Number 27 July 2004 Humanitarian Practice Network

HPNManaged by Humanitarian Humanitarian Policy Group Exchange

In this issue Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI Famine response 2 Hunger and poverty in Ethiopia: local perceptions of famine and famine At the World Food Conference in response www.alertnet.org Njuguna/courtesy ©Reuters/Antony 1974, governments proclaimed 6 ‘Famines’ or ‘mass starvations’: victims, beneficiaries and perpetrators that ‘every man, woman and 8 Food insecurity and aid policies in child has the inalienable right Ethiopia to be free from hunger and 12 Local famines, global food insecurity malnutrition in order to develop 16 Famine (again) in Ethiopia? their physical and mental facul- 19 Ethiopia 2003: towards a broader ties’. They promised that, public nutrition approach within a decade, ‘no child 22 When will Ethiopia stop asking for would go hungry’. food aid? Ten years later, in Ethiopia, Practice and policy notes between 800,000 and a million 25 Humanitarian relief and the media: making the relationship more effective people died in one of the worst 27 Improving NGO coordination: lessons famines in the country’s modern history. and environmental factors makes the task from the Bam earthquake The scale and severity of the famine of famine prevention far from easy. 30 Children’s feedback committees in eventually triggered an unprecedented Zimbabwe: an experiment in international response. Such events as Significant advances have been made, in accountability Band Aid and Live Aid marked the early warning and food security policy for 33 Civil society and Islamic aid in Iraq: moment when, for many, the world example, but new challenges such as unseen developments and threats woke up to the huge challenge of HIV/AIDS have emerged, and conflict and 36 Natural disasters amid complex political emergencies famine and food insecurity in the weak and poor governments remain key 39 Including the environment in world’s poorest countries. factors in allowing famines to continue. humanitarian assistance Three decades after the proclamations 44 Beyond the damage: probing the In Ethiopia today, much of the popu- and promises of the 1974 World Food economic and financial consequences lation is extremely and increasingly Conference, a major development theme of of natural disasters vulnerable. Most years bring famine the recent G-8 summit in the US was famine 48 Some myths about faith-based warnings and appeals for food aid in the Horn of Africa. Famine and the threat humanitarian aid from the government and interna- of it remain a shameful challenge to the About HPN tional aid agencies. This year, world. The Humanitarian Practice Network at the according to the Ethiopian govern- Overseas Development Institute is an ment, seven million people are The challenge to humanitarian organisa- independent forum where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian unable to feed themselves for the tions is to define an effective role in the face sector share information, analysis and whole year, and need 900,000 of famine in Ethiopia and elsewhere. The experience. The views and opinions expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily state or tonnes of food aid. special feature of this issue of Humanitarian reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy Group or Exchange takes Ethiopia as a focus to the Overseas Development Institute. According to Amartya Sen, consider the complex, often controversial

Britain’s leading independent ‘Famines are extremely easy to question of famine response. It explores the think-tank on international development prevent. It is amazing that they role of humanitarianism amongst all the and humanitarian issues actually take place, because various approaches and forms of action,

Overseas Development Institute they require a severe indiffer- and asks what humanitarian actors can do 111 Westminster Bridge Road ence on the part of the govern- to try to save lives and alleviate suffering. London SE1 7JD United Kingdom ment’. The term ‘famine crimes’ Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300 was used by Alex de Waal in Articles on a wide range of other humani- Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 relation to the causes of and tarian policy and practice issues are also HPN e-mail: [email protected] response to famine. However, presented in this issue. As always, we HPN website: www.odihpn.org the complex interaction of welcome submissions for publication, and political, social, economic your feedback on HPN’s publications. 2 FAMINE RESPONSE Hunger,death and poverty Famineexperiences repre- together – senting thebulk(86%)ofpopulation. Tigray – and country Southern the Oromia, of Amhara, regions main four the across locations 20 in out carried was 2003, September and July between conducted research, The aid. food and epidemics related famine, experienced have Ethiopia in people how explore to aimed which research on reports article This shortage. local how about food with cope and understand enough much settings different in people know Despite not do insecure. still we food research, considered million 15 were to up people 2003, In crises. security food faces still Ethiopia 1984, in famine devastating the Twentyafter years year or two, especially between 1999 and 2003, and some and 2003, and 1999 between especially two, or year bad a reported generally people 2004, and 1991 Between Foodsecurity oet, n dfeecs ewe ad ihn communi- ties. within and between differences and poverty, be on coping strategies, links between food insecurity and should focus the Instead, be famine. understanding in useful longer no may researchers, among and media the in both deaths, with preoccupation that suggest ‘famine’ to Differences ofopinionandahesitationtoattributedeaths dependent aid food and insecurity food chronic facing 3) affected,butnotregularly (seven); and 2) never affectedby foodproduction failures (four); 1) The 20locationscanbeclassifiedunderthree headings: is east, and north the in inthesouth. spreading, particularly largely be to assumed often famine, that suggests time. This first the for affected were locations southern and 1994, in affected been have would locations more many aid, food However, without 1994. in six and 1973 in four with compared locations, 14 affecting of famine. The 1984faminewasperceived tobetheworst, effects Only fourofthe20locationsescapedmortality Alula Pankhurst, Addis Ababa University,Bath Ababa of UniversityBevan,Addis Pankhurst,Philippa Alula and response famine and famine of perceptions local Ethiopia: in poverty and Hunger HUMANITARIAN who died’ who poverty,fromone suffered ‘People no of know I yet 1994]’ [in deaths werethere although famine, to due died has individual an that say to difficult is ‘It (nine). exchange also critical: are policies market and taxation since alone production production if even era, Derg a the during than better was However, EPRDF declined. continually that noted Haresaw in respondent have to perceived generally was production food – onwards) Front 1991 – (EPRDF Democratic Revolutionary People’s Ethiopian the and the (1974–91) 1973), Mengistu to under (up regime Derg Selassie communist Haile of reign Imperial the – regimes political three across security food Comparing perspective Historical Selling assets Selling hunger with Coping improved cultivated,seeds, irrigationandknowledge andNGOassistance. land in In and values. productivity in work increase of loss an aid, food by explained was security food better a contrast, and and conflict, policies indebtedness, development to increase, related issues population governance included factors Human products. was Other animal andplantdiseasesareduction oftrees andwild locations). insecurity (12 food weather quality,and size land in decrease a included factors natural the increasing by of mainly explained view general The insecurity food of Causes of theresearch. time the at good fairly seemed year, bad 2003 for trends while a generally clearly was 2002 Nonetheless, country. entire the over generalising in caution for need a is there variations, significant Givenproblems. continuous reported cally, while grain prices escalate rapidly. This means that means rapidly.This escalate prices grain while cally, livestock. selling However, infamineconditionspricesofcattlefalldramati- was sales asset for strategy main The ne te PD, hr i icesd production, areas’ faraway in famine about hear we increasedand is there EPRDF, Corporation; the Market under Agricultural the by taken was it but produce, sufficient was there Derg, the during (landlord); Balabat the by taken was it but product excess was there period, Imperial the ‘In would buy them?’ buy would who famine, the of middle the in However, price. less with sold were they famine, the the of at beginning Just bony. and thin became livestock ‘The FAMINE RESPONSE a wre Fo scrt i nt iie to limited not is security Food worse. was food security food under the under food FAMINE RESPONSE 3 Number Number 27 • 2004 July [fruit of wild cactus], and cactus], wild of [fruit beles crops crops was also reported, though in Gelcha, in the Southern both Region, begging and stealing considered to were be shameful. Theft may not be able to lend, rich and the may be less willing. are Children sometimes sent away to rela- tives. People borrowed money from the community, town traders and government agencies; but interest was high and credit limited during famines. Begging and stealing ‘Although people used to steal in the night before, during the famine people used to steal in the day-time’ Begging was locally and mentioned in nearby both towns, or especially by distant the old and livestock of Theft disabled. and the (false-banana) is the staple food, enset but bread, but , ‘They rarely or do not pancake] eat injera [a local staple ‘If there is shortage of food at home, the one who suffers is the woman. They give children. priority A to man their will go himself’ and get some food for meals were reduced from twice to once a day’ ‘Unemployed ‘Unemployed armed individuals houses during the night have time and when people are robbed on the way home from the markets’ Generally, Generally, men thought that women were more affected: they fed their family first and pregnant, needed good food while giving suggested that they are weak birth but work harder then men, and and support the family while men look for work locally or breast-feeding. migrate. In Others two locations, women reportedly walked long distances to get food or off-farm income. Reduced Reduced consumption and meal frequency and changes in diet were common. In meant cereal a cropping change areas, to this cabbage and potatoes, vegetables as well and as low-status foods. pulses, areas In where notably people ate the root pastoralist areas, a move from milk to cereals and blood not usually consumed, was mentioned. Wild foods were also consumed, though and in the poorest. in some locations, and only by rarely Food and Food diet The experiences of women, older people and babies was said to take market: place at night and on the way to A child plays in Adele Harerghe Keke, ‘Ask ‘Ask help from area/country? relatives Not often, in since only and a few have outside people relatives the with enough resources. borrowing but free gifts expecting reciprocity’ No more ‘During bella [lack of food for a short time], people work for others. During shantu [lack of food for a long time, such as a year], people migrate to other areas, particularly urban areas’ ‘Almost ‘Almost everybody started to cut trees for charcoal and firewood. cities nearest Especially the to firewood the carrying in involved the women They became the backbone of their families’ for sale. became Borrowing Borrowing food was reportedly common, neighbours and the rich. But relatives but also from relatives especially from Migration Migration was reported as the main work-related seasonal and daily wage and urban migration, including rural strategy, farms, and hiring out children work on state or private labour, as herders or domestic servants. households within Wage communities was labour reported as for limited to richer shorter crises; as conditions notably to worsen, towns. Seasonal people labour migration for go harvesting further, and coffee picking is a normal strategy and only intensifies under famine conditions. Irrigation is new and limited to is insufficient water to go round. few locations; there a Borrowing Work the sale of livestock People does also sold household assets, not gold and ‘even land’. provide food Trees, for firewood and long. charcoal were also sold, women: mainly by 4 FAMINE RESPONSE Famine, poverty and the rich the Famine,and poverty reduction the isequallydistributed. of five in affected be food that suggested it was threelocations only In villages. to said were elderly the mentioned and also were children and women locations the not equally distributed. Most mentioned adults, but in half were food in reductions that agreed generally Informants households within Foodallocation was alsonotedthattherichbetter resisted famine’s effects: richer got people that during famine.Somesaidthattherichlostmore stock,butit said respondents locations, 13 In from poverty tofamine: drought tofamine topoverty; afewidentifiedcausallink from progression the on up picked Most recognised. ally gener- was poverty and famine between connection The mothers search forfood,andaninabilitytoafford medicalfees. when care of lack were factors Other diseases. eat to resistance of lack to their and aid, food inability and foods famine their mothers, worst hungry from supply were of problems milk milk, for babies need regular their that to due affected recognised respondents All and frequently, more food foodfaster.young menateserved needed they food; chew to teeth lacked they that said Others programmes. work for food in participate not could and work, or food for looking larly affected,mainlybecausetheycouldnotmove around werepeople older particu- that respondentsthought Most HUMANITARIAN both good and bad times’ bad and good both during food available the share to is tradition ‘Our aae o rdc dogtrssat crops they Thus, yam. drought-resistant cassava, potato, sweet produce including to manage they more; cultivate oxen have who farmers ‘Rich poverty’ with do to irregular. and unreliable lot a have that factors basic the been were events These has rain rain; of shortage a been has there time, long a For rainfed. fundamentally is Agriculture livelihood. of means community,our ‘In important sole the is agriculture famine’ to vulnerability all resources leadingtopoverty. This inturncreates finishes which famine, is there drought of times ‘In cannot also mothers milk’ no has Their breast the since children their breastfeed eat. to and nothing disease having of because affected highly are ‘Babies as they could not bear to see their starving children’ suicide committed people where cases were ‘There food’ for women the on depends family whole The charcoal. and firewood selling and collecting like work off-farm in engaged are women drought, the ‘During exchange Famine and conflict Famineand Foodaid Interventions to conflictwithinhouseholds: no reported leading potentially as locations reported also was Seven Famine conflict. food. over disputes and hunger to owing tolerance reduced firewood, and water for competition food, and livestock of theft of result a as In more than half of the 20 locations, conflict was reported es ad rvne lvsok ae, ae aor and labour wage sales, out-migration. livestock prevented and ness, indebted- reduced death, from people saved aid food rity, insecu- food chronic from suffering locations nine needy.In most the towards targeted was it 2003, in looted; was and in aid 1983–84 wastoolate;in1994,itinsufficienttogoround food Region, Oromia Haro, Oda In even locations. and within between vary Patterns 2000. around beginning others in years, many nine back going fromcase one in reported communities, was aid food on dependence Regular tion, nepotismandtheft. corrup- through aid food manipulated militia and officials, local traders, rates; interest high at money and food lent and prices low at property bought Individuals mentioned. was enrichment of source a as aid food for potential The capi- better: talise onhavingsurvived may rich the period, post-famine the in Moreover, with his wife, children and cattle. He lacks patience’ lacks He cattle. and children wife, his with quarrels and angry becomes he working family the after in food, hours get not does person a if ‘Yes, other’ each kill people and disappointment be would there themselves, for it have protect they not when and “haves”, the from steal they do who Those not. who have people who and between have conflict be will there ‘Yes, dead or we would have become labourers’ become have would we or dead been have all would we aid, food no was there ‘If aid’ food receives community ‘Even in seasons where food is relatively secure, the become richer during famines in a short cut way’ cut short a in famines during richer become village officials and administrators. for They and others true is This benefit. personal own their for aid aid the manipulate through corruption and nepotism. Some get a lot of who people some are There aid. food been always has there famines, ‘During hungry’ the from prices cheaper at property and livestock and buy famine the survive can rich were who ‘Those of period the famine’ and drought in survive could and more benefit FAMINE RESPONSE 5 , Food and Famine Number Number 27 • 2004 July works in the Wellbeing in Developing Wellbeing works in the is a member of the Department of (Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 2001). for Social Studies, (Addis Ababa: Forum Philippa Bevan than ‘famine’, moving away from a preoccupation in the media and academia with famine deaths to take a to poverty. food security relates view of how broader poverty have a and individuals and involved, households processes are considerable understanding of actively the engaged in struggles to survive and Given prosper. options, people are able choices, to make and appropriate should be modalities of assistance. making on types and involved more in decision- in the way it is delivered. Issues of timely delivery, the effects on local production and exchange, variation and nutrition of food aid-based diets, especially for pregnant and lactating women and babies, unfair distribution and misuse should be given more attention, and innovative ways of ensuring food security, in should be explored. which say, more have local people should not conflict with local labour needs and priori- ties at peak times, the useful work by local people, should must be voluntary be and should considered not alienate or damage resources, or undermine indi- vidual and community initiatives. social status and individual potential, should interventions be fine-tuned to defined suit and local managed conditions, by and local simply people, rather following than blueprints. regional international, national or even gation gation schemes took over people’s land, and the coffee- the water. poisoned machine processing Policy Policy conclusions implications: policy with findings key five raises research This • We should be talking about hunger and poverty rather • People and communities affected by hunger and • aid is an important problems Food are cushion, but there • Food for work and employment generation schemes • Given significant variations in ecology, livelihoods, Alula Pankhurst Sociology and Anthropology at Ethiopia. Addis His Ababa email University, address net.et. is alulapankhurst@telecom. Countries ESRC Research Group at the University of Bath, UK. is [email protected]. email address Her The research described in Wellbeing in this Developing Countries ESRC-funded article project at was the University part of Bath, with collaborators from Bangladesh, of the Peru, Thailand and Ethiopia. The full paper and a summary briefing on the comparative research in the four countries can be found at www.welldev.org.uk. Destitution in Ethiopia’s NortheasternDestitution in Highlands Ethiopia’s (Amhara National Famine Famine and Survival Strategies: A Case Study from Northeast Ethiopia Food Security and Sustainable Livelihoods in Ethiopia Food (Brighton and Addis Ababa: Institute for Development Studies/Save the Children UK, the Children 2003). Studies/Save (Brighton and Addis Ababa: Institute for Development ‘Airport ‘Airport construction and irrigation schemes were some of the employment [EGSs]. Now generation there are no EGSs in the community’ schemes ‘Negative ‘Negative aspects arise when people incentive (food) seek before they involve in development for an for bad is It community. the benefit that programmes people to wait for an incentive before they work for their own wellbeing. They could have done it out of self-initiation’ ‘The community is distribution’ aid engaged food is there whenever programmes in food for work ‘For ‘For those lazy fellows who depend on the food aid it has a negative of type this from them pull to aid permanent a want aspect. Hard-working farmers life for ever’ Dessalegn Rahmato, 1987). Research, 1 (Addis Ababa: Institute of Development Monograph Kay Amare, Sharp, Stephen Devereaux and Yared Regional State) Regional Yared Amare (ed.), Amare Yared References and further reading References Employment Employment generation schemes reported in four regu- larly food-aid dependent locations include road and other construction, terracing, irrigation, tree nurseries coffee-processing and a machine. incomes, environmental rehabilitation and Advantages a reduction in were migration. Negative aspects were that the airport and irri- cash Food Food aid was generally reported as work’ linked programmes. Benefits to were that people could ‘food work for locally rather than migrating, that some work was useful (soil conservation, ponds, forestry) work and spirit, encouraged and a that people development. Major constraints participated were conflicts with other in their own labour needs and people’s own priorities at peak times, low payments and the late arrival of food. Not everyone is and the work was often compulsory. involved, Employment Employment generation Food for Food work Four Four occasionally food-aid dependent locations reported that some people sold aid to buy cigarettes, and that low grain prices may affect merchants. food-insecure In most locations, chronically distribution was unfair perceived as because of delays or corruption, incorrect reporting. nepotism, Other reasons included mentioned discrimination inefficiency, against the ‘rich’, older or poorer people; people ‘cheating’ through and high NGO salaries. double registration; The negative effects of food aid included long-term depen- and God. on oneself reliance and reduced laziness dency, 6 FAMINE RESPONSE by experts, withoutconsultation withthoseinvolved.by experts, implemented are are They technologised. and Malthus, depoliticised on based responses the like responses, These entitlements. lost replace to developed be could example, plans for accepted, was So, entitlements of it. notion Sen’s once correct to intervene to wrong then went The and what identify right. to putting is response needs appropriate and collapsed has system benign otherwise An problem. managerial or technical a as appears it failure, a as identified is something When still unexpected‘emergencies’. a be could famines product that possibility the or consider breakdown not did of Sen entitlements. person’s a idea of time this the collapse, food of retained failure a he as production, famine of moved notion Sen the although from First, away reasons. two for not, did have could and Howeverit studies. radical, famine to approach new a produced potentially was work Sen’s limitations their and responses Technologised relations withinasociety. entitlement of forms other and ownership on attention focused it Finally, households. or ‘persons’ mode, specific Malthusian but the in ‘populations’ at not looked it particularity.Second, own its in famine each examine to be could need the stressedfood. This into converted or for traded that owned person a assets the or tlements, enti- of questions but food of quantities not emphasised Sen’swork food. sufficient to access had households or was; what was crucial was individuals whether particular area any in head per supply food total the what matter was not necessary for a famine to occur. It did not ability’ avail- ‘food called he what in decline a that argued Sen Sen. Amartya by challenged being was view this 1980s, early the By it. upon relies that population the longer support no can land The scarcity. of conditions in to leads largely example, for drought through production, food of failure understood were Malthusian terms: as natural disasters that occur when a famines Historically, theory entitlements and Sen has remained elusive. ‘famine’ of meaning the Yet at. looking are they is it what know they until famine of causes the study to begin cannot Analysts famine. a actually is place taking is what that convinced are they unless act motivatedto be cannot Donors action. and analysis to preliminary essential an as is be. Many writers see the search for an adequate definition what establish might causes its what determine to to and famine by attempts meant many been have There Jenny Edkins, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK of Wales,Aberystwyth, University Edkins, Jenny perpetrators and beneficiaries victims, starvations’: ‘mass ‘Famines’or HUMANITARIAN exchange of the social or economic system; famines are famines system; economic or social the of David Keen – has directly examined the strategies of the of strategies the examined directly has suffering – Keen David those that – writer one Only stages. different at strategies employ famine from coping the and process, examined a as famine of Waal notion de the developed Alex have as such writers work, Rangasami’s Since while of thecommunity, victims, istomisswhatgoingon. of strategies rest the of inaction) (or actions the to attention no paying coping the or of responses section the one only study To to other’. the to flow accrue losses while community ‘benefits which in one be cannot famine Second, defined solely with reference to the victims. The process is is famine. it a die, people still before nonetheless halted is the process the of If death. culmination and disease of The stage final the before well comes mortality.process and ‘famishment’ dearth, stages: three economic comprising and oppression social of process political, protracted a as seen of be condition necessary should a Famine culmination. biological its only not but famine is she mortality First, that definition. argues this questions Rangasami Amrita festation ofstarvation causingwidespread death’. mani- virulent particularly ‘A was: famine of definition His breakdown. a and as famine saw which and factors, demographic biological on others focused like mid-1980s, which, the in famine current of definition a retained Sen starvations Repoliticisingmass from itsintendedbeneficiariestoothers. food of diversion the 1984, in Ethiopia in happened or,as starve, streets police the on people the while shops food is protecting it whether force, are by people food to some access famine denied a During starve. community, others the while of the sections uphold certain to of used rights is ownership state the the which of in violence way legitimate the question not does Sen addition, society concerned. Both routinely occur during famines. In the of system legal the outside fall that those are which transfers’, ‘non-entitlement calls he what and starvation deliberate of instances excludes approach His non-violent. entitlements and benign ultimately as state the and what of view limited economics, fromseparable as politics sees Sen is. politics his Sen’s in of lies potential blunted was radical approach the why reason second The terms Malthusian in largely understood historically,were famines FAMINE RESPONSE 7

