Reality of Aid Report 2016

REALITY OF AID 2016 REPORT

Technical cooperaton as an aid modality: Demand-led or donor-driven?

The Reality of Aid Technical cooperaton as an aid modality: Demand-led or donor-driven? Reality of Aid 2016 Report Published in the Philippines in 2016 by IBON Internatonal IBON Center, 114 Timog Avenue, Quezon City 1103, Philippines Copyright © 2016 by The Reality of Aid Internatonal Coordinatng Commitee

Writer/Editor: Brian Tomlinson

Copy editor: Erin Ruth Palomares

Layout and Cover Design: Jennifer Padilla

Cover Photos: UN Photo/John Pierre Lafont UN Photo.ficker.com UN Photo/Ray Witlin

Printed and Bound in the Philippines by Zoom Printng Co.

Published with the assistance of:

13 POLITICAL OVERVIEW Undermining Democratic Country Ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation? The Reality of Aid Network International Coordinating Committee

23 CHAPTER 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multilateral institutions’ aid 29 Donor priorities for technical cooperation, drivers and implications of tied aid Juliet Akello, Uganda Debt Network Technical cooperaton as an aid modality: Demand-led or donor-driven? Reality of Aid 2016 Report 37 International financial institutions and issues in technical assistance in Manipur and Published in the Philippines in 2016 by IBON Internatonal North East India IBON Center, 114 Timog Avenue, Quezon City 1103, Philippines Jiten Yumnam, Centre for Research and Advocacy Manipur 52 Tax Inspectors Without Borders Copyright © 2016 by The Reality of Aid Internatonal Coordinatng Commitee Hernan Cortes and Tove Maria Ryding, European Network on Debt and Development

63 Technical assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic, 2016 Writer/Editor: Brian Tomlinson Chinara Aitbayeva, Nash Vek PF Copy editor: Erin Ruth Palomares 69 CHAPTER 2: Technical cooperation for infrastructure development Layout and Cover Design: Jennifer Padilla 71 Questioning the effectiveness of technical cooperation in Bangladesh Cover Photos: UN Photo/John Pierre Lafont Ahmed Swapan Mahmud and Farjana Akter, Voices for Interactve Choice and Empowerment UN Photo.ficker.com 76 Technical assistance of multi-lateral donors in the water sector in Sri Lanka: UN Photo/Ray Witlin A recipe for privatization? Sajeewa Chamikara, Movement for Land and Agricultural Reform

Printed and Bound in the Philippines by Zoom Printng Co. 83 Technical, yes — but what kind of assistance? USAID COMPETE’s PPP promotion in the Philippines Published with the assistance of: Bryan Ziadie, IBON Internatonal

93 CHAPTER 3: South-South experience in technical cooperation 95 Horizontal South-South bilateral cooperation experiences: Good practices in Argentina and Paraguay Karina Cáceres, Fundación SES All rights reserved ISBN: 978-971-9657-09-5 109 People4Change: People to people South-South cooperation Lea Sofa Simonsen, ActonAid Denmark 117 Triangular cooperation among civil society organizations in South America: Institutional strengthening in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia Alejandra Solla, Fundación SES Argentna; Rolando Kandel, Fundación SES; Ancelin Gauter, Fundación SES France 123 CHAPTER 4: : Global Aid Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

125 Global Aid Trends 2016 Financing 2030 Agenda: Where are the resources? Brian Tomlinson, AidWatch Canada 207 BRICS Reports 207 India South-South experience in technical cooperaton in India Jyotsna Mohan, Voluntary Acton Network India 219 South Africa Donor priorites for technical cooperaton and ted aid Rutendo Hadebe, University of Cape Town

227 OECD Reports 227 EU European Union Zuzana Sladkova, Concord Europe 231 Australia Australia’s ‘New Aid Paradigm’: Beyond ODA? James Goodman, AidWatch Australia and University of Technology Sydney; Mat Hilton, AidWatch Australia 243 Canada Canada: Contnuity with change? Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for Internatonal Co-operaton 251 Denmark Dramatc aid cuts and increased spending on refugees in Denmark Kira Boe, Global Focus – Danish CSOs for Development Cooperaton 254 Italy Development cooperaton shores up eforts to rebuild Italy’s global profle Luca De Fraia, ActonAid Italy 259 Japan Japan: Recent trends in aid policy and technical cooperaton Akio Takayanagi, Japan NGO Center for Internatonal Cooperaton 267 South Korea Republic of Korea: A new model for rural development? Limits and problems of Saemaul Undong (SMU) ODA Mihyeon Lee, People’s Solidarity for Partcipatory Democracy 274 United Kingdom Aid 2.0? A new strategy for UK aid Amy Dodd, UK Aid Network 281 USA The state of US foreign assistance Alicia Phillips Mandaville and Christna Hoenow, InterActon 289 PART 2: Glossary of Aid Terms 301 PART 3: RoA Members Directory The Reality of Aid Network

The Reality of Aid Network exists to promote national and international policies that contribute to new and effective strategies for poverty eradication built on solidarity and equity. Established in 1993, the Reality of Aid is a collaborative, non-proft initiative, involving non-governmental organisations from North and South. It is in special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

The Reality of Aid publishes regular, reliable reports on international development cooperation and the extent to which governments, North and South, address the extreme inequalities of income and the structural, social and political injustices that entrench people in poverty.

The network has been publishing reports and Reality Checks on aid and development cooperation since 1993.

These reports provide a critical analysis of how governments address the issues of poverty and whether aid and development cooperation policies are put into practice.

The Reality of Aid International Coordinating Committee is made up of regional representatives of all participating agencies.

REALITY OF AID NETWORK International Coordinating Committee (2016)

Kavaljit Singh Chairperson Madhyam 148, Maitri Apartments, Plot #28, Patparganj I.P., Delhi, India Tel: 91-11-430-36919 Email: [email protected] www.madhyam.org.in

Vitalice Meja Reality of Aid Africa Wanandege Flats Appt 4D Kirichwa Road Kilimani P.O.Box 36851 - 00200 Nairobi, Kenya Tel: + 254 202345762/ 254 704353043 Email: [email protected] www.roaafrica.org

Yodhim dela Rosa Reality of Aid Asia Pacifc 3/F IBON Center, 114 Timog Avenue Quezon City 1103, Philippines

1 Tel: +63 2 9277060 Telefax: +63 2 9276981 Email: [email protected]

Alberto Croce Representing Latin American CSO members Red Latinoamericana de Deuda, Desarrollo y Derechos (LATINDADD) Fundación SES San Martín 575 6°A Buenos Aires, Argentina Tel: +54 11 5368 8370 Email: [email protected] www.fundses.org.ar

Jeroen Kwakkenbos Representing European Country CSO members European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD) Rue d’Edimbourgh 18-26 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 8944645 Fax: +32 2 7919809 Email: [email protected] www.eurodad.org

Fraser Reilly-King Representing non-European OECD CSO members Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) 450 Rideau Street, Suite 200 Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 5Z4 Tel: +01 613 2417007 Fax: +01 613 2415302 Email: [email protected] www.ccic.ca

Erin Ruth Palomares Global Secretariat Coordinator 3/F IBON Center, 114 Timog Avenue Quezon City 1103, Philippines Tel: +63 2 9277060 Telefax: +63 2 9276981 Email: [email protected] www.realityofaid.org

2 Acknowledgments

The Reality of Aid 2016 Report is written by authors from civil society organisations worldwide whose research draws on knowledge and expertise from aid agencies, academia, community-based organisations and governments. We would like to thank those who have generously contributed their knowledge and advice.

Overall editorial control of the Reality of Aid 2016 Report lies with the Reality of Aid International Coordinating Committee, but the views expressed in the reports do not necessarily refect the views of the International Coordinating Committee, or of IBON International that published this Report.

The International Coordinating Committee was assisted by Brian Tomlinson as Content Editor, and Erin Ruth Palomares as Managing Editor.

This Reality of Aid 2016 Report is published with support from 11.11.11-Coalition of the Flemish North-South Movement.

Preface

The Reality of Aid Reports analyze and advocate key messages relating to the performance of aid donors from a unique perspective of civil society in both donor and recipient developing countries. The RoA Reports have established themselves as a credible corrective to offcial publications on development assistance and poverty reduction. They have also developed a reputation as an important independent comparative reference for accountability and public awareness of development issues.

Technical cooperation remains one of the most heavily used forms of aid, accounting for between a quarter and a half of all ODA. However, to date it seems that technical cooperation remains largely insulated from donors’ efforts to improve the quality and effectiveness of their aid, largely ignoring the principles of democratic ownership and partnership.

An examination of technical cooperation should focus on the relationship between technical cooperation and capacity building initiatives by aid providers and commitments towards strengthening democratic country ownership. Policy space for democratic ownership, where people’s voices and interests can shape government development initiatives, is vital if technical assistance is to be effective in building capacity for sustainable poverty reduction. Are recipient developing countries free to decide, plan, and sequence their economic policies to ft with their own development strategies? How can technical assistance as a disguised or soft form of policy conditionality be avoided? What reforms are needed on the part of aid providers in their approaches to technical cooperation that is consistent with their commitment to ownership? How can developing countries’ governments and other recipients of technical assistance create the conditions to manage this form of cooperation in their own interests?

Contributors to this Report explored the following: role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multilateral development banks’ aid, technical cooperation for trade and infrastructure development, technical cooperation and tied aid, and South-South experience in technical cooperation. Comprised of 23 contributions, this 2016 RoA Report provides analyses relating to the performance of aid donors in the provision of technical assistance from a unique perspective of civil society, in both donor and recipient developing countries, with a focus on poverty reduction.

Kavaljit Singh Chairperson The Reality of Aid Network

5 Reports Part 1

Reports

7 Undermining Democratic Country Ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

Reality of Aid Coordinating Committee 1

8 Undermining Democratic Country Ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

Reality of Aid Coordinating Committee 1

The 2015 Addis Ababa Agenda for Action identifed as crucial to Agenda 2030. The (AAAA) established a holistic and forward- AAAA cites technical cooperation as vital to looking framework that brings together the supporting the following efforts: increases in fnancial means to implement Agenda 2030 for domestic resource mobilization in developing sustainable development, including an ambitious countries (§28); building local capacities (§34); set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) the promotion of micro, small and medium- to chart development progress in ways that sized enterprises (§43);the implementation of leave no one behind. Offcial Development investment promotion regimes for low income Assistance (ODA) is an essential pillar of this countries (§46); realisation of infrastructure framework, as its resources are meant to focus plans (§47); and, the fostering of aid for trade on the development needs of the poorest capacities (§90). populations and countries. The 2016 Reality of Aid Report civil society The AAAA emphasizes the importance of analysts draws on a range of country case studies “continued efforts to improve the quality, focusing on the continued use and scale of impact and effectiveness of development technical cooperation to drive donor agendas in cooperation and other international efforts development cooperation. A central question in public fnance, including adherence to in these reviews was the extent to which the agreed development cooperation effectiveness provision of technical cooperation is consistent principles.” (§58) Central to these principles is with, and takes account of, development democratic country ownership, transparency effectiveness principles, which have been and accountability, a focus on results closely agreed to over the past decade. Where does linked to partner country priorities, and untying TC ft in the context of these principles? aid from donor country economic interests. How does it relate to new global agendas like Agenda 2030, the Paris Agreement on Climate Technical assistance, later more commonly Change or the Sendai Framework for Disaster referred to as a technical cooperation (TC), Risk Reduction? How “ft for purpose” is and capacity development has had a long and technical cooperation for achieving these controversial history as a means for delivering agendas? Several contributions have critiqued development change through aid. Technical technical cooperation inside a human rights cooperation, whether through training and development effectiveness framework. programs, capacity building, or provision of This overview chapter draws some lessons and donor-recruited technical expertise, has been conclusions based on these assessments.

9 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

1. Shifting views in donor discourse: has morphed into “technical cooperation,” From technical assistance to with a stress on training and entrenching skills’ cooperation and capacity building transfers. The focus is on capacity development through which developing country actors A focus on technical assistance by donors manage their own development priorities. dates from the 1970s into the 1990s. In this period, donors emphasized the value of According to the OECD Development providing personnel to recipient countries Assistance Committee (DAC), with skills, know-how and advice, primarily from their donor country. Widespread gaps “Technical co-operation (also referred to in basic management and skills capacities in as technical assistance) is the provision many developing countries, particularly in of know-how in the form of personnel, the poorest post-colonial new states, were training, research and associated costs. … understood during this period of development It comprises donor-fnanced: cooperation to be major barriers to progress. • Activities that augment the level of In this era, bilateral providers extensively knowledge, skills, technical know-how employed technical assistance to prepare or productive aptitudes of people in and implement development projects developing countries; and to ensure the realisation of donor- • Services such as consultancies, technical support determined outcomes in service delivery or the provision of know-how that contribute or infrastructure. At the multilateral level, to the execution of a capital project.”2 technical assistance was a key resource deployed by the World Bank, alongside policy Following the 2005 Paris Declaration for conditionality, to embed neo-liberal structural Aid Effectiveness,3 the provision of technical adjustment programs in the 1980s and 1990s cooperation became closely related to in many developing countries. “capacity development” as indicated in the following quote: In the past twenty years, there have been many shifts in views on development and the means “Capacity development is the to achieve progress. Greater emphasis is now responsibility of partner countries with placed on cooperation for poverty reduction donors playing a support role. It needs – inside a context where ‘country ownership’ not only to be based on sound technical of development priorities is respected. analysis, but also to be responsive to the Equally important are local participation and broader social, political and economic good governance as critical pre-conditions for environment, including the need to sustainable outcomes. Increasingly there has strengthen human resources.” [§22] been an emphasis on the value of south-south and triangular exchanges for the development During this Paris meeting donors committed of relevant skills and knowledge transfers and to “align their analytic and fnancial support learning. Since the 1990s, technical assistance with partners’ capacity development objectives

10 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

and strategies, make effective use of existing means for the achievement of the different capacities and harmonize support for capacity SDGs over the next 15 years. development accordingly.” [§24] 2. The scale of technical In 2006, the DAC published The Challenge cooperation in aid allocations of Capacity Development, Working towards good practice. This document provided an important In 2014, the DAC recorded a total of US$19.5 guide for TC based on a review of technical billion in free-standing technical cooperation cooperation and various forms of capacity (TC), which made up 14% of Real ODA development based on over 40 years of donor (ODA less debt cancellation, imputed students experience.4 Much of these fndings and and refugee expenses in donor countries). As advice continue to be relevant today. indicated in Chart One below, this represented a sharp decline from 2005 when TC accounted At the Accra High Level Forum in 2008, aid for 27% of Real ODA. This drop is even providers agreed that their “support for capacity more striking given that ODA has increased development will be demand-driven and designed since 2005 (see the Aid Trends chapter in this to support country ownership.” 5 [Accra Agenda for Report); yet these increases in overall ODA have Action (AAA, §14] Together with partner country seemingly not been translated into increases in governments they committed in the AAA to: free-standing technical cooperation. “i) Jointly select and manage technical co- It is important to note that DAC statistics do operation; and not present a complete accounting of TC inside ii) Promote the provision of technical co- ODA. OECD DAC statistics only track “free- operation by local and regional resources, standing technical cooperation” – provision of including through South-South Co- expertise for training or skills transfer (capacity operation.” [§14b] development) initiatives. They therefore under- Inexplicably, however, after 2010, donor estimate total TC as DAC donors and multilateral commitments to reforming technical institutions do not report on donor-provided cooperation / capacity development have not expertise within projects (i.e. assisting in their been a major discussion point in donor discourse preparation and technical implementation). on effective development cooperation. For example, the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Technical cooperation delivered through Development Cooperation, which adopted the multilateral institutions, particularly the Paris Declaration commitments, gave TC only International Development Association (the cursory attention, identifying it as a factor in concessional lending window of the World aid providers’ commitments to use partner Bank), has also declined as a share of total TC. country institutions and procurement systems In 1980 multilateral TC made up 27% of total in aid provision. There is no reference to TC, but only 11% in 2014. demand-driven technical cooperation. This leaves bilateral aid providers who are Yet technical cooperation continues to be a currently the primary providers of TC. Three signifcant resource in ODA, and an important in particular, according to DAC statistics,

11 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

Chart 1: Technical Cooperation as a Percentage of Real ODA

have prioritized TC in their ODA. In 2014, TC can involve a wide range of activities, Germany, France and Japan, among the top from university research to long-term fve DAC donors, channelled 54%, 41% foreign experts placed in developing country and 33%, respectively, of their real bilateral ministries, co-operant exchanges organized assistance into TC. This compares with an by CSOs, training courses, or short-term average of 18% for all bilateral DAC donors.6 consultants on special assignments.8 When excluding the United States (see footnote 6 for an explanation), TC made up While the forms and emphasis in technical approximately 25% of total real bilateral aid cooperation have varied over the past four for all other DAC donors in 2014. decades, its stated rationale has remained constant. TC is consistently focused on flling While technical cooperation remains a crucial largely donor-perceived gaps in skills and/or resource of development cooperation, its use and institutional competences to more effectively focus, and in particular how it is implemented deliver development outcomes. As noted relative to core principles of development above, the 2005 Paris Declaration’s emphasis effectiveness, remain largely unanalyzed.7 on “aid effectiveness,” included a commitment by donors to be guided by “demand-driven” 3. Modalities and roles of TC, gaps and institutional needs explicitly technical cooperation in ODA identifed by developing country partners. In this policy context, TC was to be a resource Offcial statistics reveal little about the to strengthen partner country ownership forms of technical cooperation. In practice of development priorities and to enhance 12 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

domestic skills to ensure the achievement of Reality of Aid asked authors to address a country-determined development outcomes. number of questions to help make links An examination of various case studies, as between trends in the deployment of technical outlined in this report and others, indicates cooperation and aid provider commitments to that the reality has fallen far short of these ideals. the Busan principles for effective development cooperation.9 An important focus was the The report’s case studies identify substantive examination of how TC can contribute – or roles for TC, many which have been consistent undermine - the space and opportunities for in aid provider practices over these decades. democratic country ownership. Specifcally, the These roles include: questions were:

• Embedding provider technical assistants • Is technical cooperation limiting policy (TAs) in government ministries to develop space for developing countries to freely specifc capacities and/or improve the choose and implement policies to enable technical standards for institutional processes development strategies? (such as procurement or tax policies); • Is technical cooperation being employed • Embedding provider TAs within projects as a “soft form” of policy conditionality? to cover needed technical skills to design • What approaches on the part of aid and build infrastructure; providers will enable the provision of • Providing policy advice, often technical cooperation consistent with accompanying World Bank loan conditions country ownership? or WTO or regional trade agreements. • How can the recipients of technical • Providing advice to infuence government cooperation create conditions for legislation and regulations in areas seen developing countries to manage technical (by aid providers) to be critical for cooperation in their own interest? development progress; and • Sharing experiences through South-South The country case studies highlight the Cooperation (SSC) and/or civil society continued political role of TC within aid and networks drawing on expertise from similar development cooperation. They demonstrate development conditions and realities. that TC often promotes donor-inspired paradigms for governance, export-led It is diffcult to measure the scale or value of development, and private sector partnerships these roles, relative to total TC disbursements, at the expense of peoples’ rights and the as there is little data available on TC projects and strengthening of partner country policy space. undertakings. Nevertheless, CSO authors in this report provided an assessment of the impact of 4. Trends and issues in the deployment TC through various country case studies. Their of technical cooperation reference point is not just effective delivery of technical projects, but also people-centred By 2005 academic research and institutional development paradigms, where peoples’ interests evaluations had documented a growing and voice are able to shape government and civil consensus, even among aid providers, that society development initiatives. traditional technical assistance, as implemented

13 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

over previous decades, had largely failed to of technical cooperation by aid providers. All deliver sustained change. In a damming critique three, which are described below, have the written in 2005, development specialist Roger potential to undermine country ownership and Riddell provided this assessment of World the implementation of the 2011 Busan principles Bank’s capacity building work in Africa: for effective development cooperation.11

“More generally, a major ten-year review a) The tendency to prioritize aid of the World Bank’s efforts at supporting provider interests to realize specifc capacity building in Africa … makes grim donor-determined results and avoid reading. Acknowledging the weaknesses risk in aid delivery, irrespective and ineffectiveness of traditional of the needs of partner country approaches to capacity development, counterparts. the Bank admits that its attempt to focus more directly on helping to strengthen For many recipient countries, TC is largely public institutions in Africa continues to supply-driven and organized to meet aid be a huge challenge, and that in its more providers’ interests. In particular, aid providers recent efforts, a range of key weaknesses employ TC to manage and safeguard the remain. … Capacity development efforts deployment of aid in ways that ensure remain insuffciently led by the recipient implementation of donor cooperation countries, and based on insuffcient objectives. DAC donors’ pre-occupation knowledge about precisely what to do and with the achievement of short-term results how to do it.”10 increasingly drives their aid priorities – pushed by increasing domestic political According the report’s case studies, these pressure to produce tangible results. TC statements are still relevant. This, despite the experts and consultants are usually selected attention to partner-country –focused “capacity by aid providers and therefore are primarily development” in more recent times. The accountable to them. Their mandate includes Bangladesh chapter concludes that “country strong expectations to maintain control ownership, alignment and effectiveness are over the delivery of “outputs” as defned in largely absent” in TC for Bangladesh aimed at the project plan. Because these consultants strengthening the performance and capacity function inside tight contractual obligations to of public institutions and public procurement. produce these results there is little incentive to The Uganda case study similarly highlights address the often more complex capacity needs examples of TC that are generally not aligned and interests of partner country counterparts. with national development strategies or strengthening national systems – despite aid Where developing country capacities are providers’ affrmation of country ownership perceived to be weak, donors can respond as a guiding principle. to a “risky environment” with distrust in the partnership relationship. Measures to Reality of Aid authors have identifed three respectfully determine and assist in the critical issues related to the goals and delivery development of local capacities often take

14 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

second place to a reluctance to take risks infrastructure PPPs. The emphasis has been if government or institutions are identifed on donor-driven technical advice, sometimes as having defciencies. The latter concerns over decades, to promote the privatization often translates into technical assistants and of public services. Examples have included consultants taking control rather than working roads in the Philippines, export-oriented alongside country partners. agriculture in Sri Lanka, or access and exploitation of natural resources in North Rather than acting on their Busan commitments East India. or an understanding that project objectives include (formally or informally) capacity The Sri Lankan case illustrates the critical role building, donors are likely to choose strategies played by technical assistants, recruited and to avoid risks rather than the slower processes supported by the World Bank and the Asian that have the potential to develop local self- Development Bank (ADB), in designing not reliance. only technical aspects of irrigation projects, but also in proposing and carrying out An example is provided in the Bangladesh case politically motivated reforms to privatize study of a World Bank supported, multi-year access to water over a 20 year period. To this program to improve the national procurement day, the World Bank continues to provide system. As the author points out, donors advice and support towards an export- insisted on the use of donor-determined oriented agriculture strategy, ignoring issues procurement rules and mechanisms, over of food production to address local and the reformed national system. This practice, national food security. which essentially undermined local capacities, operated coincidental with the initiative of In the case of NE India, the ADB, alongside the World Bank, donors and the Bangladeshi other donors, has aggressively promoted government, to create a new law to reform private sector engagement in large-scale the procurement system and Bangladeshi agriculture, the development of energy capacities to implement the new system. sources and forest exploitation. In the Even when completed, donors did not use the words of the author, “the prioritization of reformed national procurement system. road projects are in areas with potential to connect trading points for business interests b) A tendency to promote, design of multinational corporations or where there and implement public private are natural resources, water, oil, and forest partnerships (PPPs), in ways that resources for exploitation for their proft.” ignore peoples’ priorities, interests The needs of communities are neglected and alternatives. in these plans, “where most of the roads [that would better serve and service these Several case studies (Philippines, Sri Lanka, communities] continue to be in dilapidated Kyrgyz Republic, India and Japan) document condition.” TC has been embedded in the widespread use of foreign technical various stages of infrastructural projects in cooperation to design and implement the region since the 1990s.

15 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

Donor support for infrastructural that it is unconstitutional and fails to prohibit development has often marginalized affected ecologically destructive open-pit extraction: populations, sometimes to the detriment of stated project goals. In the case of NE India, “It marginalized mining-affected ADB guidance for technical assistants ignored communities, grassroots organizations, issues related to indigenous peoples’ rights over and environmental NGOs from being land and economy, and failed to implement the effectively heard in the process of free, prior and informed consent of indigenous developing the law and did not follow peoples affected by infrastructure development. the legislator’s own protocol for debate The Sri Lankan case documents the successful and ratifcation of the General Mining resistance of farmers to repeated schemes Law. They also allege that over 20 articles for the privatization of water in various in the mining law violate Honduran laws irrigation schemes promoted by TC experts and constitution, as well as international and government offcials. The Philippines treaties ratifed by the Honduran state.”13 case study of TC in support of the Laguna- Lakeshore Expressway-Dike PPP highlights the Similar instances of donor infuence through so-far successful resistance of those who will be TC in the legal and regulatory process, often displaced to this development, in the context of with a privatization agenda, are noted in the documented serious ecological concerns. report’s cases of the Philippines (governing PPPs) and Sri Lanka (governing irrigation and In all these cases, PPPs have not promoted governance of water resources). In these and inclusive partnerships, nor have they allowed other cases, TAs have often been embedded in alternative technical advice and proposals. related government ministries and institutions National experts familiar with the conditions as part of the project implementation. of affected local populations and communities have been ignored or deliberately marginalized. For example, in a case study presented by Eurodad, technical cooperation was used c) The tendency to shape or infuence to update national legislation as well as national development priorities through regulations on taxation. This initiative also legislation and governance reform. included support for audits on taxes owed by multinational corporations (MNC), in order A little technical assistance through aid can go a to strengthen domestic revenue mobilization long way in creating an open legal environment in developing countries. Through an OECD for exploitation of natural resources. Canada, project, Tax Inspectors without Borders, TAs for example, has an explicit policy to provide from industrialized countries in which these technical cooperation to promote “sustainable MNCs are often based, train tax administrators development in the area of minerals and metals,” in developing countries in MNC audit including shaping laws governing mines and their procedures and related issues. development.12 In Honduras, Canadian aid has assisted in the drafting and passage of new mining While this may sound useful, Eurodad legislation, which social and environmental documents case studies that clearly suggest that organizations continue to resist on grounds such TC is primarily supply-driven by donor

16 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

countries. In all examples there was little or no such as governance, agro-industrial and service involvement of the developing country domestic sectors, and human rights (truth, justice and revenue authorities. Technical assistants faced reparations). signifcant potential conficts of interest, coming from northern countries in which there are Civil society also carries out South-South substantial loopholes for MNCs to avoid taxation technical cooperation programs through (e.g. the Netherlands). The Eurodad case study people-to-people exchanges across developing quotes the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial countries. In these initiative participants share Flows from Africa as follows: skills and experiences with counterpart CSOs at the community level and to strengthen “It is somewhat contradictory for solidarity across borders (People4Change and developed countries to continue to provide Fortalizas chapters in this report). technical assistance and development aid (though at lower levels) to Africa, while at Authors acknowledge that South-South the same time maintaining tax rules that exchanges can face some of the same enable the bleeding of the continent’s challenges found in North-South exchanges. resources through illicit fnancial fows.”14 These include factors such as cultural misunderstanding/poor communication These practices raise signifcant questions on and a lack of attention to sustainability. But transparency (with TAs working to infuence an evaluation of People4Change noted that national political processes through legislation) they can also produce the highest benefts, and processes of accountability to people and providing not only highly relevant skills based communities affected by national legislation on similar development challenges, but also and governance bodies. inspiration at the local level in the realization that these challenges can be overcome. In the 5. Technical cooperation in South- case of Fortalezas, for example: South Cooperation and civil society people to people exchanges “The bilateral exchanges were critical in sharing the value of different practices While diffcult to measure, technical cooperation of other institutions. … They allowed plays a major role in South-South Cooperation for unexpected benefts as organizations (SSC). Some of the key SSC providers are discovered interesting methodologies Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and India. VANI’s used by their peer organizations, and were chapter on India draws attention to the fact able to use and adapt them to their own that in 2014/15 more than 8,000 Indian environments and development plans.” technical assistants were provided to 160 countries in a variety of disciplines. The These positive initiatives in technical cooperation majority were part of cooperation programs offer new ideas and positive directions for how with India’s immediate neighbours, such as technical cooperation can be strengthened and Bhutan. A review of Argentina’s SSC in this made more effective. As many note, technical report identifes the importance of mutual cooperation has the potential to truly contribute beneft and shared interests in SSC in areas to people-centered development outcomes,

17 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

consistent with the principles for effective Given the surprising lack of progress development cooperation. to date, all development actors – aid providers, partner governments, CSOs – 6. Recommendations as full partners in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, Given the fact that technical cooperation should reaffrm at HLM2 the essential comprises up to 25% of real bilateral aid importance of demand-led TC fully (and more for select donors), a careful review integrated into developing country of its benefts and limitations is critical. priorities and capacity need. They should This, combined with the fact that technical also call for its inclusion in the GPEDC’s revised cooperation has continued to suffer from a Monitoring Framework for implementation poor track record despite commitments to post-Nairobi. To create a baseline of data change, aid providers and partner countries and analysis of current practices, a multi- must take a hard look at existing practices. As stakeholder Global Partnership Initiative noted in this report, many providers fall far on Technical Cooperation should come short of best practices in terms of effective together following the Nairobi meeting to development cooperation and the principles review and measure existing practices in that should guide its implementation. technical cooperation against the purpose set out in HLM2, and in line with the Reality of Aid Capacity development is a strong focus of recommendations set out below. Agenda 2030, the 2015 Paris Agreement on As a core resource in development cooperation, Climate Change, and in the more recent, UN- much more attention is required to more adopted 2016 Sendai Framework on Disaster fully understand the circumstances where Risk Reduction. These agreements, among technical cooperation is playing a constructive others, create a crucial and defning moment for role, how it should be delivered, and how it rethinking and reforming technical cooperation. could conform better to the Busan principles, including incentives for partner countries to Development partners are structuring lead technical cooperation efforts. Ultimately, nationally owned action plans related to these a GPEDC-led process must ensure that by global agreements; development actors are the time of the next HLM in 2018, technical meeting in the Second High-Level Meeting cooperation, as an aid modality, is wholly (HLM2) of the Global Partnership for Effective consistent with the four Busan principles for Development Cooperation (GPEDC) in effective development cooperation. Nairobi in November 2016 to review progress in their long-standing commitments to effective The following recommendations propose a development cooperation. A failure to look number of changes to technical cooperation 15 more closely at practices related to TC may specifc to each of these four Busan principles. seriously undermine the implementation of a) Democratic country ownership these core global agendas, as well as affect the credibility and effectiveness of the GPEDC and • Support country management development cooperation itself. of technical cooperation A key

18 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

determinant of effective technical alone project implementation units (PIUs). cooperation is a commitment to demand- led capacity development, which includes • Establish dedicated country units recipient country management of the to coordinate and manage TAs priorities and deployment of technical Developing country governments and assistants, according to this country’s counterparts should establish and/or development strategies and priorities. enhance dedicated units to:

• Avoid TC as “soft conditionality” - Coordinate country-driven analysis of Technical cooperation must be capacity needs; understood as a means to an end – the - Negotiate with providers’ potential development of full country ownership technical cooperation interventions and policy space for democratically (including training and education determined development alternatives. opportunities) to meet these needs; TC should never be used as a convenient - Exercise leadership in the selection and informal mechanism to promote and and deployment of TAs; and embed donor/World Bank conditions for - Monitor and assess lessons in relation to fnancial assistance. TC support for stronger and sustainable institutional capacities to address • Deploy regional and national expertise complex local development interests. Providers should give priority to the support of country and regional sharing • Technical cooperation should never be a of expertise to build capacities. Part of this substitute for apparent reforms required for approach is giving priority to meaningful a sustainable and effective public service. collaborations South-South Cooperation and triangular cooperation. b) Focus on developing country results

• Focus TC on skills and knowledge • Support capacities for country- transfers Aid providers should determined results T e c h n i c a l develop internal training programs for cooperation should be managed jointly potential technical assistants. Technical to ensure provider support for results expertise, sensitivity to the local context derived from development priorities, and process skills should be prioritized. plans and policies as determined by Technical assistants should work as the country partners. Effectiveness is advisors not in implementation positions. highly context specifc, with impact and Providers should develop explicit sustainability guided by local stakeholders. incentives to transfer knowledge and skills, rather than fll gaps and manage • Have clear goals for technical risks for short-term donor-determined aid cooperation initiatives Partner country results. Providers should meet their Paris counterparts should be clear about the Declaration commitments to avoid stand- purpose of TC in relation to specifc

19 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

capacities and expertise needed to realize information related to the mandate and country determined results priorities and terms of reference for their TC personnel interests. and their expected contribution to country- determined development outcomes. This • Create fexible and iterative technical transparency should include the costs assistants’ terms of reference for associated with donor-provided technical engagement Effective technical assistants assistants. Such information should enable in a supportive advisory role or in training developing country counterparts to explore programs require fexibility to respond to alternative local, regional or SSC expertise unique and changing realities, particularly with these same resources. Developing in politically sensitive environments. country counterparts should never consider TC to be a “free good,” as this can only c) Respecting inclusive partnerships reinforce an aid dependency culture.

• Empower non-state actors Technical • Report to the OECD DAC all TC that cooperation should take account of the is tied, either formally or informally, essential importance of empowering to donor country experts, and remove non-state actors, such a civil society all tied TC from the DAC calculation organizations (CSOs), who in turn of Country Programmable Aid offer a range of technical capacities and Aid providers that report to the OECD knowledge at the national level towards DAC should report on the tying status of people-centered development outcomes. all TC, the degree to which the provision A fully enabling environment for CSOs is of technical support has been formally or the basis for CSO empowerment. informally tied to the provision of donor country experts. • Respect and implement human rights norms in technical cooperation Technical • Until such time as the tying status of cooperation related to the exploitation of TC is known, the DAC should remove natural resources and/or major infrastructure all TC from its current calculation of development should be conducted within Country Programmable Aid (CPA), i.e. a human rights framework, including the aid that is available to partner countries delivery of programs to ensure free, prior to program against their own priorities. and informed consent by indigenous According to the Aid Trends chapter in people, participatory assessment of this report, assuming that at least 80% impacts on communities and affected of free-standing technical assistance populations, and deliberate consideration continues to be donor driven, in 2014 of measures for the empowerment of CPA would have fallen to less than half of women and girls in local development. Gross Bilateral ODA (41%) for that year, d) Transparency and accountability rather than the reported 53%.

• Be fully transparent about the provision • Be transparent about lines of of their TC. Providers should publish accountability

20 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

Providers and developing country for TC outcomes, based on an agreed counterparts must be clear about the evaluation framework, should be included lines of accountability for technical in the agenda of inclusive country level assistants within TC programs. Lines of mechanisms for mutual accountability, accountability should be to developing involving providers and all relevant country hosts. Mutual accountability stakeholders.

Endnotes

1 This chapter was prepared with the assistance of since 2006. As a percentage of real bilateral aid, US Brian Tomlinson, the editor for this 2016 Reality of TC was 42% in 2005, but only 3.2% in 2008. Excluding Aid Report. the US, in 2014, 18% of real ODA was allocated to TC, 2 Quoted in OECD, “2008 Survey on Monitoring the rather than 14% as recorded in Chart One. Paris Declaraton,” Organisaton for Economic Co- These calculatons for TC are for “stand-alone operaton and Development, htp://www.oecd.org/ technical assistance.” They exclude technical dataoecd/58/41/41202121.pdf, p. 149. See also assistance provided within an investment project, OECD DAC, Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts, at which is not reported by most donors. These later htp://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm. expenditures on TC can be crucial, as described in 3 Paris Declaration, §22, accessed at several case studies in this Report (Sri Lanka, India, http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/ and the Philippines), and may increase as a focus on parisdeclaratonandaccraagendaforacton.htm. infrastructure increases in overall aid allocatons. 4 OECD DAC, The Challenge of Capacity Development, 7 The aid trends chapter in this Reality of Aid Report Working towards good practce, 2006, accessed provides additonal informaton on the allocaton of August 2016 at htp://www.fao.org/fleadmin/ TC. In 2014, 44% of TC went to Least Developed and templates/capacitybuilding/pdf/DAC_paper_fnal.pdf. Low Income Countries and more than half (51%) was allocated to countries where government 5 Accra Agenda for Acton, §16, accessed at revenue was less than $1500 per capita. In terms http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/ of sectors, government and civil society (28%) and parisdeclaratonandaccraagendaforacton.htm. educaton (22%) received the largest share and 6 In 2014, the UK allocated 16.9% and the United account for 50% of TC in that year. States, 2.8%, of their real bilateral aid to technical 8 ActonAid Internatonal, Making Technical cooperaton. An unexplained drop in the reported Assistance Work, 2006, accessed August allocatons by the US to TC afer 2006 has afected the 2016 at htp://www.actonaid.org/sites/fles/ historical trend for technical cooperaton. In 2006 the actonaid/real_aid_2.pdf. This report is the most US reported a total of US$9.3 billion in TC, but only comprehensive overview and analysis by an US$723 million in 2007. Given the scale of US aid, this internatonal NGO on the strengths and weaknesses drop has accentuated the overall drop in reported TC of technical cooperaton.

21 Political Overview: Undermining democratic country ownership: Embedding Northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

9 See Reality of Aid, “The Reality of Aid 2016 Theme Africa htp://www.uneca.org/sites/ default/fles/ Statement: Technical cooperaton and capacity publicatons/if_main_report_english.pdf. development as an aid modality,” December 2015, 15 These recommendatons were informed by the Reality accessed August 2016 at htp://www.realityofaid. of Aid chapters and the following documents: org/2015/11/the-reality-of-aid-2016-report- theme-statement-technical-cooperation-and- 1) LenCD, the Learning Network on Capacity capacity-development-as-an-aid-modality/. Development, “Technical Cooperaton: An Introducton,” 2010, accessible at htp://www.lencd. 10 Riddell, R., Does Foreign Aid Work? Oxford: Oxford org/topic/technical-cooperaton-introducton; University Press, 2007, page 209 2) LenCD, the Learning Network on Capacity 11 These Busan principles for efectve development Development, “Technical Cooperaton: cooperaton are: 1) ownership of development priorites Reviewing the Evidence,” 2010, accessible by developing countries; 2) Focus on results (and on at htp://www.lencd.org/topic/technical- enhancing developing countries capacites, aligned cooperaton-reviewing-evidence; with the priorites and policies set out by developing countries themselves); 3) Inclusive development 3) Land, T. 2007. Joint Evaluaton Study of Provision partnerships (recognizing the complementary roles of Technical Assistance Personnel: What can of all development actors); and 4) Transparency and we learn from promising experiences? (ECDPM accountability to each other. [§11] Discussion Paper 78). Maastricht: ECDPM, accessible at htp://ecdpm.org/publicatons/ 12 See htp://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-materials/ joint-evaluation-study-provision-technical- policy/8690#il-d. assistance-personnel/; 13 Mining Watch Canada, “Honduran organizatons 4) Governance and Social Development Resource fght to have Canadian-backed mining law Center, “Helpdesk Research Report: Changing declared unconsttutonal,” 26 February, 2015, approaches to technical assistance,” 2009, accessed August 2016 at htp://miningwatch.ca/ accessible at htp://www.gsdrc.org/docs/ blog/2015/2/26/honduran-organizations-fight- open/hd586.pdf; and have-canadian-backed-mining-law-declared. 5) ActonAid, Real Aid: Making technical assistance 14 UNECA. (2014). Illicit Financial Flows: report of work, 2006, htp://www.actonaid.org/sites/ the high level panel on illicit fnancial fows from fles/actonaid/real_aid_2.pdf.

22 Chapter 1 The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid Donor priorities for technical cooperation, drivers and implications of tied aid Juliet Akello, Uganda Debt Network

International financial institutions and issues in technical assistance in Manipur and North East India Jiten Yumnam, Centre for Research and Advocacy Manipur

Tax Inspectors Without Borders Hernan Cortes and Tove Maria Ryding, European Network on Debt and Development

Technical assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic, 2016 Chinara Aitbayeva, Nash Vek PF

23 Donor Priorities for Technical Cooperation, Drivers and Implications of Tied Aid

Juliet Akello, Uganda Debt Network1 Donor Priorities for Technical Cooperation, Drivers and Implications of Tied Aid

Juliet Akello, Uganda Debt Network1

1. Country Context formulation process of the NDP II, many were not suffciently involved in the frst In the past two decades, Uganda has developed NDP. Uganda is currently implementing the many initiatives in debt relief, poverty NDP II (2015/16 – 2020/21), which guides all eradication and economic development. resource allocation mobilized domestically and Uganda received debt relief from the Highly externally for programme implementation. Indebted Poor Countries Initiatives (1998 and 2000) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative DPs comprising of bilateral, multilateral (2006). The resources freed by debt relief were and United Nations agencies have created channeled into fnancing poverty eradication the Development Partner Group (DPG) to programs established by the Poverty coordinate and harmonize their efforts in Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) that was supporting the Ugandan government. The launched in 1997. The saved resources and government has responded by encouraging additional support from donors enabled the DPs to provide development assistance Ugandan government to achieve a reduction primarily through General Budget Support in poverty levels from 38.8% in 2002/03 to (GBS). 19.7% in 2012/13.2 2. Procurement and Employment of In 2010 the Ugandan government established Technical Assistance by Bilateral the frst National Development Plan (NDP) Donors in Uganda (2010/11 - 2015/16), which incorporated lessons from the PEAP. It was launched to The Ugandan government seeks to create a guide the formulation of sectoral policies development cooperation strategy that is linked and planning processes. Subsequent NDPs to national priorities, expertise and fnancing are expected to be developed to drive the requirements. Central to this goal is the capacity economy to middle-income status within 30 to be able to exercise maximum fexibility in years (2040). The NDP is an instrument for allocation of resources, recruitment processes, employing key interventions for economic fnancing and expenditure choices. Just as growth and social economic transformation important is control over the management and as well as serving as an important tool for scope of technical assistance (TA). external resource mobilization.3 Through sector working groups, capacity Although non-state actors4 and Development constraints are conveyed to donors to guide Partners (DPs) were consulted during the and enable effective coordination in the

25 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

deployment of TA. Planning using a sector Uganda indicated falsifcation of data. In these wide approach, inputs from the Ministry of cases some facilities or local government units Finance or direct interventions of DPs in over-reported costs in order to receive greater bilateral project agreements have been used resource allocations for drug procurement.11 to identify TA needs leading to procurement This example, along with other cases, has modalities.5 When a particular DP cannot led to mistrust of local public fnancial provide TA, others may be willing to provide management and procurement systems and such assistance. TA support opportunities may has undermined DPs’ confdence in the safety be sought from existing programmes or project of their resources.12 In response DPs have frameworks before initiating new ones.6 recruited, posted and paid directly for TA placements across government sectors.13 In In all cases, TA is expected to be in line with practice, this means that DPs have control capacity needs and complementary to local over the deployment of TA. capacity building efforts. However, according to Granger H (2015) TA often does not Uganda is increasingly investing in incorporate local counterparts in capacity infrastructure projects. Given the concerns building and in some cases have become the about the Ugandan government’s accounting managers of these programmes themselves.7 capacities, there is potential that in future, TA support is frequently managed by DPs DPs will insist that the initiatives that they while ministries, departments and agencies support will come with procurement and (MDAs) have limited roles in the procurement, project management personnel to fll capacity recruitment and payment of TA experts.8 The gaps and ensure effective implementation and recruitment and payment of TA staff directly reporting. This possibility is reinforced by the by DPs has the potential to distort salary NDP II (2015/16 – 2020/21) which suggests structures and undermine the use of the local/ that even some loans (semi-concessional national system. Unfortunately, poor reporting external borrowing) are to be tied to on TA by MDAs and information on this preconditions in procurement processes. In modality of aid is often inadequate and doesn’t practice this means that although interest guide donors on where capacity constraints payments will be made on such loans, are most pressing, thus making it diffcult for creditors’ interests must also be met. them to deploy the required TA. This, in turn, affects the alignment of TA with the Ugandan The Uganda Partnership Policy (2012), government’s capacity building efforts.9 which was developed by the Government in consultation with DPs, states that Government The Ugandan government’s weak capacity in reserves the right to decline any development procurement and accounting has, led DPs to assistance, which directly administer TA support, indicative of a) is insuffciently aligned with government a view that the government lacks the ability priorities; b) has low value for money; c) has to effectively manage large procurements.10 excessive conditionalities; and/or d) has high For instance, a report on health spending in transaction costs. Records of such rejections

26 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

are not readily available so it is not clear The NDPII and the Partnership Policy whether this directive has been implemented. encourage donors to remove conditionalities in But there is concern that donor-driven aid, tied aid particularly in the provision of “supply such as TA, is fragmented and therefore less led” TA that is often not aligned to government effective as it is designed to meet donors’ priorities. Tied TA signifcantly reduces country or interests. Such initiatives are not likely to be local ownership of programmes.18 As noted by a aligned with national development strategies Ministry of Finance offcial: “Government has limited for strengthening capacity in national systems.14 control over the high rates of turnover of such staff which The approaches highlighted for providing, affects continuity of operations….” All aid providers procuring and employing TA to Uganda is affrmed country ownership as a guiding principle consistent with the Uganda Partnership Policy for aid effectiveness in 2008 in Accra and again at (2012). However, the Ugandan government the High Level Forum in Busan in 2011. intends to develop guidelines for the designing, contracting and managing TA with a focus of Budget support is an important modality for reducing such assistance gradually. aid in the context of country ownership. Since 2012 donor budget support has been irregular 3. Impact of Tied Aid on the and declining with frequent suspension of aid Effectiveness and Cost of disbursements due to concerns about high- Technical Assistance in Uganda profle corruption.19 This has eroded trust; jeopardized donor confdence in Government In 2010, untied aid in Uganda accounted systems; and has affected aid resource for 95% of the total received.15 Untied aid is mobilization and impact on aid effectiveness.20 generally acknowledged to improve value for In this light, the Human Rights Watch report money, to reduce transaction costs, and to (2013) noted that these conditions were likely to encourage the use of country systems. It also infuence donors towards conditioning their aid allows for fexibility in the allocation of resources to Uganda.21 The Ugandan government needs to to meet a country’s priority needs. Chinese aid use existing legal and institutional frameworks is an exception to this trend in untying aid. In to enhance accountability to promote good recent years China has provided considerable governance and to fght corruption in order assistance to Uganda. This has included project to reassure DPs and regain their confdence in aid, technical cooperation, business related providing aid and using government systems. activities as well as loans and grants that are often tied.16 Conditions sometimes require that In addition, the poor harmonization of Chinese experts implement Chinese-funded implementation strategies by DPs with those of project loans (e.g. hydroelectric dams, paved the Ugandan government has led to inconsistent roadways and railway systems) and that Uganda achievement of results. For instance, the 2015 imports project materials from China. This report of the Joint Evaluation of Budget suggests heavy and continuous dependence on Support (JEBS) on Uganda indicated that the Chinese Government.17 while some donors explicitly provided TA to

27 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

complement their sector budget support (e.g. 5. Interventions and Strategies for Sweden and Norway in water and sanitation) Improving Participation of Nationals capacity-building modalities and strategies were in Technical Cooperation Projects not necessarily integrated as part of sectoral strategies. This produced mixed results in Citizens’ participation in donor - government many cases.22 discussions on acquisition of external assistance is limited as the responsibility is 4. Accountability of TA to Donors restricted to the Ministry of Finance, which or Local Government Counterparts eventually has an impact on its utilization. Citizens usually get involved only at the point TA should be regarded as an instrument for of monitoring. Improvements to this practice building capacity in the recipient country, not to ensure greater effectiveness include: linked to donor priorities. However, in several programmes, TA to Uganda has been initiated 1. Both DPs and Government should consult by DPs and posted to designated jobs.23 Such civil society, private sector and direct specialized staff are accountable directly benefciaries in the process of external to the DPs as they are expected to provide development resource mobilization. This assurance to the donor agency and meet its approach prepares them to engage in need for effective project implementation and monitoring donor funded programmes / reporting on the terms that they have set.24 projects and external resource utilization. It strengthens both transparency and Poor fnancial management by government accountability. institutions has contributed to a practice whereby DPs provide aid resources directly 2. DPs should make their web sites open to to recipient non-government organizations the public for easy access to information on (NGOs) and community based organizations aid resources and best practices in different (CBOs). Organizations receiving such sectors (e.g. water and sanitation). Donors resources account and report directly to their should also liaise with the Prime Minister’s respective donors. Where DPs are directly Offce to disseminate information through involved in the implementation process, the “Baraza” strategy25 to strengthen the which is more often than not, fragmentation use of a government system to enhance of aid resources and duplication of activities aid effectiveness. This sensitization and is common as is the concentration in a few accountability platform can be used to ‘favored’ sectors. While this off-budget interest intended benefciaries to participate modality of aid delivery to NGOs/CSOs was in project implementation and monitoring. recognized at the 4th High Level Forum in Busan (2011), the quantity of such aid is not 3. Non-state actors like CSOs, CBOs and captured by the Ugandan government even NGOs should form partnerships and when it has an impact on the economy. This coalitions in order to integrate their also makes it diffcult to establish effectiveness implementation plans and strategies with of development cooperation. national and donor priorities. In liaison

28 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

with the Ugandan government, a clear Illustrations of initiatives in development mechanism/platform for engagement cooperation leading to positive results should be established to link and harmonize coordination of dialogue a) In 2010, China impacted positively on the between CSOs working at the community economic welfare of the population through project level with international agencies. Sector, aid to small scale agricultural plants (Kibimba local government, DPs and civil society and Doho rice schemes). A demonstration farm implementation plans should be aligned was established where Chinese experts trained to the NDP to strengthen ownership of local people in planting and handling machinery all planning processes. for processing and harvesting rice. This built local capacity and improved the quality of rice 4. DPs supporting projects outside that was able to secure competitive prices. The government systems should provide result was an improvement in farmers’ incomes funds after an agreement has been made and welfare status.28 on joint or designated sector activity implementation by CSOs with participation b) Another positive example is Organic Agriculture from benefciary populations to avoid (OA), a holistic production management system duplication of work. Such collaboration that has contributed to improved food security, and enhanced citizens’ participation is increased household income and reduced poverty vital as it will complement government through the creation of employment in rural areas. action, strengthen the effective utilization A group of DPs29 are collaborating with the of resources and provide a fair tracking Food and Agricultural Organization to support system for project implementation. the agricultural sector in Uganda and champion implementation of OA. 6. Uganda’s Experience on the Impact of Technical Cooperation for 7. What should be the focus Poverty Focused Outcomes for Aid of Technical Cooperation: Meeting donor needs or building In the framework of international debt relief sustainable local capacity? initiatives, the PEAP was widely recognized for its impact in sustaining growth and poverty When donors initiate and control the supply reduction in Uganda.26 However, although of TA linked to an initiative its effectiveness DP support made a signifcant contribution to is undermined, especially when it is not poverty reduction in Uganda, the 2014 Uganda integrated into local government systems. Poverty Status Report indicates that vulnerability It can be seen as meeting a donor need at to poverty remains considerably high at 43%.27 the expense of local capacities. Bilateral aid This vulnerability, as well as a high rate of relationships can be skewed towards interests demographic growth (3.3% per year), poses a of outside countries rather than local priorities huge challenge for quality service delivery and the and needs. When local needs are prioritized, possibility for effective poverty reduction. however, there can be great benefts.

29 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Examples: On the less positive side, the JEBS Report a) In 2015, the Ministry of Finance received external indicated that although policies, strategies assistance from German Cooperation (GIZ) and plans (Universal Primary Education to provide technical support to human resource and Universal Post Primary Education and development, development of audit manuals and Training) have been developed in the education tools. This process was to build sustainable local sector, there has been little capacity building capacity and promote accountability, transparency support directly linked to budget support.33 The and effectiveness in auditing in Uganda. The technical capacity of the Ministry of Education Government of Ireland also provided aid geared at central level was reported to be declining towards improving the quality of audits through and capacity at local level as being weak. These technical capacity building and re-tooling in the capacity needs have not been addressed by any Directorate of Value for Money and Specialized DP initiatives as donors’ focus has shifted from Audits, Forensic Investigations and IT Audit and sector to project support.34 Other Directorates performing fnancial audits. As a result, a total of 166 staff were trained in Conclusion these specialized areas.30 The knowledge acquired by Ugandan staff through these programmes can The effectiveness of external assistance is highly then be replicated and shared with a broader range dependent on three main factors: 1) the donor of government offcials. and recipient’s motives; 2) policy effectiveness b) The Danish Government supported Uganda of the recipient country; and 3) an alignment 31 to establish the Climate Change Unit in between country priorities and the objectives the Ministry of Water and Environment. of the resource. In Uganda, donor concerns The preparation of a comprehensive Capacity on country systems has increased their anxiety Development Strategy was spearheaded by the and need for guarantees that the money is well Danish Government which provided TA for spent. This concern can lead them to post overall capacity development. It also funded the TA from their countries as they believe it will implementation of the National Adaptation Programmes of Action and the development safeguard aid utilization. However, in order of a climate change policy for Uganda.32 to be truly effective in the long term, external Specifcally, TA is employed in the areas of sector resource delivery modalities must be organized coordination, fnancial management and water to uphold local institutional building and resources management at central level, but with capacity development. Such an approach should frequent interaction with the decentralized levels. be a priority at all levels and is fundamental Support for adaptation to climate change benefts if emphasis is to be put on transformational all party interests. Joint efforts should be made for development with or without conditionality on its integration in all development portfolios. development assistance to Uganda.

30 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Endnotes

were Italy (11%), Korea (58%), Spain (90%), United 1 The Uganda Debt Network is a policy advocacy States (91%) and China. organizaton that was formed in 1996 to campaign for debt relief for Uganda under the HIPC Initatve 16 Economic Policy Research Centre 2010, Impact of the WB/IMF. The organizaton promotes and of China-Africa Aid Relatons: A Case Study of advocates for poor and marginalized people to Uganda, p.1. partcipate in infuencing poverty-focused policies; 17 i)http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/ demanding for their rights and monitoring service news/1338375/highlights-china-uganda-relatons delivery to ensure prudent, accountable and See more at: ii) htp://www.newvision.co.ug/new_ transparent resource generaton and utlizaton. vision/news/1338375/highlights-china-uganda- UDN engages with various government MDAs at relatons#sthash.6zwlnLK4.dpuf. the natonal level and through partnerships with local governments and nurturing community based 18 Aid efectveness 2011: Progress in Implementng organizatons at sub natonal levels. the Paris Declaraton in Uganda – Volume II Country Chapters, p.10. 2 MoFPED 2014, Poverty Status Report: Structural Changes and Poverty Reducton in Uganda, p.8. 19 In 2010, the Joint Budget Support Framework 3 Natonal Development Plan (2010/11 – 201/15) Development Partners cut aid because Government April 2010, p.4. didn’t take efectve acton in 2008/09 against several high level corrupton cases, especially 4 Non-State Actors include private sector, civil society recommendatons from the Common Wealth organizatons, media, and academia. Heads of Government (CHOGM) audit reports 5 Hazel Granger 2015, Demand and Supply of Technical published in 2008. The scandal involving UGX 6 Assistance and Lessons for the Health Sector: Country billion (approximately U$2.4 million) led to donor Perspectve Note – Uganda, p.7. cuts amounted to over 10% of their U$360 million in direct budget support. In 2012, donors again 6 Second Natonal Development Plan (NDPII) stopped direct budget support and ultmately 2015/16 – 2019/20, June 2015, p.8. received repayment of U$12.7 million that was 7 Granger Hazel 2015, Demand and Supply of Technical mismanaged in the Ofce of the Prime Minister over Assistance and Lessons for the Health Sector: Country funds meant for Peace, Recovery and Development Perspectve Note – Uganda, p.7. Plan (PRDP). The Human Rights Watch report (2013) indicated that increased corrupton has 8 MoFPED 2015, Report On Public Debt, Guarantees, been insulated by the failure of Government to Other Financial Liabilites And Grants FY 2014/15, p.24. hold high level public leaders from accountng. 9 Aid Efectveness 2011: Progress in Implementng 20 The Independent 2013, IMF: Aid Cuts Good the Paris Declaraton in Uganda – Volume II Country Opportunity for Uganda. [Online]. Available at: htp:// Chapters, p.8. www.independent.co.ug/ugandatalks/2013/06/imf- 10 MoFPED 2012, Summary of Project support aid-cuts-good-opportunity-for-uganda/. [Accessed: 20th January 2016]. managed outside Government systems, p.10. 21 Human Rights Watch 2013, “Letng the Big Fish”, Failures to Prosecute High-level Corrupton in 11 EU Country Ofce 2010, Health Spending in Uganda, p.50. Uganda: The Impact of Current Aid Structures and Aid Efectveness, Country Briefng 1, p. 8. 22 Internatonal Cooperaton and Development 2015, Report on Joint Evaluaton of Budget Support to 12 MoFPED 2013, Summary of Project Support Uganda, Volume 1, p.16. Managed Outside Government Systems FY 2012/13, December, p.3. 23 MoFPED 2013, Report on Loans, Grants & Guarantees, FY 2012/13, p.2. 13 MoFPED 2013, Report on Loans, Grants & Guarantees FY 2012/13, p.2. 24 Granger Hazel 2015, Demand and Supply of Technical Assistance and Lessons for the Health 14 Aid Efectveness 2011: Progress in Implementng Sector: Country Perspectve Note – Uganda, p.7. the Paris Declaraton in Uganda –Volume II Country Chapters, p.3. 25 A Citzens’ Advocacy Forum coordinated by the 15 Second Natonal Development Plan (NDPII), Ofce of the Prime Minister that brings together 2015/16 – 2019/20, June 2015, p.9. The exceptons policy makers, public service providers and public

31 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid International Financial Institutions and Issues in Technical Assistance in Manipur and North East India

service users to share relevant public informaton Swedish Internatonal Development Cooperaton and to develop correctve interventons to Agency, and the Internatonal Trade Centre. Jiten Yumnam, Centre for Research and Advocacy, Manipur outstanding challenges afectng their livelihood. 30 Of regularity audits, teammate champions training, Uganda Revenue Authority Asycuda tax system, 26 Natonal Planning Authority 2013, Development advanced Value For Money course, audit of networks, Partnerships Thematc Report: Mid-Term Review of SQL database & security audit and Linux audits. the Uganda Natonal Development Plan, p.1. 31 The CCU coordinates Uganda’s response to the 27 MoFPED 2014, Poverty Status Report: Structural climate change challenge and also liaises with Changes and Poverty Reducton in Uganda, p. 1 & 98. other insttutons outside Uganda, partcularly UN agencies and intergovernmental insttutons. 28 African Economic Research Consortum 2010, The 32 http://www.wri.org/our-work/project/world- Impact of China –Africa Aid Relatons: The Case of resources-report/role-development-partners- Uganda, Policy Brief Issue No.10, p.1 adaptaton-planning. 29 DPs include the United Natons Environment 33 Internatonal Cooperaton and Development 2015, Programme, the Government of Austria through Report on Joint Evaluaton of Budget Support to Uganda, Volume 1. United Natons Conference on Trade and Development Capacity building task force, the 34 Ibid, pg 49.

32 International Financial Institutions and Issues in Technical Assistance in Manipur and North East India

Jiten Yumnam, Centre for Research and Advocacy, Manipur

International Financial Institutions International Development (DFID, UK), in North East Region (NER) Australian Aid (AUSAID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have are key bilateral agencies fnancing development intensifed their presence and reach in Manipur projects across NER. The ADB, WB and JICA and North East Region (NER) in the past few are involved in fnancing energy, agri-business, decades. This involvement is part of larger water supply/ sanitation and urban development move to integrate India economically with the in Manipur. The IFIs have targeted NER in economies of the Asia Pacifc region and is their sub-regionalization processes. For instance, also seen as a way to reduce ‘poverty’ among the ADB has included this region in its South indigenous communities in the NER region. Asia Sub Economic Cooperation (SASEC) to complement and integrate it with similar The chapter attempts to provide an overview initiatives, such as Greater Mekong Sub Region of the increasing involvement of the IFIs, with (GMS) in South East Asia. their emphasis on Technical Assistances (TA) in preparation of projects, and with subsequent The ADB is actively involved in shaping the coordination with the Government of India. development vision for Manipur and NER. There has been tremendous development of TA Central to this engagement is Vision 2020 in infrastructure projects, roads, urban project, for India’s NE region, with its overwhelming power reforms, trade and investment, mostly focus on privatization and on fostering trade fnanced by the Asian Development Bank. The and commerce with neighboring countries. chapter also discusses the larger implications In the country partnership strategy, 2013- of TA initiatives and its implications for the 2017, the Asian Development Bank includes human rights of the indigenous peoples of a special emphasis on NER as a strategic Manipur and across NER. location to promote cross-border regional cooperation. The ADB also understands The IFIs are involved in a range of sectors: NER as the gateway to Southeast Asia for infrastructure, energy, tourism, urban trade and investment, suggesting the need development, agriculture, water management to integrate South Asian economies. The and related policy reforms in Manipur. The ADB maintains that SASEC, which includes Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the the NER, has massive energy potential, vast World Bank (WB) are two key multilateral resources of minerals, oil, forest, livestock, banks, while the Japan International fertile agriculture land, important ports and Cooperation Agency (JICA), Department for cheap skilled labour.

33 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

The ADB and World Bank fnanced projects an agreement signed with the Government of across the NE region, including ADB fnanced India in 2015. road and energy projects and the World Bank fnanced high voltage transmission and An agreement on water and sanitation services distribution lines, are aimed at harnessing and in Shillong and Sikkim signed by Australia exploiting the rich resources of the NE region.1 and the government of India (GOI) in 2003, included a provision whereby Australia would IFIs and Technical Assistance provide TA to Meghalaya and Sikkim for the planning and delivery of these services. The Prior to fnalizing funding in specifc sectors, Australian Consulting Firm, Kellogg Brown the IFIs have developed an extensive range and Root Private Limited executed an AU of technical assistance (TA) especially in $39.4 million project, which began in late roadwork, urban development, agribusiness, October 2003. The project complements tourism and water projects. The ADB is Australian assistance of AUS$3 million to the leading multilateral bank with extensive the World Bank’s South Asia water and involvement in in Manipur and India’s NE sanitation program. The AusAid program also region with TA preparation and subsequent emphasized policy and institutional reforms in project implementation for several of its India as part of Australia’s support for water sectoral fnancings. Many of ADB’s TA governance reform in South Asia. projects have been funded by DFID (United Kingdom) or the Japan Special Fund. This TA, ADB and Road Projects in NE which was developed over the last decade, has Road projects are one of the key sectoral now advanced to IFI loan projects and many foci for ADB investment in NER. Regional are now fully in the implementation phase, transportation and connectivity has been despite the controversies generated. The ADB considered by IFIs as crucial to foster trade fnanced Thoubal – Kasom Khullen road and commerce among the countries in South project, the Imphal Ring Road Project and and South East Asia. The goal of ADB the Kangchup to Tamenglong Road project transport sector support under the India’s have all landed in controversy in recent years country partnership strategy 2013 – 2017 is to in Manipur. increase the movement of people and goods in a more effcient, safe, sustainable manner. Many OECD countries have promoted private A loan agreement (Trance-I) between sector participation through fnancing by their Government of India and ADB was signed bilateral development agencies. This is evident for the North Eastern States Road Investment in many development processes across the NE Program (NESRIP) in July 2012 and for the region. DFID, USAID, JICA, GIZ are directly tranche II in February 2014 at a total cost involved in fnancing a variety of development of US$200 million.2 The implementation of sectors. Japan is preparing ODA loans Tranche II is progressing in NE States, which through JICA amounting to approximately includes Manipur, where the roads projects 67 billion yen for the improvement of road from Tupul (NH 53) to Bishnupur, Thoubal to network connectivity in the North East with Kasom Khullen has been taken up.3 The ADB

34 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

also fnanced road projects in Manipur under the length of the road to be taken up under the US$425 million multi-tranche South Asian Sub- proposed NESRP scheme has been set at 433.7 regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) Road Km. covering the States of Assam, Manipur, Connectivity Investment Programme approved Meghalaya, Mizoram, Sikkim and Tripura.6 by the ADB in 2014. Manipur is one of the States The project was envisaged for implementation targeted for a US$300 million loan agreement over 5 years, from 2011-2016. The estimated signed between the Government of India and project cost is US$298.2 million. the ADB in March 2015 aiming to improve road connectivity and increasing domestic and ADB outlined the objectives of its TA regional trade along the North Bengal-North as facilitating economic growth, poverty Eastern region international trade corridor. New reduction, and environmental action by roads in Manipur envisaged for construction improving the North Eastern State Roads under the project includes the Imphal-Kanchup- network and road connectivity to the national Tamenglong Road, Imphal Town ring road and and sub-regional road networks. ADB’s plans Imphal –Moreh Road project. to prioritize those roads that will be important for regional integration and trade fows to other Earlier, the ADB approved a Project parts of India and neighboring countries. The Preparatory Technical Assistance (PPTA) TA agreements have prioritized about 2,500 to prepare a feasibility study for up-grading km of roads using criteria of road condition, and reconstruction of state roads as well traffc, and connectivity.7 as institutional development and capacity building of State Public Works Departments Of the key the key objectives of the ADB (PWDs) in the North East States. A TA road projects in Manipur and across NE agreement worth US$1.2 million was provided is to reduce poverty by fostering trade and on a grant basis from the Japan Fund for commerce between South and South East Poverty Reduction for capacity building Asian countries. However, villagers affected for the North Eastern State Roads Sector.4 by the ADB fnanced 47 Km Thoubal - Earlier in December 2004, a TA agreement Kasom Khullen road and the Imphal Town to provide assistance in evaluating the Ring Road project have already raised feasibility of trade and investment creation for concerns on multi-faceted impacts, including the private sector, was also signed between loss of their agriculture land, grazing grounds Government of India (GOI) and ADB as and homestead land, which will all lead to part of the North Eastern State Roads Project their impoverishment and impact on their (NESRP). This TA was co-funded by the livelihoods. Six villagers of Thoubal and GOI through the Ministry of Development Ukhrul Districts, affected by the road project of Northeastern Region (MDONER) and fled a legal petition against ADB in August ADB.5 Technoconsult International Limited, 2014 concerning the violation of community Bangladesh, Development Consultants Pvt. rights, including forced acquisition of their Ltd., India, and Vision Rx Connexion Pvt. land disregard of environmental impacts.8 Ltd., India carried out the consultancy service The affected village petitioned that the project for the project from 2005 to 2006. The total authorities commenced land acquisition

35 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

without providing information on related Tamenglong District, Manipur, besides oil rehabilitation and compensation measures.9 exploration plans in the region. These mega The ADB has so far failed to respond to the dams and oil exploration will lead to massive legal notice served to them on violation of scale of fooding and destruction of both community rights. agriculture land and forest, impacting the livelihood of indigenous communities. The Public Works Department, Manipur and private companies implementing the road The larger implications of mega road projects project, including AECOM Asia Company have never been assessed, particularly on the Limited, Rodic Consultants Private Ltd, indigenous local economy and on the role of Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. indigenous women in local economic traditions Ltd, ABCL, have begun constructing the and practices. The health and environmental ADB fnanced Bishenpur – Tupul road and impacts and potential to increase logging in Thoubal to Kasom Khullen Roads without forested areas have never been assessed. There conducting a detailed impact assessments are also concerns that the road projects are and causing widespread environmental pursued to promote the interest of private damages. The extensive sand and stone corporate bodies, as against the rights of mining by ABCI company from Ejei River indigenous communities. The prioritization for road construction for the Bishenpur to of road projects are in areas with potential to Tupul road had led to massive soil erosion, connect trading points for business interest of receding of water level, loss of fsh habitat multinational corporations or where there are and scarcity of water in Noney and Tupul natural resources, water, oil, and forest resources areas in Tamenglong District, also rendering for expropriation for their profts. These agriculture land unft for cultivation. priorities are not based on the actual needs and aspirations of communities in rural areas, where More than 1000 people will simply lose their most of the roads continue to be dilapidated agriculture land and their source of survival condition. The demands for road repair and due to ADB’s Imphal Town Ring Road proper maintenance has been a longstanding project, pursued in 2015, which will lead to demand of communities, but continues to be impoverishment of indigenous communities. out of consideration for improvement. The Zeliangrong Youth Front raised concerns with the Kangchup –Tamenglong road project ADB and Urban project in March 2016 due to a lack of assessment of social impacts and unclear rehabilitation and The ADB has provided a loan for the North resettlement plans for those affected by the Eastern Region Capital Cities Development project. There are concerns that the ADB Investment Project (NERCCDIP), still in roads from Bishenpur to Tupul will directly its implementation phase. The ADB Board facilitate the construction of a 66 MW Loktak of Directors approved this loan under its downstream hydroelectric project and the 70 Multi-tranche Financing Facility (MFF) MW Nungleiband Hydroelectric project in for US$200 million in June 2009 from the

36 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

ADB’s ordinary capital resource. The projects efforts to introduce ULBs, by undermining fnanced under the Multi Tranche Financing Khasi indigenous peoples traditional norms Facility of ADB was originally scheduled for of land and community affairs management completion as Tranche 1 (May 2009-Oct 2011), in the Town. The reforms prescribed under Tranche 2 (March 2010-December 2013), NERCCDIP-I intend to create regulatory Tranche 3 (December 2012 – December 2015), frameworks, fnancially viable service delivery notwithstanding delays. The Government of systems, and enhanced tariffs. They will also India and ADB, signed a US$80 million loan create an environment for Private Sector agreement in January 2016 for infrastructure Participation (PSP), including developing improvement in Agartala and Aizawl, respective a time-bound PSP plan, a build operate and capitals of the NER States of Tripura and transfer agreement for compost plants, Mizoram under the NERCCDIP. 10 outsourcing solid waste collection, and user charge billing and collection. The ADB prepared the NE Region Urban Sector Profle Study, completed through TA The proponents of ADB’s NERCCDIP in December 2003, including the Project insisted on holding municipal elections under Preparatory Technical Assistance (PPTA).11 74th Constitutional amendments (CAA) The NERCCDIP is indeed part of ADB’s in Shillong and under the new Meghalaya loan package in India’s NER under its SASEC Community Participation Bill, 2010 without initiative. It envisages the capital cities of the consent of Khasi peoples’ traditional NER to play a pivotal role in supporting institutions, the Durbar Schnongs in Shillong both ADB’s promotion of globalization, Municipality Area. The Durbar Schnnogs liberalization and privatization and to support have already objected to the new Meghalaya India’s free trade initiatives with neighboring Community Participaotry Bill, 2010 and countries.12 The project aims, among others, subsequent plans to organize elections. to reduce disparities between NER and the The Synjuk Ki Rangbah Shnong (SKRS), a developed regions of India through municipal conglomerate of headmen of Durbar Shnongs reforms to develop legislative and institutional in Shillong Municipal area had already decided frameworks for Urban Legislative Bodies against municipal elections, which is being (ULBs), accompanied with reforms to create pushed as a reform plan of NERCCDIP government revenue sources by introducing implementation in Shillong: “…After a and rationalizing user charges and urban-based threadbare discussion, we have unanimously decided taxes.13 The implementation of the Tranche III to oppose the proposed municipal election, the elections of the NERCCDIP is still ongoing in NER. will hamper the functioning of traditional institutions The total project cost for the two solid and if the government goes ahead with the municipal waste and sewerage and sanitation sub elections, we have decided to boycott it…”14 The project of Shillong Town is US$51.7 million. meeting also took serious note of the legality The implementation of NERCCDIP at of the Meghalaya Municipal (Amendment) Shillong Town in Meghalaya is marred with Ordinance 2010, which was given assent by community rights violations, especially in the the Meghalaya Governor in June 2010.15

37 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Several civil society organizations wrote to The ADB’s TA for the northeast power ADB seeking information, more specifc development project,17 prepared in 2004, details on the impacts of the project, called for the development of locally available including the application of ADB’s safeguard resources, including hydropower, natural gas, policies on environment impact assessment, and renewable energy sources to provide involuntary resettlement and consultation critical transmission and distribution facilities, and involvement of indigenous peoples.16 The and to assist institutional strengthening in the CSOs are also concerned about the level of power sector with private sector participation. involvement of CSOs in the non application Power sector reform, fnanced by the ADB is of ADB’s safeguard policies in NERCCDIP, actively being pursued in Manipur, Assam and in particular the Involuntary resettlement and across the NE region. on Indigenous Peoples. Some CSOs are even wrongly listed as being consulted for project The Assam Power Sector Development preparation and implementation despite Program18 has received support from the their lack of information. There are further ADB. In 2002 the GOI and ADB agreed that concerns about the accessibility to the service TA and a fnancing loan would be provided as the project is based on user charges. to support reform of the fnancial and power sectors of Assam State.19 By this time the reform ADB and Power Sector of Assam State Electricity Board had already commenced in line with the recommendations by an ADB TA.20 These reforms included the Power sector is also one of the major introduction of a proft-centered approach priority area for the IFIs, including the in its 14 distribution circles as steps towards ADB. The ADB and JICA are the donors unbundling and corporatizing its operations. In primarily engaged in fnancing energy related Manipur, the Electricity Department has already development initiatives in India’s northeast. been corporatized and there is an ongoing plan The ADB prioritizes six areas: 1) power to install electric meters and a pre-paid system sector reform, 2) the promotion of higher is being introduced. Already, the Manipur State effciency and low carbon power sources 3) Power Distribution Company Limited has hiked expansion, de-bottlenecking and optimization the power tariff in Manipur by 10% in February of transmission and distribution systems, 2016, much to the resentment of communities 4) institutional strengthening to implement in the potential impacts causing further reforms required by the Electricity Act of 2003, impoverishment of their lives. Notwithstanding 5) promotion of private sector participation, the power hike, the accessibility to power and 6) encouragement of energy strategy and service is another concern as the creation of environmental and social sustainability. ADB power infrastructure is focused in urban areas has stated that its power sector strategy and and not so much in rural and remote areas of operations are most likely to be implemented Manipur. As the entire power sector reform is in states committed to reform. focused on a proft and commercial approach,

38 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

many areas and communities will further be Industrial (Investment) amendment policy, left out, as the scope for proft will be low and 2013, the Manipur Tourism Policy, 2010, are disproportionate to the massive investment all focused on private sector led growth. They required for such regions. foster open market competitions, by insisting on global tenders, inviting international ADB and Trade TA consultants and private multinational companies to promote implementation, In October 2004 the ADB prepared TA plans for procurement etc. The push for the Trans the promotion of trade and investment in NER. Asian Railway and Highway in Manipur along The ADB argued that its trade and investment with the several road infrastructure projects by initiative for NER was timely and necessary to ADB and JICA are all intended to promote improve the market environment in NER and private sector led growth and development in to create a favorable environment for private the region. sector investments.21 This TA also focused on increasing the capacity and productivity of NE The ADB’s poverty reduction strategy argues India’s private sector in order to meet the ADB that the private sector can play a key role in defned challenges and issues facing the sub pro-poor growth through the generation of 22 region in international markets. employment and income. The ADB supported The ADB maintains that NER has unexploited TA in the “Agribusiness Development natural resources and that many states have high Support Project” in Sikkim, which includes an agribusiness potential. Creation of an action investment component for external fnancing plan would thus enhance the conditions for to promote the commercialization of private sector led growth. The plan responded agriculture and development of agribusiness. to the need for a policy framework enabling This investment aims to promote the competition, for an institutional setup with an production, processing and marketing of open, competitive level playing feld among high value crops and their integration in sectors, and the establishment of a support international markets. mechanism for private sector development. All these measures were key actions outlined in the IFIs and TA: A Discussion of Impacts TA document. TA, WTO and policy conditionalities: The The implementation of this TA in the trade IFIs, in particular the Asian Development sector has led to the integration of private Bank and the World Bank, have provided the sector-led growth in all the policy priorities and content and legitimacy for a particular set of initiatives for development in the NER region. developmental priorities in NE India. They have India’s signing of Free Trade Agreement with done so with a view to integrating the region ASEAN, the formulation of a series of policies into a pattern of economic development that such as the Manipur Hydro Power Policy, 2012, primarily benefts a narrow band of corporate, the New Land Use Policy, 2014, the Manipur economic and political interests. A quick

39 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

reading of the WB’s country assistance strategy into smaller units of generation, transmission for the last few decades and the ADB’s country and distribution where the government will strategy for India reveals the far reaching role have little infuence. Once this happened, only these institutions play in setting and directing the Electricity Regulatory Commission will developmental priorities and processes in have a say on tariff fxation, which implies that India’s NE region. It is critical to note that these the price for electricity, an essential service, prescriptions dovetail with those of the World would be decided by the market. Trade Organization (WTO). In response to this policy condition, the A signifcant trend in the involvement of IFIs in Electricity Act was passed by the Government NER is the heavy emphasis on the intensifcation of India in 2003. It required that all states of trade and private sector participation. The completely unbundle their respective state technical assistance programs of IFIs uniformly electricity boards (SEBs) or electricity uphold the approach promoted by the WTO departments by December 2005. Through and other global fnancial institutions for the central government the ADB imposed privatization and the insistence on free trade as conditionalities for ADB loans, specifcally essential parameters for development in the NE that they must demonstrate a commitment to region. The ADB in its TA for investment in the the dismantling of the respective SEBs. NE maintains that all export opportunities and trade promotion in the region must be evaluated Since this measure was passed there has been in terms of WTO norms that have come with wide spread corporatization of the power India’s accession to the WTO models. Since sector across the NE region. The appointment 1995, when India joined the WTO, there has been of workers is now through contracts and a surge in imports of agricultural commodities, there has been mass layoffs of employees in which are being dumped by developed countries the Manipur State Electricity Board. This in the international market below their cost of development has been marked by vehement production. This has led to a deep decline in protests by workers and employees’ unions. domestic agriculture prices and has deepened the agrarian crisis, including suicides in rural India.23 In Manipur, there was a protest against corporatization of the electricity department The shift in India’s power sector to emphasize by employees in October 2013. The the participation of private parties in the Manipur electricity employees union staged generation and distribution of power a sit-in-protest at the electricity department commenced in 1990s. In response, the World offces in Keishampat, Imphal against the Bank advocated for a reduction in government Manipur government’s corporatization of involvement in this sector. The IMF and WB’s the department.25 Many workers are not pre-conditions to bail out India from a balance regularized, paid low wages and deprived of payments crisis included reforms and a of basic facilities and promotion. Pressing reduction of transmission and distribution its long standing demand for service losses.24 Subsequently, the ADB insisted on regularization for Work-Charge and Muster unbundling the State Electricity Boards (SEBs) Roll employees under Manipur State Power

40 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Company Limited and Manipur State Power development strategy promotes the private Distribution Company Limited, Manipur sector and mitigates risks for the sector. Electricity Employees’ Union (MEEU) staged a sit-in-protest in front of Thoubal Division The ADB rationalizes its aggressive private Electricity offce at Thoubal Athokpam in sector promotion by maintaining that February 2016. the involvement of the private sector will reduce fnancial pressure and demands on In Meghalaya, the state electricity board a poorly resourced and ineffcient public (MeSEB) employees’ staff union raised their sector. It argues that this will free up utility concern with initiatives to privatize this board and infrastructure costs and thus allow the (MSEB). In a memorandum submitted to the government to redirect resources to the chairman by the MSEB for reviewing the 2003 social sectors. However, the Government’s Electricity Act, the union stated that previous spending on social sectors has declined, both experiences of dismantling state electricity at the national level and in Manipur. For boards in Assam, Orissa and Delhi and instance, in the 2015 budget for India, the privatization of electricity supply had proven Ministry of Agriculture witnessed a reduced to be a total failure for both power distribution allocation from Indian Rupees (Rs) 19,852 and revenue collection. The impact of crore in the year 2014 to just Rs 17,004 crore. corporatization and the commercial model Similarly, funds for the Women and Child of function of Manipur’s power sector has Development Ministry have been slashed to recently been felt when in February 2016 the Rs 10,382.40 crore from Rs 18,588.39 crore, Manipur State Power Distribution Company subsequently affecting allocations in respective Limited has increased the power tariff by 10 States like Manipur. 27 percent.26 The overall implications of these policy conditions and commercialization of The ADB insists that its trade and investment service were never assessed by the IFIs or initiatives for the NER are necessary to the GOI. There are clear concerns with the improve the market environment in the NER. corporatization of power sector as to both The result, the ADB claims, will be a favorable accessibility and affordability, especially in environment for private sector investments rural areas of Manipur. which will make it possible for the region to participate in global and regional markets. Focus on private sector-led development However, this has not proven to be the case. All TA strategies developed by IFIs for projects The private sector involvement in NER region in Manipur and across the NER impose private has led to expropriation of land and resources sector development as the engine of growth as well as destruction of the environment. for the region. The strategy is geared towards In practice these measures have undermined measures that facilitate free and unhindered the rightful participation of communities and trade and increase opportunities for private their organizations in development decision- sector participation. The ADB’s private sector making affecting their land.

41 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

One clear concern with the implementation Exploitation of natural resources for large of ADB’s road projects is the overwhelming scale development projects focus on privatization of development. Multinational private consultancy and civil The pattern of economic development set by TA works companies carried out the entire and IFIs that is increasingly being pursued and consultancy and civil works for road building. legitimized, is one based on a series of measures The Management Services Value (MSV), that benefts the dominant economy and the AECOM Asia Company Limited, both based interests that proft and gain from it. These in USA, Egis International, based in France, measures involve an enormous appropriation Roughton International Ltd, base in UK, and exploitation of natural resources, the Rodic Consultants Pvt. Ltd, Aarvee Associates building of large centralized water and power Architects Engineers & Consultants Pvt. Ltd, projects, the imposition of land and water use based in India are some of the construction strategies, and an emphasis on cash crops and supervision consultants for the ADB road processes that use and exploit the bountiful projects in NER. The BVSR constructions land, resources and people in NER. Pvt. Ltd., ABCI, BSCPL Infrastructure Limited, M/s Tantia Construction Ltd, The World Bank’s fnancing of the creation Dineshchandra R. Agarwal Infracon Pvt. of high voltage transmission lines will make Ltd are some of the civil works Contractors. possible the construction of mega dams in The accountability of these private companies Manipur and NE region. This includes the remains an unaddressed issue, such as the 1500 MW Tipaimukh dam, the 190 Pabram environmental damage by ABCI in exploiting HEP project and the 67 MW Khongnem sand and stone from Ejei River, Tamenglong Chakha dam over Manipur’s Barak River. District, Manipur with adverse consequences Indeed, the NE region is recognized as India’s and without responding to social impacts. powerhouse. Already, more than 200 mega dams are planned for the region. As well, the The French cement multinational company, ADB’s fnancing of extensive road building Lafarge has received substantial support from across Manipur and the NER will facilitate the ADB and IFC for its limestone mining the construction of these mega dams, as well operation in Meghalaya in NER India. This as oil exploration and mining throughout the has led to destruction of forest as well as NER region. In Manipur, ADB roads with violations of indigenous peoples’ customary ongoing construction, such as the one from laws and land ownership. The Mizoram State Bishenpur Town to Tupul are key supports for Road project, fnanced by the World Bank the 66 MW Loktak downstream hydroelectric and implemented by RBM Tantia (part of project and the 70 MW Nungleiband dam. The RBM Road Builders of Malaysia), Baghareetha increased involvement of IFIs in NER is also Private Limited, CCAP Limited and Termat linked to a rise in concessions for mining and Engineering and Infrastructure Private Limited other extractive industries.29 The government has encountered controversy over project of India unveiled the North East Hydrocarbon delays, problems with compensation and the Vision 2030 in February 2016 to exploit adequate rehabilitation of communities.28 hydrocarbon across the NER region.

42 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Negation of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights The polices and standards developed by IFIs have failed to receive a global consensus, An assessment of the collective funding with wide rejection of these policies on initiatives of the IFIs, the ADB, JICA and grounds of lack of sensitivity to equity, World Bank reveals that the focus is to target sustainability, human rights and justice.30 But the region’s land and resources with minimal even these limited policies and standards care for the human rights of indigenous of IFIs are continuously violated in project peoples in NER. There is a complete implementation in India’s NE region. The disregard for the indigenous economy, way conception phase and TA undertaken on behalf of life and cultures dependent on their land of the IFIs often failed to mention indigenous and resources for their intrinsic physical and peoples’ rights over their land and the need spiritual survival. Indigenous peoples will lose to have their consent before pursuance of their identity and cultures if land alienation specifc projects.31 An overwhelming focus, in and displacement associated with IFI projects contrast, is to promote private sector interest are pursued without any monitoring and at the cost of indigenous peoples’ rights and accountability mechanism. survival.

