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Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Angola

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Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Angola www.transparency.org www.cmi.no Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Angola Query Could you please provide an overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Angola? Purpose corruption in 2009. But Angola’s overall legal and institutional anti-corruption framework remains highly Our country has commercial interests in Angola and inadequate. Anti-corruption institutions are new investments are being planned. Most of the underdeveloped, often lacking human and financial information available on corruption appears to be resources, as well as technical expertise and capacity. anecdotal and scattered, and maybe outdated. They are subject to widespread political interference, casting serious doubt on the political will for reform. Content Although civil and political rights are guaranteed by the Angolan constitution, civil society and the media face many challenges of a political, financial and logistical 1. Overview of corruption in Angola nature that restrict the free exercise of their 2. Anti-corruption efforts in Angola constitutional rights. 3. References 1 Overview of corruption in Summary Angola Emerging from nearly three decades of conflict and instability, Angola continues to face major challenges of Background weak governance and widespread corruption at all levels of society. Corruption manifests itself through Following independence from Portugal in November various forms, including bureaucratic, political and 1975, Angola has been ravaged by years of civil war grand corruption, embezzlement of public resources, involving the government controlled Popular Movement systematic looting of state assets, and a deeply for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the rebel entrenched patronage system that operates outside National Union for the Total Independence of Angola state channels. The scale of corruption and (UNITA). This civil war claimed millions of lives and mismanagement has been considerable in the refugees. After the death of UNITA leader Joseph extractive industries. Savimbi in 2002, a ceasefire was finally reached by the two factions and UNITA assumed the role of major The government has introduced important reforms in opposition party. Although the political situation began recent years, especially with regard to revenue and to stabilise after the 2002 peace agreement, President budget transparency. It also called for a crackdown on José Eduardo dos Santos – who holds the Presidency Author(s): Marie Chêne , Transparency International, [email protected] Reviewed by: Robin Hodess, Ph.D., Transparency International, [email protected] Date: 25 February 2010 Number: 257 U4 Expert Answers provide targeted and timely anti-corruption expert advice to U4 partner agency staff www.U4.no Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Angola since 1979 – has so far shown little commitment to the major challenges of weak governance, and widespread democratisation process. Parliamentary elections - corruption at all levels of society. which had been repeatedly delayed since 1997 - were finally held in 2008, with the ruling MPLA winning over Major worldwide governance indicators reflect this 80 % of the votes. situation. In 2010, the country ranked 168th of the 178 countries assessed by Transparency International’s The country continues to face major challenges of Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), scoring 1,9 on a widespread poverty, a ruined infrastructure, an scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean), abundance of minefields and guerrilla movements suggesting widespread and endemic forms of fighting for the independence of the northern exclave of corruption. These findings are consistent with the World Cabinda. In August 2006, a peace treaty was signed Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators World Bank with a faction of the Front for the Liberation of the 2009 Worldwide Governance Indicators which Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), a separatist guerrilla group underline Angola’s extremely poor performance on all which is still active in the North, but sporadic violence six dimensions of governance assessed. While the and insecurity persist in the region. country has improved its performance in terms of political stability (from 19,2 in 2004 to 35,8 in 2009 on a Natural resources have played an important role in scale of 0 to 100), it scores very poorly in all other fuelling conflict and insecurity in the country, with all areas of governance, especially in terms of voice and sides in the conflict seeking control over the country’s accountability, regulatory quality and rule of law. The resource wealth. The country is one of the top two situation even seems to be deteriorating in terms of producers of petroleum and diamonds in Sub-Saharan control of corruption (from 6,3 in 2004 compared to 5,2 Africa. In the post-war era, increased oil production in 2009). combined with high international prices for oil has supported growth rates averaging more than 15 % from Angola also performs poorly on the 2010 Heritage 2004 to 2008, making Angola one of the fastest growing Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. The economies in Africa (CIA, 2011). Oil is the driving force country ranks 161st out of the 179 countries of the economy, accounting for 58% of Angola's GDP assessed (and 40th out of 46 in the Sub-Saharan Africa and 80% of government revenues (Revenue region), with an economic freedom score of 46,2 on a 0 Transparency Watch). Post-war reconstruction efforts to 100 scale (Heritage Foundation, 2010). In particular, and resettlement of displaced people have also the country performed extremely poorly in terms of contributed to high rates of growth in the construction freedom from corruption, with a score of 19 on a 0 to and agriculture sectors. Angola has made considerable 100 scale, with corruption perceived to be rampant progress in improving its infrastructure, with major among government officials at all levels. Similarly, investments made into the building and rehabilitation of Angola performed poorly on the 2010 Ibrahim Index roads, hospitals, schools and railways. of African Governance 1 . It was ranked 43 from 53 Sub-Saharan African countries assessed, In spite of these noteworthy improvements, economic scoring particularly poorly in the areas of Sustainable growth has largely failed to translate into better Economic Opportunity and Human Development (Mo development outcomes for all. The exploitation of the Ibrahim Foundation, 2010). country’s natural resources has created considerable wealth for a minority of the population, but the vast Forms of Corruption majority of its people still live in dire poverty. While, according to UNICEF, significant progress has been Petty and bureaucratic corruption made towards reducing maternal and infant mortality since 2002, Angola continues to rank among the Petty bribery is widespread in Angola and public weakest in the UNDP Human Development Index, servants routinely ask for bribes – referred to as although its GDP per capita is that of a lower middle “gasosas” in the local language. Bribes are demanded income country (UNDP, 2010 and UNICEF, 2010). Extent of corruption 1 The Ibrahim Index uses a number of different variables to compile its list which reflects the state of governance in As Angola emerges from nearly three decades of Africa. conflict and instability, it continues to struggle with www.U4.no 2 Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Angola for accessing basic public services such as health, countries where certain key anti-corruption safeguards justice and education, while police officers often extort are so weak that the risk of large-scale theft of public small payments at checkpoints. Public officials are resources is greater than in most countries. Angola known to supplement their low wages by levying shares with 15 other countries characteristics that put it additional charges for bureaucratic services such as at risk of being affected by grand forms of corruption, vehicle registration, identity card applications, permits including extremely poor conflict of interest safeguards and registration of businesses (Freedom House, 2007). in government, weak oversight over large state-owned enterprises, and poor or non-existent controls over the Inefficient government structures, red tape and an flow of money into the political process (Global Integrity, opaque regulatory environment combined with low civil- 2009). service salaries offer many opportunities for rent- seeking. Over 46 % of the companies surveyed within A recent report by Rafael Marques de Morais – an the framework of the 2006 World Bank & IFC Angolan investigative journalist and write2 – documents Enterprise survey expected to make informal payment how key sectors of the economy such as petroleum, to “get things done”, while 36 % identified corruption as telecommunications, banking, media and diamonds a major constraint to doing business in the country form part of a business empire3 built by high ranking (World Bank & IFC, 2006). While progress has been officials close to the presidency to enrich themselves made in recent years to improve the overall regulatory and tighten the ruling party’s political grip over the environment, the business environment remains country (Marques de Morais, R, 2010). difficult. It is plagued by pervasive corruption, complex bureaucratic procedures and an underdeveloped Political corruption financial system (US Department of State, 2010). The World Economic Forum Global Corruption also undermines the integrity of the Competitiveness Report 2010-2011
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