©Reuters/Antony Njuguna/courtesy www.alertnet.org . Crime is not ‘ended’: If mass starvation is a 2 Number Number 27 • 2004 July committed , they are happen Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views Accounts and Critical Century of Genocide: Eyewitness once mass starvations are considered crimes, parallels can be made with other crimes like genocide or war crimes These questions are taken from S. Totten, W.S. Parsons and I.W. Parsons W.S. Totten, S. taken from These questions are 2 Charny, Garland, 1997), substituting ‘famine’York: (New for ‘genocide’. solutions, but one perpetrators, bystanders, victims of and survivors. Using the responsibility, criminal liability, language of genocide, appropriate who questions committed the become: famine?; how, and why?; who the victims?; were who was involved? crime, the appropriate language should be used. Crimes do not criminals are deterred, detained and prosecuted. deterred, criminals are No one has yet been prosecuted for committing mass star- vation, but there are prospects that this may happen with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome Statute that forms the basis of the ICC explicitly includes mass starvation under three headings. It is a war crime if it is used as humanity, if a it weapon is the of deliberate extermination war; of a a civilian crime population by the against deprivation of food; and a genocide, if it is carried out with the intention of destroying in whole or in part group. or religious a national, ethnic, racial Article 8 of the Statute defines as a war crime ‘Intentionally using starvation of civilians as depriving them a of method objects indispensable of to warfare their survival, by An Ethiopian woman carries firewood in Sekota, Ethiopia, May 2003 1 Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Famine (Oxford: James Currey, 1997). James Currey, (Oxford: Alex de Waal, Waal, Alex de in Africa 1 If it is accepted that mass starvation is the result of a series of small acts, at least some of them deliberate and carried some out with the intention of producing outcome, precisely this then it is question of possible responsibility. to Alex begin phrase ‘famine de crimes’, and has to suggested that Waal a possible explore has the used solution would the be ‘anti-famine contracts’and people. between If such a political is contract in place, ‘famine is rulers is deterred’. a political scandal. Famine Attributing responsibility Once mass starvations are considered crimes, can parallels be made with crimes. other This crimes changes the like vocabulary. When genocide genocide discussed, is or it war is not so much a question of causes and Such political contracts may seem more likely in cratic demo- political regimes it However, is important to avoid concluding that than democ- in racy prevents famine, since this authoritarian risks reinstating a grand ones. anti- framing importantavoid also to is It famine. of theory famine contracts as simply ments that fail to respond measures quickly enough to an emerging against govern- crisis: to say this would be to return to and disaster. the breakdown failure, language of To study mass starvations in this way is to is way this in starvations mass study To examine how they come small actions about, or what inactions happen, and make who exactly them the beneficia- ries and the victims are. It requires close investigation rather than grand general It theory. means addressing minutiae or details. The histo- rian of the Nazi genocides, Raul Hilberg, adopts precisely this approach: ‘In all my work I have never begun by asking the big questions, because I was always afraid that I would come up with small answers ... I look at the process ... as a series of minute steps’. Such questions reinstate mass starva- tions as a political relationships process, of power involving between people and between groups (not just between people and commodities, as in entitle- ments theory). inevitably Social power relations relations. power is not centralised and are possessed, However, but dispersed. produced on a Power day-to-day basis through relations the small-scale are actions and interactions of individual people. beneficiaries beneficiaries of famine: its perpetrators and its bystanders. famine in In Sudan, Keen asks: ‘What his use study is famine, what functions does it assure, of is it integrated?’. in what strategies including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for through the acts or omissions of people or groups of under the Geneva Conventions’. At present, this applies only people. These people are responsible for famine and mass when starvation takes place in international conflict. Article starvation – and they should be held accountable. There is 7 defines ‘extermination’ as a crime against humanity ‘when already an embryonic provision in international law which committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack allows for the prosecution of those responsible for mass directed against any civilian population’ where ‘“extermina- starvations. Rather than assuming goodwill and unanimity tion” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, in the project of ending famine, it might be as well to inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, consider campaigning to improve these provisions and to calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a popula- remove impunity from those who, nationally or internation- tion’. Genocide is defined in Article 6, and includes ‘deliber- ally, commit famine crimes or the crime of mass starvation. ately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to This would take place alongside action to establish robust bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’. The anti-starvation political contracts locally. term ‘conditions of life’ is further defined as including ‘delib- erate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, Jenny Edkins is Senior Lecturer in International Politics at such as food or medical services, or systematic expulsion the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. She is the author of from homes’. Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). Conclusion A longer version of this article appeared as ‘Mass Any definition of famine which sees it as a failure of some Starvations and the Limitations of Famine Theorising’, IDS sort is missing the point. Whether famine is seen as a Bulletin, vol. 33, no. 4, October 2002. failure of food supply, a breakdown in the food distribu- tion system, or a multi-faceted livelihoods crisis, the outcome is the same. These definitions or concepts blind References and further reading us to the fact that famines, and the deaths, migrations or impoverishments that they produce, are enormously Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on beneficial to the perpetrators: they are a success not a Entitlements and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, failure, a normal output of the current economic and polit- 1981). ical system, not an aberration. Amrita Rangasami, ‘Failure of Exchange Entitlements Theory of Famine’, Economic and Political Weekly, 20, This article suggests that it might be useful to replace the nos 41, 42. notion of famine with the phrase ‘mass starvations’. This might help to get away from the idea of scarcity as a cause Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster and famines as a breakdown or failure. To talk of mass star- Relief Industry in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 1997). vations is to evoke the parallel of mass killings and geno- W. A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International cides. Famines, though clearly distinct from genocides, Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University share more with these acts than they do with natural disas- Press, 2001). ters. In many cases they are the result of deliberate actions by people who can see what the consequences will be. In David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy Ethiopia, for example, there is little doubt that the damaging of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983–1989 effects that some of the tactics of the war have had on food (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). production and distribution could have been predicted, and Simon Devereux, ‘Famine in the Twentieth Century’, IDS may have been intended. If famines are not produced delib- Working Paper (105). erately, then they are often allowed to progress beyond the stage of ‘famishment’ to ‘morbidity’. Claude Lanzmann, Shoah: The Complete Text of the Acclaimed Holocaust Film (New York: Da Capo Press, Famines are not caused by abstractions, such as food 1995). supply or entitlement failure – they are brought about

Food insecurity and aid policies in Ethiopia Jerome Frignet, Action Contre la Faim

The famine forecast for 2002–2003 put Ethiopia once In the event, the 2002–2003 food crisis did not have the again – albeit briefly – on the international front pages. feared lethal intensity, though it was still exceptional in Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s com- terms of numbers involved: at the end of 2002, the UN parisons with the situation in 1984–85 were duly relayed spoke of perhaps 15 million people ‘threatened’ by by the media, yet the circumstances of these two crises famine. All the attention and resources of the interna- are so different that a repetition now seems almost tional community were directed towards emergency

FAMINE RESPONSE FAMINE inconceivable. response, mainly food distribution. 8 HUMANITARIANexchange FAMINE RESPONSE 9 harvest, Meher Number Number 27 • 2004 July In 2003, the area most seriously affected by 1 Paradoxically, Paradoxically, a good year can undermine 2 the FAO still the estimates FAO that 7.2m people might be short of food reflecting reflecting in part climatic conditions. the dependence of farming on the absence of market effective regulation and a trans- port and storage deficit areas. towards surpluses to be directed infrastructure that could allow inputs. These are supplied on credit, which can cause repayment problems due to the of vagaries production and the absence of a price. guaranteed minimum selling producers, causing them to sell at a loss to repay their debts, which will mean reduced production capacity year. the following land) acts as a brake on rational land management by farmers. 1 Interviews with participants missions in the joint needs assessment in that area. and Surplus Disruption in Cash Crop Guinand, ‘Livelihood Yves 2 2002. Unit for Ethiopia, August Emergencies Areas’, Producing The assessment of accounting for 95% the of the total 2003–2004 illustrates national this cereal output, incoherence. While official statistics the joint and (FAO/WFP/DPPC/donor) assessment predicted a bumper crop, subsequent analyses of the country’s grain markets by the Central Statistical Authority concur on harvest a on a par with the average for the last ten Estimates years. vary from 8.5m to equivalent to a 11.8m margin of error tonnes of nearly 50%. of Estimated cereals, food aid requirements reflect this uncertainty: the while speaking of a still ‘record crop’, estimates that 7.2m FAO, people might be short of food million tonnes. – There a is, deficit in of other around words, underestimation a a fear of that needs an – restoring confidence in agricultural policy perhaps – could lead to in the catastrophe. hope of the nutritional crisis, Sidama zone in the SNNPR, was not one of the regions usually threatened with famine; it had not been considered especially vulnerable which in meant the past, that needs were was problematic. of beneficiaries mated, and the targeting spectacularly underesti- Shifting the policy focus Countrywide food self-sufficiency has long been a primary political and economic objective for Ethiopia: cropping and herding account for around 50% of gross domestic product and 70% of exports; since government the has been mid-1990s, trying to the make agricultural Ethiopian develop- While Ethiopia ment economic has drive development. come closer to this its aim has overall of not self-sufficiency, led to in food insecurity: an automatic reduction • Annual variations in production are still considerable, • cause significant price fluctuations, in These variations • The government has encouraged systematic use of • The lack of security of tenure (the state still owns the into other forms of result, Ethiopia has one of the largest world’s food international aid assistance. As programmes, a but the lowest rate Africa. of capita in Sub-Saharan official aid per situations. or recurring for chronic between temporary needs (in response to This food deficits). needs (structural crisis) and chronic a one-off means identical responses to fundamentally different problems. sarily suited to real nutritional needs. This gives illusion the of an effective solution, while masking persis- tent problems. and consequent food aid needs remains cumbersome, complex and plagued by disparate methodologies and This regional interpretations. damages its effectiveness and coherence. shortages and distribution were designed for farming regions, and are much less relevant to pastoral areas (where early warning systems do always exist). not, in any case, • Short-term emergency operations are not appropriate • Until 2003, calls for food aid made no distinction • The food rations that are distributed are not neces- • the process of assessing Finally, crops, regional deficits • Emergency food and aid eats is both visible and costly, • assessment of food The mechanisms for early warning, These evaluation and response mechanisms enable fairly large amounts of aid to be mobilised. risk, and it would unshakeable faith in them is not without However, placing on them alone: to rely be dangerous Since the ‘hidden famine’ of 1973–74, the Ethiopian govern- ment has tried to develop an early warning and emergency response system that would lead the way in sub-Saharan Africa. The system’s growing openness and transparency since the fall of the Mengistu regime better support from has international donors. In ensured 2003, pledges much exceeded 90% of the 1.7m tonnes requested. About 50% of distributions were arranged government also has emergency stocks of by around 200,000 the tons, allowing it government. to make up for the traditional tardiness of The international contributions. The mechanism is running rela- tively well; given the generous international or mass famine. widespread can avoid response, it ‘Model’ warning and emergency response mechanisms? Should Should we simply rejoice that, 20 years on, early warning large- far that a so progressed systems have and response scale famine is no longer a major risk in a country that so neatly symbolises hunger in Western eyes? Or should we also ask questions immense food insecurity in a relatively about peaceful country? the It seems persistence that the of attention emergency response paid mechanisms, such vital to as they early are, may warning and have diverted minds away from more fundamental issues about the persistence of food insecurity and how to deal with it. The bulk of aid focuses on short-term responses; the deeper causes of food insecurity are largely ignored due to lack of political will on the part of the government, policy of donors. reactive and the essentially than 40m head of large livestock and the same number again of small ruminants. The food security strategy also makes the link between so-called ‘transi- tory’ food shortages and ‘chronic’ deficits. It stresses the need to develop a preventive approach in the medium to long term, while reinforcing short- term response capacity.

This development is important, and needs to go further: often, massive so-called ‘emergency’ responses are implemented ©Jerome Frignet, ACFFrignet,©Jerome with no thought for the more fundamental approaches that they end up smothering. Genuine coordination between these approaches, all of which Livestock in Afar region, where ACF is supporting an animal health network are needed in Ethiopia, is essential.

A new approach is needed to the issue of food security, To take one example: in Afar region, Action Contre la Faim designed to guarantee self-sufficiency at household level, (ACF) is supporting a Community-based Animal Health thereby reducing the risk of temporary shortfalls. With (CBAH) network. This multi-year project is based on cost this in mind, the Ethiopian government reworked the food recovery, and is designed to operate independently. At the security strategy framework in 2002. It has set out four same time, recurrent crises in the region periodically objectives: require an emergency response. As things stand, it may be necessary to proceed with a mass campaign of free Improving food availability by increasing crop and vaccination and livestock treatment, even though this animal production goes against the cost-recovery and self-financing princi- • Developing irrigation (3% of cultivated land is currently ples of the CBAH system. However, it is possible to limit under irrigation) and water points in pastoral areas. the contradictions by establishing strict criteria, common • Soil conservation and fodder plantations in pastoral to all agencies in the region, before an emergency situa- areas. tion is declared; restricting the length of the emergency • Diversifying crop and animal production, encouraging programme to the barest minimum (typically, one month); specialisation in accordance with ecological characteris- involving ‘long-term’ stakeholders (the herders from the tics (promoting vegetable production in dryland areas). CBAH system) in designing and implementing the • Intensifying cropping through the use of inputs programme; and raising beneficiaries’ awareness of the (improved seeds, fertilizer, animal or mechanical usefulness of the veterinary service, and the fact that its traction, pest control). being provided free of charge is exceptional (not easy, of • Strengthening extension services. course). Where these principles are not put into practice, the CBAH system suffers long-term effects: in Afar zone 1 Improving access to food by increasing farm and off- in 2003, for example, massive free drug distributions farm income saturated the market and ruined the CBAH system. • Developing ‘safety net’ programmes to limit the erosion of productive capacity in the event of crisis. The failure of market mechanisms is also an important • Promoting income diversification. factor in food insecurity. At the end of 2000, in anticipa- • Improving credit and market mechanisms. tion of a bumper crop, the price of grain in the producing • Improving access to micro-credit mechanisms. regions collapsed to record lows (at times, well below production costs) for over a year.3 This impoverished Improving health services producers, who were unable to meet their credit commit- ments, and made them extremely vulnerable in the next Improving access to land through voluntary relocation cropping season – which turned out to be a disaster. At out of areas of chronic food insecurity the end of 2003, anticipating another bumper harvest and therefore the possible repetition of this process, the These new guidelines acknowledge the critical importance government established a floor price slightly above the of animal production, and the need to develop a coherent policy in this sector. Ethiopia’s livestock population is the 3 The source for this information is the Ethiopian Grain Trade

FAMINE RESPONSE FAMINE largest in Africa, with, according to FAO estimates, more Enterprise (EGTE) Cereal Price Monitoring System.

10 HUMANITARIANexchange FAMINE RESPONSE 11 , January Food Food Security Number Number 27 • 2004 July Availability Availability of Cereals for Local is Ethiopia Desk Officer for Action Contre Crop Crop and Food Supply Assessment , March 2004. , March , March 2002. , March Strategy SIDA/WFP/EC, Purchase FAO/WFP, References and further reading References Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2004. Ethiopia Network on Food Security report, FEWS NET, 2004. February Yves Guinand, ‘Livelihood Disruption in Cash Crop and Unit Emergencies Areas’, Surplus for Producing Ethiopia, August 2002. already already been launched, with no real support from inter- national donors. While it is far too resettlement early policy as to a whole, judge as it this is designed to last three years and will have an impact serious over many problems more, have already certain started relocation to sites, appear at especially including health problems, malnutrition in and a failure to Oromo region, prepare sites before families arrive. This will turn probably out to be one of the most important humanitarian the coming months. issues in Ethiopia over Conclusion The experience of 2003 underlines the persistent need for food aid, and widespread crisis it when it is properly its Yet implemented. ability to ward also illustrates the off weakness of an aid system based on a major or anticipating needs emergency (always a risky and uncer- tain exercise), and the counter-productive lack medium-term effects of aid. of Can the understanding of international the community confine itself to responding to annual appeals whose main virtue is that they send the mass of Ethiopian farmers back to oblivion until the next warnings of ‘record famine’? It is thought that core’ a of ‘hard around five million people will require food aid in any one Another two or year, three million may need food aid, even in whatever the good years, climatic because an earlier crisis conditions. has affected their means of of population production. Given 2.7% growth a year, recurrent climatic problems and better geograph- ical coverage by early warning systems, the number of beneficiaries can be expected to rise beyond ten or even 15m in bad years. This is a pattern that urgently needs breaking, not least because, one donor day, fatigue or a less favourable geopolitical context may fatally hinder the emergency provision of food to 15m need. dire Ethiopians in Jerome Frignet la Faim. His lafaim.org. email address is jfrignet@actioncontre- 4 the failure of market mechanisms is an important factor in food insecurity 4 Interviews 2004 in Addis Ababa. in March The final and most controversial aspect of this policy is the voluntary transfer, over households three affected years, by of chronic 440,000 dramatic failure of food similar experiments in the insecurity. 1980s, as The well as comparable projects in other countries, invites scepticism. Political altered since conditions the 1980s: the have government sises the voluntary now nature of the plan, the empha- occurrence of undoubtedly spontaneous relocations that need to be supervised and supported and, finally, the regional intra- nature of (rather the planned than population movements. inter-) Above all, the government says that these transfers are now are concerned people the as inasmuch unavoidable, dependent on food aid for their survival, prospect with of no regaining real their self-reliance. Projects have The food security strategy also acknowledges the need to provide small farmers with greater security of tenure (without going so far remains as taboo). privatising This the is land, between a which the major government bone and of donors, for whom the absence the of land private ownership contention main international will always be a hindrance. In the absence of an adequate transport and marketing infrastructure, a solvent market government capacity in to implement deficit a price stabilisation areas and system, the only agencies alternative to would buy locally, in be surplus distribute in for deficit areas, areas. The main in donors Western would order have to to agree among themselves to Union has adopted a local purchasing policy since do 1996, so: the European whereas the US, constrained by its own legislation, uses its own grain surpluses as aid. Moreover, this would in effect put foreign agencies in the position of acting regulator as of Ethiopian grain markets, perpetuating the economy. dependency of the country’s producers’ This cost appears price. average to be a logical counterpart the since production, of intensified to a policy idea is to ‘guarantee’ small producers a minimum return on their investment. the However, system was not tested this year, because prices naturally intervention held up price. above the According experts, this policy to is unrealistic in any some government does case, not have the since means to the intervene international on an adequate scale in the event of a collapse in prices unless it has support from donors. unlikely Donors are, however, to want to get involved in what looks Ethiopian like a subsidy farming, to even West. common in the though such practices are Local famines, global food insecurity Roger Persichino, Action Against Hunger-USA

In early 2004, the Food and Agricultural Organisation famines as such, but rather of vulnerabilities that, espe- (FAO)’s Food Outlook report estimated that 38 countries cially when recurring over time, point to famine processes were in need of exceptional food assistance, the same at work. number as in 2003, about 15% more than in 2001 and 2002, and the highest since 1984. This list is noteworthy Overall, 53 countries have required exceptional assis- less for what it includes (the majority of affected countries tance over the last six years: 29 in Africa (more than half are in Africa) than for what it leaves out, in particular the continent’s states), 14 in Asia, eight in Latin America China and India where, by the FAO’s own assessment, in (75% from Central America and the Caribbean) and two in the State of Food Insecurity 2003, about 70% of the Europe (Serbia and Russia – the northern Caucasus). As world’s undernourished people live. In other words, the Figure 1 shows, the trend is steady overall for all conti- FAO’s list says more about state capacity and/or recourse nents except Africa, where requirements for food assis- to international assistance than it does about actual food tance have risen noticeably. needs. It thus tells only one part of the story. To tell the full story, we need to take a closer look at the local dynamics of famine and the political and economic fifty-three countries have processes that influence it. This report argues that a focus on countries, rather than regions or specific areas, is a required exceptional assistance significant weakness. Famines are local, never national, over the last six years phenomena.

General geographic patterns The FAO’s publications yield consistent and useful data: Twenty-five of these countries have required exceptional since 1996, Food Outlook has listed countries requiring food assistance every year since 1998 (see Table 1). This ‘exceptional food assistance’; since 2000, it has also indicates sustained high levels of food insecurity. given the main reasons leading to such food insecurity. Exceptional food assistance is defined by evaluating The causes of famines those food requirements that will not be met by national There is a wide range of views on what actually causes production and government intervention, for instance a famines. Since 2000, FAO has given a country-by-country strategic grain reserve and/or government purchase. The indication of posited reasons why food assistance is list of countries affected is therefore not indicative of required. These fall broadly into four categories: natural

Figure 1: Exceptional food assistance requirements, 1998–2004

30 Africa 25

Asia 20

South and 15 Latin America

10 Europe Number of affected countries 5 Oceania 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 FAMINE RESPONSE FAMINE

12 HUMANITARIANexchange FAMINE RESPONSE 13 Conflict Economic Natural Other Number Number 27 • 2004 July Figure Figure 2 shows two clear First, Asian features and South American of food insecurity is mostly famine patterns. related to economic issues (dependency on monoculture in Latin America; the nature of economic policies in Haiti, Tajikistan and Mongolia) and regular natural disasters or unreliable weather. Second, African and European food insecurity appears to be essentially related to conflict and a high caseload of caveats vulnerable to populations. There this are analysis, example, capture of the course; primary importance it issues in recurring food of requirements in does But Madagascar. economic not, for it does indicate that two factors usually combine to deter- mine structural vulnerabilities and chronically high food insecurity. The different between Africa and on Europe the combination one hand, and is, Asia and Latin America on the other. however, strikingly Latin America In several 1 Africa Asia Total South and Europe 0% 80% 60% 40% 20% 100% Figure 2: Patterns of high food insecurity, of high 2: Patterns 2000–2004 Figure Guinea Uganda Tajikistan Ethiopia Tanzania Mongolia Eritrea Sudan North Korea Congo Rep. Somalia Iraq DRCLeone Sierra Georgia Burundi Liberia Afghanistan Haiti Serbia Angola Kenya Armenia El Salvador Russia Africa (14) Asia (7) America Latin Europe FAO considers that caseloads of vulnerable populations (refugees, considers that caseloads of vulnerable FAO IDPs etc.) constitute a direct requirement for exceptional food for exceptional IDPs requirement etc.) constitute a direct 1 underlying and causes are that real assistance. It could be argued from populations actually results that the existence of vulnerable categorisation. underlying causes, but this article the FAO retains Table 1: Countries insecurity high food by affected 1998 since Table disasters; economic issues crisis (an in Latin international America, economic coffee policy and Tajikistan); civil in strife; Zimbabwe and other causes (refugees in Tanzania and Guinea, IDPs/ returnees in Serbia and Montenegro, returnees instances, more than one in cause is given, for drought instance Angola). and internal Eritrea. displacement The in data allows Ethiopia for famine causes and since 2000, a as estimated by This FAO. is crude presentation of 2. described in Figure In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s unexpected of restricted resources for instance, or because logistical electoral defeat in May 2004 was in part explained by the problems impede adequate redistribution of food among discontent of a rural population affected by drought and markets. Rural populations are highly vulnerable to income high levels of indebtedness.2 This suggests that rural variations related to crop prices that are set externally. This voters feared that the BJP’s policies were threatening the is especially true in economies that rely heavily on export social compact that has prevented large-scale lethal crops such as cotton, coffee or cocoa, as in Central America famines in India for the past half-century. This would be in or Africa. Cyclical variations in commodity prices lead to line with the analysis here, which suggests that natural recurring falls in both employment and income, in turn phenomena and economic policy issues are of primary leading to decreased capacity to purchase food. concern in Asia. This can be compensated for through welfare programmes Famines, entitlements and emerging political and/or redistribution. But in the absence of successful complexes poverty eradication, such measures do not affect the issues FAO’s assessment is indicative of needs, not of actual that underpin this structural vulnerability to high food inse- assistance delivered. In that sense, it does not show those curity. Furthermore, poverty eradication, even when moder- countries where government intervention could single- ately successful, is unevenly distributed geographically, as handedly address food insecurity, but has not done so. shown in India, Brazil and China.