A failure to take the free, prior and informed In fact, the conditionality imposed through consent of indigenous peoples is evident technical assistance from the ADB and World in the IFIs’ operations in the region. The Bank, working under the WTO framework, expropriation of indigenous peoples land, have in fact taken away indigenous peoples’ in large-scale resource and dam projects, right to development while benefting the will only led to their impoverishment, and private sector, corporate bodies, local, is clearly inconsistent with the IFI’s stated national and global elites. To meet the project fnancing goals to reduce poverty in IFIs’ conditions, the GOI has begun a legal NER. Relevant authorities have failed to heed process to disregard their rights to their land peoples’ calls for information disclosure on by seeking changes in existing legislation in projects that are to be introduced or to seek favour of privatization. This eagerness to their consent for use of their lands. People receive IFIs’ projects has also led to higher have not been informed of disclosure policies, levels of militarization in the region, which environment and social policies when new has resulted in multiple conficts and tensions projects are being introduced. among indigenous communities. Indigenous communities face increased occupation of The IFI projects also lead to the undermining their land by the military. of indigenous peoples traditional institutions and functioning, as demonstrated by the case The space to seek accountability of IFIs of the NERCCDIP project in Shillong in and MNCs involved in the expropriation Meghalaya. Here the Meghalaya Community of indigenous peoples’ land is a continuing Participation Bill, 2010, has been introduced challenge. TA provided by many IFIs32 is to negate the functioning of traditional Durbar embroiled in controversies due to a lack Schnongs of the Khasi people in the town. of regard for environmental impacts and

43 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

indigenous peoples’ rights. Future investments status. Manipur continues to reel in a precarious in tertiary construction sub-sectors will expand fnancial situation despite fve year plans in the neo-liberal trade system and further expose India for the last half a century. Indeed the the NE region to the imperialist globalization.33 Chief Minister of Manipur expressed concern All these projects are being carried out with with the new Central fnancial arrangements misinformation and without the consent of of withdrawing SCS. There will be drastic affected indigenous peoples. cuts in social sector and social protection schemes, affecting women, children, elderly, the The proft seeking capitalist investors, in their differently abled and all marginalized section. scramble for proft have caused unrestrained environmental destruction, displacement, The withdrawal of SCS also comes at a divide and rule and other forms of human time when IFIs increased their involvement rights violation in Manipur and other parts of in Manipur. The challenge with fnancial NE. Recognition of indigenous peoples’ self- support from these IFIs is that support determined development is crucial for success comes in the form of loans with obligatory of all development intervention in NER, interest payments. With the new development including those fnanced by IFIs. fnancing arrangements for Manipur, it is highly apparent the State will be reduced to IFIs Financing and Increased Indebtness another highly indebted political entity to The Government of India decided to these IFIs. A larger question of accessibility withdrawn the Special Category Status (SCS) of to basic service provision and quality of such Manipur, along with several other states across service persists without clear explanations. India in January 2015. This measure meant a There has been increased concern that the mandatory condition of Manipur to bear 50% Government will rely on its natural resources, of all development fnancings in the state. The water, land, forest, oil, minerals to service its decision was based on the recommendations of accumulating debt to multilateral fnancial the 14th Finance Commission and the Union institutions and to bilateral donors. Budget of India for the year 2015-16. Manipur confronts severe challenge to even mete its 10% Challenges on application of ADB’s share in the Central assistance of 90%, under safeguard policies the SCS. The withdrawal of SCS is an obvious extension of India’s neoliberal policies of rapid There are clear concerns with the ADB failing liberalization, privatization and globalization, an to implement its safeguard policies, despite insistence of withdrawal of State’s responsibility their limitations and shortcomings. The loan and any forms of State subsidies. agreement between ADB, Government of India and NE States for the project facilities under The State Governments across India’s NER NERCCDIP-I stipulated that the ADB must are unanimous in condemning the Indian adhere to the borrower’s environmental laws Central Government’s withdrawal of SCS and and regulations, as well as ADB’s Environment in demanding the restoration of the special Policy (2002), ADB’s Policy on Involuntary

44 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Resettlement (1995) and ADB’s policy on the interest of private corporate bodies, the Indigenous People (1998) in the event of political elites and international fnancial impacts on indigenous peoples during project institutions. There is hardly any consideration implementation. ADB’s three broad general of promoting the interests and rights of review frameworks prepared on indigenous indigenous communities of the NE region peoples, environment and rehabilitation and with their rightful participation. resettlement for NERCCDIP–I prior to ADB board approval only reiterated ADB’s The IFIs projects, and in particular ADB safeguard policies and mitigation plans. road projects, are marked by absence of There is clear misrepresentation of facts and detailed socio, economic, health and impacts of the sub projects on indigenous environmental impact assessments, and peoples in order to avoid preparation of a clearly defined options with affected detailed Environment Impact Assessment communities. The project authorities and the (EIA), Initial Social Assessment, Indigenous companies failed to conduct a detailed impact Peoples Development Plan and Rehabilitation assessment of the road projects and also to and Resettlement Frameworks for each apply ADB safeguard policies, especially sub projects. Project proponents tried their related to indigenous peoples. The ADB best avoid the Category ‘A’ classifcation of funded projects often also failed to conduct ADB, as all sub-projects of NERCCDIP-I a detailed Environment Impact Assessment are classifed as category ‘B’ project, without and Management Plan in accordance with the indigenous peoples consent and thus avoiding latest safeguard policies of ADB. responsibilities and accountability for them. The ADB Safeguard Policy Statement (SPS) The larger implications of ADB fnanced of June 2009 is not applied for NERCCDIP, projects on the local economy, on the intrinsic despite the fact that the approval of the project role of indigenous women in sustainable was around the same time the new policy and traditional economic system, and on the statement was approved by ADB.34 environment and natural resources in Manipur has not been considered. These considerations Conclusion are crucial given the primacy of a liberalized economy and trading system among countries IFIs are increasingly associated with with powerful economies in South and South development processes in Manipur across East Asia, relating under WTO guidelines. the region, in shaping development visions through their TA. The IFIs are increasingly The overwhelming priority for privatization promoting a neoliberal development agenda and the role of corporates in India’s Look East in the region with a clear private sector role. Policy, complemented by IFI’s in their project The defnition of development objectives fnancings and objectives, would defnitely of fostering trade and commerce with usher in an economy defned and controlled neighboring countries are pursued not only by corporates. Such a focus will lead to in an exclusive process, but also to promote uncontrolled plunder of natural resources in the

45 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

region. The failure to consult and take, free, prior accessibility and quality of service need careful and informed consent of affected communities consideration. The priority should be to ensure is a signifcant violation of indigenous peoples’ accountability of the IFI’s and to deliver justice rights outlined in UN Declaration on the Rights in all their development fnancing, based on the of Indigenous Peoples, 2007. recognition of communities’ rights and their wishes. Delegating responsibility to manage Despite adverse experiences with past Manipur’s resources to multinational corporate privatization moves, the ADB continues to bodies, driven sole by insatiable profts, with provide private sector loans for infrastructure IFIs facilitation, will further impoverish the projects that actually raise utility prices and state, marginalize its people, devastate its place risks on governments who only recoup environment and complicates the multilayered their costs by raising tariffs and levies on their confict, within communities and with the own citizens. Rather than freeing up resources State. A full recognition of indigenous peoples for social sector spending, governments rights over their land and resources and their entering into an ADB designed public- self determined development by States, private partnership confront increased debt IFIs, multinational corporations and other and liabilities, with no legal recourse. The stakeholders involved in fostering development multiple impacts of privatization of essential across Manipur and India’s North East region, social basic services on communities, on is crucial to usher in real development.

46 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Endnotes

12 “Insidious Financial Insttutons in India’s North 1 “ADB-India Partnership Strategy”, Asian East”, by Jiten Yumnam and R. Wangkheirakpam, Development Bank htp://www.adb.org/countries/ ICR & FIPA, April 2006. india/strategy 13 TA 3902-IND: North Eastern Region Urban Sector 2 Loan 3073-IND: North Eastern State Roads Profle Project for US$ 150,000 was approved on 16 Investment Program August 2002 & North Eastern Region Urban Sector 3 Loan agreement, LOAN NUMBER 3073-IND, Profle Project. Final Report, Vols. I and II, prepared PROJECT AGREEMENT (North Eastern State Roads by Lea Associates South Asia Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, for Investment Program –Project 2) between ADB ADB, Manila, December 2003. and Government of Manipur with MDONER, 17 14 “City headmen against civic polls”, the Shillong February 2014 Times, 7 August 2010 4 Proposed Mult-tranche Financing Facility and 15 “Headmen to oppose municipal electon in Administraton of Technical Assistance Grant India: Meghalaya”, United News of India, 7 August 2010, North Eastern State Roads Investment Program, Project (Source: News Kerala) Number: 37143, June 2011 htp://adb.org/sites/ default/fles/projdocs/2011/37143-013-ind-rrp.pdf 16 E-mail leter from Forum for Indigenous 5 Incepton Report: ADB TA 4378 – IND, Northeastern Perspectves and Acton to Director, Environment State Roads Project, Submited by Technoconsult and Safeguards Division and to Principal Social Internatonal Limited, Bangladesh, December Development Specialist (Safeguards), Environment 2004. The TA agreement was signed between and Safeguards Division of ADB on 12 July 2010 and Government of India (GOI) and ADB as part of the subsequent communicaton with ADB. northeastern state roads project (NESRP) to provide 17 ADB: TAR: IND 38312, December 2004, TA to India for assistance in evaluatng the feasibility of trade and preparing the Northeast Power Development Project investment creaton for the private sector. 18 ADB: TAR: IND 36318, fnanced by Japan Special 6 North Eastern States Roads Investment Programme Fund, October 2002 to support reform of Assam’s (NESRIP), assisted by Asian Development Bank fnancial and power sectors (ADB), Ministry of Development of North East Region, Government of India, htp://www.mdoner. 19 A loan “Assam Governance & Public Resource gov.in/node/1437 Management”, ADB’s 2004 country program, India. The TA frst appeared in ADB Business Opportunites 7 With the support of an ADB-fnanced staf (Internet Editon), 1 July 2002. consultant, a long list of about 4,000–5,000 km has been identfed. 20 ADB 2000: Technical Assistance to India for Support 8 The villages of Somrei, Irong Ngoupikhong, N for Power Finance Corporaton, Manila Mollen of Saikul Division Village of Senapait 21 ADB: Technical Assistance to India for Preparing District, Yeasom Village, Kasom Khullen Village and North Eastern States Trade and Investment Creaton T Natyang Village of Kasom Khullen Sub-division of Initatve, TAR: IND 37407, October 2004. Ukhrul District in Manipur are some of the afected villages. 22 ADB: TAR: IND: 37407: Technical Assistance to India for Preparing the North Eastern States Trade and 9 HC notce to ADB on Manipur road project, Times Investment Creaton Initatve. News Network, 19 Aug, 20144 htp://tmesofndia. indiatmes.com/city/guwahat/HC-notce-to-ADB- 23 “Over 50,000 Farmers Protest Against WTO in India”, on-Manipur-road-project/artcleshow/40385618. October 3, 2005, Indian Coordinaton Commitee of cms Farmers Movements, India Resource Centre, htp:// www.indiaresource.org/news/2005/2017.html 10 India, ADB sign loan deal on Aizawl, Imphal infrastructure, The Business Standard, 28 January 24 K Sreenu et. al. “Power Sector Reforms in the State 2016, htp://www.business-standard.com/artcle/ of Andhra Pradesh in India” in Electricity Reforms news-ians/india-adb-sign-loan-deal-on-aizawl- in Asia: Experiences and Strategies., Workshop imphal-infrastructure-116012800613_1.html Electricity Sector Reforms in Asia. Experiences and Strategies, World Social Forum, Mumbai, 11 PPTA: IND38260-01 (ADB) - North East Region India, 19 January 2004. Organised by the TNI Urban Development (Phase II) in India. The Asian Energy project Development Bank (ADB) will provide the sum of US$ 800,000 towards this project preparatory 25 MEEU condemns corporatzaton of electricity technical assistance (PPTA), 7 December 2004. department October 9, 2013, The Imphal Times,

47 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

htp://archive.imphaltmes.com/meeu-condemns- Burma People and Civil Society Organizatons to the corporatzaton-electricity-department/ ADB, March, 2008, Bank Informaton Centre (BIC) 26 Manipur to hike 10 percent power tarif, Feb 19, http://www.bankinformationcenter.org/proxy/ 2016, NE Live. htp://www.nelive.in/manipur/ Document.11016.pdf news/manipur-hike-10-percent-power-tarif. 31 “Summary of Concerns regarding the ADB’s Draf 27 “Humongous Cut in Government Social Sector Safeguard Policy Statement”, Editor: Stephanie Spending”, By Cithara Paul and Santwana Fried, January 17, 2008 htp://www.forestpeoples. Bhatacharya, 2 March 2015, htp://www. org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2010/08/ newindianexpress.com/naton/Humongous-Cut-in- adbspsfailuresummaryjan08eng.pdf Government-Social-Sector-Spending/2015/03/02/ artcle2693462.ece 32 One example would be the ADB fnanced Imphal Ring Road Project, Thoubal to Kasom Khullen Road project, 28 Insidious Financial Insttutons in India’s North East”, by Jiten Yumnam and R. Wangkheirakpam, 33 Examples of this would include Trans Asian Highway, ICR & FIPA, April 2006 the Trans Asian Railways, and military statons 29 Such as in Meghalaya, for Uranium, Coal and 34 A brief assessment of solid waste management Limestone. and sewerage and sanitaton sub projects under 30 ADB’s weak Safeguard Policy Statement Draf will ADB’s North East Capital Cites Development cause not only social and environmental harms but Infrastructure Project (NERCCDIP), Phase 1 in also human rights violatons: An Open Leter From Shillong, Meghalaya, by Jiten Yumnam, April 2010

48 Tax Inspectors Without Borders

Hernan Cortes and Tove Maria Ryding, the European Network on Debt and Development

“Tax Inspectors Without Borders is a datng agency.” Pascal Saint-Amans, Director Centre for Tax Policy and Administraton OECD1

Introduction countries.5 In a related point of criticism, more than 100 developing countries have repeatedly Tax dodging by multinational corporations been excluded from the negotiations of the (MNCs) is currently costing developing international tax standards.6 countries billions of dollars per year. For example, the United Nations Conference During the Addis Ababa Summit on Financing on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for Development in 2015, the Group of 77, has estimated that one type of international which represents more than 130 developing corporate tax avoidance alone is costing countries, made it one of their highest developing countries between US$70 billion priorities to push for the establishment of and US$120 billion per year.2 an inter-governmental body on tax matters under the United Nations (UN).7 Such a body There is broad agreement that this issue is would allow the UN to become the global important and urgent. One approach to deal standard setter, and would pave the way for all with this problem has been to offer capacity countries to participate on an equal footing. development and technical assistance on However, this proposal was rejected by taxation to developing countries so that they OECD member states, who wanted to keep can increase their capacity to collect taxes the decision making at the OECD.8 from MNCs’ activities in their territories. However, there are many questions on how The OECD has also played a signifcant role such capacity development and technical in tax assistance. Since 2011, the OECD has assistance should be carried out. been running a Transfer Pricing Programme, which provides “support for developing countries In the area of taxation, the Organisation for seeking to implement or strengthen their transfer pricing Economic Development and Cooperation rules.”9 Among its areas of work, the Transfer (OECD) – also known as the ‘Rich Countries’ Pricing Programme provides assistance for Club’ –plays a central role. For the past 50 developing countries to introduce and update years, it has been the key decision maker for national legislation on the taxation of MNCs. international tax standards, including taxation of MNCs.3 Not least due to a multitude In 2013, OECD also initiated a project of large international tax scandals, these called ‘Tax Inspectors Without Borders’ standards have been criticised for being (TIWB).10 This initiative was announced in ineffective as a tool for taxing MNCs,4 as well May 2012 during an OECD Task Force on as for disregarding the interests of developing Tax and Development,11 and aims to enable

49 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

“the sharing of tax audit knowledge and skills with a type of tax rulings called ‘advance pricing tax administrations in developing countries through agreements’ (APA) – also known as ‘comfort a targeted, real time ‘learning by doing’ approach.” 12 letters’ or ‘sweetheart deals.’ These are Where several other tax assistance programs agreements between tax administrations and focus on workshops and training programs for individual MNCs that determine upfront how tax administrators from developing countries, the arm’s length principle will be applied in their TIWB uses an approach where: “Selected experts case. Advocates of APAs, such as the auditing will work with local tax offcials directly on current company, PwC, highlight that APAs are a way audits and audit-related issues concerning international of ‘removing uncertainty from transfer pricing.’18 tax matters and general audit practices relevant for 13 specifc cases”. From the perspective of TIWB, it is important to emphasize that auditing MNCs is not One of the TIWB’s key approaches is the just a simple matter of following a clear and deployment of foreign experts into the tax strict law. Rather, it is a process involving administration offces of developing countries assessments, judgements and decisions. All of where they can directly participate in the these can have a high impact on the level of administration of taxation of MNCs.14 taxation applied to a MNC being audited, as well as on the amount of profts claimed by At the completion of the pilot phase, in 2015, the the auditing tax administration. UNDP became a project partner of TIWB and a new four-year phase of the project was launched.15 Governments have generally also endorsed the The goal is to deploy 100 foreign experts to developing countries from 2015 – 2019.16 principle that two countries should not tax the same profts. This principle raises a critical issue for governments in the several jurisdictions Special sensitivities around where a MNC is operating. It means that if taxation of MNCs an auditing tax administration claims a high amount of a MNC’s overall profts, there will Taxation of MNCs is far from an exact be fewer profts for other countries to tax. science. If the legislation of a country follows The result can be conficts between countries the OECD standards (which many developing where the same corporation is present, or countries do), its tax administration must use sometimes with the company being audited, the so called ‘Arm’s Length Principle’17 to particularly if the MNC is dissatisfed with the determine how large a share of the company’s tax administration’s decisions. In some cases, profts ‘belong’ to their country (and can taxation of MNCs is fnally settled through therefore be taxed by them), and how large a bilateral negotiations between the government share ‘belongs’ to other countries. Since the and the company, such as in the case of Arm’s Length Principle leaves large room Google and the UK.19 for interpretation, there is a lot of discretion involved in the auditing process. This discretion The direct involvement of donor technical has in turn given rise to the increased use of assistance in the work of the tax administration

50 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

of a developing country introduces particular to his/her country as a potential risk factor risks of conficts of interest. For instance, MNCs in relation to tax avoidance of MNCs. On the operating in a developing country may have other hand, there is the desire or need to be strong connections with or are based in that loyal to the government of his/her current or donor’s country. Another potential confict of former employer, by arguing that no structures interest occurs if the donor country has structures or loopholes in the donor country’s tax or loopholes in their legislation that provide legislation are a reason for concern. opportunities for MNCs to avoid taxation. The OECD has produced a Toolkit for TIWB, These loopholes in donor countries are more which includes guidelines for managing common than one might think. A study potential conficts of interest. The TIWB commissioned by the European Commission Toolkit says that ‘The host administration and the examined 33 indicators of structures that expert together determine whether there is a potential facilitate or allow aggressive tax planning. confict of interest.22 The Toolkit also suggests It found such indicators in all EU Member actions for host countries to consider in the States, although some have signifcantly event of potential conficts of interest: more indicators than others. For example, 1. Reallocating the expert to other audit cases; the Netherlands’ tax system was revealed to 2. Limiting the role of the expert in the audit; have 17 of the 33 indicators – the highest of 3. Discussing the issue with the company all the EU countries. This was followed by which is about to be audited; Belgium with 16.20 These structures have also 4. Anonymising the cases being audited; or become a point of confict inside the EU. 5. Selecting another TIWB expert for the project. In 2015, Der Spiegel online gained access to Regarding the last option, the Toolkit confdential documents that described how underlines that: the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg have caused strong concerns on the part of “Where the expert is a currently serving tax other EU member states by protecting tax offcial, the host administration should contact the practices that provide MNCs opportunities to partner administration prior to changing the terms avoid paying taxes.21 of, or terminating, the TIWB programme due to potential confict of interest. This will allow the The donor country expert is typically a former partner administration the opportunity to discuss or current employee of the donor country’s the proposed changes to, or termination of, the tax administration. So, conficts of interest TIWB programme with the host administration can easily arise if a MNC is using structures and the expert before a fnal decision is made.”23 or loopholes from the donor country in order to avoid taxation in the host country. An The TIWB Toolkit maintains that the expert can be placed in a diffcult situation of developing host country must have the lead divided loyalties. On the one hand, there is during all phases of a TIWB project. 24 However, the requirement to train the host country tax examples from the pilot phase have questioned administration to identify fnancial transfers whether this is, in reality, always the case.

51 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Concerns relating to the TIWB pilot are approximately 150 British companies phase registered in Rwanda and bilateral trade reached £21 million in 2014. As an example Despite the fact that the TIWB initiative has of the commercial ties, the UK government been widely reported in the media, the amount notes that: “UK companies, including Deloitte, of publicly available information about the PWC and Ernst & Young, are leading the growth of actual content and experiences with TIWB is the fnancial services sector in Rwanda.”27 extremely limited. There is no offcial evaluation of the TIWB pilot phase publicly available. The TIWB pilot project between DFID and Rwanda began in 2014.28 The internal OECD In its report For Whose Beneft,25 Eurodad documents raised a number of questions published extracts of internal OECD about the project. Among other aspects, the documents that provide a ‘Secretariat Review documents pointed out that: of the Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB) Initiative’ (2014). The internal process that 6. No Terms of Reference (ToR) were produced these documents is unknown. agreed between the countries; However, Eurodad decided to release this 7. The UK was “in the lead during the whole information because these internal documents process;” raise important issues that should be part of 8. (The Rwanda Revenue Authority was “not the debate on TIWB. Below are examples from familiar enough with specifc features of TIWB- the pilot phase, which are further elaborated in concept and TIWB-programme;” the Eurodad report. 9. There was a “low level of comprehension TIWB-concept by [Rwanda Revenue Authority] The UK Rwanda Pilot Project (TIWB seen as regular Technical assistance by [Rwanda Revenue Authority]);” The UK has a long history of providing 10. “[N]o actual TIWB work on cases has been done assistance to Rwanda on taxation. In 2005, because of lack of preparation by the [Rwanda Rwanda enacted the Law on Direct Taxes on Revenue Authority];” and Income, which introduced transfer pricing 11. The OECD secretariat provided some provisions. According to Attiya Waris, these “advice and support” to the UK. There is provisions – and the law – were included, no indication that the secretariat provided any advice to Rwanda. “as a result of a DFID funded initiative. It neither followed as a result of any noticeable Another key feature of the frst UK pilot misuse of international transfer pricing laws nor phase deployments in Rwanda related to was there any discussion within any of the law implementation. Of particular concern was making and administrative bodies in Rwanda to the body that managed these deployments, the effect that there was a need for such a law.”26 namely the Investment Facility for Utilising Specialist Expertise (iFUSE). iFUSE is The UK and Rwanda also have commercial managed by DFID’s managing agent, ties. According to the UK government, there PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). PwC is,

52 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

according to iFUSE, “responsible for matching that there is potentially a very serious confict of requests from developing countries for support with the interest in DFID paying PwC to administer best available expertise and managing each deployment projects designed to help developing countries raise from start to fnish.”29 According to iFUSE,30 key more tax.” She added: “For a business that elements of its mission include reforming the claims to provide accountability and transparency, investment climate, helping deliver jobs to local PwC seems to have put itself in a position where people, improving prospects for economic conficts of interest are not only clearly possible, growth and encouraging the development of but in fact highly likely. Without transparency a greater range of products and services for how is DFID to know that PwC is not running consumers at competitive prices. rungs around them?” 33

PwC is a controversial name in the tax world. She also called for “(…) some immediate clarity It has been involved in several scandals linked to know that we are not paying PwC to bat for to tax avoidance, helping companies to reduce poor countries’ governments while also batting for their tax bills. Perhaps the most famous one big business to steal from those governments,” and is the so-called LuxLeaks scandal. It revealed underlined that: how PwC negotiated 548 tax rulings from 2002 to 2010 for over 300 MNCs in Luxembourg “PwC and Tax Inspectors without Borders must (including Pepsi, Amazon, Skype and Ikea). make public, on an ongoing basis, the affliations The goal of these tax rulings was to create a of each individual sent to each developing drastic tax reduction by channelling hundreds of country tax authority, the identities of corporate billions of dollars to Luxembourg. In some cases taxpayers in those countries over whose tax bills the resulting tax rate was below 1 per cent.31 they may have had infuence, and the identity of the auditors of those frms.” PwC is an active participant in the debate on changes in laws regulating the taxation Abott concluded: “Following the Luxleaks of MNCs in Rwanda and the East African scandal, it beggars belief that DFID would use a Community. In 2014 PwC joined other known facilitator of massive global tax avoidance business representatives in a call for the East to administer support work to tax authorities in African Community to use the OECD’s the world’s poorest countries.”34 transfer pricing rules to create better conditions for MNCs.32 On the issue of whether PwC’s involvement could create a potential confict of interest, a The involvement of PwC in the TIWB project DFID spokesperson said: has been matter of debate in the UK. Member of Parliament Diane Abbott, the shadow “PwC act as managing agents for DFID’s international development secretary, argued: Investment Facility for Utilising UK Specialist Expertise programme but are “As the Luxleaks scandal has shown, PwC is in not involved with advising developing the business of helping multinational corporations countries, which is carried out by avoid tax. For this reason it is abundantly clear independent tax experts. As with all our

53 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

programmes, we have rigorous checks Borders program is cooperating with and balances in place to ensure there is no the “Large Tax Payers” offce of the confict of interest.”35 Ghana Revenue authority to improve service levels and predictability for The UK later changed its funding method for companies and investors in Ghana. The the TIWB programme, which is no longer Embassy will establish a top sector fund. funded through iFUSE.36 Its purpose is to investigate promising business opportunities and to address any The Netherlands Ghana Pilot Project bottlenecks experienced by the private sector in the enabling environment with Ghana introduced transfer pricing legislation regard to trade and investment between in September 2012, which, according to the Netherlands and Ghana.” the OECD, is now “aligned with international standards.”37 At the same the OECD papers In terms of taxation of businesses in Ghana, affrm, it was the outcome of “signifcant input the Dutch strategy emphasizes: “The economy is and advice on the drafting of the new legislation” still dominated by a large informal sector, only a small by, among others, the OECD, the EU, and number of larger companies pay, very high, taxes. The the World Bank Group. 38 Following the Netherlands will support Ghana in broadening its tax introduction of this new legislation, a TIWB base by technical assistance and direct cooperation with pilot project between the Netherlands and Dutch tax authorities.” Ghana was launched. On the subject of the TIWB deployment in As in the case of the UK–Rwanda initiative, the Ghana, the internal OECD documents suggest: Netherlands and Ghana have clear commercial ties. In its Multi Annual Strategic Plan,39 the 1. The Netherlands were leading the process Dutch embassy in Ghana noted: “More than related to the ToR instead of Ghana. Also hundred Dutch companies are active on the Ghanaian the deployment agreement was drafted by market. General interest in Ghana is growing fast, the Netherlands, and “accepted by Ghana ranging from large multinationals to small and medium without any comments;” enterprises.” Among these companies are Royal 2. The Ghana Revenue Authority had a Dutch Shell and Unilever.40 “passive role;” 3. The communication with Ghana was From the strategy, it appears that the Dutch perceived as “troublesome;” and engagement with TIWB is part of a larger plan 4. The OECD secretariat provided advice to support international business. and support to the Netherlands “throughout the whole process”, but not to Ghana. “The Netherlands, within the framework of the OECD Tax Inspectors without The Netherlands Ghana project is ongoing.41

54 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Conclusions countries. This is evident in the fact that most international tax standards have been Taxation of MNCs is a very political issue. negotiated in forums where more than 100 Countries can often behave as competitors developing countries were excluded. These in attracting and maintaining MNCs in their forums have been criticised for omitting the respective country, rather than as allies in concerns and interests of developing countries. the fght for fair taxation. This makes tax The issue is compounded by the fact that assistance a highly sensitive area, one flled many developed countries have legislation and with a large potential for conficts of interest. practices that provide opportunities for MNCs to dodge taxes in other countries, including in As noted, the TIWB project includes a developing countries. Among the countries Toolkit that addresses conficts of interest that have these structures are those that already and emphasizes the importance of developing are, or could become, donors or providers of country leadership. However, examples from experts to be deployed in TIWB projects. the pilot projects demonstrate that these principles might not always be respected. The In the words of the High-Level Panel on Illicit fact that the OECD and UNDP’s objective for Financial Flows from Africa: TIWB centres on quantitative achievements (100 deployments before the end of 2019), “It is somewhat contradictory for increases the concern that the quality and developed countries to continue principles of these projects might become to provide technical assistance and compromised. development aid (though at lower levels) to Africa while at the same time Focusing on capacity development and maintaining tax rules that enable the technical assistance cannot solve the challenges bleeding of the continent’s resources faced by tax administrators in developing through illicit fnancial outfows.”42

55 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Endnotes Accessed on 29 June 2016: htp://www.un.org/ 1 Saint-Amans, Pascal. (2012). Tax Inspectors Without esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/9Dec14- Borders. Moving Forward with Implementaton. statement-g77.pdf OECD Task Force Plenary Meetng. Cape Town. May 2012. htp://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/t-on- 8 See for example: Government of the United States. td-sess-four-oecd.pdf. (2015). Statement to ECOSOC Special Meetng on Internatonal Cooperaton in Tax Maters. Published 2 UNCTAD. (2015). World Investment Report 2015: 22 April 2015: htp://www.un.org/esa/fd/wp- Reforming internatonal investment governance: htp:// content/uploads/2015/04/2015esm-usa.pdf and unctad.org/en/PublicatonsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf Government of Japan. (2015). Statement by Mr. 3 OECD. (2014). Setng Global Standards: The OECD, the Takeshi Osuga, Ambassador, Deputy Director- G20 and the Internatonal Tax Agenda, Forum for New General for Internatonal Cooperaton and Global Diplomacy. Keynote speech by Angel Gurria, OECD Issues. Published 13 April 2015: htp://www.un.org/ Secretary General. 6 November 2014, Paris, France. esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/05/ Accessed on 29 June 2016: htp://www.oecd.org/tax/ Japan_general_specifc_20APR2015.pdf setngglobalstandardstheoecdtheg20andtheinternat 9 OECD Tax and Development Programme. Developing onaltaxagendaforumfornewdiplomacy.htm Capacity in Transfer Pricing. Accessed on November 4 See for example Tax Justce Network. (2015). OECD’s 25 2015. htp://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-global/ BEPS proposals will not be the end of tax avoidance developing-capacity-in-transfer-pricing-fyer.pdf by multnatonals. Press release. 5 October, 2015: 10 OECD. (2014). Development Co-operaton Report http://www.taxjustice.net/2015/10/05/press- 2014. Mobilizing resources for sustainable release-oecds-beps-proposals-will-not-be-the-end- development. OECD Publishing. 7 October 2014: of-tax-avoidance-by-multnatonals/ http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/ development-co-operaton-report-2014_dcr-2014-en 5 ActonAid. (2014). The BEPS process: Failing to deliver for developing countries. 16 September, 11 Saint-Amans, Pascal. (2012). Tax Inspectors Without 2014: htps://www.actonaid.org.uk/sites/default/ Borders. Moving Forward with Implementaton. files/publications/aauk_report_-_bepsuk_16th_ OECD Task Force Plenary Meetng. Cape Town. sept_2014.pdf May 2012. htp://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/ t-on-td-sess-four-oecd.pdf The idea of creatng a 6 The OECD’s process on Base Erosion and Proft group of tax advisors to be deployed in developing Shifing is an example of a process where more than countries – and even the incepton of the name 100 developing countries were excluded from the itself – has been foated by the Tax Justce Network negotatons (for an overview of which countries (TJN) since 2004. The idea was ofcially raised in were involved, see Eurodad. (2015). An assessment November 2011 by TJN’s Director John Christensen of the OECD/G20 BEPS outcomes: Failing to reach its during a meetng of the German Development objectves. 2 October 2015: htp://www.eurodad. Agency (GIZ) in Bonn, Germany. The initatve, org/BEPSfacts ). Another example is the OECD/G20 he pointed out, should be independent from process on exchange of informaton (a descripton OECD and should not be limited to audits but of the process can be found here: Markus instead should be open to more comprehensive Meinzer. (2012). The Creeping Futlity of the Global support to developing countries, mainly on taxing Forum’s Peer Reviews. Tax Justce Network. March multnatonal corporatons (MNCs) and the issue of 2012:http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/ transfer pricing (source: Christensen, John. (2015). GlobalForum2012-TJN-Briefng.pdf ). TJN and TIWB. 26 January 2015. Unpublished). 7 See for example statement on Behalf of the Group 12 OECD Tax and Development Programme. (2015). of 77 and China by Ms. Pamela Luna Tudela, Tax Inspectors Without Borders Toolkit. OECD. Minister Counsellor of the Plurinatonal State Paris, 2015.htp://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-global/ of Bolivia, at the Second Round of Substantve tax-inspectors-without-borders-toolkit.pdf Informal Session of the preparatory process for 13 OECD Tax and Development Programme. (2015). the Third Internatonal Conference on Financing Tax Inspectors Without Borders Toolkit. OECD. for Development, on enabling and conducive Paris, 2015.htp://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-global/ policy environment. (New York, 9 December 2014). tax-inspectors-without-borders-toolkit.pdf

56 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

14 OECD Tax and Development Programme. (2015). 2015. htp://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-global/tax- Tax Inspectors Without Borders Toolkit. OECD. Paris, inspectors-without-borders-toolkit.pdf 2015.http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-global/tax- 24 OECD Tax and Development Programme. (2015). inspectors-without-borders-toolkit.pdf Tax Inspectors Without Borders Toolkit. OECD. 15 OECD and UNDP. (2016). Tax Inspectors Without Paris, 2015. htp://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-global/ Borders. An OECD/UNDP Partnership to tackle tax-inspectors-without-borders-toolkit.pdf domestc resource mobilisaton with a practcal 25 Eurodad. (2016). For Whose Beneft. A diferent hands-on approach. Concept note. Accessed on 9 prespectve on Tax Inspectors Without Borders. June 2016: htp://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-global/ Report stll to be published. tax-inspectors-without-borders-concept-note.pdf 26 Waris, Atya. (2013). Taxing Intra-Company 16 OECD and UNDP. (2016). Tax Inspectors Without Transfers: the Law and its applicaton in Rwanda. Borders. A learning by doing approach to tax audit Bulletn for Internatonal Taxaton 67. No.12. assistance. Summary. Accessed on 9 June 2016: 27 UK Government, Foreign & Commonwealth htp://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-global/tax-inspectors- Ofce. (2015). Guidance UK-Rwanda commercial without-borders-summary.pdf17 relatonship. Website, published 4 November 2015: 17 OECD. (2016). Transfer Pricing. OECD website, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ including links to the OECD Transfer Pricing rwanda-business-guide/uk-rwanda-commercial- Guidelines for Multnatonal Enterprises and Tax relatonship Administratons (2010) and the OECD reports on 28 DFID. (2014). Annual Review – Summary Sheet Base Erosion and Proft Shifing (2015): htp://www. (4743782). November 2014. htp://iat.dfd.gov.uk/ oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/ iat_documents/4743782.docx 18 PwC. (2014). Advance Pricing Agreements. 29 iFUSE. (2011). iFUSE Paving the Way for Business. Removing uncertainty from transfer pricing. Bulding a Beter Investment Climate. FAQs. iFUSE. Accessed 10 June 2016: htps://www.pwc.co.uk/ htps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ tax/assets/if100-fnal-apa-fyer.pdf uploads/attachment_data/file/328295/IFUSE- 19 Simon Bowers. (2016). Google’s tax deal with the UK: FAQs-July-2014.pdf key questons answered. Published in The Guardian, 29 January 2016: htps://www.theguardian.com/ 30 iFUSE. (2014). iFUSE Paving the Way for Business. technology/2016/jan/29/googles-tax-deal-with- Building a Beter Investment Climate. the-uk-key-questons-answered-chancellor-taxes 31 Wayne, Leslie et al. (2014). Leaked Documents 20 Ramboll Management Consultng and Corit Expose Global Companies’ Secret Tax Deals Advisory (2016), Study on Structures of Aggressive in Luxembourg. Internatonal Consortum of Tax Planning and Indicators. Commissioned by the Investgatve Journalists. Accessed 26 March 2015. European Commission. Working Paper no 61, 2015. http://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks/ htp://ec.europa.eu/taxaton_customs/resources/ leaked-documents-expose-global-companies- documents/taxaton/gen_info/economic_analysis/ secret-tax-deals-luxembourg tax_papers/taxaton_paper_61.pdf 32 Xinhua. (2014). Business decry ‘unharmonised 21 Der Spiegel Online Internatonal. (2015). Internal tax policy’ on imported services. Published on 21 EU Documents: How the Benelux Blocked Ant- October 2014. htps://www.trademarkea.com/ Tax Haven Laws. Published on 6 November 2015. news/businesses-decry-unharmonised-tax-policy- http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ on-imported-services/ eu-documents-reveal-how-benalux-blocked-tax- 33 More, Sinead. (2016). PwC accused of confict of haven-laws-a-1061526.html interest. Economia. Published 22 March 2016: 22 OECD Tax and Development Programme. (2015). http://economia.icaew.com/news/march-2016/ Tax Inspectors Without Borders Toolkit. OECD. Paris, pwc-accused-of-confict-of-interest 2015. htp://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-global/tax- 34 More, Sinead. (2016). PwC accused of confict of inspectors-without-borders-toolkit.pdf interest. Economia. Published 22 March 2016: 23 OECD Tax and Development Programme. (2015). http://economia.icaew.com/news/march-2016/ Tax Inspectors Without Borders Toolkit. OECD. Paris, pwc-accused-of-confict-of-interest

57 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

35 Comment received via email from DFID to Tove 40 Elston, Leigh. (2015). GE to Sign up Shell as Supplier Maria Ryding (Eurodad) on 1 June 2016. for Ghana LNG. Interfax Global Energy. February 2015. http://interfaxenergy.com/gasdaily/article/15156/ 36 Conversaton with DFID and HMRC, 23 February ge-to-sign-up-shell-as-supplier-for-ghana-lng and 2016. Unilever. (2016). Introducing Unilever Ghana. 37 OECD Tax and Development Programme. Website. Accessed on January 21 2016. htp://www. “Developing Capacity in Transfer Pricing”. Hardcopy. unileverghana.com/aboutus/Introducingghana/ 38 Ibid. 41 Government of the Netherlands. (2016). Taxes 39 Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Crucial to Development. Leafet. Published Accra. (2014). Mult-Annual Strategic Plan, Update 12 April 2016: htps://www.government.nl/ 2014-2017. Ghana. January 2014. Accessed 9 topics/development-cooperation/documents/ June 2016: htp://ghana.nlembassy.org/binaries/ leaflets/2016/04/12/taxes-crucial-to- content/assets/postenweb/g/ghana/embassy- development-legislaton of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-in-accra/ 42 UNECA. (2014). Illicit Financial Flows: report of import/products_and_services/development_ the high level panel on illicit fnancial fows from cooperation/ghana-multi-annual-strategic- Africa: htp://www.uneca.org/sites/ default/fles/ plan-2014-2017.pdf publicatons/if_main_report_english.pdf.

58 Technical Assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic, 2016

Chinara Aitbayeva , Director of Nash Vek PF

1. Introduction From 2012 to 2015, technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan was provided by, amongst Many multilateral and bilateral donors provide others, Japan, the Asian Development Bank external assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic. (ADB), the International Development Donor assistance includes investment Association (IDA), the World Bank (WB) and projects, such as state investment, which the European Bank for Reconstruction and is an instrument of the state for fnancing Development (EBRD). development projects. Program assistance is allocated to budget support. Technical The largest amount of technical assistance was assistance (hereinafter referred to as TA) received in the years 2013-2015. Technical focuses on strengthening internal skills and assistance provided by donors to Kyrgyzstan systems. See Figure 1. amounts to tens of millions US dollars annually.

As part of bilateral assistance, the Kyrgyz 2. State investment budget by donors Republic receives investment from 28 countries and organizations. Multilateral The Department of State Investment and assistance is received from 25 international Technical Assistance, Ministry of Finance of fnancial institutions. the Kyrgyz Republic (MFKR), is responsible Figure 1

59 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

for primary information, credit background, was received from China (PRC), 11% from and project implementation. After a loan ADB and 6.8% from the World Bank. agreement has been signed, the Department of State Debt of the MFKR deals with 3. State investment budget by debt service. The Department of Project sectors Implementation (DPI) is responsible for Kyrgyzstan has received approximately monitoring and evaluation. The State US$8.6 billion to support its sector priorities Foundation of Economic Development at and infrastructure needs. As identifed in the MFKR takes the lead with repayment Chart 3 below, this has been allocated as of external assistance to the budget. As follows: US$2.1 billion for the transport of 2016, general debt obligations of the sector, US$1.95 billion for energy, US$1.48 Kyrgyz Republic (KR) amount to US$8.6 billion for public administration, US$741 billion. Chart 1 shows the main fnancing million for agriculture and US$638 million for organizations by donors. US$1.97 billion is infrastructure related needs. owed to the Export-Import Bank of China, US$1.54 billion to the Asian Development During 2014-2016 Kyrgyzstan received the Bank and US$1.48 billion to the International highest levels of external fnance for these Development Association (IDA). sector investments (Chart 4), contributing 41.9% of the costs for the transport Chart 2 demonstrates that in the last two sector, 36% for the energy sector, 6.8% for years Kyrgyzstan received the highest levels infrastructure, 6% for agriculture and 3.1% of of donor investments. Of this amount, 58.9% the budget for public administration.

Chart 1

60 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Chart 2

Chart 3

Chart 4

61 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

4. The role of technical assistance in Development and the Japanese International bilateral and multilateral assistance Cooperation Agency (JICA). i) Japan’s Technical Assistance The total technical support1 received by Kyrgyzstan from 2012 to 2015 was US$58 Japanese assistance for Kyrgyzstan currently million. Information provided by the Ministry of focuses on road administration and Finance gives details on the amount of support maintenance, with approximately US$25 received from the different donors, as shown million devoted to the supply of equipment on Chart 5 below. This support includes the for roadway maintenance. A small fund of $4 contributions of the International Development million is provided for technical assistance to Association, the Asian Development Bank, support administration and expertise needed European Bank for Reconstruction and in road maintenance. (See Chart 6)

Chart 5

Chart 6

62 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Chart 7

JICA’s support in technical assistance totaled provided US$15.5 million over three years US$29 million. These funds were directed (2012 – 2015). to the road administration council as well as reinforcement and provision of equipment to Through the World Bank/IDA, TA of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. US$2 million was provided to the National Statistical Committee of the KR, US$2.8 ii) Technical Support from IDA million to the Ministry of Agriculture of the and the World Bank KR, US$2 million to the Ministry of Labor and Social Development, US$1.4 million to After Japan, the second largest donors of the State Agency of Local Self-Government TA to Kyrgyzstan were IDA and the World and Interethnic Relations, and US$684,000 to Bank. The World Bank (including IDA) the Foundation of State Property. Chart 8

63 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

As part of IDA technical assistance, the repeatedly changed. Qualifcation World Bank has provided support for requirements were adjusted to suit the the hiring of international consultants. organization that won the tender; In two IDA technical assistance projects 2. There was a duplication of responsibilities implemented by the Ministry of Finance of with several TA projects. The Supervisor the KR and the Foundation of State Property of this project and the person conducting of the KR, approximately 50% to 80% of the correspondence with the World Bank was total amount for technical support was used the chairman of the tender committee; to pay international consultants. Companies 3. An online system in real time, which participating in tenders under IDA TA are was supposed to be created by the usually those from the following countries international consultant, was not done; (based on the analysis of two TA projects): 4. Internal trained auditors evaluated the Armenia, Georgia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan quality of training and understanding of and Kyrgyzstan. the materials as low; and In two IDA projects, TA companies from 5. The project did not meet deadlines. Armenia and the Ukraine were chosen to be international consultants. As shown in Chart 8, over 77% or US$500,000 of the project funds iii) Technical Support from the was used to hire an international consultant Asian Development Bank from Armenia. Since the Kyrgyz Republic joined the Asian Chart 9 below provides another example of Development Bank (ADB), it has received IDA TA. In this case about 41% of the funds technical assistance support in the amount of for TA were absorbed through the hiring an US$43.2 million. Considering that the total international consultant from Ukraine. amount that the ADB provided for TA to its member countries was US$148 million (212 As part of this project (Internal Auditing of the projects), Kyrgyz Republic was a priority as Public Sector), an evaluation was conducted. it received 29% of ADB’s funds allocated for The main conclusions were: technical assistance. 1. The tender for hiring an international consultant contained violations. For From 2012 to 2015, ADB has provided example, the specifcations were the Kyrgyz Republic US$8.4 million for

Chart 9

64 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

technical assistance. This has included US$4 and Kyrgyzstan began in 1993. Funding to million to KR’s Ministry of Transport and a total of US$17 million has been provided Communications. Of this, US$3 million went for the implementation of projects in several to a project to establish connections between areas, including, 1) planning and monitoring Transport Corridors CAREC 1 and CAREC of Germany’s contributions to programs 3, US$1 million for technical assistance for and projects; 2) the selection and guidance connections between Transport Corridors 1 of experts; 3) training and professional and 3, US$1 million for TA for a project to development of technical personnel; 4) improve the CAREC 3 Corridor (Bishkek— purchase of technical equipment; and 5) the Osh road), Phase 4. provision of general fnancial contributions, not tied to particular initiatives. ADB also provided US$1 million in TA to KR’s Ministry of Economics for the strengthening In April 2016, KR’s Parliament adopted of a favorable environment for public-private the law “On Ratifcation of the Agreement partnership projects and US$1 million of TA to between the KR Government and the KR’s Ministry of Finance for the introduction of Federal Republic of Germany Government electronic procurement system. (See Chart 10) on Financial Cooperation for 2015-2016” and “the Agreement between the KR iv) Technical Assistance from Germany Government and the Federal Republic of Germany Government on technical Germany’s technical assistance has been collaboration for 2015-2016, signed March 24, provided through the Society for Technical 2016 in Bishkek.” In accordance with these Collaboration (GTZ). Contact between GTZ ratifed agreements, Germany agreed to

Chart 10

65 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

provide the KR Government with grants for These investments includes: implementation of the following projects, all • GSAC: Support for Kyrgyzstan Government under the heading of collaboration programs programs; and sustainable development of the economy: • Promoting pay rate policies and public As technical assistance: utilities reform; • Assistance to the National Statistical • Facilitation of Employment and Committee; Professional Education; • Perspectives for Young People; and • Medical service reform; • Foundation for Development Projects in • Support for the national HIV/AIDS Rural Areas Conducted in Cooperation program; and with the Civil Society. • Technical support to the rural investment program. As a fnancial collaboration to following projects: vi) Islamic Development Bank • Financing Housing Construction; • Public Health: Public Health Sector Kyrgyzstan has received support from the Program V; and Islamic Development Bank for six TA projects • Public Health: Health Protection for and four projects of special assistance for a Mothers and Children IX. total of US$3 billion. v) UK Technical Assistance vii) EBRD’s Technical Assistance

The UK’s assistance has been directed to the From 2012 to 2015 the European Bank for promotion of sustainable development of Reconstruction and Development provided the KR and for reducing the level of poverty. Kyrgyzstan with technical assistance support

Chart 11

66 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

valued at US$8.6 million. Approximately the banking system and widening the country’s US$8 million of this amount was directed to systems for debt monitoring. In this way, IMF’s improving and restoring KR’s water supply, technical assistance has supplemented the main while US$567,000 was allocated to the economic partnership programs between the reconstruction of the Osh—Isfana road, Government and the Fund. and US$520,000 to electronic ticketing in public transport. Chart 11 shows that TA The Fund also actively facilitates overall for KR’s water supply was provided via strengthening of the Kyrgyz Republic through town halls. training courses for public offcials, members of parliament, and representatives of press. viii) Technical Assistance of the These courses are conducted in Washington, International Monetary Fund Vienna, and Austria. Regional training courses Technical assistance is the key component of are also offered, which focus on best practices support from the IMF, particularly funds in macroeconomic analysis, fscal and fnancial focused on governance. During the frst analysis, and record/statistics. years of independence, long-term technical experts made signifcant contributions Donor’s priorites for technical to improvements in statistics and record collaboraton and associated keeping, the tax system, and the procedures assistance of the Central Bank. Their efforts were supplemented by a series of short-term TA missions with experts from the IMF Table 1 below indicates the donors’ main headquarters. In recent years, IMF’s technical priorities in technical assistance to the KR for assistance has mainly been directed at reinforcing the period, 2012-2015:

Table 1. Donor Objectve Amount Percentage (Millions US$) Japan Transport sector $29 100% IDA / World Bank Public administraton and other sectors $15.5 80%/20% ADB Transport sector and public $8.4 60%/40% administraton EBRD Transport sector and water supply $8.6 13%/87% Germany Sustainable development of economy Amount unknown Great Britain Promotng sustainable development of Amount unknown the KR and lowering the level of poverty

67 Chapter 1: The role of technical assistance in bilateral donors’ and multlateral insttutons’ aid

Conclusions development project should have both economic and social impacts, as well as a 1. In recent years there has been an increase determination of the fnancial return. It is in the implementation of credits and also necessary to build the capacity of the grants in Kyrgyzstan, which has included executing agencies for the implementation the provision of technical assistance. In of projects. Mechanisms to ensure the projects with international fnancial transparency and monitoring are also critical. institutions technical assistance often sits inside credit or grant projects. There is 6. In terms of planning, the actual a direct connection between increased implementation of funds by an technical assistance and the increase in Executing Agency often signifcantly the level of donor funds. differs from amounts planned by Project Implementation Unit. It seems 2. During the 2012-2016 period, technical that this is the fault of weak project support has mainly been provided for public administration, transport sector planning and monitoring of project and sustainable development. implementation. Due to this issue, plans and forecasts often do not correspond 3. In technical assistance, most of the funds to the actual implementation. There is a goes to hiring international consultants. need for collaborative project planning, implementation and the timely detection 4. There are a number of problems in of problems resulting in the under- implementation of development and implementation of funds. technical support projects. Executing Agencies face the most signifcant problems. 7. Results are not sustainable after a project One general recommendation, based on has been completed. Executing Agencies calculations of the Department of State do not track or support results attained Investment and Technical Assistance, is that from a project. To resolve this issue, there realistic terms from the donors’ side and should be post-monitoring of projects from the Executing Agencies’ side must be after their completion. It is necessary determined and negotiated. to actively engage CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) interested in transparency 5. The Executing Agency is responsible for in the monitoring of credits, grants, and project implementation. Accordingly, every donors’ technical assistance for the KR.

Endnotes

1 This information was provided by Ministry of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic, in response to an ofcial request by Nash Vek SF.

68 Chapter 2 Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

Questioning the effectiveness of technical cooperation in Bangladesh Ahmed Swapan Mahmud and Farjana Akter, Voices for Interactve Choice and Empowerment

Technical assistance of multi-lateral donors in the water sector in Sri Lanka: A recipe for privatization? Sajeewa Chamikara, Movement for Land and Agricultural Reform

Technical, yes — but what kind of assistance? USAID COMPETE’s PPP promotion in the Philippines Bryan Ziadie, IBON Internatonal

Questioning the Effectiveness of Technical Cooperation in Bangladesh

Ahmed Swapan Mahmud and Farjana Akter, VOICE

An Overview of Technical Cooperation There are two important factors that characterize TA projects in developing countries. Poor countries often do not have Vision 21 Plan, also known as the Perspective the resources to pay for such services, so that Plan (2010 - 2021), provides a road map for “the bulk of the fnancing has to come from economic growth whereby Bangladesh will the TA supplier rather than its recipients, become a middle-income country by the year and secondly, the provision of TA has to 2021. It was developed with the assumption be managed as a public sector activity in that foreign aid will continue to play an accordance with the government regulations important role in the country’s development. and procedures of each supplying country.”2 Although foreign aid contributions have been decreasing, they still fgure prominently Unfortunately in many cases there is limited the country’s Annual Development Plan information available on the effectiveness (ADP) with more than 30% of the ADP being and success of TA projects in Bangladesh. supported by aid in 2015. However, several As well, it is often unclear as to how or studies have identifed concerns regarding the whether these projects align with national management and coordination of foreign aid as development plans. Research fndings that well as its alignment with national development are available indicate that TA projects are not plans and strategies. In the case of aid delivered suffciently effective. A number of reasons are through Technical Assistance (TA), country cited. The design of TA projects continue to ownership, alignment and effectiveness are ignore local conditions, are characterized by largely absent. Lack of enforcement of these poor performance of the executive agency, aid principles has frequently been noted in TA an ineffcient TA preparation process, and projects and activities. an inappropriate implementation planning.3 In addition, TA projects are often unable Each year Bangladesh receives at least to cover long-term priorities. Among the US$100 million in TA projects. Most often aid channels, TA projects are the third most this assistance is linked to strengthening ineffective category, after tied aid and food the performance and capacity of public aid. Another report published by World Bank institutions that either provide basic services indicated the ineffectiveness of TA projects. (education, health, administration, planning) This report concludes: or create employment (agricultural extension, vocational training, productivity centers, “The efforts made by the donors to public works).1 support institutional reform, principally

71 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

through technical assistance both as self- Public procurement plays a signifcant role in a standing projects and as components of country’s development process and economic other projects, have had limited success growth. However, the procurement sector is in strengthening individual institutions. globally identifed as having a high level of But, in the absence of a strong drive for corruption. A recent UN Guidebook on anti- reform from the government leadership, corruption stated that progress has been slow.”4 “An average of 10-25 per cent of a A common perception is that aid money public contract’s value may be lost to for TA projects actually benefts donor corruption. Applying this percentage to countries as it usually involves hiring of the total government spending for public foreign consultants from these countries.5 contracts, it is clear that hundreds of Research shows that the high cost of billions of dollars are lost to corruption in TA projects is directly related to the public procurement every year”9 involvement of foreign frms/ consultants and the rates that they charge. In these Public procurement also continues to be a cases the local market also suffers, since it challenge to ensuring good governance. “distorts the local labour market, and creates incentives for corruption because highly- In Bangladesh, public procurement accounts paid consultants in ministries and projects for a large percentage of the country’s budget. create demands from the less well endowed For example, in the fscal year 2011-2012 it public service offcers they work with.”6 amounted to approximately TK. 287 billion.”10 TA is also heavily criticized for its donor- Bangladesh losses due to overall corruption are driven approach.7 For example, the World generally estimated to cost about 2.5% of GDP Bank faced strong criticism for its role in growth per year11. Considering the signifcance the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience of these losses, many development documents Fund’s (BCCRF) fduciary management. have acknowledged the crisis of governance in Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were the procurement sector. 12 The World Bank’s deeply troubled by the involvement of Country Assistance Strategy (2000) noted World Bank technical assistance in fund governance and institutional limitations as management. CSOs were concerned about major constraints for Bangladesh in achieving the implications for country ownership and economic growth and poverty reduction. In decision-making authority.8 this regard, “the government’s commitment to undertake a broad-based reform agenda Recognizing this history and current practices on governance is a trigger to Bank’s moving in technical assistance, this paper will now toward high case lending support”13 focus on a Bangladesh TA project on public procurement reform. The World Bank introduced the “public procurement reform project” in 2002 with Technical Assistance Project on the objective of developing legislation and a Public Procurement Reform (PPR I) regulatory framework for proper procurement

72 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

rules and systems. The main objective was to development initiatives such as an intensive “establish a series of mechanisms to improve capacity building training program for offcials effciency, transparency, and accountability in and the start up of a monitoring system. the procurement of goods, works and services by government ministries, departments, As the project budget (Table 1) indicates statutory corporations and other public the second largest allocation (32.4%) was bodies”14. Through TA, the project was for the implementation of procurement designed to strengthen both the country’s aid reforms, rules and procedures, while the management capacity and its aid effectiveness biggest percentage (42.2%) was allocated in order “to gain donor group’s confdence to for improving procurement management justify continued development assistance to capacity. This seems to indicate that the World Bangladesh”15 Bank prioritizes the implementation and improvement of procurement capacity. An important achievement of this project was the enactment of the Public Procurement Act Despite these improvements and development (PPA 2006) and Public Procurement Rules in the procurement system, the question (PPR 2008). Initially, progress was made in of country ownership remains a gray area increasing transparency levels through the in Bangladesh. The reform agenda was a publishing of procurements opportunities, prerequisite for World Bank funding and bidding documents and the awarding of was frmly aligned to the country assistance contracts. The legislation included review strategy (CAS) for Bangladesh. In other and appeals mechanisms that considerably words, the reform project was essentially improved accountability. Just as signifcant a policy condition to receive World Bank was the implementation of organizational funding, which led to the creation of the Anti-

Table 1: Project Summary

Component Sector Indicatve Cost Bank Financing % of Bank (US$M) % of Total (US $M) Financing Establish Central Insttutonal Procurement $1.25 25.5% $0.84 18.9% Development Technical Unit Implementaton Public Sector Procurement Management $1.59 32.4% $1.59 35.7% Reforms and Rules Adjustment / Procedures Improving System Procurement Reform and $2.07 42.2% $2.02 45.4% Management Capacity Capacity building

Total Project Cost $4.91 100.0% $4.45 100.0%

Source: World Bank, Report No.: 23928-BD

73 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

came ‘with consent from development partners’, A second question is the effectiveness ‘reviewed’ by the World Bank and the ADB.”17 and sustainability of TA projects. There is a problem of credibility regarding the A central question is the future use of the recruitment of foreign consultants by the reformed procurement system. A lack of World Bank in order to take over the drafting coordination, management and planning of the regulations. Aid principles confrm that are still evident in the implementation of donors are expected to strengthen country the reformed law. Overall, the Bangladesh systems, and development partners should government is directed by donors and funding make it a priority to use these systems. institutions. A study by Riddell revealed, “GOB is in the driver’s seat but we the donors However, development partners often fail to tell them which direction to go. I do not see fulfll these commitments. In many cases, the any projects planned by the government. Plans Bangladesh government faces many diffculties are drawn by the TA teams.”18 while trying to follow the various procurement rules of different donors. This is a major The use of donors’ procurement systems challenge for the recipient administration in continues to be a problem, particularly in both Bangladesh and other countries. relation to the reformed laws on public procurement. A lack of alignment with the Conclusions country procurement system is a critical issue for Bangladesh. For example the World Bank There should be strong and respectful insisted that its procurement rules had to be coordination between the Government of followed in international tenders, rather than Bangladesh and its development partners in the reformed procurement system.19 It seems technical assistance programs. Information the World Bank does not feel comfortable using on TA projects should be accessible to the the reformed procurement rules, even though public. Both donors and partners need to they established the project to enact these laws. improve mechanisms to ensure stakeholders’ It seems that the new law is not compatible participation. Many have noted that TA with the requirements of international tenders. projects have the potential to undermine Perhaps there is still some confict between country priorities and its authority. These donor requirements and Bangladeshi law.20 issues must be addressed.

Most of Bangladesh’s donors in fact do not TA projects can make a useful contribution fully rely on the country’s procurement system. in terms of improving capacities, skills and There remains a clear lack of harmonization sectoral development. With the Bangladesh in procurement practices between donor and Government’s commitment to the eradication government systems. According to the Paris of poverty, effective and effcient use of demand- Monitoring Survey, 2008, ODA was disbursed driven TA funds is greatly needed. At the same through the country procurement system at a rate time, development partners should respect and of under 50%.21 There is still a lack of trust and encourage a country’s system in the planning and political commitment by donors to Bangladesh. implementation of public sector projects.

74 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

References

1 Kilby, P. (1979). Evaluatng technical 8 NegAge (2013), End WB role in BCCRF management assistance. World Development, 7(3), 309-323. by 2013, viewed at htp://www.newagebd.com/ Retrieved from htp://www.sciencedirect.com. detail.php?date=2012-05-11&nid=9917 ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/science/article/ 9 United Natons (2013). Guidebook on ant- pii/0305750X79900597, p. 309. corrupton in public procurement and the management of public fnances: Good practces in 2 Morgan, P. (2002). Technical assistance: correctng ensuring compliance with artcle 9 of the United the precedents. Development Policy Journal, 2(1), Natons Conventons Against Corruptons, Retrieved 1-22, p. 2. from htps://www.unodc.org/documents/ corruption/Publications/2013/Guidebook_on_ 3 Asian Development Bank (2007). Special Evaluaton ant-corrupton_in_public_procurement_and_the_ Study on performance of technical assistance, management_of_public_fnances.pdf, Page 1. Retrieved from htp://www.adb.org/sites/default/ 10 Islam, M. S. (2012). Improving transparency in files/evaluation-document/35701/files/sst- public procurement in Bangladesh: interplay reg-2007-02.pdf, p. v. between PPA and RTI Act, page 1. 4 Riddell, A. (2011). Donors and capacity development 11 World Bank, Report No: 23928-BD, 2002 in Guyana and Bangladesh. Internatonal Insttute for Educaton Planning, UNESCO, Paris, page 50, 12 This includes poverty reducton strategy documents citng the World Bank. and Vision 21. 5 Williamson, C. R. (2010). Exploring the 13 World Bank, Report No: 23928-BD, 2002 failure of foreign aid: The role of incentves 14 World Bank, Report No. 23928-BD, 2002, p. 2 and informaton. The review of Austrian 15 World Bank, Report No.23928-BD, 2002, p. 2 economics, 23(1), 17-33, page 5. 16 Ellmers, op. cit., page 17. 6 Ellmers, B. (2011). Helping or hindering? 17 Ibid, p. 17. Procurement, ted aid and the use of country systems in Bangladesh [online]. Brussels: European 18 Riddell, op. cit., pp 53 -54. Network on debt & development (Eurodad), p. 3. 19 Ibid, p. 54. 7 Greenhill, R. (2006). Real Aid: Making Technical 20 Ellmers, op. cit., p. 18. Assistance Work. ActonAid Internatonal, p. 25. 21 Ibid., p. 14.

75 Technical Assistance of Multi-lateral Donors in the Water Sector in Sri Lanka – A recipe for privatization?

Sajeewa Chamikara, Movement for Land and Agricultural Reform

1. Introduction genuine effort from these multilateral donors to support economic development policy, In 2015 Sri Lanka elected a new government. involving a proper consultative process The previous government, in power for the with the people? Experiences from history preceding nine years, was defeated. Large- do not provide positive answers. Technical scale corruption, human rights violations and assistance from key donors has always pushed economic mismanagement were among the their economic agendas and compelled main charges leveled against this government. governments to develop policies that support As with the governments that have ruled structural adjustment programs. the country since 1977, neo-liberal structural adjustment programs were the main economic World Bank has released its latest report agenda of that government. Election results “Sri Lanka Ending Poverty and Promoting were a signal, which has been repeated over Shared Prosperity – A Systematic Country and over again after 1977, that a neo-liberal Diagnostic” in October 2015 with its economic agenda cannot solve the economic recommendations for the future directions problems of Sri Lanka. People are seeking a of the country’s economy. In this report, the new economic vision. World Bank has advised Government on the need to move away from food production With the new government comes hope. that is aimed at fulflling local food security to 1 People believe that this government will more export-oriented industrial agriculture. listen to its true constituency, the people, in This advice clearly shows that the World Bank their policies for economic development. The has not changed its directions on agriculture. government has already requested support Complete transformation of Sri Lanka’s from bilateral and multilateral donors to help agriculture from local food production based in the development of the country’s economy. on small-scale food producers to an export- oriented industrial agriculture has always Technical assistance will be a key component being a top priority for the technical advice of that support. Key multilateral donors such coming from the World Bank. as the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have already The orientation of World Bank advice has been offered their support. Will the government be consistent since 1996. Privatization of water able to obtain technical assistance from these was always seen as an effective way of moving agencies, while maintaining accountability the small-scale producers out of agriculture. with the real needs of the people? Is there The Bank pushed privatization to discourage

76 1. Introduce charges in water supply and irrigation systems. 2. Increase prices beyond cost of supply. 3. Connect more people to such systems. 4. Install measurement devices throughout the system. 5. Restrict conservation measures to price based mechanisms. 6. Establish a pro-corporate regulator that will not restrain price increases. 7. Divide up the market to separate proftable areas like cities from loss-making rural areas.

1. Establish a principle1. Pass of laws ownership and establish of all water effective resources, enforcement including measures ground, to surface ensure and payment rain water. of charges. 2. Set up a central2. Passagency laws to overseeand establish the allocation effective ofenforcement water to different measures groups. to prevent extraction or collection of water without permits. 3. Create a system3. Reduce to allow the purchase role of orof additionalclose down amounts state institutions of water. engaged in the water sector. 4. Introduce system4. Offer of permits privatization to restrict arrangements extraction ofin groundwaterwhich the state and retains collection the riskof surface and companies and rain waterrewards. 5. Eliminate sources of free water such as street taps and common wells.

Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

the production of paddy, which they considered of technical assistance in its Private Sector to be a low value crop that was holding back Infrastructure Project in Sri Lanka, which has growth in the agricultural sector.2 been operating since 1996. Water is a key sector for agriculture and the Bank’s objective Therefore the Bank has always recommended has been to “infuence and accelerate the a pricing mechanism for irrigation water in transitional process from public dominated Sri Lanka to encourage small-scale farmers infrastructure to private operation and to leave agriculture and move into cities. ownership.”3 The following case study describes how the World Bank and the Asian Development To realize this agenda, the World Bank has Bank (ADB) has used their technical advice also made use of a global fund it manages, to promote water privatization to make it a titled the Public Private Infrastructure proftable business for private corporations Advisory Fund.4 This Fund was given an and to transform the agriculture in Sri Lanka. explicit mandate to promote the private sector in water. In a publication by the Public Services International Research Unit it was 2. The Role of ADB and World Bank Technical Assistance in Water noted that this Fund “provides funding for a Privatization wide range of activities related to the reform of water and sewage and the development of public-private partnerships in the sector It is generally recognized that the Asian [until] 2003 [amounting to] 23% of PPIAF”s Development Bank and the World Bank have portfolio in value terms (although many multi- been promoting privatization in Sri Lanka sectoral projects include water and sanitation since early 1980s. These fnancing institutions components).” pushed for changes in policy and legislation to allow privatization, while also exerting their The World Bank has also grasped opportunities to infuence in the implementation of these steps. move reforms rapidly when previous Sri Lankan governments have been willing. It funded a $15 a) Technical Assistance and the million package of technical assistance called promotion of Water Privatization the “Economic Reforms Technical Assistance Policies Project” from 2002, which included half a dozen contracts for work on reforms in the water PROFITMONOPOLYRISK FREE The World Bank and the Asian Development sector, as well as for top-level economic and Bank have provided previous Sri Lankan political advisors for the Prime Minister.5 The governments with consultants to design Asian Development Bank tends to make even projects, to plan and carry out reforms in more extensive use of consultants than the World institutions, and to draft policy and legislation. Bank. They are brought in through water sector projects, which are prepared by consultants and These consultants have been extensively which almost always include technical assistance employed in the privatization of water. For for consultants to implement reforms in the example, the World Bank included this type water sector.

WB/ADB actions Loans for irrigation from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank

Project Amount Date Agency Walawe Development Project $7.7 million 1969 ADB Mahaweli Ganga Development Project I $29 million 1970 WB Tank Irrigation Modernization Project $5 million 1976 WB Kirinda Oya Irrigation and Settlement I $45 million 1976 ADB Mahaweli Ganga Development Project II $19 million 1977 WB Mahaweli Ganga Technical Assistance Project $3 million 1980 WB Anuradhapura Dry Zone Agriculture Project $15 million 1980 ADB Kirinda Oya Irrigation and Settlement II $45 million 1981 ADB Village Irrigation Rehabilitation Project $30 million 1981 WB Mahaweli Ganga Development Project III $90 million 1981 WB Walawe Irrigation Improvement Project $15 million 1984 ADB Major Irrigation Rehabilitation Project $17 million 1984 WB Kirinda Oya Irrigation and Settlement III $45 million 1985 ADB Agriculture Program Loan $80 million 1989 ADB Southern Province Rural Development Project $38 million 1991 ADB National Irrigation Rehabilitation Project $29.6 million 1991 WB North Western Province Water Resources $30 million 1992 ADB Development Project North Central Province Rural Development Project $20 million 1996 ADB Mahaweli Restructuring and Rehabilitation Project $57 million 1998 WB North-East Irrigated Agriculture Project I $27 million 2000 WB North-East Irrigated Agriculture Project II $64.7 million 2004 WB National Water Management Improvement Project $36 million 2005 WB

Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

b) Projects: Privatization of irrigation equivalent to 22% of the expected operation systems and maintenance costs, rising to 100% of those costs by 1991. The Government initially The World Bank and the Asian Development stalled but eventually responded because the Bank thus consider irrigation to be a Bank made it clear that it would not support commercial activity that both can and should further investment in irrigation if cost recovery be carried out by private companies. They have was not addressed. In July 1983, the Cabinet used these projects to push for privatization. approved the introduction of a nationwide The projects in turn relied on loans from the program of water charges, aiming to achieve World Bank and the Asian Development Bank full cost recovery within 5 years.”6 to fnance many of these projects, to the tune of US$750 million (see the list of project loans The Sri Lankan government did not actually for irrigation in the accompanying Box). implement this cost recovery policy because of resistance by farmers. In response, the Asian Further, the fnance institutions have come Development Bank pressed the government to to regard privatization as a means of reducing comply with a list of actions to be undertaken water available for agriculture and therefore during the frst year of their new project, discouraging paddy production, which they Agriculture Program Loan. It was believed believe to be an impediment to economic that the enforcement of these mechanisms growth in Sri Lanka. There have been three would pave the way towards the privatization strategies in promoting these approaches. of irrigation, which would give companies the confdence to pursue strategies to privatize c) First Approach: Charging for water irrigation. The steps included:

In the early 1980s, the World Bank succeeded • “Conduct policy dialogue with the Bank in getting the government to declare that it on the fndings and recommendations of would start charging farmers for water. This World Bank study on procedures for the agreement was made after the World Bank collection of operation and maintenance threatened to cut off funding for irrigation. It costs from farmers; was also able to extract a promise from the • “Establish an administrative system and Sri Lankan government to move towards full implementable procedures for the recovery cost recovery. This was necessary in order of operation and maintenance costs; for irrigation to be a viable and attractive • “Amend the Irrigation Ordinance undertaking for the private sector. A 2004 Chapter 453 and any other legislation World Bank report noted: necessary to enable the government to quickly prosecute willful defaulters on “In 1981, during the negotiations for the operation and maintenance fee payment [Mahaweli Ganga Development Project III], through civil courts; and extensive discussions on cost recovery took • “Amend the Agrarian Services Act of place between the Bank and the Government. 1979 in line with the government’s thrust Water charges were to be collected in the for farmer participation in irrigation Mahaweli starting in September 1982 at a level management.“7

78 Loans for irrigation from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank

Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

equivalent to 22% of the expected operation and maintenance costs, rising to 100% of those costs by 1991. The Government initially stalled but eventually responded because the Bank made it clear that it would not support further investment in irrigation if cost recovery was not addressed. In July 1983, the Cabinet approved the introduction of a nationwide program of water charges, aiming to achieve full cost recovery within 5 years.”6

The Sri Lankan government did not actually implement this cost recovery policy because of resistance by farmers. In response, the Asian Development Bank pressed the government to comply with a list of actions to be undertaken during the frst year of their new project, Agriculture Program Loan. It was believed that the enforcement of these mechanisms would pave the way towards the privatization of irrigation, which would give companies the confdence to pursue strategies to privatize irrigation. The steps included:

• “Conduct policy dialogue with the Bank on the fndings and recommendations of World Bank study on procedures for the collection of operation and maintenance costs from farmers; • “Establish an administrative system and implementable procedures for the recovery of operation and maintenance costs; • “Amend the Irrigation Ordinance Chapter 453 and any other legislation necessary to enable the government to quickly prosecute willful defaulters on operation and maintenance fee payment through civil courts; and • “Amend the Agrarian Services Act of 1979 in line with the government’s thrust for farmer participation in irrigation management.“7

79 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

The Sri Lankan government lagged behind in farmer organizations could buy and sell water the amendments to the Irrigation Ordinance and from private companies on behalf of their Agrarian Services Act. The Asian Development members or they could be converted into Bank then withheld the disbursement of the or be taken over by private companies. The second installment of project funds until the initial success of these efforts can be found government adhered to this agreement. The in a report on the private sector in Sri Lanka: Bank’s project report stated: “The second “[World Bank] lending has [already] supported disbursement was delayed due to legislative the transfer of operations and management diffculties in processing amendments to of small-scale irrigation systems to local the Agrarian Services Act and the Irrigation private farmer organizations… In the long- Ordinance to enable Farmers” Organizations run, these reforms…and supportive technical to collect irrigation service fees.“8 assistance will provide the basis for the eventual complete takeover by local farmer The World Bank also did not give up on its organizations, with the view toward reducing objectives to push for privatization of water government expenditure and converting to a resources. It later made its total fnancing to market oriented system of irrigation which is the country conditional on progress in this user responsive.” 10 area. In its 1996 Country Assistance Strategy, the World Bank expected to lend only a The Asian Development Bank also adopted this minimal amount, on average $50 million per strategy but took it a step further by insisting year, because of the “unmanageable fscal that farmer organizations also contribute a defcit and stalled reforms,“ stating that in percentage of the cost of these projects. Criteria order for Sri Lanka to qualify for more fnance for the selection of a project to rehabilitate an would require “signifcant improvements in irrigation system were established. For the cost-recovery (e.g. in irrigation).” 9 North Central Province Rural Development Project, for example, they included “the d) Second Approach: Devolution majority of the farmer benefciaries in a scheme [must be] willing to form a formal Farmer By the late 1980s it was obvious that it was Organization, in case none is operational, and diffcult, if not impossible, to make farmers pay agree in writing to contribute at least 10% of the directly for water. The World Bank decided scheme cost in the form of labour, cash or kind, to try an indirect approach. It introduced a and assume operation and maintenance upon concept called “participatory irrigation system completion.”11 management.” This devolved responsibility for sections of the new or newly rehabilitated e) Third Approach: Reform of policy system to farmer organizations. and institutions

The World Bank explained the objectives The World Bank was disappointed to fnd that of this “participatory irrigation system its participatory irrigation systems management management,” saying that it would eventually approach also did not work as anticipated as it lead to full privatization of irrigation. The also received strong opposition from farmers.

80 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

In the early 1990s, the World Bank therefore With continuous pressure from farmer groups decided that a more comprehensive approach and civil society movements, the efforts of was needed to achieve the desired change water privatization have been slowed during and that reform of the entire water sector last decade. Mahinda Rajapakse’s government, was required. An important focus were which had its voter base in rural agriculture changes in Sri Lanka’s overall policy and communities, had to provide support and the implementing institutions for water protection for its constituency. They had to distribution and irrigation. Privatization from continue to support paddy cultivation with a below was not proceeding as planned, so it fertilizer subsidy and government engagement would have to come from the top. An internal in paddy purchasing. evaluation of their irrigation projects in the 1980s said: “Many lessons have been taken But the efforts to develop institutional, policy into account in the design of more recently and infrastructure framework to facilitate water prepared Bank projects. For example, there is privatization have also continued. Especially widespread recognition today that investment in the later part of the Mahinda Rajapakse in infrastructure needs to be accompanied by Government these plans again began to re- measures to reform the policy environment emerge. The National Water Services Reform and to strengthen institutions. Water needs Act, which was rejected by the Supreme Court to be priced and irrigation operation and in year 2000 citing that it has to get approved maintenance charges need to be recovered in Provincial Councils before it become a 12 from farmers.” national act, was presented and got approved in the North Western Provincial Council in Conclusion 2014. In the same year the World Bank has provided a US$100 million loan to the Sri Efforts of all the previous Governments in Lankan Government for a water resource discouraging local food production (especially conservation project to address the impacts of paddy) and privatization of water have largely climate change. failed due to the protests emerged from the farmers and civil society. As a result Water privatization efforts of Sri Lanka have of this opposition, the Mahinda Rajapakse not yet been successful largely because of Government, which came into power in 2005, the protest of millions of people affected by had to promise that his government would these policies. But it’s clear that neither the never privatize water resources in Sri Lanka. World Bank nor the ADB has given it up. Mahinda Rajapaksa confrmed in his manifesto All the governments coming into power after for the 2005 presidential elections: “Water is 1980s have tried to enact and implement one of the prime resources of our country. water privatization policies according to the The owner of these valuable resources should advice of those organizations and its clear be the people of this country. I will frmly they will accelerate their efforts with this new assure this position.” Government.

81 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

Endnotes

1 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ and Poverty Reducton - Report 32221-LK’ by the en/2016/02/25895855/sri-lanka-ending-poverty- World Bank, April 2005). promotng-shared-prosperity 3 “Private Sector Infrastructure Development Project: 2 In a 1996 Report the Bank suggested, “growth from Staf Appraisal Report 15391” by the World Bank, non-plantaton agriculture remains stagnant… May 1996 Despite its low returns per acre…low valued paddy 4 “Dogmatc Development: Privatsaton and remains the dominant crop… With free water, Conditonalites in Six Countries” by Public Services farm families maximise income through growing Internatonal Research Unit (PSIRU), February 2004. paddy and working of-farm. … Full correcton in the current situaton requires a policy of full cost 5 Jim Robertson and John Earl (see htp://www. cynosura.com). recovery (capital costs as well as O&M) from… farmers. … To start, it must be accepted that, in 6 3rd Mahaweli Ganga Development Project economic terms irrigaton water…is a private good, Performance Reassessment Report 29489” by the and so should be directed by market forces. For OED, World Bank, June 2004 this, the basic legal and insttutonal structures 7 “Agriculture Program Loan: PPAR SRI 18145” by the needed to permit market forces to operate must be Asian Development Bank, December 1996 developed. These center around enforceable water 8 “Agriculture Program Loan: PPAR SRI 18145” by the property rights for individual farmers and water Asian Development Bank, December 1996 markets. … Treatng irrigaton water as a public 9 “Country Assistance Strategy – Progress Report: good inhibits much needed insttutonal reform, Report 18711” by the World Bank, December 1998. and the creaton of independent and (eventually) private irrigaton agencies.” See Non-Plantaton 10 “Private Sector Assessment: Report 12514-CE” by Crop Sector Policy Alternatves: Report 14564 the World Bank, March 1995. CE’ by the World Bank, March 1996. This advice 11 “North Central Province Rural Development was repeated in 2003 (Promotng Agricultural and Project: RRP SRI 27186” by the Asian Development Rural Non-Farm Sector Growth - Report 25387- Bank, August 1996. CE’ by the World Bank, February 2003) and 2005 12 3rd Mahaweli Ganga Development Project (Development Forum: the Economy, the Tsunami Performance Reassessment Report 29489” by the OED, World Bank, June 2004

82 Technical, Yes — But What Kind of Assistance? USAID COMPETE’s PPP Promotion in the Philippines

Bryan Ziadie, IBON International

Since the 2001 launch of its public-private PPPs at the center of his political platform. partnership (PPP) program, USAID has Infrastructure PPPs have received the majority initiated 1,600 “development PPPs” around of the media attention. These responses have the world. The countries hosting the greatest been stimulated in part by reported decreases number of USAID PPPs are Colombia (109 in quality and accessibility of formerly public projects), followed by South Africa (94), India goods (i.e., water and metro rail systems) that (80) and the Philippines (79).1 While most of have been subjected to privatization under USAID’s PPP data focuses on projects under various PPP arrangements. the “development PPP” designation, USAID has also supported the implementation of many While the role of technical assistance in “infrastructure PPPs” by means of technical USAID’s activities in this area has not assistance (TA). Its promotion of these projects received much attention, USAID has has been particularly strong in the Philippines. allocated considerable resources for this purpose in the Philippines. For example, the Although it is not listed as a partner of the USAID-contracted Advancing Philippine Philippines’ PPP Center, USAID has played an Competitiveness (COMPETE) project, important role in shaping the Philippine PPP managed by the Asia Foundation, has a budget landscape, along with the Asian Development of US$22.5 million. Other major providers Bank (ADB), the Association of Southeast of USAID technical assistance include Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Australian Trade-Related Assistance for Development Agency for International Development (TRADE) (US$12.8 million), Facilitating (AusAID), the Canadian International Public Investment (FPI) (US$14.8 million), Development Agency (CIDA, now Global and Investment Enabling Environment Affairs Canada), and the Japan International (INVEST) (US$3.2 million). Cooperation Agency (JICA). USAID is also accompanied by other infuential non-partners In addition to having the largest budget, of the PPP Center, notably the World Bank COMPETE also has a particularly broad and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). mandate. This includes: 1) To provide technical assistance to promote “competitiveness” Both development and infrastructure through infrastructure provision; 2) To make PPPs have stimulated national debate and prescriptions for what USAID has identifed opposition in the Philippines. These debates as key national industries; and 3) To promote increased in intensity since the inauguration greater credit utilization. Implementing the frst of President Benigno S. Aquino, who placed two aims has resulted in unintended outcomes.

83 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

Nowhere is this more evident than in as USAID, which promote market-driven the much-publicized case of the Laguna- growth policies in less-developed countries.2 Lakeshore Expressway-Dike (LLED) PPP. The Aquino program included anti-corruption This controversial and now-stalled PPP and good governance measures, as well as project has received a signifcant amount of broad legislative actions to support increased technical assistance from COMPLETE. It has liberalization of the domestic fnancial system, attracted high levels of media attention due to implemented to cultivate an environment a series of failed bidding attempts and, more that would be attractive to foreign investors. importantly, the potential for serious social and However, repeated revelations in the media ecological costs associated with the project. suggesting the prevalence of systematic Some of these costs are likely to materialize corruption in the government, as well as if the project moves into the implementation inconsistencies between reported growth stage using its current design. Other costs, fgures, and the unchanged livelihood such as displacement of certain residents in situations of the majority of the population, the Laguna area, have already become evident. worked to undermine this glowing portrait.

This article focuses on three main themes. One such revelation was the discovery To provide background, it briefy places of corrupt activities connected to the PPPs inside the context of the recent wave administration’s use of the PPP program. of the Aquino administration’s neoliberal These included biased bidding practices in policy reforms and development outcomes. connection to the Light Rail Transit (LRT) Secondly, it examines the infuence that Line 1 and Metro Rail Transit (MRT) Line 3, as USAID exerts through its technical assistance, well as the outcomes of these projects. Reports and through its signifcant presence in demonstrated that PPP concessionaires reaped Philippine government institutions, referring huge benefts from the public subsidization of to the instructive example of COMPETE. their private business activity while services Thirdly, it considers the implications of declined. technical assistance practices for the LLED PPP project, particularly the roles that TA As well, the administration’s presentation of played in its promotion as a PPP, but TA national growth fgures, particularly offcial is also briefy considered as a development employment statistics,3 has been misleading. instrument more generally. A look beyond the reported fgures reveals that the “economic miracle” has consisted Political-Economic Backdrop: of unequal growth. Job creation is actually Aquino Administration, 20101-2016 weaker than in previous decades. The 692,000 new jobs created annually during the During its tenure, the Aquino administration 2010‒2015 period is lower than the average presented the Philippines as an “economic of 732,000 achieved during the 2000‒2009 miracle” and its development program as period, a time when the economy was much largely successful. This presentation was smaller.4 Moreover, additional employment mirrored in the reports of agencies such in services has coincided with weaker job

84 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

creation in manufacturing and agriculture, fact that the combined fve-year operating sectors that could play a prominent role in budgets for two of its above-mentioned a long-term development strategy, given projects—COMPETE (US$22.5 million) and the Philippines’ wealth in terms of natural TRADE (US$12.8)—is already greater than resources.5 The shrinking role of these sectors the 2016 budget for the National Economic marks the continuation of trends prevalent in and Development Authority (NEDA), which the country since the dominance of neoliberal amounts to ₱1.286 billion or US$27.7 million. policies, beginning in the late 1970s. These and the other above-mentioned USAID projects fnd institutional housing under This political and economic context puts the Partnership for Growth (PFG). In this into perspective responses by civil society White House initiative, the US and Philippine (CSOs) and people’s organizations (POs) government offcials jointly set development 6 to President Aquino’s decision to move priorities for NEDA’s Midterm Philippine forward with renewed efforts in the LLED Development Plan. All of this implies a level PPP with the Department of Public Works of policymaking infuence far beyond whatever and Highways (DPWH), the project’s main might be conjured up by the neutral-sounding overseer. In statements by the fsherfolk label “technical assistance.” alliance group Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamalakaya ng Pilipinas (Pamalakaya)7 and the Save Laguna Lake Movement (SLLM), both As a member of the secretariat of the Technical of whom have maintained staunch opposition Working Group (TWG) of the Convergence to the privatization from the beginning, there Program, the USAID COMPETE team was not only a demand for abandoning the occupies its own institutional space between LLED project, but also complete opposition the Department of Tourism (DOT) and the to Aquino’s PPP program and a call for the Department of Public Works and Highways program’s outright termination. The PPPs (DPWH). From this position, it has wielded promoted by the Aquino administration, signifcant power in shaping agendas. Among for them and many others, became symbols its accomplishments in 2013, for example, of rampant bureaucratic corruption and COMPETE highlighted technical assistance heightened economic uncertainty. Even before provided to DOT and DPWH for the resident displacements in the Laguna area identifcation of tourism road projects. Budget began, these organizations and community revisions followed, resulting in a 37% increase in members were calling attention to the very the allotment for tourism roads (from US$279 real social costs that have attended the Aquino million in 2013 to US$381 million in 2014).8 development program, costs not refected in the offcial growth fgures. While infrastructure needs are certainly dire, it is questionable whether tourism roads should Technical Assistance: A Technique be such a national budget and development for Influencing National Policy priority, if development goals include equity and sustainability. Furthermore, there are USAID’s infuence over the policymaking implications for governance. Given that process is perhaps unsurprising, given the USAID’s policy framework remains explicitly

85 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

tied to the US national security agenda,9 and The World Bank, IMF and European guided by powerful US corporate interests,10 Investment Bank (EIB) have all released studies it is alarming that it was allowed to exert such identifying cases where governments have borne infuence in identifying and setting priorities increased burdens as a result of PPP projects. for viable infrastructure projects and key This is in contrast to proponents who claim that industries. Also, the fact that PPPs fgure PPPs reduce risk. Yet, USAID has continued so strongly in its prescriptions is cause for to maintain a startling degree of confdence alarm since there is little clear evidence for in its frequent PPP prescriptions. Whether the effcacy of PPPs in achieving positive the aforementioned corporate interests (see development outcomes. Appendix A for a list of USAID PPP company partners) are guiding these prescriptions is As suggested above, PPPs have held an diffcult to say. What can be questioned, however, important place in the USAID strategy is the degree to which PPPs actually contribute to since 2001. On a global level private sector national development. participation in infrastructure projects has been on the rise since at least 1991. Following a decline USAID’s unwavering confdence, in fact, in 1997, this trend rose sharply again in 2003. seems to have helped pave the way for In the succeeding ten years (2003-2013), the President Aquino’s passage of the PPP monetary value of this participation increased Act, which constituted a comprehensive from US$182 million to US$322 million. privatization program. This controversial Act Despite various complexities in generalizing brought together key policy prescriptions in about PPPs and the need for further studies, a manner unprecedented in the Philippines general trends have emerged in terms of the and possibly the world. For instance, the Act operation of PPPs in less-developed countries, provides generous regulatory risk guarantees with similarities between issues identifed (of the kind in force in the Lesotho hospital by PPP critics in the Philippines, and other PPP), even creating a permanent public fund situations in the world.11 for this purpose in the national budget. It grants tax exemptions for PPP projects such Both academic and institutional researchers as those connected to the construction and/or have pointed out that the cost of PPP operation of power plants, toll roads and mass infrastructure projects often exceeds the costs transportation. Moreover, the Act establishes of comparable public projects. The reasons an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) include higher private sector borrowing system, giving investors a venue outside the costs relative those of the public sector, and courts to resolve cases flled by consumers incentives for governments not to reveal PPP- and other stakeholders. This measure has the contingent liabilities. Evidence of whether effect of narrowing the mandates of regulatory PPPs result in better and more effcient service bodies and institutionalizes procedures of is generally inconclusive, although there have “justice” biased in favor of investor interests, been many reports of deteriorating service, resulting in diminished social accountability. particularly where PPPs involve social services. The famous case of the Lesotho hospital PPP A 2006 USAID-funded technical report 12 has been an important reminder. foreshadowed elements of the recent PPP Act.

