMARY This photo was taken This research has developed a new model from a Firebird 303 JetRanger helicopter to better forecast cold fronts – and outcome over Lawloit, Victoria, that will help better protect communities and just after a recent firefighters. The work was completed through wildfire was hit by extensive study that has led to a better the downburst from a understanding of the complex phenomenon thunderstorm passing of cold fronts. This research has focused on by to the south. The downburst from the understanding two things. Firstly, the physical thunderstorm turned processes that cause cold-frontal wind the northerly flank changes to be what they are – why sometimes into a headfire - with they are abrupt, why sometimes more gradual, the typical pattern why some have sustained strong winds after from a line of fire of the change (Ash Wednesday 1983) and some about 5/6 headfire and 1/6 backing do not (Black Friday 1939). Secondly, how fire. The change in to verify forecasts of wind change timing at fire behaviour was observation sites and from computer forecast very dramatic, and models. increased risks to ground crews who BACKGROUND were positioned to Wind change matters to fire managers. It can the north of the fire. change bushfire activity in a moment, shifting Photo supplied by the flank of the fire to the fire front, suddenly Steve Grant, DSE Fire Management Officer. putting firefighters and communities at risk. A change in wind can also change the rate of fire spread, increase the quantity, distance and direction of downstream spotting, and change the safety status of residents and townships in a flash. -
FINAL REPORT Estimating the Effects of Changing Climate on Fires and Consequences for U.S
FINAL REPORT Estimating the Effects of Changing Climate on Fires and Consequences for U.S. Air Quality, Using a Set of Global and Regional Climate Models JFSP PROJECT ID: 13-1-01-4 October 2017 Prof. Jeffrey R Pierce Colorado State University Dr. Maria Val Martin Colorado State University Now at University of Sheffield Prof. Colette L. Heald Massachusetts Institute of Technology The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the opinions or policies of the U.S. Government. Mention of trade names or commercial products does not constitute their endorsement by the U.S. Government. Estimating the Effects of Changing Climate on Fires and Consequences for U.S. Air Quality, Using a Set of Global and Regional Climate Models Table of Contents Abstract ..........................................................................................................................................1 Background ................................................................................................................................... 2 Objectives ..................................................................................................................................... 3 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 4 Results and Discussion ................................................................................................................. 8 Conclusions and -
FIREGROUND RESPONSE 3 Volume II: Fire Preparation, Response and Recovery
FIREGROUND RESPONSE 3 Volume II: Fire Preparation, Response and Recovery 3 FIreground response In the lead-up to 7 February 2009 firefighters took precautionary measures, and when a response was required it was rapid and apt. The preparations of many brigades were exemplary. Some localities pre-positioned firefighting resources in readiness and others responded to nearby districts to support firefighting efforts. The Commission heard evidence of responsive and resourceful activity from firefighters on the day, and it commends their efforts. Many operational systems worked well, particularly considering the weather conditions. There were, however, some areas—such as timely fireground warnings to firefighters and appointing safety officers to incident management teams—where systemic problems emerged. Communications also fell short and this affected the safety of some fire crews caught unexpectedly when the wind changed. Aerial firefighting preparations and dispatch systems did not always provide the required response and need review to make them more responsive. Essential requirements such as access to water and electricity also caused problems. Successful response to a fire relies on a blend of personnel, resources and processes. These include systems for rapid fire detection, deployment of appropriate equipment and personnel to assist suppression, accurate and timely intelligence about fires and weather conditions, and good communication. In addition, robust systems are required to support firefighters on the ground and ensure their safety. Timely and precise information from the firefront is also critical to enable accurate warnings for the community. Given its terms of reference, the Commission focused on Victorian fire management systems, agencies and structures, while recognising that in many cases these are not unique to Victoria. -
The Health Effects of the 2019-20 Bushfires