A further limitation is that the FAO does its analysis on a Mark Duffield has defined ‘emerging political complexes’ country basis. This does not take into account the highly as areas characterised by warlordism and illiberal variable dispersion of food insecurity within countries, a economies (e.g. trade in illicit substances, the criminalisa- point well-illustrated by early-warning systems such as tion of the economy). These complexes are transnational FEWS and the FAO’s own GIEWS. Similarly, Save the in essence, and reflect a process of political reconfigura- Children’s food economy assessments differentiate tion. The Mano River Union (Liberia, Sierra Leone and between regions or food economy zones. Guinea), Somalia, the Caucasus and Afghanistan illustrate the concept, with their reliance on drugs, weapons or The point that famines are local phenomena is not new, primary commodities (and in some cases all of the above) but it is increasingly lost in aid agencies’ communications through a political structure essentially disaggregated campaigns. Also lost is the fact that assistance require- among warlords wielding local influence. ments factor in government capacity to redistribute aid within their own countries. This capacity is calculated on Duffield’s point is not uncontroversial, and it could be the basis of national production, but does not incorporate argued that it describes the 1990s more accurately than political and/or logistical constraints (e.g. local conflicts; the present, with its substantial decrease in conflict areas the state of the road network or the truck fleet), nor does through international intervention and/or peace agree- it evaluate a government’s willingness to redistribute this ments (in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan, the DRC and aid (the issue of access). the Balkans, for example). Nonetheless, criminalised economies and/or local violence substantially persist in the countries given as examples here. the point that famines are local The pervasiveness and resilience of emerging political phenomena is increasingly lost complexes have a clear impact on food security and, ulti- in aid agencies’ communications mately, on famines. First, reliance on criminal trade rein- forces income disparities between those who engage in campaigns such trade and those who do not (with the exception of narcotics production in Afghanistan and Colombia). Second, as demonstrated by David Keen in his analysis of The localisation of high food insecurity is significantly the famine in south-western Sudan in the 1980s, such related to two distinct issues: wide disparities in entitle- political structures amplify arrangements whereby famine ments are of primary concern in Latin America and some benefits a fraction of the population. Lastly, environments parts of Asia (Mongolia, North Korea, some regions of that remain conflictual are an obvious impediment to China and India); while emerging political complexes have effective redistribution mechanisms. more explanatory power in Africa and, to some extent, in Europe (the Balkans and the Caucasus) and Asia Finally, it is worth emphasising that economic and polit- (Afghanistan and Central Asia). Both topics are vast, and ical issues are not separate: entitlement packages and can be touched on only briefly here. political arrangements are mutually dependent. Most of Central America was in a state of armed conflict Simply put, entitlements, from Amartya Sen’s analysis, deal throughout the 1980s, and several Indian states remain primarily with demand issues in situations where some food affected by low-level insurgencies, such as the Naxalite is available, but the capacity to purchase it is low, because movement or the Assam Liberation Front: either through ‘post-conflict’ or ‘low-intensity conflict’ phases, violence is 2 See Amy Waldman, ‘What India’s Upset Vote Reveals: The High Tech never far away from the political and economic processes

FAMINE RESPONSE FAMINE Is Skin Deep’, New York Times, 15 May 2004. that underpin famine.

14 HUMANITARIANexchange FAMINE RESPONSE 15 , (London: (Rome: (Rome: FAO, Number Number 27 • 2004 July (Washington DC: USAID,(Washington 2003). Famine Famine in the Twentieth Century Risk and Vulnerability in Ethiopia: , 1996–2004, available at www.fao. is desk officer for Action Against Global Governance and the New Wars: The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy The State of Food Insecurity 2003 Food Food Outlook Learning Learning from the Past, for the Future Preparing Responding to the Present, 2003). David Keen, 1983–1989 Sudan, South-western in Relief and Famine of 1994). Press, NJ:(Princeton, University Princeton Sue Lautze et al., IDS Working 2000). Studies, Development Paper 105 (Brighton: Mark Duffield, Institute The of Merging of Development and Books, 2001). Zed Security FAO, org/docrep. FAO, References and further reading References Stephen Devereux, Roger Roger Persichino Hunger-USA. The views expressed in this article position. an agency represent do not Humanitarian response in the Palestinian territories Forthcoming Forthcoming special feature in Humanitarian Exchange The Israeli–Palestinian conflict continues to exact an appalling cost on the civilian population. The policy, closure the wall being constructed between the West Bank and they also are the cause of an intended are to the of secure targets protection the population. Israeli However, Israel, and military attacks on Palestinian population. economic, social and humanitarian crisis for the Palestinian This politically charged situation confronts humanitarian organisations with critical dilemmas. Should can how do, they services?they If essential supply to obliged is power, occupying the as Israel, when relief provide all parties? to be so by that is impartial a response and perceived and neutral, they provide The special feature of the 2004 November issue of Humanitarian Exchange will focus on humanitarian action in the occupied Palestinian territories. It will look at the and challenges different the ways are limits responding, organisations and to, explore the humanitarian possibilities for, for humanitarian actors, examine the response. If you would like to suggest HPN’s editorial policy or and submissions contribute procedure is an available at article http://www.odihpn.org/documents/HPN- submission.pdf. for this feature, please contact [email protected]. The deadline for submissions is 15 September 2004. A focus on the locality of famines illustrates three critical points. First, the spread of poverty eradication should lead – to increased which entitlements – at country levels will determine salient areas the of more high poverty, the food will remain. more insecurity: Conversely, vulnerability successful poverty to campaigns should translate in less vulnerability to entitle- eradication famines ment crises. Second, the ments, especially emergence in Africa of (in Liberia, Burundi, peace the DRC, agree- and potentially in Sudan) at mask national the resilience of level conflicts at should the local level, not tied as they are to emerging political most complexes. of the Third, analysis while in this article rural implicitly populations, deals increased with urbanisation is set to pose new challenges. In Africa Sub-Saharan alone, urban popu- lations are projected to account for 45% of 2020, the up total from in about 20% in 1980. employment At current and levels of services inevitably result in in the spread of urban slums, urban with very low areas, access this to water will recourse to subsistence agriculture. While and none of this is sanitation services inevitable, it and suggests that the no geographical distribution of famines is bound to become increasingly discrete. To address this will require a full acknowledgement of importance of local issues. the Conclusion Famine (again) in Ethiopia? Sue Lautze and Angela Raven-Roberts, Tufts University

In 2002, Stephen Devereux, an economist at the UK-based On the other hand, elevating the crisis to the level of Institute of Development Studies (IDS), stood on the famine was a tool for galvanising US public opinion, for dusty plain outside Gode in Ethiopia’s Somali Region, and advocating for a new food security strategy by the argued that the Ethiopian government and the interna- Ethiopian government, and for encouraging a higher level tional community had failed to prevent another famine. of engagement by humanitarian and development institu- Devereux cited a US Centers for Disease Control study led tions, including the rest of USAID. The compromise even- by Peter Salama that demonstrated a concentration of tually reached within USAID was to refer to ‘localised excess mortality that coincided with the onset of relief famines’. This implied that the situation was serious, but food assistance to Gode in 2000. The IDS critique stung not unmanageable. The qualifying concept of ‘local’ many in the humanitarian community in Addis Ababa, makes possible unsubstantiated claims of success: including USAID/Ethiopia staff responsible for food and famines that did not expand to a national scale. humanitarian assistance. Declaring a famine was also a complicated question for the As the warning signs of another crisis in Ethiopia intensi- Ethiopian government. Famines have contributed to the fied in 2002 and 2003, the USAID mission in Addis was downfall of Ethiopian regimes. The government’s Disaster keen to avoid another round of academic post-mortems. Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) is In the midst of the crisis, USAID engaged a group of charged with preventing famines of the 1984–85 type: that academics, including specialists from Clark University, the is, those types of famine that make regimes fall. In both the Food Economy Group and the Feinstein International 1999–2000 and the 2002–2004 crises, the DPPC fulfilled its Famine Center at Tufts University. A number of these mandate well; neither crisis was allowed to develop into academics had experience in Ethiopia predating the the type of famine that threatened the political order. famine of 1984–85. USAID’s first (and repeated) question was: ‘Is this a famine?’. following 9/11, Ethiopia’s When pressed on the issue by an IRIN reporter in Addis in July 2003, the Tufts team stated: ‘You have a widespread importance to US national livelihood crisis leading to emergency levels of malnutri- security interests increased tion, morbidity, mortality, with alarming implications for destitution. That for us is a famine’. However, to call the 2002–2004 crisis in Ethiopia a famine had different impli- Some humanitarian practitioners gauge their successes, cations for different actors. Famine, like genocide, seems in part, according to ‘famines averted’; declaring the exis- to imply a particular level of moral responsibility above tence of a famine is seen as a mark against the humani- ordinary disasters, albeit without genocide’s legal obliga- tarian effort. Both the World Food Programme and tions. As noted by Alex de Waal and a number of other Addis-based European Union staff, for example, reacted writers, declaring that a famine exists is a political strongly against the Salama article. Development actors exercise. This article examines some of the issues that resisted the use of the word famine out of a concern that arose for analysts in their engagements with USAID and emphasising humanitarian responses would come at the others on the question of famine in Ethiopia. cost of development efforts.

‘No Famine on My Watch’ The media are interested in the answer to the ‘is there a In the interim between the two most recent crises, there famine’ question essentially because of the definition of were two important political developments in the US. ‘news’: vulnerability, poverty, suffering, disease and a First, following the 11 September attacks in the US, certain level of death are viewed as the status quo for Ethiopia’s importance to US national security interests Ethiopia. To be news, these tragedies must be elevated to increased. USAID’s aggressive food aid response to the extraordinary levels, levels which the press and the public government’s 2003 appeal for food aid accordingly raised have come to associate with the term ‘famine’. There has questions about political motives. Some in the donor been what Mark Bradbury has called ‘an accommodation community thought that USAID was overreacting; as one of suffering’ over time: the numbers of people affected by British government official put it, Ethiopia was experi- recent crises dwarf those affected in 1984–85. However, encing ‘just another normal bad year’. Second, President the 2002-2004 crisis largely failed to produce the ‘famine George W. Bush challenged his administration to ensure image’ the media and public associate with Ethiopia. that famines were avoided during his tenure, a policy known as ‘No Famine on My Watch’; declaring the exis- Is it a famine? tence of a famine could be seen as a political shortcoming Although most famines are characterised by widespread

FAMINE RESPONSE FAMINE and, therefore, a political vulnerability. distress migration, this is neither necessary nor sufficient

16 HUMANITARIANexchange FAMINE RESPONSE 17

©Reuters/Antony Njuguna/courtesy www.alertnet.org Number Number 27 • 2004 July from from Addis Ababa, May 2003 The capacity of institutions compromised by to policy manage reforms, including crises too and rapid inadequately supported decen- government’s the remains Ethiopian tralisation process. While decentralisation may enable in more localised management of future crises, the timing of the decentralisation process was unfortunate; the distribu- tion of famine suffering in Ethiopia neatly corresponds to the weakness, areas of such administrative greatest as Afar commu- The international humanitarian and Somali Region. nity has been unable to step into the While breach. this can be as interpreted a lack of commitment, it is also due to the fact that the humanitarian community is overwhelmed with the world. disasters throughout Neither declared nor averted Many now hasten to declare the famines crisis are over. neither In declared Ethiopia, nor averted, declared to but be are averted. Instead rather of engaging in divisive discussions on potentially the existence or otherwise of famine in Ethiopia, a far better strategy would be to as a terrible, vulnerabilities confluence of interlocking recent describe the slow-onset crisis of livelihoods. There remain great needs for immediate, transition and longer-term responses, both to save lives and to protect and promote livelihood systems among disparate livelihood needed groups. on Consensus the is tragedies long-term characterising still Ethiopia processes in order that to coherent inform more induced short-, the medium- development and and political strategies long-term to address the humanitarian, struc- tural vulnerabilities inherent in a range of Ethiopian commu- nities and production systems. These processes entail far more than droughts; they include local, regional and inter- national political, social and economic dynamics as well as causes. other man-made and natural three least at importantchallenge is to it forward, moving In key assumptions that about crises in Ethiopia: dominate the current discourse A family carry their food home from a feeding centre in Lablibela, 700km the 2002–2004 crisis failed to produce the ‘famine image’ the media and public associate with Ethiopia increased increased sharply because systems. multiple collapses of livelihood of the nature of the and, in some cases, inappropriate. existing institutions for assistance; these were either overtaxed. inadequate or already grossly is not adept at fixing systems and institutions in midst of crisis. the victims, as in 1984–85, there was a diffusion of famine victims. In the absence of large-scale migration, it is much easier for the Ethiopian government, donors, UN agencies and NGOs to declare once again that famine was averted, or minimised as a local affair. The images from IDP lack camps facilitates further of disengagement classic famine by the media and Western publics, even as large numbers of vulnerable people morbidity and mortality. face destitution, malnutrition, • Against these threats, food aid alone was insufficient • the The sick hungry, and the dying then had to rely on • once again that it proved The humanitarian community • Consequently, instead of concentrations of famine • Vulnerability to malnutrition, morbidity and mortality The Tufts The Tufts team argued that the nature of the food aid response (coupled with increasing restrictions migration) induced vulnerable popula- on internal tions to remain in their home commu- nities. The humanitarian has community long believed distress migration is a highly desirable that preventing outcome, but one rarely achieved. The team that concluded the Ethiopian government community and were the ill-prepared to humanitarian The dispersion team of argued vulnerability. the manage following the resulting line of logic: for the absence of distress migration in definition a crisis of may be because famine. migration to camps is The prohibited, or because there camps, as are in no North Korea the throughout 1990s. Alternatively, deeply vulner- able populations may be able to remain in their home communities, for example in the absence of forced displacement or due to the timely provision of relief food. By mid-2003, this seemed to be one possible absence of explanation large-scale distress migra- for tion the in 999,650 tons of food aid. provided Ethiopia. In 2003, USAID 1. That emergencies ‘suddenly emerge’, and therefore management is critical. Resettlement may be one partial should be treated as rapid-onset crises, rather than solution to Ethiopia’s food security challenges, but to slow-onset crises. pursue resettlement in the midst of crisis – and at its 2. That crises are ‘food crises’ as opposed to ‘livelihoods present rate – is to impose additional burdens on commu- crises’. nities, service providers and the international community. 3. That the people most at risk of malnutrition, morbidity Other policies appear to have been unquestionably and mortality are the same people identified as being endorsed by the international community, despite the ‘chronically vulnerable’. vulnerabilities associated with them: the risk of malaria associated with water harvesting, the promotion of maize at the expense of farmer choice about crop diversity, the lack of marketing strategies for bumper harvests. The list in Ethiopia, famines are neither goes on.

declared nor averted, but are Donors need to work with the Ethiopian government, the declared to be averted UN and NGOs to tackle the underlying causes that lead to the kinds of acute crises that prompt academics to wonder if it is time to use the F-word. Consensus is needed among major actors on a comprehensive and This last point may be counterintuitive. Much more work is complementary action plan that provides mitigation, needed to determine exactly who is both ‘chronically vulner- preparedness and recovery activities for vulnerable able’ and demonstrated the greatest vulnerabilities in recent communities, while also providing accelerated input to crises. It is likely that these investigations will show one those sectors and areas with the capacity to absorb real population that is well entrenched in a system of annual investment and development. food aid receipts (the ‘chronically vulnerable’ or the ‘chroni- cally eligible’), and a very different population that is most at Sue Lautze is Director of the Livelihoods Initiatives risk during the current emergency (for example, those on Program at the Feinstein International Famine Center, the margins of administrative reach). There is at present an Tufts University, Medford, MA. Angela Raven-Roberts is unhelpful assumption in the development community that the Center’s Director of Academic and Training Programs. these two populations are the same; this is leading to inter- Their email addresses are [email protected] and vention strategies that assume a neat and linear (and [email protected]. doubtful) relationship between identified chronic and acute vulnerability in Ethiopia. These assumptions underpin the government’s Food Security Strategy, which includes the resettlement of chronically vulnerable populations to often distant and unprepared sites.

The second step is to engage with the institutions and References and further reading systems that vulnerable communities rely on for survival. Mark Bradbury, ‘Normalising the Crisis in Africa’, Journal The definition of vulnerability needs to be expanded beyond of Humanitarian Assistance, 1998, www-jha.sps.cam.ac. a focus on targeted individuals and groups to consider insti- uk/a/a603.htm. tutions, policies and processes. These systems include informal kinship networks, state-managed social service Alex De Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster systems and market networks. In addition to material Relief Industry in Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana inputs, a common denominator in each of these systems is University Press, 1998). the role of cash, income opportunities and debt. Health, Stephen Devereux, ‘Learning the Lessons? Famine in water and food security services are commercially available Ethiopia 1999–2000’ Institute of Development Studies, in many of the affected communities; vulnerable popula- University of Sussex, 2002 (video). tions need to be assisted in accessing these services. The state is functioning in Ethiopia, even in the midst of decen- Paul Howe, ‘Reconsidering “Famine”’, IDS Bulletin, vol. tralisation. Direct support to state budgets to manage social 33, no. 4, October 2002, pp. 19–27. services should be considered, while a plan for revitalising Sue Lautze et al., Risk and Vulnerability in Ethiopia: former state farms is urgently needed. Similarly, new part- Learning from the Past, Responding to the Present, nerships with states should be pursued for the creation of Preparing for the Future (Boston, MA: Feinstein emergency, cash-based public works programmes. The International Famine Center, Tufts University and Inter- extremely poor condition of Ethiopia’s public health system University Initiative on Humanitarian Studies and Field needs to be a focus for major donor input and aggressive Practice, 2003). UN leadership, underpinned by broad consensus on the implementation of minimum goals and achievements. Peter Salama et al., ‘Malnutrition, Measles, Mortality and the Humanitarian Response During a Famine in Ethiopia’, The third step is to critically engage with the government Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 286, no. of Ethiopia about the relationship between its policies 5, August 2001, pp. 563–71.

FAMINE RESPONSE FAMINE and acute vulnerability. A rational policy of environmental

18 HUMANITARIANexchange FAMINE RESPONSE 19 30% Number Number 27 • 2004 July the ‘food first’ culture is reflected in almost continuous emergency food aid to Ethiopia since 1965 The disaster response in 2002–2003 The main needs assessment in agency Ethiopia was post-harvest the assessment, multi- November which 2002. This took determined the place number requiring food assistance in of at district level, and people the duration of assistance for 2003. In keeping with previous years, the focus was on food security and associated food aid needs. Around 20 teams assessors participated, from with over 15 approximately agencies, ment’s Disaster 80 Prevention including and Preparedness Commission the govern- (DPPC), the World Food Programme (WFP) and agencies, other UN donors, NGOs assessment and was complemented regional by authorities. the annual Crop and The Food FAO/WFP Supply Assessment Mission, which focused and food supply and demand. production on crop Shortly after the assessments, in December 2002, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi launched a joint appeal with UN the for emergency assistance; Ethiopia, face he a said, disaster worse could than 1984. The that appeal upwards of estimated 11 million people were in need food, of and an relief additional three million needed close moni- toring. A multi-agency reassessment of emergency food took place in upwards, to April 12.6m. Although this surpassed 2003, all previous and appeals in Ethiopia it was met in its entirety. emergency figures were revised Prevalence of acute malnutrition Prevalence 0% 10% 20% 1 0 4 3 2

1.5 0.5 3.5 2.5 U5MR Figure 1: Prevalence of acute malnutrition and mortality of acute rates in selected sites 1: Prevalence in Ethiopia during the Figure second quarter of 2002 Notes: Prevalence Notes: of Prevalence acute malnutrition: less than 80% of weight-for-height the reference median (NCHS/WHO) and cases of mortalitynutritional oedema; U5MR: Under five per day. per 10,000 rate Ethiopia Ethiopia 2003: towards a broader public nutrition approach University Tufts Helen Young, The ‘food first’ food of emergency in the almost continuous flow reflected culture of humanitarian assistance aid to is Ethiopia since 1965. more-or-less This has continuous been linked nutritional surveillance, with which has explicitly advocated for a food aid assessment and response to increasing levels of acute malnutrition. The 1989 Ethiopian nutrition guidelines state that a food aid response is necessary when rises above malnutrition (wasting and nutritional oedema) the prevalence of 10%. While this level of acute acute malnutrition is clearly unac- ceptable, this policy fails to recognise the impracticality and long-term implications of such a First, the recommendation. 2000 demographic health survey reported that the prevalence of acute malnutrition in rural 11.1%, areas suggesting was national coverage of rural areas food with assistance. Second, there is little analysis of or the actual no underlying causes room of malnutrition, for linked with the social and care health environment, care and access the to health environment, as well as food security. This means that there identify those situations is where people are dying, but a not risk of necessarily from failing lack of food. to Figure 1, which shows the results of nutrition surveys from late 2002, indicates that this is indeed happening in parts of Ethiopia. The ‘food first’ culture Twenty years on one from of famines the ever most severe Twenty witnessed in Ethiopia, the prospect of hunger, starvation and death threatened ever-increasing numbers of people in 2003. Experience of famine response in Ethiopia since the mid-1980s has led to a ‘food first’ bias, which fails to take account of the risks broader and asso- vulnerabilities ciated with famine. Current policy and programming gaps capacity institutional change and major significant require is to be achieved. if progress development Early warning and needs assessment Box 1: Food distribution: three programming The process of prioritising areas for relief is a combination of technical assessment and analysis and negotiation. strategies Woredas are categorised as ‘moderately’, ‘severely’ or ‘very severely’ affected. In addition, WFP singles out those General food distribution for ‘all drought-affected’ districts where the proportion of the population in need is A single commodity ration: 15kg of cereals per person per greater than 50% of the total, and where baseline chronic month (pppm) or 500g per person per day (pppd). In the food insecurity is four or five, on a scale of 1–5. In the light first half of 2003, this was reduced to 12.5kg pppm. of ongoing early-warning data, such as market prices, migration and nutritional status, the list is updated as Blanket supplementary feeding of additional rations required, which means that assigned categories of priority for ‘at-risk groups’ may change from month to month. At-risk groups were estimated to comprise 35% of drought- affected people, and included children under five years of In February 2003, the Emergency Nutrition Coordination age, pregnant and lactating women and the chronically sick. Unit (ENCU), part of the DPPC, adopted a new decision- Ration: 4.5kg pppm (150g pppd) blended food and 750g making tool for the geographic targeting of supplementary (25g pppd) of oil. feeding. This was based on the presence of indicators including the prevalence of acute malnutrition. While this Targeted supplementary feeding of additional dry rations for may work to a degree, it has two major pitfalls. First, it risks all moderately wasted children (<80% weight-for-height) failing to identify the real cause of malnutrition, so children Ration: 9kg blended food (300g pppd). continue to suffer despite an apparently adequate response; second, it fails to recognise other responses to moderate malnutrition, which are likely to be more effec- • General distribution of a general ration for all affected tive and appropriate than targeted supplementary feeding. people. • Blanket feeding of a complementary ration for specific Nutrition survey data has long been used in Ethiopia in at-risk groups. relation to famine prevention, and for targeting assistance • Targeted supplementary feeding for moderately in a systematic way. Currently, the DPPC mainly uses nutri- malnourished children. tion status data for verifying nutrition-related problems (which are known already to exist), and for pressing the The ration scales and composition used by the DPPC and international community for an emergency response. WFP in 2003 are shown in Box 1. These have evolved from the 1989 Relief and Rehabilitation Commission guidelines Overall, the analysis of nutrition in emergencies in (15kg of cereals, 0.45kg of oil and 1.5kg corn soy blend Ethiopia has improved substantially in terms of quantita- (CSB) per person per month). tive estimates of acute malnutrition, but this has not always been matched by an improvement in the more In practice, the general ration for all drought-affected qualitative analysis of underlying causes. people was reduced from an agreed 500g of whole-grain cereals per person per day to approximately 400g. This Ration scales reduction was a result of food aid shortages rather than Emergency food assistance in Ethiopia currently consists any strategic review of nutritional composition. Figure 2 of three programming strategies: shows the decline in levels of rations since 1989.