86 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

Entitled, “A Proposed BOT [Build-Operate- subject of considerable speculation since the Transfer] Bill to Enhance Public-Private newly elected President Duterte’s assumption Partnership in Infrastructure Development,” of offce in June 2016. the report emphasizes the necessary role of government subsidies in enhancing the viability Laguna-Lakeshore Expressway- of PPP projects from the perspective of potential Dike: Social-Ecological Disaster? private sector partners. It also asserts the necessity of operational components that “facilitate According to the COMPETE year-two report, smooth implementation with hardly any “The LLED Project was not on the original contractual dispute requiring court intervention list of the government’s PPP projects [. . .]. emerging.”13 This report became the basis for the But now, it is No. 1 on the list and the biggest bills to amend the BOT Law submitted to the 14th PPP project to date.”17 The report describes and 15th Congress. By the time the PPP Act was the LLED project as follows: passed, the government subsidy proposition had returned in the form of the Contingent Liability LLED has two components: (a) a 6-lane Fund (section 24) and Viability Gap Funding expressway-dike; and (b) land reclamation. (VGF) (section 3). The VGF provision commits The project aims to mitigate fooding in the government to the subsidization of the the Laguna Lake coastal towns, particularly difference between contract-stipulated and actual in Southern Metro Manila and Laguna, profts in the event that the latter prove to be less improve the environmental condition than the former.14 of the Lake, and promote economic activities through the effcient transport USAID PPP policy promotion through of goods and people. LLED involves COMPETE includes technical assistance15 the construction of a 47-kilometer food to both the DPWH and to Representative control dike on top of which will be a high- Cosalan and Senator Marcos, Jr. to assist in speed tollway. The project will likewise the preparation of their bill, as well as the provide opportunities for developing a new most recent amendments in March 2016 to business and residential district (Central amend the current Right-of-Way Acquisition Business District) in the reclaimed areas. (ROWA) law and ease property acquisition.16 As in many offcial descriptions of the project, In terms of actual PPP projects, USAID the aims of mitigating fooding, improving activities have recently centered on two in environmental conditions and promoting particular: the Bohol Water and Sanitation economic activity are placed side-by-side. (BWS) project and the LLED project. Of While it would be ideal for this to be the these two, the LLED is by far the larger. In case, such a comprehensive approach would fact, had it moved beyond the bidding phase, require giving equal attention to each element, it would have been the largest PPP project something that has not occurred in the undertaken during the Aquino administration LLED planning stage. Instead the attention (with a budget of US$2.73 billion). For this has narrowed to the more proftable aspects, reason, among others, its status remains the heightening the risks posed by unforeseen

87 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

complications, which could jeopardize San Juan in Taytay, Rizal. Another 10,440 the project and endanger the community families in the informal settlements situated surrounding the project site. along the shoreline would also be displaced. The total “relocation cost” has been calculated to be Besides being the Philippines’ biggest, the ₱200,000 (US$4,000) per household, bringing the project has also become perhaps its most total eviction costs to approximately ₱6.5 billion complicated, both technically and politically. (US$144 million) for 80,000 households.18 In fact the project has been considered by bidders to be “unviable.” The government In this accounting for the displacement, consequently is under pressure to repackage however, signifcant costs are not included, the project to fnd ways to increase its particularly the social costs of the undemocratic proftability, something that has happened procedures by which eviction is often before with other PPPs failing to secure bids. implemented. For example, according to the This is a questionable approach given the Asian Human Rights Commission, in eviction government’s duty to the public interest. and demolition efforts that took place in Taguig in March of 2015, a 300-member team It is diffcult to imagine how the LLED jointly consisting of the Philippine National project, with its potentially catastrophic Police (PNP) and the Public Order and Safety social costs, might be attractively repackaged Offce (POSO) “confscated whatever little in the context of public opposition. This personal belongings the household[s] had like opposition to the project focuses on both the kitchen utensils, blankets, papaya trees, wood, large-scale resident displacement that would lumber, and padlocks.”19 result and the serious disaster-related risks in its current design, which would threaten There is a tendency to consider these the proposed infrastructure, not to mention procedures distinct from the PPP project the endangerment of its future inhabitants, itself, as incidental occurrences during the utilizers and maintainers. Given all the implementation. However, the institutional technical assistance provided by USAID, it context is a critical part of any assessment and would be disingenuous to suggest that the should be identifed as a constitutive social social costs were undetected by USAID or cost inherent to PPPs. the government. A more truthful assessment would be that many of these social costs simply In the Philippines, a crucial institutional were not considered to be real costs, due to contextual issue for PPPs is the PPP Act, overriding private interests in the project. particularly the above-mentioned ADR system, which places constraints on the A Laguna Lake Authority (LLA) document legal options available to those who contest entitled “Laguna de Bay Basin by 2020” reported either the project itself or the state-initiated that the project would require the eviction of procedures accompanying it. For example, 6,800 families in Barangay Malabanan in Biñan, these constraints include the prohibition 4,800 families in Sinalhan in Santa Rosa, at least on the issuance of Temporary Restraining 60,000 families in Lupang Arenda in Barangay Orders (TROs) against PPPs by local courts.

88 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

Given that TROs have been issued by the earthquake waves than structures sitting Supreme Court against actions of PPP project on solid rock. [. . .] While the earthquake concessionaires (e.g., those of the MRT and lasts, its shaking would also transform LRT), the prohibition of similar recourse the sediment and its water content into in local courts in cases of legitimate risk to a liquid-like mixture without strength. communities constitutes a signifcant loss Buildings would sink into it or topple.23 of the democratic space. Therefore, while confscation and displacement may not appear In his article in Philippine Science Letters, “On necessarily linked to PPPs,20 the legislative the geological hazards that threaten existing context that determines the rights of those and proposed reclamations of Manila Bay,” implementing PPP contracts (and the relative Rodolfo debunks several misleading assertions lack of rights of community members) are by government offcials in an attempt promote enabling factors that permit injustices for the project, where they reference “successful” affected populations. reclamation projects in the past. Rodolfo explains,

In addition to mass displacement, reasons that “The Department of Public Works and might justify the issuance of a TRO in relation Highways has long ignored or minimized to the LLED project have been identifed by the problem of land subsidence in planning a coalition of at least fve Catholic dioceses. their expensive but ineffective food-control They have “vowed to support other faith- projects24 [. . .]. It would not be surprising if based groups and people’s organizations reclamation planners also ignore subsidence in opposing the project.”21 Concerns relate to minimize costs and maximize profts, but to unaddressed safety and environmental thereby enhance risks.”25 hazards, ones that fnd support in studies by, and consultations with, geologist Kelvin Given that much of the Aquino S. Rodolfo. Put concisely, “[i]f the project is administration’s reform efforts, as well as constructed and protects Metro Manila from a signifcant focus for USAID technical lake-water foods, people living elsewhere assistance, related to the promotion of good along the lake will suffer, simply because the governance in order to, among other things, food water will have to go somewhere.”22 better facilitate infrastructure projects, it is The greatest threat, according to Rodolfo, is telling that DPWH lapses indicated by Rodolfo an earthquake. Because of the proximity of were allowed to persist. The issues ignored by the LLED project site areas to fault lines, an DPWH are some of those with the greatest earthquake is a likely event. He writes: relevance for infrastructure provision. It might be interpreted as a case of technical assistance Reclamation areas [. . .] closer to the fault being freely offered by Rodolfo, a scientist zone are underlain by thick, water-saturated with little apparent political motivation, only sediments. Any structures built there to be ignored by government offcials in favor would experience catastrophic damage of USAID prescriptions, which are far from during a major WMV Fault earthquake. approaching Rodolfo’s level of impartiality. They would shake more strongly from the Whatever these offcials’ motivations, the

89 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

effect is an institutionalization of “good be viewed as factors contributing to these governance” practices that are proving to be failures, rather than working to prevent them. very hostile to ordinary people. The two main failures considered in this chapter A Plea for Some Real Assistance — the state-managed displacement measures and the systemic lapses in good judgment made While the last attempts to secure a bid for the by the DPWH, leading to serious ecological LLED project have failed, there is still a possibility issues to be overlooked for so long — are both of further attempts. Mark Villar, the incoming examples of a government failing to accurately secretary of the Public Works Department, has account for signifcant social costs, while being said that President Duterte plans to undertake highly concerned with commercial accounting. the project.26 But it is as yet unclear what, if This indicates, among other things, a clear any, changes will be made to the project design. prioritization of private sector interests. Nevertheless, there are important lessons to be learned from the LLED PPP case. This study also emphasized the importance of civil society actions to empower affected populations. PPP failures are often defned as failures of From the earliest stages of the project, community governance. Proposed solutions have given residents, CSOs/POs — Pamalakaya and SLLM an important role to technical assistance — sought to raise awareness of the breadth of from development agencies as a means of social costs, particularly concerning the threat of promoting good governance practices. The displacement. Church groups provided important LLED PPP case, however, suggests that such support by bringing attention to ecological risks. a ‘solution’ is not so straightforward. There are many ways for CSOs/POs to become In an analysis by the Partnership for Growth protagonists to ensure the effectiveness and (PFG), good governance is understood to relevance of development projects. The LLED have three dimensions: (1) regulatory quality; case suggests that, at a minimum, social costs (2) control of corruption; and (3) political would be more effciently and ethically managed stability and absence of violence.27 The if CSOs/POs benefted from governance PPP Act, along with the series of legislative practices that enable, rather than disable them. measures promoted through COMPETE technical assistance, might be seen as an The potential for technical assistance to attempt to improve the frst dimension. But contribute to equitable and sustainable its conception of good governance seems development is thereby understood in part to insuffcient to deter the kinds of governance require an institutional context in which the and regulatory failures that are apparent in project is conceived, planned, implemented the LLED PPP case, especially when the and assessed where CSOs/POs are included, provisions of the PPP Act could reasonably rather than excluded.

90 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

APPENDIX A 25 Most Frequent USAID PPP Resource Partners28 Resource Partner # of PPPs Microsof Corporaton 62 Coca-Cola Company 36 Chevron 33 Cisco Systems 26 Intel 25 UK Department for Internatonal Development (DFID) 24 World Bank 23 ExxonMobil 19 Citgroup 18 Pfzer 16 Save the Children 15 Kraf Foods 14 Procter and Gamble (P&G) 14 The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundaton 14 Winrock Internatonal 14 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 13 United Natons Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 13 Walmart 13 Conservaton Internatonal 12 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 12 BP 11 Cargill 11 Evensen Dodge Internatonal (EDI) 11 GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 11 Google 7

Endnotes 1 George M. Ingram, Anne E. Johnson and the unemployment rate by around 3.5 percentage Helen Moser (2016), “USAID’s Public-Private points. It is plausible that a large number of these Partnerships: A Data Picture and Review of are job-seekers already discouraged amid the lack Business Engagement” (Washington, DC: Brookings of work in the country. Trying to correct for this to Insttute), p. 30. htp://www.brookings.edu/~/ allow comparability with historical data would result media/research/files/papers/2016/02/usaid- in around 4.2 to 4.3 million unemployed and a 9.8 to public-private-partnerships-ingram-johnson- 10% unemployment rate in 2015 [compared to the moser/wp94pppreport2016web.pdf, accessed 5 ofcially reported 6.3%]. This is barely changed from Jun. 2016. the employment situaton in 2010 and stll means a considerable number of unemployed Filipinos.” 2 This chapter uses the terminology “less-developed” IBON (2015), Yearend 2015 Bird Talk: End of the and “more developed” to distnguish countries at Road and a New Beginning? (Manila: IBON), p. 13. various stages of “development.” 4 Ibid. 3 “The ofcial unemployment count also uses a 5 Ibid. new more stringent defniton than before that, compared with the old defniton, reduces the 6 Aquino’s decision was taken afer the failure in 2011 number of unemployed by about 1.6 million and of the previous Laguna Lake privatzaton eforts.

91 Chapter 2: Technical cooperaton for infrastructure development

7 Natonal Federaton of Small Fisherfolk http://bulatlat.com/main/2014/11/07/residents- Organizatons in the Philippines. spur-resistance-to-road-dike-reclamation-plans/, 8 USAID (2013), Advancing Philippine accessed 28 Jun. 2016. Compettveness (COMPETE) Project: Year 1 Annual 19 Asian Human Rights Commission (2015), Report, (Washington, DC: USAID), htps://dec. “PHILIPPINES: Stop demoliton against Laguna usaid.gov/dec/GetDoc.axd?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQt Lakeshore community in Taguig,” 8 May, Hunger M2YyMi00YjRmLTkxNjktZTcxMjM2NDBmY2Uy&p Alerts, htp://www.humanrights.asia/news/hunger- ID=NTYw&attchmnt=VHJ1ZQ==&rID=MzU0OTE3, alerts/AHRC-HAU-002-2015, accessed 29 Jun. 2016. accessed 16 Jun. 2016. 20 In fact, displacements have been reported to 9 For a summary of the basis of the USAID policy accompany PPPs in numerous cases. The LRT Line orientaton, see USAID’s Policy Framework 1 Cavite extension, for example, is also expected to 2011‒2015, Securing the Future, and Building entail displacement of many informal setlers. Trade Capacity in the Developing World, all of which 21 Evelyn Macairan (2016), “Church to campaign are available at: htp://usaidprojectstarter.org/ vs Laguna Lakeshore,” The Philippine content/cdcs-country-development-cooperaton- Star, 31 Mar., htp://beta.philstar.com/ strategy, accessed 24 Jun. 2016. naton/2016/03/31/1568046/church-campaign-vs- 10 See Appendix A: Table 1. laguna-lakeshore, accessed 5 Jun. 2016. 11 Jomo KS, Anis Chowdhury, Krishnan Sharma and 22 Kelvin S. Rodolfo (2016), “The dangerous Laguna Daniel Platz (2016), “Public-Private Partnerships Lakeshore Expressway Dike,” Rappler, 24 Jan., htp:// and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: www.rappler.com/science-nature/ideas/120068- Fit for Purpose?” DESA Working Paper (New York: dangerous-laguna-lakeshore-expressway-dike, UN),https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ accessed 5 Jul. 2016. content/documents/2288desaworkingpaper148. 23 Ibid. pdf, accessed 5 Jun. 2016. 24 Kelvin S. Rodolfo and Fernando P. Siringan (2006), 12 Ibid. For more about the Lesotho hospital PPP, see “Global sea-level rise is recognised, but fooding Oxfam (2014), “A Dangerous Diversion: Will IFC’s from anthropogenic land subsidence is ignored Flagship health PPP bankrupt Lesotho’s Ministry around northern Manila Bay, Philippines,” Disasters of Health?” Oxfam Briefng Note (Oxford: Oxfam), (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing), Vol. 30, No. htps://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/fles/ 1, pp. 118‒139, htp://www.paase.org/images/ file_attachments/bn-dangerous-diversion-lesotho- Rodolfo-Siringan2006.pdf, accessed 29 Jun. 2016. health-ppp-070414-en_0.pdf, accessed 5 Jul. 2016 25 Kelvin S. Rodolfo (2014), “One the geological hazards 13 Dante B. Canlas et al. (2006), “A Proposed BOT that threaten existng and proposed reclamatons of Bill to Enhance Public-Private Partnership in Manila Bay,” Philippine Science Leters, Vol. 7, No. 1, Infrastructure Development” (Makat City, htp://philscileters.org/2014/PSL%202014-vol07- Philippines: EMERGE), p. 23, htp://pdf.usaid.gov/ no01-p228-240%20Rodolfo.pdf, accessed 29 Jun. pdf_docs/PNADH616.pdf, accessed 5 Jul. 2016. 2016. 14 For a more detailed analysis of this and the contngent 26 Louella Desiderio (2016), “Next government liabilites fund, see the secton “Less regulaton, more pursuing Laguna Lakeshore project,” The burden” in IBON (2015), “PPP Act: Surrender to Philippine Star, 13 Jun., htp://beta.philstar.com/ corporate interests,” IBON Facts & Figures (Quezon business/2016/06/13/1592625/next-government- City, Philippines: IBON), 15 Jun., pp. 6‒9. pursuing-laguna-lakeshore-project, 5 Jul. 2016 15 USAID (2014), Advancing Philippine 27 Joint USG-GPH Technical Team (2011), “Partnership Compettveness (COMPETE) Project: Year 2 Annual for Growth: Philippines. Constraints Analysis” Report (Washington, DC: USAID), pp. 5‒6 htp:// (Washington, DC: PFG), htp://www.state.gov/ pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KF99.pdf, accessed documents/organizaton/188309.pdf, accessed 5 Jul. 16 Jun. 2016. 2016. 16 Louella Desiderio and Richmond Mercurio (2016), 28 Data drawn from George M. Ingram, Anne E. “P-Noy inks law easing right-of-way process,” Johnson and Helen Moser (2016), “USAID’s Public- Philippine Star, 11 Mar., htp://www.philstar.com/ Private Partnerships: A Data Picture and Review business/2016/03/11/1561609/p-noy-inks-law- of Business Engagement” (Washington, DC: easing-right-way-process, accessed 24 Jun. 2016. Brookings Insttute), p. 30. htp://www.brookings. 17 USAID (2014), ibid., p. 9. edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2016/02/ usaid-public-private-partnerships-ingram-johnson- 18 Dennis Espada (2014), “Residents spur resistance moser/wp94pppreport2016web.pdf, accessed 5 to road dike, reclamaton plans,” Bulatlat, 7 Nov., Jun. 2016.

92 Chapter 3 SouSou eerience in ecnical cooeraton

Horizontal South-South bilateral cooperation experiences: Good practices in Argentina and Paraguay Karina Cáceres, Fundación SES

People4Change: People to people South-South Cooperation Lea Sofa Simonsen, ActonAid Denmark

Triangular cooperation among civil society organizations in South America: Institutional strengthening in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia Alejandra Solla, Fundación SES Argentna; Rolando Kandel, Fundación SES; Ancelin Gauter, Fundación SES France

Horizontal South-South Bilateral Cooperation Experiences: Good Practices in Argentina and Paraguay

Karina Cáceres,1 Fundación SES

“Building autonomous solutions to common cultural links inside the South America region: development challenges”2 Argentina and Paraguay.

Within the Latin America and the Caribbean Buenos Aires Action Plan and the continent there is an acknowledgement of a Promotion of Technical Cooperation collective identity. Despite asymmetries, a among Developing Countries combination of common factors is the basis for building and widening an equitable political, The Bandung Conference (1955) was an economical and social territorial union. With important milestone in the development the third wave of democratization in the of South-South Cooperation (SSC). This region during the 1980s, after a period of long meeting of twenty-nine countries from Asia dictatorships, fuxuations in local policies, and and Africa took place inside the context of shifts in the international context, this vision a bipolar world marked by the Cold War. It is working to promote political and economic gave birth to the Non Aligned Movement, links that support common and clear goals. and thus the frst steps towards a new “aid modality,” despite the fact that it was set This idea is refected in the political discourses inside the framework of conficts and tensions of the heads of government as well as in the between the eastern and western blocs. search for new policies based in relations of horizontality and solidarity as the driving Beginning in the 1970s changes in the principle for solving common problems that international system were taking place. occur inside the region. With these changes came the Non- Aligned Movement’s proclamations for the Using these commitments as a reference fundamental principle of self-determination, point, this chapter examines a modality of decolonization and the struggle against all International development cooperation that forms of imperialism. The political statements is not new, but is one that has advanced of this Movement called for Third World considerably in recent years as a non- countries to unite under the banner of the traditional form of north-south cooperation “Global South,” exploring new approaches in Latin America, the Caribbean and other to cooperation and mutual development. parts of the world.3 Particularly, we will take According to Gladys Lechini, cooperation a close look at the experiences of Horizontal among countries of the South was born as a South-South Bilateral Cooperation (HSSBC)4 strategy in opposition and/or complementary between countries that have a long history, to the North-South axis. This was a more tradition, common frontiers and socio- symmetric relation in comparison with the

95 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

asymmetrical relations between countries of has been the widening and deepening of the North-North axis.5 cooperation throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. During the 1990s it was In 1978 delegations from 138 countries primarily focused on the Central American adopted the “Action Plan for the Promotion and region. This way, the basic principles of SSC - Implementation of Technical Cooperation Among horizontal, equality and solidarity - supported Developing Countries” (TCDC), commonly the strengthening of regional integration and known as the Buenos Aires Action Plan.6 the reduction of asymmetries. This Plan became an important tool in the development and promotion of a strategic Cooperation between Argentina and framework for South-South cooperation. Paraguay is a more recent experience. An analysis of horizontal South South bilateral During the frst decade of the Plan, several cooperation between Argentina and Paraguay countries played key roles in the promotion of is based on several documentary sources, with the South-South Cooperation spirit at the global information from 2008 to 2013.9 This material level. Today’s BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, has contributed to the knowledge, analysis, China and South Africa) have been among refection and dissemination of the SSC the biggest promoters through their emerging cooperation experiences in the region.10 economies. Beyond the BRICS, Argentina was one of the 25 countries convened in 1997 by the An important factor in this SSC relationship is the UN Special Offce for SSC in order to promote, Argentinian Fund for South-South and Triangular through different policies, fnancing for Cooperation (FO-AR).11 The Argentinian development and the exchange of experience in Chancellery, as part of its external policy to South-South technical assistance. promote horizontal technical cooperation, created the FO-AR in 1992. This Fund provides Though it has been several years since the mechanisms for association, collaboration and approval of the Buenos Aires Action Plan, it mutual support, primarily in Latin America and still is a critical guide for promoting national the Caribbean, but also supports inter regional and regional capacities of developing countries, relations with other continents.12 which face challenges in an increasingly complex international environment.7 Documentation is also available that describes

Horizontal Bilateral South South the value of international cooperation from Cooperation between Argentina the Paraguayan perspective.13 Experiences of and Paraguay South South Cooperation between Argentina and Paraguay have been elaborated and Argentina is one of fve Ibero-American described as “successful.” countries with a signifcant level of technical cooperation activity in the region.8 According From this material it is possible to construct to Argentinian Fund for South-South and an analysis of technical cooperation with a Triangular Cooperation (FO-AR), one of focus on Argentina as a partner offering SSC the biggest achievements in this past decade projects and programs with Paraguay as the regarding Argentina’s horizontal cooperation recipient partner. 96 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

Argentina, along with other middle-high bilateral SSC providers in 2011 were Brazil and income countries,14 has provided a large Argentina.20 number of cooperation initiatives. An examination of these fgures indicates a For Argentina’s projects, 51.8% were correlation between income levels and a provided to Paraguay.21 However, Argentina’s country’s status as a recipient of cooperation bilateral SSC projects and actions in Paraguay assistance. In the case of Argentina, it diminished after 2008, which was consequence appears that there is a direct relation between of several factors. The decrease of projects the cooperation assistance provided to the and actions in 2009 is partly explained by recipient country and its per capita income.15 the international crisis and some technical changes in the reporting methodology for One example, which operates at the regional these projects.22 SSC between Argentina level inside MERCOSUR, is the Technical and Paraguay also decreased because of the Assistance Commission that identifes, suspension of Paraguay from MERCOSUR.23 develops and executes support through This was in response to an internal crisis the Fund for Structural Convergence of described as a coup d’etat in June 2012, when the MERCOSUR (FOCEM). This Fund an impeachment action dismissed President is a mechanism for the direct transfer of Fernando Lugo. Because of these political fnancial resources from the largest economies circumstances there were only 14 projects and (Argentina and Brazil) in the region to the actions between both countries during that 16 smaller ones (Paraguay and Uruguay). time (2012-2013).24

“FOCEM is one of the few examples in This reduction in SSC raises several questions Latin America where the countries of the for further refection that are beyond the scope region are the main contributors. It has a of this chapter: What exactly were the factors re-distributive character and its goal is to that caused Argentina to suspend its SSC improve development and to promote relations with Paraguay? Secondly, should a integration achieving a bigger convergence crisis in a democratic regime be a determining among the regions of the MERCOSUR.”17 variable in South-South relations? These and other questions perhaps could be examined in While recognizing the importance of regional some future research. south-south cooperation (RSSC), it is also useful to critically analyse HSSBC initiatives. Good practices in South South Bilateral Cooperation: Projects Paraguay has been a major recipient of on Human Rights, Institutional Horizontal South-South Cooperation, Strengthening and Cross-Border receiving the most South South bilateral Territorial Development cooperation among nine Latin American 18 countries. Of 519 SSC initiatives by From the perspective of Argentina, Argentina in 2008, for example, 302 of them international cooperation should be rooted 19[ were executed in Paraguay According to in the creation of mutual capacities and the 2012 edition of the same report, the main opportunities. Of course, it must target the

97 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

capacity development needs of countries Two south-south technical assistance projects that require technical assistance. But this executed between Argentina and Paraguay relationship is useful for both providers were identifed as “good practices” and and recipients as the countries that provide “successful examples” by both countries (See cooperation develop human resources and Boxes 1.5 and 1.6 for more specifc details more competent institutions to operate about each project).27 effectively in the international arena.25 A) Commitment with Memory, Truth and Justice: Projects are developed with different modalities of support. In the case of Paraguay, it has This project provided technical assistance for the received relevant experts from Argentinian organization and investigation of the detained, organizations, who provide assistance through disappeared, tortured and executed during the sharing concrete experiences, practices, dictatorship of Stroessner in Paraguay (1954 processes and methodologies. They also -1989). The Argentinian Team of Forensic include other forms of capacity building Anthropology (EAAF) and the Argentinian through dialogue, seminars and workshops Secretariat of Human Rights contributed their in subjects such as planning, development, expertise to Paraguay’s judicial system, the monitoring and evaluation of projects. Truth, Justice and Reparation Commission and the Ombudsman of Paraguay. The Argentinian Argentina has clearly showed its political organizations were able to give technical will to collaborate with other countries. It assistance in the form of forensic anthropology has prioritized relations with neighbouring tools, the systematization of information and countries, especially Paraguay and Bolivia. the development of a database. They also Through FO-AR, the Argentinian government contributed valuable support in the revision has focused on three main themes: of judicial aspects for the Truth and Justice Commission, transformed by President Lugo • Administration and governability: This into the new Directorate of Truth, Justice and includes support and assistance for Reparation.28 strengthening the capacities of public offcers and promoting the participation B) Cross-Border Technical Cooperation Program for of different social actors in decision- Fish Farming, “CARPA”: making in public policies. • Sustainable development: Focuses on the This project is contributing to sub-regional and productive development of agro-industrial sub-national integration between Argentina and service sectors. The objective is to and Paraguay through economic and social promote the conservation of natural development of the border municipalities of resources for future generations. Cambyreta (Itapúa Department – Paraguay • Human Rights: Human rights are key for and Campo Viera in the Province of Misiones- Argentina’s foreign policy. It is based on Argentina). The project for technical four pillars: memory, truth, justice and assistance in fsh farming aims to provide an reparation.26 alternative source of self suffciency for small

98 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

producers, which later successfully evolved, and knowledge gained can be replicated at the through a “cascading effect,” in the building local level, thus generating human resources of ponds, associations/working relationships with important social capital. On Argentina’s between producers, and commercialization of side, it has developed its capacity in knowledge the surplus. The project was later replicated exchange and expertise in training. in several other border municipalities in Paraguay.29 This modality of cooperation and South- South technical assistance has the added Some Conclusions beneft of generating trust among partner countries and the municipalities where the This chapter’s study of Horizontal South-South collaboration is implemented. Of particular Bilateral Cooperation between Argentina and importance is the strengthening of regional the Republic of Paraguay reveals many points integration among the cooperating countries. for refection and analysis. The commitment For example, South South cooperation by Argentina to values of horizontality and involving Paraguay has reaped positive results solidarity with fellow neighbouring countries through the establishment of new cooperation is an important priority. This SSC represents relationships with Argentina at many levels. an abandoning of an approach “based on Paraguay has now moved from an exclusively charity.” Instead it advocates for a different recipient country to one that is also a provider relationship, one based on the identifcation of of South South technical assistance in areas common interests and mutual benefts to build where it has strengths, such as hydroelectric solutions to the challenges of development and energy generation and production. the needs of the countries requiring Argentina’s technical assistance. Countries like Argentina In 2009, along with other developing that have higher levels of expertise in certain countries, Paraguay subscribed to the areas can provide important support through principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid transferring these capacities to countries with Effectiveness (ownership, harmonization, limited economies or that need institutional alignment, management by results and mutual strengthening. Such cooperation has the accountability). This commitment to principles beneft of promoting regional democracy and for effective cooperation is part of Paraguay’s productive development. efforts to move away from the effects of 35 years of dictatorship and international isolation The technical assistance offered by Argentina from Latin America and the Caribbean. South- to Paraguay has benefts for both sides. For South cooperation has provided this country Paraguay its value has been through exchange with the opportunity to make connections at of knowledge, experiences, lessons learned the international level with a new role through and participative methodologies. The skills sharing experiences with fellow countries.

99 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

Annexes Index of Boxes and Graphs:

1.1 Box. Relatons between Argentna (donor) and Paraguay (recipient). 1.2 SSC projects implemented by Argentna in Latn America and the Caribbean during 2014. 1.3 Box. Evoluton of the number of actons and projects of HSSBC executed by Argentna as the donor partner of Paraguay between 2009 and 2013. 1.4 Percentages representng the Human Rights Thematc Axis of the Projects of FO-AR in Paraguay. 1.5 Technical Assistance Project about Human Rights from Argentna to Paraguay, “Commitment, Truth and Justce”. 1.6 Technical Assistance Project about Sustainable Development, Cross-Border Technical Assistance in Fish Farming “CARPA Program”.

1.1 Box. Relatons between Argentna (donor) and Paraguay (recipient)

BoxThe case of Argentna Bolivia and Paraguay

Source: Informe Iberoamericano de Cooperación Sur-Sur año 2009.

100 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

1.2 SSC projects implemented by Argentna in Latn America and the Caribbean during 2014

Source: FO-AR, Presentación Argentna: Financiamiento de Acciones y Proyectos de Cooperación Sur-Sur, pagina 4.

1.3 Box. Evoluton of the number of actons and projects of HSSBC executed by Argentna as donor partner of Paraguay between 2009 adn 2013.

Source: Data provided by the Iberoamerican Sourth South Cooperaton Reports for the year 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013- 2014 y 2015.

101 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

1.4 Percentages representng the Human Rights Thematc Axis of the Projects of FO-AR in Paraguay.

Source: Revista FO-AR N° 9, Fondo Argentno de Cooperación Horizontal, Periodo julio 2005 – abril 2008.

102 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

1.5 Technical Assistance Project about Human Rights from Argentna to Paraguay, “Commitment, Truth and Justce”.

NAME AND DESCRIPTION: Commitment with Truth, Memory and Justce Thematc Area: Human Rights

Technical assistance of the Argentnian interdisciplinary team supportng the organizaton of the processes of search and investgaton of historical truth in Paraguay, and in the judgement and punishment of the responsibles of serious crimes, as well as collaboraton in the digging zone where clandestne burials took place.

v Insttutonal Strengthening through the creaton of a body to investgate the two dimensions of this crime: historical truth and judicial truth. It was created by a resoluton of the ombudsman and the General Directorate of Truth, Justce and Reparaton. v Technical Assistance for the organizaton and investgaton of disappeared ACHIEVEMENTS AND IMPACTS detainees and extrajudicial killings taking place in Paraguay between 1954 and 1989. Capacity development on investgaton with forensic anthropology tools, systematzaton of gathered informaton, development of databases and revision of other juridical aspects. It also facilitated the creaton of a local team. v Accompaniment during the digging in the propertes of the Natonal Police, ex 40th Batalion”, ex “Security Guard”, in the city of Asunción, and identfcaton of the skeletons found. It was pointed that at least 2 cases could belong to people who could have been denounced as disappeared detainees. v Support to the presentaton and monitoring of cases in penal justce. v The Ombudsman drafed, along with the Argentnian Team of Forensic Anthropology, a new project of South South Cooperaton fnanced by FO-AR, in order to reinforce the existng capacites of Paraguay about the search of disappeared detainees and extrajudicial killings, as well as the creaton of a forensic anthropology team and implementng a genetc data bank. v Capacitaton in Forensic Medicine for state ofcers, providing a permanent capacity that helps to the clarifcaton of Crimes and other scientfc criminologist applicatons. v Creaton of the ENABI, “Natonal Team for the Investgaton, Search and Identfcaton of disappeared detainees and extrajudicial killings in Paraguay”, and setng up of a regional data bank that allows the recogniton of the victms of the condor Plan, the systematcal killing of individuals implemented in Argentna, Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile.

FINANCING Financed by FO-AR PERIOD The project has been in development and executon for several years DONOR PARTNER República Argentna

103 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

RECIPIENT PARTNER República de Paraguay Equipo Argentno de Antropología Forense (EAAF, Argentnian Team of Forensic ARGENTINIAN Anthropology) INSTITUTIONS Ministry of Justce and Human Rights - Human Rights Secretariat Joint Commissions of Technical Cooperaton between Paraguay and Argentna PARAGUAYAN Truth and Justce Commission of the Paraguay Ombudsmen INSTITUTIONS Joint Commission of Technical Cooperaton between Paraguay and Argentna

P Joint analysis and investgaton about the politcal, economical and cultural conditons and the components which contributed to the serious human Rights violatons by the state insttutons and other organizatons between 1954 and 2003 P Investgaton, with the methods of forensic anthropology, of a small number of disappeared individuals in general, and 2 cases investgated by the Truth and Justce Commission in partcular. P Review of juridical aspects of the work of the Truth and Justce Commission, as well as the presentaton of a report with this material. ACTIVITIES P Systematzaton of the obtained informaton, creatng databases. DEVELOPED P Monitoring of cases in the criminal courts (judicializaton). P Support in the organizaton of meetngs between the Truth and Justce Commission and the representatves of HR organizatons and relatves and victms. P Professionals visit possible burial zones and partcipated in the digging tasks and analysis of the remains. P They also atended to the T&J Commission verifying cases about illegal burials, facilitatng the exchange of documents and informaton related to Paraguayan citzens disappeared in Argentna.

Law 2.225/03 for the Creaton of the Truth and Justce Commission of the Republic of Paraguay

REGULATORY Technical and Scientfc Cooperaton Agreement between the Republics of FRAMEWORK Argentna and Paraguay, July 7 , 1974, Ciudad de Asunción.

ü Promotng Cooperaton in scientfc investgaton and technological development between both states. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ü Partners seek equivalence and reciprocity in the funding of the projects. LEVELS ü Consttuton of a Joint Commission integrated by representatves of both parts. This body will determine the program of actvites, the executon and reviewing as a whole.

Source: Data obtained from the reports of the cooperaton agencies of both countries.

104 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

1.6 Technical Assistance Project about Sustainable Development, Cross-Border Technical Assistance in Fish Farming “CARPA Program”.

NAME AND DESCRIPTION: Cross-Border Technical Cooperaton Program in Fish Farming “CARPA” Thematc Area: Sustainable Development It was born with the goal of promotng social and economic development of two border municipalites (Itapua Department in Paraguay and Misiones Province in Argentna) through a bet in fsh farming, the transfer of experiences and capacitaton of producers, breeding and fatening of fsh and development of ponds.

• Formaton for local coordinators and technicians was achieved, and they now have capacity to replicate the capacitaton in other neighbour areas. • 110 ponds were built, increasing the producton of carps and the diversifcaton of the diet in rural zones. • Afer being applied in 7 municipalites, it is expected to replicate it in 6 more with the joint partcipaton of the same Argentnian technicians along with the ones capacitated in Paraguay. • Push for associatvism among producers. • Insttutonal Network of producers and government actors (Municipality, ACHIEVEMENTS AND Department and Naton), joint artculaton of diferent sectors. IMPACTS • Afer the success, there were several consequences. Sign of the Triangular SSC agreement between Paraguay, japan and Argentna, jointly with the Natonal University of Asunción to develop a project of rural fsh farming in the whole country, deepening the work of the Argentnian technicians in the Project CARPA. Consequences in the cultural sphere, with the organizaton of the “First regional fair on Fish Farming – Center Zone of the Department of Itapua” (2009). Insttutonal Strengthening of the municipalites and department of Itapua in Paraguay. Creaton of the “Natonal Plan for the Development of Sustainable aquaculture in Paraguay”, among others. FINANCING Financed by FO-AR PERIOD 36 Months DONOR PARTNER Argentna RECIPIENT PARTNER Paraguay Natonal Insttute for Fishing Investgaton and Development of the Ministry of ARGENTINIAN INSTITUTIONS Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing Campo Viera municipality, Province of Misiones Municipality of Cambyretá, Itapúa Department PARAGUAYAN INSTITUTIONS Technical Secretariat of Planning

105 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

• Creaton of internatonal networks among the actors.

• Diagnosis of conditons for the development of fsh farming in the Itapua Department. ACTIVITIES DEVELOPED • Capacitaton of local Coordinators and Technicians, along with local producers of Itapua.

• Technical assistance for small producers of Itapua about the building and management of ponds for fsh farming.

• Technical assistance for small produces about fsh fatening and harvestng.

• Technical assistance for small producers of Itapua on forming associatons and commercializaton of fsh from fsh farming.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK There is no legal Framework among municipalites, but it does exist in the Itapua Department and the Misiones Province: Acta de Entendimiento entre la Provincia de Misiones (República Argentna) y el Departamento de Itapúa (República del Paraguay), 5 de Agosto 1998.30[1] SUBNATIONAL LEVEL • Consolidaton of bilateral relatons for the development of the region founded in friendship links • Agreement to develop experience and knowledge sharing in several areas. • Establishment of projects and programs on the short, middle and long terms for the development of cooperaton. • Supportng and pushing the partcipaton of diferent actors. • Facilitatng the actve partcipaton of civil society organizatons and NGOs in their respectve jurisdictons, actng according to the spirit of the Understanding Act.

Technical and Scientfc Cooperaton Agreement between the Republics of REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Argentna and Paraguay, July 7 , 1974, Ciudad de Asunción. ü Promotng Cooperaton in scientfc investgaton and technological development between both states. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL ü Partners seek equivalence and reciprocity in the funding of the projects.

ü Consttuton of a Joint Commission integrated by representatves of both parts. This body will determine the program of actvites, the executon and reviewing as a whole.

Source: Data obtained from the reports of the cooperaton agencies of both countries.

106 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

Endnotes

1 Karina Cáceres studied internatonal relatons at (joint commission, interagency agreement, general the Catholic University of Argentna. She works cooperaton agreements or similar. for the SES Foundaton in the regional integraton and fnancing for development area, and is the 10 For more informaton, see the pages where the 2007- technical assistant of the regional program of CPDE 2008-2009-2010-2011-2012-2013 and 2014-2015 reports in Latn America and the Caribbean. are included: htp://www.cooperacionsursur.org/ informes-de-css/que-es-el-informe.html 2 Afer the big politcal, social and economic crisis of 2001, the accumulaton of experiences 11 Publicaciones del Ministerio de Relaciones with southern countries was the framework for Exteriores y Culto de la Argentna htps://www. development based in growth with inclusion and mrecic.gov.ar/es/publicaciones strengthening of the autonomy of the state. This 12 Presentación Argentna: Financiamiento de was the politcal will of the government elected Acciones y Proyectos de Cooperación Sur-Sur, in 2003. Financiamiento de Acciones y Proyectos htp://www.cooperacionsursur.org/images/docs/ de Cooperación Sur-Sur, page 4. htp://www. Argentna_Financiamiento.pdf cooperacionsursur.org/images/docs/Argentina_ 13 La Cooperación Internacional No Reembolsable Financiamiento.pdf en el Paraguay a Diciembre 2011, Marzo de 2012 3 Ayllon Pino Bruno Cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS) y Disponible en: htp://www.economia.gov.py/v2/ gobernanza multlateral del sistema de ayuda: index.php?tag=documentos Implicaciones para la cooperación española, 14 Criteria according to the World Bank: Middle-low Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el (936 to 3,705 dollars); Middle-high (3,706 to 11,455 Diálogo Exterior FRIDE junio 2009 dollars per habitant). 4 The consensus of countries partcipatng in the 15 See Box 1.1 Relación entre la cobertura de Iberoamerican Summit (22 countries of Latn America necesidades (rol receptor) y nivel de renta per and the Caribbean, both spanish and portuguese cápita (capacidades ofrecidas) speaking) was to highlight the word “horizontal”, 16 See Box 1.3 in the “bilateral south-south cooperaton” concept. This concept implies that none of the partner 17 Quote from “II Informe de la Cooperación Sur-Sur countries is subject to any conditonality and the en Iberoamérica. Estudio de la SEGIB N° 3” relaton between countries must be based in 18 2008 SEGIB report. equality. Informe de la Cooperación en Iberoamérica. Estudios N° 2 SEGIB. Noviembre 2008. 19 See Box 1.4. 5 Lechini, G, 2009 20 According to the SEGIB 2009 Report. 21 See Box 1.5 6 “The Buenos Aires Plan Acton” Special Unit for TCDC, New York htp://ssc.undp.org/content/dam/ssc/ 22 The distncton between projects and actons in the 2012 documents/Key%20Policy%20Documents/BAPA.pdf report, noted above, meant that the numbers changed. 7 UN Report “Promoción de la cooperación Sur-Sur 23 According to the FO-AR 2013-2014 Management para el desarrollo: una perspectva de 30 años” Report. http://southsouthconference.org/wp-content/ 24 See Box 1.3 uploads/2009/11/A-64-504-S.pdf 25 Fondo Argentno de Cooperación Horizontal FO-AR, 8 Other countries providing technical cooperaton Revista N° 9. Periodo julio 2005- abril 2008. www. include Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentna and Brazil mrecic.gov.ar/es/publicaciones representng the middle-high income countries. They 26 50% of FO-AR projects between 2005 and 2007 in have played roles as bidders and recipients. the HR area were developed in Paraguay. See Box 1.4 9 Important data and analysis was provided by the 27 Informe SEGIB 2011 Iberoamerican Reports on South South Cooperaton, 28 For more details please see Box 1.5. published from 2007 to 2015. While the majority of cooperaton projects between Argentna and 29 This project was highlighted by the FAO and SEGUB Paraguay occurred in 2008, it is important to note as “Good Practces”. La Cooperación Internacional changes in Latn American reports on SSC to count No Reembolsable en el Paraguay a Diciembre cooperaton actvites and their modalites as of 2011, Marzo de 2012 Available in: htp://www. 2010. Projects were defned as “a set of actons economia.gov.py/v2/index.php?tag=documentos . designed to meet a common goal, to a specifc For more details, Check Box 1.10. recipient in one or more sectors and / or topics. A 30 “Convenios Internacionales de la Provincia de project has a defned period of executon, budgets, Misiones Periodo 1994 – 2010”. Marzo 2011, expected results, program publicity and should Posadas. htp://www.cari.org.ar/pdf/provincias- provide a mechanism for monitoring and evaluaton convenios-misiones.pdf 107 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

Bibliography

Lechini Gladys La cooperación Sur-Sur y la búsqueda de FO-AR, Presentación Argentna: Financiamiento de autonomía en América Latna: ¿Mito o realidad? Relaciones Acciones y Proyectos de Cooperación Sur-Sur, pagina 4. Internacionales, núm. 12, octubre de 2009 GERI – UAM. La Cooperación Internacional No Reembolsable Ayllón Pino Bruno Cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS) y gobernanza en el Paraguay a Diciembre 2011, Marzo de 2012 multlateral del sistema de ayuda: Implicaciones para la Disponible en: htp://www.economia.gov.py/v2/ cooperación española, Fundación para las Relaciones index.php?tag=documentos. Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior FRIDE junio 2009. Fondo Argentno de Cooperación Horizontal FO-AR, Sanín Betancourt C. M. y Nils-Sjard Schulz, “La Revista. www.mrecic.gov.ar/es/publicaciones. cooperación Sur-Sur a partr de Accra: América Latna Publicaciones del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y el Caribe” FRIDE, 2009. y Culto de la Argentna htps://www.mrecic.gov.ar/ “Escenario y desafos de la cooperación sur-sur a es/publicaciones. See its reports in years 2009, 2010 30 años de la declaración de Buenos Aires. Lo viejo and 2013 -2015 y lo nuevo para conceptualizar la cooperación sur- “The Buenos Aires Plan Acton” Special Unit for TCDC, sur. Aportes conceptuales y recomendaciones para New York htp://ssc.undp.org/content/dam/ssc/ la polítca Argentna” Documento de trabajo N° 1. documents/Key%20Policy%20Documents/BAPA.pdf Octubre 2009. UNSAM. UN Report “Promoción de la cooperación Sur-Sur Informe de la Cooperación Sur-Sur en Iberoamérica para el desarrollo: una perspectva de 30 años” ocho informes 2007-2008-2009-2010-2011-2012-2013 http://southsouthconference.org/wp-content/ y 2014; 2015: htp://www.cooperacionsursur.org/ uploads/2009/11/A-64-504-S.pdf informes-de-css/que-es-el-informe.html.

108 People4Change: People to People South-South Cooperation

Lea Sofia Simonsen, People4Change Regional Coordinator, ActionAid Denmark

Introduction of people and the strengthening of solidarity across borders. The programme is at the heart South–South cooperation is a term historically of the ActionAid’s theory of change, which is used by policymakers and academics to describe anchored in the conviction that poverty and the exchange of resources, technology, and injustice can best be addressed by purposeful knowledge among developing countries. collective action, where people unite to South-South cooperation is a manifestation challenge existing power structures. of solidarity among peoples and countries of the South, which contributes to their national The programme facilitates the placement well-being, their national and collective self- of skilled and experienced development reliance and the attainment of internationally practitioners who enhance the skills and agreed upon development goals, including the knowledge of the civil society organisations Millennium Development Goals and now the and communities. Strategies include coaching Sustainable Development Goals.1 processes, critical refections and the grounding of innovative tools and methodologies so they There are many ways of understanding and are relevant inside a particular context. They organizing South-South cooperation. It is also help to establish linkages between the often understood as collaboration between local and national levels, and where relevant, countries or governments at the institutional make connections at the international level. level. This chapter expands this view by analysing the strengths and limitations of People4Change placements are always cross South-South people-to-people exchange. To border placements. This is in keeping with a do this, it examines a programme undertaken fundamental commitment to global solidarity through People4Change, a people-to-people and cross cultural respect and understanding. support programme managed by ActionAid While the majority of placements are South- Denmark, an independent NGO affliated South, this is not a mandate. Instead, the only with the ActionAid International federation. 2 factor considered in recruitment of people-to- people exchanges, is that the participants may What is People4Change? not be residents of the country where they will be placed to provide support. This is because People4Change is ActionAid’s capacity the objective is to foster global solidarity development programme that provides a through a world-wide meeting of people global approach to people-to-people support through South-South, North-South, regional with a focus on the meeting and exchange and global exchanges.

109 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

There are two distinct types of people-to- placements in Uganda.4 At the Inspirator level, people support categories: support has been 100% South-South, while at the Advisor level there has been 50/50 division • Advisors who are salaried professionals between technical support from Advisors with strong relevant skills and knowledge. from the Global North and Global South. They provide strategic and programmatic support and are tasked with making links at ActionAid Uganda’s theory of change states that: the local, national and international levels “We believe that poverty and injustice throughout the ActionAid federation. can be eradicated when people are • ‘Inspirators’ who are volunteers with supported to discover and use their signifcant and relevant practical work power and knowledge individually or experience. They receive allowances and collectively to confront power relations accommodation. Typically, Inspirators are that perpetuate violence, confict and placed with local civil society/grassroots vulnerability; build resilience to natural organisations that are working on human and man-made shocks; and expand rights based approaches to development, spaces for civic engagement in decisions internal governance or organizational that affect them.”5 development. The overall purpose of the evaluation was Advisors and Inspirators aim to build the to identify the long-term impact of the capacity of individuals and organizations People4Change programme in Uganda in relation through an increase in useful knowledge and to this theory of change. More specifcally, the skills. They are also committed to actions following two aspects were studied: that help give people a voice to challenge the existing power structures. • What change, if any, has taken place within the organisations and with the People4Change has placed more than 700 people who had received support from Inspirators and 90 Advisors from 2009 to 2015 in 29 either an Advisor or an Inspirator; and countries. ActionAid’s People4Change programme • How have these changes – if any – is one of very few people-to-people support contributed to concrete results for programmes that departs from the traditional “North the communities, local grassroots helps South” approach. Currently, more than 90% organisations and ActionAid in general. of the programme’s development practitioners are from the Global South. The assessment team met with 74% of the partner organisations6 that had received People4Change People4Change support to Uganda3 support since 2009 as well as seven local rights programmes (LRPs).7 Community members In July 2015, People4Change and ActionAid and staff members from the national ActionAid Uganda carried out a joint assessment of 43 offce were also consulted.

110 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

Findings in Relation to the Some of the early Advisor and Inspirator Communities and Grassroots/Local placements continue to have an impact. For Civil Society Organisations instance, a Nepalese Advisor on building local democracy worked with the Iganga Visits to community groups and grassroots NGO Forum, to develop neighbourhood organisations8 demonstrated that the assemblies.9 Iganga Forum credits the Advisor People4Change support by Advisors and in introducing this approach to them and Inspirators has resulted in considerable supporting them to adjust it to suit their work organizational strengthening. Community and local context. Now the neighbourhood groups and grassroots/local civil society assemblies are one of Iganga’s main initiatives organisations attested that they were stronger in the district. The Forum has seen an increased and more focused in their work because of legitimacy and respect for the organization, these collaborations, leading to positive and due to this community mobilization and its lasting results in programmes. At sub-county accountability mechanisms. Inspirators from level, public service delivery has improved the Global South who were placed in the many places. Through day-to-day mentoring northern and eastern regions of Uganda in and guidance as well as training on various 2012 have helped build up youth-led advocacy governance and budget monitoring tools, work. This has resulted in a noticeable increase partners and community groups have increased in youth mobilisation and activation. One their ability to address local issues. Concrete stakeholder noted that prior to the Inspirators’ examples of improvements in schools and arrival, youth had sat on the outskirts of the health clinics as a result of this advocacy work community playing cards and not interacting were also identifed. on development issues. Today the Activista groups are blossoming and youth are actively

Beter Health Clinics

Florence Adoch received leadership and resource track training by a Zimbabwean Inspirator based at the Pader LRP ofce. Before she partcipated in this programme, Florence was afraid to speak up. Today, she is an actve resource tracker who monitors how public resources are used in Ogum Sub-County. She has addressed issues at a local health center, which has no midwife, no birth facilites nor a space for women to rest afer giving birth. The problems were addressed at the sub-county level. The health clinic now has a mid-wife, a delivery room and a place for mothers to rest afer giving birth.

111 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

participating in groups focused on both development agenda. These experiences have economic and political empowerment.10 led to giving higher priority to inducting the stakeholders involved in the People4Change Obstacles were also identifed with the programme properly prior to any placement, placement of Inspirators and Advisors in order to avoid mismatch of expectations. supporting at a local level. In some cases, partner organisations had expectations about Findings in relation to ActionAid the Inspirator or Advisor being able to fll all Uganda’s Local Rights Programmes of the gaps for the communities and CSOs, (LRPs) even issues laying outside their clear terms of references. However, there were not any There is also a wealth of evidence of strengthening resources allocated for them to take on such and programmatic impact of LRPs from a wide breadth of work. Even when they were People4Change placements. As the partners’ able to operate beyond their intended purpose, capacity has increased, these programmes have these efforts could lead to an unsustainable been able to work more effectively and to context for the communities and local partners on their departure. Activities that document the results of their community work. were initiated under those circumstances In all LRPs, it appears that the local community would not necessarily be maintained once groups and Activista in particular have been the Inspirators/Advisors were no longer in strengthened as a result of the People4Change place, leading to a loss of action and lack of support. In most LRPs, there are examples of opportunity for the communities and partner enhanced youth mobilisation, and improved organisations to mobilise on their own public service delivery.

Improved Access to Public Services

The Amuru Local Rights Programme (LRP) has received support from a Bangladeshi People4Change governance Advisor on community scorecards and feedback mechanisms. Local ActonAid staf, partners and Actvista members partcipated in the governance monitoring trainings delivered by the governance Advisor. Now, 30 community resource trackers are using the scorecard tools. As a result of addressing various issues with the local governments, the LRP area now has improved roads, functonal health clinics and gained water access for some of the local schools.

112 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

In the eastern and northern regions, support national ActionAid offce, ActionAid LRPs, for youth mobilisation has had a noticeable communities and local partners are to take impact. An Australian Youth Advisor played advantage of the support being provided by an instrumental role in linking the LRPs and the Advisors and Inspirators. Throughout the the Inspirators to national youth work and placements, the concept of People4Change is coalitions. In these regions, youth now play a to build up the capacity of the local staff and signifcant role in advocacy activities and they communities, to be better able to undertake actively contribute to the community. This has work on their own. altered public perception of their value with local and national level duty bearers. Youth Local capacity development is clearly linked to engagement in their own development as well the level of resources, programmatic priorities and as that of their local communities has increased. overall commitment to capacity development on the part of ActionAid. In the impact assessment There are also obstacles at the local rights for Uganda, it was noted that there has been programme level. For example, due to the limited varied overall commitment and lasting impact at resources of the ActionAid local rights offce, all levels resulting from ActionAid support. At the Inspirators could at times be the primary link national and local level for instance, Advisors and to the partner organisations being supported. some Inspirators were in some cases used as gap- This engagement had positive outcomes, but it fllers and implementers, which meant that there also created sometimes sustainability challenges were knowledge and resource gaps once these and could lead to undesirable gaps upon placements ended. In other cases, the impact was departure. In some LRPs, the Inspirators were minimised due to turnover of staff – meaning able to address some of the issues of power that those staff who had been capacitated left dynamic, which were present in the relationship the partner organisations and the knowledge and between the LRP offces and the local partners, skills accrued were diminished. by building the capacity of the partners to take ownership of their own development and The stakeholders interviewed in this assessment planning. However, once the Inspirator was emphasized that the advantages of having no longer in place to maintain this relationship, people come from a different country relate to the sustainability of the framework set up for new ideas and innovation they bring to enrich partners could fall away, and limited LRP staff the program and communities. The benefts was unable to follow up on the activities started. accrue from an open and global perspective, which underscores a focus on respect and There is no doubt that the success of the solidarity. However, all stakeholders agreed programme and its impact after the end that success or failure is to a large degree of placement period is very much linked linked to the attitude and behaviour of the to the question of how well-equipped the person providing the support.

113 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

Conclusions By placing technical support at the local level, Inspirators and Advisors can work directly with For the People4Change programme, capacity communities and grassroots organisations. The development is central to the empowerment evaluation noted that South-South exchanges of individuals or organisations to take action. often produce the highest benefts. At the local Its people-centred approach to capacity level, there were signifcant impacts from hosting building recognizes the value of an outsider’s development practitioners from other Global perspective to refect on and address South countries. Not only do these people- challenges. Many stakeholders interviewed in to-people interventions make new knowledge the above impact assessment noted that the and skills available, they also provide human best situation is when the outsider comes with inspiration from other developing country focused and concrete terms of reference. This contexts. Marginalised people see that people allows them to focus on specifc tasks, which in other countries have grappled with similar can inspire new ideas and innovation. issues and have been able to overcome these diffculties. These development practitioners The kinds of general ‘value-added’ have an understanding for the challenges, contributions referenced by different because they have direct experiences of working stakeholders included: in their own countries.

• The provision of a fresh and external However, as previously touched upon, perspective; bringing in outsiders is not a totally problem- • The fact that they were someone ‘neutral’ free scenario. Outsiders may fail to understand who could help overcome ethnic or other the nuances of the local context; particularly tensions arising from national prejudices in a North-South exchange, though also in or contexts of confict; cases of South-South exchanges. There can be • Being an ‘outsider’ allows these signifcant differences in background, socio- stakeholders to say things and be listened economic contexts and cultural understanding to in ways that someone from within that throughout the Global South as well. This society might not have; lack of contextual understanding can make • The skills development work of Inspirators it diffcult to provide useful advice. One and Advisors could be better integrated into stakeholder underlined this point by saying, the organisation more thoroughly than was “Education is not all, it is important that possible with training courses. people have relevant thematic experience and the right personality/attitude.” One partner organization, LICO, described the benefts as follows: There can be problems in terms of language barriers, particularly in countries where there “It brings in mutual learning; comes are many local dialects. Most outsiders will with new things we haven’t tried before. have some lack of contextual understanding of Sharing experiences from other countries the political and cultural environment in which is enriching.”

114 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

they are operating. There can be challenges As both this case study, as well as previous related to unknowingly imposing knowledge impact assessments undertaken by that may not be culturally or contextually People4Change demonstrate, South-South appropriate in sensitive or traditional based Advisors and Inspirators provide a environments, or pushing local communities signifcant inspiration to the communities beyond their own interests and developmental and groups with which they work. Through agendas. It was noted that these challenges sharing their own experiences, knowledge are frequently less apparent in South-South and skills they inspire and mentor others to exchanges, as there are often greater sensitivity understand that there are alternatives to their to cultural adaptability, and there is a less current approaches to life and development. frequent mistrust from the local communities They are both role models and coaches to due to the appearance of similar backgrounds the communities and partner organisations in in the cultural and political contexts. their struggles to claim their voices and right to development.

115 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

Endnotes

1 United Natons Ofce for South South Cooperaton: focus on support streaming from North to South. http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ The People4Change programme was developed in ssc.html. response to this review as well as the afliaton of 2 Background on People4Change and ActonAid ActonAid Denmark with ActonAid Internatonal. ActonAid is an internatonal non-governmental 3 The following case study is fully documented in organizaton whose primary aim is to work against People4Change’s report on the Impact Assessment poverty and inequality worldwide. ActonAid works with local partners in over 45 countries and 3,000 assessing 5 years of People4Change support local communites, helping over 15 million people. undertaken in 2015. The assessment summaton As a global federaton ActonAid is governed and can be found here: htps://www.ms.dk/en/ run by its worldwide membership. The principle of capacity-development equality is central to this federaton - all member organisatons, wherever they are based, have the 4 ActonAid Uganda was one of the countries that same votng power and voice. The federaton’s piloted the People4Change Inspirator programme governing body is supported by an internatonal in 2009. It has been one of the greatest recipients of secretariat based in Johannesburg. People4Change support over the past six years both ActonAid’s theory of change is based on the in terms of Inspirator and Advisor placements. The convicton that an end to poverty and inequality summary assessment can be found at htps://www. can be achieved through purposeful individual ms.dk/sites/default/files/filarkiv/dokumenter/ and collectve acton, led by the actve agency lande/uganda_impact_assessment_2015_-_ of people living in poverty and supported by summaton_-_external.pdf. solidarity, credible rights-based alternatves and campaigns that address the structural causes and 5 ActonAid Internatonal Uganda, “Country Strategy consequences of poverty. Paper IV 2012-2017, Embracing Rights! Improving Over the past 65 years ActonAid Denmark’s Lives!”, p. 16 -17. people-centred approach to development has 6 This included local civil societes, grassroots & incorporated a variety of personnel assistance community groups programmes. In the early 1960’s, the organisaton developed a programme where Danish volunteers 7 A Local Rights Programme is a geographic unit/ were posted as gap fllers in specifc actvites. Over area, which may be represented by a local tme volunteers became more professionalised ActonAid ofce, but it may also represent partner “development workers” and by the 1990s, the organisatons only. global partnership programme began sending 8 These were all based outside Kampala, Uganda’s Danish development workers to build the capacity capital city area. of civil society organizatons in Southern countries. Eventually, the programme was deploying 9 The Neighbourhood Assemblies are a forum for development workers from the global South, albeit community members living in poverty to discuss the on a minor scale. In 2008, an external review of community-level issues and create a dialogue with the development worker programme noted that local government authorites, to discuss advocacy it was achieving substantal results in efectve issues and how to move forward together to and relevant capacity development of civil society address them. The Advisor (from Nepal) developed organisatons. However, it also raised concerns this idea with another natonal partner. related to the cost efectveness of the programme, 10 Actvista is ActonAid’s global youth network, which has the lack of diversifcaton in its approach, and the volunteer groups in more than 25 ActonAid countries.

116 Triangular Cooperation among Civil Society Organizations in South America: Institutional strengthening in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia

Alejandra Solla (Fundación SES, Argentina), Rolando Kandel (Fundación SES), and Ancelin Gautier (Fundación SES , intern, France)

I. Introduction These changes have been a key motivation for some countries in the south of Europe to study In the last 15 years the presence of Triangular the learning and innovations of Latin America and South-South Cooperation has modifed in order to confront situations of deep social some of the rules of the game for development and economical inequity, which was the lived cooperation, traditionally understood as experience of Latin America for decades. At “fnancial – economical support” from the same time, countries of the South have countries in the north to those in the south. initiated a number of inter-governmental assistance programs, particularly in the South Some of these changes are: Cone, with Brazil establishing a strong and vibrant development cooperation agency. • Relations have become more horizontal with the recognition that expert knowledge During this period, civil society organizations and contributions can go from north to (CSOs) have also been promoting regional south, south to north and south to south. integration and horizontal development • A defnition of “resources” has gone cooperation, with the understanding that beyond a narrow focus on the economic this model is not only more respectful and sphere. There is a growing appreciation egalitarian, but also more effective in the of different types of resources that are medium and long term. available in every region. Resources can include elements such as organizational This new paradigm has stimulated diversity capacity, social capital, public policies, in development cooperation with the technologies, among others. • The 2008 economic crisis in the United understanding that it can be implemented on States and the European Union deeply a state-to-state basis, from CSO to CSO, or altered the order of the “welfare state.” through CSO to state partnerships. Formerly countries in the South had seen this model as an important example In all cases, these new approaches require to follow. At the same time, the decade the respectful exchange of lessons and from 2001 to 2010 was one of growth methodologies, which often involves qualifed for Latin America. Several progressive technical assistance in order to strengthen governments, with some differences, work teams and to contribute to the placed the state as the guardian of the institutional development of both public and rights of the population. private entities.

117 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

An organization can participate effectively as a both the elaboration and the execution of public development cooperation actor when its practices: policies relating to the purposes of this social organization or network. In this sense, the CSO • have been tested, evaluated and have want to contribute not only to implementing showed good and measurable results; public policy, but also to the elaboration of these • can be translated into models that may public policies, based on the legitimacy and have meaning for others; “authority” of their community connections • can be refected in clear and sustainable and accompaniment of social processes. institutional processes; • have a central methodological core, which II. “Fortalezas,” A Program of can be adapted to the specifc contexts Triangular Cooperation where they are applied; • are the result of the institutional trajectory Several South American CSOs participate in and learning processes, rather than that of international cooperation processes focussed individuals or external actors; and on development. Many are also part of a • identifes the resources needed for the dialogue with states and contribute to South implementation of these practices. South Cooperation (SSC) initiatives. While these organizations do not necessarily These new styles of cooperation require a consider these activities to be “South - South 1 careful examination of two main questions: Cooperation” (SCC), they illustrate the contributions and roles civil society can play inside various forms of SCC. 1. What is the contribution of civil society organizations in these arrangements? This chapter focuses on the program for institutional strengthening, “Fortalezas,” Network and association building has been an which has been implemented by the SES essential part of CSO work for many years. Foundation (Argentina)2 with the Jacobs These networks are responding to the needs of Foundation (Switzerland).3 It was created to the community. It involves the establishment improve the integration of young people into of respectful relationships amongst equals and, the labour market. often, actors from various disciplines. CSOs have acquired substantial knowledge and skills Despite Latin America’s recent economic in the complexities of this work. growth young people face problems of chronic unemployment and informal employment. Over 56 million youth are members of the labour force 2. How do these contributions relate to concepts of and they represent 43% of the unemployed.4 For scale and infuence in public policy? the employed youth, 55.6% have informal jobs, which usually mean low incomes, instability and There are various ways that these innovations lack of protection or worker rights. can be “scaled up.” One way is to extend the model so that more people, including Despite this context, youth participation in the young people, are involved. Scaling up can education system has risen substantially over also involve working with the state. This latter the past decade, with 34.5% of youth (2011) approach requires that CSOs are co-partners in only studying, and not working. However, the 118 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

persistence of high levels of inequity and poverty, of program quality and, consequently, the particularly for the rural population, has limited the improvement of the occupational inclusion expansion of quality education in many areas. It of vulnerable youth who are unemployed or is characterized by high rates of school failures, work in precarious or informal conditions. repetition of grades, absenteeism and dropouts. At the same time, a secondary education certifcate, The Fortalezas program provides technical along with other psychosocial skills and abilities, and fnancial support for the institutional are increasingly basic requirements for many jobs, strengthening of six organizations (two in though this doesn’t always guarantee a good position. each country): in Argentina – Crear desde la Educación Popular Foundation and The purpose of “Fortalezas” is to strengthen UOCRA Foundation; in Brasil - Centro CSOs’ work in youth capacity building in Cultural Escrava Anastasia and Instituto education, training, job preparation and Aliança; and in Colombia - Comité de integration into their societies. A central Cafeteros del Departamento del Cauca and objective is to ensure that projects designed Microempempresas de Colombia. It also in this program are of high quality and have a participated in the implementation of projects sustained impact. to include more than 2.500 youths between 18 and 24 years in the labour force, in rural and Many lessons were learned from earlier youth urban areas, over a three-year period. employment projects that had been implemented 5 in Latin America. These lessons indicated Fortalezas intervenes at two levels: that the most effective interventions were those that provided a range of knowledge, skill training and services. These included technical 1. Institutional Strengthening training, information on job markets, job The work begins with an institutional diagnosis of preferences connected to youth interests and each CSO and its projects on youth employment life status, programs to enhance young people’s based on quality standards. This diagnosis psycho-social capacities, workplace training, identifes strengths and areas for improvement and opportunities for youth to complete their regarding the institution’s structure, internal education. Other studies confrmed, even if the management, project design and implementation, evidence is scarce, that the capacities of CSOs communication and public relations, institutional to implement and sustain quality projects are a relations and sustainability. factor affecting the effectiveness of the programs. Drawing on these lessons, the SES and Jacob Drawing on this analysis, a plan is drafted to Foundations initiated the “Fortalezas” program improve the CSO’s projects on youth and in order to strengthen the capacity of Latin employment and to increase their impact of American CSOs to develop sustainable, quality participating youth. This plan is revised and projects in this area. adjusted annually, in accordance with changes in standards and the results achieved with the A basic assumption of this program is that target population. Strategies for improvement institutional strengthening is a necessary are implemented through the engagement foundation to ensure the improvement of local/external consultancies, based on a 119 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

selection process to address the identifed • 40% have access to networks to fnd a job needs as well as the technical and economic or complete their secondary education; proposals drafted by the consultants. • 90% strengthen their capacities and future plans; and 2. Knowledge Building • The participating organizations note an improvement of 80% in terms of their The program methodology is organized to strengthened organizational capacities. verify and validate lessons from improvements These improvements include the replication achieved through the plan, the on going of new ways of working, fostering new evaluation of organizational standards, and opportunities and collaboration with through a regular monitoring and evaluation the public sector through exchanges of of the youth participating in the project. knowledge and experiences, economic support, and new forms of cooperation. Fortalezas also supports a regional network of organizations for knowledge sharing. This What were the outcomes and results achieved? aspect of its work includes international meetings of the program’s participating The “Fortalezas” program is a particularly organizations, youth who are part of the successful experience in organizational program, CSOs and public and private actors development, the enhancement of projects in (representatives from companies, decision youth and employment, as well as in outreach makers in public policy, etc.). and impact of the interventions with young people. Participating CSOs have grown and As well, Fortalezas facilitates exchange visits increased their institutional relations, generating among the Fortalezas organizations and synergies with public and private actors. other regional CSOs, where they can learn Institutional strengthening has increased their and be enriched by each other’s approaches leadership abilities in building public policies and and methodologies. It has also established a complementary agreements with actors such as website that provides a platform for updates unions, business networks and public institutions. and exchange of information generated by the It has nurtured institutional and project participating actors. sustainability, generating an effcient management Finally, it is in the process of systematizing the of resources and an effective communication with experience and lessons developed from the others about their methodologies and expertise in projects on youth and employment and the work on youth and employment. process of institutional strengthening, in order to provide information on good practices that can The institutional projects have been be used in public policies or the private sector. particularly successful. They have established a curricula that addresses both youth needs III. Results of “Fortalezas” and the labour market. The curricula includes technical and psychosocial capacity building as The medium-term goals of Fortalezas are the well as useful mechanisms for the integration following: of youth into the labour market, amongst others. In terms of the youth participants, the • 50% of the youth participating in the program exceeded its goals in 2016, reaching program obtain better quality employment 2,589 participants, of which 87.5% completed or develop their entrepreneurship skills; their training and 63.7% completed their

120 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

secondary education, re-joined the school or affrms that organizational strengthening are still studying in the education system. The is the foundation on which to improve program has also helped 57.1% of its youth the quality of CSO projects to integrate fnd employment with 58% of these having vulnerable young people into the job long-term work contracts. Sixty-six percent market, who are now unemployed or in (66%) of youth declared that they found a job precarious and informal jobs. thanks to the program. Likewise, the youth 3. The selection of participating organizations also identifed other benefts, saying that the was based on the identifcation of relevant program had increased their abilities in team organizations working in their respective work, proactivity, self-knowledge and self- geographic areas. Organizations were also esteem. From the youth perspective, the main selected with a view toward including a contributions of the program were related to diversity of methodologies in response the acquisition of “soft” abilities, important to youth and employment issues. This tools for fnding employment and improving organizational diversity provided the their performance in their jobs. foundation for signifcant learning and IV. The “Fortalezas” Program and cooperation amongst the participating Different Models of Triangular institutions. This diversity varied from Cooperation sectoral organizations (linked to the construction union and federation of coffee producers), to those with a The Fortelezas Program provides a model technical approach or geographic focus. from CSO experience for how triangular The groups could initiate internal change cooperation can be organized and through lessons learned in the experience implemented. Some of the basic ingredients of of peer exchanges with other countries. this project, from which lessons learned could This learning increased their ability be used in other circumstances, are as follows: to have a positive infuence on their particular contexts and to contribute to 1. The program was planned by a Swiss the formulation and execution of youth organization that has a background in employment public policies. fnancing development cooperation. Its priority is to support initiatives based on 4. The defnition of the goal of institutional the paradigm of triangular cooperation. strengthening was formulated by the For this project, it worked with an participating organizations themselves, organization from Argentina, which respecting their context. They did so with implements cooperation projects in the a focus on their commitment to the youth region and has considerable experience and based on local development models. in building CSO networks, inter-sector 5. The initial diagnosis was critical. It engagement, and in organizational allowed each organization to be an strengthening. This joint planning was active participant in refecting on their open and valued the knowledge and weaknesses, strengths and challenges. perspectives of each organization to This process ensured that the goals that create a proposal that supported an inter- were identifed were relevant and related regional perspective. to the needs of their context. 2. The program was based on a shared 6. The program methodology was theory of change. This theory of change distinct from standardized approaches. 121 Chapter 3: South-South experience in technical cooperaton

The improvement plans were locally 10. The bilateral exchanges were critical in formulated, with contributions from the sharing the value of different practices regional coordinators, and the strategies of other institutions. They facilitated a of strengthening were built locally, from process of methodological transference the organization itself. and mutual learning. These processes were pillars of the institutional 7. Participating CSOs also made fnancial strengthening work. They allowed for contributions to the project. Even unexpected benefts as organizations if a CSO received support for the discovered interesting methodologies improvement plan, each of them used by their peer organizations, and were contributed 75% of the resources for the able to use and adapt them to their own work projects, putting these resources at environments and development plans. the service of the program. 11. The coordinating organization achieved 8. Resources received for strengthening a good balance between valuing and were used according to the committed respecting local processes, and making improvement plan, but without external contributions for strengthening constrains, under a criteria of local institutional capacities through its own contracting. methodologies and social capital. 12. A continual promotion of inter-sectorial 9. Opportunities for regional exchanges engagement was important to eliminate were continuous and suffcient resources suspicions or prejudices among the were allocated for the participation sectors. This approach ensured that of teams with different institutional all project actors participated in the roles. The participation of high-ranking processes from their vantage point with public authorities at the beginning a commitment to the project’s ultimate was an important factor in building goals in furthering participation of agreements and expanding relations. vulnerable youth in the labour market. The participation of technical teams 13. The recognition of all partners as peers facilitated possibilities for sharing at every level of the project’s work was methodologies and practices. The essential. In addition to their local work, participation of young people gave them this approach included an invitation for a voice and allowed them to contribute partners to jointly design strategies for their vision and hopes for their lives. It joint work, either in regional networks also provided a perspective that was very or in group initiatives, contributing their valuable for regional integration. knowledge and social capital.

Endnotes

1 Cecilia Milesi, Cooperación Sur-Sur: el caso de unemployment rate (the rate for the 15 – 24 age group) Argentina,http://ceciliamilesi.com/global/wp- declining from 26% to 24% between 2005 and 2011, it is content/uploads/2015/03/CSS-Argentna-Milesi.pdf. stll high considering that this does not take into account underemployment or informal employment. The rate is 2 Fundación SES www.fundses.org.ar 25% for the lower income sectors. 3 Jacobs Foundaton www.jacobsfoundaton.org. 5 Several of these initatves were supported by the 4 Although there have been some decreases in the youth SES Foundaton and the Jacob Foundaton.

122 Chapter 4 Global Aid Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Global Aid Trends 2016 Financing 2030 Agenda: Where are the resources? Brian Tomlinson, AidWatch Canada

BRICS Reports India South-South experience in technical cooperaton in India Jyotsna Mohan, Voluntary Acton Network India South Africa Donor priorites for technical cooperaton and ted aid Rutendo Hadebe, University of Cape Town

OECD Reports EU European Union Zuzana Sladkova, Concord Europe Australia Australia’s ‘New Aid Paradigm’: Beyond ODA? James Goodman, AidWatch Australia and University of Technology Sydney; Mat Hilton, AidWatch Australia Canada Canada: Contnuity with change? Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for Internatonal Co-operaton Denmark Dramatc aid cuts and increased spending on refugees in Denmark Kira Boe, Global Focus – Danish CSOs for Development Cooperaton Italy Development cooperaton shores up eforts to rebuild Italy’s global profle Luca De Fraia, ActonAid Italy Japan Japan: Recent trends in aid policy and technical cooperaton Akio Takayanagi, Japan NGO Center for Internatonal Cooperaton South Korea Republic of Korea: A new model for rural development? Limits and problems of Saemaul Undong (SMU) ODA Mihyeon Lee, People’s Solidarity for Partcipatory Democracy United Kingdom Aid 2.0? A new strategy for UK aid Amy Dodd, UK Aid Network USA The state of US foreign assistance Alicia Phillips Mandaville and Christna Hoenow, InterActon 123 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Brian Tomlinson, AidWatch Canada Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Brian Tomlinson, AidWatch Canada

Overview domestic poverty lines, highly vulnerable to economic or climatic crises, highly susceptible to In September 2015 the international community major setbacks. reached an historic agreement at the United Nations on Agenda 2030. This Agenda In the absence of deliberate and large-scale creates a unique and critical opportunity for efforts to mobilize new fnancial resources, with all – governments, civil society and the private major priority given to targeting conditions of sector – to focus and deliver on an ambitious poverty and vulnerability, hundreds of millions set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). of people are indeed in danger of being left In committing to “leave no one behind” in behind. implementing this Agenda, developed and developing countries committed to maximize The international community is expecting a the required fnancing to achieving the SDGs wide range of fnancing to be devoted to the over the next 15 years. SDGs. But in this regard, Offcial Development Assistance (ODA) is a unique and critical public The challenge to leave no one behind is resource, which in comparison to other fnancial considerable. Countries committed not only fows to developing countries, can be deliberately to eradicate extreme poverty (destitute people programmed to purposes of reducing poverty and living on less than US$1.90 a day), which still inequality. affect more than 15% of the population of developing countries, but also to reduce by half Unfortunately, analysis in this chapter reveals those experiencing real poverty below domestic that in 2016 ODA remains woefully inadequate poverty lines (living on between US$1.90 and to the tasks of contributing to the elimination of US$3.10 a day), affecting another 20% of the extreme poverty and signifcantly reduction of population of developing countries. other forms of poverty and vulnerability. It is in urgent need of reform to meet the challenges In total, more than 2.1 billion people live in of the SDGs. conditions of poverty (often subsiding in the informal economy, with very limited resources Quantity and Quality of ODA for food, shelter and basic health). Poverty remains wide-spread. After more than four • Aid providers must live up to their “development decades,” conditions of poverty commitments to increase ODA volume (less than US$3.10 a day) continue to affect two- as a critical resource for the SDGs. The thirds (67%) of the population of Sub-Saharan value of ODA is largely unchanged over Africa, 55% of people living in South Asia, the past fve years. At US$127.5 billion in and close to 20% of the population of China. 2015, the value of Real ODA (discounting Another 1.6 billion people are living just above in-donor refugee and student costs and debt

125 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

cancellation) remains largely unchanged • Aid providers must respect and since 2010. promote the value of multilateral aid as a resource for a coordinated approach If aid providers had met their 2005 to fnancing the SDGs by increasing Gleneagles G7 Summit commitments, core contributions and reducing ODA would have increased by US$62 providers earmarked contributions billion, over current levels of US$131.6 to the multilateral system. Earmarked billion today. Achieving the UN target contributions have increased by 93% since of 0.7% of donor Gross National Income 2007, while core fnancing for multilateral (GNI) for ODA would have produced institutions increased by only 23%. The an additional US$170 billion. With former modality dramatically increases these resources, ODA could truly play transaction costs of multilateral institutions a catalytical role in addressing poverty, and negates their role in coordinating inequality and achieving the SDGs. fnancing for developing country-driven Unfortunately signs indicate a continued development priorities. pattern of levelling off of ODA and an increasing diversion of this ODA to • Aid providers need to reduce the use provider self-interests. of loans in aid disbursements for low- income and lower middle-income • Aid providers must improve country countries to avoid compromising ownership for their bilateral aid. Only sustainable fnancing of SDGs in 53% of bilateral aid was available to be these countries. Loans as a share programmed by developing country in real gross bilateral aid are increasing, partners in 2014. An essential measure reaching more than 20% in 2014. Loans in this regard is to remove eligible in- also make up almost half of disbursements country donor costs for refugees from from the multilateral system. In the ODA, as currently allowed by DAC context of continued concerns for debt rules. Country programmable bilateral sustainability for the poorest countries, aid has diminished slightly since 2010, loans comprised an alarming 30% of total but due to an expected explosive grown Real Gross ODA in 2014. in in-country provider refugee costs, it is due to shrink even further. Support • Aid providers need to meet urgent for refugees in provider countries is a humanitarian assistance appeal moral and legal obligation. But the costs targets, while increasing their of refugee resettlement should not be at investment in long-term development the expense of people living in poverty and in confict affected countries. in the developing world. A commitment Humanitarian assistance has increased to country ownership requires full direct by 37% since 2010, and as a share in country access to bilateral aid resources Real ODA reached 13.4% in 2014, devoted to priorities determined by devoted particularly to Sub-Saharan developing country partners. Africa and the Middle East. Increased

126 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

allocations to humanitarian assistance are essential to achieve a balance between of course welcomed, but the demands for mitigation and adaptation in climate fnance humanitarian funding is often the result priorities. Investment in adaptation in LICs of past failures in development. Without and LMICs is critical, as poor and vulnerable increased investment in development and people will be disproportionately affected by climate change adaptation, humanitarian extreme climate events in the coming years. emergencies will grow in scale and in impact on human suffering, with poor The OECD DAC has documented and vulnerable people most affected. approximately US$60 billion in climate fnance, with more than 75% devoted • Aid providers must ramp up fnancing to mitigation, mainly in middle-income for initiatives strengthening gender countries. equality and women’s empowerment, including increased support for Other Sources of Development Finance women’s rights organizations as drivers for change to achieve SDG- • Domestic Resource Mobilization 5 on gender equality. Almost 70% of (DRM) should be given priority in all screened DAC donor bilateral projects in its aspects, including recovery of illicit 2014 had no gender equality objectives, fows, but should not be considered in marked contrast to provider rhetoric by aid providers as a substitute for about gender equality and women’s meeting ambitious ODA fnance empowerment as an essential condition targets.Developing country revenue for making progress in the 2030 Agenda. is the key public resource for investing As a share of the value of all screened in the SDGs and increased domestic projects, support for women’s rights resource mobilization is crucial. However, organizations is almost invisible at 0.4%. large gaps will remain in public fnances to SDGs obligations in all developing • All countries must live up to and countries, particularly LDCs, LICs, and increase commitments to measures LMICs, where per capita government to limit temperature increases to less revenue is less than US$3,000 (compared than 1.5o centigrade. Financing for to US$15,000 for developed countries). adaptation and mitigation must be Eight-fve (85) countries in all income additional to provider commitments groups, with less than US$3,000 per capita to existing and increased ODA. government revenue, face huge challenges Governments must agree on a clear with poverty levels (US$3.10 a day) of defnition of climate fnance mechanisms 28% or more. Most improvements in and modalities. Climate fnance for Least DRM to date are in Upper Middle Income Developed Countries (LDCs), Low- Countries. Aid providers, in this context, Income Countries (LICs) and Lower must not abandon Lower Middle-Income Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) Countries as they also rightly focus on the should be in the form of grants. It is needs of the poorest countries.