The health effects of the 2019-20 bushfires Submission to the Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee on lessons to be learned in relation to the Australian bushfire season 2019-20 Stephen Duckett, Will Mackey, and Anika Stobart The health effects of the 2019-20 bushfires Table of contents 1 The health impacts of the 2019-20 bushfires . 3 1.1 There was extreme fire risk leading up to the 2019-20 bushfires . 3 1.2 The bushfires had direct impacts on many Australians . 4 1.3 The bushfires caused dangerously poor air quality for prolonged periods . 4 1.4 The bushfire smoke damaged people’s physical health . 8 1.5 The bushfires damaged people’s mental health . 9 1.6 Climate change means more frequent, more intense, and longer-lasting bushfires . 9 2 Recommendations . 11 2.1 Make people more aware of the health risks from bushfire smoke . 11 2.2 Review health system preparedness for natural disasters . 13 2.3 Review mental health support systems . 13 2.4 Improve health response systems under a broader climate change and health agenda . 14 2.5 Align government response systems to ensure a national approach . 14 Grattan Institute 2020 2 The health effects of the 2019-20 bushfires 1 The health impacts of the 2019-20 bushfires Hundreds of bushfires ravaged south-eastern Australia over the 2019- Figure 1.1: Fire danger in the lead-up to 2019-20 was high 20 summer, burning millions of hectares and billowing large plumes of Forest Fire Danger Index (FFDI) in spring 2019 smoke into the atmosphere. -
Bushfires in Australia
Emergency planning and response in general practice Fact sheet: Bushfires in Australia This fact sheet outlines important information about bushfires in Australia and provides tips for keeping your practice and patients as safe as possible in the event of extreme weather. Facts about bushfires • Australia is the most flammable continent on earth.i • Extreme fire weather and the length of the fire season is increasing, leading to an increase in bushfire risk. • Southern and eastern Australia are projected to experience harsher fire weather with weather conditions conducive to fire in the southeast of the continent becoming increasingly more frequent.ii The role of general practice General practices in and around fire-prone areas play a significant role in the community’s overall response. The RACGP has developed a number of resources to support general practices with preparing for, responding to and recovering from the impact of fires and other emergencies. Access these documents here www.racgp.org.au/your-practice/business/tools/ disaster/emergencies/ Emergency planning and response in general practice Fact sheet: Bushfires in Australia 1 4649 Tips Tips for ensuring preparedness for a bushfire • Develop an up-to-date emergency response plan for your practice. • Exercise your plan on a regular basis (e.g.as a desk top exercise). • Contact your local community response coordination organisation to ensure you are a part of community planning processes. • Contact your local hospital to see how you and other general practices can work with your hospital(s) in emergencies. • Connect with your state-based response organisation to ensure you are kept up to date with fire-specific information relevant to your location (Click here www.australia.gov.au/content/emergency-links-states-and-territories and select the link for your particular state/territory). -
Additional Presentation Abstracts Abstracts for the 2010 Human Dimensions of Wildland Fire Conference Proceedings
ADDITIONAL PRESENTATION ABSTRACTS ABSTRACTS FOR THE 2010 HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF WILDLAND FIRE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 1.0 PLENARY SESSIONS 1.1 Australian Response to the Black Saturday Fires: What is and isn’t Changing? Presenters Naomi Brown, Australasian Fire Authorities Council Alan Rhodes, Country Fire Authority Abstract The wildfires of 7 February 2009 in Victoria, Australia, management have been under intense scrutiny and that killed 173 people and destroyed more than 2,000 have been the focus of public debate. The presentation homes shocked the world. The government quickly will provide an overview of the fires, the Royal established a Royal Commission, the highest form of Commission findings, and the implications that flow inquiry possible in Australia, to investigate all aspects from these events. The presentation will also include of the disaster. Both the fires and the proceedings reflection on some fundamental issues that have arisen, of the Royal Commission have significantly altered such as the community’s role in responding to the risk public perceptions of the wildfire risk and how of wildfire and whether agencies and the community agencies need to respond. Key issues such as the can share responsibility for dealing with the risk. “stay or go” approach, warning systems, and incident Proceedings of the Second Conference on the Human Dimensions of Wildland Fire GTR-NRS-P-84 113 1.2 When the Incident doesn’t End: Life in the Grinder (The Experiences of a State Agency Tasked with Managing Multiple Long-Duration Incidents and the Impact on its Personnel) Presenter Mark D. Stanford, Fire Operations Chief, Texas Forest Service Abstract From 2005 through 2009, Texas Forest Service (TFS) for more than 65 percent of the 5-year period.