Figure 2: Comparison of general rations and the recommended minimum planning figure for energy

2,500

2,000 2,100 1,900 1,950 1,500 1,650 1,650 1,320 kcal 1,000

500

0 International International (500g cereal) (Cereal, oil and (500g cereal) (400g cereal) recommendation recommendation pulses 1988 1997 RRC ration RRC ration WFP ration WFP ration 1985 1989 2003 FAMINE RESPONSE FAMINE 20 HUMANITARIANexchange FAMINE RESPONSE 21 (Addis (Addis , vol. 20, no. 4, Number Number 27 • 2004 July Food Food Policy Risk and Vulnerability in Ethiopia: Learning is Associate Professor at the Friedman School (Boston, MA: Feinstein International Famine a focus on nutritional risk a provides much broader understanding of nutritional problems Ababa: Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 1989). and Rehabilitation Ababa: Relief Ethiopia Demographic Health Ababa and Calverton, MD: Survey Central Statistical Authority 2000 and ORC 2001). Macro, D. L. Pelletier et al., ‘The Food-First Policy: from Ethiopia’, Lessons Bias and Nutrition References and further reading References This article is based on work undertaken during a Tufts study into nutrition and livelihoods in Ethiopia. See Sue Lautze et al., from the Past, Responding to the Present, Preparing for the Future Center, Tufts University and Inter-University Initiative on 2003). and Field Practice, Humanitarian Studies also: See Nutritional Guidelines for Food Relief Rations 1995. strategy for Ethiopia. These ideas were widely endorsed by a by endorsed widely were ideas These Ethiopia. for strategy participatory review of 2003. in November Unicef hosted by workshop the Ethiopia emergency at a Conclusions gener- Thirty in Ethiopia have of humanitarian practice years ated the widely held view that famine is the outcome of failure a in the food supply, mortality which could be addressed by better resulting and more effi- in malnutrition and cient food distribution. become This ‘food an first’princi- rules, own its with enterprise, humanitarian Ethiopian institution approach deeply has ples embedded and advocates. within Last year continued was the heavy no exception, emphasis with on a food appeals. Although these aid problems are widely recognised, assessment a and significant shift in the ‘food first’ bias seems unlikely given the importance of the institution of food aid the globally, and power it affords a wide range Ethiopia. of It stakeholders is within therefore imperative monitored that its use and is better approaches to addressing evaluated, food insecurity and supporting livelihoods while are actively more flex- the quality and needed on all sides, not only to improve pursued. Concerted appropriate efforts ibility are of food aid programming, but also to move with a approach to more comprehensive addressing human- forward itarian needs, as encapsulated by public nutrition within the livelihoods. context of protecting broader Helen Young of Nutrition Science and Policy, Tufts University, Medford, is: [email protected]. MA. Her email address centre woreda , assumed a general ration of 1 1 Catholic Relief Services,1 Catholic Relief CARE, for the Hungry International, Food Vision. World and the Children-US Save REST, A focus on nutritional risk provides a much broader under- standing of nutritional problems, which in turn this For aid. food to limited not is that requires response broad-based a to be achieved, the entire range of nutritional concerns emergencies in must be adequately addressed at organisational single no Because policies. national including all levels, body, including the ENCU, has either authority the to capacity coordinate, facilitate or and the strengthen all emer- subdi- be must tasks these activities, nutrition gency-related vided between relevant ministries should and nonetheless departments. fall within All the wider overall nutrition In mid-2003, a joint NGO advocacy initiative called increase for in an the general food blended ration food and for the all provision drought victims of to starvation’ prevent associated the with the ‘slow regular ration. The need for widespread emergency food assistance is not in question, but it must be only In 2003, one strategy. national disaster response comprehensive part of a carefully planned good and nutrition was equated with 12.5kg of cereal grain for work to nutritionist a take not does It people. 10m than more fits all’ size out that this ‘one is relief to emergency approach likely to fail to reduce preventable morbidity and mortality, and that a wider range of food security and strategies public is health required. Of equal concern is how term the short- solution of emergency food recovery: aid how, for affects example, is longer-term it linked to or bating destitution? even exacer- back to the village, or to buy essential price goods. The sale is typically because less market prices than fall as a the result grain of usual on sales the of market day relief of value, distribution. system In of Somali registration and Region, targeting the is less structured – everyone who turns up for a distribution receives a share, which means that ration sizes change depending on the total number of people present. The 1989 DPPC ration reflects the internationally agreed planning figure for 1,900kcal energy, per person which per day. Since at then, figure for the energy that has increased planning to 2,100kcal, but this has time was not been reflected in ration scales in problem is Ethiopia. the A lack of major a public or transparent process of reviewing and establishing ration scales. As a result, mid-2003, there was in widespread confusion and misinfor- mation about what the scales should be. For example, the US-funded Joint Emergency Operations which included Plan six NGOs partners, Notwithstanding the planned ration, the that actual people rations receive are example, different committees again. decide who In is Tigray, entitled rations. This usually for results to in only two people receive from each household receiving food, thereby diluting rations even further. Rations are further reduced by the need to sell a proportion to pay for transport from the 15kg of cereals, 0.5kg of oil more-or-less and 1.5kg the of CSB. 1989 This WFP. the DPPC and in by changes brought is ration, and fails to recognise When will Ethiopia stop asking for food aid? Al Kehler, WFP

In 2003, 13 million Ethiopians required exceptional food was incorporated, and investment in technical and assistance just to survive. Despite 30 years of food aid, community skills was increased. In relief, the new govern- the country’s food security has steadily worsened, and ment recognised that the much larger relief food aid flows relief food aid has become an institutionalised response. needed to be harnessed. It adopted the ‘Employment Thus the common refrain: if food security is getting worse, Generation Scheme’ in 1993, which replaced free food is food aid the right way to address food insecurity in distributions with food for work to rebuild productive Ethiopia? The question is, however, flawed. We need assets. However, the relief programme had fatal flaws: instead to ask how food aid is being used. relief food was unreliable, often too little and coming too late; essential complementary inputs like tools, equip- Relief food aid, while effective in saving lives and relieving ment and supplies were largely unavailable. Line short-term hunger, cannot achieve sustainable food ministries did not accept their responsibilities, and the security. Food aid, when well targeted and linked with other government did not enforce them as there were too many development inputs, can and is having sustainable impact. competing priorities. By 2002, WFP’s development food aid programme in Ethiopia had reduced food shortages by 40% for 1.4m people in 800 communities. These communities were Ethiopia is Africa’s largest remarkably less vulnerable during the 2003 drought, main- taining their productive assets and emerging more resilient recipient of emergency aid per than communities with only relief assistance. However, capita contributions to WFP’s development projects in Ethiopia are shrinking, largely due to the belief that food aid does not work in development. This article, drawing on WFP’s experi- These difficulties persist. Ethiopia has received an ence in Ethiopia, asserts that food aid has a major enabling average of 700,000 tons of food aid per year for the past role in sustainable food security strategies. 15 years. The vast majority of this has been emergency food aid. Ethiopia is the largest recipient of emergency aid Food aid in Ethiopia: an overview per capita in Africa, but receives the least investment in In the early 1980s, the UN Ethiopian Highlands Reclamation development aid for each citizen. While no one questions Study concluded that soil erosion and degradation in the the need to save lives, the failure to invest in food security breadbasket of Ethiopia had reached crisis proportions. programmes for the poor is doing little to break the cycle WFP responded with a soil and water conservation of food crisis. programme that used food as a wage for labour. Technical experts implemented the programme, imposing design and Food aid for development has continued to mature in work requirements on communities. Ethiopia, but remains too small to be noticed. What is visible is the large relief programme. This has saved lives, but it has not halted the decline in assets, improved despite 30 years of food aid, malnutrition levels or mitigated vulnerability to shocks. Food shortages are in fact becoming more frequent, and Ethiopia’s food security has are affecting more people. steadily worsened It is tempting to conclude that all food aid erodes liveli- hoods, and support for successful food aid programmes is shrinking as a result. However, during 2002 WFP showed Initially, the project was successful. However, between 1984 that, where integrated food aid projects have been in and 1991 crop failures, civil war and political unrest increas- place, the beneficiaries were markedly less vulnerable to ingly hampered progress. Survival alone became the objec- the same climatic and agricultural shocks as those who tive. Food aid initially intended for development was had received no development food aid. needed to address more pressing emergencies. Relief food came late, and had to be dispatched immediately to MERET: a success story in development address life-threatening situations. The volumes of food in food aid development programmes were dwarfed by enormous The MERET programme (MERET stands for Managing amounts of relief food. Technical and managerial time and Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions to more expertise, never plentiful, was redeployed for emergencies. sustainable livelihoods) has had a measurable impact on food security among some of Ethiopia’s poorest communi- In 1991 the government was overthrown, and changes ties. Between 1994 and 2002, MERET assisted 1.4m food- were introduced to development and relief food aid insecure people in over 800 communities. The objective

FAMINE RESPONSE FAMINE programmes. In development, local community planning was to increase incomes for the poor through asset

22 HUMANITARIANexchange FAMINE RESPONSE 23 Number Number 27 • 2004 July forest forest and water development disproportionately benefit women tivity. tivity. each time. activities. development of forest result tation (trees/shrubs). ponds and springs. consumption. services roads. feeder through markets. hours per day. one and five between water by largest decrease in the number of they months suffered in from which food shortages after (2.3 months). the project of majority the for food to access improved and food of participants. Investment in water assets, harvesting, trees including and soil, earning income for the poor. vegetative covering, is most vulnerable participants have gone from ‘strug- gling’ to ‘doing okay’. Thus, it has net, acted as a protecting safety 1.4m food-insecure interventions should be considered for the four million people. Similar chronically food-insecure people who are perennially loss on cultivated land, and a depth. 37% increase in soil Area Area closure and forest development • of forage. availability 71% reported improved • 47% indicated improved livestock health and produc- • 45% reported 0.5–2.5 hours saved in collecting forage • 61% said fuel wood was more easily available • as a Field measurements indicated a 76% increase in vege- and Water road development • 42% indicated increased water availability • through 37% reported improved quality in water for • human 60% reported better access to • markets and other 25% have more income from selling more products at Women are primarily responsible for collecting wood for fuel and water, so forest and water development dispro- portionately benefit them. Of all female respondents who had participated in MERET: • 41% reported reducing the time they spent collecting •each time they collected wood. 1–6 hours 45% saved • Households headed by women experienced the this. from A number of conclusions follow 1. The MERET programme has increased the availability 2. MERET lifts people out of destitution. Almost all of its Soil and water conservation on farmland •reported 78% soil erosion. in a reduction • fertility. in soil indicated an increase 83% •soil in reduction 80% an indicated measurements Field to three months, a 40% reduction. to three eaten per day. per household. per year products. agricultural and clothing. improved from ‘struggling’ (losing assets) okay’ to (not selling assets) or well’‘doing ‘doing (making some money and buying new assets). extra tural lands. tural tions. quality. feeder roads. government to plan, implement and manage project activities and assets. tion. Food security Food and livelihoods • The average annual food shortage was down from five • 60% reported an increase in the • number of meals to cope with drought. ability 85% indicated an improved • 84% reported a 150–400kg increase in crop production • 72% enjoyed increased income • from the 73% had sale more money to of spend on education, health • 88% considered that their livelihood situation had Respondents Respondents to the survey that had participated MERET in the reported results. project the following Main impact assessment results Socio-economic and biophysical through 600 data household questionnaires (half female), were 60 collected focus groups involving 600 individuals (female, able vulner- groups and planning teams), household 200 questionnaires, non-beneficiary 20 technical staff naires at district level, background fact sheets for all sites question- and biophysical field WFP teams comprised external consultants, field monitors measurements. Data collection and counterpart technical staff. They were trained for collected then and methodologies, collection data in week a period. a six-week their data simultaneously over 2. Establish wooded lots and community forest planta- 3. water access to potable water and to enhance Improve 4. Improve access to markets through construction of 5. Strengthen the capacity of communities and the 6. Improve the availability of food through food distribu- In 2002, WFPthe with the Ministry of Agriculture undertook an assessment of the impact of districts randomly were selected, each with about ten sites. the MERET project. Ten Two sites from each district were chosen. The assessment compared areas that had projects with those Comparisons included with scientific biophysical none. field measure- ments (qualitative and quantitative), as well as the ‘impres- sions of change’ expressed by community field members technicians. and Tools were stakeholder used analysis, as from well livelihood as from and Assessment Participatory Rural (PRA). Questionnaires and unguided responses. spontaneous encourage were designed to 1. Conserve, develop and rehabilitate degraded agricul- creation creation and rehabilitation, using food for work. It included interventions to: assisted through relief. A more thoughtful intervention – for example, the majority of rural Ethiopians and rural could prevent them from sliding further backwards, government offices do not have ready access to banking and build their resilience to future shocks. facilities. Communities along major roads, with access to 3. MERET has not reduced food shortages to zero, and regular markets and with financial institutions, should will not do so unless more comprehensive food move towards more cash-based programmes. However, security packages are made available to these commu- other communities will need continued food aid for a nities. These packages, including cash-based interven- number of years. tions, need to create alternative sources of income for the poor to reduce the current complete reliance on agriculture. This would enable the effective phasing food aid has saved millions out of food aid over an appropriate transition period is possible. of lives 4. MERET has strengthened community-planning skills. This is a foundation that should be useful, particularly for supporting the government’s policy of devolving Conclusions more power to the grassroots. Ethiopia has had food aid for 30 years, and its food security is worse than ever. Food aid is not the culprit – it has saved Lessons learned were incorporated in the redesign of this millions of lives. But its potential to bring about lasting activity for the years 2003–2006. Particularly vigorous improvements in food security has not been utilised. efforts are being to work in strategic partnership with other complementary development interventions; work is With the government providing leadership, Ethiopia has under way with the World Bank, for example, to link its another opportunity. Food aid applied with development Food Security programme with the MERET programme. discipline can make a remarkable contribution. A good Even better results are expected in the next evaluation. food aid programme can simultaneously reduce vulnera- bility and improve food security. Addressing chronic hunger with relief food aid alone cannot achieve sustainable food security. Disciplined, Food aid cannot achieve food security for Ethiopians by considered development interventions are required. In the itself. By using both food and cash strategically, and by MERET project, development food aid has demonstrated providing a continuum of programme options through that it can build a solid foundation for food security. linkages with other food security programmes like the World Bank’s, the impact on community livelihoods will be Ethiopia’s opportunity: graduating from even more substantial. This will also depend on parallel food aid efforts to tackle poverty with policies that promote agri- Following the record relief requirements of 2003, culture (including security of tenure), improve education Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi called a meeting and health, address HIV, control population growth and between the government, UN agencies including WFP, upgrade rural infrastructure. Effective safety nets for the donors and NGOs. The deteriorating food security situa- vulnerable and a focus on nutrition are essential. tion was named as Ethiopia’s most pressing priority. The government requested support to move from the current Food aid will be a necessity for a number of years to come. model of short-term relief to multi-year development to However, provided that cash becomes increasingly avail- lift and keep people out of hunger. The government able, planned transitions away from food aid are also proceeded with legislation, drastically curtailing the required. The two most important areas are boosting local mandates of the relief bureaucracy and overhauling the production, so more of the imported food aid can be structure of agriculture and rural development. For the replaced with purchases of locally produced crops, and rest of 2004, the government is working with donors, UN capacity-building to enable reliable cash programming. agencies and NGOs to design a multi-year programme to protect people from shocks, build up productive assets The clock is ticking for Ethiopia: old patterns must be and link into successively more robust food security broken so that real hope can emerge. Food aid is vital to programmes. success, but with success food aid will cease. The goal – ambitious, but possible – is that by 2015 Ethiopia will no Food aid is essential to this strategy. Vast areas of longer need to ask for food aid. highland Ethiopia have very limited transport, communi- cations and markets. Institutional capacity to handle large Al Kehler is Development Coordinator for the WFP in amounts of cash at the community level does not yet exist Ethiopia. His email address is: [email protected].

Correction The caption used with the photograph on page 30 of the previous issue of Humanitarian Exchange (no. 26, March 2004) was printed in error. The caption reads ‘A Palestinian settlement on the West Bank’. It should read ‘A Palestinian village on the West Bank’. FAMINE RESPONSE FAMINE

24 HUMANITARIANexchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 25 Number Number 27 • 2004 July media criticism of relief organisations has increased NGOs, perhaps contributing to officers. NGO press individual by the coverage perception of less What makes news? Reporters who cover crises do not do so full time. In fact, the average among the respondents was less than story one in five. responded Only to two this question of made stories crisis that said (27) 10% Only crises. said covered the that they 265 exclusively journalists up more than half who of their output. Thus, the newsworthi- ness of humanitarian stories is judged by the other stories they do, such as timeliness and death-toll. norms of Almost half of the respondents (49%) Having story. said to run a relief death-toll was the best reason that a high a readership of the affected same by the background crisis was as also cited the compelling, as as people making was the a involvement of story aid workers from the readership or viewership area. crisis stories As off the news for agenda, the two main what reasons keeps given were a lack of fatigue’; each journalistic was mentioned by resources more than a and quarter of ‘crisis respondents. The third predominance of most Iraq and Afghanistan, cited followed closely a ‘lack of new angles’by reason to long-running crises. was the There was a marked orientation towards breaking news: almost half (48%) of all the stories done by all the The bad news: a more critical press and criticism that said journalists margin, four-to-one a By scepticism in the press about increased. relief organisations had Among columnists, opinion writers, the gap was 11-to-1: 57% editorial said they were writers more critical about and relief organisations, as who against said 5% they were not. Journalists having criticised NGOs ‘large as bureaucracies’, and lunches events expensive aimed at journal- attracting and for staging ists’. Faith-based organisations ‘fancy were noticeably exempt a only have journalists that seems It criticisms. these from hazy is idea necessary about in what any overhead organ- isation, and only a vague notion about where to for North data (one source NGOs is American comparative gather www.guidestar.com). , rather today than at some point in the future. in polite less and be, to used they than knowledgeable the field. Journalists doubt that humanitarian organi- sations operate efficiently, and are their motives. sceptical about kind of follow-up or relevance than a single story about an event. more that could result in find that the sites do not contain all they the need information – and that for usually do competitive not link to other NGOs reasons doing the same kind NGOs aid in the same area. of work or providing about chronic, long-term problems such as HIV/AIDS in Africa or the comeback of malaria. Journalists say that they do about know these issues, but need better reasons to run stories on chronic issues PRACTICE AND POLICYAND PRACTICE NOTES more more effective S. Steven Ross, Columbia University Humanitarian Humanitarian relief and the media: making the relationship • NGO press officers complain that journalists are less • Journalists complain that NGO press events lack the • NGOs offer increasingly elaborate websites. Journalists This article reports of on two surveys exploring the nature the relationship between humanitarian press, NGOs carried out in the latter half of 2003. The work and was the sponsored by the Foundation. The first survey Fritz covered press officers Institute field and personnel and at 54 the worldwide, humanitarian by Reuters aid email organisations and helped telephone. shape Their the responses second editors and survey, opinion covering writers. reporters, More than were tallied. The 290 full report, responses by far the largest and most systematic ever attempted in this field, www.fritzinstitute.org. is available at Has coverage Has of coverage aid work increased? By a three-to-one margin, journalists said that coverage of humanitarian aid operations had increased. This was that officers press NGO many among belief the to contrary coverage was static or declining, especially problems for such as HIV/AIDS chronic in Africa. Research in NEXIS, a database of articles, showed that the volume of stories on long-term chronic crises has indeed been increasing in the mainstream press. The coverage many more groups is providing aid, including humanitarian spread across • NGO press officers complain that few journalists know Humanitarian aid organisations need the coverage can press. help with Good fundraising, smooth the way cooperation to with host morale. Journalists governments need humanitarian and organisations to provide on-the-ground raise expertise and resources, staff and the raw material of their stories. It is surprising therefore how the other: little each side understands 26 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES hi fed tf dgtl aea ad s te t submit to photographs. them ask and cameras digital staff field their give informally,NGOs collected some typically are images to started put stillimagesontheirwebsites inresponse. While these have in NGOs Many coverage. increase in use to an images still and video reported footage’ ‘stock for who journalists by requests respondents, NGO editorial by free confirmed was This and video. and images help as such travel material, training, for America, asked North also outside particularly Journalists, ences. confer- press more hold to NGOs for was request popular doing groups other similar thingsorworkinginthesameareas. The nextmost to websites to their loath on seem links NGOs provide: most what want most Journalists want journalists What not do editors their and journalists consider manycrisestobe‘news’. that but knowl- of edge, lack not is ‘educating’ issue The into crises. about resources journalists huge pour not should organisa- aid tions humanitarian that is this from lesson average). on The output, their of (43% news breaking be to considered they what of amount substantial a did writers opinion and writers editorial columnists, as classified themselves who respondents Even editorials. or opinion, as columns 20% and features as categorised were 31% news; breaking as them by categorised were respondents ed, feig htgah fr s wt journalists’ with use journalists that conferences press the holding and stories for photographs offering aid regional needs, on reports background and without releases press journalists to distributing provideand writing include These prompting. special they services basic of range the described officers press regional Nevertheless, seminars. attending short for dollars hundred few a perhaps beyond training such mentionedhavingabudgetfor andtheIFRC outside CARE respondent No field. the in officers press train to money or time little however, is, There relations. press national inter- in well-versedrarely are officers press regional ters, more hire experienced journalistsaspress officersatheadquar- for need often a organisations international large Although training. mentioned respondents NGO many and relations, press in missteps many acknowledge NGOs fund press relations efforts. their specifically to operationally,willing see areused some money to want donors While press. the with hoc, tionship and ad rela- good remarkably a field of benefits fundraising potential is the despite within approach relations The offices. press regional for budget specific a had they that said respondents NGO 54 the of nine Only Resourceissues NGOs for Lessons HUMANITARIAN exploit the Internet the exploit to begun barelyhave NGOs exchange • Email is often used to send press releases, but distri- but releases, press send to used often is Email • are web the predate that technologies Internet Older • and video streaming as such technologies web Newer • outside the from searched fully be cannot sites Many • their that said to have talked we officers NGO the of None websites • organisations’ humanitarian Few • Key issuesinclude: were popularwithusers. areas these that reported tell, to data usage the had and do, that Those releases. online press of formal archive and room a press have NGOs Few exploited. be to begun bility. for ButthepotentialofInternettechnologieshasbarely opportunities visi- up international gain to organisations opened aid humanitarian has web worldwide The web The h wrdie e, u cn o a mr, t rva extra trivial cost. at more, far do can but web, of worldwide advantagethe great taken have humani- organisations Finally, aid tarian learning. distance CD-based or online as supple- such methods about training alternative and with visits menting materials, training basic and training visits sharing about think thus should Organisations hired. are replacements before months 18 only for sation years, two organi-that benefit expensivewould trainingvisits annual for organisation an office with field stays member typical staff a If their training. rethink about to ideas need traditional NGOs side, inefficiencies the On them. necessary toreport resources financial the lack often but are, crises the what enable to need they them to cover crises. The journalists have a fair say idea about journalists what to closer attention pay should organisations categories: aid humanitarian two side, into fall misconception the On fixing inefficiencies. and misconceptions need that issues The Conclusions a te wn mr o. hy ipae go under- requests. good ists’ displayed They of. standing of the need for timeliness in attending to journal- more want they say ros n itiuin Eal s lal underutilised, perhaps becauseaddress listsare clearly poor. is Email distribution. in errors for potential and costs the despite used, also are post and Fax manner. haphazard a in built are lists bution and Usenetnewsgroups. LISTSERVs rooms, chat include These used. sparsely or individual ignored. arecorporate virtually reporters) by newsletters online (weblogs: blogs cannot easilybefoundandindexed by search engines. but low, is bandwidth when faster load pages Framed ‘framed’. are they because or text on sparse are pages the because either Google, as such engines search by personnel ‘technical’ other or handled suchchores. webmasters their Yahoo and other search engines. Several assumed that Google, of versions international various the on found easily was website their whether basis continuing a on check to place in procedure formal a had organisation internal search engines. HPN