127 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

• Traditional aid providers and South- billion. CSO-channelled aid, both offcial South providers should seek mutually and private sources, was greater than total agreed and benefcial cooperation, DAC donor Real Bilateral Aid in 2014 including sharing experience and (US$63.6 billion, net of offcial bilateral approaches to addressing human rights aid channelled through and to CSOs). standards for aid and development effectiveness. South-South Cooperation • The international community must (SSC) has increased to at least US$32.2 establish clear benchmarks and billion (on terms broadly equivalent to criteria, consistent with development the DAC rules for ODA). But only three effectiveness principles, for the donors – Saudi Arabia, United Arab inclusion of private sector resources Emirates, and Turkey – account for 85% in public/private mechanisms to of the US$20 billion increase in SSC since achieve the SDGs. The current roles 2012. These three donors and China and scale of the private sector as a make up close to 80% of all SSC fows development actor investing in achieving in 2014. China and India, accounting for the SDGs seems somewhat exaggerated. approximately US$5 billion in SSC, are UNCTAD calculates that only US$35 the primary providers for SSC allocations billion in foreign direct investment beyond the Middle East. Recorded (FDI), outside of China and Hong Kong, triangular cooperation to date has been was directed to developing countries for very modest in amounts of aid involved. material plant operation (the majority of FDI was for mergers and acquisitions). • All development actors, including The OECD DAC records only $700 aid providers and partner country million allocated from ODA for public governments, must maximize their private partnerships (PPPs) in 2014. A efforts to reverse the shrinking and study of US PPPs, not surprisingly, closing space for CSOs, enabling documents that most PPPs were closely CSOs to maximize the impact of related to existing commercial interests their US$70 billion contributions to of the business partner. ODA directed development, as independent actors to strengthening the domestic private in their own right. ODA from bilateral sector in developing countries, with DAC providers, through and with CSOs, particular emphasis on small and medium increased to US$21.6 billion in 2014, enterprises and the rural economy, are which represents 22% of Real Bilateral Aid the more productive avenues to create in that year. Accurate fgures are diffcult, livelihood opportunities for poor and but estimates indicate that approximately vulnerable populations. US$48 billion is raised by CSOs annually from private sources. Together 1. Introduction these sources suggest a total annual contribution of CSOs to development In September 2015, all member states of and humanitarian assistance of US$70 the United Nations unanimously adopted

128 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Agenda 2030,1 creating a unique opportunity delegates and observers. As a universal for all – governments, civil society, and the agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions private sector – to deliver on an ambitious set and address the impact of climate change, in of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) the words of Kumi Naidoo, executive director over the next 15 years. The SDGs present of Greenpeace, “the wheel of climate action both a compelling vision for the planet and turn slowly, but in Paris it has turned.” its people (“leaving no one behind”) and signifcant challenges for their achievement. The challenges are nevertheless immense. As Chief amongst these challenges is fnancing, Harjet Singh, Global Lead on Climate Change which some estimate will require morshe than for ActionAid, noted, “As climate change US$1.5 to US$2.0 trillion from all sources.2 In continues to worsen and affect millions more, a world in which annual productive activities people are beginning to demand more from were valued at US$77.8 trillion in 2014,3 this their governments and ask for the transformative scale of investment is daunting but certainly change to secure homes, jobs and futures. .... feasible, requiring less than 2% of global GDP. Paris is only the beginning of the journey.”7

Fully fnancing the SDGs demands an An important marker on that journey is climate ambitious global vision to extend and maximize fnance for adaptation and mitigation to ensure development fnance. It means abandoning 70 implementation of the agreement, particularly years of ‘business as usual’ approaches that have for those on the frontline of climate change. been largely driven by measures that advanced Countries reiterated a 2008 commitment to the narrow interests of the already rich and US$100 billion in climate fnance from all sources powerful. A Third Financing for Development by 2020 and agreed to scale up this fnance by Conference, (Addis Ababa, July 2015), was 2025. The Agreement calls on all parties to supposed to set out the fnancial underpinnings mobilize funds, and “such mobilization of climate for delivering the SDGs. Unfortunately its fnance should represent a progression beyond outcome, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda previous efforts.” [Article 9, §3] Unfortunately, (AAAA),4 failed to break away from ‘business there is no re-iteration of previous agreements as usual,’ and produced few commitments that climate fnance should be “new and towards new funds, nor did it increase existing additional” to existing commitments to ODA.8 sources for fnance. In the words of Winnie Byanyimi of Oxfam, “we must all admit that we Agenda 2030 – Transforming our world: the 2030 have failed to fnance the SDGs.”5 Agenda for Sustainable Development – calls for a revitalized and enhanced global partnership, “in On a more positive note, at the United a spirit of global solidarity, in particular solidarity Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, with the poorest and with people in vulnerable December 2015,more than 190 countries situations.” [§39] The means to implement this agreed to the Paris Agreement on Climate Agenda requires the mobilization of dedicated Change.6 This historic and legally binding domestic resources, international public fnance, agreement to limit warming to below two multilateral organizations and signifcant private degree Celsius was signed in front of 36,000 sector and civil society resources.

129 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) of the time frame of the post-2015 agenda.” [§51] Third International Conference on Financing for The specifc commitments made in the AAAA Development (August 2015), with respect to development cooperation can be found in Annex One. “… supports, complements and helps to contextualize the 2030 Agenda’s means These outcomes were deeply disappointing to of implementation targets. It relates to many CSO observers. Despite coverage of domestic public resources, domestic areas in urgent need of additional and effective and international private business and fnance, the AAAA only recognizes “that fnance, international development funding from all sources, including public cooperation, international trade as an and private, bilateral and multilateral, as well engine for development, debt and debt as alternative sources of fnance, will need to sustainability, addressing systemic issues be stepped up for investments in many areas and science, technology, innovation and including for low-carbon and climate resilient capacity-building, and data, monitoring development.” [§60] and follow-up.” [§62] But the AAAA sets no new targets for public While all of these areas of fnance will be crucial fnance; makes no new commitments that can to the achievement of the SDGs, this chapter be monitored; fails to acknowledge previous looks more closely at the role of aid providers agreements that climate fnance would be and international development cooperation. additional to ODA and creates no new measures to strengthen accountability to existing targets. In this context, ODA providers have stated their willingness to “reaffrm their respective How ready are current allocations of aid commitments, including the commitment by resources and practices in development many developed countries to achieve the target cooperation to meet the challenges of of 0.7 per cent of gross national income for Agenda 2030? To examine this question, this offcial development assistance (ODA/GNI) chapter picks up from the 2014 Reality of Aid to developing countries and 0.15 per cent to Report, which analysed aid trends in light of 0.2 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed commitments to end poverty, trends in the countries.” [§43] quantity and allocations of ODA, measures to improve the quality of ODA, and the fnancing In the AAAA, the global community recognizes resources of other actors in an increasingly shared “common goals and common ambitions complex aid architecture.9 to strengthen international development cooperation and maximize its effectiveness, 2. ‘Leaving no one behind’ – transparency, impact and results.” [§50] It re- Trends in Global Poverty iterates the importance of all countries meeting their commitments to increase ODA and The elaboration of the SDGs in Transforming acknowledges the EU’s commitment to “the our world begins with the proposition that 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI target within the “eradicating poverty in all its forms and

130 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the A commitment to reduce inequalities greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development.” The 2030 Agenda uniquely acknowledges [A/RES/70/1, Preamble, paragraph 1] The the importance of reducing inequalities, Declaration goes on to commit that “as we within and among countries, to achieve the embark on this great collective journey, we SDGs. SDG-10 calls for the reduction of pledge that no one will be left behind.” [A/ inequality within and among countries. It RES/70/1, §4] UN members elaborated this seeks to do so through ten specifc objectives, commitment through 17 goals and specifc including “progressively achieve and sustain objectives that are to be achieved by 2030. income growth of the bottom 40 per cent Moreover, they acknowledge that our world in of the population at a rate higher than the which billions still live in poverty there also are national average.” It calls for countries to “rising inequalities within and among countries “progressively achieve and sustain income … [with] enormous disparities of opportunity, growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the wealth and power.” [A/RES/70/1, §14] population at a rate higher than the national average.” [A/RES/70/1, 21/35] SDG-5 A commitment to end global poverty focuses on achieving gender equality as an essential foundation for progress. Sustainable Development Goal One (SDG- 1) has a clear objective: “to end poverty in all Addressing extreme poverty requires its forms everywhere.” This goal is translated substantial progress in the reduction into several specifc objectives. By 2030, the of all forms of poverty. global community has committed to: The elimination of extreme poverty by 2030 • “Eradicate extreme poverty for all people is a necessary and exceptionally important everywhere, currently measured as people objective, one that will be a major challenge living on less than US$1.25 a day [in for the global community in the coming years. updated 2011 PPP dollars, US$1.90 a day]; However, it needs to be achieved inside a • “Reduce at least by half the proportion of more holistic approach to poverty. men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to The eradication of extreme poverty by 2030 national defnitions [emphasis added]; … builds on the success of the frst Millennium • “Ensure that all men and women, in Development Goal (MDG). It aimed to reduce particular the poor and the vulnerable, by 50 percent the proportion of the population have equal rights to economic resources, as living in extreme poverty by 2015. As the 2014 well as access to basic services, ownership Reality of Aid Report argued, however, addressing and control over land and other forms of extreme poverty is only successful inside the property, inheritance, natural resources, context of policies that aim for the reduction appropriate new technology and fnancial and eventual eradication of conditions affecting services, including Microfnance.” [A/ the lives of all of those living in poverty, not RES/70/1, 15/35] just those living on the arbitrary measure

131 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

of less than $1.25 a day [now updated by the dependent on the practices of China, India World Bank to $1.90 a day in 2011 dollars].10 and Indonesia, which are artifcially low and Development policy analyst, Andy Sumner, signifcantly lower cross-country averages. For has made the point that very small changes in these three countries, Hoy points out, the global poverty line can affect many million people living in poverty, including the scale and “These countries would have much higher location of global poverty.11 national poverty lines today, given their mean consumption, if they were consistent Are national defnitions of the with the cross-country trend. The national poverty line, as agreed in SDG1, poverty line would be almost four times adequate to achieve signifcant higher in China, around 2.5 times higher reductions in global poverty? in Indonesia and more than 50% higher in India. This would result in around two thirds In achieving the SDGs, it is crucial to consider of the population in these countries being their inter-relationships as well as their overall defned as living in national poverty.”14 impact on people living in poverty. SDGs related to ending hunger (Goal 2), ensuring Indeed, poverty lines can be set so that many healthy lives (Goal 3), guaranteeing inclusive people live just below these lines and then are and quality education for all (Goal 4), achieving miraculously ‘lifted out of poverty’, without gender equality and empowering all women much change in their actual life conditions. and girls (Goal 6), and ensuring availability of Sumner observes that the proportion of water and sanitation for all (Goal 7), require people living in extreme poverty in developing a comprehensive approach that addresses the countries has declined from 55% to 15% full scope and extent of poverty throughout between 1981 and 2012. But at the same time, the global South. The agreed objective to those living on an income between US$1.90 reduce the proportion of people living in and US$5.00 increased from 25% to 40% in poverty according to national defnitions may the same period. The latter are living in highly be very limiting in this regard, as these lines precarious conditions where they may slip back are often highly politicized. In fact, the SDG into extreme poverty. Only at US$10 day is 1 objective may create incentives to keep there a measure of security against poverty.15 national poverty lines at unrealistic low levels 12 in order to achieve this objective. Updating the World Bank’s International Poverty Line: What are the metrics for Chris Hoy, a researcher with the Overseas assessing global poverty? Development Institute, has studied national poverty lines in 59 countries. Of the countries In 2015, the World Bank launched a revision he has examined, the median national of its International Poverty Line (IPL). It poverty line is US$1.86 a day (2005 PPP), updated 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) above US$1.25 (extreme poverty), but below data to new calculations of 2011 PPP (i.e. the US$2.00, considered by many to be the minimal equivalent cost in 2011 dollars of a bundle International Poverty Line.13 Current average of goods across all countries). A new IPL measures of national poverty lines are highly of US$1.90 a day was established, said to be

132 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

equivalent to $1.25 a day (2005 PPP), and a of poverty for the destitute (US$1.90 a day). similar IPL of US$3.10, equivalent to US$2.00 It stresses the urgent need to address these a day (2005 PPP). Independent researchers conditions as well as the fact that the global have challenged the assumptions and credibility community must take into account trends of these new IPLs as well as the notion that for real poverty measured at US$3.10 (2011 poverty is measured only in relation to the cost PPP). It must also be recognized that many of a minimum basket of goods.16 more millions of people live on the margins of poverty, particularly in middle-income While acknowledging the weakness of these countries. A measure of this vulnerability World Bank sanctioned IPLs, they are, is the number of people living on between unfortunately, the only comprehensive cross- US$3.10 and US$6.00 a day at 2011 PPP country measurements of poverty available. And (approximate equivalent to US$4.00 in 2005 despite their limitations, World Bank poverty PPP).17 Measures to address inequalities statistics are still an urgent wake-up call for (SDG-10) must target this population among focusing the world’s attention on the depth of those in the bottom 40%. poverty in the majority of developing countries. 2.1 The Extent and Depth of Poverty Following the trends identifed in the Global Aid Trends chapter in the 2014 Reality of Aid a) Extreme Poverty - US$1.90 a day Report, the analysis below examines the extent (formerly US$1.25 a day 2005 PPP)

Chart 1: Percentage of Population Living in Extreme Poverty

133 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Extreme poverty includes those people living Extreme poverty is concentrated in in destitution, at the very edge of subsistence, politically fragile and vulnerable countries. characterized by severe deprivation of the basics of life (food, water and sanitation, In other parts of the world, extreme poverty shelter and access to healthcare). tends to be concentrated in politically fragile and/or environmentally vulnerable countries. Conditions of extreme poverty continue Twenty-two percent (22%) of extreme poverty to afect at least 15% of the population of is located in politically fragile countries and developing countries. half of those living in extreme poverty are According to the World Bank poverty found in countries that are considered to be 18 statistics, 898 million people continue to live environmentally vulnerable. Given these in extreme destitution in developing countries. conditions, reaching these people may present This represents a substantial drop of 45%, major challenges, compared to progress that down from 1,645 million people in 2002. was achieved for the MDGs.

In 2012, the Bank estimated that 15% of the population in developing countries lived in b) Conditions of poverty – US$3.10 severe poverty, a level that does not meet even a day (formerly US$2.00 a day 2005 the basic human needs for food, health and PPP) shelter. As indicated in Chart1, the majority of extremely poor people are concentrated in More than 35% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa where 43% of people are developing countries live in conditions of living on less than $1.90 a day and South Asia real poverty. (19%). More than 40% of the population of these two regions live in these conditions of According to World Bank statistics, absolute destitution. 2,100,000,000 people, or 35% of the population of developing countries, live on less than China has had a major impact on the US$3.10 a day. While not offcially considered reduction in extreme poverty from 2000 destitute, those living on daily incomes of to 2015. between US$1.90 a day and US$3.10 a day, are very poor. Costs for food and shelter mean It is important to note that changes in China there is little left over for health care or basic have had a substantial impact on these education of their children. statistics on extreme poverty. For example, comparing 2002 with 2012, more than half Real poverty is wide-spread across almost all (55%) of people who are no longer living on developing countries and is a key challenge $1.90 a day are Chinese. Over this decade, in realizing the SDGs. the number of people in China living in this condition declined by 410 million. Generally, As Chart 2 indicates, in 2012 more than half the segments of China’s population who the people of South Asia and two-thirds of continued to live in extreme poverty as of the people of Sub-Saharan Africa were living 2012 were subsisting in rural areas. in conditions of real poverty. While only

134 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 2: Percentage of Population Living in Real Poverty

6% of the population of Latin America and the than 50%. So while there has been substantial Caribbean lived on less than US$1.90 a day, 12% progress over the past decade in the reduction of the population, or 72 million people, existed of poverty, particularly in East Asia and the on less than $3.10 a day, a poverty line considered Pacifc, much greater effort will be required to to be very low, given the cost of basic goods. In achieve the ambitious Agenda 2030. Asia, nearly 20% of the population of China lives on an income of below US$3.10 a day, with 170 c) Vulnerability to Poverty – US$6.00 million people living on an income between $1.90 a day (approximately $4.00 a day a day and $3.10 a day. 2005 PPP) Almost two-thirds of the population of Poverty remains pervasive across the developing countries (62%) are living in developing world, and it remains the key poverty or are still highly vulnerable to challenge in realizing the SDGs. Sixty-two of poverty. the 128 countries with World Bank poverty statistics report poverty levels at $3.10 a day While the modest gains of the MDGs are for more than 25% of their population. Two- important, they remain highly susceptible thirds (41) of these 62 countries (the majority in to setbacks. The vast majority of the Sub-Saharan Africa) have poverty levels higher population (62% or 3,750 million people) in

135 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 3: Percentage of Population Vulnerable to Poverty

the developing world are living in conditions South to meet their SDG commitments in the of poverty or are highly vulnerable to poverty. context of widespread and deep poverty. Approximately 1.6 billion people are in danger of slipping back into poverty as they are living d) Depth of Poverty just above the US$3.10 poverty line. In many countries without social safety nets these The depth of poverty afects the level of people eke out a living inside an informal and efort needed to overcome these conditions. uncertain economy, with a high degree of An important measure of poverty is the vulnerability against unexpected economic, “poverty gap ratio” which was developed by the climatic or household shocks. The poor and UN as an indicator for the MDG1. This ratio, near poor constitute almost all the population expressed as a percentage of the poverty line, is of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. In the average level below the poverty line for all China, they make up 50% of the population, those living below this line. For example, two despite its remarkable economic successes over countries may have the same number of people the past decade. living below a given poverty line; however, in one country the average level of income below Subsequent sections will locate these poor this line may be much lower. In practice this and near poor geographically and examine may mean that it will take much more effort for 19 the fnancial capacities of governments in the this population to rise above the poverty line.

136 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Sub Saharan Africa is the region where the the numbers of extremely poor people in depth of extreme poverty is the greatest. East Asia and South Asia are less than Sub- Saharan Africa, particularly in East Asia, there In 2012, for extreme poverty (US$1.90 a day are additional challenges relating to the fact 2011 PPP), the average poverty gap ratio that the vast majority live in countries that for all developing countries was 3.7%. . For are politically fragile and/or environmentally Sub-Saharan Africa this poverty gap ratio was vulnerable. much deeper at 16.5%, compared to 3.7% for South Asia. These two regions had the highest 3. Mobilizing Aid Resources for proportion of the population living in these the SDGs conditions. 3.1 Ofcial Development In certain countries in Sub-Saharan Africa Assistance (ODA) as a crucial the depth of poverty is extreme: Burundi resource for the SDGs (32%), DRC (39%), Haiti (29%), Lesotho “ODA providers reaffrm their respective (30%), Madagascar (41%), Malawi (33%), ODA commitments, including the Micronesia (27%), Mozambique (27%) and commitment by many developed countries Zambia (30%).20 In these countries, with a to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of 30% poverty gap ratio, the extremely poor are ODA/GNI and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of living, on average, at a much deeper level of ODA/GNI to least developed countries.” destitution, at approximately US$1.33 a day. [AAAA, §51] The depth of poverty is more challenging The ambition of the SDGs, the broad scope at a poverty measure of $3.10 a day. of poverty across all developing countries, For the broader measure of poverty (US$3.10 and growing inequality, demand concerted a day, 2011 PPP), the depth of poverty is more ‘game-changing’ measures to maximize the widespread. At this poverty line in 2012, there resources needed to realize Agenda 2030. were 29 countries with a poverty gap ratio of Dramatic increases in targeted international more than 25% (concentrated in Africa, but concessional public fnance to complement from all regions). There were four African domestic fnance will be essential if the countries with a ratio greater than 50%. barriers and conditions perpetuating poverty and inequality are to be overcome. The depth of poverty will affect the pace of poverty reduction, with Sub-Saharan Africa In Transforming our world, UN member states facing the greatest challenge in ending extreme agreed to poverty by 2030. According to Development Initiatives, the sub-continent has 32 of the 33 “ensure signifcant mobilization of countries with the greatest depth of extreme resources from a variety of sources, poverty and has seen the slowest progress to including through enhanced development reduce poverty over the past decade.21 While cooperation, in order to provide adequate

137 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

and predictable means for developing The modest measures to enhance development countries, in particular least developed cooperation in the AAAA were discouraging countries, to implement programmes and incommensurate with the ambition of and policies to end poverty in all its Agenda 2030. Further, there is ample evidence dimensions.” that aid has not measured up as a resource dedicated to poverty reduction. ODA, which But are current aid resources, policies and remain the main channel for development practices on track to ramp up these resources, cooperation assistance, nevertheless is in ways that target poverty and inequality? essential as a resource and public policy instrument dedicated to advance many of the ODA will continue to be a relevant and SDGs. Why is this so? essential resource for achieving the SDGs. ODA is a unique fnancial resource, It is often said that the importance of Offcial whose importance for the SDGs Development Assistance (ODA) for achieving should not be diminished or brushed the SDGs is fading as the amount of ODA aside as irrelevant. pales in comparison to the supposed growth in “resources from a variety of sources.” The ODA’s potential contribution should be latter include increased domestic resource determined, not by a comparison to other mobilization in developing countries, growing fnancial fows to developing countries, resources from South-South Cooperation such as those from the private sector, but (SSC) aid providers and an expanding role by its characteristics as a dedicated resource for the private sector as a development for development shaped by public policy actor. There is no question that such sources choices (Box One). Clearly, these potential deserve attention, particularly in assessing characteristics have not fully realized to date. and maximizing areas that demonstrably This chapter analyzes the current realities for reduce poverty and inequality. But in any ODA in areas that must be addressed by policy resourcing scenario, substantial scaling-up of makers if ODA is to realize its potential as a development cooperation is crucial. resource in the realization of the SDGs.

138 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Box One: ODA as a Unique Resource for Achieving the SDGs

1. Sizable resource fow While clearly inadequate, ODA at US$137 billion is still a major fnancial resource. Its value has increased 33% since 2005. While it has not increased in value since 2010, neither has it shrunk. 2. Purpose determined by public policy Distinct from other fnancial fows, ODA can be fully devoted to the purposes of reduction of poverty and inequality. Its priorities and modalities are exclusively a public policy choice. Other resources fows may be important for achieving the SDGs, but they often linked to other purposes. Addressing the SDGs may be one of them, but would rarely be the primary driver that sustains and directs this resource fow. 3. A fexible resource ODA can be a fexible resource, available to development actors in ways that are responding to country-level SDG strategies, and evolving understandings of the complex conditions for making development progress for poor and vulnerable populations. 4. Catalyst in support of country-owned development As a fexible resource, in coordination with other aid providers and partner countries, ODA can and should be programmed as a catalyst to unique country-led and country-owned development strategies. 5. Predictable funding for long-term initiatives Again, as a public policy choice, ODA has the potential to contribute in ways that provide predictable resources for long-term development initiatives. This is essential to achieve real change in uncertain and complex socio-economic realities. 6. A key resource for multilateral institutions and CSOs ODA is a primary and crucial source of fnance for the multilateral system. It disbursed US$63 billion in 2014 to multilateral organizations for developing countries (US$43 billion in core contributions). It is a crucial contributor to CSOs as independent development actors (US$22 billion in 2014), which in turn have raised an estimated US$48 billion in private funds for development cooperation (see section 6.2 below). 7. Reaching marginalized communities and key policy objectives (e.g. gender equality) Working with a range of development actors, and in particular civil society, ODA is a unique resource that can be targeted to marginalized communities. It can address crucial areas such as gender equality or democratic governance, which other fows for the most part cannot do. 8. An accountable resource As a public resource, with appropriate levels of transparency, it is currently the only development fow whose impact may be traceable. As well, citizens and parliaments can hold its policies, practices and allocations accountable through legislation and other democratic means.

139 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

3.2 Trends in the Level of Ofcial value of the US dollar, the equivalent value of Development Assistance since ODA in 2015 (in 2014 dollars) increased to 2000 US$146.7 billion, an increase of 6.9% (Chart 5). While this increase in value is notable, This section examines three trends in ODA developing countries in reality had available since 2000: 1) recent trends in annual DAC only US$131.6 billion in ODA in 2015. ODA fows, 2) the comparative performance The value ODA (in 2014 dollars) has of DAC donors and 3) the prognosis for DAC increased considerably since 2000, but ODA in the next few years. has registered only a modest growth since Chart 7: Changing Value of Country Programmable Aid (CPA) as a percentage of Gross Bilateral ODA a) Current levels of ODA 2010. Highlights The value of ODA (in 2014 dollars) has grown considerably since 2000 - by 82.5%. In the In 2015 ODA declined by US$5.6 billion in past ten years (since 2005) it has increased by current dollars. only 14.3%. In the past fve years, the value of ODA has increased by even less – 8.7%. In 2015, ODA was US$131.6 billion, down Nevertheless, ODA continues to be a very 4% from US$137.2 billion in 2014 (Chart signifcant fnancial fow for development and 4). However, because of the changes in the humanitarian purposes.

Chart 4: Total DAC Official Development Assistance, 2000 to 2015

140 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 5: The Value of Total DAC Official Development Assistance, 2000 to 2015

In 2015, five donors contributed almost would have been $302 billion in aid resources two-thirds of ODA. in 2015 (or US$327.8 in 2014 dollars). With US$170 billion in additional ODA, ODA Five donors– France, Germany, Japan, the would truly play a catalytic role in addressing UK and the US – contributed a total of poverty, inequality and achieving the SDGs. US$86.1 billion in ODA (at current prices) in 2015. This amounted to 62% of total ODA b) Trends in Real ODA since 2000 for that year. The policies and trends of these fve donors have a profound impact on overall The truth is that US$131.6 billion in ODA ODA trends and future directions. was not actually available to developing countries in 2015. If donors had lived up to the UN ODA goal of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI), As many civil society and academic observers ODA would have been US$302 billion in have pointed out, the rules established by the 2015. DAC permit the inclusion in ODA of several expenditures that do not reach developing ODA remains below 50% of the UN countries. These expenditures include the designated target for ODA (i.e. 0.7% of GNI). costs of refugees in the donor country for their If all donors had lived up to this goal there frst year, institutional costs for students from

141 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

developing countries studying in the donor Chart 6 provides the trend since 2000 in the country, and the full value of debt cancellation value of Real ODA in constant 2014 dollars, in in the year that it is cancelled. While these are comparison with the fgures shown in Chart 5. legitimate expenditures, they do not belong in ODA, whose purpose is resource fows for Highlights people living in poverty in developing countries. Moreover, while donors must deduct from Real ODA for 2015 (in 2014 dollars) was only ODA any principal repaid that year on previous 2.4% higher than in 2014, in contrast to the ODA loans, they do not include the interest 6.9% recorded by the DAC. paid by the recipient country. Almost all the 2015 increases in the value of Real ODA therefore also subtracts these ODA was the result of in-donor expenditures expenditures and interest payments for refugees, students and debt cancellation. from bilateral ODA. Removing these When these are removed, Real ODA in 2014 disbursements, imputed costs and interest dollars is US$127.5 billion, not US$146.7 billion. payments provides a more accurate picture of the trends for what Reality of Aid has termed In efect, developing countries had no “Real ODA,” a resource that is actually spent more ODA resources available to them (in on development cooperation. value terms) in 2015 than they did in 2010.

Chart 6: Trends in Real ODA, 2000 to 2015, Constant 2014 Dollars

142 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 7: DAC ODA Performance Ratio: ODA and Real ODA

The substantial increases in Real ODA took Highlights place before 2010. At 0.30% of donor GNI, ODA performance The value of Real ODA increased signifcantly in 2015 showed no improvement between from 2000 to 2015, by more than 80%. However, 2013 and 2015. But Real ODA performance a considerable proportion of this increase took declined in 2015 to 0.26% from 0.27% the place between 2000 and 2010 (73% increase). previous year. In the last fve years (since 2010), Real ODA ODA performance for all DAC donors was increased by less than 5%, from US$121.6 only 0.30% in 2015, unchanged from 2014 billion to US$127.5 billion in 2015. and 2013. At 0.26% in 2015, Real ODA performance declined from a high of 0.28% in c) The Generosity of Donors: Trends 2010. It is a mere two-ffths of the 0.7% UN in the ODA Performance Ratio target for ODA. (See Chart 7) With the UN ODA target of 0.7% of GNI Average DAC member performance has as a benchmark, the donor members of the been decreasing since 2010. OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have agreed to compare their relative The average country effort is the median performance as aid providers in terms of the performance ratio among the DAC donors. percentage of ODA to GNI. In 2010 the average country effort reached

143 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

0.50% of GNI, driven by donors that increased Table One: 0.7% Donor “Club” in 2015 their ODA between 2005 and 2010. The Donor ODA Real ODA average country effort in 2010 had improved Performance Performance considerably from 2004, when it was 0.42%. Denmark 0.85% 0.72% But by 2014 this measure had declined to 0.46% Luxembourg 0.93% 0.93% for these 22 DAC donors in 2004. It increased Norway 1.05% 0.93% to 0.48% in 2015, but only due to very large Sweden 1.40% 0.93% in-donor expenditures on refugees in key United Kingdom 0.71% 0.70% European donor countries in 2015 (see below). The Netherlands 0.76% 0.58% Real ODA is ODA less debt cancellaton, in-donor country refugee and student costs, and interest payments on Real ODA Performance has essentially previous debt. stagnated since 2005. d) Missed Commitments: What Improvements in Real ODA performance have directions for future DAC ODA fows? stagnated since 2005. Real ODA performance improved marginally between 2005 and 2010, Recently some commentators have speculated when it reached 0.28%, but declined each year that ODA is a tired concept. They maintain after this high. As noted above, this performance that it has been in decline and is in urgent need is far below the UN target of 0.70%. of “modernization” to make it relevant to the fnancing needs of the SDGs. In response to There were six donors in 2015 in the 0.7% this criticism, it must be recognized that while club, but only fve when in-donor refugee aid has not declined signifcantly since 2010, costs were discounted. neither has it met the expectations created at the 2005 Gleneagles G7 Summit in the UK In 2015, there were six aid providers that met “to end poverty.” the UN target – the UK (0.71%), Denmark (0.85%), Luxembourg (0.93%), Norway If donors had lived up to commitments made (1.05%), Sweden (1.40%) and the Netherlands at the 2005 G7 Summit, there would be $62 (0.76%). The Netherlands, historically a 0.7% billion in additional ODA available today. donor, has been reducing its ODA since 2011 and in 2014 reported a ratio of 0.64%. The Following the Gleneagles G7 Summit, donors move back into the 0.7% donor club for the made ambitious commitments to increase Netherlands in 2015 was because of large their ODA performance by 2010 and 2015. increases in refugee expenditures. If these The DAC documented these commitments 22 expenditures are factored out, there were really in 2008. If the promises made by donors only fve 0.7% donors, as indicated in Table (including President Obama in his frst term One. These fve 0.7% donors collectively of offce) had been met, ODA in 2015 would provided a small proportion of Real ODA have been at least US$194 billion. This would - US$29.3 billion - or just over 25% of total have meant that there would have been US$62 23 DAC Real ODA in 2015. billion more ODA – an increase of 47%.

144 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

This additional US$62 billion would have The OECD DAC releases an annual survey of been tangible proof that DAC donors were forward projections for its members’ bilateral committed to and ready to invest in the SDGs, aid. The 2015 review suggests that aid will irrespective of domestic economic challenges. continue at the same level from 2015 until 2018, with some small fuctuations.25 The UK increased their ODA to meet their commitment to 0.7% (with three other EU Similarly, a review of current information members already at 0.7%). from CSOs, government, and media reports on DAC donor ODA budget plans reveal that Nine EU member states (all were members several large donors are expected to increase prior to 2002) agreed that they would reach their ODA, particularly Germany and France. the 0.7% by 2015, including those who were (See the review of expected trends in Annex already 0.7% donors. Only the UK achieved Two.) Among the 18 DAC donors that were this target, and the Netherlands, formerly a reviewed, 11 increased their ODA between 0.7% donor, saw its aid performance fall to 2014 and 2015, even when in-country refugee a low of 0.64% in 2014 (see above). Other costs were excluded. EU members promised to reach at least 0.51% by 2010. Looking to the future, it is expected that at least 10 donors will increase their ODA Despite a strong rhetoric, there is an contributions beyond 2015. These 10 donors absence of frm commitments to increase made up 58% of ODA in 2015. The outlook ODA to meet Agenda 2030. for the United States (contributing 23.6% of ODA in 2015) remains uncertain, but current At the Addis Financing for Development projections suggest a small decrease. Reversing Conference (July 2015), the EU limited its this decrease would substantially affect total commitments to achieving the 0.7% target ODA available for the SDGs in coming years. by 2030, with the proviso “taking into consideration budget circumstance.” Newer 3.3 Trends in Bilateral Aid member states have a target of 0.33% of their Allocations GNI.24 While these targets are stretched over a long timeframe, they can be contrasted to Bilateral ODA has remained constant other DAC donors that have not set any new at 70% of ODA since 2000 aid targets for themselves. Bilateral ODA, which is development assistance delivered directly from the aid Despite signifcant cuts by some donors, provider to the recipient government of a forward projections of ODA indicate partner country, has averaged a constant that Real ODA will continue at more or 70% of ODA for the past 15 years. In 2015, less existing levels, due to ODA increases bilateral assistance amounted to US$94.4 planned by the large providers - Germany billion, just over 70% of ODA in that year. and France. Real bilateral ODA, when refugees, students

145 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

and debt are removed, has been approximately of bilateral aid disbursements where partner two-thirds of total Real ODA since 2005. country partners can have a signifcant say in defning the priorities for its use. Only 53% of 2014’s bilateral aid was available for programming, under In 2014 only 53% of Gross Bilateral ODA, developing country ownership. or US$57 billion, was actually available to developing countries to program according Both Transforming our world and the AAAA to their country priorities. Chart 8 indicates stress the importance of “country ownership” that CPA has been stagnant and falling slightly where developing country actors determine since 2010. Another important issue is that the priorities and most effective strategies for this amount is only potentially available to realizing the SDGs. Country ownership has developing country partners. The DAC’s CPA been a guiding principle for aid effectiveness calculations included all donor free-standing since the Paris High Level Forum in 2005. technical assistance, the majority of which is Bilateral aid is a key source for fnancing these donor driven. So, at a realistic discount of strategies. But how much bilateral aid is actually 80% of the value of technical assistance as available to be programmed by developing probably donor driven, the resulting bilateral country partners? The DAC has developed aid available to developing country partners in a measure of “country programmable aid 2014 was US$44.7 billion, less than half (41%) 26 (CPA).” CPA represents the proportion of Gross Bilateral ODA for that year.

Chart 8: Changing Value of Country Programmable Aid (CPA) as a percentage of Gross Bilateral ODA

146 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

There has been an explosive Under DAC rules for ODA, these expenditures growth in donor country refugee can be counted as ODA, and they have been expenditures. growing considerably since 2010 (Chart 9). In 2015, they more than doubled, amounted In-country donor expenditures make up a to US$13.3 billion (2014 constant dollars) or growing part of bilateral ODA that is discounted 12.7% of Bilateral ODA, up from $6.6 billion in the estimation of country programmable aid. and 7% in 2014. As a percentage of Gross Bilateral ODA, the value of key components that infate aid have Assisting refugees arriving donor fuctuated from year to year, amounting to 36% countries is a legal obligation. But in 2005, 13% in 2010, 23% in 2013, 13% in resources for this support should not 2014, and 11% in 2015. These numbers often be taken from aid budgets, whose refect the impact of large amounts of debt target is poor and vulnerable people being cancelled in a particular year. 27 in developing countries.

Dramatic increases in donor expenditures for There were massive movements of Syrian, refugees have recently become a controversial Afghani and Somali refugees to Europe in issue for some donors, particularly in Europe. late 2015 and into 2016. The expectation is

Chart 9: Donor In-Country Refugee Expenditures as a percentage of Bilateral ODA

147 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

that these expenditures will rise sharply in contrary to DAC rules.30 At this meeting a 2016 to refect the large numbers of refugees decision was taken to clarify the rules, i.e. requiring assistance. In several cases donors “improve the consistency, comparability, are fnancing these costs through their regular and transparency of our reporting ODA- ODA budgets. While assisting refugees eligible in donor refugee costs.” The DAC for their frst year in the donor country is a Secretariat will collect information on moral and legal imperative, it should not be current practices and the DAC’s Working taken from aid budgets as it inficts the costs Party on Statistics will bring proposals to of refugee settlement on the backs of people the 2017 High Level Meeting.31 The EU living in poverty in the developing world. and Japan have been nominated to chair a special working group on in-donor refugee In 2015, in-country refugee expenditures costs and migration issues. became a signifcant component of ODA for some donors. For example, these expenditures represented over 20% of ODA 3.4 Trends in Multilateral Aid for fve donors: Sweden – 33.8%, Austria – Allocations 26.8%, Italy – 25.5%, Netherlands – 22.8%, The value of multilateral aid for Greece – 20.6%. implementing SDGs by developing country governments has been Similar ODA expenditures on refugees can weakened. It is increasingly driven by be expected from other European donors in donor, rather than developing country, 2016. In Denmark close to 30% of Danish priorities. ODA in 2016 is likely to be related to refugee settlement costs; in Norway these Thirty percent (30%) of ODA has been costs may be up to 20%; and Sweden will disbursed annually as assessed core probably cap these costs at 30% of ODA.28 contributions to multilateral organizations, All these donors are 0.7% donors and including international fnancial institutions. they risk undermining the credibility and The value of multilateral aid (in 2014 dollars) effectiveness of their ODA as a signifcant has grown slowly from US$17.8 billion in resource for progress in the SDGs. 2000 to US$37.2 billion in 2015.

At the February DAC 2016 High Level As a development resource, assessed and Meeting, a number of donors advocated for core fnancing of multilateral organizations an extension of the inclusion of a one-year is often seen as a quality resource. Generally period of refugee support as ODA to two it is allocated by multilateral organizations in years. CSOs strongly opposed including ways that respond directly to the expressed in-donor refugee costs in ODA,29 and needs of developing country governments. have raised concerns that some European The growth in this core fnancing, however, donors may try to charge costs associated has been unevenly distributed to different with preventing migrants arriving in Europe types of multilateral organizations. This has to their ODA budget, a move that is the potential to undermine a balanced and

148 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 10: Value of Multilateral ODA, 2000 to 2015

responsive approach to developing country of US$7.8 billionin 2000 to US$6.8 billion in needs and compromise the ability of the 2014. On the other hand, the value of donor multilateral system to rise above individual support for the World Bank’s International donor political self-interests in priorities for Development Association (IDA) window, bilateral aid. which has been accompanied by many Bank- determined policy conditions for recipient Uneven distribution of growth in governments, increased by close to 70% over mulitlateral funding: UN organizations these years, from US$5.2 billion in 2000 to 32 fall, while World Bank IDA increases. US$8.8 billion in 2014 (in 2013 dollars). Changing multilateral architecture UN organizations will be crucial for the – increasing attention to thematic realization of the SDGs. Through the UNDP vertical funds. and UNICEF, the UN is well positioned to respond to the expressed needs of developing The overall architecture of the multilateral country partners. Despite the UN’s system has been changing. Donors have been paramount global mandate, donor support for able to increasingly impose their priorities UN organizations has not grown as ODA has through the the creation of specialized increased. Instead the value of donor support vertical funds. This shift can be seen in for the UN has dropped slightly from a high growing support for “other multilateral

149 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

organizations,” where the value of annual special funding – US$3.7 billion in 2014, donor disbursements to these funds has compared to US$9.8 billion in core fnancing. grown from US$1.8 billion in 2000 to US$7.3 billion in 2014. Examples include specialized More than 40% of ODA is vertical funds such as the Global Alliance for essentially delivered by multilateral Vacines and Immunizations, the Global Fund organizations to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, or the Global Environment Facility for Least If DAC donor core contributions are Developed Countries. While these specialized combined with earmarked funding, more than funds are often championed by individual 40% of gross ODA in 2014 was delivered by donor interests, including northern civil society multilateral organizations. Several donors organizations, they have been criticized for deliver considerable proportions of their ODA how their funding distorts the provision of to and through multilateral organizations – services, particularly in the poorest countries.33 the UK (59%), Canada (48%), France (35%), the United States (34%), Japan (30%) and Donor ear-marked mulitalteral funding Germany (30%). In 2016 barely one sixth of 34 has been rapidly growing as a preferred UNDP’s budget of UNDP is core funding. donor modality for fnancing through the multilateral system. Though these funds may be welcomed by a particular organization, they also entail high Donors can infuence the priorities of cash- transaction costs as each donor has specifc strapped multilateral organizations through requirements and often closely manages the provision of ear-marked funding for the rules governing the allocation of its donor priorities, which are then administered funds. Earmarking can result in program by these agencies. According to the OECD incoherence and ineffectiveness on the part DAC statistics, an additional US$19.6 billion of agencies managing these funds. In light in bilateral DAC ODA was channeled through of the fnancing requirements for the SDGs, multilateral organizations in 2014, beyond the the DAC suggests that “a critical mass of US$42.6 billion in core DAC donor support. core resources and better quality earmarked funding will be essential going forward.” They Earmarked contributions have increased by call on the multilateral system to play 93% since 2007, compared to an increase of only 23% for core fnancing of multilateral “a major role in mobilising large volumes organizations. For UN organizations, of fnance by combining and blending earmarked funding makes up almost double different instruments and sources of its core resources - US$12.7 billion compared fnance in complex fnancial “packages” to US$6.8 billion respectively in 2014. The and by deploying risk mitigation tools World Food Program, UNHCR, UNDP and and developing new pooled funding UNICEF were the largest recipients of ear- mechanisms to bring in private resources marked funding. The World Bank has also from banks, institutional investors and received a considerable amount of ear-marked the enterprise sector.”35

150 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

3.5 Donor Eforts to Broaden the reporting directives on peace and security Defnition of ODA expenditures […], to clarify the eligibility of activities involving the military and the police.” Does the inclusion of military-related The language for this reporting directive is expenditures and measures to sometimes vague with more references to counter violent extremism preface exceptional circumstances, which open the a return to major foreign policy door to a more permissive approach in this security infuences? area.39 Development Initiatives points out that the revised rules allowing for ODA to fnance Under the rhetoric of the “ODA modernizing “routine policing functions” or “the provision process” a number of DAC donors at of related non-lethal equipment” is subject to the February 2016 HLM advocated for a wide interpretation by donors.40 much broader inclusion in ODA of fnance for military equipment and training for A key area of concern for the diversion of ODA peacekeeping, as well as costs related to countering terrorism. Other donors, such as resources to donor security and foreign policy Sweden, resisted this militarization of aid, a interests are the new rules that allow the inclusion position that was strongly promoted by CSOs in ODA of activities focused on “preventing prior to the meeting.36 In the end, the DAC violent extremism.” According to Eurodad, members affrmed the developmental purpose “while activities focused on “perceived threats of ODA and agreed that “fnancing of military to the donor country” are excluded, a limited equipment and services is generally excluded number of activities that are “led by partner from ODA reporting and that development countries [where the] purpose is primarily cooperation should not be used as a vehicle to developmental” are allowed.”41 Given the highly promote providers’ security interests.”37 political dimensions of actions against extremism, this opening requires close monitoring. The rules for ODA support for the military and policy must be clarifed. Development Initiatives points out that the use of ODA for confict prevention, peace and While maintaining this restriction on “regular” security, even under the old rules has increased by military costs, the new rules allow for more 67% since 2005. Of the US$3.1 billion allocated inclusion of “non-coercive security related for these activities in 2014, more than half were activities.” Examples of these activities could devoted to peacebuilding (US$1.7 billion). include training of partner military on human Security sector reform also received signifcant rights and sexual violence issues, civilian policy resources (US$700 million).42 efforts to prevent criminal activities, or the extra costs involved in delivery of humanitarian ODA priorities towards donor services by the military, where civilian assets security pre-occupations have been cannot deliver these goods and services in a shifting since 2002 with increased aid 38 timely and effective way (under the old rules). to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

In the Communiqué, DAC donors agreed Over the past decade, donor foreign policies “to update and modernize the ODA relating to anti-terrorism have been a critical

151 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

driver for the country priorities of major and the UK. While their share in this aid has donors. There is no better example than declined since this 2005 peak, contributions the overall trends in DAC donor aid to from UK and the US still accounted for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq since 2002. somewhat under two-thirds of the total in 2014 (57%). In 2013/14, Afghanistan remained the Between 2002 and 2005 aid from DAC donors number one recipient of US aid, and Pakistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq grew from ranked number 5. For the UK, Pakistan was US$946 million to almost US$10 billion. It number three, and Afghanistan number six. accounted for 20% of ODA in 2005 (not including humanitarian assistance and debt 3.6 Increasing Use of Loans in Aid cancellation). While aid to these three countries Delivery has declined as a share of total ODA since 2005, it still amounted to US$8.1 billion in 2014, or DAC rules for counting loans as ODA 7% of total ODA for that year. (See Chart 11) By defnition, ODA is intended to be Foreign policy considerations for the United concessional transfers of resources from aid States and the United Kingdom, both large providers to partner countries in the South. aid donors and heavily invested in the wars Concessional loans have been a component in Afghanistan and Iraq, played a large role of bilateral aid transfers by DAC donors for in these aid allocations. Fully 90% of aid for many decades. Under current (2016) DAC these three countries in 2005 came from the US rules that defne ODA eligibility, the loan

Chart 11: DAC ODA to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq

152 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

must be provided below market rates and their ODA. By 2010, the proportion of loans the difference between the cost of a market in Gross Bilateral ODA reached 17% and loan and the ODA loan determines the it is expected to exceed 21% in 2015. Since concessionality or “grant” component (which 2010, bilateral aid loans have increased from has to be at least 25%). US$16.2 billion to US$19.1 billion in 2015, an increase of 18% in fve years. (See Chart 12) While loans diminished as an aid modality in the early 2000s, they have become more widely used by Loans make up almost half of gross bilateral donors since 2006. disbursements from the multilateral system.

During the 1990s donors were strongly Developing countries also receive concessional encouraged to provide their assistance in the loans from multilateral banks, most notably form of grants, particularly to low-income the World Bank’s International Development and lower middle-income countries, many Association (IDA) window, the regional of whom were emerging from a debt crisis development banks and the European Union. that had crippled their economies. After In 2014 (the last year where data is available), 2000 the proportion of loans in Gross Real multilateral institutions together provided a Bilateral ODA declined, reaching a low of total of US$24.3 billion in concessional loans 14% in 2006. But since that year, donors as part of their ODA. Loans were 47% of have increasingly used loans in the delivery of multilateral gross disbursement in 2014.

Chart 12: DAC Donors Bilateral Loans as Percentage of Real Gross Bilateral ODA

153 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

In 2014, loans comprised 30% of Real loans in their aid program, accounting for 84% of Gross ODA. total bilateral loans in 2014.

Adding together multilateral and bilateral There is a high concentration of loans loans, fully 30% of total Real Gross ODA in 2014 to lower Middle Income Countries. was delivered as loans to developing countries (Chart 13). The trend is upward, largely driven According to Table One, there is a high by the policies of major donors, particularly concentration of loans to Lower Middle- France, Germany and Japan (See Chart 14). Income countries (LMICs) (55% of loans by Preliminary data for 2015 indicates that Germany total dollar value in 2014). These are countries has continued to increase its ODA loan portfolio. where government revenue is usually below These three donors have consistently relied on $3,000 per capita (see below). Such governments

Chart 13: Total ODA Loans (Bilateral & Multilateral) as Percentage of Total Real Gross ODA

Table One: Allocation of Loans by Country Income Group Percentageof Bilateral Loans Total Bilateral / Multlateral Loans total loans 2005 2010 2014 2005 2010 2014 LDCs/LICs 8.6% 6.3% 12.2% 30.2% 25.2% 26.2% LMICs 50.3% 59.7% 54.8% 48.3% 54.8% 49.4% UMICs 41.1% 34.0% 33.0% 21.5% 20.0% 24.3% HIPCs 10.4% 5.4% 7.0% 29.2% 24.5% 20.8% Source: OECD Dataset DAC2a

154 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 14: Loans as a Percentage of Gross Real Bilateral ODA

can ill afford the increasing debt payments that ODA loan under DAC rules can have a higher these loans represent. A surprising 12% of interest rate than the market rate.44 loans in 2014 were directed to Least Developed and Low Income countries, many of which At the December 2014 DAC High Level Meeting, were the benefciaries of the Heavily Indebted donors agreed to reform the eligibility and treatment Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). HIPC countries of these loans in terms of how they are counted 45 received 7% of loans in 2014. Over 50% of as ODA. These new rules, which will not be the loans in 2014 were given to ten countries fully implemented until 2018, state that only the of which half were LMICs (India, Viet Nam, concessional grant element of a loan will be included Morocco, Indonesia and the Philippines). as ODA, and repayments of the loan principal will no longer be deducted from donor ODA. The reference The DAC agree on new rules for the interest rate for the calculation of concessionality inclusion of loans in ODA. will be linked to a country’s income status. So, for example, this could mean that a higher rate might be DAC rules for ODA loan concessionality, given to Low-Income Countries (LICs), but loans established several decades ago, have been to these countries would require a grant element of controversial in recent years. Persistently 45% to count as ODA. The thresholds are lower for 46 low interest rates have meant that an eligible LMICs and UMICs.

155 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Changes to the rules for loans are concessional, but could be eligible under new welcomed, but concerns remain that DAC “risk premia”, yet to be agreed.47 rules may incentivize the use of loans. 3.7 Trends in Humanitarian Changes in the rules governing loans are an Assistance important improvement. They will affect ODA reporting levels in 2018, the frst year they are Humanitarian assistance has grown applied, and consequently the comparability rapidly since 2010. of ODA for that year with earlier years. CSOs have raised concerns about whether Driven by the refugee crises and conficts the changed rules will meant that donors to in Syria, Iraq and Ukraine, serious disease will prefer loans over grants, particularly epidemics, and natural disasters, humanitarian in the Least Developed, Low Income and assistance is again on the rise. According Lower Middle-Income Countries, which face to Development Initiative’s 2015 Global potential issues in debt sustainability. There is Humanitarian Assistance Report, US$24.5 also the worry that DAC donors may use the billion was provided in international new rules to broaden the inclusion of donor humanitarian assistance in 2014, up 19% from loans and guarantees through private sector 2013.48 Humanitarian assistance from DAC instruments (development fnance institutions, donors has increased in value, and at US$16.6 export-import banks, etc.), which may not be billion in 2014, is up 37% since 2010 (Chart 15).

Chart 15: Trends in Humanitarian Assistance, 2005 to 2014

156 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Humanitarian assistance is also increasing total humanitarian assistance in 2014, but down as a share of Real ODA, reaching a level from 48% in 2010). Humanitarian assistance for that was last seen in 2005. the Middle East rose from 7% in 2010 to 25% in 2014, refecting the needs of the Syrian/Iraq The value of humanitarian assistance (in crisis (Chart 17). constant 2014 dollars) was US$16.6 billion in 2014, the highest level since 2005 (Chart 16). As Arab donors and Turkey have become a share of Real ODA, humanitarian assistance in substantial actors in humanitarian 2014 was 13.4% of Real ODA, up from 10% in assistance. 2010. As a share of Real ODA, it has reached the highest level since 2005, the year of the Asian In 2014, a number of Arab donors became Tsunami and humanitarian crises in the Sudan major actors in humanitarian assistance as they and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. contributed US$1.6 billion, up from US$760 million in 2013. Among these donors, UAE, Sub-Saharan Africa remains a major Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia provided focus for humanitarian assistance, US$755 million, much of it directed to despite attention to the Middle East. the crises in the Middle East. As Turkey responded to the millions of Syrian refugees Signifcant humanitarian resources continue on its boarders it contributed a record US$1.8 to be allocated for Sub-Saharan Africa (40% of billion in humanitarian assistance. By May

Chart 16: Humanitarian Assistance as a Percentage of Real ODA

157 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 17: Humanitarian Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa & Middle East as Percentage of Total Humanitarian Assistance

2015, Turkey had become the world’s largest refugee hosting country.49

Private donors contributed 24% of More than 25% of humanitarian humanitarian assistance in 2014. assistance reported to the DAC in 2014 was directed to the Syrian crisis. Private donors’ responses to humanitarian situations have been growing in recent Donor assistance reported to the OECD years. While diffcult to accurately measure, DAC for people affected by the Syrian crisis Development Initiatives estimates that living in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan these donors (individuals, foundations and amounted to US$5.2 billion in 2014. This companies) provided US$5.8 billion in 2014. amount is expected to increase in 2015 and These contributions are up slightly from 2016. Turkey, a middle-income aid provider, 2013, but less than 2010, when these donors provided 44% (US$2.3 billion) of the US$5.2 contributed US$6.1 billion (Haiti earthquake billion, primarily to Syrian refugee populations and Pakistan foods). According to on its borders. The United Arab Emirates Development Initiatives data, “International provided US$378 million for humanitarian NGOs (INGOs) are the largest mobilisers of operations in Jordan and Syria. Together the private funding, raising an estimated US$4.7 DAC donors provided US$2.1 billion in 2014, billion in 2013, and US$22.7 billion (89% of while multilateral organizations contributed the total of private funding) in the fve years US$422 million.51 For the DAC donors, Syrian between 2009 and 2013.”50 related humanitarian assistance was 16% of its

158 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

humanitarian assistance for that year. But their the humanitarian and development worlds, total contributions accounted for less than recognizing the increasing need for inter- 50% of the humanitarian assistance provided related interventions from humanitarian, by governments for this crisis. peacekeeping and development.

The humanitarian system is in crisis. The frst World Humanitarian Summit, in May 2016, produces mixed results. Despite record amounts of humanitarian assistance in 2014, the United Nations has reported a funding The international community met in Istanbul gap of approximately US$15 billion for critical at the frst World Humanitarian Summit in needs. This represents more than 60% of the May 2016. In the lead-up to these meetings a funds raised in 2014 from all sources.52 wide range of proposals were made to create a common platform or management framework The UN High Level Panel on Humanitarian that brings together all the tools to address Financing noted that many of the current the different dimensions of a crisis. Many humanitarian responses are for protracted proposals emphasized the importance of 54 crises. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ramping up support for local resilience. Not Change projects a growth in the numbers and only more funding, but multi-year and less intensity of climate-related disasters, with costs earmarked funding is required from donors, exceeding current estimates. The High Level including consideration of fnancing packages Panel documents the deepening ineffectiveness for middle income countries that are hosting 55 of the current humanitarian mechanisms: large numbers of refugees. With only 0.4% of ODA spent on disaster risk reduction and “The global humanitarian system is preparedness, the Secretary General called for overstretched and is unable to respond a modest goal of 1% of ODA by 2020 devoted 56 adequately. This gap between demands to preparedness. and resources is complex in nature; it is not just the result of more armed The outcomes of the Summit were described confict, extremism, disaster, disease as “mixed results.” On the positive side there and displacement. Humanitarian aid’s were commitments for greater transparency in traditional function to provide life-saving humanitarian spending. A “Grand Bargain”, assistance— in short, to get in quickly, fx which was agreed to by 15 of the largest the immediate problems and leave—has humanitarian donors, 16 aid agencies, including evolved to include a dizzying array of the Red Cross and three INGO consortia, additional responsibilities: from building set out 51 commitments in ten key areas resilience and preparedness to providing to improve the effciency of delivery in the 57 long-term basic services such as health, humanitarian aid system. These commitments shelter and education.”53 include increased use and coordination of cash based modalities (less donor driven food aid), The Panel pointed to the urgency of improved joint and impartial needs assessments overcoming the “benign neglect” between (to direct priorities in humanitarian responses),

159 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

reduced ear-marking of donor contributions, acknowledge the need to strengthen capacities harmonized reporting requirements, and for larger scale interventions by these actors.60 enhanced engagement between humanitarian However, the Summit made signifcant progress and development actors, among others. on engaging local responders more directly in coordinated humanitarian actions. On the less positive side, there was no progress on measures to reduce serious breaches At the same time, the Istanbul Summit in humanitarian law, including bombing of largely failed to consider the deteriorating hospitals, the use of civilians as shields in confict and dangerous conditions in which many and the need to address burden-sharing of CSOs are working in confict areas. For refugees and migrants. While the Grand Bargain example, the impact of counter-terrorism on addressed many crucial issues for reform, specifc humanitarian responses, particularly by civil objectives for implementation and demonstrating society organizations, was not discussed. progress are largely missing. The United States, Several major organizations have pointed out for example, suggested that while they are that operations in high-risk jihadi run areas committed to the Grand Bargain, their responses of Syria, for example, run the risk of being to humanitarian emergencies will continue to branded “supporters of terrorists” under be situation- specifc, and will not be guided by current anti-terror legislation.61 “arbitrary targets.”58 The US provided 50% of all humanitarian assistance in 2014. 4. What about Local Finance for SDGs: Promoting domestic The Summit committed to increase resource mobilization? access to humanitarian resources, tools and coordination mechanisms for local “We underscore that, for all countries, public governments and local CSOs. policies and the mobilization and effective use of domestic resources, underscored Local NGOs, national and local governments by the principle of national ownership, are demanding a larger share of humanitarian are central to our common pursuit of resources. A number of CSOs associated with sustainable development, including the Charter4Change are calling for 20% of this achieving the Sustainable Development funding to go directly to local implementing Goals.” [Transforming our world, §60] NGOs.59 The Grand Bargain has committed to 25% of humanitarian funding to local and ODA is a crucial tool, but not the national responders by 2020, greater use of answer to resourcing sustainable funding tools such as the UN and NGO-led human development. pooled funds, and the inclusion of local actors in coordination mechanisms. It also pledges to At best ODA is a catalyst and a complementary develop a “localization marker.” As a senior US resource for addressing key issues in poverty offcial has pointed out, recent estimates do not eradication and the achievement of the SDGs account for indirect delivery of humanitarian by 2030. Clearly, much larger allocations of assistance through local responders nor do they ODA are required to realize this role and to

160 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

focus attention on conditions for marginalized the economics of poverty and the politics of populations. Equally important is the urgent DRM, will undoubtedly require a continued need for investment in education, primary and critical role for aid, with increasing levels health care, climate resilience/ adaptation and of ODA commitments. infrastructure for sustainable livelihoods for people living in or near poverty in developing Increasing domestic resource countries. At the same time it must be mobilization (DRM) is a crucial recognized that ODA will never be suffcient challenge. to raise billions of people out of poverty, nor should it be seen as having this responsibility. The AAAA affrms that “[…] the mobilization and effective use of domestic resources, Developing country government underscored by the principle of national revenue is the key public resource for ownership, [is] central to our common pursuit of investing in the SDGs. sustainable development [...]” [§20] During the Addis Financing for Development Conference, Regardless of country income level, developing many developed countries stressed the country governments are the primary source for importance of domestic resource mobilization fnancing sustainable progress for the SDGs, as as the central challenge in fnancing for they were for the MDGs. Governments have development, arguing that ODA will have an a clear obligation to invest in the social sectors important but diminished role in the future. – health, education, water and sanitation – but also to enable economic growth and improved National governments are best placed to livelihoods for all its people. establish relevant policies and initiatives to sustainably reduce poverty through domestic Many governments are close partners with aid resource allocation – this is surely the goal providers in these efforts, especially in Low- for all countries. But, while accepting the Income Countries, but also in many Middle- challenge in marshalling these resources, Income Countries. What are the current the Finance Minister for Malawi, Goodall revenue capacities for these governments to Gondwe, retorted, fulfll these obligations? Can an emphasis on domestic resource mobilization (DRM) “We need the space and autonomy to compensate for the fnancing gaps for the mobilize national resources,” … [noting SDGs in Middle-Income Countries? If not, that] “when differences arose and partners how well is ODA complementing domestic became supervisors, governments resources to fll these gaps? resented it.”

Moving beyond aid dependency is a goal of To avoid such situations, he called for “genuine all low-income and Low/Middle-Income equal partnership.” While welcoming Countries. Domestic resources will ultimately domestic resource mobilization as central provide the basis for achieving this end. But to the implementation of the sustainable the low starting points for many countries, development goals, the Minister urged States

161 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

to “tread carefully” on the targeted 20 per domestic resource mobilization fll the gap cent of tax-to-gross domestic product ratio for the SDGs? While governments cannot as a threshold above which countries were rely on aid to meet its obligations, what is the considered to have suffcient resources and relevance of aid in this context of domestic not need technical assistance.”62 resource defcits?

Developing country government Domestic resource mobilization is not just a must have the policy space and technical matter of improving tax collection resources to drive country priorities systems and implementing a range of taxes and for the SDGs. revenue generating policies. At the country level, entrenched elite politics and interests, Governments that are given the policy space as well as an often-broad lack of respect for and resources are well placed to assess country government and its institutions fuelled by conditions and set priorities. Domestic corruption, greatly affect the effectiveness of a government revenue (tax and other revenue) government’s fscal policy. In recent months, has indeed been increasing over the past there has been irrefutable proof of massive ffteen years. This revenue has almost doubled tax evasion and illicit transfers of income between 2005 and 2010, and reached an at the global level. Wealthy individuals and estimated US$5.3 trillion in 2014.63 transnational corporations have successfully avoided contributing their fair share, including Development Initiatives argues, “For many from the developing world.66 governments to set and drive their own poverty reduction agenda, domestic resources Can domestic resource mobilization must become the spine around which other fll the fnancing gap for the SDGs by development fnance fows are coordinated.”64 2030? An analysis of government sector spending for the MDGs concluded, however, that most Building on work by Development Initiatives, developing countries had substantially missed the this question was asked in the Aid Trends spending mark in their budgets devoted to core chapter of the 2014 Reality of Aid Report. 67 The MDGs. The study estimated these governments following section continues this analysis by had allocated about 35% of their spending to correlating current government spending per the core MDGs (agriculture, education, health, capita with levels of poverty (US$1.90 and environment, social protection, and water and US$3.10), and country income status (Low sanitation), when they should have been spending Income / Least Developed, Lower Middle- 57% of budgets to reach these MDG targets.65 Income, and Upper Middle-Income). It briefy summarizes research on donor policies But is this allocation realistic for countries in support of DRM. Finally, it examines with substantial levels of poverty? Have international issues inside a context where these resources been broadly available to CSOs are advocating to untangle the web of governments, especially in Low-Income illicit capital fows and tax evasion to ensure and Lower Middle Income Countries? Can that the rich and the corporate world shoulder

162 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

their responsibilities in poor countries. This is As a point of reference, the average per capita a necessary foundation for the realization of revenue for developed countries, to cover the SDGs. the same set of government expenditures, is approximately US$15,000. This is over 4.1 Government revenue and levels fve times more than the level available for of poverty most Middle Income Countries.69 It is also important to note that governments’ of What do trends in developing country developed countries are struggling with the government revenue per capita suggest challenges of poverty, social and economic for fnancing capacities to realize SDGs inclusion. With much lower revenue, how is in these countries? it possible for developing countries to create favourable conditions, or even a basic set of Development Initiatives’ excellent data hub services, for their people? brings together useful data on developing country government revenue per capita (net of 85 countries with less than US$3,000 ODA and debt disbursed to the public sector) per capita government revenue for 124 countries.68 Revenue per capita is a face huge challenges in poverty strong indicator of a government’s ‘current reduction. capacities to fnance the SDGs. At the same time this data provides solid proof of the In the 30 countries with less than US$500 per importance of mobilizing new revenue sources capita in revenue, almost half the population for these governments. It is important to keep (47%) are living in conditions of extreme in mind that per capita government revenue poverty. Three quarters (75%) live on less must cover all government expenditures than US$3.10 a day (Chart 18). While the for the social sectors, as well as legitimate extent of poverty declines with higher levels of expenditures for institutionalizing the rule government revenue, all 85 countries with less of law, upkeep of infrastructure, conduct than US$3,000 per capita government revenue of foreign policy, ensuring environmental face huge challenges in poverty reduction, and protection, defence, etc. the concomitant fnancing needs by government for education, health and social protection. Among 124 countries documented in Development Initiatives’ database, 4.2 Government Revenue and Country Income Groups • 30 had per capita government revenue of less than US$500 per person; Countries formally labeled “Lower • 27 had per capita government revenue of Middle Income Countries” (LMICs) between US$500 and US$1,500 per person; have very low government per capita • 28 had per capita government revenue of between US$1,500 and US$3,000 per revenue. person; and Not surprising, there is a close alignment • 39 had per capita government revenue of between countries with per capita revenue of less more than US$3,000 per person. than US$500 and those with Least Developed

163 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 18: Government per capita Revenue and Levels of Poverty: Percentage of population living in poverty

or Low-Income status (LDCs/LICs) (Chart decade have been in UMICs. LDCs, LICs and 19). Almost all Lower Middle-Income LMICs, on the other hand, face considerable Countries (LMICs) had per capita revenue of challenges in improving DRM, certainly to the less than US$3,000, and 13 of these 30 LMICs degree needed to fnance SDGs in the next had revenue less than $1,500 per person. Of ffteen years. Against this evidence of the extent the 48 Upper Middle-Income Countries, 12 of and depth of poverty and very low government them had per capita government revenue of revenue, it is crucial that aid providers not less than $3,000. abandon these countries as they rightly focus on the needs of the LDCs and LICs. Donors should not ignore the development fnance needs of Middle- 4.3 ODA and Domestic Resource Income Countries or withdraw ODA as Mobilization source of government revenue. In the lead-up to the Addis Conference Erik With higher levels of gross national income, Solheim, OECD DAC Chair, called on aid the potential to increase government revenue providers to “agree to channel aid to those among UMICs is clearly high. Many of the countries with the least access to other sources increases in government revenue over the past of fnance, the greatest diffculty in attracting

164 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 19: Government per capita Revenue and Country Income Groups: Number of countries

investors, and the weakest tax systems, [with Many of these countries have weak economic special attention to] vulnerable groups, such as foundations for increases in domestic ethnic and religious minorities and indigenous government revenue at the scale required for rural populations struggling to break out of Agenda 2030. poverty ...”70 Can ODA make a useful contribution In recent years, ODA has focused to maximizing domestic resource on countries with low government mobilization (DRM)? revenue. Recent research suggests a justifcation for Chart 20 assesses the top 50 country recipients scaling up aid for DRM as a donor priority. of DAC bilateral and multilateral ODA (a 71 Current aid allocation to DRM is relatively combination of LDCs, LICs and LMICs). Of weak. A preliminary assessment pointed the top 50 aid recipients, more than two-thirds to 232 projects, totalling US$92.5 million of bilateral aid (69%) went to countries that in 2013, with a core focus on DMR, and an had per capita revenue of less than US$1,500, additional 371 projects, totalling US$600.5 and 72% of multilateral aid went to recipients million, where DRM was a component but with similar per capita revenue. Thus, ODA not the focus for the project.72 It is important on this measure appears to be well focused. to note that technical assistance is the primary

165 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 20: Government per capita Revenue and Allocation of ODA: Percentage of bilateral and multilateral DAC ODA to Top 50 recipients

modality for the delivery of these programs July 2015. These aid providers committed and thus represents 46% of expenditures to double technical cooperation for DRM for core DRM projects. As mainly technical by 2020. In March 2016, the DAC Working projects focusing on new forms of taxation, Party on Stats initiated a frst step through a administration, auditing, and relevant IT project purpose marker for tax administration systems, small increases in funding can be to track these investments. effective. Development Initiatives pointed out that 44% of DRM aid went to countries DRM in the poorest countries should with per capita revenue of less than $500, and be guided by principles for fair nearly half were least developed countries.73 taxation.

The Addis Tax Initiative set out a goal DRM is not only about maximizing government to double technical cooperation to revenue. It also must consider policies for fair DRM by 2020. taxation, particularly in situations where the informal economy is essential to the survival The Addis Tax Initiative, a multi-provider of millions living in poverty. Wherever partnership, was launched at the Addis possible, the emphasis should be on direct Financing for Development Conference in progressive taxes on income or assets such

166 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

as land, which takes account of the income businesses in developing countries, often in of taxpayers and their relative ability to pay. the extractive industries, at US$138 billion. Many poor countries instead rely on indirect Total capital fight from developing countries taxes (e.g. customs duties), as these are easier (not just illicit fows) can be as high as US$1 to collect. However, these indirect taxes often trillion or US$60 billion for Africa.76 These place a heavy burden on poor people as well as are signifcant amounts, ones that could make the many millions that make up ‘the working a real difference to the revenues of developing poor’, those living just above the poverty line. countries. There is growing concern and An important test for effective policy and public pressure to rein in this massive fow technical advice for DRM is an assessment of capital and revenue that has, to date, been of the impact of changes in the tax regime on largely out of reach to the tax authorities of poor and vulnerable people.74 developing country governments.

Donors supporting DRM need to include But will LDCs and Lower Middle-Income developing countries in pro-actively Countries truly be the benefciaries of a tackling the global structural factors fair global tax regime? that distort available tax resources. Reversing these fows, implementing fair cross- Tax evasion by the rich, proft shifting by border taxation rules, improving transparency multinational businesses, tax exemptions for and shuttering international tax havens have foreign direct investment and international illicit been identifed as a prime source of revenue fows from corruption and criminal activity have for advancing Agenda 2030. Such measures all received prominent attention in recent years. are unquestionably important. But, with the Can developing country governments capture exception of a few resource rich countries, will these potential revenue streams? Steps towards LDCs and Lower Middle-Income Vountries be this goal could include better transparency in the real benefciaries of a fair global tax regime? access to tax and corporate information on a country-by-country basis, greater regulation of In their study, Development Initiatives money fowing to so-called “tax havens,” and noted that among resource-rich developing more rigorous structuring of tax regimes for countries, natural resources accounted for natural resource extraction.75 While attention 58% of total revenue and that this high has increasingly focused on these areas, the dependency left them vulnerable to swings issues are complex in making progress. in international prices for these resources. Longer-term sustainability of these sources However, the potential of these revenue is also a critical issue.77 Forstater points out sources cannot be ignored. Maya Forstater that the majority of offshore wealth is held by quotes IMF estimates that developing citizens of OECD countries and by others in countries lose between US$100 and US$300 upper middle-income countries in the South. billion in tax revenue through various proft Most LDCs and LMICs have limited access shifting techniques. She quotes an Action to foreign direct investment and therefore Aid study that values the tax exemptions for multinational tax revenue in their jurisdiction.78

167 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

5. Current Qualities of ODA: Fit for 3. Balanced allocations to regional groups, Purpose for the SDGs? according to need; 4. Focusing on gender equality and women’s If ODA is to be an essential and effective empowerment; source of development fnance for Agenda 5. Allocations of aid for demand-driven, not 2030, it must not only grow decisively in supply-led, technical cooperation; and quantity, it must also improve upon its 6. The provision of a fair share of resources performance in several key areas. for climate change, balanced between adaptation and mitigation. What is the quality of ODA in afecting change for people living in poverty? 5.1 Trends in the Sector Allocation of DAC ODA: Key sectors for people In 2011 in Busan, South Korea, donors made living in poverty important and specifc commitments to ensure more effective development cooperation. Transforming our world sets out an ambitious They did so with partner countries, non-state agenda for achieving progress across actors in civil society, and the private sector. many sectors by 2030: In Busan, all actors affrmed four principles for effective development cooperation – By 2030, double the agricultural productivity respect country ownership; focus on results and incomes of small-scale food producers, based on country priorities; support inclusive in particular women, indigenous peoples, partnerships; and deepen transparency family farmers, pastoralists and fshers ... and mutual accountability. Through the [Transforming our world, SDG2.3] Busan-mandated multi-stakeholder Global By 2030, reduce the global maternal Partnership for Effective Development mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 Cooperation, a monitoring round in early 2016 live births [Transforming our world, SDG3.1] reported on progress on commitments that By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, were made to implement the principles. tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne These results on effective development diseases and other communicable diseases. cooperation will only be available in November [Transforming our world, SDG3.3] 2016.79 Principles for effective development By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys cooperation were consistent with the goals of complete free, equitable and quality reducing poverty and inequality. This section primary and secondary education examines ODA performance in several key leading to relevant and effective learning areas affecting the goal of poverty reduction: outcomes [Transforming our world, SDG4.1] 1. Contributions to key sectors affecting the Several of these goals build on the MDGs, lives of people living in poverty; which have obtained modest success 2. Balanced allocations to country income since the Millennium Declaration of 2000. groups, according to need; Without a dramatic shift in both the quantity

168 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

and focus of ODA on key social, economic, From 2000 to 2010, ODA investment in social environmental and institutional goals, the infrastructure and services (health, education, prospect for progress by 2030 will be greatly water etc.) was considerable. The rate of diminished. What then is the starting point for growth exceeded the overall growth in ODA, ODA sector investments going forward? more than doubling from US$20.3 billion in 2000 to US$46.7 billion in 2010 (2014 constant Recently there has been no dollars). But since 2010 these investments growth in overall ODA sector have shrunk by 7% to US$43.2 billion in 2014. investments. Growth in ODA support for the Chart 21 demonstrates the increases in value of production sectors has been modest. ODA disbursements from 2000 to 2005, 2005 to 2010, and 2010 to 2014. Almost no growth In the 2005 to 2010 period, ODA investments in sector allocations has occurred during the expanded in the productive sectors (agriculture, 2010 – 2014 period, with the exception of industry, mining, trade policy, etc.), at a similar fnancial services (largely micro-fnance). rate to the overall growth in ODA. Since 2010 growth in ODA disbursements for these Investments in the social sectors have sectors have been fat at US$7.7 billion (2014 shrunk since 2010. constant dollars). Note: This area was affected

Chart 21: Growth in Value of ODA Disbursements to Sectors since 2000

169 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

by special G7 initiatives in agriculture in 2009 spending …, it should come as no surprise and 2010. (See below.) then that the MDGs remain elusive in many countries.”80 Will donors ramp up ODA investments in sectors key to realizing the SDGs? In a similar approach, trends for sector investments in health, basic education, Previous aid trends chapters in Reality agriculture, water and sanitation, and of Aid documented the degree to which government and civil society capacities can ODA priorities were infuenced by the serve as an indicator of intentions going MDGs. Using a proxy indicator for forward. (See Chart 22) ODA investments in the MDGs, the 2014 chapter concluded, The pace of large increases for health disappeared after 2010. “…the level of ODA dedicated to the MDGs has been modest at best, with During the frst decade of the 21st century, these improvements stalling after 2010. ODA disbursements for basic health, Given the failures to meet commitments reproductive health, including HIV AIDS, in ODA quantity and in addressing the and environmental protection expanded MDGs, as well as limits on government appreciably (Chart 22). Basic health /

Chart 22: Growth in Value of ODA Disbursements to Key Sectors for the SDGs

170 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

reproductive health increased from US$2.6 Agriculture investments grew from billion in 2000 to US$11.1 billion in 2010 2005 to 2010, but since 2010 have (2014 constant dollars). But after 2010, donors been more or less fat. failed to maintain this pace of increasing investments in these areas, which are crucial Benefting from the L’Aquila 2009 G7 initiative for people living in poverty. in food security and agriculture, ODA for agriculture increased by 67% to reach US$4.5 Investments in basic education have billion in 2010. Since then, increases have shrunk since 2010. been modest - around 4% to US$4.7 billion in 2014 (2014 constant dollars). Billions of From 2000 to 2010 donor ODA contributions people still rely on small-scale agriculture for for basic education grew by close to 120%. their livelihoods, which is under increasing But since 2010 basic education seems to have pressure. Issues include access to fertile land, declined as a priority. Contributions have availability and use of appropriate technology decreased from US$3.7 billion in 2010 to US$3.0 and credit, and the impact of climate extremes billion in 2014 (2014 constant dollars). Progress caused by climate change. was made in the 2000s towards achievement of the Education for All goals, but a major effort Dramatic increases in ODA are required is needed to complete full enrollment in quality to meet sector goals by 2030. primary education. The SDGs make it clear that it is also important to focus on secondary and There is no commitment in Transforming our tertiary education objectives. world or in the AAAA in terms of the extent to which ODA will be called upon to ramp In other sectors, water and sanitation increased up investments to meet the SDGs. But saying until 2008 to US$5 billion, but has stagnated, this, there is little doubt that the fnancial remaining at US$5.5 billion in 2014. needs are enormous.

Investments in strengthening Table Two provides an overview of the government and civil society scale of extra public investments required capacities grew dramatically up until (including from additional government 2010 (by 335%), but recently they revenue in developing countries) in several have declined by approximately 10%. important sectors for poor and vulnerable people. For these four sectors – education, Strengthening government and civil society health, agriculture and water and sanitation – has been a strong donor focus in the 2000s. the additional annual public investments total But ODA for this purpose declined by 10% approximately US$175 billion. These estimates after 2010 and is now down to US$12.9 also presume considerable additional private billion. However, this amount is still almost sector investments. Clearly a dramatic increase 25% higher (by value in 2014 constant dollars) in ODA is required irrespective of progress that than a decade ago, in 2005. can be made in domestic resource mobilization.

171 Table Two: Estimates of new investments required for key SDG social and productive sectors Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Extra Public Spending Sector (US$ billions annually) 2014 ODA Sector Investment Educaton US$22 billion+ US$9.1 billion Health US$51 to US$80 billion US$14.1 billion Agriculture US$51 billion US$4.9 billion Water and Sanitaton US$22 to US$24 billion US$4.5 billion Sources: Development Finance Internatonal and Oxfam, Financing the Sustainable Development Goals, Government Spending Watch Report 2015, page 31, accessed April 2015 at htp://eurodad.org/fles/pdf/1546383-fnancing-the- sustainable-development-goals-lessons-from-government-spending-on-the-mdgs.pdf; and OECD Dataset, DAC5, current dollars. 5.2 Allocation of ODA by Country Income Countries (2014 DAC list of LDCs Income Group and LICs) have been increasing since 2000 (by 36%). In 2010 they reached 49% of “Developed countries to implement fully ODA disbursements (country allocated, not their offcial development assistance including debt cancellation). Since 2010, the commitments, including the commitment share of these disbursements in ODA has by many developed countries to achieve fuctuated, and in 2014 it declined to 46% the target of … 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; of ODA. The preliminary DAC fgures for ODA providers are encouraged to 2015, however, project an increase in DAC consider setting a target to provide at disbursement for LDCs.81 least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries.” [Transforming our While the dollar value of ODA to these countries world, 17.2, A/RES/70/1, 26/35] (in 2014 dollars) has increased by more than 50% since 2005 (Table Three), there has been a There has been a positive shift in the decline in its value since 2010. This trend is true 2000s in ODA disbursements to Least for both bilateral and multilateral aid. Developed and Low Income Countries. Aid to LMICs fell from 2000, but has The past ffteen years have seen a positive shift been holding steady since 2010. in ODA disbursements to the Least Developed and Low-Income Countries. This trend is true Disbursements to Lower Middle Income both as a proportion of total ODA [46.4% in Countries (LMICs) declined slightly from 2014] (Chart 23) and in the value of the ODA 34% of ODA in 2000 to 31% in 2014. In disbursed [US$28.3 billion in 2014] (Table terms of dollar value, bilateral ODA to Three). Unfortunately, by both measures, LMICs increased by 25% since 2005, but ODA to these countries has leveled off and has declined slightly since 2010. On the even declined slightly since 2010. other hand, the value of multilateral ODA The share of ODA to LDCs and LICs has increased by close to 80% between 2005 and leveled of and declined since 2010. 2014, with an increase of 30% between 2010 and 2014. It is essential to maintain these Disbursements, as a proportion of total ODA disbursements, as poverty in these ODA, to the Least Developed and Low countries is pervasive.

172 Table Two: Estimates of new investments required for key SDG social and productive sectors Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 23: Disbursements of ODA by Income Group

ODA to UMICs has declined. 16% in 2014. The latter fgure represented a small increase from 2013. In dollar value, ODA targeting of Upper Middle Income ODA fows to these countries have increased Countries, as a proportion of total ODA, since 2010 for both bilateral (slightly) and declined from a peak of 27% in 2005 to multilateral aid (by 50%). (See Table Three)

Table Three: Value of ODA to Income Groups (Country Allocable ODA, excluding debt cancellation, Billions of 2014 constant US Dollars) Bilateral 2000 2005 2010 2014 LDCs/LICs $12.1 $18.5 $29.2 $28.3 LMICs $12.5 $13.7 $18.0 $17.3 UMICs $8.6 $17.7 $10.2 $10.4 Multlateral LDCs/LICs $7.3 $12.2 $16.6 $18.2 LMICs $5.6 $7.7 $10.4 $13.3 UMICs $4.5 $3.3 $3.7 $5.6 Total LDCs/LICs $19.4 $30.7 $45.8 $46.5 LMICs $18.1 $21.4 $28.4 $30.6 UMICs $13.1 $21.0 $13.9 $16.0 Source: OECD Dataset DAC2a, April 2016

173 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Changing membership of income of ODA in each year. In 2000, 63% of ODA groups over time went to the LDCs/LICs in that year, compared to 46% in 2014. This reduction is primarily Trends in the allocation of aid to different a function of a decrease in the number of income groups are affected by the fact that LICs from 2000 (25 countries) to 2014 (four some countries have changed their income countries). Similarly UMICs disbursements status several times since 2000. Chart 23 and as a proportion of total ODA increased from Table Three use the 2014 list of countries in 3.3% in 2000 to 16% in 2014. Presently there each income group, which is established by are 62 countries in this income group, rather the distribution of per capita income in 2013, than 28. to track trends over time.82 While the number of LDCs has remained constant, with 49 While shifts in donor country priorities occur countries in 2000 and 48 in 2014, the number over time, donors have often continued of “Other LICs” declined signifcantly over to follow the country in maintaining these years from 25 countries in 2000 to only disbursements, somewhat irrespective of four in 2014. Many of former LICs are now its change in income status (particularly for in the LMICs grouping. Similarly, LMICs LMICs). When LICs move into the LMIC declined from 45 countries in 2000 to 33 category, as noted above, this pattern of countries in 2014, during which time many continued disbursements is important, where LMICs graduated to UMICs status. UMICs the numbers of people who live in poverty have increased dramatically from 28 countries endures and governments are only able to in 2000 to 62 countries in 2014. collect low levels of revenue from domestic sources. Sumner notes that graduation from LIC to LMIC status has been precarious for some Are DAC donors meeting the AAAA countries. Where this graduation is not the target for allocation of ODA to LDCs? result of economic growth through structural changes, levels of poverty have remained DAC donors are in fact not far off the high and poverty reduction precarious. He mark for the AAAA target, which calls points to a sub-set of 19 countries for which for an allocation of 50% of ODA to Least ‘graduation’ from LIC status may have been Developed Countries, when ODA is adjusted premature.83 for components that can never be assigned to a country (for example, imputed in-donor Over time, donor aid seems to follows country expenditures). Only a few donors, the country, rather than its change in however, have achieved the 0.15% of GNI income status. target. If this 0.15% goal had been achieved in 2014 it would have resulted in US$69.5 billion A comparison of disbursements for the actual for LDCs, instead of the US$42.5 billion LDCs/LICs in 2000 to disbursement for the disbursed, amounting to a 50% increase in actual LDCs/LICs in 2014 shows a signifcant disbursements to LDCs (US$23.2 billion). This decline in these disbursements as a proportion shift in ODA is possible. Further, progress in

174 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

donors’ realizing the 0.7% UN target would 5.3 Trends in Geographic and greatly facilitate meeting this AAAA GNI Regional Distribution of ODA target for LDCs in the future. “[We] reaffrm the importance of ODA allocations need to take account supporting the new development of where people living in poverty are framework, ‘the African Union’s Agenda living, not just the diferent income 2063’, as well as its 10-year Plan of Action, groups. In fact, the majority of poor as a strategic framework for ensuring a people live in Middle-Income Countries. positive socio economic transformation in Africa within the next 50 years and its Targets for the allocation of aid between continental programme embedded in the income groups need to take into account resolutions of the General Assembly on the the actual disbursement of people living on New Partnership for Africa’s Development US$1.90 a day and US$3.10 a day in these (NEPAD). … We will enhance international countries. Not all people living in poverty live cooperation, including ODA, in these areas, in the Least Developed Countries. in particular to least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, small Table Four points out that a majority of island developing States, and countries in extremely poor people (those living on US$1.90 Africa.” [Addis Ababa Action Agenda §8 a day) actually live in Middle-Income Countries, and §120] principally LMICs. The large populations of extremely poor people in India (LMIC) and The proportion of ODA to Sub-Saharan China (UMIC) are a major factor in these Africa (44% in 2014) has remained percentages. For the broader measure of poverty more or less static since 2010. (US$3.10 a day), almost two-thirds (63%) live in Middle-Income countries. Disaggregating Improving DAC donor allocations for those living on a daily income between US$1.90 development efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa and US$3.10, (i.e. poor people on the margins was a priority in the frst decade of 2000s. of extreme poverty), fully 73% of this group As noted in Chart 24, there has been some live in Middle-Income Countries. success, moving from 34% of total ODA in 2000 to 43% in 2010.But since 2010, the Table Four: Distribution of Poverty by Country Income Groups proportion of total ODA to the sub-continent has remained relatively constant (44% in 2014). Between A slightly different pattern is apparent in DAC US$1.90 a US$3.10 US$1.90 Day a Day and bilateral aid. DAC bilateral aid to Sub-Saharan US$3.10 a Africa exhibited smaller increases in the frst Day decade, moving from 33% of total bilateral aid LDCs/ 48% 37% 27% in 2000 to 39% in 2010. But since 2010, the LICs proportion of bilateral aid to the sub-continent LMICs 37% 45% 52% has shown a modest improvement, with 43% UMICs 15% 18% 21% of bilateral assistance directed to that region in Source: World Bank PolCal Net Dataset, March 2016 2014 (Chart 25).

175 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Although aid to Asia has diminished, “We reaffrm that achieving gender ODA to Afghanistan is still prominent. equality, empowering all women and girls, and the full realization of their human The proportion of total ODA to Asia has rights are essential to achieving sustained, declined over the 15 years from 2000 (30%) inclusive and equitable economic growth to 2014 (24%). A similar decline is evident for and sustainable development. We reiterate bilateral assistance to the region. Afghanistan, the need for gender mainstreaming, however, is the exception. In 2000 bilateral including targeted actions and investments aid to this country was negligible, but by 2005 in the formulation and implementation it accounted for 16% of total bilateral aid to of all fnancial, economic, environmental Asia. It showed a major increase in 2012, at and social policies.” [Addis Ababa Action 32% of total bilateral aid to Asia. The most Agenda, §6] recent fgures (2014) indicate that bilateral aid to Afghanistan accounted for 23% of aid to SDG-5 affrms the importance of achieving Asia for that year. gender equality and women’s empowerment. All countries agreed to “adopt and strengthen 5.4 Promoting Gender Equality sound policies and enforceable legislation and Women’s Empowerment for the promotion of gender equality and

Chart 24: Trends in Regional Distribution of ODA

176 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 25: Trends in Regional Distribution of Bilateral ODA

the empowerment of all women and girls objective of the project (gender equality is the at all levels.” [Transforming our world, 5c, A/ stated primary goal); 2) gender equality is a RES/70/1, 18/35] Women’s empowerment signifcant objective (gender equality is one of has several dimensions. Realizing gender several objectives of the activity); or 3) there are equality rights is, of course, key but just as no gender equality objectives in the activity. important is the establishment of approaches to achieve development outcomes that fully include women and girls and take into account There are several questions related to the the realities of their lives. How well has ODA interpretation of this system, particularly contributed to these goals to date? with the “signifcant” marker. Donors tend to employ different interpretations of the Measuring ODA that targets gender meaning of a “signifcant” gender objective, equality: Questions about the a problem for inter-donor comparability. But OECD’s gender policy marker. also as a policy marker, donors count the full value of the activity when an activity is deemed The OECD DAC uses a project policy marker “signifcant,” even though gender equality may to track donor disbursements for gender equality only be one of several objectives.84 In both and women’s empowerment. Donors are asked cases this can produce inaccurate results, ones to screen and score their projects according to that exaggerate the fnancial commitment to three criteria: 1) gender equality is the principal gender equality and women’s empowerment.