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1 MSF-CIS (Celula Inter-Secçoes), Mozambique: A Data Collecting System Focused on Food Security and Population Movements by T. Dusauchoit (1994) 2 Responding to the 1991/92 Drought in Zambia: The Programme to Prevent Malnutrition (PPM) by D. Mukupo (1994) 3 An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia by M. Duffield (1994) 4 Bad Borders Make Bad Neighbours - The Political Economy of Relief and Rehabilitation in the Somali Region 5, Eastern Ethiopia by K. Van Brabant (1994) 5 Advancing Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-Cold War Era: Suggested Roles for Governments and NGOs by K. Rupesinghe (1994) 6 The Rwandan Refugee Crisis in Tanzania: initial successes and failures in food assistance by S. Jaspars (1994) 7 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief ed. J. Borton (1994) 8 Targeting the Poor in Northern Iraq: The Role of Formal and Informal Research Methods in Relief Operations by P. Ward and M. Rimmer (1995) 9 Development in Conflict: the Experience of ACORD in Uganda, Sudan, Mali and Angola by ACORD (1995) 10 Room for Improvement: the Management and Support of Relief Workers by R. Macnair (1995) 11 Cash-for-Work and Food Insecurity in Koisha, Southern Ethiopia by P. Jenden (1995) 12 Dilemmas of ‘Post’-Conflict Transition: Lessons from the Health Sector by J. Macrae (1995) 13 Getting On-Line in Emergencies: A Guide and Directory to the Internet for Agencies involved in Relief and Rehabilitation by L. Aris, P. Gee and M. Perkins (1996) 14 The Impact of War and Atrocity on Civilian Populations: Basic Principles for NGO Interventions and a Critique of Psychosocial Trauma Projects by D. Summerfield (1996) 15 Cost-effectiveness Analysis: A Useful Tool for the Assessment and Evaluation of Relief Operations? by A. Hallam (1996) 16 The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Study III ed. J. Borton (1996) 17 Monetisation: Linkages to Food Security? by J. Cekan, A. MacNeil and S. Loegering (1996) 18 Beyond Working in Conflict: Understanding Conflict and Building Peace (The CODEP Workshop Report), by J. Bennett and M. Kayitesi Blewitt (1996) 19 Human Rights and International Legal Standards: what relief workers need to know by J. Darcy (1997) 20 People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel ed. S. Davidson (1997) 21 Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience by I. Levine (1997) 22 The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis by P. Atkinson (1997) 23 The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of Sri Lanka by K. Van Brabant (1997) 24 Reproductive Health for Displaced Populations by C. Palmer (1998) 25 Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: the new relief ‘agenda’ and its limits by D. Hendrickson (1998) 26 The Food Economy Approach: a framework for understanding rural livelihoods by T. Boudreau (1998) 27 Between Relief and Development: targeting food aid for disaster prevention in Ethiopia by K. Sharp (1998) 28 North Korea: The Politics of Food Aid by J. Bennett (1999) 29 Participatory Review in Chronic Instability: The Experience of the IKAFE Refugee Settlement Programme, Uganda by K. Neefjes (1999) 30 Protection in Practice: Field Level Strategies for Protecting Civilians from Deliberate Harm by D. Paul (1999) 31 The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Well-being by R. Garfield (1999)

HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK 32 Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New Sector in Humanitarian Aid by C. Horwood (2000) 33 The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know by P. Le Billon (2000) 34 NGO Responses to Hurricane Mitch: Evaluations for Accountability and Learning by F. Grunewald, V. de Geoffroy & S. Lister (2000) 35 Cash Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits and Assessing Risks by D. Peppiatt, J. Mitchell and P. Holzmann (2001) 36 Food-security Assessments in Emergencies: A Livelihoods Approach by H. Young, S. Jaspars, R. Brown, J. Frize and H. Khogali (2001) 37 A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response by J. Barry with A. Jefferys (2002) 38 HIV/AIDS and Emergencies: Analysis and Recommendations for Practice by A. Smith (2002) 39 Reconsidering the tools of war: small arms and humanitarian action by R. Muggah with M. Griffiths (2002) 40 Drought, Livestock and Livelihoods: Lessons from the 1999-2001 Emergency Response in the Pastoral Sector in Kenya by Yacob Aklilu and Mike Wekesa (2002) 41 Politically Informed Humanitarian Programming: Using a Political Economy Approach by Sarah Collinson (2002) 42 The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict by Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn (2003) 43 Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster by Sultan Barakat and Rebecca Roberts (2003) 44 Livelihoods and Protection: Displacement and Vulnerable Communities in Kismaayo, Southern Somalia by Simon Narbeth and Calum McLean (2003) 45 Reproductive health for conflict-affected people: policies, research and Programmes by Therese McGinn, Sara Casey, Susan Purdin and Mendy Marsh (2004) 46 Humanitarian futures: practical policy perspectives by Randolph Kent (2004) 47 Missing the point: an analysis of food security interventions in the Great Lakes by Simon Levine and Claire Chastre (2004) Good Practice Reviews

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1 Water and Sanitation in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1994) 2 Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes by J. Shoham (1994) 3 General Food Distribution in Emergencies: from Nutritional Needs to Political Priorities by S. Jaspars and H. Young (1996) 4 Seed Provision During and After Emergencies by the ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996) 5 Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populations in Emergency Operations: Registration and its Alternatives by J. Telford (1997) 6 Temporary Human Settlement Planning for Displaced Populations in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1998) 7 The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies by A. Hallam (1998) 8 Operational Security Management in Violent Environments by K. Van Brabant (2000) 9 Disaster Risk Reduction: Mitigation and Preparedness in Development and Emergency Programming by John Twigg (2004)

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HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 27 Number Number 27 • 2004 July the Iranian took government the unprecedented step of requesting outside aid Yes: lack of journalistic resources resources lack of journalistic Yes: budget cuts) (staff layoffs, older crises continue fatigue – many Yes: long-term 28% 26% Afghanistan on Iraq, concentration Yes: crises lack of new angles in older Yes: 22% small and seem crises outside of Iraq Yes: less newsworthycomparison by 21% 17% No, no differenceOther 25% 5% ture ture was destroyed. Key government officials, health staff the dead. among personnel were and national response The Iranian government took the unprecedented step of requesting international assistance and – in a brave move for a country largely closed to outsiders instituted for a 30 no-visa, open years skies – policy for relief supplies and personnel to assist the affected population. first two In weeks after the the earthquake, over 120 tonnes of relief supplies and 1,900 international personnel arrived in Bam, complementing the 4,500 tonnes of supplies and 8,600 personnel already deployed by the Iranian govern- ment and the Red Crescent. Many relief professionals sector in considered the the initial response and exemplary, it is true that impressive. There performance were no on significant disease outbreaks; key indicators was according to the Iranian Red Crescent, the first food and water distributions began within days. distributed within the first three 20,000 tents were 12 hours, and over Table 3: With the Table exception of Iraq, is it getting harder to get crisis stories published or aired? Why? is an associate professor of professional practice in journalism at Columbia New University, York. His Yes, more criticism and scepticism by press by criticism and scepticism more Yes, press by less criticism and scepticism 54% Yes, change No real 13% 33% Yes, more coverage more Yes, less coverageYes, changeNo real 59% 19% 22% Table 2: Do you Table sense any trend in the past five years in press criticism or scepticism about crisis intervention or humanitarian aid organisations’ work? Table 1: Do you Table sense any trend in the past five years in how you or your colleagues cover crises? Improving Improving NGO coordination: lessons from the Bam earthquake Jenty Wood, Oxfam (writing in a personal capacity) Background The earthquake hit in the early hours of the morning on 26 December 2003. Its scale killed, and people out of a population of about 90,000 were was massive: some infrastruc- about 80% of the housing stock and government 26,000 This article tries to answer his question. on It the reflects nature of first international NGO coordination and co- operation in the Bam response, then ways that inter-agency asks coordination could be if improved – there are without losing sight of agencies’ individual furtherfor discus- areas suggests it identity Finally, independence. and sion and research. In a recent lessons-learned meeting on the quake Bam in earth- Iran, a the polite Iranian and Ministry respectful of Health colleague related international from his NGO frustration coordination at in the early days emergency. of He the said that, at the desperately trying same to set time up field as hospitals he and bury was the dead, representatives from over 100 international NGOs appreci- He him. with meetings requested individually had ated their help, he said, but some organisations wanted to ask him about the siting of rural clinics when still he was trying to arrange emergency Was there medical no way, evacuations. he asked, that these in the early days of a disaster? better themselves agencies organise could Steven Steven S. Ross email address is [email protected]. 28 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES and intervention workintheseareas.and intervention assessment their focus to and zones assigned accept to agreed who NGOs, international by up picked rapidly was provincialdifferent a branch,by assisted be to each zones 12 into city the dividing Crescent, Red Iranian the by ated initi- system A matter. coordinated a in standards approaches agree and to and cooperate to willing organisa- were that tions proof was it but end, the The in failed specifications. tender and standards agencies agreed procurement using latrine tender joint a five initiate to together banded of group A mechanisms. coordination formal more also were There of people Bam. the help to done things get to wanted everyone simply that sense a strong was There other organisations. to supplies provided Frontières Sans Médecins and Children, the Save from tents borrowed Oxfam good. were relations personal each and other, response. helped the Organisations for agency lead the Crescent, Red Iranian the with links and strengthened sectoral meetings coordination established OCHA also field. sports former a for camp on organisations a international up set (OCHA) Humani of the for UN Office the and government ian Iran- the effort, coordination the in assist To earthquake. in the after weeks Bam two first the in arrived sations organi- international 200 Over mechanisms coordination Initial cetd oal: oe wud o ue arns with latrines use not would women locally: designs accepted Project so. do to not were some and agencies, between time significantly varied have not did they that or assessments, their share to asked not were they that mation that had been gathered quickly. Others said simply not were they finished, or because sharing they infor- felt uncomfortable because reports their share not did they that said agencies Several agencies. between shared not generally were which of results the assessments, vidual indi- conducted NGOs international Most covered. being were needs whether at not done, being work of amount the at looked systems record and assigned in, work to werezones huge agencies Small ill- water. and came food enough agencies or bags sleeping without Some arrived even some Bam. – equipped in the among working coordination agencies in difficulties were there that disaster, the of scale the given inevitable, was it Perhaps problems Coordination HUMANITARIAN exchange ain Assistance tarian Coordination An Iranian woman and her child stand in front of a of front in stand child her and woman Iranian An destroyed building, Bam, December 2003 December Bam, destroyedbuilding,

n pann to. oe f h wel U progress UN Sphere. weekly to data the actual compared of systematically reports None tool. planning coordination and a as used actively seldom was Sphere worth. Yet its proved easily example, for of items, fittings water the relief standardising that doubt no is there and used, also were standards technical Other work. their in to beapplyingkeyinternationalstandards such asSphere professed publicly Bam in operating agencies all Almost standards international of application The is stillroom forimprovement. early the days of to the however,Bam earthquake, suggests that there argument this Applying (IASC). Committee of Council Washington- the International based andthebroader-basedVOCA Inter-Agency Standing Geneva, in the (ICVA) as Agencies Voluntary such bodies nation coordi- inter-agency of emergence the and teams; (DAC) Coordination and Assessment Disaster UN the and OCHA of development the Sphere; as such standards national tance by most(thoughnotall)internationalNGOsofinter- accep- broad the factors: three to due mainly ago, years 20 were they than better far are things that say hands Old really nowaytodobetter? there is but points, valid are These essential lost. be and will flexibility appear, will coverage in gaps and far too can coordination inter-agency that Push effective. independence so this them make exactly and is mandates it missions, and own systems, their have NGOs vidual ©Frederik Kok, NRC Geneva NRC Kok, ©Frederik ht a big oe and distributed where. done being about was what confusion general was there and prices, higher get to other each against off agencies played agencies. Suppliers between cated communi- be to learning this for weeks took it Sometimes them. through seen be could superstruc- shadow their because tures sheet plastic tional NGOs set up their own their up set NGOs tional is thejobofOCHA.Ifinterna- coordination First, parts. two has to usually questions these answer traditional The before theemergency? group a as coordinated better international NGOshave been Could effort? of duplication the reduce to response the of days early the in better cated havecommuni- we Howcould inevitable? situation this Was chaos the through Sorting ulcto. eod indi- increase Second, duplication. potentially and mess the to add this just would system, coordination PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 29 For For example, There There is no doubt that, in Number Number 27 • 2004 July While the modalities of this Is there scope for agreements could could improve communication and potentially the quality of interventions in the partner organisations to get field. in touch with each other and It could also potentially undertake joint assessments encourage or pool informa- tion and infrastructure. Conclusions Conclusions and recommendations The experience of Bam provides importantimproving lessons coordination for among rapid-onset international emergencies. NGOs Some in key guide this debate. questions should Can be Sphere used the to concept reinvigorate of a set of agreed designs for relief items? Bam, if agencies had been able to show vendors three or four pre-agreed ‘Sphere-compliant’ latrine designs, items could have been deployed. The more concept of standardisation has fallen from quickly and with most favour agencies recently, stressing the need for more effectively locally appropriate solutions, rather than bringing in too many items from abroad. given However, the wide accep- tance the Sphere standards now enjoy, perhaps step a could next be to adapt these into a could set be reviewed and of considered for designs local production in that an emergency. Like Sphere, these would status of rules, but would rather be suggested guidelines. not have the These would need to be adapted stances, but to they individual could at circum- least jump-start a process discussion. a base for concrete provide or Could NGO bodies like VOCA ICVA, or Interaction be more active in putting together rapid-onset joint disasters? assessment teams between in international NGOs on this prior gency, to so the emer- that when mobilisation disaster system strikes is the inter-agency clear? chances for the This rapid deployment of a good-quality could team improve with the a range of skills and attributes. It could also reduce duplication in assessments and generated. results add credence to the Alternatively, or additionally, could international NGOs be represented on UNDAC teams? would need to be worked out, given that many tions already organisa- have emergency rosters it should be possible to work out a system where NGOs could propose pants at short partici- notice. Using the IASC or other existing coor- dination mechanisms could be a good place to start. Could existing coordination bodies play an expanded role in promoting information exchange between agencies and external bodies, such agencies and between individual as the UN, donors and local governments? could Interaction put members considering responding to an emergency in touch with agencies help them make an informed decision on whether to inter- already there, to vene? While clearly it would not bodies make sense to for become these operational in perhaps the designate field, focal point they agencies could in who could emergencies ensure that members were in touch with each other. These interventions designed to would complement the have existing UN to humanitarian be well- Sphere Sphere was seldom actively used for coordination and planning This brings us to the third improvement in the This sector relief brings us to the improvement third in the last networks two such as ICVA decades: and Interaction. Despite the the fact that most arriving organisations in a Bam member were of reinvigoration of NGO one of these membership was coordinating not obvious. In bodies, the first evidence response, month of not the of one UN this meeting ment or report inter-agency appears to assess- have mentioned these organisa- tions. Although clearly it is not the aim of these bodies to actively coordinate response on the ways ground, are that there they between members could prior to a crisis, and facilitate even in the early more days of an emergency? By building communication a culture that reminds organisations of their inter-agency making that sure common documents such as the human- commitments, and itarian charter or other standards are well disseminated, Current Current coordination mechanisms UNDAC meanwhile remains an the United to assist The UNDACtool. system is ‘designed essentially UN-centric Nations in meeting international needs qualified information during the first phase of for a sudden- early and onset disaster and in the coordination of incoming inter- national relief at national level and/or at the site of the emergency. It also aims at strengthening national regional and disaster response capacity’. In Bam, an assess- ment team was deployed within 72 hours. This included from a representatives range of UN bodies, plus at times donor representatives. Despite the fact that UNDAC meant to act as is ‘part of a joint effort to enhance system- wide coordination’, there is currently no international provision for NGOs to be represented would they that UNDACme One told team. member team on the UNDAC have welcomed such participation, but were unsure who would be best suited for it, and how to get good-quality staff at such short notice. More needed. discussion on this is OCHA and UNDAC Despite years of emergency interventions, there remains confusion regarding the role of OCHA. OCHA is clear that its coordinating role within a humanitarian response does not extend to leading it. many Yet NGO representatives in Bam suggested that they would have appreciated OCHA playing a more active part. One senior staffer told me that one reason why agencies were so willing to embrace the zonal system was that organisations there to be clearly was directed – ‘they really an wanted urgent need to be for told where to go so work’. that Government officials also wanted OCHA they to assume could get down to mandate. partits not of was clearly this although role, this And while Sphere was used in reviewing assessment data, assessment reviewing in used was Sphere while And it was of only limited benefit in speeding up materials. latrines and other for process the design information systems, but they could provide a much- needed, less public coordination forum. They could also References and further reading ensure that the NGO perspective is clearly articulated to The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in donors, the government and other actors, and not Disaster Response, Sphere project, second edition, eclipsed by UN or Red Cross appeals and media November 2003. messages. The preliminary report from the UN Lessons Learned The example of international NGO actions in Bam workshop on Bam is available from the OCHA website suggests both a need for improvement, and a willingness at www.unocha.org. to achieve this. Clearly, each of these ideas requires much The UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) further thought and discussion. However, if international Mission Report following the Bam earthquake is at NGOs were able to make progress, we would be in a www.reliefweb.org. better position to answer our colleague from the Iranian Ministry of Health when he asked how we could organise Nicola Reindorp and Peter Wiles, Humanitarian ourselves better in the face of disaster. Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience (London: ODI, June 2001). Jenty Wood is the Humanitarian Programme Manager for Ben Watkins, ‘Information Exchange for Humanitarian Iran, Oxfam GB. The views expressed in this article are her Coordination in the Horn of Africa’, Humanitarian own, and do not necessarily reflect those of Oxfam GB or its Exchange, no. 19, September 2001, www.odihpn.org. affiliates. Her email address is: [email protected].

Children’s feedback committees in Zimbabwe: an experiment in accountability Chris McIvor, Save the Children (UK)

Over the last two years, due to drought, economic decline and low agricultural productivity arising from the government’s land reform prog- ramme, a significant humanitarian operation has been under way to feed Zimbabwe’s people. During the peak of the hungry season from November to April, some four to five million people (about 40% of the population) have been recipients of food aid. This has largely been delivered through inter- national organisations, since govern- ment structures have generally been ©Georgie Scott ©Georgie regarded by donors as too partisan and politically compromised to be able to deliver such assistance in a neutral and impartial manner. An aid delivery at Mucheni School, Zimbabwe To target beneficiaries within areas of need, agencies have largely used community meetings, of when food will be delivered, to assist with distributions supported by traditional structures of leadership such as and to participate in post-distribution monitoring. chiefs, headmen and local councillors. Local leaders convene community gatherings, where agency personnel On paper at least, community involvement in humani- explain the criteria for selecting beneficiaries. After these tarian assistance in Zimbabwe looks significant. Yet there criteria have been discussed and debated, the community are numerous signs that it may not be as extensive as it is then tasked with producing its initial registration list. would appear. Many members of vulnerable communities This is subsequently checked by humanitarian agencies in receipt of food aid do not feel empowered, do not through household verification and further meetings. believe that they are privy to all the information they

PRACTICE AND POLICY PRACTICE NOTES Community committees are set up to notify beneficiaries should receive, and do not feel that agencies or their staff

30 HUMANITARIANexchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 31

©Georgie Scott Number Number 27 • 2004 July monitoring of emergency aid interventions is that the people and organisations complaints tasked and with problems registering people against may whom the complaints are The directed. well be willingness the to share this same feedback and pass it on for resolution may ultimately depend on the goodwill of the people and institutions implicated. structures set up to monitor the performance programmes, of and aid are unable to raise their individual and collective concerns. but exploitation, sexual and coercion physical possible This relates not also to their inclusion only as beneficiaries in programmes. to In Zimbabwe, where numbers of child-headed there households and where such are increasingly families are considerably marginalised within commu- large is acute. this problem nity structures, wake of allegations of sexual widespread exploitation and abuse of refugees in West Africa. One of the task force’s recommendations was that humanitarian agencies must including populations, beneficiary to accountable more be children. This included disseminating information to beneficiaries on their rights, entitlements and responsibil- all ities, as well as the setting up of a mechanism to hear and to complaints. respond Save’s children’s committees children’s Save’s In August 2003, the Save the Children (UK) formulated programme a plan to translate into these recommendations something practical and concrete. that was followed. informed the strategy Several factors • One of the major dilemmas relating to the appropriate • Children are frequently invisible within the community meet To these considerations, the plan envisaged several stages. Food aid would set up beneficiaries, their own committees to particularly collect feedback, complaints children, and suggestions for improvements to the Children Children gather food aid, Mucheni School, Zimbabwe many children claimed they were excluded from the registration process The IASC task force Further impetus for mechanisms that better responded to community concerns, especially among children, from the came Inter-Agency Standing Committee force (IASC) task on Protection This Humanitarian was Crises. set up in March 2002 in the from Exploitation and Abuse in Save Save the surveyChildren (UK)’s also included focus group discussions with 140 boys and girls between the ages of eight and 16. Their criticism Despite was the particularly fact worrying. that many children where live in parents households have either claimed that they were never died included in the registration or are process. Community gatherings did not seek their partici- absent, they partic- verifications pation, nor did subsequent household ularly focus on them consulted. When child-headed as households were included a group that no information was in beneficiary lists, on many occasions needed to be given to them about their entitlements, roles and respon- sibilities. Finally, children unwilling to make indicated complaints, either within the that commu- nity or they to agency staff, were for and adults by echoed observation an was This fear terminated. that food aid might be children alike. No independent, friendly and and people were mechanism of feedback had been set up, accessible left with the impression that the agency did not particu- what they had to say. larly value To explore To community concerns, Save the Children (UK) carried out a survey operational 2003 in its three in August areas in members claimed that explanations of Zimbabwe. selection Community criteria were agency inadequate; staff, people claimed, impatient were when asked, for example. They also pointed questions out that community were gatherings were not necessarily the most appropriate beneficiaries, mechanism for selecting since there publicly was dispute the inclusion of influ- a ential reluctance people to who might food aid, for fear not of recrimination and merit possible persecution. Many of those interviewed also complained of late deliveries, uncertain schedules poor and planning of distribution points. Several areas had no shade to protect against the sun or the rain during adequate latrines or running water. the wet season, nor did they have Community Community complaints are are in any way accountable to is delivered. aid that for the them programme. Child representatives to these committees organisation needs to monitor more closely what happens would be elected by groups of children themselves. These to food after it is collected from distribution points. In representatives in turn would receive training in informa- some cases, guardians may sell a portion of the rations tion-gathering skills, the principles and practice behind received to meet needs which have little to do with the food aid targeting and delivery, documentation and welfare of the rest of the family. reporting skills and learning on how to be accountable, so that the views and opinions of other children were fairly Of particular concern are the cases of child abuse that and adequately represented. Each of these steps was have been brought to the board’s attention. These gener- preceded by detailed discussion with parents and ally relate to the vulnerability of children under the care of community leaders, so as to solicit their permission for step-parents or other guardians, one or both parents children to participate. having died. Sexual exploitation, physical punishment, refusal to support orphans’ attendance at school and To address concerns about potential bias in the collection excessive child labour have been documented. In line with of information, it was decided to establish an indepen- Save the Children (UK)’s child protection policy, these dent channel of communication rather than rely on agency cases have been brought to the attention of the relevant staff to gather and respond to the feedback received. This authorities for further investigation and redress. resulted in the idea of an independent ‘ombudsperson’ who would provide the core point of contact between the The children involved have also registered their interest committees and the programme. This individual was and enthusiasm in being part of this project. It has given expected to report to a board that had wider representa- them skills they otherwise may not have acquired, and tion than senior Save the Children (UK) personnel. A has increased their self-confidence and assertiveness representative of one of the organisation’s principal within the family and the community. donors, a government delegate, a representative from another humanitarian agency and the director of the Save Problems have also been noted. Some committee the Children (UK) programme were to form a hearing members claim that they have been stigmatised by other committee that would respond to the complaints and children and adults as ‘agency spies’, and that some feedback coming from the children’s groups. This board people in the community are fearful that the aid had a mandate to redirect food aid operations in response programme will be terminated as a result of what they to observations received, and to provide feedback to the disclose. Through general community meetings and children around their concerns. awareness raising, Save the Children (UK) has been at pains to point out that the purpose of this endeavour is not to find some pretext to withdraw assistance. One of cases of child abuse are a the principal reasons for greater accountability within the programme is to ensure that it lives up to its ideal of particular concern meeting the needs of the most vulnerable.