177 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Focusing on gender equality as a Support for gender equality as a principal objective can be a proxy principal objective in projects has indicator of donor targeting gender increased in value, but remain a equality in ODA. very small proportion of screened bilateral ODA. The challenges in determining actual levels of support for gender equality in projects Over the past fve years, allocations to projects where gender equality is a signifcant where gender equality is a principal objective objective (intended to demonstrate gender have increased slightly as a share of screened mainstreaming), requires the use of a proxy bilateral ODA, from 4% in 2010 to 4.7% in indicator. In this regard, activities where gender 2014. The value of this ODA (in 2013 dollars) equality is marked as the “principal” objective however increased from US$3.1 billion to can provide an indication of the importance US$5.3 billion, a signifcant increase of 70%, donors give to gender equality in their aid although from a very low base of US$3.1 billion. allocations. Chart 26 only looks at DAC data for the period 2010 to 2014, as earlier years are Five donors account for 75% of bilateral ODA both unreliable and incomplete. activities with a gender marker of principal

Chart 26: DAC Bilateral ODA: Trends in the Gender Marker, 2010 to 2014

178 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

objective – the United States (37% of the agriculture and humanitarian aid were priority marker total), the UK (16%), Sweden (10%), sectors for gender mainstreaming (“signifcant the Netherlands (6%) and Norway (6%). objective”) in 2014.

There have been improvements in The share of ODA toward donor the coverage of the gender policy support for gender equality marker since 2010. However, 70% of organizations is almost invisible. projects that were screened had no gender equality objectives. A second indicator of DAC donors’ commitment to gender equality is The percentage of bilateral aid activities that demonstrated by the support they provide were not screened for gender equality marker to gender equality organizations. In 2014 has declined sharply since 2010, from 32% to this support amounted to US$451 million, an 9% in 2014. In practice this means that there increase of US$30 million from 2013, and the is currently a more comprehensive picture frst signifcant increase since 2010.85 Two of DAC donors’ gender policy priorities. donors – Australia and Sweden – accounted Only 25% of activities in 2014 were marked for most of this increase. But as a share of all “signifcant,” implying that they involve screened aid activities for the gender marker, gender mainstreaming. In that same year an support for these organizations is almost alarming 70% of screened activities had no invisible at 0.4%. Even as a share the small gender equality objectives. number of activities marked “principal” for gender equality objectives, women’s rights This poor performance on allocation of aid for organizations received only 8.5% of this ODA purposes relating to gender equality is in stark contrast in 2014. These are the organizations that will to the rhetoric of donors on gender equality and be the main drivers of the gender equality SDG. women’s empowerment as an essential condition for There is limited donor support for an making progress in the 2030 Agenda. enabling environment for women’s rights and empowerment. ODA with gender equality markers is concentrated in health, education In 2015 the Association for Women’s Rights and civil society projects. in Development (AWID) and 1000 women’s rights organizations criticized the international Table Five sets out the sector distribution community, saying that of ODA with a gender equality marker (either principal or signifcant). As might be “[once again it had failed] to recognize expected, projects where gender equality is the critical and unequivocal role women’s the principal objective are concentrated in organizations, feminist organizations and the social sectors such as health, education women human rights defenders have or civil society. Education, health (including played in pushing for gender equality, reproductive health), government and civil the human rights and empowerment of society, economic services (micro-fnance), women and girls.”

179 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Table Five: Sector Distribution of Bilateral ODA marked gender equality, 2014 Percentage of Total Marker Category (Sector allocable) 2014 Percentage of Marker Total (Sector Allocable) Principal Signifcant

Social Infrastructure and Services 80.5% 65.3%

Educaton 11.0% 16.4%

Basic Educaton 6.2% 4.0%

Health 17.6% 9.1%

Basic Health 15.5% 6.5%

Reproductve Health 22.1% 8.4%

Water and Sanitaton 3.6% 6.4%

Government and Civil Society 24.7% 21.0%

Women’s Equality Organizatons 8.8% 0%

Confict, Peace and Security 2.4% 4.1%

Economic Infrastructure and Services 2.7% 10.1%

Producton Sectors 9.6% 11.7%

Agriculture 8.8% 8.9%

Cross Cutng, Mult-Sectors 7.2% 13.0%

Humanitarian Aid 1.8% 11.9%

Other Sectors 2.7% 10.1%

Source: OECD Dataset: Aid projects targetng gender equality and women’s empowerment, CRS

This picture of the real priorities for gender 5.5 Demand-Led Technical Cooperation equality in the allocations of donor ODA for Partner Countries? confrms this observation. In recent years, women’s rights organizations have pushed Technical cooperation (TC) has been a strategic resource for donors and partner governments to “to commit to creating an countries since the launch of aid programs in enabling environment and resources to allow the 1960s. The dollar value of this resource women’s organizations, feminist organizations increased in the early 2000s, but has been and women human rights defenders to be able declining over the past eight years as a share to do their work free from violence.”86 Their in donor ODA disbursements. Donors in the efforts have met with little success to date. 2008 Accra Agenda for Action agreed that

180 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

“Donor support for capacity development than 30% since 2006. The 2014 fgure (US$17.8 will be demand-driven and designed to billion) is below the 2000 level (US$20.2 billion). support country ownership. To this end, These shifts in the priority and use of TC have developing countries and donors will i) primarily been with bilateral donors. In contrast, jointly select and manage technical co- the value of multilateral cooperation TA has been operation, and ii) promote the provision relatively stable since 2000. of technical co-operation by local and regional resources, including through The changing priority for TC as an aid South-South co-operation.” modality for bilateral donors is apparent Chart 28, which shows the share of TC in DAC Real Recognizing that it is hard to measure the Bilateral ODA since 2000. degree to which technical cooperation has been lead by partner country priorities and TC has dropped from 24% of Real management, this section identifes some Bilateral Aid in 2010 to 19% in 2014. macro trends in TC. As a share of Real Bilateral ODA bilateral The value of technical cooperation has technical cooperation, has declined signifcantly been declining since the mid-2000s. since its peak of 48% share in 2003. From 2007 to 2013 it maintained a level of around As indicated by Chart 27, the value of technical 24% but fell to 19% in 2014. It is diffcult to cooperation (in 2013 dollars) has declined by more predict whether this decline will continue.

Chart 27: Trends in the Value of Technical Cooperation, 2000 to 2014

181 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 28: Trends in Bilateral Technical Cooperation as a Percentage of Real Bilateral ODA

The distribution of TC by country As indicated by Table Six below donor income groups indicates that almost countries’ share of TC in their ODA varies half is allocated to LDCs/LICs. considerably. For example, Germany allocates close to 50% of its bilateral ODA through In 2014, 44% of TC was disbursed LDCs and technical cooperation, while for United States LICs, with 22% in LMICs and 19% in UMICs. TC was only 2.7% of bilateral ODA in 2014. About 15% of TC was not implemented in a Germany, Japan and France accounted for specifc country. Surprisingly governments with more than 60% of TC in 2014. These three low revenue per capita are not a clear priority for this assistance. Although 51% went to countries donors also account for the largest share of with less than $1,500 per loans in their bilateral ODA. capita revenue, 43% went Table Six: Share of Technical Cooperation in Donor ODA (2014) to countries with per capita Share of TC in Donor Bilateral ODA revenue above $1,500 and Donor Share of TC Donor Share of TC 23% to those with per capita Germany 46.9% United Kingdom 13.4% (2013) revenue over $3,000. Austria 43.9% Sweden 13.3% Germany, Japan and Belgium 36.9% The Netherlands 12.0% France account for Japan 33.2% Norway 6.2% 60% of bilateral TC in Australia 32.8% United States 2.7% 2014. France 32.2% Denmark 2.6% Source: OECD Dataset DAC2a, April 2016

182 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Six sectors receive the bulk of technical public sector policy and administration reform, cooperation. and 4) modernizing agricultural practices.

An interesting question is the sectors that Table Eight: Allocation of Technical Cooperation with Sectors (2014) receive the largest investments in TC. Note: Due to data limitations this table Unfortunately, there is insuffcient data for allocates US$5.5 billion out of total bilateral a defnitive answer. However, based on the TC of US$15.5 billion 2014 disbursements of US$5.5 billion in TC Share of Allocable Sector Technical (out of a total of US$15.5 billion), Table Seven Cooperaton provides a tentative breakdown. As indicated, Confict, Peace and 14.0% government and civil society sectors received Security the largest share, with education not far Other Social behind. Six sectors received more than 87% Infrastructure and 13.9% of these TC disbursements. Services

Table Seven: Allocation of Technical Basic Educaton 12.6% Cooperation within Sectors (2014) Public Sector Policy Note: Due to data limitations this table 10.3% allocates US$5.5 billion out of total bilateral and Administraton TC of US$15.5 billion Agriculture 9.7% Sector Share of Allocable Technical Cooperaton Producton Sectors 8.6% Government and Civil Society 27.7% Source: OECD Dataset DAC2a, April 2016 Educaton 21.7% Mult-Sector 18.2% 5.6 Climate Finance and ODA: Agriculture 9.1% Balancing adaptation and Health 6.5% mitigation Confict, Peace and Security 6.1% The Conference of the Parties, “decides that Source: OECD Dataset DAC2a, April 2016 … developed countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilization goal Peace and security, social [USD 100 billion per year] through 2025 in infrastructure, basic education and the context of meaningful mitigation actions public sector policy have the largest and transparency on implementation; prior share of TC within a sector allocation to 2025 the Conference of the Parties of bilateral ODA. … shall set a new collective quantifed In which sectors is TC playing the largest goal from a foor of USD 100 billion per role? Table Eight shows the share of TC in year, taking into account the needs and disbursements for various sectors. Four areas priorities of developing countries.” [Paris utilized the greatest amount of TC resources Agreement, §54] in aid directed to this sector – 1) promoting confict resolution, peace and security, 2) “Decides that the Green Climate Fund developing capacities for basic education, 3) and the Global Environment Facility, the

183 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

entities entrusted with the operation of the Agreement, Preamble].” Article 9 (in the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, Annex) calls on developed countries to as well as the Least Developed Countries maximize the mobilization of resources from Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, all sources, “noting the signifcant role of administered by the Global Environment public funds,” whereby “such mobilization of Facility, shall serve the Agreement.” [Paris climate fnance should represent a progression Agreement, §59] beyond previous efforts.”

An ambitious Paris Agreement was Currently there is no agreement on what reached at COP21 in December 2015. and how to count climate finance to reach the US$100 billion goal by 2020. The Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate While Article 9 calls on developed countries to Change (UNFCCC), in Paris (December “to take the lead in mobilizing climate fnance 2015), brokered an historic, far-reaching from a wide variety of sources, instruments and legally binding Paris Agreement with and channels, noting the signifcant role of ambitious measures for the mitigation public funds,” sources for this fnance are and adaptation to climate change. While ambiguous and contested. A central question commitments by governments reported to is what constitutes climate fnance and how COP21 are still insuffcient to meet the stated should it be measured? aim to keep global warming “well below 2o C above pre-industrial levels”, the ‘parties’ have After more than a decade of discussion there agreed to review emission targets every fve is no general agreement on this question. The years and implement other actions to ensure UNFCCC Committee of Finance in 2014 put that this goal is achieved. Furthermore, forward an initial defnition: parties have agreed “to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre- “Climate fnance aims at reducing emissions, industrial levels, recognizing that this would and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing the vulnerability of, and signifcantly reduce the risks and impacts of maintaining and increasing the resilience of, climate change.” [Annex, Article 2] Article 2 human and ecological systems to negative also acknowledges, “This Agreement will be climate change impacts.” implemented to refect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities However, the Parties to the Convention have and respective capabilities, in the light of not formally endorsed this statement.87 different national circumstances.” What is the most appropriate Given these ambitious goals and actions, modality for climate fnance? governments adhering to the Paris Agreement recognize “the urgent need to enhance the Another topic of debate is the most appropriate provision of fnance … in a predictable modality for climate fnance – grants or loans. manner, to enable enhanced pre-2020 CSOs argue that grants are the appropriate action by developing country Parties [Paris modality, particularly for adaptation. They

184 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

maintain that developing countries should How much progress has been made to date not be put in the position of increased debt with respect to the US$100 billion target? In burdens to mitigate or adapt to conditions a comprehensive report, the OECD suggests for which they bear no responsibility.88 This that private and public fnance by developed brings up another question: Should climate countries for “climate action” in developing fnance be measured as gross fows, including countries reached US$62 billion in 2014, up all loans, or on a net fow basis (less repayment from US$52 billion in 2013. of debt), and counting only concessional public and private fnance? Even more ambiguous For the purposes of the OECD assessment, is the question of counting private fnance climate actions are all investments targeting and investment for mitigating and adapting “low carbon or climate resilient development,” to climate impacts. None of these questions which do not include coal. According to the report, more than 70% of these fows have been resolved. were bilateral or multilateral public funding (including non-concessional loans) and 25% Will climate finance be additional to ODA? were private sourced funds mobilized through Unfortunately, the concerns of developing donor public fnancial activities. The small remaining funds were export credits. But the countries and CSOs for “new and additional” report acknowledges that the data gathering climate fnance (above commitments to ODA) methodologies had varying degrees of coverage all but fell off the agenda in the Paris meetings. and consistency, as they were subject to Should climate related activities in ODA, different accounting methods among donors.89 where the donor performance is less than the UN target of 0.7% of GNI, be available The OEDC report also demonstrates that only for donors to include when measuring their one sixth of this fnancing went to adaptation, contributions to the US$100 million goal? At and that 75% targeted mitigation projects. In the COP17 in Bali in 2007, Parties agreed to Paris, the Agreement calls for an improved the principle of “additionality.” Much of the balance: “The provision of scaled-up fnancial donor-sourced Fast Track Climate Finance, resources should aim to achieve a balance agreed at COP19 in Copenhagen in 2009, was between adaptation and mitigation, taking not necessarily new and additional, but was into account country-driven strategies, and drawn from and reported as ODA. In the Paris the priorities and needs of developing country Agreement, what constitutes “progression Parties …” [Annex, Article 9] Poor and beyond previous efforts” remains ambiguous. vulnerable people will be disproportionately affected by extreme climatic events; investment in adaptation is critical for development efforts The question is: How much climate that strengthen resilience to climate change for fnance to date, and for whom? the most affected populations and countries. When it comes to accountability for fnancing Donor bilateral climate fnance is commitments, all the above issues will reported to the OECD on a policy inevitably affect the accuracy, credibility, and marker basis. This gives unreliable ultimately the ambition, of reported climate estimates of the total value of actual fnance by the Parties to meet the Paris targets. climate fnance.

185 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

The OECD has developed an ODA policy At the Paris Conference, donors made more than marker for DAC donor climate fnance US$1.5 billion in new commitments to climate targeting mitigation and adaption, either as funds. These included US$260 million to the a “principal” objective of a project, or as a Green Climate Fund, mandated by the UNFCCC “signifcant” objective (one among several as the primary fnancial instrument for public other objectives). But the full value of a climate fnance. Other commitments were made project is included for projects screened as to the Least Developed Countries Fund (US$252 “signifcant.” Projects may also be screened as million), the Global Climate Change Alliance both mitigation and adaptation. (US$380 million), the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (US$339 million), the REDD+ Early In 2014, DAC donors marked US$18.8 billion Movers Program (US$113 million), and the in projects, or 14.4% of aggregate aid, as Adaptation Fund (US$75 million). targeting mitigation (including dual targeting with adaptation). Another US$12.4 billion, or 9.9% of Additional commitments for new initiatives aggregate aid, was marked as targeting adaptation were made to insurance resilience funds (more 90 (including dual targeting with mitigation). The than US$2 billion in coverage), the Green Wall OECD estimate that approximately US$19 billion for the Sahara and Sahel (US$2.2 billion), and (or about 16% of Real ODA for these years) was the World Bank’s Transformative Carbon Asset reported to the UNFCCC as climate fnance Facility (US$500 million), among others.94 for 2013/14.91 However, this amount should be viewed with caution due to the limitations of In the lead-up to the Paris Conference, China the marker system noted above. Each donor made a major commitment of US$3.1 billion in also uses its own coeffcient and methodology South South Cooperation for climate fnance. for determining the portion of ODA activities marked climate fnance that will be reported to The Green Climate Fund is fully 92 the UNFCCC. operational. But what will be the sources for “new and additional” It is also interesting to note that in 2014 fve fnance for climate action? donors (Germany, Japan, France, the US, and Norway) provided more than 79% of marked The Green Climate Fund is now the largest climate fnance for mitigation. These same climate facility. It has more than US$10 billion fve donors, with the substitution of Sweden in pledges, and US$2.9 billion in paid up funds. for Norway, provided 67% of adaptation The frst grants were allocated in September fnance. In terms of activities marked as climate 2015 and the Fund expects to allocate US$2.5 mitigation as a principal objective, almost half billion by the end of 2016.95 were concentrated in Asia, with only 6.7% in Sub-Saharan Africa. For activities marked The launch of the Green Climate Fund with climate adaptation as a principal objective, sizable pledges will play a signifcant role in 21% were focused in Sub-Saharan Africa, with meeting the Paris Agreement’s climate action 93 another 30% concentrated in Asia. goals. However, without clarity and agreement on what constitutes targeted climate fnance What climate fnance commitments towards these goals, the ambition of US$100 were made in Paris? billion for these actions by 2020 is likely to be

186 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

unattainable. The World Resources Institute Climate Change identifed middle-income has set out several fnancing scenarios, which aid providing countries through South-South implies that high to medium growth in the Cooperation, the mobilization of citizens’ levels of developed country climate fnance for resources by CSOs, and investments by the developing countries will be required.96 But will private sector to help fll these funding gaps. these investments be “new and additional” to ODA, or will they come at the expense of the 6.1 South-South Cooperation Aid urgent need to expand ODA fnancing to meet Providers the full range of sustainable development goals? “South-South cooperation is an important 6. Other Sources of Development element of interna tional cooperation Cooperation Finance for development as a complement, not a sub stitute, to North-South cooperation. “[A revistalized Global Partnership] will We recognize its increased importance, facilitate an intensive global engagement different history and particularities, and in support of implementation of all the stress that South-South cooperation should Goals and targets, bringing together be seen as an expres sion of solidarity Governments, the private sector, civil among peoples and countries of the South, society, the United Nations system and based on their shared experiences and other actors and mobilizing all available objectives. … We welcome the increased resources.” [Transforming our world, §39] contributions of South-South coop eration to poverty eradication and sustainable “We acknowledge the role of the diverse development. We encourage developing private sector, ranging from micro- countries to voluntarily step up their efforts enterprises to cooperatives to multinationals, to strengthen South-South cooperation….” and that of civil society organizations [Addis Ababa Action Agenda, §56 & §57] and philanthropic organizations in the implementation of the new Agenda.” In the lead-up to the Special General [Transforming our world, §41] Assembly’s adoption of the 2030 Agenda, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged “the Governments are the foundation for setting acceleration of the development momentum the requisite policies, programs and fnance to across the global South.” He noted the key role implement Agenda 2030 inside the priorities South-South Cooperation (SSC) can play in its established by each country. ODA will play implementation. Alicia Bárcena, Executive a crucial role in complementing government Secretary of the UN ECLAC (Economic revenues for these purposes. But ODA alone Commission for Latin America and the is insuffcient to meet the fnancing needs of Caribbean), refected a common refrain in the developing countries, even if donors were to international community when she recently meet their 0.7% commitments on aid quantity. asserted the unsustainability of “the current Other sources of fnancing are essential. The pattern of development.” She called for a international community meeting in 2015 on change of paradigm, saying that “here South- Financing for Development, the SDG, and South cooperation plays a central role.”97

187 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

The April 2014 High Level Meeting (HLM) Development Bank made its frst loans in early for the Global Partnership for Effective 2016, civil society critics expressed concern Development Cooperation in Mexico welcomed, about the absence of transparency and suffcient environmental and social safeguards “the initiatives undertaken by Southern in the Bank’s approval processes.98 partners to deepen the understanding of the nature and modalities of South-South A focus on SSC concessional fows Cooperation and the ways and means to enhance its development impact as well as SSC providers have been allocating highly its potential synergies with the efforts of concessional development fnance (loans and other development cooperation partners grants), whose terms parallel the rules for and modalities.” [§27] determining ODA established by the OECD DAC. While not underestimating the medium The second HML, scheduled to take place term importance of the various institutional in Nairobi, November 2016, is expected to initiatives noted above, the focus here is on continue this focus on SSC as a key resource trends for SSC concessional fows. Can they for the SDGs. be scaled-up to fnance the SDGs alongside more traditional aid fows from DAC donors? Concessional South-South Cooperation forms only part of an A number of SSC providers have been emerging parallel development reporting their aid fows to the DAC, which, fnance architecture. in turn, publishes them alongside those from DAC members. Unfortunately, other SSC South-South Cooperation represents a broad providers have not regularly published up-to- range of assistance efforts between middle- date statistics for fnancial fows in support income SSC providers and other developing of development cooperation, comparable to country partners. SSC fnancing extends beyond DAC ODA. In the absence of this data, it is the scope of concessional development fnance. only possible to make informed estimates of In an increasingly multi-polar world, several total SSC concessional fnance. rapidly developing middle-income countries, lead by China, are creating a parallel development SSC aid fows increased to US$32.2 fnance architecture. These initiatives include the billion in 2014, but the increase recently launched the BRICS New Development since 2012 is highly concentrated Bank, the Chinese-sponsored Asia Infrastructure among three donors – Saudi Arabia, Development Bank, and China’s South-South Turkey and the UAE. Cooperation Fund. Table Nine provides an estimate for total These Southern-initiated institutions create concessional fows from SSC and other non- new and alternative opportunities for country DAC donors. For the period of 2014/15, governments seeking development fnance. these fows amount to US$32.2 billion. However, some concerns and cautions have According to OECD DAC sources, SSC fows been noted. For example, when the New have increased considerably since 2012, when

188 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Table Nine: Estimates of South South Cooperation Concessional Flows for Development (DAC ODA-like flows) Concessional Assistance Aid Provider (millions US$) Notes a) SSC Providers Reportng to the DAC Saudi Arabia $13,634 2014 United Arab Emirates $4,389 2015 Turkey $3,913 2015 Russia $1,140 2015 Hungary $152 2015 Israel $207 2015 Kuwait $277 2014 Romania $214 2014 Chinese Taipei $274 2014 Nine (9) Other providers* $344 2014 and 2015 b) SSC Providers Not Reportng to the DAC (estmates) China $3,400 2014 India $1,600 2015 Qatar $1,344 2013 Brazil $500 2010 Mexico $530 2013 South Africa $148 2014 Four (4) Other Providers** $174 2014 $11,952 in 2012 & Total SSC Providers 2014/15 $32,240 (estmate) $27,325 in 2013 (same sources) Percentage of DAC Real ODA (2014) 26% Percentage of DAC Country Programmable Aid, including Humanitarian Assistance (2014) 46% Sources: Providers reportng to the DAC: OECD Dataset DAC1a (2015 current prices); Providers not reportng to the DAC: OECD DAC Table 33a: Estmates of concessional fnance for development (ODA- like fows) of key providers of development cooperaton that do not report to the OECD-DAC, accessed April 2016 at htp://www.oecd.org/development/stats/statstcsonresourcefowstodevelopingcountries.htm; For India, DevEx, “India’s Foreign Aid Budget: Where is the money going?,” March 9, 2015, accessed April 2016 at htps://www.devex. com/news/india-s-2015-16-foreign-aid-budget-where-the-money-is-going-85666. * The nine providers are Bulgaria, Croata, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, and Thailand. *** The four providers are Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Indonesia. the equivalent estimate put fows from these The Middle East accounted for almost donors at US$12 billion. 70% of SSC fows in 2014/15.

Three donors accounted for 85% of the US$20 Chart 29 tracks the regional distribution of billion increase between 2012 and 2014/15 – SSC and non-DAC donor fows. It is evident Saudi Arabia,(increased by US$13.3 billion); that the primary focus for 2014/15 fows is the United Arab Emirates (increased by US$3.6 Middle East and North Africa, which make up 73% of those fows distributed by region.100 billion) and Turkey (increased by US$1.4 Sub-Saharan Africa received only 9% of the billion). The primary focus for these donors, recorded fows, most of which came from and the dramatic increases in SSC resources, China and India. India is reported to allocate is the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, at least 80% of its concessional aid to its 99 particularly in Syria and Egypt. immediate neighbours, particularly Bhutan.

189 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 29: Distribution of South-South Cooperation and Non-DAC Donors’ Concessional Flows

While Arab aid providers are presently donor is unclear,101 and Mexico has not yet reported contributing much needed humanitarian the regional distribution of its aid allocations. support in the Middle East and North Africa, this is, hopefully, a time-specifc urgency. For some years to come, SSC So a high percentage of this aid may not be concessional aid fow targeting the available for the 2030 Agenda, as it is likely SDGs is likely to be modest relative to to decline when the immediate humanitarian the DAC fows. crises in the region subside. In terms of concessional fows, it is important China and India are the primary SSC to note that several SSC providers under- aid providers beyond the Middle estimate their contributions to SSC through East, with approximately $5 billion in-kind technical assistance. But given current in fows annually. realities for middle-income providers, the potential role of SSC in fnancing the SDGs, Among the other SSC providers, China and India beyond China and India, with perhaps some (with a combined estimate of US$5 billion in contributions from Brazil, Mexico and South concessional fows in 2014/15) are the primary Africa, will be modest, when compared to providers outside the Middle East. Given the current ODA allocations of DAC donors. current political turmoil in Brazil, its future as a However, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,

190 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

China and South Africa), as well as Mexico and forgiving the debt owed China by relevant Indonesia, may also provide signifcant non- LDCs, landlocked developing countries, and concessional resources bilaterally or through small island developing countries.103 various South-South development banks. At the second Summit of the Forum on Triangular cooperation is modest to date. China-Africa Cooperation (December 2015), China’s President announced US$60 billion in A number of DAC donors have engaged in funding for Africa over the next three years. “triangular cooperation,” joint initiatives This included: involving middle-income aid providers with DAC donors and partner countries in the • US$5 billion in interest free loans; South. These innovations in fnance are • US$35 billion in preferential loans and often promoted at international meetings on export credit; development fnance. • US$5 billion in additional capital for each of the China-Africa Development Bank The OECD DAC recently completed a study and Special Loans for the Development that was based on a survey of actors involved of African SMEs; and in triangular cooperation. These actors were • US$10 billion to support a fund for strong advocates for such efforts to build greater China-Africa production capacity collaboration between development partners development.104 and to support developing country partners with innovative technical support. However, the There was no indication of the degree to which fndings also pointed to the lack of policies and these announcements would affect the level of guidelines for triangular cooperation. It notes, that concessional fnance (ODA-like) in future years. at this stage, fnance through triangular cooperation is still modest, where “most providers […] invested 6.2 Civil Society as Aid Providers less than USD $10 million per year,” and “most “Multi-stakeholder partnerships and the developing countries received less than USD $5 resources, knowledge and ingenuity of the million in total through triangular cooperation.”102 private sector, civil society, the scientifc The role for China in future community, academia, philanthropy and development cooperation in support foundations, parliaments, local authorities, of the SDGs is expanding. volunteers and other stakeholders will be important to mobilize and share At the end of 2015, China made a number of knowledge, expertise, technology and signifcant announcements regarding future fnancial resources, complement the initiatives for its development cooperation. At efforts of Governments, and support the Special Session of the UN for the SDGs the achievement of the sustainable in September, President Xi Jinping announced development goals, in particular in the creation of a US$2 billion fund to support developing countries.” [Addis Ababa South-South Cooperation. He committed to Action Agenda, §10]

191 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

While CSOs are recognized as critical actors (in current dollars) have been slowly increasing in development, particularly in knowledge since 2010 when US$18.6 billion of ODA sharing and accountability, neither the AAAA was implemented by CSOs, translating into an nor Transforming our world put much emphasis increase of over 15% in the past four years.106 on these organizations as important providers of development cooperation. The same can While proportions varied among DAC be said of the role of private foundations. countries, together DAC donor bilateral ODA channeled through and to CSOs represented But CSOs provide signifcant fnancing for 22% of their Real Bilateral ODA in 2014, up from 20% in 2010. development. It is estimated that CSOs manage approximately US$70 billion in development An accurate estimate of private assistance annually, primarily from DAC funds raised for development by countries (taking into account both their CSOs is challenging. privately raised funds and donor resources channeled through CSOs – see below). Some DAC members provide estimates of private funds raised by CSOs in their country. As a key partner for civil society in developing Since 2010, these estimates have hovered countries, CSOs are global development around US$34 billion, with a small drop in actors, playing multiple roles on the ground in 2014 to US$32.8 billion (mainly due to two 107 communities. They contribute to innovative donors not reporting in that year). Of this sector projects, support humanitarian amount, US$26 billion in 2014, or more than 75%, was raised in the United States. assistance, and hold other development actors accountable to their commitments Given the reporting limitations, these estimates and good governance. At the same time, do not provide a comprehensive accounting CSOs have witnessed a deteriorating enabling of all private funds raised by CSOs. In 2013, environment for their work in an increasing the Center for Global Prosperity put total 105 number of countries. privately raised CSOs funds at US$48 billion globally, including US$370 million in Brazil, ODA implemented by CSOs is China, India and South Africa.108 The DAC increasing, reaching US$21.6 also records that US$330 million was raised by billion in 2014. CSOs in Turkey in 2014, and US$190 million in the United Arab Emirates. The DAC documents offcial aid resources channeled to CSOs (for purposes identifed Unfortunately, the Center for Global Prosperity by CSOs) and through CSOs (for purposes has not produced a report on philanthropic identifed by the donor and contracted to contributions since 2013. CSOs). In 2014, DAC donors provided US$18.7 billion to CSOs, with an additional US$2.9 billion It is estimated that US$70 billion channeled to CSOs by multilateral organizations. in development cooperation This makes for a total of US$21.6 billion in resources are raised and managed ODA implemented by CSOs. These amounts by CSOs.

192 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

While only an estimate, combining the DAC strategy to deal with the fnancing gap, donors fgures on ODA fnance channeled through have been eager to bring the business sector to CSOs and the private fnancing identifed the table to discuss fnancing options for the by the Center for Global Prosperity, CSOs SDGs. At the same time, they are expanding currently contribute at least US$70 billion in options for using ODA as a means to increase development cooperation. private sector investment in support of the SDGs in the poorest countries. 6.3 The Private Sector, ODA and the SDGs Corporate foreign investment is concentrated in the wealthy “Encourage and promote effective developing countries. public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience It is suggested that there has been a major shift and resourcing strategies of partnerships.” towards private sector fnance now available [Transforming our world, Goal 17.17, 27/35] to developing countries that can be tapped for the SDGs, essentially marginalizing ODA as a “Projects involving blended fnance, development resource. including public-private partnerships, should share risks and reward fairly, However, current allocations of private foreign include clear accountability mechanisms direct investment (FDI) to developing countries tells a different message. Of the $690 billion in FDI and meet social and environmental directed to developing countries in 2014, 76% was standards. … We also commit to holding invested in Upper Middle Income Countries, 17% inclusive, open and transparent discussion in LMICs, and a mere 6.5% in Least Developed when developing and adopting guidelines (LDCs) and Low Income Countries (LICs).109 and documentation for the use of public- private partnerships…” [AAAA, §48] Goodman and Hilton, in the Australian chapter for this Report, point to UNCTAD “Aid for Trade can play a major calculations demonstrating that foreign direct role. We will focus Aid for Trade on investment in physical operations (removing developing countries, in particular least mergers and acquisitions) was only US$63 developed countries, including through billion in 2014 for all developing countries, the Enhanced Integrated Framework outside of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South for Trade-Related Technical Assistance Korea, Singapore and the UAE, with only to Least Developed Countries. We will US$1.5 billion to least developed countries.110 strive to allocate an increasing proportion These investments of US$63 billion are just of Aid for Trade going to least developed under DAC members’ total Real Bilateral countries …” [AAAA, §90] ODA in that year (US$85.2 billion) – excluding in-donor student and refugee costs and debt Private sector investment is a crucial cancellation. component to achieving the SDGs by 2030, particularly in areas of economic infrastructure, Given the absence of signifcant investment sustainable livelihoods and decent jobs. As a opportunities in LDCs and LICs, the foreign

193 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

private sector investment is unlikely to turn Among PPPs supported by USAID, the tide with private fnancing for the SDGs, 89% were with business sector particularly in the poorest countries. In these partners, and 83% were highly countries the route to expanding opportunities associated with the commercial for better livelihoods lies with strengthening the interests of the business partner. domestic private sector, and particularly small and medium enterprises, and the rural economy, as The Brookings Institute recently published an Reality of Aid argued in its 2012 Global Report.111 interesting study of PPPs initiated by USAID, a major promoter of engaging the private ODA support for private public sector in USAID development efforts. The partnerships (PPPs) is increasing, but study reviewed 1,600 projects between 2001 112 remains a very small portion of ODA. and 2014. The total value of USAID’s investment in these PPP projects was US$16.5 billion, averaging US$880 million a year, Calls for strengthening “private public with the expectation that private partners partnerships” (PPPs) in support of the SDGs contributed at least an equal share. was a persistent refrain at both the Addis Financing for Development Conference and the A review of these projects presents a different SDG Special UN Session approving the SDGs profle that the macro picture in the DAC data: in September 2015. • Only 26% (by value) targeted UMICs, Indeed, several donors have devoted increasing while 42% targeted MICs, and 32% amounts of ODA in PPPs. This support has targeted LDCs and LICs; and grown from US$84.8 million in 2005 to US$700.7 • In relation to sectors 47% (by value) was million in 2014 (2014 constant dollars). (Chart 30) concentrated in the health sector (in part due to one very large project worth US$4.2 Five donors account for more than 85% of these billion), 13% in agriculture and food PPP disbursements in 2014 – Belgium, Denmark, security, 12% in economic growth, trade and the Netherlands, the UK and the US. However, entrepreneurship, 7% in education, and 12% despite this growth, ODA directed to PPPs were considered multi-sectoral. accounted for only 1.3% of the ODA of these fve donors in that year. The Brookings study also explored several questions on the nature of the partnerships. It Social sectors rank high in sector found that 89% of the PPPs (by value) were with distribution of allocable PPP ODA. business sector partners (with the remaining 11% with NGOs). The PPPs (83% by value) For DAC donors as a whole, close to 40% were highly associated with the commercial of ODA devoted to PPPs was directed to the interests of the business partner, which can be social sectors in 2014. The productive sectors considered an informal modality for tying US accounted for 20% of sector allocable PPP aid to US corporate interests. Technical advice ODA, with agriculture making up 9.4% of this and expertise represented the main resource amount. Approximately 21% of sector allocable offered by the business sector (88% of the PPP ODA was directed to business support PPPs by value). They also found that where the services, and 16% to multi-sectors (including business sector contributed expertise, the PPP 11% devoted to environmental protection). was more likely to be tied to their commercial

194 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Chart 30: Donor ODA to Public Private Partnerships, 2005 - 2014

interests. The study, unfortunately, did not ODA resources devoted to strengthening assess these PPPs in terms of a sustained the trade relations of developing countries. development impact and poverty reduction. For example, the fgure includes all ODA in support of economic infrastructure, Allocation of ODA to key sectors targeting including micro-fnance, and all of agricultural aid-for-trade held constant since 2005. investments, with unknown amounts focusing on production for trade.. Aid-for-trade has been a long-standing interest of donors following the collapse of the WTO Perhaps a more accurate picture is provided Doha Development Round of trade talks through an examination of the detailed DAC in 2005. However, an accurate assessment sector codes. The DAC CRS records $763 million of aid for trade is diffcult, both in terms of in 2014 devoted to trade policy and regulation. the amount invested and the impact of trade Other elements, such as transportation and on development outcomes for poor and storage, business support services, mineral 113 marginalized populations. The most recent resources and mining, and commodities support DAC fgures put ODA devoted to aid-for- could arguably be included. The sum of all 114 trade at US$42.8 billion. of these components for 2015 gives a total investment of US$9 billion, far removed from the Given the fact that the DAC does not $42.8 billion claimed. It is also useful to note that disaggregate large allocations in the fnance these sectors have been a constant proportion of and production sectors, this amount appears allocable sector aid resources since 2005, hovering to be a signifcant exaggeration of the real between 10% and 12% over the decade.

195 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Annex One

Addis Ababa Acton Agenda: Development Cooperaton Commitments

1. ODA Levels: “ODA providers reaffrm their respective ODA commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries.” [§51] 2. Focus on least developed countries: “We recognize the importance of focusing the most concessional resources on those with the greatest needs and least ability to mobilize other resources,” including praise for those countries that devote at least 50% of their ODA to least developed countries. [§52] 3. Predictability and transparency: “Encourage the publication of forward- looking plans which increase clarity, predictability and transparency of future development cooperation, in accordance with national budget allocation processes.” [§53] 4. Tracking resources of gender equality: “Urge countries to track and report resource allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment.” [§53] 5. Catalyze resources from other sources: Support domestic resource mobilization and “unlock additional fnance through blended or pooled fnancing.” [§54] 6. Effective development cooperation: “Welcome continued efforts to improve the quality, impact and effectiveness of development cooperation and other international efforts in public fnance, including adherence to agreed development cooperation effectiveness principles” and will “take account of efforts in other relevant forums, such as the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, in a complementary manner.” [§58] 7. Humanitarian fnance: “We recognize the need for the coher ence of developmental and humanitarian fnance to ensure more timely, comprehensive, appropriate and cost-effective approaches to the management and mitigation of natural disas ters and complex emergencies. We commit to promoting inno vative fnancing mechanisms to allow countries to better prevent and manage risks and develop mitigation plans.” [§66] 8. Peacebuilding: “We recognize the peacebuilding fnanc ing gap and the role played by the Peacebuilding Fund. We will step up our efforts to assist countries in accessing fnancing for peacebuilding and development in the post-confict context.” [§67] 9. Innovative fnance: “We invite more countries to voluntarily join in implementing innovative mecha nisms, instruments and modalities which do not unduly burden developing countries.” [§69] 10. Multilateral Development Banks: “We encourage the multilateral development fnance institutions to establish a process to examine their own role, scale and

196 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

functioning to enable them to adapt and be fully responsive to the sustainable development agenda.” [§70] 11. Middle-income countries: “We recognize that middle-income countries still face signifcant challenges to achieve sustainable development. … We also acknowledge that ODA and other concessional fnance is still important for a number of these countries and has a role to play for targeted results, taking into account the specifc needs of these countries.” [§71] 12. South South Cooperation (SSC): “Recognize its increased importance, different history and particularities, and stress that South-South cooperation should be seen as an expres sion of solidarity among peoples and countries of the South, based on their shared experiences and objectives. It should continue to be guided by the principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual beneft.” [§56] 13. Development Banks: “We welcome efforts by new development banks to develop safeguard systems in open consultation with stakeholders on the basis of established international standards, and encourage all development banks to establish or maintain social and environmental safeguards systems, including on human rights, gender equality and women’s empowerment, that are transparent, effective, effcient and time-sensitive.” [§75] 14. Strengthening health systems and universal health coverage: “We commit to strengthening the capacity of countries, in particular developing countries, for early warn ing, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks, as well as to substantially increase health fnancing and the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, especially in least developed countries and small island developing States.” [§77] 15. Delivering quality education: “We will scale up investments and international coopera tion to allow all children to complete free, equitable, inclusive and quality early childhood, primary and secondary education, including through scaling-up and strengthening initiatives, such as the Global Partnership for Education.” [§78] 16. Climate fnance: Look forward to a Paris Agreement that “refects the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances.” [§59] The AAAA “recognize(s) the need for transparent methodologies for reporting climate fnance…” [§60] It notes the decision of the Board of the Green Climate Fund to “aim for a 50:50 balance between mitigation and adaptation over time on a grant equivalent basis and to aim for a foor of 50 per cent of the adapta tion allocation for particularly vulnerable countries, including least developed countries, small island developing States and African countries.” [§61]

197 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources? Annex Two Future Trends in DAC Donor ODA 2014 to 2015 Increase / Donor Expected Trend Decrease & Percentage of Total DAC ODA in 2015

Decrease: The May 2016 budget projected another decrease in Australian aid. From a high of AU$5,053 million in 2012-13, aid fell to AU$4,052 million in 2015-16, and is Decreased 11.1%. Australia projected to be AU$3,828 million in 2016-17, AU$3,912 million in 2017-18 and AU$4,014 billion in 2018-19. Aid in 2.4% of ODA in 2015 2016/17 is 24% less than in 2012-13.115

Uncertain: Planned cuts in 2015 to the Austrian Aid Agency Increased 15.4%. But budget were postponed at the last moment. Aid levels declined by 7.4% excluding Austria may rise due to debt cancellaton (Sudan) and increased refugee costs. in-country refugee costs. Real aid may be afected, but directon of real aid uncertain. 0.9% of ODA in 2015.

Decreased 7.8%. Declined Decrease: Since 2012 aid has been cut more than €900 by 12.2% excluding refugee Belgium million. The development minister has announced further costs. cuts of €1 billion over next fve years.116 1.4% of ODA in 2015.

Increase: Very modest increase in aid expected from 2015 to 2016; Expect modest increases thereafer.117 The Increased 17.1% Canada increase from 2014 to 1015 was due to a special one-of loan to the Ukraine and double payments to the IFIs in the 3.3% of ODA in 2015. calendar year 2015. Denmark Decrease: New government will reduce aid to 0.7%. Increased 0.8%. Declined Budget for 2016 fulflls this promise and the 2015 budget by 6.8% excluding refugee is projected to be 0.73% of GNI down from the expected costs. 118 level of 0.83%. 2% of ODA in 2015.

Decrease: New conservatve government in 2015. Finish ODA will decrease by 43% between 2014 and 2016, from Decreased 5.7%. Finland around €1.2 billion to €715 million.119 In early 2016 the government announced an additonal €25 million cut to 1% of ODA in 2015. Finland’s ODA. France Increase: France’s development agency — Agence Française de Développement – annual fnancing capacity Increased 2.8%. Increased will rise from €8.5 billion ($9.22 billion) to €12.5 billion by 3.4% excluding refugee by 2020 and half of that increase will be directed towards costs. climate change — raising annual climate fnancing from 3 billion to €5 billion by 2020.120 7% of ODA in 2015.

Germany Increase: In March 2015 the German government Increased 25.9%. Increased announced that German ODA would increase by €8.3 by 5.8% excluding refugee billion by 2019. This would be the highest increase in costs. German history. 13.5% of ODA in 2015. Ireland Increase: Afer repeated cuts in ODA since 2011, ODA will Increase by 1.9%. increase by €40 million to €640 Million in 2016. 0.5% of ODA in 2015.

198 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Increase by 14.2%. But Increase: The government’s ambiton is to reach 0.30% of increase cut to 7.5% Italy GNI by 2020. In 2015 the rato was 0.21%. excluding refugee costs. 2.9% of ODA in 2015.

Increase: According to the General Account Budget (the main budget), Japan’s ODA budget was increased by 1.8% Increase by 12.4%. Japan for fscal year (FY) 2016. This is frst tme since FY 1997 that the ODA budget has been increased. 7.1% of ODA in 2015.

Increased by 24.4%. But Decrease: Total ODA levels are expected to increase, increase 15.4% excluding Netherlands but only because of substantal increases for in- refugees costs. country refugee expenditures. 4.4% of ODA in 2015.

Increase: The 2016 budget proposal entails an overall increase in the ODA budget of NOK1.2 billion Increased by 8.7%. But compared with the inital budget proposal for 2016, increase reduced to 2.2% Norway bringing the ODA budget for 2016 to NOK34.8 billion, excluding refugee costs. which represents 1 percent of Norway’s total income (GNI).121 3.3% of ODA in 2015.

Increase: Spain has publicly announced reversing Increased by 1.5%. But the decline in its ODA as its economy increases and increase reduced to 0.4% Spain has projected increases in its 2015 and 2016 budgets. excluding refugee costs. However, it also failed to spend its full allocaton in 2014. (DAC Peer Review, 2016). 1.2% of ODA in 2015.

Increased by 38.8%. But Increase: Small increase for climate fnance increase reduced to 9.9% Sweden included in ODA. A new accountng method will put excluding refugee costs. Sweden below 1% of GNI in 2016. 5.4% of ODA in 2015.

Unchanged: The government has earmarked just over CHF11 billion ($11.2 billion) for internatonal Increased by 6.7%. Switzerland cooperaton over the next four years, including development and humanitarian aid as well as trade 2.7% of ODA in 2015. promoton and other economic measures.

Increase: Tied to 0.7% of GNI. But increases will not be as large as originally expected. Because estmates of growth has been halved, the country’s aid budget, United estmated in November at $23.4 billion for 2019-2020, Increased by 3.2%. Kingdom will be about 650 million pounds ($932 million) less than expected.122 These estmates will be even further 14.2% of ODA in 2015. reduced with the impact of the Brexit vote. The future of the 0.7% target is also uncertain.

Decrease by 7%. United States Decrease: ODA is projected by CSOs to be lower in 2017. 23.6% of ODA in 2015. 199 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Endnotes

1 See htp://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. Blog, December, 2015, accessed April 2016 at asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/ 2 Martn, M. & Walker, Jo, 2015. Financing the posts/2015/12/22-cop21-unfinished-agenda- Sustainable Development Goals: Lessons from fnance-global-south-roberts-weikmans. government spending on the MDGs, a report 9 Brian Tomlinson, 2014. “Fit for Purpose: ODA prepared for Development Finance Internatonal and the fnancing of the Post-2015 Development and Oxfam, May 2015, page 31, accessed April 2016 Agenda,” in The Reality of Aid 2014: Rethinking at htp://eurodad.org/fles/pdf/1546383-fnancing- Partnerships in a Post 2015 World: Towards the-sustainable-development-goals-lessons-from- Equitable, Inclusive and Sustainable Development. government-spending-on-the-mdgs.pdf. Manila: Ibon, accessed April 2016 at htp://www. 3 World Bank, 2016. “Gross Domestc Product, 2014,” realityofaid.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/1. World Development Indicator Database, February Fit-for-Purpose.pdf. 2016, accessed April 2016 at htp://databank. 10 See Brian Tomlinson in Reality of Aid, op. cit., pp worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. 136 -141. 4 See htp://www.un.org/esa/fd/wp-content/ 11 Summer, A., 2015. “When does One Dime = 100 uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf. Million People,” Center for Global Development 5 See Winnie Byanyimi, Executve Director, Oxfam Blog Post, November 5, 2015, accessed April 2016 at Internatonal, “Addis Financing for Development htp://www.cgdev.org/blog/when-does-one-dime- Conference Failed in Many Ways, But the Fight 100-million-people. He notes that “Approaches to for Tax Justce Contnues,” Hufpost Impact, July global poverty need to be informed by a broader 28, 2015, accessed at htp://www.hufngtonpost. understanding of the overall global consumpton com/winnie-byanyima/addis-financing-for- distributon and how very modest changes to the devel_b_7888906.html. See also “Civil Society assumed poverty line lead to signifcantly diferent Response to the Addis Ababa Acton Agenda understandings of the scale and locaton of global on Financing for Development,” July 16, 2015, poverty. It would therefore be beter, we suggest, accessed at htps://www.globalpolicywatch.org/ to make estmates with a range of poverty lines, blog/2015/07/16/civil-society-response-agenda- probably up to at least $10 a day, so as to pay fnancing-development/; CSO Partnership for greater atenton to the global distributon overall.” Efectve Development Cooperaton, “CPDE reacton 12 The issues relatng to natonal poverty lines in to the Addis Ababa Acton Agenda (AAAA),” July 29, developing countries are both complex and 2015, accessed at htp://csopartnership.org/cpde- controversial. See Hoy, C., 2016. “Projectng reacton-to-the-addis-ababa-acton-agenda-aaaa/; Natonal Poverty to 2030,” Overseas Development and Women’s Working Group on Financing for Insttute, March 2016, access April 2016 at htp:// Development, “Reacton to the Outcome Document www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource- of the Third Internatonal Conference on Financing documents/projecting_national_poverty_ for Development: Addis Ababa Acton Agenda,” to_2030_fnal_web.pdf. Hoy documents the accessed at htps://wwgonfd.fles.wordpress. poverty lines in 59 developing countries and found com/2015/07/women-working-group-reacton-to- that approximately one third of the populaton addis-ababa-acton-agenda-17-july-20151.pdf. or 1.2 billion people live below these natonal 6 See htps://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/ poverty lines. There is a great deal of variability eng/l09r01.pdf. across countries and regions. See also Reddy, S. & Lahot, Rahul, 2016, “$1.90 a day: What does it 7 See comments by civil society leaders at htp:// say? The New Internatonal Poverty Line,” New Lef www.climatenetwork.org/press-release/civil- Review, #106, January-February 2016. Reddy and society-responds-final-paris-climate-agreement- Lahot provide an excellent overview of the many released. signifcant issues in the Bank’s methodologies for 8 Roberts, T & Weikmans, Romain, 2015. “The calculatng an Internatonal Poverty Line at $1.90 a unfnished agenda of the Paris climate talks: day, which as they suggest calls for a new approach Finance to the global south,” Brookings Insttute based on an assessment of clearly defned basic

200 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

human requirements and the commodites needed 23 Author’s calculatons based on OECD DAC 2008, op. to meet those requirements (with both income and cit. [note 21], and OECD Dataset, DAC1a. non-income components. 24 See Looking to the Future, Don’t Forget the Past 13 Hoy, op. cit. p. 13. He found the median poverty – Aid Beyond 2015, Concord AidWatch 2015, line to be around $1.80 a day (2005 PPP) and the accessed April 2016 at htp://www.concord.se/wp- mean to be around $2.36 a day (2005 PPP). This content/uploads/FINAL_AidWatch2015.pdf. result correlates with the World Bank measure of 25 OECD DAC, “2015 Global Outlook on Aid,” Accessed poverty at $2.00 a day (2005 PPP) or $3.10 a day April 2016 at htp://www.oecd.org/dac/aid- (2011 PPP), which is used in this chapter as an architecture/2015%20FSS%20Survey%20fyer.pdf. approximate measure of both extreme poverty (absolute depravaton) and highly vulnerable poor 26 The DAC defnes CPA as Gross Bilateral Aid less: people. humanitarian aid and debt relief (unpredictable aid); administratve costs, imputed student costs, 14 Hoy, op. cit., p. 13. development awareness, research and refugees 15 Sumner, A., 2016. “The World’s New Middles – in donor countries (no cross boarder fows); Implicatons for the future of development and and food aid, aid from local governments, core aid,” UNU-WIDER Blog, May 2016, accessed June funding to NGOs, ODA equity investment, aid 2016 at htps://www.wider.unu.edu/publicaton/ through secondary agencies and aid which is not world%E2%80%99s-new-middles-implications- allocable by country or region (do not form part of future-development-and-aid. cooperaton agreements between governments). 16 See Reddy and Lahot, op. cit. for a summary of 27 These include donor country refugee and imputed these critcisms. student expenditures, full amount of debt cancellaton for which the beneft to recipient 17 The 2014 Reality of Aid Report looked at poverty at countries are spread over decades, and interest US$1.25 a day and US$2.00 a day. It also considered paid to donors, not deducted with the principle “near-poverty” conditons of poverty people living in ODA loan repayments to donors. Donor on less than US$4.00 a day. administraton costs and disbursements for public 18 Strawson, et. al. 2015. Investments to End Poverty, awareness are not included as these are legitmate 2015. A Report prepared by Development Initatves, expenses in managing an aid program. 2015, page 11. Accessed April 2016 at htp:// 28 Unpublished data collected by Concord and a devinit.org/?dialogFeatures=protocol=htp#!/post/ network of European CSOs monitoring this issue, investments-to-end-poverty-2015 April 2016. 19 See htp://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mi/wiki/1-2-Poverty- 29 “Aid in 2016: Call on world leaders to help refugees gap-ratio.ashx?From=Indicator-1-2-Poverty-gap- - without jeopardising the world’s poorest people, rato and Strawson op. cit. p. 10 CSO petton, February 2016, accessed April 2016 at 20 World Bank, PovcalNet, htp://iresearch.worldbank. htp://www.eurodad.org/protecthepoorest. org/PovcalNet/index.htm?1. 30 Concord AidWatch 2015, op. cit., page 19. 21 Strawson, op. cit., p. 11. 31 Development Cooperaton Directorate, “Follow up 22 OECD DAC, 2008. Aid Targets Slipping Out of to Decisions at the February 2016 DAC High Level Reach, See table 4, page 13, Accessed April 2016 Meetng,” DCD/DAC (2016) 15, accessed April at htp://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/41724314.pdf. 2016 at htp://www.oecd.org/ofcialdocuments/ There was no goal expressed by the United States publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/ following Gleneagles. President Obama in his frst DAC%282016%2915&docLanguage=En campaign for Presidency promised to bring US aid 32 Author calculatons from OECD Database, DAC1a, to US$50 billion and in his frst term postponed April 2016. this goal to his second term. This goal is the one that is used here for the US. First year support for 33 In Mozambique, for example, in the health sector refugees is counted in 2015 in the same proporton one study concluded that “three serious concerns as refugee support in 2005 for Denmark, Germany, emerged: 1) difcultes coordinatng external Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the resources and challenges to local control over United States.

201 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

the use of resources channelled to internatonal 42 Dalrymple, op. cit. private organizatons; 2) inequalites created 43 Tew, R. 2016. “Aid spending by Development within the health system produced by vertcal Assistance Commitee donors in 2015,” funds channelled to specifc services while other Development Initatves, Factsheet, April 2016, sectors remain under-resourced; and 3) the exodus p. 2, accessed April 2016 at htp://devinit.org/#!/ of health workers from the public sector health post/aid-spending-by-development-assistance- system provoked by large disparites in salaries commitee-donors-in-2015. and work.” Mussa, A., Pfeifer, J., Gloyd, S, and Sherr, Kenneth, 2013. “Vertcal funding, non- 44 For an excellent discussion of ODA loans and governmental organizatons, and health system related issues see Tew, R. 2015. “ODA Loans: strengthening: perspectves of public sector health Tracking a growing source of development workers in Mozambique,” Human Resources for fnance,” Development Initatves Report, June Health 2013 11:26, Accessed April 2016 at htp:// 2015, accessed April 2016 at htp://devinit. human-resources-health.biomedcentral.com/ org/?dialogFeatures=protocol=http#!/post/oda- artcles/10.1186/1478-4491-11-26. But it is also loans-tracking-a-growing-source-of-development- the case that new vertcal funds are emerging, such fnancing. See also Colin, S., 2014. “A mater of as the Green Climate Fund, “which has a quasi- high interest: Assessing how loans are reported as universal membership of advanced economies and development aid,” Eurodad Report, January 2014, developing countries with an equal voice.” OECD accessed April 2016 at htp://www.eurodad.org/ DAC, Multlateral Aid 2015: Beter Partnerships for amaterofighinterest. a Post-2015 World, July 2015, accessed April 2016 45 DAC Final Communiqué, High Level Meetng, at htp://www.oecd.org/dac/multlateral-aid-2015- December 16, 2014, Annex Two, accessed April 9789264235212-en.htm. 2016 at htp://www.oecd.org/dac/OECD%20 34 McLeod Group (Canada), 2016. “UN Development DAC%20HLM%20Communique.pdf. System: Running on Empty,” May 31, 2016, 46 See Lonsdale, C., 2016. “Modernizing ODA loans: accessed June 2016 at htp://www.mcleodgroup. Impact of new DAC reportng rules (Part 1)”, ca/2016/05/30/the-un-development-system- Development Initatve Blog, March 8, 2016 and running-on-empty/. Tew, R., 2016. “Modernizing ODA loans: Impact of 35 OECD DAC, Multlateral Aid 2015, op cit., page 14. new DAC reportng rules (Part 2)”, Development Initatve Blog, March 9, 2016, accessed April 2016 36 Eurodad, “Statement to the High Level Meetng,” at htp://devinit.org/#!/post/modernising-oda- February 15, 2016, accessed April 2016 at htp:// loans-impact-of-new-dac-reportng-rules-part-2. www.eurodad.org/OECD_DAC_HLM. See also, Kwakkenbos, J. and Grifth, J., 2016. “Will reportng 47 Kwakkenbos, J., and Grifths, Jesse, 2016. “Will rule changes agreed by OECD commitee undermine reportng rule changes agreed by OECD commitee the credibility of aid?,” Eurodad Analysis, Accessed undermine the credibility of aid?,” Eurodad Blog, April 2016 at htp://www.eurodad.org/OECD_ February 19, 2016, accessed April 2016 at htp:// DAC_HLM_ANALYSIS; Anders, M., 2016. “ODA www.eurodad.org/OECD_DAC_HLM_ANALYSIS. Redefned: What you need to know,” DevEx, 48 Development Initatves, 2015. Global February 23, 2016, accessed April 2016 at htps:// Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015, Bristol, www.devex.com/news/oda-redefined-what-you- UK, 2015, page 19, accessed April 2016 at need-to-know-87776. http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/ 37 DAC High Level Meetng, “Communiqué,” February GHAreport2015/. This annual report is an excellent 19, 2016, accessed April 2016 at htp://www.oecd. and defnitve report on humanitarian assistance org/dac/DAC-HLM-Communique-2016.pdf. and is relied upon for many of the metrics in this secton of the chapter. 38 See the revised language in Annex Two of the 2016 Communiqué, op cit, pages 10-16. 49 Ibid., p. 34 & p. 38. 39 Dalrymple, op. cit. 50 Ibid., pp 42-44. 40 Dalrymple, op. cit. 51 OECD Dataset, DAC2a, humanitarian assistance. 41 Kwakkenbos, op cit. 52 Too Important to Fail – Addressing the humanitarian fnancing gap, High Level Panel on Humanitarian

202 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

Financing, Report to the Secretary General, 63 Development Initatves, Investments to End December 2015, page v, accessed April 2016 at Poverty, 2015, op. cit., p. 16. htp://www.un.org/news/WEB-1521765-E-OCHA- 64 Ibid., p. 23. Report-on-Humanitarian-Financing.pdf. 65 Martn and Walker, 2015, op. cit., p 30. 53 Ibid., pp 2-3. See also Davies, R, “Too important to fail: A strategic fnancing mechanism for 66 See the work of UNDRIS, The Politcs of humanitarian assistance,” DevPolicy Blog, Domestc Resource Mobilizaton for Social February 8, 2016, accessed April 2016 at htp:// Development, a research project, 2011 devpolicy.org/too-important-to-flail-a-strategic- – 2015, accessible at htp://www.unrisd. financing-mechanism-for-humanitarian- org/80256B3C005BB128/%28httpProjects%29/ assistance-20160208/. D8BC0D08FA1BD10BC125795F004C812F?OpenDocument. 54 Aly, H., and Wall, Imogen, February 2016. 67 Development Initatves updated this work on “Humanitarian Reform: What’s on – and of – the government revenue and poverty reducton in table,” IRIN, February 11, 2016, accessed April 2016 its report, Investments to End Poverty, 2015, op. at htp://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/02/11/ cit., chapter three. The following analysis takes humanitarian-reform-whats-and-table. inspiraton from this analysis by DI. 55 High Level Panel, op. cit., pointed out that more 68 See htp://devinit.org/#!/data/methodology/. than 80% of government funding for the six main 69 Development Initatves, Investments to End UN humanitarian bodies was earmarked in 2013, Poverty, op. cit., p. 3. compared to 15% ten years earlier. 70 Solheim, E, 2015. “Making the Most of More 56 Aly, February 2016, op. cit. Aid,” Project Syndicate, April 10, 2015, accessed 57 For details on the Grand Bargain, see htps:// April 2016 at htps://www.project-syndicate.org/ consultations2.cworldhumanitariansummit.org/ commentary/development-aid-new-channels-by- bitcache/4334ccbd5dcb38e9f2c332f51f55861633386 angel-gurria-and-erik-solheim-2015-04. 1f2?vid=58101 71 Strawson, T. & Ifan, Guto, 2016. “Aiding Domestc 58 Aly, Heba, May 2016. “Will US Aid Change?,” IRIN, Revenue Mobilizaton,” Summary Brief, page 3, May 30, 2016, accessed June 2016 at htps://www. Development Initatves, April 2016, accessed irinnews.org/interview/2016/05/30/will-us-aid- April 2016 at htp://devinit.org/#!/post/aiding- change. domestc-revenue-mobilisaton. The study noted the difculty in locatng relevant projects in the 59 See Charter4Change, Localizaton of Humanitarian DAC’s Creditor Reportng System (CRS+) as there is Aid, accessed April 2016 at htps://charter4change. no DAC coding for projects with a DRM purpose. org/. See also the discussion of this issue in Rowling, M., “Local groups demand bigger slice of 72 Ibid. aid pie for world’s crises,” Reuters, accessed April 73 Ibid, p. 5. 2016 at htp://www.reuters.com/artcle/us-global- 74 See Development Initatves, Investments to End humanitarian-aid-idUSKCN0WJ01K. Poverty, 2015, op. cit., pp 25-26. 60 Aly (May 2016), op. cit. 75 See Forestater, M., 2015. “Internatonal Tax, 61 Esslemont , T., 2016. “Syrians sufer as ant- Transparency, and Finance for Development: A terror laws squeeze charites – survey,” Reuters Short Guide for the Perplexed,” Brief, Center for Trust, February 24, 2016, accessed April 2016 at Global Development, February 12, 2016, accessed http://news.trust.org/item/20160224000357- April 2016 at htp://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/ rtjoh/?source=fHeadlineStory. fles/Internatonal-Tax-Transparency-Development- 62 ECOSOC, “As developing countries strive to enhance Finance_Short-Guide_CGD-brief.pdf. See also for economic performance, developed partners should example, Duncan Green, “What should Europe do honour or surpass aid pledges, Addis Conference about Illicit Financial Flows? Five take-aways from hears,” Plenary, 3rd & 4th Meetng Summary the African Union’s High-Level report,” Oxfam From (AM & PM) Addis Ababa, July 14, 2015, accessed Poverty to Power Blog, February 6, 2015, accessed April 2016 at htp://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ at htps://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/what-should- dev3187.doc.htm. europe-do-on-illicit-financial-flows-five-take-

203 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

aways-from-the-african-unions-high-level-report/ 85 DAC donor gross disbursements at current prices and “Reformers v lobbyists: Where have we got to for DAC CRS sector code 15170. on tackling corporate tax dodging?,” May 9, 2014, 86 Mossa, Z., 2015. “Movements, money and social accessed April 2016 at htps://oxfamblogs.org/ change: how to advance women’s rights,” AWID, fp2p/reformers-v-lobbyists-where-have-we-got-to- March 10, 2015, accessed April 2016 at htp://www. on-tackling-corporate-tax-dodging/. awid.org/news-and-analysis/movements-money- 76 Forestater, op. cit. and-social-change-how-advance-womens-rights. 77 Development Initatves, Investments to End 87 Quoted in Westphal, M., Canfn, P., Ballesteros, Poverty, 2015, op. cit., p. 26. A, and Morgan, Jennifer, 2015. “Getng to $100 billion: Climate fnance scenarios and projectons to 78 For a more in-depth discussion of these and other 2020,” Working Paper, World Resources Insttute, issues in internatonal tax and illicit capital fows May 2015, page 5, accessed May 2016 at htp:// for fnancing the SDGs, see Forstater’s longer www.wri.org/publication/getting-100-billion- 2015 briefng paper, Can Stopping Multnatonal climate-fnance-scenarios-and-projectons-2020. Tax Dodging Close the Gap in Financing for Development?, Center for Global Development, 88 Ibid, page 5. Policy Paper 15/69, October 15, 2015, accessed 89 OECD and Climate Policy Initatve, 2015. “Climate April 2016 at htp://www.cgdev.org/publicaton/ Finance in 2013-14 and the USD 100 billion goal,” can-stopping-tax-dodging-multinational- OECD October 2015, accessed June 2016 at enterprises-close-gap-development-fnance. htp://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/OECD-CPI- 79 The results of this monitoring round were not Climate-Finance-Report.pdf. The report notes, available at the tme of fnalizing this chapter. with respect to methodology: “It is important These results will be available November 2016. to acknowledge that recent developments in See htp://efectvecooperaton.org/monitoring- defnitons and accountng methodologies to track country-progress/explore-monitoring-data/. climate fnance are a staging post on the way towards more complete and transparent estmates 80 Tomlinson, op. cit., p. 151. of climate fnance. Improving the quality and 81 OECD DAC, 2016. “Development aid in 2015 contnues coverage of data collecton is an evolving mult-year to grow despite costs for in-donor refugees,” April 13, process. Methodological choices made this year 2016, accessed April 2016 at htp://www.oecd.org/ on refned defnitons and accountng approaches dac/stats/ODA-2015-detailed-summary.pdf. represent progress but it may be some tme before they can be systematcally implemented and before 82 Least Developed Countries are determined by data can be consistently and routnely collected.” resoluton of the General Assembly. The current 90 OECD Development Cooperaton Directorate, 2015. income levels for Other LICs is less than US$1,045 “Climate-related development fnance in 2013-14,” per capita in 2013, for LMICs, between US$1,046 November 2015, accessed June 2016 at htps:// and US$4,125 per capita in 2013, and for UMICs, www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/ between US$4,126 and US$12,745 per capita in Climate-related-dev-fnance-ENG.pdf. 2013. 91 Ibid. 83 Sumner, A., 2016. “The World’s New Middles – Implicatons for the future of development and 92 OECD and Climate Policy Initatve, op. cit. aid,” UNU-WIDER Blog, May 2016, accessed June 93 Author’s calculaton based on OECD DAC CRS 2016 at htps://www.wider.unu.edu/publicaton/ Dataset, aid actvites targetng environmental world%E2%80%99s-new-middles-implications- acton, June 2016. future-development-and-aid. 94 See ODI, What climate fnance was commited 84 For a DAC overview of these issues see OECD DAC at the Paris Climate Talks?” accessed June 2016 Network on Gender Equality (GENDERNET), 2016. at htps://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/fles/ “Background paper on OECD DAC members’ use lightbox-images/cfu-cop-commitments.png. of the DAC gender equality policy marker and best 95 “Climate Fund Update Highlights: May 2016,” practces for quality assurance and control,” OECD Heinrich Boll Stfung, North America, May DAC, not published on the internet. 27, 2016, accessed June 2016 at htps://blog.

204 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

climatefundsupdate.org/2016/05/27/climate- Daily, December 4, 2015, accessed April funds-update-highlights-may-2016/. 2016 at htp://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/ XiattendsParisclimateconference/2015-12/04/ 96 Westphal, et al, op. cit. content_22631225.htm. 97 ECLAC, “South-South Cooperaton is a Key Tool for Achieving the 2030 Agenda’s Goals,” April 13, 2016, 105 Rutzen, D., 2015. “Aid Barriers and the Rise of accessed April 2016 at htp://www.cepal.org/en/ Philanthropic Protectonism,” Internatonal Journal news/south-south-cooperaton-key-tool-achieving- of Not-For-Proft Law, Vol. 17, March 2015, accessed 2030-agendas-goals. April 2016 at htp://www.icnl.org/research/ journal/vol17ss1/Rutzen.pdf. See also Brian 98 Santos, L.A., 2016. “Civil society call for safeguards Tomlinson, ““GPEDC Indicator Two: Civil Society as BRICS Bank makes frst loans,”DevEx, April 18, Operates within an environment that maximizes its 2016, accessed April 2016 at htps://www.devex. engagement in and contributon to development, com/news/civil-society-calls-for-safeguards-as- An Assessment of Evidence,” Civil Society Platorm brics-bank-approves-frst-loans-88038. for Efectve Development (CPDE), June 2016, and 99 Author’s calculatons based on reports to the OECD DAC CIVICUS, “Civil Society Watch Report,” June 2016, by these donors. accessed June 2016 at htp://www.civicus.org/ 100 The distributon of non-DAC donors was calculated images/CSW_Report.pdf. from OECD Dataset DAC2a. For China the regional 106 A comprehensive review of DAC donor fnancing distributon is derived from Figure 2 in the Report to and through CSOs can be found in the by for the period 2010 to 2012 in “China’s Foreign periodic review by the Development Cooperaton Aid (2014),” Informaton Ofce of the State Council, Directorate of the DAC, which can be found 2014, accessed April 2016 at htp://news.xinhuanet. at htp://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/ com/english/china/2014-07/10/c_133474011.htm; partneringwithcivilsociety.htm. India’s distributon was assumed to be 80% South Asia and 20% Africa based on various newspaper 107 OECD Dataset, DAC1a, IV Net Private Grants reports on the priorites for India’s development 108 Center for Propsperity, 2013.The Index of assistance; South Africa was assumed to be only Global Philanthrophy and Remitances, with a distributed to Sub-Saharan Africa; and Qatar was Special Report on Emerging Economies, Hudson assumed to be 85% Middle East and 15% North Africa Insttute, p. 12, accessed April 2016 at htp:// based on a review artcle, htps://en.wikipedia.org/ www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/ wiki/Qatari_foreign_aid. Brazil has not reported attachment/1229/2013_indexof_global_ any aid informaton since 2010, but presumably philanthropyand_remitances.pdf. maintains a modest aid program in Africa as well as the America. See footnote 69. 109 World Bank data, accessed April 2016 at htp:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD/ 101 Cabral, L., 2016. “Brazil’s Development Aid Plan Flops,” countries/1W-XN-XT-XL-XM?display=graph. Business Day, March 18, 2016, accessed April 2016 at htp://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2016/03/18/brazils- 110 Goodman, J and Hilton, Mat, 2016. “Australia’s development-aid-plan-fops. ‘New aid Paradigm’: Beyond ODA?” in Reality of Aid 2016 Report, forthcoming. 102 OECD Development Cooperaton Directorate, 2013. “Triangular Co-Operaton: What can we learn from 111 See Reality of Aid 2012 Report – Aid and the a survey of actors involved?” OECD Development Private Sector – Catalyzing Poverty Reducton and Assistance Commitee, May 2013, accessed April Development? IBON Foundaton Internatonal, 2013 at htps://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global- accessed April 2016 at htp://www.realityofaid.org/ relatons/OECD%20Triangluar%20Co-operaton%20 roa_report/aid-and-the-private-sector-catalysing- Survey%20Report%20-%20June%202013.pdf. poverty-reducton-and-development-2/ 103 Xinhua, “China pledges 2 bln USD to support 112 Ingram, G., Johnson, A., and Moser, H. USAID South-South Cooperaton,” September 26, 2015, Public Private Partnerships: A Data Picture and accessed April 2016 at htp://news.xinhuanet.com/ Review of Business Engagement, Brookings english/2015-09/26/c_134663349.htm. Insttute, Global Economic and Development Working Paper 94, February 2016, accessed April 104 Xinhua, “Xi announces 10 major China-Africa 2016 at htp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ cooperaton plans for coming 3 years,” China

205 Global Aid Trends, 2016 Financing Agenda 2030: Where are the resources?

research/files/papers/2016/02/usaid-public- org/2015/11/23/aidwatch-report-looking-to-the- private-partnerships-ingram-johnson-moser/ future-don-t-forget-the-past-aid-beyond-2015/ wp94pppreport2016web.pdf. All the data in these 117 See htp://ccic.ca/media/news_detail_e.php?id=402 two paragraphs are derived from this study. 118 Concord AidWatch 2015, op. cit. 113 Reality of Aid 2012, op. cit., p. 132. 119 Ibid. 114 Seehtps://public.tableau.com/views/Aid_for_trade/ 120 Jef Tyson, “What AFD reform means for the future of Aid_for_trade?:embed=y&:showTabs=y&:display_ French aid,” DevEx, February 1, 2016. count=no&:showVizHome=no#1. 121 htp://www.statsbudsjetet.no/Statsbudsjetet-2016/ English/?pid=70718 115 htp://devpolicy.org/scaled-last-aid-cuts-20160504/ 122 Molly Anders, “UK aid braced for $1 billion shortall,” 116 Concord AidWatch, 2015, htp://concordeurope. DevEx, March 18, 2016.

206 South – South Experience in Technical Co-operation in India

Jyotsna Mohan, Voluntary Action Network India

Overview South-South Co-operation is by no means a new process. In fact, many developing countries In the last few years, India has become have a long history of extending technical recognized as an aid providing country, largely assistance or economic and political support due to its emergence as a rapidly emerging to other developing countries. But since the developed country, despite the contradiction decolonization and globalization era began at of it still being at a lower level of the Human the end of the World War II, the international Development Index (HDI). For several years system has been largely dominated by the now, India has been operating as a traditional North-South development relationships. In donor, providing aid to neighboring countries. recent years, however, the focus has moved to 1 It has also been noted that India’s foreign SSC in response to a resurgence of the Global policies are not considerably different from South, as several developing countries have those of western countries, despite claims on become more assertive and their economies being ‘demand driven’. have grown stronger.

This paper analyses these issues using a South- Agenda 2030, particularly with the adoption South Co-operation (SSC) framework. The of the Sustainable Development Goals objective is to identify and critically examine the (SDGs), the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on processes and policies of India’s development fnancing for development (AAAA) and WTO assistance programmes, including major meetings, SSC has assumed new importance trends in assistance and target benefciaries. across various international forums. The India’s strategic interests and objectives in evolution of SSC calls for new coalitions and SSC will also be studied as will the scope and information exchanges amongst Southern involvement of civil society organizations. research institutions and think-tanks, which The chapter identifes the major areas of can contribute to the building of a consensus Indian engagement in the immediate region of on suitable models for promoting Southern South Asia and in Africa. It also explores the development co-operation for mutual beneft. various agencies and instruments employed by India in extending development co- Evolution and Development of South-South Co-operation operation, such as Lines of Credit (LoCs) and

technical assistance programmes through the The evolution of SSC can be traced back to Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation the non-alignment movement in the 1950s, Programme (ITEC). which eventually created the impetus for the

207 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

development of global institutions like the countries has taken place in a manner that G20 or the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China has transcended the traditional constructs of and South Africa). Sometimes there can be a a Global North and a Global South into a tendency in the South to assume that these politics where there is a North in the South institutions are directed against the North and and a South in the North. its institutional dominance, but that is not the case. Northern actors are closely following While rising powers such as the BRICS have the process of SSC, recognizing it as a very been engaged in offcial and non-offcial important element of a developing international development co-operation for decades, the order. Some are quite positive about SCC as it development community has only recently allows for diversifcation of actors leading to acknowledged their role as development actors. new economic opportunities for all. Countries that were once predominantly regarded as aid recipients are now emerging as According to Dr. Sachin Chaturvedi, Director aid providers in their own right. In addition General, Research and Information System to bilateral and multilateral donor activity, for Developing Countries (RIS), these countries are increasingly sharing their experiences with other countries through “SSC is understood as a process of horizontal ‘South-South Co-operation ’, or establishing government-to-government through ‘Trilateral Co-operation,’ where linkages as it is visibly led by the South-South Co-operation is facilitated and/ governments of developing countries. But or funded by a Northern donor country.3 to see the genesis of SSC in government linkages is not entirely correct, as India’s role as an aid provider in a historically it was a refection of people’s SSC perspective aspirations to connect with other countries in similar stages of development and India has a long history in technical co- assert collectively against colonial rulers. operation and business partnerships. In many This led to collaboration on the level of initiatives, it has helped create an environment capacity creation for self-reliance and also for mutual learning. India’s political and expression of political solidarity between economic strength has meant that it has played developing countries. It is in this context an important role in this work. Therefore, that development co-operation evolved development partnerships have an important as a policy in independent India.”2 place in the country’s foreign policy. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, There is a need for a common understanding of the concept of SSC and also for a collective “This development co-operation is based analysis of how the processes of SSC can be on two main pillars. First, development strengthened. SSC should not be viewed in co-operation incorporates[s] the idea isolation from North-South Co-operation of partnership, i.e. working for mutual (NSC), as they are complementary processes. beneft, and secondly, development Also, the development process in many co-operation [is] based on priorities determined by the partner.”4

208 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

India has engaged in capacity-building initiatives the delivery of the various elements of with its neighboring countries and has also India’s development assistance have been extended its program throughout the African streamlined. It is useful to delineate how continent where it shares historical bonds. DPA is structured. The focus of India’s engagement includes connectivity, human resource development and India’s external development assistance institution building. For example, during the programs include lines of credit, grant India-Africa summit in March 2015, India was assistance, technical consultancy, disaster relief, commended for having “a partnership beyond humanitarian aid, educational scholarships strategic concerns and economic benefts.”5 and a wide range of capacity building programs including short-term civilian and With the establishment of the Development military training courses. To implement these Partnership Administration (DPA) in 2012, programs, DPA has three divisions:

Source: Sachin Chaturvedi, Indian Development Partnership: Genesis and Evoluton, Forum for Indian Development Co-operaton, January 2014.

209 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

• DPA I is responsible for project appraisals with India’s neighbours, and are in various and lines of credit (LoC). It handles all stages of development. In South East Asia, LoCs, grant projects in East, South and Central Asia, Africa and Latin America, West Africa regions, grant assistance bilateral projects in information and computer projects in Bangladesh and the Sri Lanka technology (lCT), small and medium Housing project. enterprises and archaeological conservation, • DPA II is responsible for capacity have been undertaken. building schemes, disaster relief, and India’s technical and economic co- The Third India-Africa Forum Summit operation programme (ITEC). Forty (IAFS-III) was held in New Delhi in October seven (47) institutions conduct around 2015. This summit, where Heads of State/ 280 courses annually. Heads of Government from 54 African • DPA – III is responsible for the project nations participated, reinvigorated age-old implementation of grant projects in partnerships between India and Africa and Afghanistan, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal brought a new vision to the relationship. The and Sri Lanka.6 vision document, entitled ‘Delhi Declaration 2015,’ and the accompanying ‘India-Africa framework for Strategic Cooperation, outlined Indian Development Assistance (Figure in USD Billion)7 a multi-faceted strategy for dovetailing the India growth story with Africa’s Agenda 2063 to spur mutual resurgence. The Summit placed development co-operation at the heart of the India-Africa partnership, unveiling US$10 billion in lines of credit for a host of development projects over the next fve years as well as grant assistance of US$600 million. DPA played an active role in the Summit, as bilateral discussions were being conducted on the sidelines relating to various projects being undertaken in Africa with India’s assistance.

Development projects in infrastructure, Extension of lines of credit on concessional hydroelectricity, power transmission, terms to developing countries has been an agriculture, education, health and industry, important instrument of India’s external as prioritized by the host governments, are development assistance. Over the years, 226 being implemented in several countries, LoCs, amounting to US$16.9 billion have including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, been allocated to different countries in various Myanmar, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. In sectors. Of this, US$8.7 billion has been addition, several projects have been initiated allocated to African countries and US$8.2 on strengthening cross-border connectivity billion for non-African countries.

210 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

During 2015-16, more than 8,360 civilians were Bhutan (51%), Bangladesh (4.4%), were offered as training technical assistants Afghanistan (11.8%), Sri Lanka (8.8%), (TAs) to 161 partner countries in a wide range Nepal (7.4%), Myanmar (4.7%) and African of disciplines under the previously mentioned countries (3.5%). Other benefciaries include ITEC and SCAAP programmes. In order to Maldives, Mongolia, Latin American countries strengthen the continued engagement with and Eurasia. ITEC alumni, as well as to be consistent with the objectives of the Digital India initiative, Lines of Credit (LoCs) an ITEC portal is now available. Over 2,000 defense training TAs was provided to partner From April to November 2015, four LoCs, countries through various Indian defense amounting to US$2.3 billion, were approved. institutions. As well, 500 civilian training TAs Of this amount, US$279 million was available was offered under the technical co-operation to African countries and US$2 billion to other scheme of the Colombo Plan for cooperative countries. During the same period, seven LoC and economic social development in Asia agreements to a value of US$565 million were and the Pacifc. In addition, special courses signed. in a variety of disciplines were conducted in response to requests from partner countries. A line of credit of US$1 billion was extended to Humanitarian assistance was provided to Bangladesh in 2010. In 2012, US$200 million Syria, Philippines, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen of this amount was converted into a grant and Nepal in 2015-16.8 for projects prioritized by the Bangladesh Government. The balance of US$800 As the table above indicates, the principal million was increased to US$862 million to benefciaries of India’s technical co-operation cover 15 projects focusing on supplies and programmes in the fnancial year 2015-16 infrastructure. The supply projects have

Principal Destinations of India’s Technical Co-operation Programs (2015-16)9

211 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

been completed. The infrastructure projects, countries is demand-driven and focuses on the which include construction of rail bridges beneft of mutual learning. Most of the aid and and new rail lines, are in various stages of grants are decided bilaterally, based on need implementation.10 and country priorities.

In June 2015, the Government of India Purpose behind India’s Development Assistance12 announced a second line of credit of US$2 billion to Bangladesh for various social and infrastructure development projects. These projects included initiatives in power, railways, road transportation, information and communication technology, shipping, health and technical education sectors. The progress of these LoC projects is monitored regularly through periodic review meetings with the Government of Bangladesh and other stakeholders.

A LoC of US$1 billion has been extended to Nepal for hydropower, irrigation and Most of India’s foreign assistance is granted other infrastructural development projects. to her neighbours – Bhutan, Afghanistan and Of this amount, an allocation of US$450 Nepal – with a second priority being African million and an additional LoC of US$300 countries. According to Nigam Shailly, million was committed to Nepal for post earthquake reconstruction work. These “‘Approximately 60 % of India’s LoCs are in addition to two Indian LoCs for development assistance is allocated for Nepal of US$100 million (2007) and US$250 training of civil servants, engineers and million (2010). The LoC of US$100 million public-sector executives of recipient has been fully utilised for road projects, rural countries; approximately 30 % for ‘easy electrifcation projects, power transmission funds’ to help overseas governments and hydro power projects. The US$250 million buy Indian equipment or services, such LoC, which covers power transmission and as ground-water pumps, medicines, road projects, is progressing well. At least 19 health care infrastructure and railway road projects, totaling US$69.37 million, have equipment. The fnal 10% is disbursed been approved under this LoC.11 for costs incurred in projects abroad, India’s Foreign Policy and DAC Donors: such as feasibility studies or technical Similarities and differences expertise from India on government- run institutions such as hospitals, railway As discussed in the earlier sections, the services or universities. Thus it can be Ministry of External Affairs (India) has clearly noticed that India doesn’t provide much 13 indicated that India’s assistance to the other aid as outright cash grants”.

212 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

As Agrawal notes, Two types of data would be helpful in order to assess the nature and pattern of India aid: 1) “Up until the mid-1990s, India increasingly data from India as aid provider, which ideally relied on offcial development assistance should be a head division for India managing (ODA) from OECD countries, at one data, and 2) information from recipients of point even becoming the world’s largest India’s assistance. Up until 2012, data was aid recipient. However, today, as a completely scattered. It was a struggle to consequence of its economic rise, foreign collect and collate data from the Exim bank, aid has become only a marginal feature departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in India’s overall economic development, and Ministry of Economic Affairs, think tanks accounting for less than 0.3% of the such as Research and Information System country’s GDP.”14 (RIS), Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) or from relevant universities. Aid Received and Provided by India15 Data coordination improved with the creation of the Development Partnership Agreement in 2012. But since the department is barely four years old, it will still take some time to get all the data in one place. It can also be diffcult to collect data from recipient countries since most of these agreements happen bilaterally, and do not come under public notices in India. The result, however, can be a lack of transparency. As noted above, there is no overarching institutional structure that has an overview of aid fows.

As the fgure above depicts, up to 2012/13, Because India is not classifed as a “donor” India received more aid than it provides. or a “new donor” under the OECD DAC Recent initiatives have reversed this paradigm, there has been a conceptual problem proportion, which has much to do with its with India being identifed as a “donor.” India projection as a world leader globally. Recent is still a developing country, and for many changes in India’s foreign policy have included years to come may well require that resources the provision of aid, grants and loans directly be diverted inside the country. Therefore it to governments, an approach similar to the cannot be bound to obligations required of OECD DAC modus operandi. more conventional donors.

An important distinction with the DAC donors There is very limited participation of citizens is the scattered availability of data on India’s in planning, implementation and evaluation aid. The lack of institutionalized, homogenous of programmes under SSC in general, and processes means that information on India’s India in particular. India’s interpretation of aid activities is scattered, irregular, incomplete processes such as the Busan Partnership and therefore diffcult to compare with others. for Effective Development Cooperation,

213 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Financing for Development, and Agenda 2030 initiatives such as Make in India, Digital India, the is different than what was established by North Swachh Bharat campaign (Clean India campaign) South Cooperation (NSC). Consequently, the and Smart Cities in India’s efforts to boost processes that India has adopted for providing development co-operation with other nations. development assistance and evaluating its impact are also different. In fact, they are India’s Initiatives in BRICS and the continuing to evolve. However, efforts are New Development Bank being made at DPA to streamline India’s development co-operation. A key challenge For India, the BRICS platform is extremely is to compile and consolidate data relating to important, as is IBSA. Both aim to collectively the lines of co-operation managed by different boost bargaining power and infuence on ministries. To date DPA has achieved some global issues, and also to strengthen economic results in data collection and dissemination, and political ties among the member-countries but there is still work to do. along the lines of South-South Co-operation. Among the BRICS countries, India’s expertise As part of its approach to SSC, India’s lies in the software industry, the availability Government understands that development of cheap labor, the service sector, and the is a process that requires multi-stakeholder pharmaceutical industry, particularly in the area engagement. The Government has shown of generic drugs. According to the Ministry that it is eager to collaborate with civil society, of Commerce and Industry, trade with BRICS which has been endorsed and welcomed by partners is about US$95 billion in 2013/14. Indian civil society. It has previously engaged The Ministry suggests, “there are signifcant CSOs such as SEWA, TERI and Barefoot synergies with other BRICS partners which College in its programmes, and has also may be tapped to further strengthen intra- set up the Forum for Indian Development BRICS linkages in these areas.”16 Cooperation (FIDC -2012) as a platform for the government, civil society and academia to come together and explore various facets of The initiative to establish the BRICS’ New Indian development co-operation. Development Bank (NDB) during the 2012 BRICS Summit in India was part of overall India has been engaging multilaterally efforts by BRICS to promote international with southern countries through various development and to refect their priorities. platforms such as the IBSA Forum (India, India sees this Bank as a good opportunity Brazil, and South Africa), the BRICS Group to strengthen the role of emerging market (Brazil, Russia, India and China), the South economies, particularly India. The recent Asian Association for Regional Co-operation appointment of Indian national, KV Kamath, (SAARC), and the Association of Southeast as the head of the NDB might be a stepping Asian Nations (ASEAN) (at the regional level). stone for India to become a dominant Of these, BRICS and IBSA have emerged infuence in both the BRICS and the region. It as crucial fora to improve dialogue and co- may also be a way to position Indian interests operation in SSC. These platforms have in the system and to refect India’s increasing also given better visibility and opportunities to role in emerging markets.

214 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Other Indian initiatives include a BRICS report a permanent seat at the United Nations Security focusing on synergies and complementarities Council (UNSC). According to one analyst, amongst BRICS economies. This report highlights BRICS role as growth drivers for the “While Russia and China support India world economy. The report was released by the (along with Brazil and South Africa) leaders at the Delhi Summit in March 2012. in playing an important role at the UN, India added the Urbanization Forum to BRICS the declaration document does not have co-operation mechanisms to bring greater focus such mention of expanding the UNSC to on intra-BRICS co-operation so members could include India. This complicates matters learn from each others’ experiences in tackling as the other three permanent members, challenges of rapid urbanization, an issue faced United States, Britain, and France, have by all BRICS members.17 openly backed India’s claim.”19

India introduced the practice of holding a BRICS Other notable features of the Ufa Declaration academic forum as a preparatory mechanism, include: feeding into the annual Summit agenda. The frst such meeting was held in New Delhi in May • Expanding the use of BRICS national 2009, just prior to the frst BRIC Summit held in currencies in transactions (India and Yekaterinburg, Russia in June 2009.18 Russia were expected to announce an agreement in 2016.); and The theme of the 2014 BRICS summit at Ufa, • A framework for BRICS e-commerce Russia, was titled “BRICS Partnership - a co-operation and the strengthening Powerful Factor of Global Development.” The of Intellectual Property Rights co- focus was on strengthening co-operation in areas operation amongst members, which is of common interest in the international economic expected to substantially aid the ongoing and political agenda. For India, there were three recovery process in the Indian economy. major takeaways from the Ufa Declaration: India will take advantage of opportunities to 1. A focus on increasing trade-ties amongst revitalize and reinvent its economy in hosting BRICS nations; the BRICS Presidency (starting February 2016) 2. The need to strengthen co-operation coming out of the Ufa Summit.20 The 8th amongst BRICS members in areas BRICS Summit is scheduled to take place in of information, communication, and India in Goa, in October 2016. It is expected technology (ICTs); and that there will be more than ffty meetings and 3. India’s role at the United Nations. events, at ministerial, senior offcials, working groups, technical, and track-II levels. The core The declaration states that the BRICS nations theme is “Building Responsive, Inclusive and will strengthen their cooperation to counter Collective Solutions,” with a special focus on international terrorism, giving the central role institution-building, the implementation of in this action to the United Nations. However, past commitments, and the exploration of there is no mention of India’s attempt to secure innovative solutions.

215 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

People-to-people interactions, business, 2030, the post-2015 development agenda. youth, and sports will be the key priority Goal 17 to revitalize the global partnership for areas for India’s BRICS Chairmanship. Many sustainable development, in particular, places BRICS-based initiatives will be hosted during emphasis on the critical role of South-South India’s Chairmanship: The under-17 football and Triangular Co-operation in achieving tournament, a flm festival, the friendship cities this ambitious development agenda. It sets conclave, a wellness forum, a trade fair, a youth targets for SSC and Triangular Co-operation summit, a think-tank forum, an academic council that emphasize both technology25 and capacity are some of them. The participation of people building,26 where all countries have committed from across Indian states will be encouraged, to achieve progress. and BRICS events will be organized in different states across the country.21 In all these efforts, there are huge possibilities for involving civil society organizations for Breaking Financial Monopoly of public education, awareness building, advocacy the West and outreach work to scale up South-South Co-operation. It is widely agreed that CSOs The New Development Bank and the China- are well positioned to promote and implement led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank22 various forms of SSC, particularly at this will break the monopoly of the World Bank moment where its processes and institutions and IMF. It also could make their functioning are still being constructed. In order to do so, more transparent. China’s offcial newspaper, civil society must showcase its knowledge and Global Times, suggests “it will motivate the skills acquired through experience. It is also IMF and the World Bank to function more important for civil society to demonstrate that normatively, democratically and effciently, it has the track record, expertise and capacity to in order to promote the reform of [the] contribute in a meaningful way to the principles international fnancial system as well as and practices of South-South Co-operation. democratization of international relations.”23

Conclusion: Scaling up SSC and Civil society linkages have been challenged engaging the Civil Society in examining and documenting potential adverse negative impact on local populations The issues and ideas of South-South of partner countries from Indian corporate Cooperation are being given prime importance or government projects in SSC. CSOs need by India as well as by civil society. The launch to strengthen their linkages and skills to of the ‘Network of Southern Think-tanks document experiences in order to monitor (NeST)’24 in March 2016 bringing together whether SSC is moving in the right direction. Southern think-tanks, civil society, academia They also need to support and mentor local and media on South-South Co-operation NGOs to ensure that they are not exploited by exemplifed this fact. Indian entities.

The SDGs stress the importance of South- It is important to understand that Indian civil South Co-operation in implementing Agenda society is still in the nascent stage when it

216 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

comes to voicing opinions on India’s foreign tank Research and Information Systems for policy. In fact, there are very few that have Developing Countries (RIS) with funding started to engage on these issues. Earlier, it from MFA and the subsequent creation of was a subject largely left to academics and the Forum for Indian Development Co- think tanks. The civil society sector needs to operation by the RIS in 2012. Now there is understand and connect with these issues in a need for a continued dialogue with MFA, order to provide useful opinions. which includes higher levels of involvement by voluntary organizations that are willing to More broadly, civil society needs to engage in work on South-South Co-operation national government programs and become involved or internationally. The government needs to be in the monitoring and evaluation of ongoing more vocal and understanding of the concerns projects, both domestic and international. and contributions of voluntary organizations. Civil society can play a major role in bringing global issues to the local level. It can help At present, discussions are taking place make connections between the local and on how to engage more civil society international by demonstrating their relevance organizations in the BRICS 2016 New Delhi to grass root organizations as well as the Summit and to fnd ways to formalize the wider population. For instance, civil society ‘Civil BRICS’. Though both the agenda and played a major role in encouraging people to dates for the Summit remain uncertain, civil be actively involved in discussions on issues society has begun planning and mobilising relating to the SDGs and Financing For strategies with regard to a Civil BRICS. Development (FFD) by showing how these Think tanks, academia and business have issues had a direct connection to the local institutional space within BRICS; civil society level. These discussions were largely absent does not yet enjoy institutional recognition during the implementation of the Millennium inside this framework. Yet civil society plays Development Goals. an important role in drawing attention to the collective socio-economic challenges The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) has of the BRICS countries. Further, robust been quite welcoming of research and policy engagement with civil society from all the work from independent organizations. This fve countries will strengthen the foundation is evident in the establishment of the think of BRICS as a Southern grouping.

217 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Endnotes

1 India’s Global Footprints, VANI Publicaton, 2012. 16 http://www.indianembassy.ie/docs/India%20 2 Excerpts from the Internatonal Seminar on South - in%20BRICS.pdf South Co-operaton, August 26-27, 2014, New Delhi 17 Ibid (Organized by Voluntary Acton Network India). 18 Ibid 3 htp://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-guides/ 19 http://www.indiawrites.org/diplomacy/ufa- rising-powers-in-international-development/ summit-brics-boost-for-indian-economy/ rising-powers-and-south-south-development-cooperaton #.Vuw2n-IrLIU . 20 http://www.indiawrites.org/diplomacy/ufa- summit-brics-boost-for-indian-economy/ 4 Annual Report 2015-16, Ministry of External Afairs, New Delhi. htp://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/ 21 htp://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/26558/ PublicatonDocs/26525_External_Afairs_English_ Unveiling_of_Indias_BRICS_Logo_and_Launch_of_ AR_2015-16_Final.pdf BRICS_Website_by_External_Afairs_Minister# 5 htp://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-guides/ 22 All BRICS countries are founding members of this rising-powers-in-international-development/ bank. rising-powers-and-south-south-development-co- 23 Simha, Rakesh Kumar, (July, 2015) Five takeaways operaton #.Vuw2n-IrLIU. from the BRICS summit, Russia and India Report, 6 Ministry of External Afairs (Government of India), http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2015/07/16/five_ htp://www.mea.gov.in/development-partnership- takeaways_from_the_brics_summit_44245 administraton.htm# . 24 Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy, ET Bureau Mar 8, 2016, 7 Nigam Shailly, (September, 2015), “India’s Foreign India to launch network of think-tanks of South- Aid: Social Responsibility or Hegemonic Strategy?,” South Co-operaton countries, URL: htp://artcles. Internatonal Journal of Technical Research and economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-03-08/ Applicatons. e-ISSN: 2320-8163, www.ijtra.com, news/71309358_1_south-south-co-operation Special Issue 34, PP. 17-25. -development-agenda-post-2015. 8 Annual Report 2015-16, Ministry of External Afairs, 25 Target 17.6 - Enhance North-South, South-South New Delhi htp://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/ and triangular regional and internatonal co- PublicatonDocs/26525_External_Afairs_English_ operaton on and access to science, technology AR_2015-16_Final.pdf and innovaton and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved 9 Ibid coordinaton among existng mechanisms, in 10 Ibid partcular at the United Natons level, and through 11 Ibid a global technology facilitaton mechanism when agreed upon. htp://www.un.org/ 12 Nigam Shailly, (September, 2015), sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/. 13 Ibid. 26 Target 17.9 - Enhance internatonal support for 14 Agrawal, S. (2007), Emerging Donors in Internatonal implementng efectve and targeted capacity- Development Assistance: The India Case, Ontario: building in developing countries to support natonal Internatonal Development Research Center, p. 3. plans to implement all the sustainable development goals, including through North-South, South-South 15 Nigam Shailly, (September, 2015), op. cit. and triangular co-operaton. htp://www.un.org/ sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/.

218 Donor Priorities for Technical Cooperation and Tied Aid

Rutendo Hadebe, University of Cape Town

“If you have come to help me you are wasting been that TA is an effective approach to your time. But if you have come because your poverty reduction. It shows, however, how liberation is bound up in mine then let us work.” these programs epitomize contradictory quoted in Interaction 1991 ideological questions relating to tied aid and technical assistance. The paper cites various In the past few years, technical assistance (TA) examples of TA in describing the prevailing has become an integral part of development arguments for and against this modality of aid. aid and assistance. Yet it continues to provoke tension and epistemological questions about This section will be followed by a refection its relevance, appropriateness, effcacy, ethics on the technical cooperation and possibilities and unequal power dynamics. for ways of conceptualizing it to become more effcient, relevant and transformative in future. In 2005 the Blair Commission for Africa identifed tied aid, food aid and technical What is Technical Cooperation/ assistance as the three most problematic Support/Assistance? aspects of current aid modalities. Recent world donor agencies’ reports have highlighted In Arndt’s (2007) paper Foreign Aid and Development, a reduction of tied aid and food aid. In he defnes technical assistance as “the provision contrast, technical assistance has remained a of donor funded personnel to supply missing big consumer of aid resources and, in some skills and train local people.”1 This defnition is instances, has even increased. comparable with its use by international fnancial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, both This paper focuses on TA in order to identify of which argue that technical support is critical for and refect on its underlying concepts, in the improving policies and project design, strengthening context of poverty reduction development implementation, and enhancing organizational skills. projects in post-colonial Sub Saharan Africa and other developing countries in the A more layered defnition of technical ‘South’. It outlines the history of technical assistance reveals that technical cooperation is support in donor institutions, the inaugural generally concentrated into three main areas: vision for TA, and its evolution to become a permanent fxture of powerful donor fnancial 1. Technical assistance to strengthen a institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF. country or organization’s knowledge It looks at the controversies that have shaped gaps. In this case, outside consultants and the discourse around the concept. A second advisors are hired (and funded) to examine objective is to examine structural adjustment a project. They are generally given access programs (SAP), where the assumption has to critical organizational information

219 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

on budgets, expenditures and staffng. tension, such that there are calls to ‘rethink’ its This ultimately allows them to become a underlying concepts. Technical assistance was monitoring arm of the donor organization. initiated by the United Nations following the The insertion and immersion of outside Second World War. At that time it was thought personnel into the funded organization of as support or assistance. Over time and with is premised on the donor’s perception the demand for a more politically correct and that existing systems, as designed by local nuanced approach to technical support, words personnel, are ineffcient. The assumption such as ‘assistance’ and ‘support’ were replaced is that this type of assistance is critical to by ‘cooperation’ to suggest an egalitarian and strengthening an institution. reciprocal arrangement between the donor agency and the funded counterparts. The term ‘technical 2. Technical assistance to create or strengthen cooperation’ suggests a concept that is regularly institutions. Derived from donors’ beliefs reviewed and contextualized, an approach that that existing rules are either ineffcient challenges a ‘one-size-fts-all’ approach. or missing altogether, this form of TA generally aims to improve bureaucratic Institutions such as the UN argue that learning procedures, particularly those associated from technical assistance initiatives is a two way with the monitoring and accounting of process and that knowledge exchange is not a expenditures.2 The assumption is that simplistic linear commodity. The UN denies the without such procedures or placements, portrayal of funded institutions’ local personnel resources are unlikely to be properly as passive consumers of knowledge. monitored.. Technical assistance to fll this perceived gap is provided through the Despite this rhetoric, both the IMF and insertion of the funder’s own personnel as the World Bank have been instrumental in technical assistants in a critical arm of the provoking polarizing notions and experiences funded institution. in their use of technical assistance, which deviate from the more ‘politically correct’ and 3. Technical assistance through the provision nuanced framework advanced by the UN. of training programs to recipient countries or organization offcials. This form of Even a superfcial examination of some of the TA, which is often less controversial, is practices of technical assistance raises questions designed as training initiatives to support regarding organizational synergy and effcacy. oversight or capacity building activities. For example, the insertion of personnel who While training opportunities, especially might not ascribe to an organization’s ethics, those that include foreign travel, can histories and values has the potential to be distributed to political supporters as disrupt internal power dynamics. In addition, prizes, the amount of technical assistance the presence of outside personnel who report being used in these ways is relatively low. to a different authority can be problematic. In many instances it has provoked tensions An examination of the history of technical between local and embedded staff. Academics cooperation provides insights into why, after have long called for a rethink around this and so many years, it continues to be a source of other TA concepts.

220 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Questioning of technical assistance gained terms of the competing ideologies of socialism traction in the 1990s. It can be linked to or neoliberalism. that period’s increased presence of technical assistants with the expansion of the IMF and The ability to control aid resources is World Bank’s structural adjustment programs. generally blamed for the establishment of The dominance of IMF and the World Bank many dictatorships in post-colonial Africa. It in the technical assistance debate is related to is argued that before the era of the structural the critical but problematic role TA played in adjustment (1985-1995) African dictators both institutions during the implementation of maintained authoritarian power through structural adjustment programs. patronage networks, whereby they paid off supporters using resources provided through By 1993, SAPS were found everywhere in West loans from international fnancial institutions. Africa, as well as in all 36 countries in Sub-Sahara It saw the entrenchment of dictators such as Africa. They were usually negotiated between Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Daniel arap Moi individual governments and the Bretton Woods of Kenya to name a few. Institutions (IMF and World Bank). The governments had often been identifed as having All this changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall. the potential to fail to pay back existing loans This new era provided an opportune moment after acquiring independence from different to rethink models of aid provision. Previous colonial powers. The IMF and World Bank experiences of abuse of loans motivated a typically played a key role in the program design. deviation from the UN advocated model Contract obligations usually included technical of technical assistance into a more visible, support, which entailed assigned personnel hierarchical and often ‘racialized’ concept. The as technical assistants, who were embedded word ‘racialized’ is used here to refect the fact into the funded government institutions. This that the race of the provider and the consumer ushered in an era when ‘experts’ of a different of knowledge were usually different, with the race and culture became a permanent feature ‘provider’ being white and the ‘consumer’ black of post-colonial black majority government or brown. The mushrooming of dictatorships institutions. Today this history is associated across post-colonial Africa in the 80s gave with the uncomfortable memory of austerity, justifcation for this model of technical assistance. hardships and violation of human rights, past It is important to note that although simplistic practices that are quickly recalled when engaging and lacking in nuance, the association of in debates on technical cooperation today. neoliberal with ‘fscal success’ in countries where SAPs had been introduced provided the Bretton An examination of the IMF’s history Woods institutions license to reproduce technical demonstrates that historical developments assistance in its most linear form. have enabled these donor institutions to mold technical assistance in ways that to cater to Technical Assistance their own institutional and political agendas. Problematized So, for instance, during the Cold War Western and Eastern donors scrambled to fnd spheres Following the above analysis, the frst form or countries/organizations of infuence in of TA focuses on the deployment of advisors

221 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

and consultants from the donor country The allocation of these costs inside a project’s to fll a knowledge gap. Many who work in total budget has elicited questions about how social science disciplines have criticized this aid is done and who is benefting. In many kind of arrangement. They point out that cases countries continue to pay interest on the confrmation of foreign advisors and loans that include the costs of this technical consultants as ‘the knowledge inhabiting assistance, long after the conclusion of bodies’ is highly problematic on many levels. the project. Most often the actual money The underlying assumption is that the funded never passed through the local government institution is lacking in skills and knowledge. It institution or ministry’s hands. In many positions the advisors as superior, privileged instances the funds never left the country of personnel with power over other long-standing origin as often the TA personnel were paid local team members. The consequence is a in their home country or through their own disruption of an organization’s power dynamics country’s banks. The implementation of while also closing off any opportunity for SAPS, with their rigid administration through these positions to be challenged. technical assistance, has tended to blur their focus on poverty reduction. These inserted TAs often arrive with little knowledge about the people, culture, religion, There are major questions as to how and who language and society that the local institution should evaluate the contribution of technical serves. The model also does not have the assistance in SAPs. The many countries fexibility whereby the positions of provider that signed onto SAPS are either still poor and consumer of knowledge can be adjusted, or worse off. In this context, the resources shared or reversed even though logic demands assigned to technical assistance are recalled that this should be the case. In practice, it would with discomfort and hostility. Technical make sense that the incoming TA spend time, assistance cooperation provided by the World and seek advice from the host organization Bank and IMF was expected to usher in to learn about the country’s culture and the economic growth. Instead, the achievements constituency that the organization serves, as were often in another direction, ones which well as the particularities about doing business popularized neoliberal thinking while in that environment. weakening dictatorships and promoting tenets of democracy among previously authoritarian The above argument can be applied as well to the execution of second type of technical governed societies. assistance. Here, again, the donor agency seconds personnel to watch over the utilization Thus, the experience of technical assistance, of resources. Tensions can escalate to high levels particularly in the post-colonial period, was when an outside expert is deployed to monitor profound and continues today to reinforce old these processes. The origin of these conficts stereotypes of the African as the powerless, begins with the fact that these outside personnel passive receiver of knowledge, against the all- are utilizing program resources that have been powerful, all-knowing westerner dispensing marked for beneft to the local community. knowledge.

222 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

The Argument for Technical making it more diffcult for governments to use Cooperation foreign aid for patronage systems. Enhanced monitoring through immersed technical A critique of the current model for technical assistants, and investment into this function, cooperation, or calls for doing things reduced the resources a political leader could differently, run up against the history of TA and employ to remain in power. A study of TA and its representation in the neoliberal narrative. SAP practices during this period indicates that This narrative is one that aligns SAPs with the close monitoring and a reduction of resources democratization of independent Africa. to maintain patronage networks forced Africa’s autocratic incumbents to concede A study of this history reveals that earlier (prior to political rights to their opponents.4 1985-1995), some autocrats allowed the exercise of certain civil rights, such as permission to Institutions such as the World Bank and organize opposition parties or a (more or less) IMF argued that technical assistance played a free press. In still other countries, governments signifcant role in the ushering of democratic created commissions to examine the country’s principles and practices in national institutions constitution. In most countries, these initial in post-colonial Africa. In their quantitative movements led to multiparty elections. By 1994, analyses of linkages between donor funding and 29 African countries had held 54 elections, democracy building, technical support is cited with observers judging the majority as “free.” as a key driver against coercive rule by would- These elections boasted high turnouts and many be-dictators. Technical assistance personnel opposition victories: voters removed 11 sitting have been hailed as being instrumental in the presidents with three others declining to run. displacement of ‘dictatorial’ leaders during During 1995–97, 16 countries staged second the 90s through their efforts to eliminate the round elections, so that by 1998 only four subverting of donor resources by dictators. countries in all of sub-Saharan Africa had not Technical assistance personnel have also been staged some sort of democratic contest. Given the credited with cutting government budgets, continent’s poor record of competitive elections the privatization of parastatal organizations, in the post-independence period, rapid political and the starving of subsidized public service liberalization during this time was a monumental to make resources available for debt servicing. political change and accomplishment.3 Ultimately, technical assistance is portrayed as playing a key role in reducing debt and laying Although the link between technical assistance, a foundation for what was perceived as being SAPs and democratic rights are diffcult to future economic growth. clearly establish, there are certain aspects that were useful in this regard. For example, a critical But the fact is that poverty levels did not really arm of SAPs entailed a monitoring function, decrease and even the incidences of growth carried out by embedded personnel. In the never translated to an improved quality of life. 1980s and 1990s donors paid close attention to Therein lies the irony that invokes a call for government spending and signs of corruption, evaluation of technical assistance.

223 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

The argument against Technical or approved brands. So, while the project’s Assistance within the context of main objective might be poverty alleviation, the SAPs promotion of local small businesses or services seems to be excluded from the agenda. The IMF and World Bank represent SAPs as an era of successful poverty reduction. This Rethinking technical cooperation characterization is in opposition to common for the future critiques of SAPs as being key drivers of strategies resulting in the escalation of There is no doubt that technical cooperation inequality levels, and thus poverty levels. has provided opportunities for reciprocal learning for both the developed and the The IMF and World Bank have evaluated developing world. While it is easy for post- structural adjustment programs as major colonial Africa to reject technical assistance, successes in poverty reduction. But in the reality is that a total elimination of TA is reality, the World Bank set conditionalities not the solution for Africa. Instead, a reformed that worked against the poor, included approach to aid for Africa calls for a replacement liberalization of markets, devaluation of local of old inequitable concepts of TA with ones currencies, the abandonment of state subsidies that are more egalitarian and that recognize the in the provision of health and education strengths and needs of recipient countries and services and the transformation of industry organizations. The following are suggestions to being export market oriented. Technical that can transform the way technical assistance assistance was a primary instrument in is executed and experienced: ensuring the implementation of these policies. 1. Rethinking and organizing the As a modality of aid they also raised questions costs of technical assistance about the extent of tied aid in donor programs. Currently the cost of TA personnel is borne The fact is that technical personnel associated by the funded institution. However, technical with SAPs spent little, if any of their salaries in assistance personnel are chosen, recruited, their country of operation. They usually enjoyed supervised and answerable only to donor free accommodation, as it was catered for by the organizations. Given this reality, it is worth project budget. Most often they returned home rethinking the fnancial and institutional for holidays, creating the expression “money responsibility for technical assistance. Is returning back through the back door.” it logical for the organization receiving assistance, which has little direct control over Against this reality is another that is promoted TA, to have to meet these costs from project by donor countries – one that tells its citizens budgets? This is particularly problematic how their tax dollars are being used to uplift considering that the organization cannot poor Africa. These stories conveniently forget undertake an evaluation of the value of the to factor in the amounts that return back to personnel or the assistance. the donor countries as allocations for technical cooperation costs. As well, procurement clauses The Blair Commission of 2005 criticized donor often require that funded institutions purchase organizations who, through tied funding, key equipment and vehicles from the funder insisted that recipient organizations had to

224 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

purchase donor products or services, including tenure to facilitate assimilation, a deeper technical assistance. The Commission found understanding of local cultures, and their ability that this practice effectively reduced the value to incorporate this knowledge into their work. of aid by 30 percent. The continued tying of TA to donor country experts requires a thorough 4. Recognizing the history of the society research into this modality of development aid. Knowledge of the economic and social history of the society and communities affected by 2. Questons on Local Ownership aid interventions should be a pre-requisite Problems with local ownership are directly for all technical assistance personnel. This relating to the issues identifed above. The will help ensure that their approach is not unquestioned authority of TA personnel a-historical and does not assume a context- brought from the outside underlines this less superiority. With reference to post connection, especially when local personnel colonial Africa the impact of colonialism become aware of the remuneration disparities. and slavery should inform an understanding Thus the project remains a ‘donor’s thing’ and a context of unparalleled levels of poverty. little long-term uptake by recipients takes place. Donor personnel should be able to position themselves in that history. If this process There needs to be a comprehensive evaluation is recognized and followed, it is less likely of technical assistance, which juxtaposes its that donors will continue to promote the costs against its real value in terms of the distortions of the grand narrative, “look how reduction of poverty experienced by the much we have given Africa.” affected communities. Because technical 5. Inclusion of the local society in all assistance is generally seen as problematic, stages of the project agencies need to demonstrate that they are aware of the critique. They should start making In many instances local communities are efforts to reduce technical assistance costs and not involved in the project design. Instead its domination in development aid modalities. they are relegated to be passive receivers of 3. Rethinking defnitons of knowledge donor resources, solutions, or experiments. This approach perpetuates dependency Simplistic notions of knowledge suggest that it - development becomes a donor’s thing. is a commodity given in a linear form with the Without any contribution to the project it learner being a passive receiver from a superior is very diffcult to convince a community or provider. Over the years, researchers have society that they have a responsibility to fnd rejected this model, arguing that knowledge is solutions to the problems highlighted and fuid and the roles played by knower/learner targeted by the project. are inter-changeable, not static. One way to remedy this phenomenon is for This new model of knowledge transfer should donors to reconfgure program designs, to be adopted for technical assistance. Hired ensure that the targeted society is included. A experts from abroad should endorse and project approval should only be implemented facilitate a ‘learning with’ approach. Donor when there is evidence of approval at both personnel should be hired for medium-term local and donor levels.

225 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Procurement of equipment should also Conclusion emphasize local development, with a priority given to the potential to supply at local and regional While recognizing major diffculties, it is as level. On this topic, Makonen Getu argues that important not to totally reject technical support. there needs to be a shift from needs assessment An approach whereby donor and recipient to a focus on potentials. He argues that such an organizations are learning side-by-side in an approach would frame internal factors as primary egalitarian atmosphere provides opportunities and external factors as complimentary.5 that extend beyond technical knowledge. It provides opportunity to understand different cultures and the incorporation of Africa is not a homogenous territory. Its distinct knowledge systems. It can accelerate nations, ethnic and cultural groups represent development though the positive attitudes and diverse and unique histories, which should enthusiasm these relationships foster. be factored into each project design and the confguration of technical support. As a continent devastated by colonialism, Africa can beneft from aid from western 6. Move away from a ‘one-size-fts-all’ governments. But African institutions want template and deserve the right to have an input in shaping this aid. Africa, like its donors, realizes The early, one-dimensional form of TA was that trillions of dollars have been directed its a function of the context and state of Africa way in the name of poverty reduction. Yet 30 plus years ago. Today’s Africa is much progress in reducing poverty in Africa has different. Strangely enough, however, been highly problematic. African thinkers the philosophy and execution of technical and development practitioners are eager for assistance has not responded to this changed opportunities to provide local solutions to world. For example, most African countries these problems, ones using local resources, have university-educated populations that can skills and knowledge. A rethink of aid and easily be assimilated into technical assistance technical assistance can become the frst port roles in development. of call to make this a reality.

Post-colonial Africa has strongly endorsed A new reality is that hostilities against former the tenets postulated by development colonial powers have escalated. This makes it aid effectiveness. Many who are in the imperative for donors to continually rethink development industry believe that this technical assistance, to ensure that it suits a space provides an opportune moment to transform and time. aid modalities. Technical assistance and tied aid are a critical part of this agenda. Endnotes

1 Arndt C (2000) technical cooperaton in F.Tarp (ed) 5 Getu M (2003) Making Technical Assistance Foreign aid development (pp290-311) London ; Programmes Work: A New Approach in Routledge Transformaton Vol 20 No 2 Christan and Other 2 Arndt, op. cit. Approaches to Poverty Reducton Development 3 Gibson et al: 2015 p. 323 Strategies pp111-120, Sage Publicatons Ltd. Stable URL: htp://www.jstor.org/stable/43052565 4 Ibid, p. 324.

226 European Union

Zuzana Sladkova, CONCORD Europe

Overview position as the world’s biggest ODA donor with an increase in nominal terms from €57.1 • For the European Union (EU) billion in 2014 to €64.4 billion in 2015. collectively, the sum of ODA from the 28 EU Member States, remains the world’s It is important to note that the EU’s genuine 2 biggest ODA donor in absolute numbers ODA is really only €52.4 billion. The €12 billion or 18% of all ODA includes spending by providing €64.4 billion1 to ODA in on students in donor countries, refugees in 2015. However the EU’s genuine ODA donor countries, debt cancellation, repayment reaches only €52.4 billion. The €12 billion of interest on concessional loans and future difference is spent on in-donor costs interest on cancelled debts and tied aid. such as refugees, support for students, debt relief, interest and tied aid. In 2015, EU institutions managed €12.3 billion • The EU collectively did not reach the in development assistance, making them one 0.7% target in 2015,delivering instead of the world’s largest donors. However, the 0.45% of its GNI in ODA. Only fve EU institutions alone cannot achieve the EU member states reached the 0.7% 0.7% goal. EU collective ODA is the sum ODA/GNI target: Luxemburg, Sweden, of the ODA from the 28 EU Member States Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. and the part provided by the EU institutions • In the UN fnancing for development that is not credited to Member States. Most negotiations, the EU merely recommitted to of the EU institutions’ ODA is, for the a collective 0.7% target within the timeframe purposes of ODA/GNI reporting, imputed of the post-2015 agenda (by 2030). to EU Member States, i.e. Member States data include part of the EU institutions’ spending. 2015: Missed 0.7% target For years the EU has upheld, but failed to The EU has been more ambitious then other deliver on, collective and national aid quantity countries in (re)committing to the 0.7% targets, intended to be met by 2015. This ODA/GNI target. However, in 2015 only includes a collective 0.7% of GNI target, an fve EU countries met this target: Luxemburg, individual one of 0.7% for older EU Member Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and the States and a less ambitious one of 0.33% for UK. The EU, collectively, is a long way off the the countries that joined the EU after 2002. target, delivering 0.45% of its GNI in ODA If all the EU Member States had met their compared to 0.41% in 2014. Nonetheless, the ODA/GNI targets in 2015 the collective EU EU member states together still maintain their aid would have reached €105 billion3

227 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Old/New Aid Commitments UN, which would have been in charge of monitoring the implementation of fair tax The repeated failure of the EU to meet its cooperation mechanisms between countries. targets and keep its promises has eroded its reputation and credibility as a development Another relatively new initiative was the actor. Both within the EU and among other European Union pledge to join Power Africa donors it has failed to create positive pressure by allocating €2.5 billion in grants from for stepping up efforts. the 2014-2020 budget to support power generation and electricity access across sub- During one of the two major international Saharan Africa by bringing together African development events of 2015, the Third and donor governments, private companies Financing for Development Conference and international fnancial institutions. in Addis Ababa (July, 2015), the EU only However, the authors of the initiative have recommitted to a collective 0.7% target within been criticized for failing to accompany it by the timeframe of the post-2015 agenda (by an impact and sustainability assessment. 2030). Meanwhile, individual EU Member States’ targets have been diluted and weakened. Development effectiveness as a Old member states are now only required to priority meet their 0.7% commitment “taking into consideration budgetary circumstances, while Development effectiveness was one of new member states merely have to “strive” the EU’s priorities for the Addis Ababa to reach their 0.33% target.”4 Along the same conference and for implementing the SDGs. disappointing lines, the EU has unilaterally But the EU missed a great opportunity to recommitted to a specifc ODA target of 0.20 make development effectiveness principles % ODA/GNI for Least Developed Countries a global standard for all development fows. (LDCs), between 2015 and 2030, instead While the principles were reiterated in the of considering civil society’s proposal of Addis outcome document, the Addis Ababa allocating 50% of aid to these countries. Action Agenda (AAAA), in the part related to aid fows and were thus recommitted at the Arguably the most innovative initiative global level, the language fell well short of what emerging from the Addis Ababa conference is needed. The principles of democratic country was the EU institutions’ non-binding and ownership, inclusive partnership, transparency, non-fnancial commitment to the Addis accountability and results remain completely Tax Initiative. The European Commission relevant in the international debate about the (EC), the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, future of all forms of development fnance. Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden launched this Initiative, with the aim of doubling The EU must honour its long-standing capacity building efforts in order to increase commitments on development effectiveness by domestic resource mobilization. However, monitoring the progress of its implementation. the EU failed to advocate for complementing For example, as part of efforts to strengthen the Initiative through the establishment of accountability and transparency in international an inter-governmental tax body under the cooperation and development, the European

228 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Commission published, in July 2016, a frst (EDF) and EU budget 2014-2020, will further report on selected results, (July 2013 - June drain away resources from aid mechanisms 2014).5 This report has been released a few such as various forms of budget support, months ahead of the High Level Meeting which are arguably more (aid) effective with (HLM) of the Global Partnership on Effective regard to ensuring country ownership. Development Cooperation to be held in Nairobi in November 2016. It was useful, but New directions in development policy the EU and its member states must also explain how they are going to reach development As 2015 was a year of big international events, effectiveness targets and demonstrate progress 2016 is a year of changes in EU development against indicators set out by the GPEDC. policy directions. The frst of these is the new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security The second GPEDC monitoring round will Policy, which will guide the EU’s global actions provide opportunities to review progress amidst a rapidly evolving global context. and for the EU to agree on an ambitious and action oriented joint position to ensure that This strategy comes at a time when Europe the Second HLM in Nairobi will deliver a is facing a deep identity crisis, creating a plan to accelerate progress and foster inclusive temptation to promote ‘quick fx’ solutions, partnership. and thus endangering the EU’s core values and international commitments. Instead the Global Joint programming Strategy should be seen as an opportunity to reinforce the importance of the European With regard to EU joint programming, project, to affrm the EU’s commitment to the some progress, albeit modest, was made on 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development implementing joint modalities for delivering aid. (2030 Agenda) and the Paris Agreement on For example in Ethiopia EU representations Climate Change. It is also an important moment agreed on a roadmap to implement EU- to ensure policy coherence for sustainable spear-headed pilot joint actions in the feld development (PCSD) while addressing the of nutrition and health. However, there is deteriorating space in which civil society still a lot to do to on the implementation of operates in many countries. joint programming, which could contribute to greater harmonisation of EU development The EU Global Strategy needs to address efforts in partner countries. the root causes of today’s global challenges, especially rising inequality and power New aid mechanisms imbalances within and outside Europe, through a gender and human rights-based approach, In 2014 and 2015 EU institutions launched together with a human-centered understanding new types of aid mechanisms, such as the of security and development fnance. Bêkou, Madad and the Africa Trust Funds. These initiatives which are managed by the EU, Since 2005, EU Development Cooperation has with a total contribution of around €3 billion been guided by the European Consensus on from both the European Development Fund Development. However, the world scene has

229 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

changed and the revision offers a tremendous its potential repercussions on the membership opportunity to factor in the policy implications of other EU countries, the European refugee of these changes in the global social, economic crisis and the rise of populist, anti-immigration and environmental landscape. The revision is and anti-EU parties in a number of European at least a threefold endeavour as it will have member states, are just two of the major to capitalise on the visionary features of the concerns which have deeply and darkly marked 2005 Consensus, adjust and respond to the the EU’s recent history. This has translated intervening changes, and envision the trends into, and perhaps refects, a general loss of that might emerge in the coming ffteen years confdence in the model of the European which will need to be addressed. Union as a source of greater political, economic and social stability for the continent. Brexit: back to EU27 Despite these challenging circumstances Sadly, one of the European Union’s few the EU must stand frm on its principles, members who had made a frm commitment commitments and actions, as well as its’ to the 0.7% ODA target in its law, is now international solidarity and responsibilities, in to leave the club. The Brexit’s frst direct order to prove those wrong who are trying to negative impact on the volume and value of undermine the European idea by putting into EU development aid in general has resulted doubt its value and benefts. from the devaluation of the British pound. Medium- and long-term consequences for the EU’s institutions’ own development budget Recommendations and the European Development Fund are • The EU should meet existing aid even more daunting. According to European commitments (0.7% for EU-15; 0.33% for Commission annual reports the loss of U.K. EU-13) by 2020, and allocate 50% of aid contributions could leave some EU pooled budgets to LDCs by the same deadline. funds reduced by as much as 19%. Aid • EU institutions should take the lead in offcials have predicted that the EU’s funding establishing and encouraging Member for humanitarian action may be particularly States to endorse a joint action plan to affected by this loss. accelerate the implementation of the Conclusion development effectiveness principles. • The EU should stop using ODA for in- donor refugee costs and climate fnancing. EU institutions are currently facing what many Instead, it should search for alternative see as their biggest challenges in the history of ways of funding these costs separately. the European Union. The recent Brexit, with

Endnotes

1 All numbers are in constant prices of 2014. 4 European Council (2015). “A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradicaton and Sustainable Development 2 2016 CONCORD AidWatch Report 9to be published afer 2015.” Council Conclusions, 9084/15 in October 2016) 5 htp://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/fles/ 3 Ibid eu-results-report-2016.en_.pdf

230 Australia’s ‘New Aid Paradigm’: Beyond ODA?

James Goodman, Chair, AidWatch Australia and University of Technology Sydney and Matt Hilton, AidWatch Australia

Overview geared to Australia’s commercial, security and diplomatic interests. AusAid has been Since 2013 the Australian Government has dissolved into the Department of Foreign transformed Australian overseas aid. Affairs and Trade, with aid fully integrated into Australia’s ‘economic diplomacy’. Private • Aid has been redirected, to serve national fnance is lauded as the cure-all for poverty interests frst, poverty reduction second. reduction and the primary purpose of aid has • Aid is distributed directly by the been transformed into a means of leveraging Department of Foreign Affairs and Australian private interests. Trade. • Aid programs are geared to ‘economic Having established its new aid ideology, diplomacy’ over aid effectiveness. the Government has cut the aid budget by • Aid funds are dubbed ‘aid investment’, almost 25%, reducing aid to its lowest level not ‘Offcial Development Assistance’. as a proportion of national income since the • There is no target to increase aid, and it is early 1970s. This recent Australian experience a regular source of budget cuts. shows us the neo-liberal model of aid at work • Aid is at its lowest level in relation to - negating the traditional conception of aid as national income since the early 1970s. development assistance and instead enabling • As aid is discredited, re-channelled and a new corporate-state nexus, branded as cut, it is losing public support. ‘economic diplomacy’. • A new paradigm for aid is needed, grounded in solidarities. Is it still Official Development Assistance (ODA)? Introduction AidWatch believes it is now time to seriously Since the election of a conservative question whether Australian aid indeed Government in late 2013 the Australian aid qualifes as ‘offcial development assistance’ program has been radically transformed. (ODA). For the OECD, ODA must be Under the Government’s ‘new aid paradigm’ “administered with the promotion of the it is diffcult to recognise aid as having a economic development and welfare of developing meaningful development mandate beyond countries as its main objective” (emphasis in 1 promoting the private sector and growth. original). As with other donor countries, The offcial purpose of aid is now to promote Australian national interests have historically the national interest, with aid explicitly impinged on these primary objectives. But,

231 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

offcially, national interest was always defned as a signals disenchantment with, and potentially secondary concern. Until 2011 AusAid’s objective undermines, the Australian public’s was to “assist developing countries to reduce commitment to overseas aid. poverty and achieve sustainable development, in line with Australia’s national interest”.2 For all its shortcomings ODA expresses development solidarity and a sense of public The national interest proviso was itself responsibility in the face of global needs. In recent questioned by the Labor Government’s years public support in Australia for overseas 2011 ‘Review of Aid Effectiveness,’ which aid has fallen. For instance Australian National proposed a rewording that prioritised anti- University (ANU) polling showed support for poverty. The rewording positioned national aid falling from 85% to 75% between 2001 interest as a secondary by-product rather than and 2014. In 2014 only 20% of respondents as a precondition: to an Essential Media poll supported the 0.5% GNI target; in 2015 only 35% of those polled “The fundamental purpose of Australian by the Lowy Institute opposed the AUS$1 aid is to help people overcome poverty. This billion cut in the aid budget. At the same time, also serves Australia’s national interests by the ANU poll confrmed that only 12% of the promoting stability and prosperity both in population supports the use of aid to promote our region and beyond.”3 Australian commercial or political interests, and in contrast, 75% support overseas aid geared to The change was implemented, but disappeared humanitarian objectives. 5 with the demise of AusAid in 2013. The declared objective of Australia’s Department Aid certainly has been discredited as of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) successive governments have sought to direct ‘Australian Aid’ division is quite simply to aid for political and commercial purposes. “promote Australia’s national interests by The previous Labor administration favoured contributing to sustainable economic growth Australia-based International Development and poverty reduction.”4 Contractors. They used aid to promote trade agreements, to create a market in climate In offcial terms the ‘main objective’ of offsets and, most controversially, counted on- Australian ODA is no longer the “economic shore refugee detention as ODA. The current development and welfare of developing Government announced aid cuts on the eve countries” as required by the OECD, of the 2013 election and has since dramatically but the promotion of “Australia’s national reframed the role of aid to the point that it interest.” The question arises, is it still aid? is now little more than an adjunct to private interests and diplomatic objectives. The overall At one level this concern could be seen effect has been “damaging [to] the integrity of as a simple accounting matter to confrm the aid program… making it look like a piggy whether public funding for Australia’s bank ripe for raiding”.6 The Government’s overseas national advantage qualifes as aid. ‘new aid paradigm’ dovetails with populist At a more fundamental level, however, it anti-aid rhetoric, and has contributed to the

232 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

erosion of public confdence, which, in turn “increased resources justifed in terms of the makes it easier to cut the aid budget. overall fscal context rather than to a set of funding targets.” It also recommended that Discarding the GNI target ODA be focused on “countries of strategic interest.”9 In its response to the NCA report Until recently there was a bipartisan political the Government simply stated “Reforms consensus in Australia that the aid program to Foreign Aid are in the 2014-15 Budget.” should be linked to a Gross National Income In formal terms the Coalition remained (GNI) target. Following the adoption of the committed to the GNI target, but the “overall Millennium Development Goals, the coalition fscal context” justifed an immediate 20% cut under John Howard (Australia Prime Minister, with further reductions to follow. 1996 – 2007) increased the aid budget to about 0.25% of GNI. When Labor gained the In order to reach the 0.5% target in 2018, aid government in 2007, they continued this trend, spending would have had to rise to AUS$9,482 raising ODA to about 0.35% by 2011. The Rudd million.10 Yet maintaining this level even eluded Labor Government initially set a target at 0.5% Labor: In 2013 the Labor Government cut aid of GNI to be achieved by 2017, and the target, by AUS$100 million to AUS$5,032 million, but not the timing, was formally supported by the and extended the deadline for achieving the Coalition in its 2013 election platform. 0.5% goal by a year. Under the Coalition, aid spending was maintained at this level through Breaking this consensus on aid two days before to 2015 and then cut by close to a billion to the 2013 election, the Coalition announced AUS$4,052 million. The most recent budget, in major cuts to ODA and abandoned the May 2016, planned a further AUS$200 million timetable to reach the GNI target.7 In making cut, to approximately AUS$3,800 million. As the announcement, Joe Hockey, who became a result, in 2016 Australian aid is projected to Treasurer in the 2013-15 Abbott government, fall to 0.22% of GNI, comparing with 0.30% set ODA against domestic priorities: “We for the OECD as a whole in 2014.11 have to cut the growth in foreign aid, to fund Australian infrastructure because the This decline puts Australia out of step with the stronger the Australian economy, the more rest of the OECD, where a “fscal context” generous we can be in future.”8 The target of heavy indebtedness has generally not was later abandoned altogether by the Abbott been weighed against ODA. In the United Government’s Commission of Audit (NCA). Kingdom, for instance, the Conservative The Commission, which was established to Government has increased ODA to 0.7% conduct a “‘thorough review of the scope, of GNI even though it has a public debt effciency and functions of the Commonwealth equivalent to more that 90% of national government,” was headed by the President of income. In contrast Australia’s public debt is the Business Council of Australia. equivalent to about a third of national income. “Fiscal context” is thus politically defned, The Commission’s fnal report recommended as is whether ODA has legitimacy over and that ODA be delinked from GNI, with above domestic spending priorities. The

233 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

current Government has effectively delinked have a foreign policy objective and maintained aid spending from GNI, thus breaking the key spending in areas where it arguably does. means of ring-fencing aid. Ever-shrinking aid is now routinized into the budget process, and The 2015/16 budget saw 40% cuts to programs this refects the “new paradigm” in aid policy. in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Burma, Laos and the Aid Effectiveness – for Australia? Philippines. The program in Africa was, for all intents and purposes, phased out. Multilateral The OECD debate on aid effectiveness, aid was cut by 40%. These cuts, however, centred on the 2005 Paris Declaration and have not been uniform. Countries of strategic the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, had importance, and those which cooperate its echo in Australia with the creation of with Australia’s punitive and illegal offshore the Offce of Development Effectiveness detention program, or have agreed to resettle (ODE) in 2006. The ODE retains its status asylum seekers, such as Cambodia, Nauru as an “operationally independent unit” in and Papua New Guinea, have been largely DFAT, and also with the 2011 Independent untouched by the cuts. This refocusing of aid Review of Aid Effectiveness, which itself led on the ‘Indo-Pacifc’ is not uniform, nor is it to the Independent Evaluation Committee consistent with aid effectiveness criteria. overseeing the ODE. Indeed, the OECD’s aid effectiveness The aid effectiveness agenda was transformed framework implicitly assumes the focus of by the 2014 policy, “Making Performance ODA should be on development results Count”, which links aid to a series of ten for developing countries. Donor countries key targets.12 These are essentially policy and have legitimate priorities but these should be performance targets focusing on private sector subordinated to the goals of development. assistance and ‘aid for trade’ (discussed below). Australia aid effectiveness is now circumscribed by Australian government priorities, as The ffth performance target, which focuses expressed in the 2014 ‘performance targets’, on the Indo-Pacifc region, seeks to ensure not by development effectiveness. With the that at least 90% of country aid is spent in re-distribution of aid cuts at country level, the region. Ironically, this regional re-focusing the emerging geography of Australian aid trumps concerns about aid effectiveness at now directly refects Australia’s diplomatic the country level. The 2011 Review of Aid priorities. Australia now directs its ODA Effectiveness specifcally recommended low in ways that, frst and foremost, deliver expansion in PNG, the Solomon Islands ‘effectiveness’ for Australian interests. and East Timor, citing governance concerns, whilst recommending high expansion in Assisting Private Finance? sub-Sahara Africa, Indonesia and East Asia. In large part the reverse has occurred as the The Government’s ‘new development aid program has almost completely retreated paradigm’ rests on the assumption that from areas where Australia is not deemed to prosperity is best enabled by infows of private

234 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

fnance. The offcial policy, Australian aid: surprisingly, most FDI ‘greenfeld’ infows promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing are to industrialising countries. In 2014 Hong stability, argues there is a “need for change [as] Kong, China, South Korea, Taiwan , Singapore aid represents an increasingly small proportion and United Arab Emirates together accounted of development fnance.” Specifcally, it argues, for US$145 billion of the total $208 billion in “private investment in developing countries ‘greenfeld’ investment fowing to developing is approximately six times the size of ODA countries.18 This means there was only US$63 fows.”13 This claim assumes development billion in private ‘greenfeld’ investment fowing fnance includes all private fnance fows, to other developing countries, with US$13 billion which is patently untrue. to Africa. Even less ‘greenfeld’ investment, about US$1.5 billion, fows to the least developed In 2014 OECD ODA reached US$137 billion, countries (LDCs), while about a third of all ODA, while aggregate foreign direct investment or US$41 billion, went to LDCs in 2014.19 (FDI) to developing countries stood at US$681 billion and has been around this level ODA and other forms of non-private since 2010. Contributions from NGOs and development fnancing therefore are critically private benefactors provided an additional important for developing countries (aside US$32 billion.14 Unlike ODA, private fnance those that have industrialised). The OECD can fow in the reverse direction (from poor to emphasizes the role of non-concessional rich countries such as repatriated proft). The offcial fows such as those through multilateral relevant comparison, then, is with net FDI development banks and state-owned fows to developing countries. In 2014 this investment funds, as opposed to private FDI.20 fow stood at US$403 billion.15 Setting aside ODA is even more important for LDCs and personal remittances, which are not really a the OECD itself confrms, “ODA makes up meaningful form of development fnance, we more than two thirds of external fnance for can estimate that ODA is about a third of total the least-developed countries.”21 net private investment. It is important to recognize that ODA and Unfortunately, not all of this net FDI FDI are very different fnancial fows. FDI is development fnance as such. A large is money invested for proft; ODA is money proportion, US$233 billion in 2014, is in granted (or loaned) on the expectation of social mergers and acquisitions, which delivers and environmental impact. Aid is thus critically no extra local investment.16 For developing important for the poorest countries. It is countries the key is ‘greenfeld’ investment, misleading to suggest that all aggregate private which in fact has fallen dramatically, from fnance fows are a form of development US$350 billion in 2009 to US$208 billion fnancing, and that they offer a meaningful in 2014. UNCTAD defnes “greenfeld” alternative to ODA for developing countries. investment as “all new investment projects and Furthermore, it is crudely self-serving for a expansion of existing investments… where government to make this assertion as a way to they lead to a new physical operation.”17 Not rationalise large cuts to ODA.

235 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Aiding Private Players access’ for private players. Increasingly, ODA promotes Australian interests at the expense When the Australian Government announced of developing country priorities. its ‘new aid paradigm’ in 2014, it argued that aid should help countries create strong Under ‘Making Performance Count’ the economies. The examples given were China frst target for the aid program is promoting and South Korea, pointing out that both have prosperity. The policy collapses prosperity delivered prosperity for their people and are into trade by defning the target in terms now able to become aid donors in their own of “promot[ing] economic development right.22 This was offered as a key rationale for by increasing Australia’s aid-for-trade focusing on growth and the private sector. The investments.” There is no justifcation for irony is that a focus on facilitating the private this approach beyond an assertion that, “the sector directly dismantles exactly the very kind evidence is clear that economic growth is the of developmental state that enabled China and most effective means of reducing poverty.” Korea to industrialise. The next two targets focus on benefting private Furthermore, private sector-led growth based companies, including the stipulation that “all on a neo-liberal model tends to concentrate new investments will explore innovative ways wealth, thus exacerbating inequality and to promote private sector growth or engage poverty, which negates development goals. the private sector in achieving development The UNDP’s Human Development Index reveals outcomes,” and that “all new investments there is no direct correlation between GDP … will promote private sector growth.” The growth and human development. A 2013 policy further requires that “all country and report maintained that instead high public regional programs have aid investment plans expenditure on health and education is the key that describe how Australia’s aid will promote factor.23 economic growth in ways that provide pathways out of poverty.”25 Australia’s record on integrating ODA with existing public sector programs has been The new paradigm directly uses aid as an weak. Under the Accra Agenda for Action instrument for leveraging market access for on Aid Effectiveness, and later the Busan Australian commercial interests. One of the Partnership for Effective Development key targets announced as part of the new Cooperation, donors are required to ensure 2014 package is the requirement that ‘aid for country ownership of aid through integration trade’ increase to 20% of total aid spending. with national budgets. Australia has lagged on In 2016-17 about US$750 million is to be this, with the OECD, and then the Global spent on ‘aid for trade,’ which represents Partnership for Effective Development approximately 19.5% of the overall aid Cooperation, reporting its failure to meet the program. The frst priority for this spending required targets.24 Post-2014 the focus of the is to “encourage unilateral reform, promote aid program has been to downplay the role of open and transparent markets and deepen 26 the public sector and instead to fund ‘market regional economic integration.” As part of

236 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

this approach Australia is working with the especially “secured transactions.”31 Here, World Bank to “address legal, regulatory, and investments are insured against losses by the administrative impediments to investments.”27 developing country government, which means in practice that developing country taxpayers Trade can play an important role in bear the risks of private overseas investors. development but only when it is founded on human development and sustainability Currently, donor country Export Credit objectives. In Australia’s program the emphasis Agencies (ECAs) play a key role in guaranteeing is on free trade as part of the aid program investments.32 ECAs regularly under-write and market-driven regional integration, often investments, especially where a country is at the expense of local development, the identifed to be high-risk. As a result, ECAs protection of the environment and human are estimated to create 80% of developing rights. Australia is currently negotiating the country debt.33 In the ‘new aid paradigm’ PACER-Plus trade agreement with the Pacifc ODA is literally renamed as ‘aid investment,’ Island countries. It seeks to extend market and is to be directed to facilitate public-private access in the region for trade in goods, services partnerships, for example in infrastructure, and investments as well as to improve trade to enable private fnance fows to developing and investment facilitation and economic countries. cooperation. It is clear that this agreement will disproportionately beneft Australia and New In this respect Australian ODA offers a new Zealand to the detriment of many of these source of ‘soft’ public funding to bolster countries.28 DFAT directly links its “economic private sector projects. One focus has been diplomacy” to advancing PACER-Plus, stating on supporting private sector innovation, that “negotiations... include elements of trade including an ‘Innovation Xchange’, launched capacity-building and trade development in 2015 with a budget of AUS$140 million. assistance designed to strengthen Forum There is no evidence that the Xchange has Island Countries’ ability to trade.”29 achieved anything substantial, as very little public information is available. The reference Australia’s ODA has been organised in ways group is dominated by big business, including that will directly assist private players. DFAT executives from Mastercard, private venture quotes the International Finance Corporation capital groups and corporate conglomerates. (IFC), a World Bank private fnancing agency, Another private sector funding stream, the as endorsing the private sector as the key source ‘Business Partnerships Platform,’ offers 50% of jobs in developing countries. To justify this funding for any corporate initiative that can claim it focuses on job growth after the 2007- “deliver a combined social and fnancial return 8 fnancial crisis, a crisis largely caused by the on investment.”34 private sector.30 In terms of policy directions, the IFC analysis fnds “almost no beneft” DFAT has also introduced direct corporate from reducing corporate taxation, and instead partnerships into the aid program. Of recommends more direct forms of assistance particular concern are the memoranda of in the form of “investment facilitation” and understandings (MOUs) signed with two of

237 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Australia’s biggest banks, Westpac and ANZ An invisible Aid Program Bank. Both operate in many Pacifc islands that are in competition with local banks (e.g. Winding-up Ausaid was one of the frst Westpac in Papua New Guinea, Fiji and actions of the incoming conservative Vanuatu and ANZ in 12 Pacifc countries). Government. It was not foreshadowed in These MOUs have not been made public and the election campaign, but was announced it has never been clear what fnancial value is in the Government’s frst day in offce. An attached to them. The agreements are pitched important impact of this move, as noted, has as increasing access to fnance, support to been the lost development mandate for aid. A private sector development and even female related impact has been a signifcant decline in fnancial literacy. In reality, the aid program is openness and transparency. working with Australian banks to bring more customers. The Australian Foreign Minister, There is now almost no public information Julie Bishop, in a media release at the launch of on projects being fnanced by Australian aid. the Westpac Memorandum quite openly stated, One key means of holding AusAid to account “The agreement forms part of the Coalition was its ‘blue book’ yearly budget statement, Government’s economic diplomacy agenda, detailing aid expenditures. In contrast, in May which aims to more closely engage with the 2015 the ODA budget papers ran to less than private sector, the business community and ten pages. In May 2016 there was a longer non-government organisations to promote document, centred on highlights rather than 35 prosperity in our region.” fnancial openness, adding nothing to public information about the aid program. DFAT’s frst corporate MOU was actually with Carnival Australia in 2013. Carnival Australia, Detailed project-level information is no longer the Australian branch of the global cruise ship available on the Australian aid website. For brand, Carnival, runs a large number of cruise example, the Nauru Aid Program Performance ships from Australia to the Pacifc Islands, Information 2014-15 runs to just four pages especially Vanuatu. Again, this corporate with very little useful information about what partnership was made with little transparency. the program is actually doing or achieving. To date the only public information of the In its annual ODA performance assessment, agreement has been a study based on a survey DFAT states that information on projects is of cruise ship passengers in 2014. available through the AusTender website.37 However, information is minimal: drilling In 2015 DFAT canvassed a partnership with down to actual projects not possible, even if Coca Cola to deliver medical supplies in the such projects disburse considerable amounts Pacifc. Here a problem with health logistics of public funding to private operators.38 becomes an opportunity to create a private sector monopoly. The benefts to Coca-cola are clear, Transparency about performance is woeful. in terms of making it harder for governments to As noted, the DFAT performance framework take action against soft-drink consumption and substitutes policy objectives for effectiveness the related obesity crisis in the region.36 criteria. The objectives and associated targets

238 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

are simply asserted, and not in any way justifed “We do not yet have detailed information on in terms of their effectiveness. In this respect, the all the specifc programs which have been effectiveness agenda has been radically subverted. discontinued as a result of aid cuts.”41

This reduction in transparency is refected in Freedom of information requests could the frst offcial performance review issued provide an avenue of last resort. However under the new policy targets. It simply the Department of Foreign Affairs grants reports on whether the ten policy targets less than one-in-fve freedom of information were achieved, not whether they were requests in full, and 25% of requests are denied effective. For instance, Target 8 reports on completely.42 Foreign policy is routinely ‘Aid Quality Checks’, where “investments veiled in secrecy: Australia’s aid is now folded rated as satisfactory against the effciency into DFATs economic diplomacy, and is by and effectiveness criteria [are] considered defnition off-limits for public scrutiny. In this to be delivering high standards of value for context offcial leaks become the only reliable money.”39 The purpose of projects is not source. This avenue is how, for instance, assessed. Instead all of the quality standards Australians learnt about DFAT promotion relate to process requirements and, whether investor-state provisions in the Trans-Pacifc the planned outcomes have been achieved, not Partnership, a trade deal that will have extensive whether or how those outcomes contribute impacts on the region’s developing countries.43 to development goals. The same applies in the country reports where overall success is Re-asserting ODA as development rated against benchmarks and assessed as to assistance whether it is ‘on track’. The impact of the current Government on In this context, program information is opaque. Australia’s aid program has been extensive. In It is simply impossible to fnd out how much of 2015 the ANU’s Development Policy Centre the AUS$1.2 billion in spent on offshore refuge surveyed the sector and found that three out detention in Nauru and PNG is being claimed of four non-government aid practitioners, as ODA. The OECD reported that Australia both from NGOs and for-proft contractors, claimed US$343m in 2013 as “in-donor” (ie, “on- believed aid had become less effective since shore”) refugee costs. As there is no counting of 2013. ‘Transparency’, ‘strategic clarity’ and “off-shore” detention fgures, are not available for ‘predictable funding’ had suffered the most. 2014 or 2015: as the OECD reports, “Australia In terms of strategy, the main concern was considers that its processing of irregular migrant that “helping poor people in developing arrivals does not align with the DAC’s rules in- countries has become a less important goal donor refugee cost.”40 for Australian aid,” with close to 70% of respondents rejecting the idea that aid should Remarkably, in February 2016, a year after be directed at trade and infrastructure.44 the 2015-16 aid cuts, it was still unclear Remarkably, given DFATs own glowing which projects DFAT had cut. In its budget assessment of aid ‘performance’, more than submission in February 2016, the Australian a third of respondents (38%) did not believe Council for International Development stated, that Australian aid was effective.45

239 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Aid no longer has its institutional advocate rather than ending poverty or creating a in the form of AusAid, allowing ODA to more just world. become a ‘diplomatic ATM’, as predicted by a former AusAid deputy in 2013.46 Most Unfortunately, neither the key NGO members importantly, aid has become a soft target, with of ACFID, or ACFID itself, are fnancially little in the way of political pain associated independent of DFAT. ACFID membership with redirecting or cutting it. The key is a condition of DFAT accreditation, and question is how and whether these problems most ACFID members are recipients of can be addressed politically. Aid practitioners DFAT funding. ACFID itself relies on DFAT certainly have a voice in the political debate, grants for half of its AUS$1.4 million income. but they are often characterised as self- Whilst fnancial independence from DFAT would not necessarily guarantee a more critical interested, speaking as part of an industrial and public voice on ODA, it should be seen sector that depends on taxpayer funds, rather as an important precondition, especially in the than as speaking in the public interest. context of a Government that in the past has taken a vindictive approach to punishing its There are attempts to rebuild public support critics by discontinuing their funding. for the aid program, notably by the peak agency for aid NGOs, the Australian Council More broadly, the limited objective of for International Development (ACFID). restoring public confdence in aid must Its Campaign for Australian Aid asserts the address the question of what aid is being spent legitimacy of aid in meeting human needs, on. Raising this question would force a more and seeks pledges of support for a ‘fairer productive debate and allow a more broad- world’ through increased aid spending.47 based questioning of the ‘new aid paradigm’. This misses the bigger question of what aid Clearly, re-creating an effective political base should be spent on and the extent to which for ODA requires a radical re-think of the aid is now directed at private sector growth terms of political engagement on aid.

240 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Endnotes

1 OECD (2008) Is it ODA? OECD: Paris. 17 UNCTAD (2014) World Investment Report, Methodological Note, UNCTAD: New York, p. 62. 2 Government of Australia (2011) Independent Review of Aid Efectveness, Commonwealth of 18 Ibid. UNCTAD (2015) Annex Table 6. Australia: Canberra. 19 Ibid. UNCTAD (2015) Annex Table 6; Ibid. OECD Ibid. Government of Australia (2011). (2015) Annex, Table 31. 4 DFAT (2016) ‘Australia’s Aid Program’, available 20 Klein, A., Sangarre, C. and Semeraro, G. (2014) “The at: htp://dfat.gov.au/aid/pages/australias-aid- growing development potental of other ofcial program.aspx fows”, Chapter 4, Development Cooperaton Report 2014, OECD: Paris. 5 Morris, M. and Newton-Howes, J. (2015) ‘Where Australia’s case for aid went wrong – and what we 21 OECD (2015) “Development aid stable in 2014, aid can do to rebuild’, Dev Blog, June 3. to poorest countries stll falling”, Press Release, 4 August, OECD: Paris; Klein, A., Sangarre, C. and 6 Morris, M. and Newton-Howes, J. (2015) ‘Where Semeraro, G. (2014) “The growing development Australia’s case for aid went wrong – and what we potental of other ofcial fows”, Chapter 4, can do to rebuild’, Dev Blog 3 June. Source: htp:// Development Cooperaton Report 2014, OECD: devpolicy.org Paris. 7 ABC (2016) ‘Promise check: Cut growth in foreign 22 Minister for Foreign Afairs (2014) “The New Aid aid by $4.5 billion over four years’, Australian Paradigm”, Speech to the Natonal Press Club, Broadcastng Corporaton. Source: htp://www.abc. Canberra. net.au 23 UNDP (2013) 2013 Human Development Report: 8 Ireland, J. and Hall B. (2013) ‘Coaliton slashes The rise of the South, UNDP: New York. p. 71. foreign aid as part of $9b savings measures’, Sydney Morning Herald, 5 September. 24 OECD/UNDP (2015) Making development cooperaton more efectve, Global Partnership for 9 Natonal Commission of Audit (2014) Towards Efectve Development Cooperaton, OECD: Paris, Responsible Government, NCA: Canberra, Secton Table B9; OECD (2011) Aid Efectveness 2005-10: 7.14. Source: htp://www.ncoa.gov.au Progress in Implementng the Paris Declaraton, 10 Howes, S. (2013) ‘The 2013-14 aid budget, Budget OECD: Paris. Table C.3.e Briefng’, 15 May. Source: htp://devpolicy.org 25 DFAT (2014) Making Performance Count: enhancing 11 OECD (2015) Development Cooperaton Report the accountability and efectveness of Australian 2015, OECD: Paris; Howes, S. (2015) ‘Australian aid, DFAT: Canberra. Aid the Way we were’, Dev Blog, 12 May. htp:// 26 DFAT (2015) Strategy for Australia”s aid for Trade devpolicy.org Investments, DFAT Canberra, p. 10. 12 DFAT (2014) Making Performance Count: enhancing 27 DFAT (2016) Australian Aid Budget Summary 2016- the accountability and efectveness of Australian 17, DFAT: Canberra, p. 42 aid, DFAT: Canberra. 28 Narayanasamy, T. (2015) “Worried about the TPP? 13 DFAT (2014) Australian aid: promotng prosperity, Australia is pushing another bad deal”, New Matlda, reducing poverty, enhancing stability, DFAT: 18 November. Source: htps://newmatlda.com Canberra, p. 2. 29 DFAT (2016) “Pacifc Agreement on Closer Economic 14 OECD (2015) Development Cooperaton Report Relatons (PACER) Plus”, Source: htp://dfat.gov.au/ 2015, OECD: Paris, Statstcal Annex, Table 1. trade/agreements/pacer/pages/pacifc-agreement- 15 Ibid. OECD (2015) Annex, Table 5. on-closer-economic-relatons-pacer-plus.aspx 16 UNCTAD (2015) World Investment Report 2015: 30 IFC (2016) IFC Jobs study: assessing the private Reforming Internatonal Investment Governance, sector contributon to job creaton and poverty UNCTAD: New York, p. 13. reducton, Internatonal Finance Corporaton: Washington, p. 15.

241 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

31 Ibid. IFC (2016), p. 48. 39 Ibid DFAT (2016), p. 19. 32 OECD (2016) “Ofcial Export Credit Agencies”, 40 OECD (2016b) ODA reportng of in-donor Country online listng by OECD country with web addresses. Refugee Costs, DAC Secretariat, April, OECD: Paris. Source; htp://www.oecd.org/trade/exportcredits/ 41 ACFID (2016) “Submission to the 2016-17 Federal eca.htm Budget”, February, ACFID: Canberra. 33 Brynildsen, O. (2011) ECA”s: Exportng goods or 42 DFAT (2016) Freedom of Informaton Statstcs: Data exportng debts, Eurodad, European Network on 2014-15, DFAT, Canberra. Source: htps://data.gov. Debt and Development, Brussels. au/dataset/freedom-of-informaton-statstcs 34 DFAT (2016) “Busines Partnerships Platorm”, 43 Dorling, P. (2015) “Wikileaks: secret trade deal Source: htp://dfat.gov.au/aid/who-we-work-with/ exposed”, The Saturday Paper, 4 July. private-sector-partnerships/opportunites/Pages/ business-partnerships-platorm.aspx 44 Wood, T., Burkot, C, and Howes, S. (2016) ‘The 2015 aid stakeholders Survey: Australian aid: signs 35 DFAT (2014) “Australia and Westpac partner in the of risk”, Development Policy Centre: Canberra, pp. Pacifc,” Press Release, 8 September. iv and 16. 36 Byfeld, S. (2015) “Should Australia partner with 45 Ibid. Wood et al (2014), p. 44. Coke in the Pacifc?” Devpolicy Blog. 14 July. Source: htp://devpolicy.org 46 Tomar, R. (2015) Australia”s aid programme, Briefng, Library of the Parliament of Australia 37 DFAT (2016) The Performance of Australian Aid Library, Canberra. Source: htp://www.aph.gov.au 2014-15, DFAT: Canberra, p. 6. 47 ACFID (2016) “Campaign for Australian Aid”, 38 Government of Australia (2016) “Austender: The Source: htp://australianaid.org Australian Government Tender System”, Website, Canberra. Source: htps://www.tenders.gov.au/

242 Canada: Continuity with change?

Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation

Overview • Budget 2016, the frst by Canada’s new Liberal government, announced modest • Canadian offcial development assistance increases to the international assistance (ODA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016/17 is envelope in 2016/17 and 2017/18 of estimated by the Canadian Council for Cdn$128 million per year. The Budget International Co-operation (CCIC) to also announced that Canada would be Cdn$5.6 billion or 0.28% of Gross be conducting a review of Canada’s National Income (GNI), assuming no international assistance policy framework supplementary estimates and GNI growth in the coming year. remains consistent with current levels. • With the exception of 2013/14, when • In 2015 Canada’s performance ranked aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) fell 14th among 28 member countries in the to Cdn$2.0 billion, ODA to SSA has Organization for Economic Co-operation remained above Cdn$2.3 billion since and Development (OECD) Development 2011/12. This amount is nominally above Assistance Committee (DAC) with the Cdn$2.1 billion Canada hit in 2008, respect to ODA as a percentage of GNI – when it doubled aid to SSA, but now increasing from 0.24% in 2014 to 0.28% falls short of the target calculated in real in 2015. Although welcome, this increase terms. In 2014/15, aid to Asia increased is overstated, as noted below. to Cdn$1.3 billion after hovering around Cdn$1.1 billion in previous years. After • After Canadian aid peaked at Cdn$5.51 hitting a peak of Cdn$986 million in billion in FY2011/12, major cuts 2011/12, aid to the Americas sharply announced in Budget 2012 saw Canadian declined in 2012/13 and 2013/14, levelling aid dropping to Cdn$4.84 billion in off at Cdn$558 million in 2014/15. FY2013/14. In the frst two years, the government in fact surpassed the planned • Humanitarian assistance has risen cuts of Budget 2012, returning hundreds substantially. The average from of millions in unspent allocated money FY2008/09 to FY2012/14 was Cdn$567 to the Treasury. While Canadian ODA million per year. In FY2013/14 and seemingly bounced back in 2014/15 to FY2014/15 it jumped to Cdn$857 million Cdn$5.68 billion, the increase is made up and Cdn$847 million respectively, mainly of two one-off payments. Consequently, due to responses to the humanitarian if you subtract these amounts, the real situation in the Philippines (2013-14), ODA amount is actually closer to $4.8 South Sudan and West and Central Africa billion, slightly lower than in 2013/14. (2014-15) and the Middle East.

243 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

women and girls, not just mothers and babies. In 2014, the government increased its Democracy and governance is focused more countries of focus from 20 countries to 25, on inclusion, pluralism, and diversity, than on including three more in SSA. It added Burkina exclusion. For example, the Conservatives’ Faso, Benin, the Democratic Republic of Offce of Religious Freedom, which focused the Congo (and substituted Sudan for South on religious rights and freedoms, has been Sudan) in Africa. In Asia, Burma, Mongolia replaced by the Offce of Human Rights, and the Philippines were added and in the Freedoms and inclusion. The Liberals have Middle East Jordan was included. retained a strong emphasis on humanitarian assistance, initiated by the Conservatives, with Canadian Aid and Development: increasing focus on tackling the middle ground A time of transition between disaster relief and development. These subtle yet important shifts have been With the election of a new Liberal government dubbed by many as “continuity, with change.” in October 2015, Canada has shifted from being an introverted and obstructionist player on the The election of the new government has world stage to a much more collaborative and signaled other, more dramatic changes. constructive one. Its 180 degree pirouette with The focus of Canadian aid has shifted from regards to addressing climate change – even poverty alleviation (addressing the symptoms pushing for the more ambitious target of of poverty) to poverty reduction and keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees – inequality (addressing its root causes). The new and its very public bid for a seat on the United government has reversed years of signifcant Nations Security Council in 2020, are perhaps declines to the aid budget with modest increases. the two most obvious signals that “Canada is They have promised a new funding framework back” – at least in principle. for Canadian international assistance. In this initiative, they are consulting the Canadian The new government, however, has not development community, alongside a full policy completely shifted tack relative to several of review of Canadian international development its predecessor’s initiatives. For example, the and humanitarian policy. Both are scheduled to merger between the Department of Foreign be completed in 2016. Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) and the former Canadian International Unlike their predecessors, the Liberals have Development Agency (CIDA) has not been also accepted that the new 2030 Agenda for undone. However, the former DFATD has Sustainable Development applies as much to been rebranded to Global Affairs Canada Canada as Cameroon, and have committed (GAC) with a much greater emphasis on inter- to developing a national plan for addressing departmental collaboration. this agenda both at home and abroad. Finally, climate change is now a top priority, with the To maternal, newborn and child health government embracing the full range of players (MNCH) the Liberals have added a focus on needed to realize the ambitions of Paris, and sexual reproductive health and rights – an announcing Cdn$2.65 billion in funding for election promise – with a strong emphasis on climate change adaptation and mitigation over the next fve years. 244 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

news story to tell. Canadian aid seems to have But there are also areas where there is no bounced back in 2014/15, hitting an estimated change. Some initiatives, like the Civil Society Cdn$5.7 billion, up from Cdn$4.9 billion the Organization Partnership Policy, which was previous fscal year. However, the increase was welcomed by CSOs last year, remains in place, entirely the consequence of two extraordinary as is the support for the Canadian private factors: 1) a one-off concessional loan of sector, and in particular the extractive sector. Cdn$400 million to Ukraine in 2014/15; and 2) a double payment in 2014/15 of Cdn$441.6 What all of this means for Canada in the coming million to the World Bank’s International years is still unclear. A major question is whether Development Association (IDA). This second the emphasis will be on continuity or real change. payment occurred due to a technical change To realize the ambition of Paris on climate in how payments will be made to these change and the 2030 Agenda, substantive, institutions. If you subtract these amounts, the transformational action will be required. real aid budget is actually closer to Cdn$4.8 billion, lower than in 2013/14. Canadian Aid back on Track? The trend of apparent increases to Canada’s After the International Assistance Envelope ODA is not likely to change in the coming (IAE) was frozen at Cdn$5 billion in 2011/12, years. One example of this is an unintended the Conservative government announced consequence of Canada’s recent acceptance of reductions in FY2012/13 that brought the 25,000 Syrian refugees. Although government IAE to Cdn$4.62 billion by FY2014/15 and support towards the integration of 25,000 through 2015/16. The IAE is a better measure Syrian refugees is wholly welcome, this than total ODA of our real aid commitments could increase ODA by Cdn$876.7 million to reducing poverty in developing countries as in 2015/16.3 The cost of refugees for their it focuses on budgeted fnancial fows for aid. frst year in a donor country can be included as ODA for that year. Costed outside of Not only did the government implement these budgeted aid in the IAE, refugee resettlement cuts, it also allowed hundreds of millions of dollars typically adds Cdn$260 million per year to authorized for poverty eradication to lapse (i.e. Canada’s ODA. In 2015/16, this resettlement go unspent) in 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. fgure will likely increase signifcantly – as – former CIDA and DFATD respectively were it has for European donors. This one-off required to return it to Treasury.1 commitment will again overstate an increase to Canadian ODA without any commensurate In April 2015, the OECD confrmed this sharp increase to the IAE.4 fall, noting that Canadian aid allocations had dropped by 11.4% in 2013 and 10.7 % in 2014, Budget 2016 – the frst by the new Liberal or from US$5.65 billion in 2012 to US$4.91 Government – did reverse the trend in billion in 2013 and US$4.20 billion in 2014.2 declining Canadian aid, announcing welcome increases of $128 million per year to the IAE A year later, Canadian aid statistics and the for 2016/17 and 2017/18. But these limited OECD provisional aid numbers had a good and modest increases are not enough to

245 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports position Canada as a leader on the global stage, Responding to Agenda 2030 and Paris: Hole nor do they match the government’s rhetoric of in Government, or Whole of Government? “being back” with clear commitments to invest Under the previous Conservative government, in sustainable development internationally. Canada offcially recognized the universal nature of the sustainable development goals Furthermore, there continues to be a lack of (SDGs)5 – that is, that the goals were to be transparency around details on the budget. applied to all Member States, including Canada. For example, as of time of writing, we do not However, a confdential memo leaked in June know if the government’s welcome pledges of 2015 noted that “Canada has no plans to apply $2.65 billion over fve years to climate fnance, the Post-2015 Agenda domestically, or to take made in November 2015, and $1.1 billion in on new reporting obligations beyond what we humanitarian and development assistance to are currently producing.”6 Iraq and Syria, made in early February 2016, are new and additional. The climate fnancing As with climate change, the Liberal will comprise a mix of grants and loans, but government has taken a new approach to we do not know in what proportion, nor the the issue of universality and the SDGs. In balance between adaptation versus mitigation. response to a survey conducted during the Budget 2016 is a step in the right direction, 2015 Federal Election, the Liberal government and a welcome course correction from the accepted the universality and applicability of repeated cuts of the past fve years. But it’s a the SDGs both at home and overseas and very small step. Much more will be needed to committed to a domestic and international match the ambitions of the new government plan of action.7 Accordingly, implementing to the needs of the planet and its people. the SDGs is the second priority in the mandate letter of the new Minister of International Development.8 And while it is not referenced

Figure 1: Canadian ODA 2010/11 to 2014/15. Source: Canadian Statistical Report on International Assistance, various years.

246 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

in any other Minister’s mandates, in February outcomes of the Paris agreement and Agenda 2016, Environment and Climate Change 2030 into their work internationally. On this Canada released a draft Federal Sustainable latter point, civil society and Canadians have Development Strategy that makes numerous already submitted ideas as part of a government and clear references to the 2030 Agenda. consultation on Canadian priorities post- (That said, the draft Strategy falls short as it is 2015.10 The results from the consultation primarily focused only on the environmental affrm, among other things, the importance of pillar of sustainable development.) universality, rights based approaches, climate change, environmental sustainability, women Global Affairs seems to have established and girls’ empowerment and truly sustainable at least informal relations with other and inclusive growth that reduces poverty, government departments with respect to the inequality and the burden on the planet. 11 implementation of the SDGs. Collaboration This input should form the basis for the next and coherence across silos and between round of consultations for the policy review. branches and departments is a core theme of the Liberal government’s new approach.9 New Partners in Development: Global Affairs’ implementation of the SDG Civil Society and Private Finance agenda will be an important test of the merged departments’ ability to ensure policy After four years (2008 – 2012) of tense relations coherence (or not) between diplomacy, between the Conservative government and trade and development on the broad and the Canadian international development comprehensive SDG agenda. community – which saw defunding of numerous organizations, lengthy and Beyond the federal level, the extent to which unpredictable funding delays, an abandonment the government is liaising with provincial and of support for public engagement, and ad hoc municipal governments to discuss domestic and selective consultations – relations began implementation remains unclear. Going to improve under Conservative International forward, this will be essential since a number of Development Minister Christian Paradis. goals, including ones on health, education and Since early 2014, the former government took infrastructure, span jurisdictional boundaries. defnitive steps towards re-establishing a more positive relationship with civil society. What elements of the SDGs Global Affairs intends to implement in the coming year should The International Development and also soon become clear. In May 2016, the Humanitarian Assistance Civil Society government launched a consultation and review Partnership Policy, launched in February of the policy and the corresponding funding 2015, marked a signifcant turning point in framework necessary to guide Canada’s aid the relationship between the international decisions – this is the International Development development and humanitarian assistance Minister’s top priority in her mandate. community and DFATD, as it was then known. 12 The policy, which was developed This review will be a litmus test of the in direct consultation with civil society, government’s commitment to integrating the establishes a new framework with nine clear objectives for how the government would 247 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

engage with civil society. Six years later, with the new Liberal government still supportive of a role for The policy identifes CSOs as independent the Canadian private sector, it still remains development actors with their own set of values unclear how exactly any such strategy will be to guide their work (the Istanbul Principles implemented in practice beyond supporting for CSO Development Effectiveness and ad hoc initiatives, nor how such initiatives have the Humanitarian Principles), while also leveraged positive development impacts and recognizing the role that governments have to change for the poor. Perhaps recognizing the play in generating an enabling environment for limits of this approach (and the lack of interest civil society to realize its full potential. Finally, among the Canadian private sector to engage), the policy commits to an annual review of its the Canadian government has shifted tack to implementation in consultation with CSOs. focusing on several initiatives to try to leverage To help inform this process, CCIC has private fnance for development. developed a set of milestones and indicators for the coming one to fve years to benchmark The announcement of a Development Finance progress.13 The frst report against these Initiative in April 2015 was followed by the benchmarks will be produced just ahead of the June 2015 launch of the Convergence Blended frst consultation on implementation, which is Finance Platform, intended to support and expected in September 2016. Some changes enable the blending of private, public and have already occurred in terms of funding philanthropic capital around development modalities, dialogue and renewed interest in initiatives for the greater good. Looking public engagement, among other things. forward, the ability of both initiatives to demonstrate clear development and fnancial Around the time that relations with civil additionality will signal how well they are able society were becoming strained, the to actually contribute to reducing poverty and government began to actively promote the inequality in developing countries. Canadian private sector in its development strategy. The government demonstrated this Conclusion priority with the launch in October 2010 of the government’s Sustainable Economic How will these trends in Canadian ODA and Growth Strategy (SEG)14 and with the June development cooperation policy converge with 2013 announcement of a new International global efforts to implement Agenda 2030 and Institute for Extractive Industries and the new Paris agreement? Cooperation for Development (to support and build natural effective development will not be achieved resource management capacity in developing unless Canada re-establishes a timetable of countries).15 Another moment occurred in predictable increases to our aid budget and November 2013 with the establishment of makes clear commitments to support developing the government’s Global Markets Action country national action plans on climate change Plan, under which “all diplomatic assets of the and the SDGs. Canada needs to promote Government of Canada will be marshalled on inclusive partnerships with all development behalf of the private sector.”16 actors and insist on sustainable outcomes that reduce poverty and tackle inequality, leave no one behind. For Canada to really “be back”, it needs 248 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

to move confdently forward.

Endnotes com/news/politics/tories-have-no-plans-to-match- poverty-aid-vow-inside-canada-memo 1 Berthiaume, Lee. (2013). “Hundreds of millions 7 Canadian Council for Internatonal Co-operaton in foreign aid unspent last year, federal records (2015). Report on Survey Sent to Partes. Retrieved confrm,” Postmedia News, November 1, 2013. from: htp://www.ccic.ca/_fles/en/2015_10_16_ Retrieved from: htp://www.canada.com/business/ Report_Survey_Partes.pdf Hundreds+millions+foreign+unspent+last+year+federal 8 Prime Minister of Canada (2015). “Minister of +records+confrm/9114155/story.html Internatonal Development and La Francophonie ; Blanchfeld, Mike (2014). “Foreign Afairs Canada Mandate Leter.” Retrieved from: htp://pm.gc.ca/ Lets $125 Million In Aid To Poor Countries Lapse,” eng/minister-international-development-and-la- The Canadian Press, November 20, 2014. Retrieved francophonie-mandate-leter from: htp://www.hufngtonpost.ca/2014/11/20/ 9 For example, Foreign Afairs Minister Stéphane foreign-affairs-canada-lapsed-funds_n_6194630. Dion noted in November that implementng the html. Fekete, Jason and Lee Berthiaume (2015). government’s climate change obligatons will be “Tories lef $9.5 billion in approved funds untouched the responsibility of everyone in Cabinet. See to avoid defcit during electon year,” Natonal Post, McCarthy, Shawn (2015). “Entre Liberal cabinet December 10, 2015. Retrieved from: htp://news. responsible for climate-change agenda: Dion.” natonalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politcs/ Globe & Mail, November 12, 2015. Retrieved from: tories-lef-9-5-billion-in-approved-funds-untouched- http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ to-avoid-defcit-during-electon-year entire-liberal-cabinet-responsible-for-climate- 2 Organizaton for Economic Cooperaton and change-agenda-dion/artcle27224782/ Development (OECD) (2015). “Development aid 10 Department of Foreign Afairs, Trade and stable in 2014 but fows to poorest countries stll Development Canada (DFATD) (2015). “Post- falling.” Retrieved from: htp://www.oecd.org/dac/ 2015 Development Agenda - Government of stats/development-aid-stable-in-2014-but-fows-to- Canada Priorites.” Retrieved from: htp://www. poorest-countries-stll-falling.htm internatonal.gc.ca/development-developpement/ 3 Levitz, Stephanie. (2015). “Cost of Syrian refugee priorities-priorites/mdg-omd_consultations. plan pegged at $1.2B over 6 years,” Canadian Press, aspx?lang=eng November 20, 2015. Retrieved from: htp://www. 11 For a summary of the comments and feedback from cbc.ca/news/politics/syrian-refugees-billion-six- the consultaton, see Department of Foreign Afairs, years-1.3327780 Trade and Development Canada (DFATD) (2015). 4 The cost of refugees living in Canada in their frst “Summary Report of Comments Received on the year is included in our overall aid budget, but is Online Request for Feedback on the Government not part of the IAE. Therefore, higher refugee costs of Canada’s Post-2015 Development Priorites.” increase our aid budget without seeing any increase Retrieved from: htp://www.internatonal.gc.ca/ to the resources going to fght poverty in developing development-developpement/priorities-priorites/ countries. summary_report_comments-rapport_sommaire_ 5 Group of Seven (G7) (2014). “The Brussels G7 Summit commentaires.aspx?lang=eng and DFATD (2015). Declaraton,” para. 13, afrms that “We commit to “Summary Report of the Discussion on the work with all partners to agree an ambitous and Government of Canada’s Post-2015 Development universal post-2015 agenda, anchored in a single Priorites. (May 12, 2015).” Retrieved from: set of clear and measurable goals.” Retrieved from: http://www.international.gc.ca/development- http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press- developpement/priorities-priorites/summary_ releases/2014/06/pdf/the-brussels-g7-summit- report_discussion-rapport_sommaire_discussion. declaraton/ aspx?lang=eng 6 Berthiaume, Lee. (June 15, 2015). Tories have ‘no 12 DFATD (2015). Internatonal Development and plans’ to match poverty aid vow inside Canada: memo. Humanitarian Assistance Civil Society Partnership Otawa Citzen. Retrieved from: htp://otawacitzen. Policy. Retrieved from: htp://www.internatonal.