Yet it would be naive to expect that promoting the Progress and lessons learnt accountability of emergency food aid programmes to the Seven children’s feedback committees had been formed most marginalised and invisible members of a society by April 2004, representing seven communities in does not have repercussions. This has surfaced in Mutoroshanga District in northern Zimbabwe. These families, where some parents have expressed their reluc- communities largely comprise informal chrome miners tance to allow their children to participate in a process and former commercial farm workers. It is in one of the that they believe might well undermine their authority: most disadvantaged parts of the country. Save the ‘What will they demand next?’ was one comment made by Children (UK) has been working there for the last four guardians at community meetings set up during the initial years. Around 50 children have been trained, through phase of the project. formal workshops and practical on-site visits. An ombudsperson has been recruited and the board has met The fear of subsequent ‘demands’ also has a political dimen- four times to hear feedback from the children, both about sion, and perhaps explains why, in another area of Save the the food aid programme and about other issues. Children (UK) operations, the local authorities rejected a proposal to set up feedback committees. In the project’s The board generally believes that this intervention has pilot district, some traditional leaders and local political provided information of a nature and quality that may not representatives have expressed concern about setting up have been possible through the normal post-distribution feedback and complaints mechanisms that might challenge monitoring visits conducted by international NGOs. In their own ways of doing things in the community. As one particular, children have raised issues around the alloca- councillor remarked, it is a short step from promoting the tion of food aid within households, and the marginalisa- accountability of food aid deliveries to demands for greater tion of orphans by caregivers prioritising their own accountability among elected office-holders. children at mealtimes. When agency officers have previ- ously conducted household verification visits, these Chris McIvor is Country Programme Director for observations have never been shared with them. The Zimbabwe, Save the Children (UK). His email address is: children’s committees have also suggested that the [email protected]. PRACTICE AND POLICY PRACTICE NOTES

32 HUMANITARIANexchange References and further reading

Humanitarian Exchange no. 24, July 2003, has a special feature on accountability, including an article covering the West African sex scandal. Feedback Channels: A Save the Children (UK) Strategy for Channelling Complaints and Suggestions Related to Food Aid Operations in Zimbabwe, internal document, Harare, July 2003. Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises in Southern Africa, WFP, UNICEF, SC (UK) Regional Training Report, Pretoria, May 2003. Report of the IASC Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises, 13 June 2002, www.unicef.org/emerg/IASCTFReport.pdf.

Civil society and Islamic aid in Iraq: unseen developments and threats Theo Murphy, independent

This article explores two related, but neglected, aspects may become a problematic trend.1 The regional historical of the aid environment in Iraq: the politicisation of aid by pattern dictates that an embryonic organisation develops local religious/political parties; and the role and position an ideology and then complements this with aid, slowly of international Islamic aid. Clearly, in the politically building a following before becoming militarised. In Iraq, charged climate of present-day Iraq, the activities, the opposite has taken place: the impulse to address the funding and political affiliation of international aid is a key most pressing need, security, has created political/reli- question. Yet while there has been extensive debate gious parties that already possess military power without

about US NGOs and their affiliations with the belligerents, having proved themselves in any other way, nor neces- NOTES PRACTICE AND POLICY Islamic aid organisations are afforded de facto member- sarily commanding popular support. Addressing inade- ship of the humanitarian community in Iraq without any quacies in electricity and fuel availability or high enquiry into their funding, affiliation and agenda. This unemployment – all of which are present needs – is not presents a potential – but unforeseen – threat to the prin- easy. Patrolling the streets with armed militias is another ciples of humanitarian action. matter, and perhaps a shortcut to legitimacy.

Manipulation by political/religious parties History in the region suggests that the emerging polit- ical/religious parties in Iraq will need to turn to something security is the greatest need, other than rhetoric in order to build a constituency for and the greatest deficit taking power. Historically in the Middle East, inchoate organisations and parties like Hamas and Hizbollah generated support by providing essential services that the government could not provide. Iraqi groups like al Sectarianism and intra-sect tension and competition are Dawa and the Sadr party can be expected to do the same. likely to increase as elections draw near, with implications With the pressure of upcoming elections (or impending for the perceived neutrality of international NGOs. civil or sectarian war), competition to provide aid in order Comparisons with Lebanon in the 1980s, where extreme to consolidate political support seems likely. That this has divisions shaped the political and humanitarian land- not happened yet does not mean that it will not do so in scape, cannot be ignored. While international NGOs are the future. Emerging groups are addressing gaps in the aware of the Sunni–Shi’a–Kurdish split, little attention is essential services that the ‘government’ (the Coalition paid to how this is evolving, or how these groups may use Provisional Authority) is providing. It is only that these international NGOs for their own ends. gaps are not ‘humanitarian’, but security-related.

The proliferation of armed ‘brigades’ and ‘corps’ linked to 1 This article was written before the events of early April 2004, sects and political parties highlights that security is the surrounding Moqtada al Sadr. This comment reflects more the threat greatest need and greatest deficit in essential services. of these armed groups aligning against one another and forcing inter- The ‘Mahdi Army’ and other groups that patrol the holy national NGOs into perceived alliance with the groups in whose region cities of Najaf and Karbala mark the beginning of what they work.

Number 27 • July 2004 33 Although the co-option of inter- national aid by various groups is not unique to Iraq, it is signifi- cant nonetheless because it may erode the impartiality of humanitarian agencies in the eyes of other competing groups or parties. Thus, even though international NGOs may provide their aid on an impartial basis, it ©Reuters/Gleb Garanich/courtesy www.alertnet.org Garanich/courtesy ©Reuters/Gleb may be that, due to an NGO’s geographic location, it may be perceived by default as being aligned with this particular party or group. Thus, an interna- tional NGO working in Sadr city may face co-option by the Sadr, who will take the credit for bringing in the NGO’s services. This is nothing new. But the fact that the NGO may then be seen as being non-neutral and non- Iraqi women wait for humanitarian aid, Baghdad, April 2003 impartial, because of the location of its projects within a sectarian enclave, is potentially a much greater risk, since privately funded, the freedom that this usually implies is a this poses obvious security problems when NGOs depend myth. In the case of Gulf states, and the international for protection on recognition of their status. In effect, the Islamic NGOs deriving funding from them, there is a agency becomes perceived as pro-Sadr, with obvious conse- tendency towards the Salafi interpretation of Islam. This is quences if the Sadr come into conflict with other Shi’a, important as regards Iraq in that, in this interpretation, Sunni or Kurdish groups. Shi’a are considered as virtual infidels. Thus, when funding is given to meet the appeals of the international Islamic It is as yet unclear to what degree the neutrality of inter- NGOs in Iraq, private donors are thinking of their Sunni Iraqi national NGOs will be questioned based on where ‘brothers’, not the whole of Iraq, especially the Shi’a. projects are located. It may come to the point, as it did in Impartiality is therefore compromised, through the Lebanon, where an NGO is scrutinised for the number of earmarking of funds, on which programme decisions are projects it has in each sectarian area, but as yet people based. In interviews conducted with some of these NGOs, are not monitoring this very closely. More research into executives lament the earmarking of donor money, and are opinion on the ground is needed to see to what degree distressed at being compelled to serve Sunnis and not all this is the case, because if this perception holds true it Iraqis. The concrete results of this earmarking of funds are can have serious security-related consequences. After the reflected in the geographic distribution of international first Gulf war, some international NGOs were criticised as Islamic NGO programmes, which overwhelmingly focus on being pro-Kurdish, since the majority of programmes were the Sunni Triangle. Therefore, some Islamic NGOs, though in the Kurdish north of Iraq. When Iraq was under the independent of political influence, are constrained by donor control of Saddam Hussein’s regime, this criticism never bias. In the same way, US NGOs are tied to the US govern- developed into a security threat. In the current lawless ment indirectly through funding. environment, this may no longer hold. Another possibility is that Islamic NGOs may be guided by The threat from within: the hidden face of local, especially Gulf, governments. In this case, ties to international humanitarianism? some of these NGOs may also shape their programme The identity of humanitarian assistance in Iraq is also under choices according to political machinations. It is likely threat from within. The lack of independence has received a that the Sunni Gulf states fear an expansion of hostile great deal of attention from European agencies, which criti- Shi’a influence along their borders, and wish to stem it. cise the relationship between their US counterparts and the Thus government-driven aid via government-dominated occupying forces. However, Islamic, especially Gulf-based, Islamic NGOs may be used to ‘buy’ the goodwill of the NGOs operating in Iraq pose a much greater, and as yet Shi’a south, perhaps in the hope of creating a friendly unrealised, threat to humanitarian principles. Whereas US neighbour out of a one-time foe. NGOs may be criticised for a lack of independence (and perhaps eventually neutrality and impartiality should the conflict devolve into a large-scale US–Iraqi conflict), some the identity of humanitarian aid Islamic NGOs reject impartiality in a much more blatant way, in particular in making a distinction between Sunni is under threat from within

PRACTICE AND POLICY PRACTICE NOTES and Shi’a in Iraq. While many Islamic NGOs claim to be

34 HUMANITARIANexchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 35 , (London: IS1M Newsletter Number Number 27 • 2004 July , HPG Report 14 (London: ODI,, HPG Report 2003). 14 (London: worked for an international NGO in Basrah (New York: Random House, 2002). Random York: (New local population, it must seriously examine itself, and more strictly define what it means by neutral, impartial and inde- pendent aid. Without knowing how all humanitarian actors are funded, politically aligned and ideologically driven, the humanitarian community risks passively linking organisations itself and to objectives that many would of strenuously its reject, members and themselves actively from. seek This to is an distance environment NGO with where the even privilege of an independent funding may easily find itself entangled in partisan aid, if not by its own actions then by its association with the actions of other NGOs, groups. affiliation with local religious/political through or It is essential for the security of all international actors in Iraq that the principles of humanitarian upheld. the Unfortunately, argument that assistance the ends justify are the means, or that the Coalition’s objectives amount to humanitarian ideals, prevails with the majority of the aid community in Iraq, who view the exigencies of funding as their primary concern. In the process of securing funding, agencies are happy to join the Coalition as ‘force multi- pliers’ or field agents of the ‘hearts and minds campaign’. In such an the environment, principles of aid set are aside keepsakes of another era. as anachronistic Theo Murphy in 2003. He has Afghanistan. He is also currently working in Darfur. worked His email in is [email protected]. address Sudan, Jordan and The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World by Randolph Kent (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). Press, University (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Network Paper 46, April 2004 Humanitarian futures: practical policy perspectives The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq Case for Invading The Storm: Threatening The Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Trail The Jihad: This paper is about the future, and about how tomorrow may well not look much agencies like the humanitarian environment of today. can adapt to meet it. The humanitarian environment of It argues that many of the changes that are occurring now are likely to In community. the impinge foreseeable future, in we may some face new way types of on humanitarian the crisis, with humanitarian new tools at our disposal to reduce their impact. In turn, many of the increasingly assumptions less relevant. The question – upon and the central issue addressed which here – is whether and humanitarian how humanitarian organisations need to develop, do they What strategies can deal with the dynamics of change, and its consequences. organisations base their work may be and how should such strategies be becoming linked to policies and practice on the ground? For a copy of this Network Paper, contact [email protected]. The paper website: is www.odihpn.org. available for download at the HPN no. 5, July 2000, www.isim.nl/newsletterl. no. Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, References and further and reading References I. B. Tauris, 2003). Tauris, I. B. Jonathan Benthall, ‘Humanitarianism and Issues and Trends of A Review Terror’: on War Humanitarian Action and the ‘Global Islam after 11 September’, in Joanna Gilles Keppel, Macrae and Adele Harmer (eds), M. Pollack, Kenneth Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan, ‘Islamic Relief Organizations: Between “Islamism” and “Humanitarianism”’, Conclusions The potential manipulation of aid by local in groups has Iraq the opportunisticmany historical parallels: explosion of civil society in Somalia, the sectarian division Lebanese down to example the provision of universal appropriation of aid of by regional factions, to extreme name aid, and the awareness of lack the is Iraq in distressing is What few. a but of these pitfalls, and the active cooperation from human- erode partswhich actions in community humanitarian the of community hopes itarian principles. If the international NGO to maintain some semblance of neutrality in the eyes of the It is unclear to what degree and in what form neighbouring governments are involved in Iraq, but the country is strate- gically important, and logic dictates that they are seeking a in their national interest. way to influence developments States States may also try through to spreading influence a politic Islam. (the Da’wa spreading and revitalisation of Islam) is a developments state-particular interpretation primary of tool thereof, a religious manipulated for political ends. By creating co-religionists, principle that is often through drawing people to a particular of influence into the sphere may be drawn Islam, adherents interpretation of of the state whose ideology they share. A prime example is the spread of Wahabism, an ideology particular to Arabia. Saudi Within development or relief programmes, that those focus on education are efforts and assimilation. at ideology dissemination the most likely vehicle for 36 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES nild Ntrl iatr ad ope Political Complex conclu- key sions thatemerged. and the summarises article Disasters This 2003, Emergencies’. November ‘Natural in (BRCS) entitled Society Cross Red British other the by hosted and seminar one-day a These at debated state? were issues functioning no is there if cially be espe- preparedness, conflict, is to responsibility and Whose promoted? disasters natural both is to that sensitive analysis, and be warning and early holistic to best approach more flexible a hazard can How natural portrayed? and and assessed conflict of combination a by caused emergency humanitarian a can How lenges. chal- difficult some raises emergencies political complex and disasters natural between interface the at Operating experi- countries in occurred encing complexpoliticalemergencies. have disasters ‘natural’ to subject periodic natural hazards. Inthelastfive years, atleast140 also are emergencies political complex from suffering areas many while ‘natural’, truly rarely are ters disas- natural inappropriate: often is this Yet (CPEs). cies emergen- political distinction complex and disasters natural between conceptual and operational sharp a is There risk of natural hazards has been linked to the weakening the to linked been has hazards natural of risk increased the Colombia, In recorded. ever rates mortality and malnutrition highest the of some by marked famine a triggering insecurity,thus food acute facing already areas rural early into towns from in displacement massive attacks caused 1998 Rebel 1997. of end conflict-related the by of vulnerability years high many of state a in population the left and had impoverishment drought of years threeGhazal, El Bahr In conflict. sufferedyearsof had tion popula- the of most Afghanistan, hit drought the weakened, time the been has disaster.natural a to resiliencetherefore local and gies By base strate- coping local asset of viability the reducing substantially the natural impover- effect, the long-term a of ishing had impact has conflict the Where increased disaster. that conflict of In allofthesesituations,itwasusuallythe by followed 2001, in India in Gujarat in earthquake the • in conflict and disaster natural of combination the • thedrought inAfghanistanbetween 1999and2001; • to 1997 in Sudan South in famine Ghazal El Bahr the • or atleastwithconditionsofpoliticalinstability: CPE, a with coincided disaster natural a where situations of preparedwere studies seminar,case the four of advance In CPEs and disasters natural between interface The Margie Buchanan-Smith, independent consultant, and Ian Christoplos, ODI Research Associate Research ODI Christoplos, Ian and consultant, independent Buchanan-Smith, Margie emergencies political complex amid disasters Natural HUMANITARIAN communal riotinginAhmedabad2002. Atrato in flooding recurrent and Medio); and 1999 January in earthquake Belt’) (‘Coffee Cafetero Eje (the Colombia 1998; exchange indirect effects cn i hlig i wres ehn ter intervention their rethink theirapproach totargeting.strategies, particularly workers aid helping in icant and how thesewere changing. hasbeensignif- This report providing Dinka the amongst vulnerability of causes study,the into insight vulnerability seminal a commissioned SC-UK 1998, WFP.and In (SC-UK) Children-UK the Save of work economy food the through particularly analysis, and gathering information in investment long-term been There has practice. good of example an offers Sudan South unless better-off, the positive andsometimescontroversial stepswere taken. by captured were resources tion rehabilita- and relief limited as consequences devastating and more even with reproduced, structures simply were relations power social Exploitative resources. bilitation reha- and relief of way by least the received marginalised often groups most and poorest the result, a As society. underlying in the relations power unequal and discrimination on of patterns up pick to slow were agencies earthquake, many Gujarat a the After of event. seismic impact or destructive climatic is direct the emergency about the assumptions beyond look because to failure a of because either or defined, narrowly rare, is holistic of approach kind this Yet vulnerable. some particularly make groups that factors political and social underlying the capture also should hazards natural on focused ment assess- vulnerability a environment, peaceful more a In weakened been by years ofconflict. have may respond and cope to capacity local how disaster,and natural of risk the overlook to tendency a is conflict violent with marginalisation.political Yetand/or areasthereconflict in associated risks to the and an fashion disaster, constitute timely natural of risks the both to attention raise to Assessments and opportunity emergencies. appropriate an compound to in ability vulnerability the strengthening respond broad-based to key to the is assessments commitment greater A play to role key a Vulnerability– assessments early warning, so that when a crisis is imminent the early the imminent is crisis a when that so warning, early for critical is dynamics longer-term these Understanding warning early of challenge The inl aaiy o noc ln ue euain has regulations the riskoffloodsandlandslides. use land increasing forests, of exploitation enforce unchecked the allowed to capacity tional institu- of lack The institutions. local on conflict of effect of a natural disaster natural a of impact the increase that conflict of effects indirect the is it PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 37 Number Number 27 • 2004 July a more analysis comprehensive of risk would help break down the distinction between natural hazards and conflict Closing the gap between the natural disaster and CPE discourses: a way forward The strong message that emerged from the case studies and the seminar discussions is that there is a need for aid agencies to strengthen their contextual – and especially political – analysis regardless in of whether they are labelled these ‘natural disaster’ compound or emergencies, ‘complex political preparedness emergency’, for all and types of to tarian discourse has emergency. become overly focused on CPEs, The just strengthen humani- as the natural disaster discourse has technical remained risk reduction at tied the expense to of understanding the political complexities that are inevitably involved. If vulnera- in reducing coherent to become more policies are these barriers must be reduced. bility, A more comprehensive analysis of risk, that breaks down the distinction between natural hazards and conflict, one way is of achieving this. Vulnerability analyses associ- ated with natural disasters could break cratic ruts out by drawing lessons of from the growing focus techno- on political economy analyses in CPEs. Those working with CPEs could learn about the disaster-affected practical people from those challenges working with natural facing The common denominator for both is the need to hazards. people. vulnerable focus on the risks faced by Institutional Institutional distinctions between natural disasters and CPEs Often, agencies become lopsided in their focus type of emergency rather than on on both. In Atrato Media in one Colombia, for example, decided to some focus on conflict alone, even humanitarian when they were agencies working in an area affected by natural disaster in the form of recurrent flooding. The responsibility for was left to responding state institutions or the Colombian Red Cross. Yet the response to the floods could have been strength- ened by the involvement of these humanitarian agencies. They are often in a position to respond more rapidly and effectively than the state, have teams already in the area, of the local context. knowledge and have Colombia also offers a positive example of agencies humanitarian taking a more earthquakeBelt, a number of agencies sought in the Coffee integrated approach. After the to ensure good minimise the likelihood of armed groups interfering in their communication and work. transparency, Caritas, for to instance, paid special standard attention of to housing the they were building, recognising that new houses could become a source of conflict. They also included some beneficiaries who had affected by the earthquake, not but were nevertheless been equally directly the likelihood of conflict. reduce again to vulnerable, regime regime was in government government fell, Taliban Taliban ? First, when trying to persuade a scep- in time the funding environment changed, and there was a huge influx of donor resources. At the same time, there was a massive turnover of international staff and poaching of skilled Afghan staff by the UN, private contractors and embassies. This weakened the ability of NGOs to do in- depth vulnerability assessments at when just the financial resources the were available. When moment the new UN mission to Afghanistan, UNAMA, was set up in early 2002, the influx of international staff meant These new demoted. effectively many national staff were that and the experience often lacked local knowledge arrivals of negotiating in Afghanistan. Conditions required for preparedness Preparedness to implement requires mitigating a conducive interventions funding skills environment, and adequate clarity about who initiatives. Afghanistan is offers an leading example preparedness of how diffi- cult it may be to September guarantee 2001, preparedness all was of reasonably strong these. amongst international aid agencies Prior in terms of skills and to 11 experience. But as long as the power, power, it was difficult for aid agencies to access donor funding to tackle By the end of 2000, to the drought. people so vulnerable the underlying issues the scale that of the drought was made close to overwhelming all the agencies involved. After the tical donor audience agencies must be coordinated and coherent in their to early respond, warning messages – NGOs a particular challenge in and a complex crisis other where the causal linkages may be hard contested to and predict. Second, agencies which have done early the warning analysis must be prepared effective and to sustained engage advocacy in in delivering the early warning message, even more so in a hostile political envi- to respond. reluctant donors are where ronment So what can an early warning system do to convince scep- So what can an early warning system do tical decision-makers (particularly donors but also NGOs) to respond, In Bahr El Ghazal, the long-term investment in informa- tion-gathering paid off, at standing what least was happening. More in than nine months terms of before the famine, SC-UK issued a statement under- that parts of South Sudan were heading for the worst year since Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) had begun in 1989. But the impact of the long-term erosion of livelihoods and coping strategies was hard to convey. ments, Donor looking for simple, govern- concise messages, were not well-disposed to receiving and acting upon these early warnings of famine. Significant made resources were available only when widespread there was starvation. hard warning had failed, evidence Where shocking media coverage provided of conventional the trigger, early but by famine. then in response to full-blown warning warning system can different’, in other words why an acute crisis communicate is impending why ‘this This can be distress. chronic extended period of amidst an year is particularly challenging when of the crisis. complex causes there are multiple and 38 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES aua dsses fr xml i Idnsa Npl or Nepal inter- and impact Indonesia, the countries these of all in In Zimbabwe. example for disasters, natural recurrent to vulnerability population’s the on impact an in research real-time to countries where conflict and political instability are having itself lend would agenda This type this for required is support funding of kind What 4. to findings their communicate practitioners can How 3. tech- a from broadened be assessment risk can How 2. vulnera- affect instability conflict/political does How 1. Key questionstobeaddressed wouldinclude: and interconnectedness to the elicit amore timelyandappropriate response. order in capture ‘natural-disaster-plus-conflict’ of to complexity tools) to ical research, analyt- other for (and area assessments vulnerability productive strengthen most the possibly is of analysis This overlaid. be an can emergency the of causes which immediate underlying of the top on of vulnerability, of understanding causes promotes it if ularly the of partic- assessment, persuaded vulnerability the of potential unifying strongly were participants Seminar website: www.odihpn.org. HPN the at download for available is paper The [email protected]. Paper,contact Network this of copy a For and hostpopulations,menwomen,adultsadolescents. migrants forced a displaced, internally is the and There refugees between systems. equity of evaluation issue the and address to monitoring need paramount good and management; good support; technical and training good programmes; sound culturally and technically of design the greater enable to a experience requireand evidence will on reliance services of quality and content coverage, the in gaps the bridging that argues paper This impossible foraffectedpopulationsactuallytoobtainreproductive health services. or difficult it making remain, quality and content coverage,programme in gaps substantial past, the in than today While thescopeofreproductive available healthservices toconflict-affectedpopulationsiswithoutquestionbetter titioners withessentialinformationfordelivering effective reproductive topeopleincrises. healthservices tude ofreproductive healthneeds;andexplores thelessonsforprogramming. Itaimstoequiphumanitarianprac- magni- the about know we what outlines policy; in advances describes paper This emergencies.reproductive in to needs health respond to capacity a developing in made been has progress significant decade, past the Over HUMANITARIAN f nlssassmn, hc tks long-term a takes perspective? which analysis/assessment, of convincing way? and accessible an in crisis compound a of convincingly,decision-makers complexity the conveying political and social incorporate factors? to approach nical national levels? How canthisbestbemeasured? and district household, at disasters, natural to bility Reproductive health for conflict-affected people: policies, research and programmes and research policies, people: conflict-affected Reproductivefor health exchange by Therese McGinn, Sara Casey, Susan Purdin and Mendy Marsh Casey,Mendy Sara and McGinn, Purdinby Therese Susan Network Paper 45, April 2004 April 45, Paper Network measures inplace. preparedness adequate not are nor are understood, disaster sufficiently natural and conflict of connectedness Sector Humanitarian the in Decision-making and Assessment Hofmann, C.-A. and Darcy J. Emergency and March 2004). Development Programming in Preparedness Twigg, John andMango,2001). DMI (London andAhmedabad:HI, 2001 2001-October January Funds. India Appeal Earthquake DEC of Expenditure of Evaluation Independent Southern ‘The 1998). (Nairobi: SC-UK, Chol, Sudan Vulnerability Study’ Changath Chol and Harrigan S. the to Guideposts Future Development: in Administration (ed.), Collins P. in Mitch’, Hurricane after Narratives the Rejuxtaposing Services: Public and I. Christoplos, ‘Natural Disasters, Complex Emergencies available from theBRCS. are seminar the for papers Background 2004. (BRCS), ‘Natural Society Cross Red British the by Christoplos, Hosted Seminar a on I. Report Emergencies’, Political and Complex Amid Disasters Buchanan-Smith M. References reading andfurther , HPG Report 15(London: 2003). , HPGReport ODI, (Chichester: John Wiley andSons,2000). iatr ik euto: iiain and Mitigation Reduction: Risk Disaster Go Patc Rve 9 Lno: ODI, (London: 9 Review Practice Good , According to Need: Needs Need: to According plig Public Applying PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 39 Number Number 27 • 2004 July a normal environmental impact assessment will not work in a quick-onset crisis Crisis assessment a legal requirement Rarely Reactive May need to be partial in coverage data Based on available ‘No project’ outcome is not an option Completed in hours to weeks Sudden-onset location Unpredictable Uncertain duration and dynamic Beneficiary population heterogeneous to life-saving activities sometimes difficult to given Priority goals with environmental reconcile Contrasting Contrasting normal and rapid environmental impact assessments An environmental impact assessment (EIA) is intended to identify disaster-related impacts before on they the occur, so environment avoided. Normal EIA procedures that are always not, however, they can appropriate be mitigated for or humanitarian between crises. a normal The and 1. Table summarised in are assessment context differences a crisis environmental impact Normal EIA procedures should be used when a crisis has been under way for some time (beyond six where a months), change in status or is gradual, as in the case of the slow implementation of a peace updating) an EIA doing (and periodically perspective, for a agreement. From this protracted humanitarian crisis such as the conflict in Sri the Lanka slow is transition to feasible. peace Similarly, in Sudan provides more than and programmatic of strategic use the results and execute enough time to environmental impact assessments as input into planning develop, process. and managing the post-conflict transition A normal EIA will not work in a quick-onset crisis such a war, or when a crisis goes through a rapid transition. For example, the normal EIA useful results until long process after the relief phase would following a not cyclone, produce or when dramatic a and rapid change changes in the in social and economic government leads to A legal requirement often exists A legal requirement and proactive Deliberate and extensive be thorough Will data collection Comprehensive ‘No project’ option is a possible outcome Completed in months to years launch planned Project chosen Location planned Duration Beneficiary population identifiable and static goals may be made compatible with socio- Environmental economic ones Normal assessment Modified from a normal–disaster comparison developed by UNHCR by a normal–disaster comparison developed Modified from and CARE Table 1: Differences in context between normal and crisis environmental impact assessment between normal and crisis environmental in context 1: Differences Table Including Including the environment in humanitarian assistance Benfield Hazard Research Centre, University College London Charles Kelly, This article provides a brief progress-to-date summary of the Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment in Disasters project. The project has developed structured and process field tested to a identify between disasters and the environment which need to be and prioritise linkages and short-term relief for effective recovery. considered Humanitarian relief can itself lead to negative impacts on the The environment. concentration refugees of in Kosovo Kukes in Albania, for handling example, capacities. exceeded As local a result, waste- refuse and tips raw sewage was dumped overflowed into stream courses. These waste problems were exacerbated by relief supplies in packaging excessive and the distribution the provision of of disposable sanitary items. At the same time, humani- tarian assistance can improve environmental conditions. Following urban fighting, for example, using food an for work intervention in a clean-up effective way of campaign improving the local can environment, as be well an as getting food to the needy. The idea of considering humanitarian assistance might the seem illogical. The environment midst as of a humanitarian crisis may not look like the best time to part of start trying to hug trees; trying to combine environmental action with humanitarian aid could jeopardise both. Still, not considering the environment during a humanitarian crisis risks a number of significant The negative environment outcomes. is a major origins contributing of most factor humanitarian to crises. the Failing to the links consider between the crisis and the environment means that humanitarian aid will be based on an incomplete and incorrect understanding of the crisis. A likely result is that the aid will do less good than intended, or could actually of the crisis. contribute to the worsening or prolonging 40 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES . e nertbe no te assmn tos and tools assessment other into integratable Be 6. inputasandwhenavailable. Incorporate participatory 5. identifi- the response. While crisis to directly linked Be 4. of phases initial the In data. quantitative require Not 3. Be be usable by non-specialists. Specialists are important to 2. need results These quickly. results Produce 1. number ofcriteria.Itneedsto: a meet to needs crisis a in work can which process EIA An output horizon foranormalEIA). (the years or months not days, of matter a in operations and plans into providedinput and as identified be to need issues environmental salient points, crisis these order.At niomna Cneune o Rle Atvte) The Activities). Relief (Negative of strategies Consequences coping local Environmental as well as assistance relief of impact the to Needs) Unmet (e.g. considerations relief-specific to Statement) Context (The environment the and crisis the between linkages possible about information general from move both operation, in different significantly though Assessments, Community and Organisational The be accomplishedinadifferent order (see asconditionsallow. issues environmental Figure salient 1). These stepsare notalock-stepprocess, andcan on attention focus to designed steps 11 of series a involves process REA The which after crisis, proceduresroutine shouldbepossible. the EIA after days 120 first the in use for designed is process REA The crisis. the to related environmental issues important most the on perspectives nity commu- and government) local incorporates NGO, (e.g. organisational which process subjective a uses It issues. environmental salient identify rapidly to means the with non-specialist providethe to designed is process REA The (REA) Disasters in project hasjustcompletedafirstphaseofactivities. Assessment Impact CARE Environmental Rapid The situations. crisis and other and disasters in ments London a test assess- impact environmental and conduct rapidly to College process develop to collaborated University have International at Research Hazard Centre Benfield the years, four past the Over Disasters in Assessment Impact EnvironmentalRapid HUMANITARIAN mental results donotexistinisolation. environ- that so processes assessment sectoral other of part be and into link to needs process assessment The issue. cross-cutting a is Environment processes. of crisisiftheyare tofeedintoplansandoperations. immediacy the to related be must important, results process the is issues long-term to medium- of cation being or data, bad to risks stalled whencriticaldataisnotavailable. due process results bad quantitative-based producing A unreliable. or scarce is data quantitative crises, humanitarian many not should assessment wait forthespecialists. The crisis. a of the stages in early time right the at available specialist right the is rarely but process, response and assessment the to updatable withminimaleffort. exchange n uoe Cnrl mrc, ni, ot America North have events India, training and tests America, field The Australia. Central and Europe, in in events crises held, been have events after training REA Five countries. these shortly or during Ethiopia Indonesia Afghanistan, in and tested field been has REA The REA the using in learned Lessons niomna ipcs n avrey fet h very the affect adverselypeople theyare tryingtohelp. and impacts environmental negative have can provide they assistance the that stood the under- fully that not has community suggests assistance humanitarian organisations humanitarian of part the on policies procurement sustainable of lack general The norm. the than rather exception the is this but dures, organisations have green procurement policiesandproce- assistance humanitarian Some plans. and policies ment procure- emergency standard into process the integrate to effective more is it plans), procurement emergency of development the of part as (e.g., disaster a during review procurement greenness the do to possible is it Although immediate andlong-termnegative impactsofassistance. design, review or procurement the stages of a project, to minimise the at used be can questions, eight of in checklist provided assistance a involving process, screening This the crisis. the to response of identify to (sustainability) used is ‘greenness’ process linked but separate A as used be can which procedures needed andasappropriate indisastersandcrisis. of set a provide to but process, lock-step a create to not is REA the of The intent process. Analysis and Consolidation the of a revision in results Assessment Organization the of integration later a with first, done be could Assessment Community Community the Alternatively, available. the becomes communities initially, from done information as soon as completed be should be Assessment Organisational the can only that Assessment mean conditions If time. same the at Assessments Community and Organisational the both do to recommended, is but necessary, not is It ronmental impacts. envi- negative potential for resulting again screened the then actions with module, Analysis and Consolidation community the in prioritised and and consolidated then are organisationalassessments the in identified Issues food securityassessment)tosave cost,timeandeffort. assessment other can be integratedREA into other field assessments (e.g., a from field or the for data community collecting of detailed process The reports. informants including key means, of surveys, collected variety be a can through questions the answer to Information crisis. a by affected indirectly and directly communities to concern of to issues environmental questions disaster-related identify of set a uses Assessment Community The the of perspective the organisation(s) providing humanitarianassistance. from environmental important are disaster-related which those issues identify to issues environmental potential of of range set broad a a covering tables and narrative uses Assessment Organisational

PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 41 Action Module 4 Number Number 27 • 2004 July Step 11 of relief review Green procurement analysis Module 3 identifying community concerns vital to a successful impact. assessment of environmental involved in field-level operations seem to find it easier to understand and use the REA than people with less crisis assessment. hands-on experience in rapid complicated than was intended in seems to come the from users (both in design. the field tests and This in training) trying to extract maximum output from the process. Unfortunately, this assessment tendency process makes more consuming, the demanding which and increases is too long and complicated. process time- complaints that the suggestions for improving and expanding crisis post-crisis and environmental impact assessment. One is to develop a quantitative data-driven assessment tool to fill the gap between a rapid assessment in the first weeks of a crisis, and when EIA results would be avail- able. Another suggestion is to develop REA versions which are localised to specific countries These REAs or would be simpler to use and more directly regions. linked to local environmental issues and than the generic REA under the project. developed responses Consolidation and • Individuals who are currently or who have been • There is a tendency to make the REA process more • Use and review of the REA have led to a number of Two other aspects of the REAtesting and training are worth noting. First, which the REA takes have emerged in Step 7 Consolidate the issues Step 8 Identify critical issues and actions Step 9 issues and Prioritize actions Step 10 Environmental consequences of relief activities review Module 2 Based on information collected directly communities from secondary or from sources Step 6 Community level assessment: community assessment summary form Module 1 assessment Organization level level Organization simple and easy to use, some complicated if the process is aspects not fully understood. The can become REA was initially written in English, and it can be hard for those who do not have a good grasp of the English language. It has been translated planned. are additional translations into Spanish, and usable results, and these lead to improvements in the environmental and other operations. aspects of humanitarian closely linked. However, it was found that knowledge of Sphere was not universal. It became necessary to decouple the REA from Sphere, although this linkage can be easily re-established by Sphere. (The users environment familiar is a with cross-cutting issue in Sphere. The REA is a way of considering the environ- assessment process.) ment in the Sphere-mandated assessment, but the broad scope impacts and the close link between environmental and of environmental humanitarian conditions in many communities makes crisis assessment. Step 1 Context statement Step 2 influencing Factors impacts environmental Step 3 threats Environmental of disasters Step 4 Unmet basic needs Step 5 environmental Negative consequences of relief activities Figure 1: The REA process 1: The Figure • Despite these difficulties, the process does produce • Initially, the REA process and Sphere indicators were • Community input is critical. This can be said for any • Although the assessment process was designed to be • There is considerable resistance to doing yet another identified a number of that: were among the points learned Key process. changes to improve the REA a very broad look at the crisis situation. This contrasts REA are likely to be developed by users in a bottom-up with most other impact assessment tools used in a crisis, process, rather than through centralised design. In parallel, which are sector-specific. It can, however, be difficult to the REA needs to be integrated into other assessment tools integrate the REA into sector-specific assessments. This to make it easier to do, and because critical linkages integration process, which is important in reducing the between the environment and crises exist in all humani- workload and cost involved, needs further attention. tarian assistance sectors.

Second, the REA is one of the few assessment tools which A second phase of the REA project began in March 2004. explicitly considers the perspectives of the humanitarian This will focus on three areas: response organisation and the crisis victim (community) separately in framing issues and actions. Because informa- • Training, including training of field staff and REA tion on survivor views may not be immediately available or trainers. representative, plans for immediate response are neces- • Disseminating and perfecting the REA process. sarily based on a variety of formal and informal assess- • Support for use of the REA in large-scale disasters. ments. These inputs are filtered by the perceptions which the humanitarian assistance providers bring to the crisis. These efforts are expected to increase awareness, use The organisational module of the REA forces users to recog- and adaptation of the REA process. nise the role that these perceptions play in shaping the response, as well as raising issues which may not initially There was no purpose-built way to systematically be considered. Integrating the issues important to organi- consider environmental issues in humanitarian crises sations with issues identified by those directly affected by a when the project started four years ago. This has now crisis leads to a convergence of purpose for relief and changed. With the existence of a tested REA process, the recovery plans and activities. This improves the impact and years ahead should see a greater integration of environ- effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. mental issues into humanitarian assistance, and the increased effectiveness of this assistance. Conclusions The REA offers significant advantages in broadening our Charles Kelly is an Affiliate at the Benfield Hazard understanding of the links between the environment and Research Centre, University College London. He can be crises, and bringing together the perceptions of assis- reached at [email protected]. tance providers and of those experiencing the crisis. Both these outcomes improve the planning and execution of Further details of the REA project, including Guidelines for humanitarian assistance. Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment, background information and training materials developed by The REA continues to evolve. It is a generic approach and is InterWorks with project funding, can be found at most effective when adapted to specific contexts. These www.benfieldhrc.org/SiteRoot/disaster_studies/rea/rea_ contexts can include conditions found in a specific country index.htm. A CD containing a beta version of an eLearning or region, or specific types of disaster. Adaptations to the (self-study) module on the REA is available on request.

Useful websites

USAID Africa Bureau Environmental Assessment Capacity Building Program (ENCAP): www.encapafrica.org. Food Aid Management (resource and procedure documents on environmental impact assessments): www.foodaid- management.org/envmt3.htm. The International Association for Impact Assessment: www.iaia.org. The UN Environment Programme: www.unep.org. UNHCR’s pages on the environment and refugees: www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=PROTECT&id= 3b94c47b4. Other resources Environmental Documentation Manual (Washington DC: USAID Environmental Working Group, Food Aid Management, January 1999). Environmentally-friendlier Procurement Guidelines (Geneva: UNHCR, 1997). Joseph Bishop, Guidelines For Environmental Assessment Following Chemical Emergencies (Geneva: UNEP/OCHA Environmental Unit, 1999). Richard Black, Refugees, Environment and Development (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998). PRACTICE AND POLICY PRACTICE NOTES 42 HUMANITARIANexchange HIV/AIDS and humanitarian action by Paul Harvey HPG Report 16, April 2004

What are the implications of HIV/AIDS for our understanding of crisis and humanitarian aid? HIV/AIDS is both a long- term crisis in its own right, and a contributory factor in acute emergencies. The epidemic presents key challenges for both humanitarian and development assistance, and for the interface between them. These challenges and the role of the humanitarian system in responding to them are the subject of a recent HPG report, HIV/AIDS and Humanitarian Action, HPG Report 16 (London: ODI, 2004). The full report, a resource guide on HIV/AIDS and emergencies and background papers are available from the ODI website at www.odi.org.uk/hpg/hiv.html.

The southern Africa crisis in 2002 and 2003 raised a series of practical questions around the programming of humanitarian aid in the context of an HIV/AIDS epidemic, ranging from whether and how food aid rations need to be adapted, to the question of whether AIDS-related stigma affects participation in relief programmes. These programmatic findings are summarised below:

• Early-warning systems and assessments need to incorporate analysis of HIV/AIDS and its impact on livelihoods. • The emergence of new types and areas of vulnerability due to HIV/AIDS should be considered in assessment and targeting. Groups such as widows, the elderly and orphans may be particularly vulnerable, and urban and peri-urban areas may need to be assessed. • The targeting and delivery of aid must be sensitive to the possibility of AIDS-related stigma and discrimination. • The HIV/AIDS epidemic reinforces the existing need for humanitarian programmes to be gender-sensitive. • Emergency interventions must aim to ensure that they do not increase people’s susceptibility to infection with HIV/AIDS. • Food aid in the context of HIV/AIDS should review ration sizes and types of food and assess delivery and distri- bution mechanisms in the light of HIV/AIDS-related vulnerabilities, such as illness, reduced labour and increased caring burdens. • Labour-intensive public works programmes should consider the needs of labour-constrained households, the elderly and the chronically ill. • HIV/AIDS reinforces the need for health issues to be considered as part of a humanitarian response. • Support to agricultural production (including seed distributions) should recognise adaptations that people are RCIEADPLC NOTES PRACTICE AND POLICY making in response to HIV/AIDS.

The report also raises more fundamental questions about what the HIV/AIDS epidemic means for existing models of relief and development. Some of the key findings of the research in relation to these questions are summarised below:

• HIV/AIDS clearly has profound humanitarian consequences, both in terms of directly causing illness and death and in terms of the wider impact it is having on societies. These effects will inevitably deepen as the impact of the epidemic grows. Existing models of development and relief assistance are likely to prove inadequate to cope with the consequences of HIV/AIDS. • Aid agencies should endeavour to analyse the complex ways in which HIV/AIDS is affecting people’s liveli- hoods and the impacts of livelihood insecurity on HIV/AIDS. • The response of development assistance actors may need to draw on expertise and experience available within the humanitarian system, and vice-versa. • Greater resources need to be invested in prevention, care, treatment and mitigation. Urgent thought needs to be given to what this implies for public expenditure management systems within African countries, and how expanding access to treatment for HIV/AIDS can be part of expanding access to basic health care more broadly. • HIV/AIDS reinforces the risk of periodic crisis, and may make crises more likely. This underlines the existing need for greater investment in disaster preparedness and mitigation. • HIV/AIDS will increasingly add to the burden of chronic poverty and destitution in Africa. This highlights the need for greater investment in social protection and long-term welfare. Given the limited capacity and resources of many African governments, this implies a need for long-term commitment by donor governments. • Aid agencies should endeavour to link humanitarian aid programming where possible to the development of local capacity for long-term welfare provision.

For a copy of the report and briefing paper, contact [email protected]. The report and the briefing paper are available for download at the HPG website: www.odi.org.uk/hpg.

Number 27 • July 2004 43 Beyond the damage: probing the economic and financial consequences of natural disasters Charlotte Benson and Edward Clay, ODI

The reported global cost of ‘natural’ disasters rose 15-fold These effects can also have significant humanitarian between the 1950s and the 1990s. During the 1990s, major consequences, as well as implications for poverty reduc- catastrophes resulted in reported economic losses aver- tion and other development objectives. aging an estimated $66 billion per year (in 2002 prices). Record losses of some $178bn were recorded in 1995, the Issues of vulnerability year of the Kobe earthquake in Japan – equivalent to 0.7% Underlying the impact of a disaster is the issue of of global GDP.1 Numbers of people affected have also risen vulnerability. There has been relatively little work on this sharply, with a three-fold increase between the 1970s and from a national perspective, although there is a consid- 1990. erable body of work at a household level, particularly on drought in sub-Saharan Africa. Household-level research These alarming increases have triggered growing aware- plays an important part in informing both risk reduction ness of the potential human, structural and economic and post-disaster response efforts. National-level threats natural hazards pose. However, there is only a analysis should play a significant complementary role, limited sense of their broad economy-wide or macroeco- placing vulnerability within a broader socio-economic, nomic significance, or their implications for longer-term political and policy context, and capturing shifts over development. This is partly because impact assessments time more clearly. often concentrate on the most easily measured direct losses occurring as a consequence of a disaster. This Research at a national level shows that vulnerability to largely reflects immediate concerns to meet the most natural hazards is determined by a complex and dynamic visible short-term humanitarian needs of affected people, set of influences, such as the economic structure of a and to determine replacement investment requirements country, its stage of development and prevailing economic and insured losses. There has been much less focus on conditions and policy. Vulnerability changes quickly, partic- indirect and secondary impacts, such as on the demand ularly in countries experiencing rapid growth, urbanisation for goods and services and livelihood opportunities. and socio-economic change. Regular re-assessment of vulnerability is required to ensure that disaster manage- 1 Munich Re, Topics Annual Review: Natural Catastrophes 2002 ment strategies, including the nature and form of post- (Munich: Munich Reinsurance, 2002), www.munichre.com/pdf/topics. disaster relief and rehabilitation, remain appropriate.

Figure 1: Economic losses caused by natural disasters, 1950–2002

700

600

500 Number of 400 events

300 Economic losses 200 (US$bn)

100

0 1950–1959 1960–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999

Source: Munich Re, Topics Annual Review: Natural Catastrophes 2002 (Munich: Munich Reinsurance, 2002), www.munichre.com/pdf/topics. PRACTICE AND POLICY PRACTICE NOTES

44 HUMANITARIANexchange Figure 2: Number of fatalities (2002) 10,576 11,000 10,00 9,000 8,570 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 661 825 459 61 0 Africa America Asia Australia/Oceania Europe Worldwide

Munich Re, Topics Annual Review: Natural Catastrophes 2002 (Munich: Munich Reinsurance, 2002), www.munichre.com/pdf/topics.

Reduced vulnerability in Bangladesh stability in recent years; the growth of micro credit, In Bangladesh, vulnerability to cyclones and related enabling the poor to better withstand disaster shocks; coastal storm surges has been reduced through a combi- and labour migration. Remittance flows have increased nation of shelters, embankments that reduce impacts, post-disaster – for instance, rising by 18% following the enhanced early warning and evacuation planning.2 1998 floods – providing those affected with a new form of Meanwhile, the economy’s sensitivity to extreme coping mechanism. RCIEADPLC NOTES PRACTICE AND POLICY monsoon flooding and drought has also declined. This is partly due to structural change in agriculture, with a rapid expansion of much lower-risk dry season irrigated rice, internal market integration and increased private food vulnerability to natural hazards imports during disaster years. Despite extreme and long- is determined by a complex and lasting flooding in October and November 1998, cereal production was actually 5.6% higher year-on-year in dynamic set of influences 1998/99 (the government’s pre-flood forecast was for 2.4% growth).3 Initial assessments of losses, which antici- pated a 10-11% decline in output, underestimated the country’s greatly enhanced capacity to increase dry Increased vulnerability in Malawi season production when required.4 In contrast, Malawi’s economy has become increasingly sensitive to climatic variability (drought, erratic rainfall, Changes in the composition of productive activity have extremely high rainfall and related floods). This too been another factor in Bangladesh’s increased resilience reflects a complex of factors, including: to flooding; export-oriented garment manufacturing has expanded, and to date has been relatively flood-proof. • non-sustainable agricultural practice; Other developments have included relative financial • structural changes in agriculture, where a shift to smallholder production has not been accompanied by 2 IFRC, World Disasters Report 2002 (Geneva: International Federation the establishing of a viable credit system, support in of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2002). providing seeds and other inputs and a supportive 3 Government of Bangladesh, Memorandum for Bangladesh marketing structure for smaller producers; Development Forum 2000-200 (Dhaka: Economic Relations Division, • institutional weaknesses in the agricultural sector; Ministry of Finance and Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, • de-industrialisation, with the reintegration of South 2000). Africa into the regional economy; 4 Quazi Shahabuddin, ‘1998 Floods, Post-flood Agricultural • political instability and problems of governance; Rehabilitation Programme and Growth Performance’, in R. Sobhan (ed.), Trends in the Post-Flood Economy: A Review of Bangladesh’s • the short-term behaviour of aid donors, contributing to Development 1998-99 (Dhaka: Centre for Policy Dialogue and the volatility of public finances; and University Press, 2000). • the effects of HIV/AIDS on human resources.