249 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

gc.ca/development-developpement/cs-policy- Economic Growth – CIDA’s Sustainable Economic politque-sc.aspx?lang=eng Growth Strategy.” Retrieved from htp://www. acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/ 13 For details, see CCIC (2015). DFATD’s Internatonal EconomicGrowth/$file/Sustainable-Economic- Development and Humanitarian Civil Society Growth-e.pdf. Partnership Policy: Milestones to Measure Progress, August 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.ccic. 15 Government of Canada (2014, June 19). Project ca/_files/en/2015_09_02_Milestones_for_ profle: Creatng the Canadian Internatonal implementing_CSO_Partnership_Policy.pdf Insttute for Extractve Industries and Development, Retrieved from htp://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ 14 CIDA (October 2011). “Stmulatng Sustainable cidaweb%5Ccpo.nsf/projEn/S065811001 16 Ibid, p. 11.

250 Dramatic aid cuts and increased spending on refugees in Denmark

Kira Boe, Global Focus – Danish CSOs for Development Cooperation

Overview the current Liberal government, sought a higher level of ODA. In the negotiations • In 2015 Denmark elected a new for the 2016 budget, this party was able to government. The previous centre-left increase Danish aid to 0.71% of GNI.1 government was replaced by a centre- right government. Amongst other While the opposition continues to argue that things, this new government promised current ODA levels are too low, the traditionally to reduce aid to 0.7% of GNI. pro-aid Social Democrats will not guarantee an • Aid for 2015 was cut as much as aid increase if they regain power. possible (to 0.73% of GNI). The budget In Denmark there is broad political consensus approved for 2016 has reduced Danish that the country’s ODA should be above ODA to 0.71% of GNI. the UN minimum target of 0.7% of GNI. • The new government has promised to However, the recent cuts bring it far from the focus Danish aid on geographical home former centre-left government’s objective countries of the refugees that have of ODA at 1% of GNI. In addition, it is recently arrived in the EU. This is mainly important to note that less than 0.5% of GNI Syria and its neighbouring countries. is actually spent on development objectives in Danish ODA Performance developing countries, as the cost of receiving refugees in Denmark is now the largest budget Following the national elections in June line in ODA. In 2016, almost 30% of ODA 2015, the new centre-right government will be spent in this area, a dramatic increase dramatically cut ODA. Not only were cuts from under 2% in 2008. Consequently, in made in the budget for 2016, but halfway 2016, the largest recipient of Danish aid will 2 through the year, the 2015 budget was also be Denmark itself. cut. The planned ODA of 0.87% of GNI for Thus Danish aid was hit by two changes in 2015 (approved by the former government) 2015: a huge cut of overall ODA spending, was slashed to 0.73% by the new government as well as a refocusing of Danish aid away from June onwards. For 2016, aid will be from developing countries to fnancing costs reduced to 0.71% of GNI and is expected for receiving refugees in Denmark. to stay more or less at that level during the tenure of the current government whose While Danish aid was cut by about 15% stated objective is for Danish ODA to be in 2016 against the 2015 budget, aid no higher than 0.7% of GNI. However, the channelled through Danish civil society has smaller Conservative party, a supporter of been cut even more. All Danish CSOs with

251 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

framework agreements with the Ministry of Minister initiated a process to create a new Foreign Affairs saw those agreements cut Danish development strategy.5 The intention by 27%. An additional cut was placed on is to replace the 2012 strategy titled “The the channelling of funds from the Ministry Right to a Better Life.”6 to small and medium sized CSOs and CSOs with a special focus on youth, people with The new strategy is expected to be approved disabilities as well as religious organisations. by a wide majority in Parliament in late 2016. This funding was cut by 36%, which taken It will combine long-term development aid together has seriously inhibited the broad and humanitarian assistance, something Danish civil society’s work.3 the government has pushed internationally at both the 2016 Istanbul Humanitarian In order to enhance transparency, the previous Summit and in European policy. The government reported its ODA spending under strategy will provide the framework for two budget frameworks. The frst focused on Denmark’s international support and poverty reduction; the second on the “global contributions towards the implementation of frame” for efforts not directly linked to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). reducing poverty, but included other forms of In terms of the SDGs, Denmark’s priorities international assistance. This reporting made for international cooperation are SDG 5 it easier for civil society to monitor changes on gender equality, SDG 7 on sustainable in the policy focus and objectives of Danish energy, SDG 13 on climate change, as well ODA. However, the current government has as SDGs 16 (governance) and 17 (means of removed this system of transparency, thus implementation). seriously inhibiting civil society’s ability to monitor Danish ODA.4 SDG 16 focuses on peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice and effective, In previous years, spending under the poverty accountable and inclusive institutions. framework increased slightly, to about 82% SDG 17 concentrates on the means of of total spending (excluding administration). implementation and the global partnership In 2016, spending under what used to be the for sustainable development. Both these poverty framework has declined to a fraction goals will be crosscutting issues to be of what it was. This shift in the Danish aid addressed with partner countries. budget will undermine the poverty reduction focus and the legitimacy of Danish aid. Where the 2012 strategy was built on objectives for fghting poverty and ensuring human rights, New Development Strategy the new strategy is likely to be quite different. It has four ‘guideposts’: 1) Security and Following the 2015 agreements in Addis development – peace, stability and protection; Ababa (Financing for Development), New 2) Migration and development; 3) Inclusive, York (Agenda 2030) and Paris (Climate sustainable growth and development; and Change), as well as the election of the new 4) Freedom and development, democracy, government, the newly appointed Foreign human rights and gender equality. These areas

252 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

represent a marked shift from the previous of its ODA for pre-asylum costs. These are focus areas. As well, the policy emphasis on alarming trends as they not only limit the limiting immigration and refugee fows to amount for actual aid, but also make it very Denmark is new. diffcult to predict the funding levels that will be available for developing countries. It is Conclusion also predicted that the current government’s objective to prevent future refugee crises, There is cause for great concern regarding especially from areas close to Europe and these new directions and trends in Danish aid. Although the government seems confict areas, is likely to translate into an committed to maintain Danish aid at 0.7% increase in Danish funding in the years to of GNI, it legislated dramatic and rapid cuts come for work in these areas. to get to that level. Added to these cuts is the fact that the cost for the rising number of All of these issues, coupled with the decrease refugees will be taken, as much as possible, in ODA, mean that Denmark’s position and from ODA. In fact, Denmark is amongst the contributions towards the realization of the countries that allocated a high percentage SDGs come into question.

Endnotes

1 Research by the Timbuktu foundaton: htp://www. 4 http://www.timbuktufonden.dk/wp- timbuktufonden.dk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ content/uploads/2016/04/Analyse-af-dansk- Analyse-af-dansk-udviklingsbistand-2014-2016-.pdf udviklingsbistand-2014-2016-.pdf 2 http://www.altinget.dk/artikel/bistand-bliver-i- 5 http://www.altinget.dk/misc/Udkast%20til%20 danmark-ulande-faar-fem-milliarder-mindre udviklingspolitisk%20og%20humanitr%20 3 https://www.information.dk/indland/2015/09/ strategi%20-%20med%20forside.pdf danmarkshistoriens-stoerste-besparelse-paa- 6 htp://um.dk/en/danida-en/goals/strategy ulandsbistand

253 Development cooperation shores up efforts to rebuild Italy’s global profile

Luca De Fraia, ActionAid Italy

Overview implementation process with the expected highs and lows. There are strengths, diffcult • Italy’s aid levels are going up with a and grey areas, but surely something new is performance of 0.21% of GNI reached underway. In many regards, the adjustments in 2015, although aid infation plays a big the Italian system is experiencing echo current part. In fact, about one quarter of the global discussions. This is especially true when total Italian ODA is infated with refugee it comes to the role of the private sector as costs. well as to non-concessional fnance. Italy has • New development cooperation a special interest in the latter, as the overall architecture is in place including, for poor quantitative performance in aid may have the frst time, an Italian Development created expectations that working with the Cooperation Agency and a fnancial private sector can improve the record in the development arm. very short term. But these high hopes may be • The Italian development system creates misplaced as real transformations do require space for a wide range of actors, from time. traditional NGOs to the migration diaspora organizations. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged • The overall Italian effectiveness that the national political leadership seems to performance may improve if the new care about development. This is a sea change provisions for better planning and policy compared to the policies implemented up until coherence are implemented. 2011. In that year, a government reshuffe, • Increasing the role of the for-proft brought about by an economic crisis and private sector is part of the new ambition, pressure from global markets as well as the EU but the operational framework is still to leaders, ushered in a new political cadre and be agreed. reversed the negative trends of the previous decades. The general outlook: changes underway A comprehensive reform of the development cooperation legislation was accomplished The new Development Cooperation Act, under the current cabinet. This was backed by endorsed in 2014, introduced a number of several visits by Prime Minister Matteo Renzi innovations, including a statutory cabinet post and the President of the Republic to Africa for development cooperation. This much- over the past eighteen months. While different welcomed advance is now going through an interests, such as trade and migration policies,

254 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

may lie behind these efforts, it is also true that for 2015 translates into US$4,577 million at improving Italy’s international profle is back 2014 prices, a 14% increase on the previous on the government agenda. Development year.5 However, the inclusion of refugee costs cooperation and aid volumes are both part is now worth US$1,169 million at 2014 prices, of this strategy.1 It is notable that Mr. Renzi2 compared to US$840 million in the previous was one of the few Heads of State to attend year, which amounts to a 40% increase. Italy’s the Addis Ababa Financing for Development aid is mostly channeled through multilateral conference. On that occasion, he committed institutions (57% of total aid) and the EU in to increasing aid levels in view of the G7 particular (65% of the multilateral component). Summit that Italy will lead in 2017. This Bilateral disbursements to Least Developed promise was refected to some extent during Countries (LDCs) totaled US$221 million at the annual budget session, when additional 2015 prices, which is a mere 0.01% of Gross resources were allocated to the development National Income (GNI).6 The Government’s cooperation budget.3 ambition is to reach a 0.30% target by 2020; Canada’s good performance in 2015 (0.28% Last but not least, Italy’s outlook is seemingly and 17% increase) may thwart PM Renzi’s benefting from the diminished ambitions best intentions to come fourth in a G7 aid in the donor community, particularly at the ranking in time for the G7 Summit Italy will European Union (EU) level. In fact, the host in 2017. EU’s original aid target of 0.7% of GNI by 2015 was missed and postponed for another Italy’s situation speaks to the strategies ffteen years, claiming alignment with the 2030 European donors are implementing in Agenda’s time framework. In reality, it is a response to the massive humanitarian crises radical scenario change. EU Member States, that have been gathering in North African and with poor aid performances such as Italy, will Middle East, not far from their borders. There not feel the pressure as they had in the past. A are many lessons to learn, including the fact few years back, some NGOs were arguing that that ODA policies can be adjusted to match Italy had to leave the G7 club in light of its immediate needs. The numbers are clear: in poor ODA achievements. These times seem 2015 more than 25% of Italy’s total aid was to be behind us now. in-donor costs to assist refugees. There has been a refugee surge since the Arab spring in Italian Aid Volume: Migrants help 2011 and, sadly, the political regional scenario Italy is not positioned to change for the better any time soon. The early fgures for 2015 published by the OECD Development Co-operation It is fair to note that in Italy’s case the actual level Directorate (DAC) have been welcomed by of ODA is infated as aid volume incorporate Italian Government offcials as they portray large amounts of fnance that do not leave 4 another good year data-wise. Italy’s aid reached the country. These resources however are not 0.21% of GNI, an increased performance being diverted from the development budgets, from 0.19% for the previous year. Italy’s ODA but rather they come from other government

255 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

departments such as the Ministry of Interior. The National Council is in place and its For this reason, it is possible to claim that working groups are operational. In fact, Italy is the frst benefciary of its own aid. But, the thematic agenda has been organized in among the EU donors, this reallocation is not four streams: 1) Agenda 2030 (including among the most questionable practices: other effectiveness, coherence and evaluation); 2) European donors have diverted resources Planning; 3) role of the private sector; and 4) originally earmarked for projects abroad Migration and Diaspora. Agenda 2030 and to address the refugee crisis.7 This practice the Diaspora working groups are led by CSO has meant a net loss in terms of support for representatives, planning by delegates from partner countries. the business community, and the private sector working group by the cooperative movement. Improving the machinery Already these working groups have proven to provide the accountability space that was not The new Italian development cooperation available before. The challenge is now to turn system is now underway. Legislation to them in forums where policies can be drafted. reform the whole framework was introduced in August 2014. It included many substantial This current set up, one that brings together all changes, which Reality of Aid described and kinds of players, may also present drawbacks. evaluated in its previous report (2014). To sum On the one hand, it is likely to raise questions up, there have been normative improvements on the driving forces and interests behind in different areas from multi-stakeholder development policies. On the other hand, it participation to implementation through the defnitely offers the opportunity to bring to the creation of the Italian Development Agency. fore issues that would formerly been discussed The National Council for Development without good transparency standards. This is Cooperation held its frst meeting in July particularly the case of the for-proft sector, 2015 to bring together a wide range of players whose role in development cooperation is that the new legislation qualifes as soggetti del now debated in public. CSOs’ concerns can sistema della cooperazione, or actors of the Italian be taken into consideration, especially the development cooperation system. practical implications emerging from the new arrangements. In fact, the framework for the It is notable that the community of offcially business sector will only become operational recognized development actors is currently in 2017. Both general CSR standards and much broader than public institutions and access to concessional funds for the private specialized NGOs. It now extends to include sector are yet to be defned. a wide array of not-for-proft organizations as well as the for-proft sector that operates There may be good reasons for such a slow according to global standards in the area of implementation pace. All the different pieces social responsibility. are coming together step-by-step. In fact, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation The new architecture is already producing just became operational in January 2016. results in terms of multi-stakeholder dialogue. The Director, Laura Frigenti, was selected

256 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

through a public process, which included agenda.10 So, contradictory as it may seem, many applications, and was only appointed such an approach may have its strong points. by PM Renzi in November 2015. She brings expertise from the World Bank as well as The challenges ahead: Meeting the from Interaction, where she led on public expectations and private partnerships. Also, the role of the new fnancial arm – Cassa Depositi e Prestiti – The reforms that ushered in the new era of is still in the process of being fully defned, the Italian development cooperation were particularly in terms of the basic rules for the premised on several assumptions, both Italian private sector and the incentives to implicit and explicit. With the new system now mobilize the bulk of the Italian companies, in the implementation stage, it is apparent that which are generally small and medium in size. there were strong ambitions for the private As mentioned above, the ambition to have sector to take a leading role. The plans to resources from the private sector fowing broaden the community of development quickly may prove not to be the case. actors beyond the traditional group of NGOs may have been flled with deeper political Despite this slow pace, Italian development views and ambitions. They may also relate to cooperation has been changing its landscape a misinterpretation of the role of development and mission. In this regard, there are two cooperation NGOs, which may be nurtured telling policy decisions in the pipeline at the with some profound Italian political culture moment, both spearheaded by the Deputy traits whereby the public and private realms Minister now in charge, Mario Giro, who has a tend to be suspicious of each other. strong CSO background.8 The frst focuses on broadening the number of priority countries In this scenario, the Italian development and the second is about opening the calls- community will have to focus on several for-proposals with respect to CSO funding to challenges: include partnerships between specialized and for-proft organizations.9 • How to enhance and take advantage of the space of participation allowed for in These new directions may prove problematic, the new legislation; including their compliance with aid • Safeguarding the development mission effectiveness principles. Italy’s limited of the Italian cooperation in the face of bilateral ODA volumes would hardly justify threats in terms of instrumentalization, managing more than 20 priority countries and such as in the case of strategies to adjust even the operational capacity of the Italian ODA to the refugee crisis or to support Development Agency may not be in line with the Italian national privates sector; and the ambitious. On the other hand, these new • Ensuring that effective and genuine directions are part of an effort to push Italian Italian ODA, targeting poverty reduction development cooperation out of its comfort and the SDGs, will actually increase in zone and to make it central to the political volume in the years to come.

257 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Endnotes

1 The new three-year (2016 – 2018) plan will 6 There are no estmates for the imputable aid for broaden the set of the priority countries (21 at LDCs through multlateral agencies and therefore the moment) by including more partners from cannot be measured against the global target of central and east Africa. There are concerns such a 0.15% for LDCs. move is properly backed with long-term substantal 7 A most notable example is Sweden, which in 2015 fnancial commitments. On the other hand, such an spent on refugees 33% of its total ODA, which is expansion corresponds to Italy’s ambitons to fnd nevertheless well beyond 0,7%. allies on the contnent to address key challenges such as the management of migraton fows. 8 Mario Giro comes from the Communità di Sant’Egidio with strong presence both domestcally 2 Mateo Renzi exemplifes a new generaton and internatonally. of politcal leaders that emerged in the early 2000s. For example, in a press conference at 9 The call for proposal now in place is a kind of the Addis Ababa Conference he claimed that he mult-ter system: A) A not for proft organizaton started getng involved in politcs with the debt should frst meet the criteria to qualify as a cancellaton campaign of the early 2000s, which development actor; B) It should then apply to actually succeeded in passing ad hoc legislaton enter into a roster of organizatons matching more through the Parliament. stringent management and thematc conditons. Organizatons on the B ter can apply for funds. New 3 A total of additonal €360 mil annually by 2018. policies are encouraging partnerships of B types 4 April 13th, 2016. with A types as well as with for proft organizatons. 5 ActonAid Italy’s estmates based on OECD DAC 10 In this regard, consider also Italy proposal on a data. migraton compact at the EU level.

258 Japan: Recent Trends in Aid Policy and Technical Cooperation

Akio Takayanagi, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)

Overview ODA Charter. The revised charter, renamed • Japan’s ODA in 2015, according to the “Development Cooperation Charter,” was 6 OECD preliminary data in April 2016, was approved by the Cabinet in February 2015. US$9,320 million, a slight increase from US$9,266 million in 2014. The ODA/ Immediately after the government’s GNI ratio in 2015 was 0.22%. In real terms announcement concerning the new Charter, civil (at 2014 prices and exchange rate), ODA society organizations (CSOs) made an urgent increased by 12.4%. There was also increase statement with two main recommendations: 1) in aid to least developed countries (LDCs) Japan should strictly adhere to “the principle of and countries in Africa.1 non-militarism;” and 2) The new charter should • Since Shinzo Abe’s government came into further strengthen cooperation with CSOs/ offce in December 2012, Japan’s aid policy NGOs (non-governmental organizations) of has been increasingly aligned to its self- both developing countries and Japan to eradicate interests: national security and commercial. poverty and genuinely realise “inclusive growth.” The government’s vision of development has become growth-oriented rather than focused Several elements in the new Charter are on poverty reduction and social development. welcomed by the CSO community: 1) These characteristics of Japan’s aid policy “promoting women’s participation” as a under the Abe government are evident in main principle; 2) strengthening partnerships the renaming of the “ODA Charter” to the with CSOs as one of the “implementation “Development Cooperation Charter.”2 arrangements;” 3) noting the internationally- • Securitization of aid is often about linking agreed 0.7% ODA/GNI target; and 4) security interests and aid in the context emphasizing the importance of development of failed and fragile states or the “War on education and public engagement. Terror” after 9/11.3 These linkages certainly have been an important aspect of the securitization of Japan’s aid since late 1990’s,4 However, there are also several concerns with but under Abe there is a trend emerging the Charter. where aid is used as a countermeasure against China’s increasing global infuence. 1) Securitization of Aid

The New “Development A strengthened linkage between aid and Cooperation Charter”5 security is the leading concern. Abe’s review of Japan’s security policy has included the In the 2014 Reality of Aid Report, it was noted following components: 1) allowing the that Japan was undergoing a revision of its exercise of collective defence, 2) loosening of

259 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

restrictions on arms exports, and 3) utilizing According to the OECD-DAC’s defnition of ODA for strategic purposes. When the ODA ODA, Charter revision process began in March 2014, the Cabinet made it clear that the new Charter “No military equipment or services was to be closely related to the national are reportable as ODA. Anti-terrorism security strategy, which was approved in activities are also excluded. However, December 2013. Vice Foreign Minister stated, the cost of using donors’ armed forces to “In order to promote such universal values as deliver humanitarian aid is eligible.” freedom, democracy and human rights, ODA will play a role in security-related felds.”7 It In practice, for many donors, there has always was also reported that the government was been ambiguity as to what can be counted as planning to provide ODA for construction ODA. Japan, which had traditionally strictly or improvement of seaports and airports prohibited military aid, has now stepped into that could be used for military purposes in this “grey zone.” the Philippines and Vietnam,8 both having territorial issues with China.9 The new Charter In September 2014, as part of the “Japanese explicitly states that the National Security NGOs’ 10 Recommendations for the Revision Strategy is the basis for the new Charter. of Japan’s ODA Charter,” CSOs made the following recommendation: In establishing these provisions the Abe government made a shift away from the “Deployment of militaries in confict non-military principle of past versions of the or disaster affected areas, even if it ODA Charter. The 1992 and 2003 versions were for ‘non-military purposes’, of the ODA Charter both emphasized that could further destabilize the power “any use of ODA for military purposes or for balance of the localities and cause new aggravation of international conficts should conficts. If such military deployment be avoided.” This exclusion is based on the were carried out in any relations peace principle of Japan’s Constitution. In with ODA, the local people would contrast, the new Charter states : doubt the peaceful and humanitarian objectives of ODA and eventually “Japan will avoid any use of development lose their trust in Japan.”10 cooperation for military purposes or aggravation of international conficts. In case the armed forces or the members of the armed While it may be that the government stepped forces in recipient countries are involved in into assistance for armed forces for non-military non-military purposes such as public welfare purposes in response to these criticisms, there or disaster-relief purposes, such cases will be still remains the fear that the government considered on a case-by-case basis in light of will expand the scope of its military-related their substantive relevance.” aid. CSOs are also concerned that equipment provided for non-military purposes could be converted for military purposes in the future.

260 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

The new Charter did not include measures to 3) Growth-oriented View on prevent this possibility. Development

2) Commercialisation of Aid The new Charter has also been criticized for being too growth-oriented. While the The new Charter also has the potential to 1992 and 2003 Charters both had poverty open ways whereby development cooperation alleviation and growth as priorities, the new is used as a mechanism for pursuing Japanese one puts forward “’quality growth’ and poverty commercial interests. At the beginning of eradication through such growth.” The new this process, “Japan’s Revitalization Strategy” Charter maintains that “quality growth” must (Abe’s domestic economy strategy) was be inclusive, sustainable and resilient, but presented as a justifcation and foundation for these statements give the impression that the the new Charter, although this was not explicit assumption is that growth is the priority and in the fnal version. Among the Charter’s poverty reduction is the result of growth. basic policies and principles, “dialogue and collaboration based on Japan’s experience 4) Contrasts with earlier Charters and expertise” and “cooperation that takes advantage of Japan’s strength” were identifed. So what are the differences between the The new Charter refers to the possibility previous “ODA Charter”, frst adopted in that Japan would be “proactively presenting 1992 and amended in 2003, and the new proposals while giving full consideration “Development Cooperation Charter”? A to policies, programs and institutions” of comparison of these documents reveals developing countries. These ideas could prove several differences. to be at odds with the ownership principles agreed by Japan at High Level Forums on Aid The 1992 Charter emphasised the Effectiveness starting in Paris (2005), Accra humanitarian and developmental objectives (2008), Busan (2011) and Mexico City (2014). of ODA. In the 2003 amendments “assuring Japan’s security and prosperity” was added to The idea of utilising Japan’s experiences and the aid objective. This contrasts with the new expertise should not necessarily be completely Development Cooperation Charter. As the rejected. But the issue is that these ideas frst two concerns noted above, there appears seem to refect mainly the voices and views to be a substantial shift in Japan’s aid objectives of Japan’s business community. A policy away from an emphasis on humanitarian and paper by the Japanese Business Federation developmental objectives to a concentrations (Keidanren), published in June 2014, made on Japan’s security and commercial interests. the following proposals: 1) Aid should be used The new Charter explicitly states that to expand Japanese presence in the South; development cooperation “will also lead 2) Japan should proactively propose projects to national interests.” This emphasis is to develop countries’ governments through consistent with the Abe government’s narrow- public-private collaborations; and 3) Aid minded nationalism and hawkish approach should make use of Japanese knowledge and to foreign and security policies. Added to 11 experiences through technical cooperation. this orientation is the fact that Japan has to

261 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

increasingly compete with China, which is an Central Asia, 28% to other Asia and Oceania). emerging non-DAC aid provider, and which Only 13% was allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa. has displayed no interest in complying with The top ten recipient countries were: Myanmar, DAC’s norms and standards. Regional geo- Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq, politics is considered to be a factor behind Thailand Bangladesh, Philippines and Sri Lanka. Japan’s shift in its aid objectives. Sectorally, 45% went to economic infrastructure, while only 17% was allocated for social The DAC peer review in 2014 recommended infrastructure. These proportions are in sharp that contrast with the majority of DAC members “Japan should establish a prioritised where 37% of DAC members’ aid went to agenda for ensuring [that] domestic and social infrastructure and 19% to economic 14 foreign policy choices are informed by an infrastructure. Probably behind this difference assessment of development goals along is Japan’s growth-oriented view on development. with other goals. The planned revision of the ODA Charter could provide an Technical Cooperation: Japan’s Technical Cooperation at a Glance opportunity to set this approach out clearly [and that] Japan should use the updating According to the OECD aid statistics for 2014, of its ODA Charter to emphasise its focus Japan was the third largest provider of technical on meeting international development cooperation among the DAC members for that 12 effectiveness commitments.” year.15 The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the executing agency of Sadly, it seems that the peer review Japan’s ODA programme, provides fve major recommendations have, for the most part, not types of technical cooperation:16 been realised. In fact, it seems that policy is going in the opposite direction. Dispatch of experts Acceptance of training participants Trends in Aid Volume and Allocation Provision of equipment Technical cooperation projects According to the General Account Budget Technical cooperation for development (the government’s main budget), Japan’s planning ODA budget was increased by 1.8% for “Acceptance of Training Participants” is a fscal year (FY) 2016. This is frst time since programme whereby competent personnel in FY 1997 that the ODA budget has been developing countries are invited to participate increased. However, since Japan’s ODA in training programmes held in Japan. includes additional fnancial sources such “Technical cooperation Projects” refers to a as the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program scheme that combines the dispatch of experts, 13 (FILP), the increase in the main budget does acceptance of training participants and not automatically mean that the aid volume provision of equipment. will increase in the coming year. JICA has three types of volunteer programmes: The trends in the regional and sectoral allocation 1) Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers of Japan’s ODA have remained unchanged. In (JOCVs) (ages 20-39), 2) Senior Volunteers (ages 2013-14, 66% went to Asia (38% to South and 40-69) and 3) Youth and Senior Volunteers for

262 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Nikkei Communities.17 In 2014, 9,889 experts and Of the US$12,465 million of ODA (gross 1,617 volunteers (1,267 of which were JOCVs) disbursement), US$2,634 million (21%) was were dispatched to Southern countries and technical cooperation in 2014.19 Figures 1 and 24,101 representatives from the South travelled 2 describe the regional and sectoral distribution to Japan to participate in training programmes.18 of Japan’s technical cooperation.

Source: Japan Ministry of Foreign Afairs, Japan’s Development Cooperaton White Paper 2015.

Source: JICA Annual Report 2015

263 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Geographically, the share allocated to Sub- setting up new institutional frameworks Saharan Africa is relatively large compared and organizations. These enable partner to the total ODA allocation. Sectorally, a countries to develop problem-solving big share of “public works and utilities” capacities and achieve economic growth.”21 refects the large proportion of economic infrastructure in Japan’s ODA. As well, The fact that “technical cooperation draws on planning and administration, agriculture and Japan’s technology, know-how and experience” human resource development are sectors that is a double-edged sword. As noted earlier, the are emphasised in technical cooperation. business community has been proposing the use of Japanese knowledge and experiences through JICA partners with civil society and local technical cooperation. With this focus comes governments in its technical cooperation the danger that technical cooperation becomes a programme. Through its partnership tool for the promotion of Japanese commercial programme (JPP), JICA supports technical interests and potentially adds to Japan’s tied aid. cooperation projects initiated and proposed Japan does not report to the DAC the tying status by Japanese NGOs/CSOs (including Japanese of technical cooperation and also argues that affliates of international NGOs), local “tying its ODA contributes to transferring Japan’s 22 governments and universities.20 technology, knowledge and experiences.”

Issues around Japan’s Technical In some sectors or areas (for example, railways), Cooperation Japan’s technology and experiences are unique compared to those of other donors. In these (1) Technical Cooperation, situations technical cooperation could lead to Commercial Interests and planning based on Japan-specifc technology Developing Country Ownership and know-how, with the consequence that future procurement of products and services JICA defnes the objectve of technical from other countries would be diffcult. cooperaton as follows: Technical cooperation drawing on Japan’s technology, know-how and experiences, if badly “Technical Cooperation draws on Japan’s implemented, could also narrow choices and technology, know-how and experience undermine ownership in recipient countries. to nurture the human resources that will promote socio-economic development in In 1980’s and 1990’s, there were several media developing countries. Moreover, through reports on failed technical cooperation projects in collaboration with partner countries which the high-technology equipment provided in jointly planning a cooperation plan by Japan was inappropriate. More recently these suited to local situations, technical failures have been much less common. cooperation supports the development and improvement of technologies that are To be fair, Japan’s contributions in several appropriate for the actual circumstances of sectors (for example, public health, water, and these countries, while also contributing to pollution prevention) have been highly valued raising their overall technology levels and by developing countries. Also, a process

264 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

of “triangular cooperation” has become and concessional lending, to match partner increasingly popular in Japan’s technical countries’ needs and capacity. … The skills cooperation. In this practice, JICA, when and expertise Japan brings through its considered relevant, dispatches third country programming is responsive to need.”25 experts (for example, Southeast Asia middle- income countries’ experts to Africa) rather This review also pointed out, however, than Japanese experts, leading to expansion of “project-based assistance continues to be South-South Cooperation. Japan’s preferred approach for delivering aid” although it noted that Japan had begun The 2014 DAC peer review of Japan’s ODA to “move away from stand-alone projects was quite positive about Japan’s technical towards a more holistic approach.” The review cooperation, stating that “Japan’s model of said that increased use of programme-based technical co-operation is robust, responsive to approaches could facilitate the complementary need, and well executed.”23 use of the three instruments.26

(2) Grassroots Sharing of Conclusion Experiences and Mutual Learning After almost twenty years of decrease, Japan’s Training programmes in rural development, aid budget in the government’s main budget agriculture, and public administration for showed a slight increase in FY 2016. This invited personnel are often held in rural positive development is somewhat undercut by communities. These programmes sometimes the fact of the government’s interest in linking become opportunities for not only participants aid with its security and commercial policies, from the developing countries to learn from which has the potential to be in confict with Japanese experiences and expertise, but also objectives of poverty reduction and meeting the for Japanese local communities to learn from new SDGs. Securitization of Japan’s aid policy is developing countries’ skills and knowledge. It evident in the new “Development Cooperation also can provide a platform for discussions on Charter.” Also, there is an increased interest common issues the South and rural Japan face. from the business community to commercialise In this way, training programmes are not just a Japan’s aid. Technical cooperation is in danger one-way training based on Japanese expertise, of being used for this purpose. but can also promote mutual learning between the invited personnel and local communities From a CSO perspective, aid policies in the 24 that host the training programmes. mid-2010s should focus on action plans to achieve the SDGs. This has not been the (3) Project-based or Programme- case with Japan’s Abe government. In fact, based it has adopted a strategy to securitize and The 2014 DAC peer review stated: commercialise aid policy. For CSOs, it is important to keep advocating that the primary “Japan makes good use of instruments, objective of ODA must be to end poverty and consisting of grants, technical co-operation achieve the 2030 agenda.

265 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Endnotes

13 According to the Ministry of Finance, “FILP are long 1 htp://www.oecd.org/dac/development-aid-rises- term low interest loans and investments by the again-in-2015-spending-on-refugees-doubles.htm government to achieve policies: fnancial support 2 The full text (English version) of the Development for small and medium enterprises, constructon Cooperaton Charter is accessible at htp://www. of hospitals and welfare facilites, scholarship mofa.go.jp/fles/000067701.pdf. loans, and securing of overseas resource rights. Procuring the capital through issuing FILP bonds, 3 See, for example, Stephen Brown and Jörn (a kind of Japanese Government Bond), FILP Grävingholt eds., The Securitzaton of Foreign Aid, enables the executon of providing long-term and Houndmills: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2016. low-interest funds and large-scale and long-term 4 Pedro Amakasu Raposo and David M. Poter, public projects, which have strong policy needs, “Peacebuilding and the ‘Human Securitzaton’ of Japan’s proftability and expected returns but are difcult Foreign Aid” in Brown and Grävingholt eds, op.cit. for the private sector to deal with. Considering 5 This secton is based on Akio Takayanagi, “Japan’s the harsh fscal conditons, FILP are becoming New ‘Development Cooperaton Charter’: increasingly important as fscal measures which do Securitzaton & Instrumentalizaton of Aid”, not rely on tax funding.” CPDE Blog writen on 11 February 2015. (htp:// 14 All the fgures in this paragraph are all from OECD’s csopartnership.org/japans-new-devt-cooperaton- “Aid at a Glance” charts, htp://www.oecd.org/dac/ charter-securitzaton-instrumentalizaton-of-aid-2/) stats/aid-at-a-glance.htm. 6 It was originally expected that the revised Charter 15 Table 10 of the OECD’s “Statstcs on resource fows to would be announced by the end of 2014, but developing countries” (htp://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ because of the general electon, suddenly called statstcsonresourcefowstodevelopingcountries.htm) by Abe and held in December 2014, and some 16 http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_ comments from the ruling Liberal Democratc Party, of_assistance/tech/projects/(accessed March 16, the cabinet approval was delayed by more than a 2016) month. 17 For details, see the following website. htp://www. 7 Asahi Shimbun (English Version), April 1, 2014. jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/ (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/ citzen/volunteers.html politcs/AJ201404010044) 18 JICA Annual Report 2015. 8 Regarding the Philippines and Vietnam, it should be noted that, although it will not be counted as ODA, 19 Ministry of Foreign Afairs, Japan’s Development Abe government has been expanding technical Cooperaton White Paper 2015. cooperaton and providing equipment to the 20 For details, see: htp://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_ militaries of the two countries. work/types_of_assistance/citzen/partner.html. 9 Asahi Shimbun (English Version), April 1, 2014. 21 JICA Annual Report 2015. (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/ politcs/AJ201404010044) 22 OECD Development Co-operaton Peer Reviews: Japan, 2014, p.60. 10 JANIC, “Japanese NGOs’ 10 Recommendatons for Revision of Japan’s ODA Charter.” (htp://www. 23 Ibid., p.37. janic.org/MT/pdf/Japan-oda.pdf) 24 Such cases are documented in, Yoshiaki Nishikawa, 11 Keidanren, “Keidanren Asks for Promoton of Yoichiro Kimata and Kazuko Tatsumi eds., Internatonal Cooperaton under a New Philosophy: Community Building beyond the Borders: The Business Community’s View on the Revision of the Moment Global-local Ties were Made, Tokyo: Shin ODA Charter,” June 2014: (htp://www.keidanren. Hyoron, 2012 (Japanese language). or.jp/policy/2014/046.html: In Japanese language) 25 OECD Development Co-operaton Peer Reviews: 12 OECD Development Co-operaton Peer Reviews: Japan, 2014, p.60. Japan, 2014, pp.14-15. The reviewers were 26 Ibid. Australia and France.

266 Republic of Korea: A New Model for Rural Development? Limits and problems of Saemaul Undong (SMU) ODA

Mihyeon Lee, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy

Highlights technological cooperation with partner countries, in the name of passing on the • In 2015, South Korea provided US$1.9 experience of developing the nation. billion in net ODA (preliminary data). • There is an on-going debate on whether This ODA represented 0.14% of gross SMU is indeed an appropriate model for national income (GNI). development. The rural development • Between 2010 and 2013, Korea’s ODA experience of South Korea in 1970s may increased by 50% (to US$1.76 billion no longer be relevant for developing from US$1.2 billion). But after that countries in 2016. The context and socio- year the rate of increase was signifcantly economic environment are very different. reduced, when the current Park Geun- The ‘competition and incentive’ systems Hye administration came into power. of SMU produced adverse results not Between 2013 and 2015, Korean ODA only in South Korea in the1970s, but has only increased by 9%. The result has also in current pilot program countries. been that Korea failed to meet its target of Examples of impact of SMU approaches 0.25% of GNI in 2015. include the undermining of community • Despite criticism from civil society, solidarity and increases in inequality. the target for Korea’s aid volume to be Saying this, it must be acknowledged that achieved by 2020 was adjusted down to the sustainability and long-term impact 0.20% in late 2015.1 of SMU ODA has not been thoroughly • At the same time, South Korea’s assessed. For these reasons, South government has been focusing on Korea’s civil society is very concerned spreading Saemaul Undong (SMU) in about the current SMU ODA policy. its aid program. SMU began as a rural development project and government- Introduction led consciousness reform movement implemented by President Jung-hee Park, The past two years have been frustrating the dictator in South Korea during the times as it is clear that ODA is not a priority 1970s. The Park Geun-Hye administration for Korea’s current government. Since maintains that its SMU ODA promotes the inauguration of the Park Geun-Hye

Saemaul Undong (SMU) was a community-based rural development program of South Korea in 1970s, which was initated by Dictator Park Chung-hee, the father of current South Korean President Park Geun-hye. SMU’s contributon to narrowing the developmental gap between urban cites and rural communites over a decade SMU has ofen been critcized as government’s tool for mobilizaton of people for its propaganda.

267 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

administration in February 2013, Korea’s is putting forward is a good example. This ODA has been increasing by a small amount article reviews and discusses this approach each year, in contrast to the period between inside the context of the problems of Korea’s 2010 and 2013, when ODA increased by 50%. overall ODA policies. Despite civil society’s criticism and appeals, no progress has been made to change this trend. A modest target diminishes further

The Park administration has failed to live up The 2016-2020 Five-year Plan for development to its campaign promise to increase the ODA cooperation did not provide any practical budget to 0.25% of GNI by 2015. Instead, solutions for long-standing problems with this administration has reduced its 5-year Korean ODA, such as expanding the volume target to 0.20% by 2020. In addition, despite of ODA, overcoming aid fragmentation, persistent criticism of ‘trophy projects’ and stabilizing the priority countries’ system, or involvement of many different departments organizing the sectoral focus of ODA. in Korean ODA, the Park administration has also showed no sign of resolving the problem Prior to 2013, Korea’s ODA had experienced of fragmented ODA. signifcant and steady increases for the previous 10 years. After that year, these The Korean government’s Second Basic Plan increases slowed dramatically, coincidental for international cooperation development with the Park administration’s assumption of (2016-2020), announced in late 2015, power. In 2015, the performance of Korean fails to address the government’s stated ODA reached only 0.14% of its GNI. (The intentions for its ODA programs in coming target for 2015 had been 0.25% of GNI.) 5 years. The government was criticized for The targeted performance of Korean ODA building this Plan in haste, with limited prior proposed by the government for 2020 was consultation with civil society. While the decreased to 0.20%. Instead of advancing, the government heavily promotes its participation Second Plan has retreated from the target set in International Aid Transparency Initiatives in its earlier Plan. (IATI), in practice it provides only the most basic of ODA information and has failed to In defense of this move, the Korean meet standards of transparency demanded by government claimed that it had to come up the international community.2 with a realistic performance target, as the one for past fve years could not be achieved. The Korean government maintains that its This is in contrast to the President’s campaign ODA approach promotes technological promises of “0.25% by 2015.” The Korean cooperation with partner countries in the name government has been publicly declaring to of “passing on the experience of developing the international community, including in the nation,” and “Korean-style assistance the Memorandum for the 2012 OECD DAC model.” However, many critics argue that this Peer Review, that it would meet this earlier is no more than a “show off.” The SMU ODA target.3 By lowering the target, the Korean globalization strategy the Park administration government has contradicted its public

268 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

statements and demonstrated that it will not 1970s. There were indeed those who followed honor its promises and obligations to the the government instructions, modernized international community. The OECD DAC, their production methods, and enjoyed which visited South Korea for the OECD greater income. However, critics say it is DAC Peer Review, commented in its report an exaggeration to claim that the income of that South Korea should “sustain its recent all farmers who participated in this program increases in aid volumes to achieve its target increased substantially. Instead, it would of giving 0.25% of its gross national income be more accurate to say that the country’s (GNI) as ODA by 2015.”4 offcial rural income has improved as a result of economic growth, political and economic An Examination of the History: SMU circumstances, and the dual price system for in the 70s Revisited rice that was established in the 1970s.

Saemaul Undong (SMU) began as a rural Critics also point out that the Korean rural development project and a government-led economy has become debt-ridden since the consciousness reform movement implemented start of SMU. They claim this was because by President Jung-hee Park, the dictator in the movement promoted the use of chemical South Korea during the 1970s, to modernize fertilizers and mechanized farming. In their the rural Korean economy. Saemaul leaders, view it is inaccurate to say that the rural who were community trainers, were trained to income actually increased during a decade of give farmers instruction in how to introduce SMU, rural debt also increased by 21 times.5 and grow new agricultural products. The green revolution increased rice production and was Supporters of SMU maintain that the strategy responsible for the building of houses and roads improved rural infrastructure. However, from cement supplied by the government. This critics question if it was really a result of explanation cannot provide a whole picture of ‘spontaneous rural development movement’ as SMU’s success and failure. In South Korea, the government claims, since the government SMU receives such mixed feedback and critique. channeled surplus cement to rural villages and incited competition between villages. From the mid-2000s, the South Korean government started to apply the SMU experience SMU emphasizes diligence, independence and of the 1970s to ODA projects, and since the cooperation. SMU has been highly acclaimed for Park Geunhye administration, the share of its emphasis on cooperation between villagers budget for SMU ODA has skyrocketed. SMU and participation in village-level projects. ODA was categorized as a rural development However, cooperation wasn’t something new project although its vocational training programs for Koreans - rural villages already had long and leader training programs were classifed as history of village-level social cooperation. What technology cooperation. would be more accurate to say is that SMU was the government’s tool for the mobilization Supporters of SMU claim that its policies and of people for its propaganda.6 This view is the practices made Korean farmers richer in the most widely accepted criticism of SMU.

269 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Despite the fact that the view on SMU are divided, community.9 And in March 2016, Park the South Korean government is currently Geunhye administration proposed the ‘Plan promoting a Saemaul ODA approach, which is for International Proliferation of SMU.’10 aimed at raising awareness on SMU and passing on its approach and practices. The government SMU ODA has received a huge increase claims that SMU is a Korean development in terms of both its scope and budget. For experience worth passing onto developing example, in Myanmar where there used countries. President Park, the daughter of Jung- to be only three pilot villages, the number Hee Park (the dictator President who gave a skyrocketed to 100 in 2014.11 In 2015 the SMU green light to SMU), has been the main force ODA was approximately KRW60.1 billion, behind this expansion. representing 2.5% of total ODA (KRW 2 trillion 378.2 billion). Is SMU ODA a model for success? Alongside these developments and the From the mid-2000s, national and local government’s promotion of SMU there has governments departments started to promote been an on-going, heated debate on whether SMU in ODA, to “pass on the Korean it is an appropriate model for development. experience of development” to the world.7 Is Korea’s rural development experience in They intended to convey South Korea’s the1970s a valid model for developing countries “successful” experiences from the past (1970s) in 2016? Is Korea’ experience relevant for to developing countries in the present. Some countries with totally different context and of the key promotion strategies included feld environment? How does SMU differ from trips to South Korea, infrastructure building other generic rural development projects? Was and consulting. In 2009 the South Korean SMU indeed a successful grass root movement? Can the result of SMU be sustained over a long government designated Laos, Rwanda and period? I s there a danger that SMU will cause Myanmar as pilot countries, providing SMU the governments of countries that adopt it be ODA to them. When the Park administration even more authoritarian? These are some of the came into power, the scope was increased major issues surrounding SMU ODA. Despite signifcantly. SMU ODA is now provided to these questions and reservations, the Korea’s 498 villages in 24 countries.8 government is anxious to promote SMU ODA and its ‘best cases,’ rather than being open to The Park administration is focusing on criticism and questions. spreading SMU ODA even further. In 2014, the Korean government announced In the Plan for International Proliferation of a comprehensive plan for global SMU to SMU, the Korean government cited Hakxai integrate and coordinate SMU ODA projects (Laos), Musimba (Rwanda) and Kakao implemented by different departments and (Colombia) as the best examples of what local governments. At the UN Development SMU ODA can accomplish. The government Summit in September 2015, the President claims that in these countries SMU ODA proposed that SMU should be publicized has been responsible for increasing income and introduced throughout the international and improving the environment. However,

270 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

it is not clear if SMU is the only cause for of SMU ODA by applying its core values” as the improvements and successes of these one of the solutions for these problems.13 countries. Other factors include the community’s traditions and assets. Outside However, as has been pointed on earlier in this stimuli were also important. It must also be chapter, a central question is the effectiveness recognized that many of SMU’s practices, of a 1970s strategy inside the present context. such as providing new breeds of seeds adapted In the 1970s, an important concept of SMU to the local environment, and teaching was a ‘consciousness reform’. Is this still farming methods are not unique to it. In relevant? Further, this approach ignores the fact, these are strategies typical of most rural inherent capacities and spirit of people in development projects. Even more important recipient developing nations. is the fact that there have been no assessment of the long-term impact and sustainability of As noted above, SMU’s approach of the results for those projects before they can competition and incentive has produced be regarded as model cases. It is too early to adverse results in South Korea. Critics maintain call them model cases, because they just have that it has been responsible for destroying been or will be closed, respectively in 2014, community solidarity in villages and alienating 2015 and 2016. poor farmers who were not able to participate in village-against-village competitions.14 Given A study of an on-going SMU ODA project in a these facts, the globalization of a standardized, rural village in Myanmar tells us different story. nationalistic SMU would be hard to justify. Researchers who closely monitored this project found that SMU’s focus points of ‘competition It is also questionable whether ‘spontaneous and incentive’ alienated poor households and participation by people,’ which has been worsened inequality in the community. They lauded as SMU’s core value, can be achieved. also found that the Saemaul leaders, who were In its own evaluation of the SMU ODA backed up by external sponsors, committed programs the Korean government admitted misconducts and caused discord in the villages that the pilot projects failed to mobilize people where the projects were being conducted. to spontaneously participate. The evaluation Such phenomena were also identifed in SMU continues, projects achieve certain objectives projects in South Korea during the 1970s.12 but are “not followed up and sustainable.”15 Village Development Committees of SMU International proliferation of SMU? ODA were established to organize people for spontaneous participation in and execution of When promoting the Plan for International projects, but the Committees lacked practical Proliferation of SMU in 2016, South Korea’s authority as people’s decision-making body. government admitted that “the implementation The Korean delegation (volunteers or liaison of SMU ODA until now hasn’t been systemic - offcers) practically led the projects.16 The they lacked clear concepts, failed to strategically Korean government is making a mistake in approach, and projects by many departments promoting an unproven value as the core were fragmented and failed to be organically value, particularly as there is evidence that this interlinked.” It suggested “clarifying concept approach is likely to cause problems.

271 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Table 1. Concept of SMU ODA17

Conclusion as noted in this chapter, SMU continues to receive mixed evaluations in South Korea. The Korean government utilized the 66th UN Some elders in rural areas highly praise SMU DPI/NGO Conference in Kyungju (May 30 for having raised their living standards, while to June 1,2106) to promote SMU. This effort others criticize it as a national mobilization included exhibitions and special sessions. The system sustaining the dictatorship. hosting organizations, Kyungsangbuk-do Provincial Offce and organizations related For those developing nations wondering how to SMU, advocated for the conference’s fnal South Korea developed so quickly, stories document to recognize SMU as “an exemplary about SMU may sound fascinating. It is true, civil movement that narrowed gaps between as the Korean government claims, that some urban and rural communities,” and, as such, countries and international organizations have is an important new development model.18 asked South Korea to share its experiences from After a long debate SMU was fnally excluded SMU. However, no one can deny certain facts: in the document.19 However, this was a 1) SMU may not be suitable for other contexts clear indication of how eager the Korean and environments; 2) SMU’s government-led, government is to beautify and globalize SMU top-to-bottom style of implementation may despite its many controversies. be abused; and 3) the existing SMU projects have lacked accountability. Critics have also In the past few years he Korean government raised other issues, such as the spontaneous has been actively promoting a Knowledge participation or sense of ownership, factors Sharing Program (KSP), claiming that it will that are alleged to have made Samaul Undong teach “how to catch fsh.”20 It maintains that so successful, have not suffciently taken hold. SMU is one of the know-hows. However, SMU’s ‘competition and incentives’ approach

272 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

has affected some villages rather adversely. Said wishes to solve rural problems in partner again, SMU ODA has not been time-tested. countries, it must stop idealizing SMU. Instead it should objectively and carefully For these reasons, civil society of South Korea revisit its limits and problems as well as its has been very concerned about the current benefts. Though it may be late, the Korean SMU ODA policy and its impact. Contrary government must reconsider its strategy of to the myth of SMU’s success, there are limits globalizing SMU, and appropriately validate and problems, which must be examined and and evaluate SMU ODAs together with civil addressed. If the Korean government truly society, academic circle and experts.

Endnotes

10 25th meetng of Commitee for Internatonal 1 Internatonal Development Cooperaton Development Cooperaton(CIDC), “Internatonal Commitee, The 2nd Basic Plan for Internatonal Proliferaton of Saemaul Undong”, available at htp:// Cooperaton Development (2016-2020), Nov. 2015 www.odakorea.go.kr/hz.blltn2.ODACmtRsltSlPL. 2 KoFID, Joint Statement “Korean Government’s do?brd_seq=24&blltn_div=oda#script Disclosure of ODA Informaton Is Disappointng at 11 Kim Heesuk, “The Politcal Process Related Best”, August 2016 with Internatonal Development Project in 3 Government of the Republic of Korea, Rural Myanmar”, Insttute of Comparatve Memorandum for the DAC Peer Review, 2012. Cultural Studies, Seoul Natonal University, 2015 available at htp://bit.ly/2cn5YbU available at htp://iccs.snu.ac.kr/zb4pl8/data/ journal/21_2_%B1%E8%C8%F1%BC%F7.pdf 4 OECD, Korea-DAC Peer Reviews of Development 12 Ibid. Cooperaton, 2012 13 Ibid. 10. 5 Seo Jung-Seok, 「Modern History of South Korea」, 14 Ibid. 11. 2005 15 8th meetng of Commitee for Internatonal 6 See for example Sooyoung Park, Analysis of Development Cooperaton(CIDC), “Assessment Saemaul Undong : A Korean Rural Development of Saemaul Undong ODA projects”, available Programme in the 1970s, Asia-Pacifc Development at www.odakorea.go.kr/fleDownLoad.xdo?f_ Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, December 2009 id=1336712262750104620650CHU3KH1H6DJYV4B 64VL4 7 See for example President Park Geun-hye’s video message to the 1st Global Saemaul Leadership 16 Ibid. 11. Forum, saying “Korea will share with the 17 Ibid. 10. internatonal community its experiences and 18 Draf Outcome Document of the 66th DPI/NGO knowhow of the Saemaul Undong, which led to Conference, available at htp://outreach.un.org/ the ‘Miracle on the Hangang River.” available ngorelations/files/2016/03/Draft-Action-Agenda- at htp://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Policies/ 31March2016.pdf view?artcleId=122360 19 Joint Statement, 70 South Korean NGOs concerns 8 Ministry of Foreign Afairs, Card News “Republic on the ‘Sae-ma-ul Undong’in the Draft Outcome of Korea which received aid became a donor Document of the 66th DPI/NGO Conference, country” 2016, available at htp://blog.naver.com/ available at htp://www.peoplepower21.org/ hellopolicy/220807243280 index.php?mid=English&page=2&document_ 9 President Park Geunhye, Speech at U.N. General Assembly, srl=1414804&listStyle=list September 2015, available at htp://english.yonhapnews. 20 The South Korean governmentAp site for Knowledge co.kr/northkorea/2015/09/29/0401000000AEN2015092 Sharing Program available at htp://www.ksp.go.kr/ 9002700315.html main/main.jsp

273 OverviewAid 2.0? A new strategy for UK aid

Amy Dodd, UK Aid Network

Overview increased, with DFID’s share falling to approximately 80% in 2015 from 86% in 2014 – part of an ongoing shift to a • The referendum in July on leaving the EU more cross-government approach to returned a surprising result with a vote development and aid. for Brexit with far-reaching implications and impacts. • Africa remained the largest recipient of UK aid in geographical terms receiving • The UK government announced a new aid strategy in late 2015 which saw 60% of DFID bilateral aid. priorities shifted to focus more strongly • Reported technical assistance remains on tackling global challenges, while a relatively small proportion of UK aid 4 also advancing and protecting the UK’s overall – just US$615.73 million in 2014 national interest.1 and has remained steady at approximately • The UK continued to meet the 0.7% 3-4% of total UK ODA since it was frst ODA/GNI target2 and remains one of reported in 2010. only a few countries to meet this promise. • The political context for aid remains As the UK economy and GNI grew, aid challenging with continued attacks from also increased to US$19.3 billion (£11.7 a vocal collection of aid critics including billion) in 2014 and to US$18.7 (£12.2 some media and politicians.5 billion) provisionally in 2015. • The UK remains a champion of • Following a sustained campaign by civil transparency, but action has been slow or society and clear political commitment lacking on the rest of the aid effectiveness from all the major political parties, in agenda – a more complete picture 2015 the UK met its promise to put the will be available with the release of the 0.7% target into legislation – enshrining next monitoring survey, but substantial that promise in law and protecting the aid progress on Paris, Accra and Busan budget into the future.3 commitments seems unlikely. • Reversing the trend from previous years, UK bilateral aid also increased by 12.7% Introduction as a proportion of overall UK aid to £870 million while multilateral aid fell by 7.3%. The past two years6 - and 2015 in particular • The amount of aid spent by departments - have been important years which have seen other than the Department for continued signifcant shifts and developments International Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom (UK)’s development

274 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

and aid policies. While the UK remains one more government departments spending more of a very select group who have met the 0.7% of the aid budget, more diverse suppliers from ODA/GNI commitment – and as such one NGOs to the private sector and a continuing of the largest single donors save the US in shift away from inherently more effective absolute terms – there are growing concerns modalities like budget support, will mean that and questions7 about the direction of UK these commitments are more important than aid policy. Reaching 0.7% and enshrining ever. However, implementation appears to be it in legislation, even in sometimes diffcult limited at best. economic circumstances and in the face of substantial opposition from a vocal minority Brexit and beyond of critics, remains something the UK can and should be proud of but the quantity of UK aid The single largest challenge and threat facing cannot be a replacement for quality. the UK – and the development community These concerns were perhaps most obviously – for the coming years will be dealing with refected in the new UK aid strategy. While the implications of Brexit. While a period this new strategy outlined a potentially of political and economic uncertainty is more coherent cross-government approach already affecting programming and projects to UK aid, it also raised serious concerns as the value of the pound drops, longer-term about possible conficts between pursuing implications are as yet unclear. The precise the British national interest and supporting nature of the UK’s future relationship with real, sustainable development with a clear the EU will have a signifcant impact on the focus on reducing poverty and inequality. UK aid budget and effectiveness as it will The particular emphasis on security and determine, amongst other things, whether economic development or the private sector the UK remains engaged in EU development refects a continuation of Britain’s increasing instruments, joint programming efforts, with specialisation in fragile or confict affected impacts on the UK and EU’s negotiating situations and economic development. positions in global processes. As well, the Underpinning these concerns are real larger and much harder to answer question questions about the future of development is the impact on the UK’s role in the world. effectiveness and what real progress has The same political shifts and uncertainties may been made in meeting commitments made also strengthen domestic anti-aid critics, which in Busan. The UK has continued to push could place pressure on the 0.7 commitment. forward the transparency agenda, including recent promises to substantially improve the Still an aid champion? transparency of departments other than the Department for International Development At a time when aid is apparently less and less (DFID). However, in other areas of important or ‘popular’ – and beyond aid is the development effectiveness it is harder see watchword of the day – the UK has remained exactly what progress has been made. Further, a frm champion of both the importance of a more complex landscape of delivery channels, aid and donors meeting their commitments. modalities and suppliers for UK aid, including Promoting aid is not just important because

275 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

it is vital to delivering the ambitious Agenda For many, these objectives represent an 2030, but also it is an important signal of the acknowledgement of current trends and government’s credibility and willingness to thinking on the future of development, contribute to development. the need to shift energies increasingly to global challenges.8 Whether this strategy is This political stance was clear in the UK’s consistent with the commitments of the Prime positioning and lobbying during the Financing Minister, Secretary of State and other political for Development (FfD) negotiations in 2015. leaders to end poverty and leave no one The UK pushed hard to ensure a strong EU behind remains to be seen. The new strategy position recommitting to the 0.7% target and has however clarifed and strengthened many advocated for development effectiveness of the trends already seen as the UK focuses principles to be restated in the Addis Ababa more and more on security and prosperity Agenda for Action (AAAA). At home, the as the road to development. This approach passing of legislation to protect the 0.7% includes commitments to new targets (50% promise was a clear signal of this commitment. of DFID ODA to fragile or confict-affected To date (early 2016) the UK is the only situations), increased spending to resettle country to do so. This legislation provides Syrian refugees in the UK, and re-announced much needed protection against the attempts an increase to climate fnance. There are also of a vocal if relatively small opposition keen to several new cross-government funds (the signifcantly cut the aid budget, and will likely Prosperity Fund, the Ross Fund for research continue to do so in the future. in health and a new cross-government crisis fund) as well as increased funding allocated While these initiatives deserve praise, other to the existing Confict, Stability and Security recent changes in UK aid and development Fund. The strategy is still relatively new and policy do call into question how effective UK details are somewhat thin in some places and aid will be in the future. Increased spending the outcomes of other reviews of UK’s aid in areas of more dubious development impact policies (including the bilateral and multilateral like in-donor refugee costs, alongside the focus aid reviews expected in the coming months)9 on UK national interests, may undermine are likely to inform implementation. So there the impact of UK aid in helping to eradicate is still much at play. poverty and inequality in developing countries. The new aid strategy laid out four new Despite these uncertainties about what or re-focused objectves for UK aid: this new strategy will mean in practice and caution therefore on the part of many experts, • Strengthening global peace, security and initial assessments point to several welcome governance at home and abroad; developments: • Strengthening resilience and response to crises; • Increased funding for research in areas 10 • Promoting global prosperity for the UK like health and resilience; and and developing countries; and • Strengthened funding and mechanisms • Tackling extreme poverty and helping the to understand and respond to crises world’s most vulnerable with a focus on a whole of government

276 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

approach. This approach is also refected be delivered through modalities that support in the Strategic Defence and Security developing countries’ own strategies, the Review11 released at the same time.12 requirement to also deliver positive benefts for the UK makes this objective somewhat Another potentially positive outcome is the more challenging. possibility of a more coherent, whole of government approach to development - an area A parallel and long running issue in the UK that civil society and others have been pushing has been the tied status of UK aid. While all on for some time.13 This does come with UK aid is formally untied, much of it remains some disclaimers however. Accountability informally tied, as the majority of contracts and scrutiny are likely to be more complicated go to UK based businesses. 14 As such, this and potentially less comprehensive as aid informally tied aid arguably does relatively spending is spread through different funds and less to support better governance, institution departments. This concern was picked up by building or to foster a stronger, better both UK aid accountability mechanisms, the resourced civil society in developing countries International Development Select Committee – all of which mean less impact on tackling and the Independent Commission for Aid poverty. This concern has led some experts Impact, who have now committed to looking to speculate on the so-called ‘privatisation’ of across government at aid policy and practice. UK aid.15 Similarly, ensuring that other government departments are suffciently skilled and Though the question of who gets the benefts knowledgeable about good development of aid is not a new one, it has a renewed and aid practices will take both time and urgency as more spending seems to be tagged resources though it remains unclear where the for activities in the UK or for activities with responsibility for building this institutional less clear development impact. The increase knowledge will lie. in funding for research is a useful example – while not problematic per se and in fact much But the most fundamental and diffcult question lauded by some – it will possibly signal a return is whether the national interest and development to tying at least some proportion of the UK interests will really always line up as this strategy aid budget.16 claims. In the not unlikely scenario that they sometimes don’t, which will win? Increased funding for activities like research in the UK – basically funding the promotion Security, the Economy and a Return and sharing of UK expertise – may result in to Tied Aid? an increase in technical assistance (TA). Aid spending in the UK on TA has remained At least until 2020 with the current government, small relative to the total budget in recent the aim of a substantial portion of UK aid will years. But the focus on promoting the UK be to promote prosperity and security. While national interest, which includes to some this could turn out to be effective, and may extent UK businesses, ideas and innovation

277 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

overseas, may generate more TA. Already the Commonwealth Development Corporation UK is increasingly supporting programmes and the UK’s version of a development such as Tax Inspectors without Borders and fnance institution) received a £735 million the Addis Tax Initiative, which aim to share recapitalisation, the frst in over 20 years.17 and promote British expertise and know- how. While these sorts of programmes and Equally, the SDGs and climate commitments investments may be good development, more will require levels of fnance far beyond what attention and scrutiny will be needed to ensure can reasonably be raised or expected from they deliver good value for money in terms of public and offcial sources. Finding ways to building local capacities and tackling the root mobilise sustainable, alternative fows such causes of poverty and inequality in developing as private fnance will be key. But again, this countries. requires safeguards and principles to ensure that these forms of fnance and intervention As highlighted above, there are also fears that not only do no harm but also do some good. theses changes will lead to a ‘securitisation’ More and better evidence is also needed to of UK aid. The focus on delivering SDG 16, understand when, where and why modalities peace-building and supporting development in such as blending or leveraging ODA work the inherently more complex and sometimes to deliver both fnancial and development diffcult circumstances of fragile states, is additionality.18 The AAAA committed to a welcome and much needed. Extreme poverty transparent and inclusive process to develop is increasingly concentrated in such places. At sustainable development principles for Public the same time, care is needed to ensure this Private Partnerships, this process could be a does not lead to a greater blurring of the lines useful starting point and space to pursue this between genuine development and protecting conversation. UK national security. Alongside changes in the OECD DAC defnition of ODA that Where next for aid effectiveness? will permit more and different forms of spending on peace and security, including An obvious answer to many of these with the military and police, strong and robust questions and concerns is a renewed focus on safeguards will be necessary to deliver on the implementing the principles of development spirit of the commitment. effectiveness and aid effectiveness. And yet at a time when it has never been more important, Similarly, targeting aid spending at creating jobs it is hard to see what progress is being made. and economic growth in developing countries So where next for effectiveness in UK aid? is a potentially welcome development. Decent jobs, economic opportunities, a vibrant As the UK aid landscape becomes more domestic private sector and inclusive growth diverse, issues of effectiveness are also are all clearly an important part of development important questions for other government and a real priority for the UK government. departments, as they are increasingly able This priority was demonstrated once again to access and spend greater proportions of in 2015 when the CDC Group (formerly the UK aid. DFID has a long history as a major

278 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

player in aid and development effectiveness such as the one announced in the new aid processes, including as co-chair of the strategy to end traditional general budget GPEDC post Busan, but this will be largely support are worrying signs. new territory for many other departments. The commitment to substantially improve the Conclusion transparency of these departments (to good or very good in the Publish What You Fund It seems fair to say that there is a mixed and Aid Transparency Index)19 is a welcome start uncertain picture for the future of UK aid– and should help to enable progress in other some good and some concerning. Brexit will areas. But clearly more effort will be needed undoubtedly have a far-reaching and multiple to ensure that this growing proportion of the impacts on the future of aid and development aid budget (potentially up to 25%) delivers real in the UK. The debate and negotiations about value for money, in line with aid effectiveness what kind of Brexit we want will consume commitments. much political and technical energy. – this work will be incredibly important to protecting On paper the UK remains committed to many UK aid and promoting a more progressive, elements of the effectiveness agenda, and socially just vision of Britain in the world. is still a vocal champion of some principles such as transparency. But many of the other As one of the few aid champions – and one development effectiveness principles seem of the very few actually living up to their to be far from the reality of UK’s aid policy, quantity commitments – there is much to be programme design and delivery. It is diffcult lauded and celebrated in the UK. The strong to get an accurate picture of UK progress UK support for the 0.7% target has helped to in the implementation of its effectiveness keep it on the agenda in Europe and beyond. commitments since the last Global Partnership Progress here has helped sustain a vital space monitoring report in 2014 as DFID, like for campaigners and supporters to seek most donors, does not regularly provide this progress from other donors. information in a public and verifable way. But there are also worrying trends in the quality The evidence from the 2014 monitoring of UK aid as it appears to be increasingly tied report does suggest relatively little progress to the UK’s national interest and prosperity. has been made – save in the priority area of Successfully and effectively navigating the transparency – and the perception is that this sometimes competing priorities of the UK’s reality has not changed signifcantly since then. interests with a commitment to end poverty DFID offcials claim that effectiveness is in will require substantial effort. Safeguards, the organisation’s DNA and mainstreamed clear sustainable development principles through all their processes. But this claim has and an orientation towards development proven diffcult to verify, or come up with a effectiveness can all be part of the answer to measurable means of assessing whether these that challenge, but it is a question that remains, claims are true. More to the point, decisions so far, fundamentally unanswered.

279 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Endnotes

1 HM Treasury and the Department for Internatonal 2015 available at htps://www.gov.uk/government/ Development, UK aid: tackling global challenges in uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ the natonal interest, November 2015 available at file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_ htps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ web_only.pdf. uploads/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_ 12 See for example Sara Pantuliano at htp://www. strategy_fnal_web_0905.pdf. odi.org/comment/10147-new-uk-aid-strategy-dfd- 2 Department for Internatonal Development, government. Statstcal Release - Provisional UK Ofcial 13 See for example UK Internatonal Development Development Assistance as a Proporton of Gross Natonal Income 2015, April 2016 available Select Commitee, ‘The future of UK development at htps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ cooperaton – phase 1 - development fnance’, system/uploads/attachment_data/file/512978/ February 2014 available at htp://www.parliament. Provisional-UK-Ofcial-Dev-Ass-Proporton-Gross- uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/ Nat-Income2015a.pdf. commons-select/international-development- 3 See Internatonal Development (Ofcial commitee/inquiries/parliament-2010/the-future- Development Assistance Target) Act 2015 available of-uk-development-cooperaton-/. at htp://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/ 14 ‘Why is so much UK aid money stll going to internatonaldevelopmentofcialdevelopmentassi companies based in the UK’, Guardian available at stancetarget.html http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ 4 Data drawn from OECD.Stat Table 1 on 22 April datablog/2012/sep/21/why-is-uk-aid-going-to-uk- 2016 – note that 2015 data on technical assistance companies. is not yet available. 15 Claire Provost, The Privatsaton of UK aid – how 5 See for example the Daily Mail petton to cut the Adam Smith is proftng from the aid budget, April aid budget here https://petition.parliament.uk/ 2016, for Global Justce Now available at htp:// petitions/125692. www.globaljustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/asi- 6 in partcular 2015 as for all stakeholders in report-v2-online_0.pdf?mc_cid=b73b27d3ec&mc_ development. eid=4fd82c04d7. 7 See for example ‘Britain has a new aid strategy. But 16 Simon Maxwell, ‘The new UK aid strategy: has it got its priorites right?’ available at htp:// comments and questons’, Simon Maxwell’s blog, www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/ 25 November 2015 available at htp://www. dec/03/britain-development-aid-strategy-priorites. simonmaxwell.eu/blog/the-new-uk-aid-strategy- 8 Simon Maxwell, ‘The new UK aid strategy: comments-and-questons.html. comments and questons’, Simon Maxwell’s blog, 25 November 2015 available at htp://www. 17 Rt Hon Justne Greening MP, Writen Statement to simonmaxwell.eu/blog/the-new-uk-aid-strategy- the House of Commons, 16 July 2015 available at comments-and-questons.html. htp://www.parliament.uk/business/publicatons/ written-questions-answers-statements/written- 9 Molly Anders, ‘What to expect from DFID’s aid statement/Commons/2015-07-16/HCWS122/. reviews’, Devex, 29 February 2016, available at https://www.devex.com/news/what-to-expect- 18 UK Aid Network, Leveraging Aid: a literature review from-dfd-s-aid-reviews-87689. on the additonality of using ODA to leverage private investment, April 2015 available at htp:// 10 See for example htp://globalprioritesproject. www.ukan.org.uk/wordpress/wp-content/ org/2015/12/new-uk-aid-strategy-prioritising- uploads/2015/03/UKAN-Leveraging-Aid-Literature- research-and-crisis-response/. Review-03.15.pdf. 11 HM Government, National Security Strategy and 19 For more informaton see htp://at. Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 – A publishwhatyoufund.org/. secure and prosperous United Kingdom, November

280 The State of US Foreign Assistance

Alicia Phillips Mandaville, Christina Hoenow, InterAction

Overview In the realm of foreign assistance, the fnal years of the Obama Administration’s tenure • The 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy have been subject to inherently contradictory and Development Review (QDDR) forces. On the one hand, the last two reaffrmed core strategic priorities for US years of any President’s term naturally lend foreign assistance: themselves to a focus on institutionalizing an 1. Preventing and mitigating confict administration’s own initiatives in an effort and violent extremism; to secure hard won progress and establish a 2. Promoting open, resilient, and recognizable legacy. Pressing back against democratic societies; 3. Advancing inclusive economic growth; that instinct however, are the events of the and past few years, which not only threw into relief 4. Mitigating and adapting to climate fundamental changes in our global context, change. but also created humanitarian crises of a scale • The ongoing Syrian refugee crisis and not seen since the days following World War continuing threats to global health pose extreme II. Against this backdrop, foreign assistance challenges to foreign assistance programs. in the United States remains a complicated • Offcial development assistance combination of reactive and proactive efforts. continues to be overshadowed by private sector projects though the impacts of this Strategy and Budget Context trend are not yet fully understood. • Institutionalization of current effective From 2008 to 2012, the US saw a reinvigorated development projects and initiatives is focus on strategies underpinning its foreign a major trend within the administration assistance. Elements included a 2010 and could have lingering impact into the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD), the frst next administration. ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), and a high profle “USAID “…If we make the choice to invest in the future and Forward”2 initiative whose goal was to not just the right now, we can usher in a new era of transform the United States Agency for progress. If we persist through the inevitable setbacks International Development “into the world’s and shocks of a country’s transformation, in years to premier development agency.”3 The frst two come we will have capable and responsible partners. If we come together as a global community to say we can initiatives emphasized broad strategic goals for do this better and do it, we’ll have systems worthy of foreign assistance, while the latter addressed our complex and changing world.”1 operational challenges around internal reform, local or private sector partnerships, and the -USAID Administrator, Gayle Smith, 2016 need for innovative practices at scale.

281 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

The 2015 QDDR reaffrmed core strategic states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan,” from priorities for US foreign assistance: eating all of the resources typically applied to 1. Preventing and mitigating confict and development and humanitarian assistance, violent extremism; a larger and larger share of the international 2. Promoting open, resilient, and democratic development budget has being funded as societies; special Overseas Contingency Operations, 3. Advancing inclusive economic growth; a wartime mechanism not subject to budget and caps.7 (See fgure 1) On the positive side, this 4. Mitigating and adapting to climate change. has prevented the disastrous effects of budget caps during a time of increased global need. Each of these priorities is a credible, if However, many civil society organizations extremely broad, goal for development and worry that the consistent, artifcially low budget humanitarian assistance. However, they also fgures in the regular annual appropriations refect a continued alignment between broader process will create expectations of a much US national security concerns and development lower fgure than can actually sustain critical assistance.4 Discussion around the rationale US foreign assistance programs. for advancing resilient societies or inclusive economic growth are, for example, often Driving Forces and Emerging Global organized around the idea that a lack of either Issues can, “…alienate citizens from government and make populations more susceptible to Against this domestic backdrop, several extremist or authoritarian ideologies.”5 There is emerging global issues or trends have driven an ongoing debate between policy makers who changes or continuations in US foreign see foreign assistance as a soft power means assistance approaches and policy. of demonstrating US leadership in the world, and those who see it as purely transactional • The largest, most visible, refugee (to prevent extremist ideologies). The effect crisis in memory: In the middle of of these debates is evident in how funds are 2015, UNHCR declared that the number allocated. For instance, in budgetary terms, of refugees created by confict, crisis, the volume of funds allocated to Afghanistan, and persecution had surpassed all known Israel, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan far records.9 Although it is diffcult to outweigh those allocated to other countries.6 confrm exact fgures, credible estimates suggest Syria alone created at least 4.1 US Congressional politics and a new budget law million refugees. The United States is also continue to alter the shape of US foreign a major contributor to international assistance allocation. The Budget Control Act humanitarian efforts and such funding (BCA) of 2011 set limits on all US discretionary requests often receive strong bi-partisan spending (including foreign assistance) from support in Congress.10 FY 2011 to FY 2021. In order to prevent • Outbreaks of Ebola and Zika: The the “extraordinary but temporary costs of … 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic in West [US civilian agencies]… operating in front line Africa demonstrated the speed with

282 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Figure 1 Cuts Beneath the Surface

While topline spending remains more or less on par, the balance has shifed between permanent base funding and special “Overseas Contngency Operatons” that do not count against budget ceilings. From USGLC’s Analysis of the FY17 Internatonal Budget Request8

which a pandemic can spread in a world organizations, traditional development that is increasingly urbanized and inter- and humanitarian response actors now connected. Slow initial deployment of feel they are regularly prevented from resources to contain the disease haunted best serving their intended benefciaries. offcials once the contagion began in • Global agreements on the sustainable earnest. Although only four cases were development goals (SDGs) and climate diagnosed in the United States, they change: Long anticipated, the negotiated clearly demonstrated the link between US agreements in Addis Ababa, New York public health and investments in fghting and Paris (respectively) have lent new pandemics abroad, a concern that re- urgency to the US’s desire to support inter- emerged in 2016 with the rise of the Zika related momentum for both. virus in Latin America. • Desire for a culture of innovation: • Closing space for civil society: The As growth in the US technology sector last fve years has seen an escalation continues and technology is ever more in crackdowns on civil society actors integrated into Americans’ daily lives, as more and more governments have the rhetoric of development policy placed higher levels of restrictions on circles has changed from a transactional, the operations of both domestic and “Can we adopt innovative tools?” to a international NGOs. Once reserved more thorough, “How can we cultivate for human rights or civil liberties innovation as an approach?” Some

283 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

worry that a leadership driven race for Some have cautioned that overemphasis on innovation may cause the sector as a whole technological innovations at the expense of to shortchange learning on established political will or citizen empowerment will not practice, like citizen-led development or fnd the kind of public traction needed to drive country ownership. signifcant change. • The changing landscape of poverty: A growing body of research has documented More concretely, and taking a cue from the changing face of poverty, showing best practice in the defense and technology that the world’s poorest increasingly live sector,12 USAID and the United States in middle-income countries and rapidly Government (USG) have made increased use urbanizing centers. This raises questions of a grand challenge model for development. about how assistance is best allocated and Designed to elicit previously unexplored how domestic resources might be mobilized. solutions from non-traditional sources by offering sizeable funding to winning entries, Institutionalizing Innovation USAID has issued seven grand challenges to date, seeking solutions for issues ranging from In recent years “innovation” has become a Ebola and Zika, to energy, water, civil society watch-word in US foreign assistance policy voice, literacy and newborn health.13 As of and practice. However, to move the formal early 2016, the visible success of 2014’s Ebola dimension of the sector in this direction has challenge14 initiatives offer hope that a similar required institutional change. Typically, these challenge around the Zika virus may yield changes have taken advantage of recognized similar, needed results. need for reform, global events, or a clear infection point in a particular issue area. While USAID remains the largest provider of US foreign assistance, other development For example, USAID’s Global Innovation agencies have taken steps to institutionalize Lab was established in April 2014 as part their ability to incorporate learning, progress of the USAID Forward initiative. Its goal and innovation, particularly in regards to is to identify, test, and then scale up proven the SDGs. One worthy example is the solutions to development challenges. A President’s emergency plan for HIV/AIDS second objective is to transform the practice programming (PEPFAR) and the Millennium of development by opening it up to good ideas Challenge Corporation’ (MCC) plan to from other sectors that have already leveraged establish joint data centers in Africa in an scientifc and technological advances.11 Now effort to, “improve existing data and make operational for two years, the lab has catalyzed it more accessible, strengthen data analysis and catalogued a signifcant number of and visualization, enhance opportunities for partnerships, investments, and successes. It has citizen contribution to data, cultivate talent, moved on to explore barriers to the adoption and ensure mutual accountability when and scale of successful interventions with an implementing development aid so we can eye to removing barriers as much as possible. make a sustainable difference.”15

284 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Doubling Down on the Private Sector concern that there is still no clear evidence that these commitments will materialize as tangible “ODA—offcial development assistance—not too infrastructure. For its part, under Power long ago represented the majority—60 percent—of Africa, USAID has provided a combination overall capital fows to sub-Saharan Africa. Today, of support for partner governments, the that fgure is 20 percent.” investment environment, and the deal itself.18 -Dana Hyde, CEO of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, 201616 This approach amplifes the USAID’s Global Development Alliance strategy, which was established in 2001 in order to facilitate greater There are continued efforts by the United States public-private partnerships (PPP). In addition to incorporate the private sector into its formal to Power Africa, the US has pursued similar development strategy. This is a function of the PPP efforts under the Partnership for Growth scale of private actors’ investment capacity in and the New Alliance for Food Security and developing markets, combined with increased Nutrition. global need and reduced domestic resources. This approach is visible in policy statements, Looking across these initiatives, a range of civil from the second QDDR, to speeches by society actors question the heavy emphasis on US offcials across the executive branch and deal-brokering at the expense of an analysis of both houses of Congress. For good or ill, why markets remain dysfunctional, particularly the United States Government’s pride in the for poor and vulnerable populations. For dynamism of its private sector has infused example, an objective of the USAID’s the rhetoric of development, which manifests Development Credit Authority is to help buy itself in the exploration of new partnerships. down risk so that in-country fnancial services Civil society’s view has, however, been mixed. can lend to domestic businesses. But even if the fund received the full 24% increase One example is the US assertion of an requested in the FY17 budget request, it would increasing role for infrastructure, particularly top out at US$10 million, hardly an amount power infrastructure, in the generation of to make a signifcant difference for domestic sustainable economic growth. The Millennium business across developing countries. Challenge Corporation has directly invested billions of dollars in large-scale infrastructure Civil society has also strongly criticized PPPs in low and low-middle income countries since as a modality from a country ownership 17 2005 and new initiatives have been vocal perspective. Developing country governments about their desire to leverage private resources often lack the ability to evaluate technical for energy infrastructure. Under the banner aspects, quality standards, fnancial risks, of Power Africa, the United States reports that procurement and project implementation it has leveraged 100 private partnerships with of the contracts, especially once technical an anticipated yield of US$20 billion in private assistance associated with closing the deal investment commitments across the continent. comes to an end. The New Alliance for Food However, critics of the program express Security and Nutrition, which was developed

285 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

without a clear path for domestic civil society program include a legislative initiative (the input, has received a strong censure from Global Food Security Act) 19 and funding international civil society to the point that a requests,20 as well as research and publications CSO representing northern NGOs withdrew on results produced and lessons learned. from the New Alliance Leadership Council. While supportive of this legislation, US civil No new CSO has been willing to step forward society maintains that there is still room for to join the Leadership Council. improvement in the US’s approach to food security. It has emphasized the importance While a number of CSOs recognize the need to of greater transparency and reporting work with private sector actors in the interest requirements, the need to avoid handpicking of sustainable growth, the specifc mechanics indicators (especially avoiding women’s on how best to pursue these partnerships, empowerment and smallholder producer in ways that secure benefts for the majority targeting) and the value of making the program of people who continue to live in poverty, more accountable to the public. remains unclear and controversial. Bureaus and offces are following similar, if smaller, efforts to ensure the continuity of Practical Progress early transparency initiatives like the Open Government Partnership, US commitments to Best practices in aid, including country- the International Aid Transparency Initiative ownership, inclusive partnerships, transparency (including data publication commitments), and accountability for results, and a focus and US participation in the Extractive Industry on innovation in fnancing and technology Transparency Initiative. have become an increasingly regular and normative part of how United States’ offcials Looking closely, there are also efforts to talk about foreign assistance initiatives. With tinker on the margins of existing authorities or the rhetorical framework established, and a approaches to address emerging development number of presidential initiatives launched and humanitarian outcomes. USAID’s recent in the frst Obama administration, today’s Urbanization Policy, consolidation of the environment is more heavily characterized by African Youth Leaders Initiative, and MCC’s an essential focus on institutionalization. request for regional investment authority are all examples of agencies responding Feed the Future demonstrates this orientation to the changing world around them, while most clearly. Launched in 2010, Feed the recognizing the tight funding environment. Future is the US Government’s Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative. Focused Looking Ahead on increasing the productivity of small-holder farmers, strengthening markets and improving Looking to the future, there are indications nutrition, the Initiative works in 19 countries of what may be in store in the remarks of and has raised a substantial amount of private USAID Administrator Gayle Smith, who capital. Current efforts to institutionalize the identifes three environments for development

286 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

work: ‘‘First, in countries and on issues where for example, to see tax policy or efforts to peace and stability are a given, second, in halt illicit fnance on the agenda with the situations where a crisis is driving action and next administration. focusing attention, and third, in the toughest • US efforts to counter violent circumstances where national security is the extremism (CVE): The securitization raison d’être and staff cannot move or be out of development assistance – and the in the feld.’’21 politicization of humanitarian work— is anathema to nearly all civil society This categorization, and the Administrator’s actors. Nevertheless, the volume of comments on evaluation and accountability, foreign policy attention placed on CVE suggests the importance in future US efforts that means it is only a matter of time before test the intersection of foreign assistance with: development actors fnd themselves in diffcult conversations about the possible links between governance, economic • Country ownership and domestic opportunity, social accountability and resource mobilization: Country extremism. ownership – or the idea that assistance • The development-humanitarian should be driven by recipient country nexus: This issue featured strongly at needs and requests, and the results and around the frst World Humanitarian therefore “owned” by the country itself, Summit in May 2016. Questions about was the reason for a great deal of aid the relationship between international reform in the 2000’s and into the 2010’s humanitarian responses and sustainable in the US. In fact, it was a founding development efforts will likely multiply in principle for the Millennium Challenge the future. The world is grappling with Corporation in 2004. In Busan in 2011, a reality where generations are growing this approach was nuanced with the up as refugees in host countries that important notion of “democratic” country are already under strain to achieve their ownership. Questions of inclusivity and own development goals. Because these domestic resource mobilization are not countries are often the very countries least only a logical complement to this issue, equipped to handle surging populations, but are embedded in international efforts US offcials have signaled that a new to pursue the SDGs. We might expect, model of integrated efforts will be needed.