Number 27 • July 2004 45 The unfavourable effects of high rainfall on maize and tobacco in 2001 were recognised only following the disasters have little impact on harvest. By then many costly decisions, notably the sale of grain reserves by a cash-strapped government, had trends in total aid flows to been made on the basis of poor advice from the IMF and disaster-affected countries others. When the food crisis came, it was widely assumed to have been either caused or exacerbated by a drought in 2002. However, the supposed drought was not reflected in meteorological reports. The behaviour of broad fiscal aggregates, total annual expenditure and revenue and the budgetary deficit, The implications for relief and post-disaster suggest misleadingly that disasters have little discernible reconstruction impact in many countries. (The notable exception is many Changes such as those in Bangladesh and Malawi imply low-income sub-Saharan countries with a weak revenue that a relief programme that was highly successful a basis and high aid dependence.) However, more disaggre- decade ago may no longer be appropriate. Food aid gated investigation of current and capital expenditure by requirements can alter. New pockets of vulnerable sectors and sources of revenue shows how disasters can groups can emerge, not least amongst the urban poor. create significant budgetary pressures. The apparent insen- The nature of community support networks can shift. sitivity of fiscal aggregates in many countries in fact reflects The appropriate balance of channels for providing aid successful post-disaster efforts to remain within the overall can also change, reflecting relative strengths and capaci- budgetary envelope established before the disaster, ties of government and civil society. Low-income coun- leaving levels of expenditure and fiscal deficits unchanged. tries are most vulnerable to disaster shocks, financially In other words, disasters often result in widespread, but and economically, when there are severe and growing largely non-transparent, reallocations of resources. problems of governance and weak fiscal and monetary management. Reallocations are typically poorly documented and cannot be easily quantified. The available evidence suggests that Post-disaster reconstruction needs serious contingency the brunt of financial reallocations appears to fall thinking prior to a potential event, and its implementation primarily on capital expenditure and in the social sectors. needs to be orchestrated so that it exploits risk reduction This may have a severe impact on the poor, and often on possibilities in rebuilding a country. This is a particularly those worst affected by disaster. Donor agencies critical moment of opportunity. A disaster creates a signif- providing humanitarian support post-disaster need to be icantly heightened awareness of the need for risk reduc- aware that existing welfare and benefit schemes and tion, but this interest rapidly fades as communities and other pro-poor programmes may have been eroded, indi- economic systems are re-established and other more rectly intensifying impacts on the poorest segments of immediate priorities reassert themselves in ministries of society. The post-disaster diversion of resources can finance and aid agencies. hamper longer-term efforts to reduce poverty – and, ulti- mately, vulnerability – and to achieve sustainable devel- There is a clear related need for greater longitudinal opment. Decisions on post-disaster reallocations of analysis of the impact of particular disaster events in budgetary resources are typically made with no system in order to help facilitate better understanding of the factors place to protect priority areas of expenditure. determining vulnerability, and how these can change over time. National or economy-wide disaster impacts, The available statistics similarly suggest that disasters including total financial losses, should be reassessed have little impact on trends in total aid flows to disaster- 12–18 months after an event, as the fuller economic affected countries. It is widely believed that the interna- consequences only become apparent over time. Later, say tional community responds to disasters by increasing its after five or ten years, there should be a review of the aid, particularly in the form of emergency relief and food longer-term consequences, including investment in aid. However, some donors appear to respond to disaster disaster mitigation. Such exercises should be comple- crises by reallocating resources within projects and from mented by studies exploring impacts on affected house- existing projects, and by bringing forward commitments holds and communities. How have they fared, on both met under existing multi-year country programmes and and unmet needs arising as a consequence of a disaster? budget envelopes. Reflecting these practices, total aid How could they be supported, both in reducing vulnera- commitments typically increase in the year of, or immedi- bility to future events and recovering as rapidly as ately following, a major disaster. Reallocations can be an possible from them? appropriate way of quickly responding, in the sense that they involve a lesser administrative burden than the nego- Reallocation of public finance tiation of fresh aid commitments. However, reallocated Public finance is widely seen as obscure, unexciting and resources are typically not subsequently made good, with the domain of a few experts. Yet it is a critical dimension new commitments instead falling back after the crisis to in understanding the wider impacts of disasters. Post- reflect longer-term trends in aid. disaster sourcing of finance can have a significant influ- ence on both the short and longer-term impacts of a After a disaster, there is often a substantial gap between

PRACTICE AND POLICY PRACTICE NOTES shock. projected and actual aid disbursement, reflecting

46 HUMANITARIANexchange management constraints – such as procedural difficulties, gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this procurement delays and lack of local counterpart finance article and other outputs from the study listed below are (problems that can also delay the disbursement of devel- those of the authors. opment aid). Rapid disbursement of food aid may be particularly important as even relatively short delays can Further reading prejudice post-disaster agricultural recovery and cause financial pressures. C. Benson and E. J. Clay, The Impact of Drought on Sub- Saharan African Economies: A Preliminary Examination, Conclusion World Bank Technical Paper 401 (Washington DC: World A more complete assessment of the impact of disasters, Bank, 1998). exploring indirect and secondary effects as well as direct impacts, can contribute to ensuring that post-disaster C. Benson and E. J. Clay, Dominica: Natural Disasters response is effective and timely, enhancing the success of and Economic Development in a Small Island State, humanitarian response and reconstruction efforts. Disaster Risk Management Working Paper Series No. 2 Analysis of the longer-term impacts of disasters and (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001), www.provention- underlying determinants of vulnerability from an consortium.org/files/dominica.pdf. economic perspective helps to highlight a number of clear C. Benson and E. J. Clay, Bangladesh: Disasters and lessons for reducing hazard risk, and for making post- Public Finance, Disaster Risk Management Working disaster assistance more appropriate. Paper Series No. 5 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2002), www.proventionconsortium.org/files/Bangladesh.pdf. Charlotte Benson ([email protected]) and Edward Clay C. Benson and E. J. Clay, Understanding the Economic ([email protected]) are Senior Research Associates at the and Financial Impacts of Natural Disasters, Disaster ODI. Risk Management Series No. 4 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2003). This article is based on Benson and Clay, Understanding the Economic and Financial Impacts of Natural Disasters E. Clay, L. Bohn, E. Blanco de Armas, S. Kabambe and (Washington DC: World Bank, 2004). The study was H. Tchale, Climatic Variability, Economic Performance undertaken on behalf of the World Bank’s Hazard and the Uses of Climatic Forecasting in Malawi and Management Unit with the financial support of the UK Southern Africa, Disaster Risk Management Working Department for International Development’s Conflict and Paper Series 7 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2003), Humanitarian Aid Department (CHAD). Financial and www.proventionconsortium.org/files/malawi.pdf. professional support from these two organisations is RCIEADPLC NOTES PRACTICE AND POLICY Disaster risk reduction: mitigation and preparedness in aid programming by John Twigg Good Practice Review 9, March 2004

Natural disasters are widespread and numerous in developing and middle-income countries. They can cause great loss of life and immense damage to communities, infrastructure and national economies. Ethical, humanitarian considera- tions oblige us to act to protect human life and prevent suffering. Many researchers and aid institutions have identified natural disasters as a major threat to sustainable development. This Good Practice Review aims to help project planners and managers to: • appreciate the significance of hazards (primarily natural hazards) and the risks associated with them; • appreciate the need for risk management in project planning and implementation, and the value of such efforts; • recognise the main issues that must be understood and addressed when carrying out risk reduction or disaster miti- gation and preparedness initiatives; and • understand – at least in broad terms - how to address these issues in practice, throughout the project cycle. Lasting protection against disasters will not be reached overnight. It is a long-term goal to be attained through a contin- uous process of improvement. Community resilience to hazards can be built up incrementally over time, as long as the basic approach is sound. This Review is above all a practical document. However, it is not a manual. Its emphasis is on the process of planning and implementing risk reduction initiatives. It focuses on key issues and decision points and how to address them. Readers are referred to more detailed technical manuals and studies where appropriate. It has been difficult to present a balanced coverage of such a broad and diverse subject, and there are inevitable gaps. Nevertheless, the book is evidence-based. The descriptions and discussions are supported by case studies, which aim to give a sense of the range and diversity of practical approaches that can be used. For a copy of this Good Practice Review, contact [email protected]. The review is available for download at the HPN website: www.odihpn.org/publistgpr9.asp. It is also available on CD-ROM.

Number 27 • July 2004 47 Some myths about faith-based humanitarian aid Wilfred Mlay, World Vision International

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, many commenta- tors have devoted attention to an apparent clash between the values of the West and those of Islam. The humanitarian sector has not escaped this debate. Unfortunately, the discussion is impoverished by persistent myths and an inappro- priate focus on the values of the humanitarians, rather than on the value of those being assisted.

A familiar story is being repeated Rice/World Vision©Janet along the following lines: humani- tarianism is a Western-driven, neo- colonial enterprise. In particular, the story goes, the threats to inter- national aid workers and the assets of Western aid organisations in World Vision Afghanistan staff measure sugar Afghanistan and Iraq are simply the as part of a nutrition programme manifestation of a growing clash between Islam and the West. Samuel Huntington’s well-known work, The Clash of Myth no. 1: Christian humanitarian Civilizations, supposedly exposes the causes of this organisations embody the West’s clash with confrontation, while David Rieff’s book A Bed for the Night: Islam Humanitarianism in Crisis pronounces the near-death of a Adherents of the ‘culture clash’ theory often make the humanitarianism allegedly beholden to Western govern- uncharitable claim that today’s Western aid ments and their interests. Even the UN Under Secretary- organisations are simply last century’s white European General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, has mused missionaries in new clothing. Furthermore, they contend privately that aid organisations in Afghanistan are ‘too that Christian humanitarians are particularly pernicious Western’. in carrying out a ‘civilising mission’ that unwittingly or deliberately promotes the values of the world’s major Western powers. According to this theory, a web-page many commentators have image of a Christian aid worker kneeling next to a burqa- clad Afghan woman is just a modern version of the devoted attention to an apparent lithograph of the pith-helmeted missionary standing next clash between the values of the to a Masai warrior in battle dress. While such caricatures distort both past and present, they are hurled broadly at West and those of Islam Western-based aid agencies, but particularly at Christian organisations.

This search to find cultural underpinnings for the travails of Such conflation falsely presents Christianity as a ‘Western’ humanitarianism is remarkable in its neglect of any serious religion and Islam as an ‘Eastern’ religion. In fact, both exploration of its religious aspects. Thin attempts to do faiths are global religions whose adherents live this often create caricatures of religious humanitarianism, predominantly in developing countries of the South. and thus perpetuate misunderstanding. Humanitarianism Christianity, like Islam, began in the Middle East, and now is best served not by a navel-gazing examination of the has 1.1 billion followers in Latin America, Africa and Asia, many values of its large cast, but by a dedication to greater compared with 800 million in North America and Europe. accountability and transparency to those for whom faith- In demographic terms, the average Anglican is African, based humanitarian agencies claim to act. However, cari- female, under the age of 30, a mother of three, walks four catures and generalisations lead to commonly-held kilometres a day to fetch water, lives on less than $1.50 a assumptions about the role of faith in humanitarian assis- day, and is related to someone with HIV/AIDS.1 tance that are false and inhibit the effectiveness of the ensemble. Three prevalent myths about Christian humani- 1 Rev. Canon Richard Marsh, Anglican Communion News Service, 9

PRACTICE AND POLICY PRACTICE NOTES tarian organisations are worth our attention. February 2004, www.anglicancommunion.org.

48 HUMANITARIANexchange To conflate Christianity with the West is delusion. As Philip provide the majority of private contributions to World Jenkins notes in his book The Next Christendom, Vision’s relief and development work. But World Vision Christianity has been in China about as long as it has been also raises substantial funds in developing countries, in England, and the Ethiopian church prospered for some of which have very modest Christian populations. centuries before the first Anglo-Saxon was converted. For example, in Taiwan, Japan, Thailand and elsewhere, the overwhelming majority of contributors to World Vision It is equally misleading to treat Islam as if it were synony- are non-Christians. World Vision’s appeal to assist those mous with the Middle East or with speaking Arabic. More afflicted by poverty, HIV/AIDS or disaster presumably Muslims speak non-Arabic languages than Arabic. touches their compassion and common humanity, not Indonesia accounts for more Muslims than any other their religious affiliation. single country. Throughout the West – in North America and Europe in particular – mosques are almost as easy to World Vision is not unique among Christian NGOs. Other find as churches. Christian humanitarian organisations are equally diverse in staffing, governance and funding sources. Such global Just as Christianity and Islam are global, so are most of diversity suggests that the blanket charge against them of the large, international humanitarian organisations. Far Western cultural imperialism is mislaid. from being Western enterprises, the composition of the staff and governance structures of many aid organisations reflects a true global diversity. This is a global diversity the blanket charge of ‘Western usually lacking from the boardrooms of the largest multi- national corporations, and even the senior management cultural imperialism’ is mislaid level of UN agencies.

World Vision International is one example of this diversity. Its 24-strong board includes members from 19 different Myth no. 2: Religious approaches create countries, with an equal balance from the North and South. conflicts, rather than solve them Of the organisation’s 49 member offices, 27 are full-fledged The argument here is three-fold: indigenous entities with staff and governing boards composed almost entirely of nationals. Another 22 are a) Religions define themselves by competing truth- guided by indigenous advisory councils that are expected claims. to become self-governing. Most of the agency’s staff b) This competition inevitably provokes violent conflicts embrace one of three Christian expressions: Catholicism, for which religion is inescapably culpable (the

Protestantism or Eastern Orthodoxy. However, despite the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, South Asia and so on). NOTES PRACTICE AND POLICY organisation’s Christian character, many non-Christians c) Therefore, religious organisations or persons have seek employment and are employed by World Vision in nothing to offer societies wracked by religious countries where Christians are a minority. In the Middle conflicts, even when those societies are in need of East and Asia, many staff members are Muslim. In South- humanitarian assistance. east Asia, many are Buddhist. R. Scott Appleby’s Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, What is true for its staff and organisation is also true for Violence and Reconciliation explodes this myth. Appleby World Vision’s private donors. In the West, Christians does not shy away from examining ‘religion’s violent accom- plices’, namely religious zealots who invoke faith to justify violent acts. But he distinguishes between militants for violence and ‘militants for peace’, namely religious zealots who sacrifice their lives for reconcil- iation, for the poor, or for the common good. Positive examples of ‘zealots for peace’ include the Buddhist Dhammayietra in Cambodia, the Catholic Community of Sant’Egidio in Mozambique and the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra ©Janet Rice/World Vision©Janet Leone. Appleby notes two things about such groups: 1) explicitly reli- gious approaches to humanitari- anism succeeded in the midst of religiously ‘loaded’ conflicts; and 2) religious approaches succeeded A World Vision Program Officer and a young Iranian in the village of Nartij, Iran, where non-religious ones had after the earthquake in late 2003 failed.

Number 27 • July 2004 49 50 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES in establishingtrustandmutualrespect. created and important was WorldVisionof nature faith-based the that tensions said participants eased Council initiatives. community-building violence, reduced dialogue a five that established faiths, of three and representatives groups together ethnic drew which The Tolerance. Council, and Peace on Council Community gious multi-reli- and multi-ethnic a of formation the facilitated Vision World Catholic), and Orthodox Muslim, (between divided bitterly city religiously and Serbs) Kosovoand Albanians (between ethnically the Mitrovica, in 1999, In between bridges build to Muslims andChristians. helped strategy The lines. religious along divided communities in them work to paired together then members, staff Christian and Muslim recruited Vision World Indonesia, of region Maluku North the In violence. in Muslim–Christian ongoing suffering areas including communities, Muslim with effectively work to able been has Vision World Indonesia, in example, For giously tonedeaf. differ- religious by ences, havinganearforreligion defined ispreferable tobeingreli- openly are that conflicts in major but, faith; as such issue, All single any beyond far goes that efforts. economy political multifaceted complex, a peace-building have conflicts large mobilise in to able constituencies are they Thus, actors. partisan religious leadersare oftenviewed withinaconflictasnon- Transformation Conflict that demonstrated 2002 Workingin Group the by study case NGO An organisations. humani- tarian secular to available not are that conversations up opens often organisations religious of character The e Cos n Rd rset oeet n Non- and Movement Crescent Red and Cross Red Two principlesinthe tiveness ofthat assistance. effec- the evaluate should Moreover, recipients that stipulate assistance. they humanitarian determine should alone need human that establish they importantly, Most equation. humanitarian the from ‘transactions’ religious eliminate explicitly conduct of codes these of all Almost exclu- sively, not among Western humanitarianorganisations. inter- though wide predominantly, of consultation, result agency the are assistance, humanitarian of provision the cover which principles, normative These sector.humanitarian the govern conduct of codes Several conversionreligious is covert, or overt whether intent, real their because assistance humanitarian impartial or neutral out carry Faith-based3: cannot no.Mythorganisations HUMANITARIAN advance their cause their advance to aid using agencies faith-based and secular of abound examples exchange Code ofConductfortheInternational ed ln’ Fihbsd raiain mry their marry organisations Faith-based alone’. need this humanitarianism, of basis the on the calculated are priorities ‘aid that establishes with principle faiths many odds to common at vision spiritual being from Far if every personisGod: people’sto respondGod’s to doing as is in needs will task important most the that taught He Code. ICRC/NGO the in codified imperative humanitarian the articulated Jesus sented onitsboard ofdirectors. repre- the is and fund Partnership, Accountability to Humanitarian helps Vision World them; organisations safeguard the to that belong they but codes, these to Vision andmanyotherfaith-basedorganisations adhere World do and only Not stereotypes. action generalised avoid and humanitarian actions, specific measure of to which by gauge legitimacy a provide the to add efforts self-regulation These standards. Sphere the and International Partnership Accountability Humanitarian the Conduct, of Code the as such initiatives to rise gave what precisely is others. This of expense the the at do, they as of ideology political side same the the to to adheres that only conflict own aid their delivered of have those or or to creed, aid agencies, directed have advance cause, faith-based to their aid used have and that Examples agencies, of secular members agenda. individual of an abound promote to same its the secular do may of organisations within in advantage individuals Similarly, taking rooted of agenda. organisational an promote to power of position firmly capable is or humanism, faith-based overtly whether organisation, Any principles. codified these of partial the of development the to led examples have that assistance of delivery real the impartiality and neutrality, of and principles people undermines assist to fundamentally faith by motivated being erroneous that the belief between distinguish to important is It still adhere totheletterandspiritofCode. and opinions’ religious or political ‘particular espouse can NGOs humanitarian that emphasises It nuance. important politicalorreligious creed’, itaddsan tance ofaparticular accep- or embracing the to assistance of distribution or promise,deliveryprohibits‘the explicitly 3 Principle While Relief Disaster clearly tothequestionofreligious humanitarianism: in Organisations Governmental 25:35-36) (Matthew me visited you and prison in was I me, of a care took you and sick was I clothing, me gave was you and naked I was I drink, me, welcomed to you and stranger something me gave you and for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty a further to used be standpoint. religious not or political particular will Aid 3: Principle kind. any of distinction adverse without and race, recipients the the of of nationality or regardless creed given is Aid 2: Principle speak PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 51 Humanitarian (Oxford: (Oxford: Oxford Number Number 27 • 2004 July (New York: (New York: Simon and Schuster, is Africa regional vice-president of World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Press, University Oxford York: (New , no. 25, December 2003. 25, December , no. Exchange Wilfred Wilfred Mlay is [email protected]. email address His International. Vision This article is Ghandour’s written article entitled ‘Humanitarianism, in Islam and response the to Abdel-Rahman West: Contest or Cooperation?’, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002). Simon and Schuster, York: (New Religion: Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (Lanham, MD: and Littlefield, 1999). Rowman Forgiveness Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Writing for HPN Writing Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice: On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Learned, Lessons On Practice: Peacebuilding Better Towards Building Peace from the Ground Up: A Call to the UN for Stronger United and Committed to Building Community Peace: Council Mitrovica’s for Peace , New York, 2002, www.wcrp.org. York, , New (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2002). for Conflict Prevention, Centre European (Utrecht: contains articles on practical experience, institutional initiatives and policy developments. review review operational experience of good practice in the key areas of humanitarian activity. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order The Ambivalence of the Sacred The Ambivalence examine specific issues or experiences in the humanitarian field. They are 12–15,000 words long. We long. words 12–15,000 They are examine specific issues or experiences in the humanitarian field. (Radnor: Temple Foundation Press, 2001). Press, Foundation Temple (Radnor: The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity The Next Christendom: , World Vision Occasional Paper, 2002, www.justice-and-peace.org. 2002, Occasional Paper, Vision World , A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis A Bed for the Night: If you have an idea for an article or paper you would like to develop, HPN staff would be pleased to +44 (0)20 7922 0331. or call – send an email to [email protected] discuss you it with Submissions may be sent electronically to [email protected] or posted to HPN, Overseas Development Institute, SE1 7JD, London Bridge Road, UK.111 Westminster Network Papers Good Practice Reviews Articles and book reviews for website HPN’s are (www.odihpn.org) between 500 and 2,000 words long, and can be submitted in English at any time. Humanitarian Exchange Each issue also has a special feature of articles on a particular theme words or country/region. Articles long. are about 2,000 We prefer in English. with authors is however Correspondence them to be submitted in English, but can required however is summary A languages. other in drafts accept also can but English, in submitted also be to them prefer accept drafts in with authors is in English. in English and correspondence other languages. of experts. group a peer review in close consultation with HPN and GPRs developed are HPN is pleased to consider articles and papers in for some publication way submitted in involved anyone by humani- tarian action. If you have knowledge and experience to share but do not consider yourself a ‘writer’, do not worry! It important ideas that are is your them. to communicate help you – HPN has experienced editorial staff to The Humanitarian Practice Network provides an opportunity for people to share to share knowledge and experience. All inter- or others working with national and the articles HPN members, readers written by HPN are by and papers published others. academics, independent consultants and national NGOs, UN and donor institutions, or by agencies, government Conflict Transformation Working Group, with Civil Society Collaboration and Aid and Conflict Practices Anneke Galama and Paul van Tongeren (eds), Tongeren van GalamaAnneke Paul and Bill Lowrey and Rudy Scholaert, and Tolerance and Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (eds), University Press, 1995). Press, University Raymond G. Helmick and Rodney L. Peterson, Transformation David Rieff, David Rieff, 1996). R. Scott Appleby, Philip Jenkins, References and further reading References Samuel Huntington, P. spiritual spiritual vision to the neutral and impartial humanitarian imperative when they heed Loving their own one’s religious neighbour texts. pillars five poor is one of the Assisting the commandment. is a of Islam. Jewish It is a and injunction sacred for task other Christian religions. for Humanitarianism is Buddhism a and task them. than divides rather religions, that unites a holy Humanitarian Practice Network

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