287 Chapter 4: Global Aids Trends, BRICS Reports, and OECD Reports

Endnotes

1 Gayle Smith, March 2016 speech htps://www. Mechanisms,” Congressional Research Services usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/mar-9- (October 16, 2015) pp. 2 2016-administrator-gayle-smith-us-leadership- internatonal-development 11 https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/15396/LYR_fnal_Web_1112.pdf. 2 http://modernizeaid.net/wp-content/ uploads/2016/03/MFAN.-Timeline.pdf 12 htp://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2014-03-13 . 3 http://www.igdleaders.org/usaid-forward- 13 htps://www.usaid.gov/grandchallenges . delivering-development-reform/ 14 https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press- 4 The frst QDDR made this inital alignment obvious releases/dec-12-2014-united-states-announces- at least in part through its ttle, “Leading through results-grand-challenge-fght-ebola. civilian power”, introducing the shadow of the 15 https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/fact- military directly into the very document intended sheet-mcc-and-pepfar-partner-to-invest-in-data- Part 2 to defne the strategy of American diplomats and collaboratves-for-loca. development professionals. 16 https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/speech/ 5 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development speech-012816-powering-africa-summit. Glossary of Aid Terms Review (QDDR) 17 htps://www.mcc.gov/resources/story/story-what- 6 Foreign Aid: An Introducton to US Programs and sets-mccs-infrastructure-investments-apart Policy p 13, htp://fpc.state.gov/documents/ 18 htps://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43593.pdf organizaton/157097.pdf 19 http://www.bread.org/news/feed-future- 7 Ibid p 18. legislaton-introduced-congress 8 htp://www.usglc.org/downloads/budget/USGLC- 20 https://www.interaction.org/choose-to- Budget-Analysis-FY2017.pdf invest-2017/feed-the-future 9 htp://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html 21 http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future- 10 Rhoda Margesson, “Internatonal Crises and development/posts/2016/04/01-usaid-gayle- Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Response smith-evaluatons-ingram

288 Part 2

Glossary of Aid Terms

289 GlossaryThe Reality of Aid Terms of Aid 2016 Report

GlossaryGlossary ofof Aid Terms Terms

AAA Accra Agenda for Action globalisation. See http:// ACP African, Caribbean and www.africa-union.org Bangladesh Aid Group was formed in October Convention). 1974 under the direct ADB Asian Development Bank supervision of the World Bank, comprising 26 donor AECI Spanish Agency for agencies as well as countries International Cooperation that made the commitment Aid of providing support to the Development Assistance country for its development. APEC Bilateral Aid is provided to developing Cooperation, or APEC, countries and countries on is the premier forum for Part II of the DAC List on facilitating economic growth, a country-to- country basis, cooperation, trade and and to institutions, normally region. related to these countries. ASEAN Association of South East Bilateral portfolio investment includes bank Asian Nations lending, and the purchase of shares, bonds and real estate. Associated Financing is the combination Bond Lending refers to net completed Assistance, whether grants international bonds issued by or loans, with any other countries on the DAC List of Aid Recipients. packages. Associated BoP Balance of payments Financing packages are subject to the same BOT Build, Operate and Transfer criteria of concessionality, BOOT Build, Operate, Own and developmental relevance and Transfer recipient country eligibility as BSS Basic Social Services (Basic Tied Aid Credits. Education, basic health African Union (AU) Formed following and nutrition, safe water the September 1999 Sirte Declaration by African Heads the purposes of the 20/20 of State and Government, the Initiative AU succeeds the Organisation BSWG Budget Support Working of African Unity (OAU) Group as the premier vehicle for accelerating integration Budgetary Aid in Africa, ensuring an given in certain cases to appropriate role for Africa dependent territories to cover in the global economy, while addressing multifaceted CAP The Consolidated Appeal social, economic and political Process for complex problems compounded by humanitarian emergencies certain negative aspects of managed by UNOCHA 290 268270 Glossary of Aid Terms The Reality of AidGlossary 2016 ofReport Aid Terms

Glossary of Aid Terms GlossaryGlossary ofof Aid Terms Terms

AAA Accra Agenda for Action globalisation. See http:// CAP Common Agricultural Policy reuired for the completion ACP African, Caribbean and www.africa-union.org (EU) of disbursements. Bangladesh Aid Group was formed in October CAS Country Assistance Strategy Concessionality Leel is a measure of the Convention). 1974 under the direct CBSC Capacity Building Service ADB Asian Development Bank supervision of the World Centre Bank, comprising 26 donor compared to a loan at market AECI Spanish Agency for agencies as well as countries CDF Comprehensive Development rate (cf Grant Element). International Cooperation that made the commitment Framework used by The World Bank Conditionality is a concept in international Aid of providing support to the development, political Development Assistance country for its development. CEC Commission of the European economy and international APEC Bilateral Aid is provided to developing Community relations and describes the Cooperation, or APEC, countries and countries on CEECA Countries of Central and use of conditions attached is the premier forum for Part II of the DAC List on Eastern Europe and Central to a loan, debt relief, bilateral facilitating economic growth, a country-to- country basis, Asia aid or membership of cooperation, trade and and to institutions, normally international organisations, CFF Compensatory Financing typically by the international Facility region. related to these countries. Bilateral portfolio investment includes bank CGAP Consultative Group to Assist organisations or donor ASEAN Association of South East the Poorest. A micro-lending countries. Asian Nations lending, and the purchase of shares, bonds and real estate. arm launched by the WB Constant Prices Prices adjusted to take Associated Financing is the combination in 199. A recent report Bond Lending refers to net completed prepared by the Washington into account and so make a Assistance, whether grants international bonds issued by DC-based Institute for Policy countries on the DAC List of like with like comparison or loans, with any other Studies, found that 46 percent over time. Aid Recipients. of CGAPs expenditures in packages. Associated BoP Balance of payments Cotonou Partnership Agreeent Signedsigned in Financing packages was spent on policy reforms Cotonou, Benin, on 2 une are subject to the same BOT Build, Operate and Transfer 2000, the agreement replaces criteria of concessionality, BOOT Build, Operate, Own and but end up hurting poor the Lom Convention, as developmental relevance and Transfer borrowers, particularly the framework for trade and cooperation between the recipient country eligibility as BSS Basic Social Services (Basic women. Tied Aid Credits. EU and its ember States Education, basic health CGI Consultative Group on and African, Caribbean and African Union (AU) Formed following and nutrition, safe water Indonesia the September 1999 Sirte CIS Commonwealth of more information, go to: Declaration by African Heads the purposes of the 20/20 Independent States http://europa.eu.int/comm/ of State and Government, the Initiative development/body/cotonou AU succeeds the Organisation Coitent BSWG Budget Support Working in writing and backed by the / indexen.htm of African Unity (OAU) Group as the premier vehicle for necessary funds, undertaken Countryoned onership implies that accelerating integration Budgetary Aid all sectors of the country in Africa, ensuring an given in certain cases to should be involved in appropriate role for Africa dependent territories to cover to a recipient country or a determining whether an in the global economy, while multilateral organisation. aid is needed or not, how it addressing multifaceted CAP The Consolidated Appeal Bilateral commitments are is used and in monitoring social, economic and political Process for complex recorded in the full amount the implementation of problems compounded by humanitarian emergencies of expected transfer, the projects and programs certain negative aspects of managed by UNOCHA irrespective of the time supported by the aid 291 268270 26271 GlossaryGlossaryThe Reality of of Aid Aid Terms Terms of Aid 2016 Report Glossary of Aid Terms

GlossaryGlossaryGlossary ofofof AidAid Terms TermsTerms Glossary of Aid Terms

(grants(grants oror loans).loans). AlthoughAlthough whichwhich thethe datesdates onon whichwhich relief to eligible countries to states of ex-ugoslavia in governmentsgovernments representrepresent principalprincipal oror interestinterest paymentspayments up to 0. Europe. partnerpartner countries,countries, theythey cancan areare duedue areare delayeddelayed oror Deocratic onership - one of the DFID Department for International nono longerlonger actact independently,independently, rearranged.rearranged. Development (U) but have to be accountable but have to be accountable isis aa formform ofof reliefrelief inin Declaration. It implies the to the country as a whole, DGCS Directorate General for to the country as a whole, whichwhich aa newnew loanloan oror grantgrant isis participation of the people comprising the citiens, Development Cooperation comprising the citiens, arrangedarranged toto enableenable thethe debtordebtor parliament, business sectors parliament, business sectors countrycountry toto meetmeet thethe serviceservice of any project or program Disurseent Disurseents record the and civil society. and civil society. paymentspayments onon anan earlierearlier loan.loan. to be funded by foreign aid. actual international transfer CPIA Country Policy and The project and program CPIA Country Policy and debtsdebts areare re-organisedre-organised Institutional Assessment implementation should of goods or services valued Institutional Assessment similarly be transparent at the cost to the donor. In CurrentCurrent (cash)(cash) pricesprices areare pricesprices notnot adjustedadjusted bilateralbilateral creditors.creditors. TheThe and directly or indirectly the case of activities carried ParisParis ClubClub hashas deviseddevised thethe accountable to the people. out in donor countries, such following arrangements for CSOCSO CivilCivil SocietySociety OrganiationOrganiation following arrangements for as training, administration reducing and rescheduling Deeloping Country (see(see NGONGO below)below) reducing and rescheduling or public awareness thethe debtdebt ofof thethe poorest,poorest, mostmost of developing countries programmes, disbursement DAC Development Assistance DAC Development Assistance indebtedindebted countries.countries. eligible to receive ODA. In is taken to have occurred CommitteeCommittee thethe DACDAC 1996 a number of countries, TorontoToronto TersTers agreedagreed byby thethe ParisParis ClubClub inin when the funds have been ofof thethe OrganisationOrganisation forfor including Israel, ceased 1919 providedprovided upup toto transferred to the service EconomicEconomic CooperationCooperation andand to be eligible for ODA. A debtdebt reliefrelief onon rescheduledrescheduled provider or the recipient. DevelopmentDevelopment (OECD)(OECD) isis second group of countries, They may be recorded gross aa forumforum forfor consultationconsultation Countries and Territories in owedowed byby thethe poorest,poorest, (the total amount disbursed amongamong 2121 donordonor countries,countries, Transition including Central mostmost indebtedindebted countriescountries over a given accounting togethertogether withwith thethe EuropeanEuropean and Eastern Europe are pursuingpursuing internationallyinternationally period) or net (less any Commission,Commission, onon howhow agreedagreed economiceconomic reformreform repayments of loan principal toto increaseincrease thethe levellevel andand programmes.programmes. during the same period). Development Assistance. allall aidaid recipientrecipient countries.countries. TrinidadTrinidad TersTers agreedagreed byby thethe ParisParis ClubClub inin OA has the same terms and DPL Development Policy Loan TheThe membermember countriescountries areare 19901990 supersededsuperseded TorontoToronto conditions as ODA, but it DSF Decentraliation Support Australia,Australia, Austria,Austria, Belgium,Belgium, TermsTerms andand providedprovided upup toto does not count towards the Facility Canada,Canada, Denmark,Denmark, Finland,Finland, 00 debtdebt relief.relief. 0.7 target, because it is not France, Germany, Ireland, EBD European Bank for France, Germany, Ireland, NaplesNaples TersTers agreedagreed byby thethe ParisParis ClubClub inin 19941994 going to developing countries Italy,Italy, apan,apan, Luxembourg,Luxembourg, Reconstruction and supersededsuperseded TrinidadTrinidad TermsTerms Deeloping Countries Developing countries Netherlands,Netherlands, NewNew ealand,ealand, Development andand provideprovide upup toto 6767 debtdebt are all countries and territories Norway,Norway, Portugal,Portugal, Spain,Spain, relief.relief. TheyThey alsoalso introducedintroduced in Africa in America (except EC European Commission Sweden,Sweden, Switerland,Switerland, UU thethe optionoption ofof aa one-offone-off the United States, Canada, ECO European Community andand USA.USA. DACDAC setssets thethe reductionreduction ofof 6767 inin thethe stockstock Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands and Falkland Islands) ECOSOC Economic and Social Council statisticsstatistics internationally.internationally. by the poorest, most indebted by the poorest, most indebted in Asia (except apan, Brunei, (UN) DetDet eliefelief maymay taketake thethe formform ofof cancellation,cancellation, countriescountries withwith anan establishedestablished Hong ong, Israel, uwait, tracktrack recordrecord ofof economiceconomic atar, Singapore, Taiwan and ECOWAS Economic Community of re-organisationre-organisation ofof debt.debt. reformreform andand debtdebt servicing.servicing. United Arab Emirates) in West African States, described at: http://www.ecowas.int/ aa DetDet cancellationcancellation isis reliefrelief fromfrom thethe burdenburden EnhancedEnhanced NaplesNaples TersTers UnderUnder thethe Heavily-Heavily- ofof repayingrepaying bothboth thethe principalprincipal IndebtedIndebted PoorPoor CountriesCountries and New ealand) and EDF European Development andand interestinterest onon pastpast loans.loans. (HIPC)(HIPC) debtdebt initiative,initiative, ParisParis Albania, Armenia, Aerbaijan, Fund see Lom Convention Club members have agreed to Georgia, Gibraltar, alta, and Cotonou Partnership DetDet reschedulingrescheduling isis aa formform ofof reliefrelief byby Club members have agreed to increaseincrease thethe amountamount ofof debtdebt oldova, Turkey and the 292 22722 227 GlossaryGlossary of of Aid Aid Terms Terms The Reality of AidGlossary 2016 of Report Aid Terms

GlossaryGlossary ofof AidAid TermsTerms GlossaryGlossary of of Aid TermsTerms

(grants(grants oror loans).loans). AlthoughAlthough whichwhich thethe datesdates onon whichwhich relief to eligible countries to states of ex-ugoslavia in governmentsgovernments representrepresent principalprincipal oror interestinterest paymentspayments up to 0. Europe. partnerpartner countries,countries, theythey cancan areare duedue areare delayeddelayed oror Deocratic onership - one of the DFID Department for International nono longerlonger actact independently,independently, rearranged.rearranged. Development (U) but have to be accountable but have to be accountable isis aa formform ofof reliefrelief inin Declaration. It implies the to the country as a whole, DGCS Directorate General for to the country as a whole, whichwhich aa newnew loanloan oror grantgrant isis participation of the people comprising the citiens, Development Cooperation comprising the citiens, arrangedarranged toto enableenable thethe debtordebtor parliament, business sectors parliament, business sectors countrycountry toto meetmeet thethe serviceservice of any project or program Disurseent Disurseents record the and civil society. and civil society. paymentspayments onon anan earlierearlier loan.loan. to be funded by foreign aid. actual international transfer CPIA Country Policy and The project and program CPIA Country Policy and debtsdebts areare re-organisedre-organised Institutional Assessment implementation should of goods or services valued Institutional Assessment similarly be transparent at the cost to the donor. In CurrentCurrent (cash)(cash) pricesprices areare pricesprices notnot adjustedadjusted bilateralbilateral creditors.creditors. TheThe and directly or indirectly the case of activities carried ParisParis ClubClub hashas deviseddevised thethe accountable to the people. out in donor countries, such following arrangements for CSOCSO CivilCivil SocietySociety OrganiationOrganiation following arrangements for as training, administration reducing and rescheduling Deeloping Country (see(see NGONGO below)below) reducing and rescheduling or public awareness thethe debtdebt ofof thethe poorest,poorest, mostmost of developing countries programmes, disbursement DAC Development Assistance DAC Development Assistance indebtedindebted countries.countries. eligible to receive ODA. In is taken to have occurred CommitteeCommittee thethe DACDAC 1996 a number of countries, TorontoToronto TersTers agreedagreed byby thethe ParisParis ClubClub inin when the funds have been ofof thethe OrganisationOrganisation forfor including Israel, ceased 1919 providedprovided upup toto transferred to the service EconomicEconomic CooperationCooperation andand to be eligible for ODA. A debtdebt reliefrelief onon rescheduledrescheduled provider or the recipient. DevelopmentDevelopment (OECD)(OECD) isis second group of countries, They may be recorded gross aa forumforum forfor consultationconsultation Countries and Territories in owedowed byby thethe poorest,poorest, (the total amount disbursed amongamong 2121 donordonor countries,countries, Transition including Central mostmost indebtedindebted countriescountries over a given accounting togethertogether withwith thethe EuropeanEuropean and Eastern Europe are pursuingpursuing internationallyinternationally period) or net (less any Commission,Commission, onon howhow agreedagreed economiceconomic reformreform repayments of loan principal toto increaseincrease thethe levellevel andand programmes.programmes. during the same period). Development Assistance. allall aidaid recipientrecipient countries.countries. TrinidadTrinidad TersTers agreedagreed byby thethe ParisParis ClubClub inin OA has the same terms and DPL Development Policy Loan TheThe membermember countriescountries areare 19901990 supersededsuperseded TorontoToronto conditions as ODA, but it DSF Decentraliation Support Australia,Australia, Austria,Austria, Belgium,Belgium, TermsTerms andand providedprovided upup toto does not count towards the Facility Canada,Canada, Denmark,Denmark, Finland,Finland, 00 debtdebt relief.relief. 0.7 target, because it is not France, Germany, Ireland, EBD European Bank for France, Germany, Ireland, NaplesNaples TersTers agreedagreed byby thethe ParisParis ClubClub inin 19941994 going to developing countries Italy,Italy, apan,apan, Luxembourg,Luxembourg, Reconstruction and supersededsuperseded TrinidadTrinidad TermsTerms Deeloping Countries Developing countries Netherlands,Netherlands, NewNew ealand,ealand, Development andand provideprovide upup toto 6767 debtdebt are all countries and territories Norway,Norway, Portugal,Portugal, Spain,Spain, relief.relief. TheyThey alsoalso introducedintroduced in Africa in America (except EC European Commission Sweden,Sweden, Switerland,Switerland, UU thethe optionoption ofof aa one-offone-off the United States, Canada, ECO European Community andand USA.USA. DACDAC setssets thethe reductionreduction ofof 6767 inin thethe stockstock Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands and Falkland Islands) ECOSOC Economic and Social Council statisticsstatistics internationally.internationally. by the poorest, most indebted by the poorest, most indebted in Asia (except apan, Brunei, (UN) DetDet eliefelief maymay taketake thethe formform ofof cancellation,cancellation, countriescountries withwith anan establishedestablished Hong ong, Israel, uwait, tracktrack recordrecord ofof economiceconomic atar, Singapore, Taiwan and ECOWAS Economic Community of re-organisationre-organisation ofof debt.debt. reformreform andand debtdebt servicing.servicing. United Arab Emirates) in West African States, described at: http://www.ecowas.int/ aa DetDet cancellationcancellation isis reliefrelief fromfrom thethe burdenburden EnhancedEnhanced NaplesNaples TersTers UnderUnder thethe Heavily-Heavily- ofof repayingrepaying bothboth thethe principalprincipal IndebtedIndebted PoorPoor CountriesCountries and New ealand) and EDF European Development andand interestinterest onon pastpast loans.loans. (HIPC)(HIPC) debtdebt initiative,initiative, ParisParis Albania, Armenia, Aerbaijan, Fund see Lom Convention Club members have agreed to Georgia, Gibraltar, alta, and Cotonou Partnership DetDet reschedulingrescheduling isis aa formform ofof reliefrelief byby Club members have agreed to increaseincrease thethe amountamount ofof debtdebt oldova, Turkey and the 293 22722 227 GlossaryThe Reality of Aid Terms of Aid 2016 Report

GlossaryGlossary of of Aid TermsTerms

Agreement. has replaced Gross National EFA Education for All Product (GNP) with GNI. As GNI has generally been EFF Extended Fund Facility higher than GNP, ODA/GNI EIB European Investment Bank ratios are slightly lower than previously reported ODA/ EU Economic and onetary GNP ratios. Union GNP Gross National Product EPC Engineering Procurement Construction Grant eleent a commitment: interest rate, ESAF (ESalF) Enhanced Structural maturity and grace period Adjustment (Loan)/Facility Eport Credits are loans for the purpose of capital). It measures the of trade extended by the concessionality of a loan, expressed as the percentage If extended by the private by which the present value sector, they may be supported of the expected stream of repayments falls short of the FAO Food and Agricultural repayments that would have Organisation (UN) been generated at a given reference rate of interest. G Group of 20 Finance The reference rate is 10 inisters and Central Bank in DAC statistics. Thus, Governors established the grant element is nil for in 1999 to bring together a loan carrying an interest systemically important rate of 10 it is 100 per industrialied and developing cent for a grant and it lies economies to discuss key between these two limits issues in the global economy for a loan at less than 10 G Group of 24 developed interest. If the face value nations meeting to coordinate of a loan is multiplied by assistance to Central and its grant element, the result Eastern Europe is referred to as the grant euivalent of that loan (cf GATT General Agreement on Tariffs concessionality level) (Note: and Trade the grant element concept is GDP Gross Domestic Product not applied to the market- GEF Global Environment Facility based non-concessional operations of the multilateral Gini development banks.) income distribution, where 0 represents perfect euality GSP General System of and 1 perfect ineuality. Preferences GNI Gross National Income. IC High Income Countries those ost OECD countries have with an annual per capita introduced a new system income of more than US of national accounts which 9 in 199. 294 2722 Glossary of Aid Terms The Reality of AidGlossary 2016 ofReport Aid Terms

Glossary of Aid Terms GlossaryGlossary ofof Aid Terms Terms

Agreement. has replaced Gross National IPC Highly Indebted Poor banks in the same offshore EFA Education for All Product (GNP) with GNI. Country (Debt Initiative) As GNI has generally been central monetary authorities EFF Extended Fund Facility I higher than GNP, ODA/GNI irus are excluded. Guaranteed EIB European Investment Bank ratios are slightly lower than bank loans and bonds are previously reported ODA/ IADB InterAmerican Development included under other private EU Economic and onetary EU Economic and onetary GNP ratios. Bank or bond lending. Union GNP Gross National Product IASC Inter-Agency Standing IsDB Islamic Development Bank EPC Engineering Procurement Committee (Committee Construction Grant eleent responsible to ISG International Steering Group a commitment: interest rate, ESAF (ESalF) Enhanced Structural ANIC apanese NGO Centre for ESAF (ESalF) Enhanced Structural maturity and grace period ECOSOC for overseeing humanitarian Adjustment (Loan)/Facility International Cooperation Adjustment (Loan)/Facility affairs, the work of OCHA Eport Credits are loans for the purpose of capital). It measures the and the CAP). AS oint Assistance Strategies of trade extended by the concessionality of a loan, IDA International Development BIC apan Bank for International expressed as the percentage Association (World Bank) Cooperation If extended by the private by which the present value IDPs Internationally displaced CP oint Country Programme sector, they may be supported of the expected stream of persons Review repayments falls short of the FAO Food and Agricultural repayments that would have IDT International Development ICA apan International Organisation (UN) been generated at a given Targets (for 201) as outlined Cooperation Agency reference rate of interest. in the DAC document G Group of 20 Finance LIC Low Income Countries those The reference rate is 10 Shaping the 21st Century with an annual per capita inisters and Central Bank in DAC statistics. Thus, also known as International Governors established income of less than US76 the grant element is nil for Development Goals in 199 in 1999 to bring together a loan carrying an interest systemically important IFAD International Fund for LDC (or sometimes LLDC) Least rate of 10 it is 100 per Agricultural Development industrialied and developing cent for a grant and it lies Developed Country 4 poor economies to discuss key between these two limits IFC International Finance and vulnerable countries are issues in the global economy for a loan at less than 10 Corporation G Group of 24 developed interest. If the face value IFIs International Financial Nations, with an annual per nations meeting to coordinate of a loan is multiplied by Institutions capita income of less than its grant element, the result US76 in 199 assistance to Central and IF International onetary Fund Eastern Europe is referred to as the grant LIC Lower iddle Income euivalent of that loan (cf INGOs International Non- GATT General Agreement on Tariffs Countries those with an concessionality level) (Note: governmental Organisations and Trade annual per capita income the grant element concept is Internal Ban Lending is net lending to of between US766 and GDP Gross Domestic Product not applied to the market- countries on the List of Aid US0 in 199 based non-concessional GEF Global Environment Facility Recipients by commercial Lo Conention ulti annual framework operations of the multilateral banks in the Bank of agreement covering Gini development banks.) income distribution, where International Settlements development cooperation 0 represents perfect euality GSP General System of reporting area, ie most between the EU members and 1 perfect ineuality. Preferences OECD countries and most and African, Caribbean and GNI Gross National Income. IC High Income Countries those GNI Gross National Income. (Bahamas, Bahrain, Cayman for Lom came from the ost OECD countries have with an annual per capita ost OECD countries have Islands, Hong ong, EDF. Lom has now been introduced a new system income of more than US introduced a new system Netherlands Antilles and replaced by the Cotonou of national accounts which 9 in 199. of national accounts which Singapore), net of lending to Partnership Agreement. 295 2722 227 GlossaryThe Reality of Aid Terms of Aid 2016 Report Glossary of Aid Terms

GlossaryGlossary of of AidAid TermsTerms Glossary of Aid Terms

ADCT ore Advanced Developing agency on letters or other NIC Newly industrialised countries OC Countries and Territories, instruments. NIPs National Indicative Commissioner for Human comprising those that have ultilateral aid is aid channeled through Programmes (EU) Rights been transferred to Part II international bodies for use in NP Net Present alue OOF of the DAC List of Aid or on behalf of aid recipient Recipients. (Aid) is government countries. Aid channeled assistance with the same DGs or illennium Development through multilateral agencies terms and conditions as that do not satisfy both the Goals are the international is regarded as bilateral where ODA, but which goes to criteria necessary for ODA or goals for poverty reduction the donor controls the use Countries and Territories OA. and development agreed by and destination of the funds. in Transition which include PAIS Partnership in Statistics the United Nations in the year ultilateral portfolio inestent covers the former aid recipients for Development capacity 2000. These include the IDTs. transactions of the private and Central and Eastern programme for statistical TDS edium-Term Development non-bank and bank sector European Countries and the development Strategies in the securities issued by Newly Independent States. It Paris Declaration on Aid Effectieness is ultilateral Agencies are international multilateral institutions. does not count towards the a commitment to make aid institutions with NABAD National Bank for Rural 0.7 target. more effective towards the governmental membership, Development OAU Organisation of African goal of poverty reduction which conduct all or a National Progra on Peoples Unity now succeeded by and better uality of life. Epoerent (known as African Union. Aside from institutional activities in favour of PNP) sets out the details of OCA (See UNOCHA) and structural reforms, it development and aid recipient operational plans for poverty also raises concerns about countries. They include ODA the effectiveness of the reduction through promoting Assistance (often referred multilateral development capacities of the local aid regime for sustainable banks (eg The World Bank, to as aid) of which at least development. The Paris communities and providing 2 must be a grant. The regional development banks), funds for development. Declaration commits United Nations agencies, and promotion of economic regional groupings (eg certain NB National Board of Revenue development or welfare must be the main objective. It must Onership Partner countries exercise European Union and Arab NEDA National Economic and effective leadership over their agencies). A contribution Development Authority, the go to a developing country as development policies, and by a DAC ember to such economic planning agency in strategies and co-ordinate an agency is deemed to be the Philippines ODF development actions multilateral if it is pooled NEPAD New Partnership for Finance is used in measuring with other contributions and Alignent Donors base their overall disbursed at the discretion Africas Development. For support on partner countries information, go to http:// recipient countries includes of the agency. Unless a bilateral ODA, b grants national development otherwise indicated, capital www.nepad.org/ and see also strategies, institutions and African Union. and concessional and non- subscriptions to multilateral concessional development procedures development banks are NGDO Non Governmental lending by multilateral aronisation Donors actions are more recorded on a deposit basis, Development Organisation harmonised, transparent and ie in the amount and as at NGO (PO) Non-Governmental collectively effective the date of lodgement of the Organisations (Private considered developmental anaging for esults anaging resources relevant letter of credit or oluntary Organisations) and improving decision- other negotiable instrument. also referred to as oluntary which have too low a grant making for results Limited data are available on Agencies. They are private element to ualify as ODA. an encashment basis, ie at utual Accountaility Donors and OECD Organisation for Economic the date and in the amount that are active in development partners are accountable for of each drawing made by the Cooperation and development results 296 work. Development (see DAC) 227 2 Glossary of Aid Terms The Reality of AidGlossary 2016 of Report Aid Terms

Glossary of Aid Terms GlossaryGlossary of of AidAid TermsTerms

NIC Newly industrialised countries ADCT ore Advanced Developing agency on letters or other NIC Newly industrialised countries OC Countries and Territories, instruments. NIPs National Indicative Commissioner for Human Programmes (EU) Rights comprising those that have ultilateral aid is aid channeled through Programmes (EU) Rights been transferred to Part II international bodies for use in NP Net Present alue OOF of the DAC List of Aid or on behalf of aid recipient (Aid) is government Recipients. (Aid) is government countries. Aid channeled assistance with the same assistance with the same that do not satisfy both the DGs or illennium Development through multilateral agencies terms and conditions as that do not satisfy both the Goals are the international is regarded as bilateral where ODA, but which goes to criteria necessary for ODA or ODA, but which goes to OA. goals for poverty reduction the donor controls the use Countries and Territories OA. and development agreed by and destination of the funds. in Transition which include PAIS Partnership in Statistics the United Nations in the year ultilateral portfolio inestent covers the former aid recipients for Development capacity 2000. These include the IDTs. transactions of the private and Central and Eastern programme for statistical TDS edium-Term Development non-bank and bank sector European Countries and the development Newly Independent States. It Strategies in the securities issued by Newly Independent States. It Paris Declaration on Aid Effectieness is multilateral institutions. does not count towards the a commitment to make aid ultilateral Agencies are international 0.7 target. a commitment to make aid institutions with NABAD National Bank for Rural 0.7 target. more effective towards the governmental membership, Development OAU Organisation of African goal of poverty reduction Unity now succeeded by and better uality of life. which conduct all or a National Progra on Peoples Unity now succeeded by and better uality of life. African Union. Aside from institutional Epoerent (known as and structural reforms, it activities in favour of PNP) sets out the details of OCA (See UNOCHA) and structural reforms, it development and aid recipient also raises concerns about operational plans for poverty ODA countries. They include ODA the effectiveness of the reduction through promoting Assistance (often referred multilateral development Assistance (often referred aid regime for sustainable capacities of the local to as aid) of which at least banks (eg The World Bank, to as aid) of which at least development. The Paris communities and providing 2 must be a grant. The regional development banks), 2 must be a grant. The Declaration commits funds for development. promotion of economic United Nations agencies, and promotion of economic development or welfare must regional groupings (eg certain NB National Board of Revenue development or welfare must be the main objective. It must Onership Partner countries exercise European Union and Arab be the main objective. It must NEDA National Economic and go to a developing country as effective leadership over their agencies). A contribution Development Authority, the go to a developing country as development policies, and development policies, and by a DAC ember to such economic planning agency in strategies and co-ordinate an agency is deemed to be the Philippines ODF development actions multilateral if it is pooled Finance is used in measuring Finance is used in measuring Alignent Donors base their overall with other contributions and NEPAD New Partnership for Alignent Donors base their overall support on partner countries disbursed at the discretion Africas Development. For recipient countries includes support on partner countries recipient countries includes national development of the agency. Unless information, go to http:// a bilateral ODA, b grants national development a bilateral ODA, b grants strategies, institutions and otherwise indicated, capital www.nepad.org/ and see also and concessional and non- strategies, institutions and African Union. and concessional and non- procedures subscriptions to multilateral concessional development procedures development banks are NGDO Non Governmental lending by multilateral aronisation Donors actions are more recorded on a deposit basis, Development Organisation harmonised, transparent and collectively effective ie in the amount and as at NGO (PO) Non-Governmental collectively effective the date of lodgement of the considered developmental Organisations (Private considered developmental anaging for esults anaging resources relevant letter of credit or oluntary Organisations) and improving decision- other negotiable instrument. which have too low a grant also referred to as oluntary which have too low a grant making for results Limited data are available on Agencies. They are private element to ualify as ODA. an encashment basis, ie at utual Accountaility Donors and OECD Organisation for Economic partners are accountable for the date and in the amount that are active in development Cooperation and partners are accountable for of each drawing made by the Cooperation and development results work. Development (see DAC) 297 227 2 277 GlossaryThe Reality of Aid Terms of Aid 2016 Report Glossary of Aid Terms

GlossaryGlossary of of Aid TermsTerms Glossary of Aid Terms

Partially Untied Aid PGF the Poverty Reduction and ecipient Countries and Territories is the education or training at home Growth Facility, which current DAC list of Aid or abroad, and b payments for which the associated replaces the ESAF and is Recipients see LDC, LIC, to consultants, advisers, and goods and services must the name given to IF LIC, UIC, HIC. similar personnel as well as be procured in the donor Loan Facilities to developing SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes, a teachers and administrators country or a restricted countries. (See also PRSP). program imposed by the serving in recipient countries group of other countries, Priate Flos are long-term (more than one WB for providing its loan to (including the cost of which must however include year) capital transactions by recipient countries associated euipment). substantially all recipient Assistance of this kind Soft Loan A loan of which the terms are more countries. Partially untied for balance of payment aid is subject to the same favourable to the borrower facilitate the implementation purposes) with aid recipient than those currently attached disciplines as Tied Aid and countries, or through of a capital project is Associated Financing. to commercial market terms. included indistinguishably multilateral agencies for the It is described as concessional PDF Philippines Development among bilateral project and and the degree of programme expenditures, Forum They include all forms concessionality is expressed as of investment, including and is omitted from technical PEFA Public Expenditure and its grant element. cooperation in statistics of Financial Assistance. A international bank lending and Export Credits where SouthSouth Deelopent Cooperation partnership established in refers to the cooperation/ December 2001 involving the the original maturity exceeds Tied Aid is Aid given on the condition relations amongst developing that it can only be spent on World Bank, IF, European countries in the AAA, Commission, Strategic reported to DAC separately goods and services from for Direct Investment, Export South-South cooperation the donor country. Tied aid Partnership with Africa, on development aims to and several bilateral donors Credits and International credits are subject to certain Bank Lending, Bond Lending observe the principle of non- disciplines concerning their (France, Norway, Switerland, interference in internal affairs, and the United ingdom. and Other Private (lending). concessionality levels, the euality among developing countries to which they Its mandate is to support Prograe Aid partners and respect for integrated, harmonied may be directed, and their their independence, national development relevance approaches to the assessment of general imports, or (ii) sovereignty, cultural diversity and reform of public an integrated programme designed to try to avoid using and identity and local content. aid funds on projects that expenditure, procurement, of support for a particular It plays an important role in sector, or (iii) discrete would be commercially viable international development focusing on the use of elements of a recipients cooperation and is a valuable diagnostic instruments. budgetary expenditure. In ensure that recipient countries complement to North-South receive good value. Perforanceased aid is a system of each case, support is provided cooperation. as part of a World Bank/ TNC Transnational Corporation benchmarks which, once SPA Special Programme of reached, trigger additional IF coordinated structural Triangular deelopent cooperation refers adjustment programme. Assistance for Africa (World funding packages. Bank) to Northern donors or PF Public Finance anagement PSP Poverty Reduction Strategy multilateral institutions Papers SPADA Support for Poor and providing development PPP Public-Private Partnership Disadvantaged Areas oA Reality of Aid Network assistance to Southern Poer priatiation model imposed by the SSA Sub-Saharan Africa governments to execute eal Ters projects/programmes with United States and United SWA (SWAp) Sector Wide Approach ingdom on Chile and India account of exchange rates the aim of assisting other in the 1990s which is claimed TA or TC Technical Assistance/ developing countries. to be contrary to the principle comparison over time see Cooperation includes both Constant Prices UIC Upper iddle Income of democratic ownership. a grants to nationals of aid Countries those with an recipient countries receiving annual per capita income 298 2627 2 Glossary of Aid Terms The Reality ofGlossary AidGlossary 2016 of of AidReport Aid Terms Terms

Glossary of Aid Terms GlossaryGlossaryGlossary of of of Aid Aid Terms TermsTerms

Partially Untied Aid PGF the Poverty Reduction and ecipientecipient Countries Countries and and Territories Territories is is the the educationeducation or or training training at at home home Growth Facility, which currentcurrent DAC DAC list list of of Aid Aid oror abroad, abroad, and and b b payments payments for which the associated replaces the ESAF and is RecipientsRecipients see see LDC, LDC, LIC, LIC, toto consultants, consultants, advisers, advisers, and and goods and services must the name given to IF LIC,LIC, UIC, UIC, HIC. HIC. similarsimilar personnel personnel as as well well as as be procured in the donor Loan Facilities to developing SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes, a teachersteachers and and administrators administrators country or a restricted countries. (See also PRSP). SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes, a serving in recipient countries programprogram imposed imposed by by the the serving in recipient countries group of other countries, Priate Flos are long-term (more than one WB for providing its loan to (including(including the the cost cost of of which must however include WB for providing its loan to associated euipment). year) capital transactions by recipientrecipient countries countries associated euipment). substantially all recipient AssistanceAssistance of of this this kind kind Soft Loan A loan of which the terms are more countries. Partially untied Soft Loan A loan of which the terms are more for balance of payment favourable to the borrower aid is subject to the same favourable to the borrower facilitatefacilitate the the implementation implementation purposes) with aid recipient than those currently attached disciplines as Tied Aid and than those currently attached ofof a acapital capital project project is is countries, or through to commercial market terms. Associated Financing. to commercial market terms. includedincluded indistinguishably indistinguishably multilateral agencies for the It is described as concessional It is described as concessional amongamong bilateral bilateral project project and and PDF Philippines Development and the degree of and the degree of programmeprogramme expenditures, expenditures, Forum They include all forms concessionality is expressed as concessionality is expressed as andand is is omitted omitted from from technical technical PEFA Public Expenditure and of investment, including its grant element. its grant element. cooperationcooperation in in statistics statistics of of Financial Assistance. A international bank lending and Export Credits where SouthSouthSouthSouth Deelopent Deelopent Cooperation Cooperation partnership established in refers to the cooperation/ the original maturity exceeds refers to the cooperation/ TiedTied Aid Aid isis Aid Aid given given on on the the condition condition December 2001 involving the relations amongst developing relations amongst developing thatthat it it can can only only be be spent spent on on World Bank, IF, European countries in the AAA, reported to DAC separately countries in the AAA, goodsgoods and and services services from from Commission, Strategic South-South cooperation for Direct Investment, Export South-South cooperation thethe donor donor country. country. Tied Tied aid aid Partnership with Africa, on development aims to Credits and International on development aims to creditscredits are are subject subject to to certain certain and several bilateral donors observe the principle of non- Bank Lending, Bond Lending observe the principle of non- disciplinesdisciplines concerning concerning their their (France, Norway, Switerland, interference in internal affairs, and Other Private (lending). interference in internal affairs, concessionalityconcessionality levels, levels, the the and the United ingdom. euality among developing euality among developing countriescountries to to which which they they Its mandate is to support Prograe Aid partners and respect for partners and respect for maymay be be directed, directed, and and their their integrated, harmonied their independence, national their independence, national developmentdevelopment relevance relevance approaches to the assessment of general imports, or (ii) sovereignty, cultural diversity sovereignty, cultural diversity designeddesigned to to try try to to avoid avoid using using and reform of public an integrated programme and identity and local content. and identity and local content. aidaid funds funds on on projects projects that that expenditure, procurement, of support for a particular It plays an important role in It plays an important role in wouldwould be be commercially commercially viable viable sector, or (iii) discrete international development international development focusing on the use of elements of a recipients cooperation and is a valuable cooperation and is a valuable ensureensure that that recipient recipient countries countries diagnostic instruments. budgetary expenditure. In complement to North-South each case, support is provided complement to North-South receivereceive good good value. value. Perforanceased aid is a system of cooperation.cooperation. benchmarks which, once as part of a World Bank/ TNCTNC TransnationalTransnational Corporation Corporation IF coordinated structural SPASPA SpecialSpecial Programme Programme of of reached, trigger additional Assistance for Africa (World TriangularTriangular deelopent deelopent cooperation cooperation refers refers funding packages. adjustment programme. Assistance for Africa (World to Northern donors or Bank)Bank) to Northern donors or PSP Poverty Reduction Strategy multilateralmultilateral institutions institutions PF Public Finance anagement SPADA Support for Poor and Papers SPADA Support for Poor and providingproviding development development PPP Public-Private Partnership Disadvantaged Areas oA Reality of Aid Network Disadvantaged Areas assistanceassistance to to Southern Southern Poer priatiation model imposed by the SSA Sub-Saharan Africa governmentsgovernments to to execute execute eal Ters SSA Sub-Saharan Africa United States and United projects/programmesprojects/programmes with with account of exchange rates SWA (SWAp) Sector Wide Approach ingdom on Chile and India SWA (SWAp) Sector Wide Approach thethe aim aim of of assisting assisting other other in the 1990s which is claimed TATA or or TC TC TechnicalTechnical Assistance/ Assistance/ developingdeveloping countries. countries. comparison over time see to be contrary to the principle CooperationCooperation includes includes both both Constant Prices UICUIC UpperUpper iddle iddle Income Income of democratic ownership. aa grants grants to to nationals nationals of of aid aid Countries those with an recipient countries receiving Countries those with an recipient countries receiving annualannual per per capita capita income income 299 2627 2 272 GlossaryThe ofReality Aid Terms of Aid 2016 Report

GlossaryGlossary of of Aid Aid Terms

of between US06 and UNITA United Nations Institute for US9 in 199 Training and Research UN United Nations UNOCA UNAIDS oint United Nations Coordination of Programme on HI/AIDS Humanitarian Assistance UNCED United Nations Conference UNISD United Nations Research on Environment and Institute for Social Development, Rio de aneiro Development 1992 Untied Aid for which the associated Part 3 UNCS United Nations Centre for Part 3 Human Settlements, Habitat goods and services may be fully and freely procured in UNCTAD United Nations Conference substantially all countries. ROA Members on Trade and Development UN United Nations olunteers RoA MembersDirectory Directory UNDCF United Nations Capital Directory Development Fund Uruguay ound Last round of multilateral trade negotiations under the UNDAC United Nations Disaster GATT Assessment and Coordination USAID United States Agency for UNDAF United Nations Development International Development Assistance Framework ertical prograes also known as vertical UNDCP United Nations Drugs funds, global programmes Control Programmes UNDP United Nations Development by the OECD and the World Programme Bank as international initiatives outside the UNEP United Nations Environment UN system which deliver Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, country level in support of focused thematic objectives. Organisation WB World Bank UNFPA United Nations Fund for WFP World Food Programme Population Activities WIP Wider Harmoniation in UNC Practice High Commissioner for Refugees WO World Health Organisation UNICEF United Nations Childrens Fund WID Women in Development UNIDO United Nations Industrial WSSD World Summit for Social Development Organisation Development, Copenhagen 199. See 20/20 Initiative. UNIFE United Nations Development Fund for Women WTO World Trade Organisation

Sources consulted include: Reality of Aid, Annual Development Cooperation Report of the DAC 300 2820 Part 3

RoA Members Directory

301 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

RoA AFRICA Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria Phone #: (234) 52 258748 Africa Leadership Forum Address: ALF Plaza, 1 Bells Drive, Benja Village, Economic Justce Network (EJN) Km 9, Idiroko road, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria Address: Church House 1, Queen Victoria Street, Email: [email protected] Cape Town. Republic of South Africa Phone #: (234) 803 4543925 Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Website: www.africaleadership.org Phone #: (27) 21 424 9563 Fax #: (27) 21 424 9564 Africa Network for Environment and Economic Website: www.ejn.org.za Justce (ANEEJ) Address: 123, First East Circular Road Benin City Forum for African Alternatves Edo State Nigeria, West Africa Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (234) 80 23457333 Forum for the Reinforcement of the Civil Website: www.aneej.org Society (FORCS)/ Forum pour le Renforcement de la Société Civile (FORSC) African Forum and Network on Debt and Email: [email protected] Development (AFRODAD) Address: 31 Atkinson Drive, Harare, Zimbabwe Forum Natonal sur la Dete et la Pauvreté (FNDP) Email: [email protected] Address: BP 585 Abidjan cidex 03 Riviera, Abijan Phone #: (263) 4 778531/6 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (263) 4 747878 Phone #: (225) 05718222 Website: www.afrodad.org Foundaton for Community Development - Center for Economic Governance and Aids in Mozambique Africa (CEGAA) Address: Av. 25 de Setembro, Edifcios Times Square Address: Room 1009, Loop Street Studios, 4 Bloco 2 - 3º andar Loop Street, Cape Town 8001/ P.O. Box 7004, Email: [email protected] Roggebaai, 8012 South Africa Phone #: (258) 21 355300 Phone #: (27) 21 425 2852 Fax #: (27) 21 425 2852 Fax #: (258) 21 355 355 Website: www.cegaa.org Website: www.fdc.org.mz Centre for Peacebuilding and Socio-Economic Resources Development (CPSERD) Foundaton for Grassroots Initatves in Africa Address: Lagos, Nigeria (GrassRootsAfrica) Email: [email protected] Address: Foundaton for Grassroots Inittves in Africa (GrassRootsAfrica) House Number 87 Centre for Promoton of Economic and Social Bear Regimanuel Gray Estates, Kwabenya-Accra Alternatves (CEPAES) PMB MD 187 Madina- Accra Ghana Email: Address: P. O. Box 31091, Yaounde, Cameroon [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (233) 21-414223 Phone #: (237) 231 4407 Fax #: (233)-21-414223 Website: www.grassrootsafrica.org.gh Civil Society for Poverty Reducton (CSPR) Address: Plot No. 9169, Nanshila Road Kalundu- GRAIB-ONG P/B E891 Postnet No. 302, Lusaka, Zambia Address: BP 66 AZOVE Benin Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (260) 211 290154 Phone #: (229) 027662; 91 62 22 Fax #: (229) 46 30 48 Economic Community of West African States Network on Debt and Development (ECONDAD) Groupe de Recherche et d’Acton pour la Address: 123 1st East Circular Road, Promoton de l’Agriculture et du Développement

302 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

(GRAPAD) Address: c/1506I Maison DJOMAKON Jean VONS Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) Guindéhou VEDOKO, Benin Address: 2nd Floor, Shelter Afrique Along Email: [email protected] Mamlaka Road, Next to Utumishi Co-op House Phone #: (229) 21380172 / 21384883 P.O. Box 3556-00100 GPO Nairobi, Kenya Fax #: (229) 21380172 Email: [email protected] Phone #: (254) 20 2730371/2 and 2727883/936 Grupo Mocambicano da Divida (GMD) / Fax #: (254) 2 2730374 Mozambican Debt Group Website: www.kepsa.or.ke Address: Rua de Coimbra, nº 91 - Malhangalene, Maputo Email: [email protected] Malawi Economic Justce Network (MEJN) Phone #: 21 419523, cel. 82 - 443 7740 Address: Malawi Economic Justce Network, Fax #: (258)21-419524 Centre House Arcade, City Centre, PO Box Website: www.divida.org 20135, Lilongwe 2 Malawi Email: [email protected] Habitat of Peace - Congo - DRC Phone #: (265) 1 770 060 Fax #: (265) 1 770 068 Phone #: (243) 99811818 Website: www.mejn.mw Insttute for Security Studies/Insttut D‘Etudes de Securite Social Development Network (SODNET) Address: PO Box 1787 Brooklyn Square Tshwane Address: Methodist Ministry Center, 2nd Wing, (Pretoria) 0075 South Africa Email: [email protected] 4th foor, Oloitoktok Road, Of Gitanga Road, Phone #: (27) 012 346 9500/2 Kilimani Nairobi 00619 Kenya Fax #: (27) 012 346 9570 Email: [email protected]; po-edwardoyugi@ Website: www.iss.co.za gmail.com Phone #: (254) 20 3860745/6 Fax #: (254) 20 3860746 Insttute of Development Studies (IDS) University Website: www.sodnet.org of Zimbabwe Address: PO Box MP167, Mt Pleasant, Harare, Southern African Centre for the Constructve Zimbabwe Resoluton of Disputes (SACCORD) Email: [email protected] Address: P.O. Box 37660, Lusaka, Zambia Phone #: (263) 4 333342/3 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (263) 4-333345 Phone #: (260) 1 250017 Fax #: (260) 1 250027 Jubilee Angola Address: PO Box 6095, Luanda, Angola Tanzania Associaton of NGOs (TANGO) Email: [email protected] Address: Of Shekilango Road, Sinza Afrika Sana Phone #: (244) 2366729 Dar es Salaam P. O. Box 31147 Tanzania Fax #: (244)2335497 Email: [email protected] Phone #: (255) 22 277 4582 Jubilee Zambia Fax #: (255) 22 277 4582 Address: P.O. Box 37774, 10101, Lusaka, Zambia Website: www.tango.or.tz Email: [email protected] Phone #: (260) 1 290410 Tanzania Coaliton on Debt and Development (TCDD) Fax #: (260) 1 290759 Address: Shaurimoyo Road, Mariam Towers, 8th Floor, Website: www.jctr.org.zm PO Box 9193, Dar Es-Salaam, Tanzania Email: [email protected] Kenya Debt Relief Network (KENDREN) Phone #: 255 (22) 2866866/713 - 608854 Address: C/O EcoNews Africa, Mbaruk Road, Fax #: (255) 22 2124404 Mucai Drive, P.O. Box 76406, Nairobi, Kenya Website: www.tcdd.org Phone #: (254) 020 2721076/99 Fax #: (254) 020 2725171 THISDAY Website: www.kendren.org Address: 35 Creek Road, Apapa, Lagos

303 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

All Nepal Peasants’ Federaton (ANPFa) Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Address: PO Box: 273, Lalitpur, Nepal Phone #: (234) 8022924721-2; 8022924485 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (234) 1 4600276 Phone #: (977) 1-4288404 Website: www.thisdayonline.com Fax #: (977) 1-4288403 Website: www.anpfa.org.np Uganda Debt Network Address: Plot 424 Mawanda Road, Kamwokya ANGIKAR Bangladesh Foundaton Kampala / P.O. Box 21509 Kampala, Uganda Address: Sunibir, 25 West Nakhalpara, Tejgaon, Email: [email protected] Dhaka 1215 Bangladesh Email: angikarbd@ Phone #: (256) 414 533840/543974 yahoo.com Fax #: (256) 414 534856 Phone #: 881711806054 (mobile) Website: www.udn.or.ug Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND) Uganda NGO Natonal Forum Address: P.O.Box: 5792/14, Mazraa: 1105 - 2070 Address: Plot 25, Muyenga Tank Hill Rd, Beirut, Lebanon Kabalagala, Email: [email protected] PO Box 4636, Kampala, Uganda Phone #: (961) 1 319366 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (961) 1 815636 Phone #: (256) 772 408 365 Website: www.annd.org Fax #: (256) 312 260 372 Website: www.ngoforum.or.ug Asia Pacifc Mission for Migrants (APMM) Address: c/o Kowloon Union Church, No.2 Zimbabwe Coaliton on Debt and Development Jordan Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR of China (ZIMCODD) Email: [email protected] Address: 5 Orkney Road, Eastlea, Harare, Phone #: (852) 2723-7536 Zimbabwe; Fax #: (852) 2735-4559 P O Box 8840, Harare, Zimbabwe Website: www.apmigrants.org Email: [email protected] Phone #: (263) 4 776830/31 Centre for Human Rights and Development Fax #: (263) 4 776830/1 (CHRD) Website: www.zimcodd.org.zw Address: Baga toiruu, Chingeltei district, Ulanbataar 17, Mongolia RoA Asia/Pacific Phone #: (976) 11325721 Fax #: (976) 11325721 Advancing Public Interest Trust (APIT) Website: www.owc.org.mn Address: 107/ Ground Floor, Sher Sha Shuri Road, Mohammadpur, Dhaka 1216 Bangladesh Centre for Organisaton Research and Educaton Email: [email protected] (CORE) Phone #: (880) 2-9121396; (880) 2-9134406 Address: Natonal Programme Ofce A-5 Vienna Fax #: Ext-103 Residency Aldona Bardez 403 508, Goa, India Website: www.apitbd.org Email: [email protected]; core_ne@ coremanipur.org Aidwatch Philippines Phone #: (91) 832-228 9318 Address: 114 Timog Avenue, Quezon City, 1103 Website: www.coremanipur.org Philippines Email: [email protected] China Associaton for NGO Cooperaton Phone #: (63) 2 927 7060 to 62 (CANGO) Fax #: (63) 2 929 2496 Address: C-601, East Building, Yonghe Plaza, 28# Website: aidwatch-ph.collectvetech.org/node/2 Andingmen Dongdajie, Beijing, 100007, P.R.China

304 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

Email: [email protected] Forum LSM Aceh (Aceh NGOs Forum) Phone #: (86) 10 64097888 Address: Jl. T. Iskandar No. 58 Lambhuk, Fax #: (86)10 64097607 Banda Aceh, Indonesia Website: www.cango.org Email: [email protected]; forumlsmaceh@ yahoo.com COAST Phone #: (62) 651 33619; 081514542457 Address: House# 9/4, Road# 2, Shyamoli, Fax #: (62)65125391 Dhaka 1207 Bangladesh Website: www.forumlsmaceh.org Email: [email protected] Forum of Women’s NGOs in Kyrgyzstan Phone #: (880) 2-8125181 Address: Isanova 147, kv. 7; 720033 Bishkek, Fax #: (880) 2-9129395 Kyrgyzstan Website: www.coastbd.org Phone #: (996) 312 214585; (996) 555 996612 Website: www.forumofwomenngos.kg Coastal Development Partnership (CDP) Address: 55/2 Islampur Road, Khulna-9100, Green Movement of Sri Lanka (GMSL) Bangladesh Address: No 9, 1st Lane, Wanatha Road, Email: [email protected] Gangodawila, Nugegoda, Sri Lanka Phone #: (880) 1916033444 Email: [email protected] Fax #: 88 02 9564474 Phone #: (94) 11 2817156 Website: www.cdpbd.org Fax #: (94) 11 4305274 Website: www.greensl.net Cooperaton Commitee for Cambodia (CCC) Address: #9-11, St. 476, TTPI, Chamkarmorn, IBON Foundaton Inc. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, PO Box 885, CCC Box 73 Address: 114 Timog Avenue, Quezon City, 1103 Phone #: (855 23) 216 009 or (855 -16) 900 503 Philippines Fax #: (855 23) 216 009 Phone #: (63) 2 927 6981 Website: www.ccc-cambodia.org Fax #: (63)2 927 6981 Website: www.ibon.org Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA) Address: # 2 P. Guevarra Street, West Modern INCIDIN Bangladesh Site, Aurora Hill, 2600 Baguio City, Philippines Address: 9/11, Iqbal Road, Mohammadpur, Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Dhaka-1207 Bangladesh Phone #: (63) 74 304-4239 Fax #: (63) 74 443- Phone #: (880) 2-8129733 7159 Website: www.cpaphils.org Website: www.incidinb.org

Council for People’s Democracy and Internatonal NGO Forum on Indonesian Governance (CPDG) Development (INFID) Address: Quezon City, Philippines Address: JL Mampang Prapatan XI, No. 23 Jakarta Phone #: (63) 2 3741285 12790, Indonesia East Timor Development Agency (ETDA) Email: [email protected] Address: P.O. Box 30, Bairro Pite, Dili, Timor-Leste Phone #: (62) 21 7919-6721 to 22 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (62)21 794-1577 Website: www.infd.org Phone #: (670) 723 3674; (670) 723 3816 Law & Society Trust (LST) Ecumenical Center for Research, Educaton and Address: Law & Society Trust, No. 3, Kynsey Advocacy (ECREA) Terrace, Address: 189 Rt. Sukuna Rd. G.P.O 15473 Colombo 8, Sri Lanka Suva Republic of Fiji Islands Email: [email protected], [email protected] Phone #: (679) 3307 588 Phone #: (94) 11 2684845 / (94) 11 2691228 Fax #: (679) 3311 248 Fax #: (94) 11 2686843 Website: www.ecrea.org.f Website: www.lawandsocietytrust.org

305 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

Lok Sanjh Foundaton Email: [email protected] Address: House 494, Street 47, G-10/4, Phone #: (679) 330-2963 / 331-7048 Islamabad, Pakistan Email: [email protected] Fax #: (679) 331-7046 Phone #: (92) 51-2101043 Website: www.piango.org Fax #: (92) 51 221 0395 Website: www.loksanjh.org Pakistan Insttute of Labor and Educaton LOKOJ Insttute Research (PILER) Address: No. 706, Road No. 11, Adabor, Shamoli, Address: Pakistan Insttute of Labour Educaton Dhaka 1207, Bangladesh & Research ST-001, Sector X, Sub Sector - V, Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Gulshan-e-Maymar, Karachi – Pakistan Phone #: (880) 28150669 Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Fax #: (880) 29664408 Phone #: (92) 21 6351145-7 Website: www.lokoj.org Fax #: (92) 21 6350354 Website: www.piler.org.pk Mindanao Interfaith People’s Conference (MIPC) Address: 2F PICPA Bldg., Araullo St.,Davao City 8000 Peoples Workers Union Philippines Address: B-25, Bano Plaza, Garden East, Email: [email protected] Nishtar Road, Karachi, Pakistan Phone #: (63) 82 225 0743 Phone #: 92-30-02023639 Fax #: (63) 82 225 0743 Proshika Natonal Network of Indigenous Women (NNIW) Address: I/1-Ga, Secton-2, Mirpur, Dhaka-1216, Address: Natonal Network of Indigenous Bangladesh Women (NNIW), Kathmandu Metropolitan- 34, Email: [email protected] Baneshwor, PO Box 7238, Nepal Phone #: (880) 8015812; (880) 8016015 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (880) 2-8015811 Phone #: (977) 1-4115590 Website: www.proshika.org Fax #: (977) 1-4115590 Website: www.nniw.org.np Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC) Address: 142, Maitri Apartments, Plot No. 2, Nepal Policy Insttute (NPI) Patparganj, Delhi – 110 092, India Address: 60 Newplaza Marga, Putalisadak, Phone #: (91) 11-43036919 Kathmandu, Nepal Fax #: (91) 11-222-4233 Email: [email protected]; npi.info@wlink. com.np SEWALANKA Foundaton Phone #: (977) 1-4429741 Address: # 432 A, 2nd Floor, Colombo Road, Fax #: (977) 1-4419610 Boralesgamuwa, Sri Lanka Website: npi.org.np Email: [email protected] Phone #: (94) 773524410; (94) 112545362-5 NGO Federaton of Nepal Fax #: (94) 112545166 Address: Post Box No 8973 NPC 609, New Website: www.sewalanka.org Baneshwor, Kathmandu, Nepal Email: [email protected] Shan Women’s Acton Network (SWAN) Phone #: (977) 1 4782908; Address: PO Box 120 Phrasing Post Ofce, Cell : 977 9841212769 Chiangmai 50200, Thailand Fax #: (977) 1 4780559 Email: [email protected]; kenneri@ Website: www.ngofederaton.org shanwomen.org Website: www.shanwomen.org Pacifc Islands Associaton of Non Governmental Organisatons (PIANGO) Solidarity for People’s Advocacy Network (SPAN) Address: 30 Ratu Sukuna Road, Nasese, Suva, Fiji Address: Cebu City, Philippines Islands; Postal: P.O. Box 17780, Suva, Fiji Email: [email protected]

306 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

South Asian Network for Social and Agricultural Email: [email protected] Development (SANSAD) Phone #: (91) 22-2882 2850 / 2889 8662 Address: N-13, Second Floor Green Park Fax #: (91) 22-2889 8941 Extension Website: www.vakindia.org New Delhi India - 110016 Phone #: (91) 11-4164 4845 Voices for Interactve Choice and Fax #: (91) 11-4175 8845 Empowerment (VOICE) Website: www.sansad.org.in Address: House #67, 4th foor, Block-Ka, Pisciculture Housing Society, Shaymoli, Tamil Nadu Women’s Forum Dhaka-1207, Bangladesh Address: Kallaru, Perumuchi Village and Post Email: [email protected] Arakkonam 631 002, Vellore District, Tamil Nadu, Phone #: (880) 2-8158688 India Fax #: (880) 2-8158688 Email: [email protected] Website: www.voicebd.org Phone #: (91) 041421 70702 Wave Foundaton The NGO Forum on Cambodia Address: 3/11. Block-D, Lalmata, Dhaka 1207, Address: #9-11 Street 476, Toul Tompong, P.O. Bangladesh Box 2295, Phnom Penh 3, Cambodia Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (880) 2-8113383 Phone #: (855) 23-214 429 Fax #: (855) 23- 994 063 RoA Latin America Website: www.ngoforum.org.kh (SUR) Centro de Estudios Sociales y Educación Third World Network (TWN) Address: José M. Infante 85, Providencia, Address: 131 Jalan Macalister, 10400 Penang, Santago, Chile Malaysia Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Phone #: (562)2642406 / 2360470 Phone #: (60) 4 2266728/2266159 Fax #: (562)2359091 Fax #: (60) 42264505 Website: www.sitosur.cl Website: www.twnside.org.sg Asociación Arariwa para la Promoción Técnica- UBINIG (Policy Research for Development cultural Andina Alternatve) Address: Apartado postal 872, Cusco, Perú, Address: 22-13, Khilzee Road, Block # B, Avenida Los Incas 1606, Wanchaq Cusco, Perú Mohammadpur, Shaymoli, Dhaka 1207, Email: [email protected] Bangladesh Phone #: (5184) 236-6887 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (5184) 236889 Phone #: (880) 2 81 11465; 2 81 16420 Website: www.arariwa.org.pe Fax #: (880) 2 81 13065 Asociación Civil Acción Campesina Vietnam Union of Science & Technology Address: Calle Ayuacucho oeste No. 52, Quinta Associatons (VUSTA) Acción Campesina Los Teques, Estado Miranda, Address: 53 Nguyen Du Str. - Ha Noi - Viet Nam Venezuela Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (84)4 9432206 Phone #: (58 212) 3214795 Fax #: (84)4 8227593 Fax #: (58 212) 321 59 98 Website: www.vusta.vn Website: www.accioncampesina.com.ve

Vikas Andhyayan Kendra (VAK) Asociación Latnoamericana de Organizaciones Address: D-1 Shivdham, 62 Link Road, Malad (West), de Promoción al Desarrollo, A.C. Mumbai 400 064 India Address: Benjamín Franklin 186, Col. Escandón,

307 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

Del. Miguel Hidalgo, México, D.F. C.P. 11800 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (5551) 32126511 Phone #: (5255) 52733400 Fax #: (5551) 32337523 Fax #: (5255) 52733449 Website: www.camp.org.br Website: www.alop.org.mx Centro de Derechos y Desarrollo (CEDAL) Asociación para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos (ADP) Address: Huayna Capac No 1372, Jesús María Address: Apartado postal 4627, Managua C.S.T. 5 Lima 11, Perú cuadras al Sur, 1 1/2; cuadra al Oeste Managua, Email: [email protected] / [email protected] Nicaragua Phone #: (511) 2055730 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (511) 2055736 Phone #: (505) 2281360 Website: www.cedal.org.pe Fax #: (505)2664878 Website: www.adp.com.ni Centro de Educación Popular (QHANA) Address: Apartado postal 9989, La Paz, Calle Base, Educación, Comunicación, Tecnología Landaeta No. 522, La Paz, Bolivia Alternatva (BASE-ECTA) Email: [email protected] / lapaz@ Address: Avenida Defensores del Chaco, piso 1 qhana.org.bo San Lorenzo, Paraguay Código Postal 2189 San Lorenzo Website: www.qhana.org.bo Email: [email protected] Phone #: (59521) 576786/ (59521) 580239 Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo (DESCO) Central Ecuatoriana de Servicios Address: Jr León de la Fuente No. 110, Lima 17, Agrícolas(CESA) Perú Address: Apartado postal: 17-16 -0179 C.E.Q. Email: [email protected] Inglaterra N 3130 y Mariana de Jesús, Quito, Phone #: (511) 613-8300 a 8307 Ecuador Fax #: (511 ) 613-8308 Email: [email protected] Website: www.desco.org.pe Phone #: (593 2) 524830 / 2529896 Fax #: (5932) 503006 Centro de Investgación y Promoción del Website: www.cesa.org.ec Campesino (CIPCA) Address: Pasaje Fabiani No. 2578 Av. 20 de Centro Andino de Acción Popular (CAAP) Octubre / Campos y Pinilla, Casilla 5854, La Paz, Address: Apartado postal 17-15 – 173 – B Martn Bolivia de Utreras 733 y Selva Alegre Quito, Ecuador Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (591 2) 2432272, 22432276 Phone #: (5932) 252-763 / 523-262 Fax #: (5912) 22432269 Fax #: (5932) 568-452 Website: www.cipca.org.bo Website: www.ecuanex.net.ec/caap Centro de Investgaciones (CIUDAD) Centro Cooperatvista Uruguayo (CCU) Address: Calle Fernando Meneses N24-57 y Av. Address: Edo. Víctor Haedo 2252, CP 11200 La Gasca, Casilla Postal 1708-8311, Quito, Ecuador Montevideo, Uruguay Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (5932) 2225-198 / 2227-091 Phone #: (5982) 4012541 / 4009066 / 4001443 Fax #: (5932) 2500-322 Fax #: (5982) 4006735 Website: www.ciudad.org.ec Website: www.ccu.org.uy Centro de Investgaciones y Educación Popular Centro de Assessoria Multprofssional (CAMP) (CINEP) Address: Praca Parobé, 130-9o andar Centro Address: Apartado postal 25916, Santafé 90030.170, Porto Alegre – RS Brasil de Bogotá, Carrera 5ª No. 33A-08, Bogotá,

308 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

Colombia Phone #: (511) 433-6610 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (511) 433-1744 Phone #: (571) 2456181 Website: www.cepes.org.pe Fax #: (571) 2879089 Website: www.cinep.org.co Comisión de Acción Social Menonita (CASM) Address: Barrio Guadalupe 21-22, Calle 3, Av. Centro Dominicano de Estudios de la Educación NE, 2114 (CEDEE) San Pedro Sula, Cortés, Honduras Address: Santago 153, Gazcue (Apdo. Postal 20307) Email: [email protected], casm@ Santo Domingo, Dominicana, Rep. sulanet.net Phone #: (504) 552 9469/70 Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Fax #: (504) 552 0411 Phone #: (1809) 6823302; 6882966 Website: www.casm.hn Fax #: (1 809) 686-8727 Coordinacion de ONG y Cooperatvas Centro Félix Varela (CFV) (CONGCOOP) Address: Calle 5ª No 720 e/ 8 y 10 El Vedado, Address: 2a. Calle 16-60 zona 4 de Mixco, Residenciales Ciudad Habana, Cuba Valle del Sol, Edifcio Atanasio Tzul, 2do. Email: [email protected] / [email protected] Nivel Guatemala, Centro America Phone #: (537) 8367731 Phone #: (502) 2432-0966 Fax #: (53 7) 8333328 Fax #: (502) 2433-4779 Website: www.cfv.org.cu Website: www.congcoop.org.gt

Centro Latnoamericano de Economía Humana Corporación de Estudios Sociales y Educación (CLAEH) (SUR ) Address: Zelmar Michelini 1220 11100 Address: José M. Infante 85, Providencia, Montevideo, Uruguay Santago, Chile Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (5982) 9007194 Phone #: (56) 2 235 8143; 236 0470 Fax #: (5982) 9007194 ext 18 Fax #: (56) 2 235-9091 Website: www.sitosur.cl Website: www.claeh.org.uy Corporación Juventudes para el Desarrollo y la Centro Operacional de Vivienda y Poblamiento Producción (JUNDEP) AC (COPEVI) Address: Fanor Velasco 27, Santago, Chile Address: Calle Primero de Mayo #151 Col. San Email: [email protected] Pedro de los Pinos, Del. Benito Juárez México, Phone #: (562) 3611314 - 3611316 D.F. C.P. 03800, México Website: www.jundep.cl Email: [email protected] Phone #: (5255) 55159627 y 4919 Corporación Región para el Desarrollo y la Website: www.copevi.org Democracia Address: Apartado postal 67146 Medellín, Centro para la Acción Legal en Derechos Calle 55 No. 41-10, Medellín, Colombia Humanos (CALDH) Email: [email protected] Address: 6ª. Avenida 1-71, Zona 1, Ciudad de Phone #: (574) 216-6822 Guatemala, Guatemala Fax #: (574) 239-5544 Email: [email protected] Website: www.region.org.co Phone #: (502) 2251-0555 Fax #: (502) 2230-3470 Corporación Viva la Ciudadanía Website: www.caldh.org Address: Calle 54, No. 10-81, piso 7, Bogotá, Colombia Email: [email protected] Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales (CEPES) Address: Av. Salaverry No. 818, Jesús María, Phone #: (57 1) 3480781 Lima 11, Perú Fax #: (57 1) 212-0467 Email: [email protected] Website: www.viva.org.co 309 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

Deca-Equipo Pueblo, AC Fundación para el Desarrollo en Justcia y Paz Address: Apartado postal 113-097 México, D.F., (FUNDAPAZ) Francisco Field Jurado No.51, México, D.F. México Address: Calle Castelli 12, segundo piso “A” Email: [email protected] (C1031AAB) Buenos Aires, Argentna Phone #: (52 55) 5539 0055 – 5539 0015 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (52 55) 5672 7453 Phone #: (5411) 48648587 Website: www.equipopueblo.org.mx Fax #: (5411) 48616509 Website: www.fundapaz.org.ar Enlace, Comunicación y Capacitación, AC (ENLACE) Fundación Promotora de Vivienda (FUPROVI) Address: Benjamín Franklin 186 Col. Escandón Address: Del costado Norte de la Iglesia de Moravia CP 11800, México, D.F., México 700 mts. Este, 100 mts. Norte, 100 mts. Oeste Moravia, Email: [email protected] San José, Costa Rica Phone #: (52 55) 52733343 – 52734648 Email: [email protected] Website: www.enlacecc.org Phone #: (506) 2470000 Fax #: (506) 2365178 Federación de Órganos para Asistencia Social Website: www.fuprovi.org Educacional (FASE) Address: Rua das Palmeiras, 90 Botafogo, 22270- Fundación Salvadoreña para la Promoción y el 070 Desarrollo Económico Río de Janeiro, Brasil (FUNSALPRODESE) Email: [email protected] Address: Apartado postal 1952 Centro de Phone #: (5521) 25367350 Gobierno, 27 Calle Poniente y 17 Av. Norte, No. Fax #: (5521) 25367379 1434, Colonia Layco, San Salvador, El Salvador Website: www.fase.org.br Email: [email protected] Phone #: (503) 22252722 / 22250414 / 0416 Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP) Fax #: (503) 22255261 Address: Apartado postal 17-110-5202 Quito Website: www.funsalprodese.org.sv Calle Mallorca N24-275 y Coruña, Quito,Ecuador Email: [email protected] Fundación SES (Latndadd) Phone #: (5932) 2520408 – 2529372 Address: Avda de Mayo 1156 2º piso, Fax #: (5932) 250-4978 Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Argentna Website: www.fepp.org.ec Email: [email protected] / e-grupo2-latndadd@ fundses.org.ar Fundación Foro Nacional por Colombia Phone #: 54-11-4381-4225/3842 Address: Carrera 4 A No 27 62 Bogotá D.C., Colombia Website: www.fundses.org.ar Email: [email protected] Phone #: (571) 2822550 Fundación Taller de Iniciatvas en Estudios Fax #: (571) 2861299 Rurales (Fundación Tierra) Website: www.foro.org.co Address: Apartado postal 8155, La Paz Calle Hermanos Manchego No. 2576 La Paz, Bolivia Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE) Email: [email protected] Address: Calle Arturo Ambrogi #411 entre 103 Phone #: (5912) 2430145 – 2432263/2683 y 105 Av. Norte, Col. Escalón, San Salvador, El Fax #: (5912) 211 1216 Salvador, P.O. Box 1774, Centro de Gobierno Website: www.fierra.org Email: [email protected] Phone #: (503) 22095300 Grupo Social Centro al Servicio de la Acción Fax #: (503) 22630454 Popular (CESAP) Website: www.funde.org Address: San Isidro a San José de Ávila, fnal avenida Beralt (al lado de la Abadía), Edifcio

310 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

Grupo Social CESAP Caracas, Venezuela Email: [email protected] Juventudes para el Desarrollo y la Producción Phone #: (58212) 8627423/7182 – 8616458 (JUNDEP) Fax #: (58212) 8627182 Address: Fanor Velasco 27, Santago, Chile Website: www.cesap.org.ve Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Phone #: (56) 3611314; 3611321 Insttuto Cooperatvo Interamericano (ICI) Website: www.jundep.cl Address: Apartado postal 0834-02794, Ciudad de Panamá, Avenida La Pulida, Pueblo Nuevo, La Morada Ciudad de Panamá, Panamá Address: Purísima 251, Recoleta Santago, Chile Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (507) 2246019/ 2240527 Phone #: (562)732 3728 Fax #: (507) 2215385 Fax #: (562)732 3728 Website: www.icipan.org Website: www.lamorada.org

Insttuto de Desarrollo Social y Promoción Productvidad Biosfera Medio Ambiente - Probioma Humana (INDES) Address: Equipetrol calle 7 Este No 29 Santa Cruz de la Address: Luis Sáenz Peña 277, 5to. Piso, ofcina Sierra, Bolivia 10, 1110 Buenos Aires, Argentna Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] indesmisiones@ Phone #: (591) 2 3431332 arnet.com.ar Fax #: (591) 2 3432098 Phone #: (5411) 43726358/ (543752) 435764 Website: www.probioma.org.bo Fax #: (5411) 43726358/ (543752) 435764 Website: www.indes.org.ar Programa de Promoción y Desarrollo Social (PRODESO) Insttuto de Estudos Socioeconomicos (INESC) Address: Apartado postal 168, Santago de Address: SCS quadra 08 Bloco B-50, salas Veraguas, Calle 4 Paso de las Tablas, Santago de 433/441 Edifcio Venáncio 2000, CEP 70333-970 Veraguas, Panamá Brasilia – DF, Brazil Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (507) 998-1994 Phone #: (55 61) 212-0200 Fax #: 998-6172 Fax #: (55 61) 226-8042 Website: www.prodeso.org Website: www.inesc.org.br Proyecto de Desarrollo Santago-La Salle Insttuto de Estudos, Formacao e Assessoria em (PRODESSA) Politcas Sociais (Insttuto Pólis) Address: Apartado postal 13 B, 01903, Address: Rua Araújo, 124 Centro, Sao Paulo - SP Brazil Guatemala, Km. 15 Calzada Roosevelt, Zona 7 Email: [email protected] Guatemala, Guatemala Phone #: (55) 11 2174-6800 Email: [email protected], federico. Fax #: (55) 11 2174 6848 [email protected], [email protected] Website: www.polis.org.br Phone #: (502) 24353911 Fax #: (502) 24353913 Insttuto Hondureño de Desarrollo Rural Website: www.prodessa.net (IHDER) Address: Apartado postal 2214, Tegucigalpa, Red Latnoamericana sobre Deuda , Desarollo y D.C., Honduras Colonia Presidente Kennedy, Derechos (LATINDADD) Zona No. 2, Bloque No. 37, Address: Jr. Daniel Olaechea 175, Jesús María - Perú casa #4416, Súper Manzana No. 5 Tegucigalpa, Email: [email protected] Honduras Phone #: (511) 261 2466 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (511) 261 7619 Phone #: (504) 2300927 Website: www.latndadd.org

311 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

Servicio de Información Mesoamericano sobre Phone #: (44) 20 7561 7561 Agricultura Sostenible (SIMAS) Fax #: (44) 20 7272 0899 Address: Lugo Rent a Car 1c al lago, Esq. Sur Website: www.actonaid.org.uk oeste parque El Carmen, Reparto El Carmen, Managua, Nicaragua Alliance Sud Email: [email protected] Address: Monbijoustrasse 31, PO Box 6735 CH- Phone #: (505) 22682302 3001 Berne, Switzerland Fax #: (505) 22682302 Email: [email protected] Website: www.simas.org.ni Phone #: (41) 31 390 93 33 Fax #: (41) 31 390 93 31 Servicio Ecuménico de Promoción Alternatva Website: www.alliancesud.ch (SEPA) Address: Apartado postal 23036 Fernando de Britsh Overseas NGOs for Development la Mora Soldado Ovelar 604 esq. Marcos Riera, (BOND) Fernando de la Mora, Paraguay Address: Bond Regent’s Wharf 8 All Saints Street Email: [email protected] London N1 9RL, UK Phone #: (59521) 515-855/ 514365 Email: [email protected]; advocacy@bond. org.uk Servicio Habitacional y de Acción Social (SEHAS) Phone #: (44) 20 7520 0252 Address: Bv. del Carmen 680, Villa Siburu (5003) Fax #: (44) 20 7837 4220 Córdoba, Argentna Email: [email protected] Website: www.bond.org.uk Phone #: (54 351) 480-5031 Fax #: (54 351) 489-7541 Campagna per la Riforma della Banca (CRBM) Website: www.sehas.org.ar Address: Mondiale (CRBM), via Tommaso da Servicios para la Educación Alternatva AC (EDUCA) Celano 15, 00179 Rome, Italy Address: Escuadrón 201 #203 Col. Antguo Email: [email protected] Aeropuerto, Oaxaca, México C.P. 68050 Phone #: (39) 06-78 26 855 Email: direcció[email protected] Fax #: (39) 06-78 58 100 Phone #: (52 951) 5136023 – (52 951) 5025043 Website: www.crbm.org Website: www.edudaoaxaca.org CeSPI - Centro Studi di Politca Internazionale Address: Via d’Aracoeli 11, 00186 Rome, Italy RoA European OECD Countries Email: [email protected] Phone #: (39) 06 6990630 11.11.11 - Coaliton of the Flemish North-South Fax #: (39) 06 6784104 Movement Website: www.cespi.it Address: Vlasfabriekstraat 11, 1060 Brussels, Belgium Christofel-Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. (CBM) Email: [email protected] Address: Christan Blind Germany e.V., Phone #: (32) 2 536 11 13 Nibelungen Straße 124, 64625 Bensheim, Germany Fax #: (32) 2 536 19 10 Email: [email protected] Website: www.11.be Phone #: (49) 6251 131-0 Fax #: (49) 6251 131-199 Acton Aid Italy Website: www.christofel-blindenmission.de Address: ActonAid Internatonal - via Broggi 19/A - 20129 Milano, Italy Concern Worldwide Website: www.actonaid.it Address: 52-55 Lower Camden Street, Dublin 2 Ireland Acton Aid UK Email: [email protected] Address: Hamlyn House, Macdonald Road, Phone #: (353) 1 417 7700; (353) 1417 8044 Archway, London N19 5PG, UK Fax #: (353) 1 475 7362 Email: [email protected] Website: www.concern.net

312 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

Coordinaton SUD Fax #: (45) 35350696 Address: 14 passage Dubail, 75010 Paris, France Website: www.ibis.dk Email: [email protected] Phone #: (33) 1 44 72 93 72 Intermón Oxfam Fax #: (33) 1 44 72 93 73 Address: Calle Alberto Aguilera 15, 28015 Website: www.coordinatonsud.org Madrid, Spain Email: [email protected] Diakonia-Sweden Phone #: (34) 902 330 331 Address: SE-172 99 Sundbyberg, Stockholm, Website: www.intermonoxfam.org Sweden Email: [email protected] KEPA Phone #: (46) 8 453 69 00 Address: Service Centre for Development Fax #: (46) 8 453 69 29 Cooperaton- KEPA Töölöntorinkatu 2 A, 00260 Website: www.diakonia.se Helsinki, Finland Email: [email protected] European Network on Debt and Development Phone #: (358) 9-584 233 (EURODAD) Fax #: (358) 9-5842 3200 Address: Rue d’Edimbourg, 18–26 1050 Brussels Website: www.kepa.f Belgium Email: [email protected] MS Acton Aid Denmark Phone #: (32) 2 894 46 40 Address: MS ActonAid Denmark Fax #: (32) 2 791 98 09 Fælledvej 12 2200 Kbh N., Denmark Website: www.eurodad.org Email: [email protected] Phone #: (45) 7731 0000 Eurostep Fax #: (45) 7731 0101 Address: Eurostep AISBL, Rue Stevin 115, B-1000 Website: www.ms.dk Brussels, Belgium Email: [email protected] Phone #: (32) 2 231 16 59 Fax #: (32) 2 230 37 80 Networkers South-North Website: www.eurostep.org Address: Ullveien 4 (Voksenåsen), 0791 Oslo, Norway Forum Syd Email: [email protected] Address: PO Box 15407, S-104 65 Stockholm, Phone #: (47) 93039520 Sweden Website: www.networkers.org Email: [email protected]; maud.johansson@ forumsyd.org Norwegian Forum for Environment and Phone #: 0046 8-506 371 62 Development (ForUM) Fax #: 46 8 506 370 99 Address: Storgata 11, 0155 Oslo, Norway Website: www.forumsyd.org Email: [email protected]; oerstavik@ forumfor.no Global Responsibility Austrian Platorm for Phone #: (47) 2301 0300 Development and Humanitarian Aid Fax #: (47) 2301 0303 Address: Berggasse 7/11, A-1090 Vienna, Austria Website: www.forumfor.no Email: [email protected] Phone #: (43) 1 522 44 22-0 Novib - Oxfam Netherlands Website: www.agez.at Address: Mauritskade 9, P.O. Box 30919, 2500 GX The Hague, The Netherlands IBIS Email: [email protected] Address: IBIS Copenhagen, Norrebrogade 68B, Phone #: (31) 70 3421777 2200 Copenhagen N, Denmark Fax #: (31) 70 3614461 Email: [email protected] Website: www.novib.nl Phone #: (45) 35358788

313 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

OEFSE- Austrian Foundaton for Development Australian Council for Internatonal Research Development (ACFID) Address: Berggasse 7, A-1090 Vienna, Austria Address: 14 Napier Close Deakin Australian Email: [email protected] Capital Territory (Canberra) 2600, Australia Phone #: (43)1 317 40 10 - 242 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (43) 1 317 40 15 Website: www.oefse.at Phone #: (61) 2 6285 1816 Fax #: (61) 2 6285 1720 OIKOS Website: www.acfd.asn.au Address: Rua Visconde Moreira de Rey, 37 Linda- a-Pastora 2790-447 Queijas, Oeiras - Portugal Canadian Council for Internatonal Email: [email protected] Cooperaton/Conseil canadien pour la Phone #: (351) 218 823 649; (351) 21 882 3630 coopératon internatonale (CCIC/CCCI) Fax #: (351) 21 882 3635 Address: 450 Rideau Street, Suite 200 Otawa, Website: www.oikos.pt Ontario, Terre Des Hommes - Germany K1N 5Z4, Canada Address: Hilfe für Kinder in Not Email: [email protected] Ruppenkampstraße 11a 49084 Osnabrück, Phone #: (1) 613 241-7007 Germany Postach 4126 49031 Osnabrück, Germany Fax #: (1) 613 241-5302 Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Website: www.ccic.ca Phone #: (05 41) 71 01 –0 Fax #: (05 41) 71 01 –0 Council for Internatonal Development (CID) Website: www.tdh.de Address: 2/F James Smith’s Building cnr. Manners Mall and Cuba St., Wellington, New UK Aid Network (UKAN) Zealand/ PO Box 24 228, Wellington 6142, New Address: UKAN, Acton Aid, Hamyln House, Zealand London, N19 5PG, UK Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone #: (64) 4 4969615 Fax #: +44 207 561 7563 Fax #: (64) 4 4969614 Website: www.cid.org.nz RoA non-European OECD Countries Friends of the Earth (FOE) Japan Aid/Watch Address: Internatonal Environmental NGO, FoE Address: 19 Eve St Erskineville NSW 2043, Australia Japan 3-30-8-1F Ikebukuro Toshima-ku Tokyo Email: [email protected] 171-0014, Japan Phone #: (61) 2 9557 8944 Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Fax #: (61) 2 9557 9822 Phone #: (81) 3-6907-7217 Website: www.aidwatch.org.au Fax #: (81)3-6907-7219 Website: www.foejapan.org American Council for Voluntary Internatonal Acton (InterActon) Japan Internatonal Volunteer Center (JVC) Address: 1400 16th Street, NW, Suite 210 | Address: 6F Maruko Bldg., 1-20-6 Higashiueno, Washington, DC 20036, USA Taito-ku, Tokyo 110-8605 Japan Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Phone #: (1) 202 667-8227 Phone #: (81) 3-3834-2388 Fax #: (1) 202 667-8236 Fax #: (81) 3-3835-0519 Website: www.interacton.org Website: www.ngo-jvc.net

314 The Reality of Aid 2016 Report

ROA Members Directory

Japan ODA Reform Network-Kyoto Pacifc Asia Resource Center (PARC) Address: 2, 3F Toyo Bldg., 1-7-11 Kanda-Awaji- Japanese NGO Center for Internatonal cho, Asia Taiheiyo Shiryo Centre, Chiyoda-ku, Cooperaton (JANIC) Tokyo 101-0063, Japan Address: 5th Floor Avaco Building, 2-3-18 Email: [email protected] Nishiwaseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0051, Japan Phone #: (81) 3-5209-3455 Email: [email protected] Fax #: (81) 3-5209-3453 Phone #: (81) 3-5292-2911 Website: www.parc-jp.org Fax #: (81) 3-5292-2912 Website: www.janic.org.en People’s Solidarity for Partcipatory Democracy ODA Watch Korea Address: 132 Tongin-Dong, Jongno-Gu,Seoul, Address: 110-240 #503 Dong-Shin Bldg., 139-1 110-043, Anguk-dong, Jongno-gu, Seoul, Korea South of Korea Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]/ [email protected] Phone #: (82) 2-518-0705 Phone #: (82) 2 723 5051 Fax #: (82) 2-761-0578 Fax #: (82) 2 6919 2004 Website: www.odawatch.net Website: www.peoplepower21.org/English

315