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Le Secret Aura Mis 40 Ans Avant D’Éclater Au Visage De La Suisse

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Le Secret Aura Mis 40 Ans Avant D’Éclater Au Visage De La Suisse « Le secret aura mis 40 ans avant d’éclater au visage de la Suisse. » «Es dauerte 40 Jahre, bis das Geheimnis der Schweiz um die Ohren fliegt.» «Ci sono voluti 40 anni affinché la Svizzera si trovasse di fronte all’esplosione di questo segreto.» Mehdi Atmani, novembre 2019 Fr. 25.– / € 24.– ISBN 978-3-03878-044-1 NEW: Swiss Press Live Journalism Michael von Graffenried On 16 April 2019, for the first time in the history of the Swiss Press Awards, three journalists nominated at Swiss Press Award 19 and one Swiss Press Photo category winner told their stories in front of a live audience at the Museum of Communication in Bern. From left to right and top to bottom: Rahel Walser (Audio), Aline Wanner (Text), Florian Imbach (Video) and Nicolas Brodard (Photo, Swiss Stories) / photographer Nicolas Brodard (Photo) / journalist Aline Wanner (Text) / Nicolas Brodard, Aline Wanner, Rahel Walser, Florian Imbach and jury member Patrick Feuz in front of the audience. www.swisspressaward.ch 2 Gewinner Gagnants Vincitori Winners 3 Inhalt Swiss Press Award Swiss Press Text 4–5 Swiss Press Journalist of the Year Sommaire 1. Arnaud Robert La révolution des toilettes Swiss Press Text heidi.news Indice 6 Jury Text Contents 7–11 Gewinner / Gagnant / Vincitore / Winner 2. Martin Beglinger / Zoé Baches / Ermes Gallarotti Die Affäre Khan e nd 12–15 2. Preis / 2 prix / 2°premio / 2 prize Neue Zürcher Zeitung 16–17 3. Preis / 3e prix / 3° premio / 3rd prize 3. Jacopo Scarinci / Andrea Manna Le frontaliere di Ghiggia Swiss Press Online La Regione 18 Jury Online 19–29 Gewinner / Gagnant / Vincitore / Winner Swiss Press Online 30–31 2. Preis / 2e prix / 2° premio / 2nd prize e rd 32–33 3. Preis / 3 prix / 3° premio / 3 prize 1. Christian Zeier / Valentin Felber / Florian Spring / «Credit Crisis» – Der Finanzskandal Stirling Tschan reflekt.ch und DAS MAGAZIN von Moçambique Swiss Press Audio 34 Jury Audio 2. Duc-Quang Nguyen / Mathieu Rudaz La Suisse et son territoire 35–37 Gewinner / Gagnant / Vincitore / Winner 24heures.ch 38–39 2. Preis / 2e prix / 2° premio / 2nd prize e rd 40–41 3. Preis / 3 prix / 3° premio / 3 prize 3. Sibilla Bondolfi / Carlo Pisani / Daniel Rihs Telearbeit in den Bergen swissinfo.ch Swiss Press Video 42 Jury Video Swiss Press Audio 43–45 Gewinner / Gagnant / Vincitore / Winner e nd 46–47 2. Preis / 2 prix / 2°premio / 2 prize 1. Franziska Engelhardt / Stefanie Müller-Frank «Zündstoff» – Die Geschichte e rd 48–49 3. Preis / 3 prix / 3° premio / 3 prize republik.ch eines Messies Swiss Press Local 2. Cédric Guigon / Joëlle Cachin Ebola, une épidémie 50 Jury Local RTS Radio, La Première de méfiances 51–53 Gewinner / Gagnant / Vincitore / Winner e nd 54–55 2. Preis / 2 prix / 2°premio / 2 prize 3. Alice Pedrazzini / Giuseppe Bucci Io mi chiamo Nina e rd 56–57 3. Preis / 3 prix / 3° premio / 3 prize RSI, Rete Uno e fra 20 anni … Swiss Press Photo Swiss Press Video 58 Jury Photo 59 Gewinner / Gagnant / Vincitore / Winner 1. Mehdi Atmani / Alexandre Bugnon La Suisse sous couverture 60 Swiss Press Photo of the Year rts.ch 62–63 Gewinner-Kategorien / Gagnant Categories / Vincitori per categorie / Winner Categories 2. Isabelle Ducret Made in Etiopia RTS, Temps Présent 3. Cécile Durring / Jérôme Galichet Moudon : Objectif 50 % Abbildung vorne / Page de couverture / Übersetzung / Traduction / Traduzioni / Translation: RTS, Mise au Point Impressum Copertina / Front cover: Pascale Bournier 24heures Cindy-Jane Armbruster, Clara Benn, Claudio Meier, Porträtbilder und Filme / Portraits et films / Yves Petignat, Thomas und Katia Röthlin Swiss Press Local Ritratti e film / Portraits and films: Roland Lanz Umschlagbild hinten / Quatrième de couverture / Lektorat / Correction / Correzione bozze / Proofreading: Quarta di copertina / Back cover: Michael von Graffenried Angela Benza, Prangins; Ast & Fischer AG, Wabern 1. François Ruchti Safaris de chasse en Valais Herausgeberin / Éditeur / Editore / Publisher: Druck / Impression / Stampa / Printed by: RTS, Mise au Point Fondation Reinhardt von Graffenried, Bern Ast & Fischer AG, Wabern 2. Urs Bühler «Wir Stadttiere» © 2020 Swiss Press Award, Till Schaap Edition, Bern ISBN 978-3-03878-044-1 nzz.ch Konzept und Realisation / Concept et direction artistique / Swiss Press Award Sekretariat: Concetto e direzione artistica / Concept and artistic direction: Regula Bachofner 3. Alessandro Bertellotti Natale col pane bianco Michael von Graffenried, Paris Zeughausgasse 18, Postfach CH-3001 Bern RSI, Rete due Grafische Gestaltung / Conception graphique / mailto: [email protected] Grafica / Graphic design: Gerhard Blättler, Bern www.swisspressaward.ch Swiss Press Swiss Press Redaktion / Rédaction / Redazione / Edited by: Printed in Switzerland Thomas und Katia Röthlin, Baden Journalist Photographer of the Year of the Year Mehdi Atmani Yves Leresche rts.ch L’Illustré La Suisse sous couverture Grève des femmes, Lausanne 4 5 JOURNALIST OF THE YEAR Swiss Press Journalist of the Year 2020: Mehdi Atmani «Cryptoleaks» war der erste Scoop «Cryptoleaks» a été le premier scoop «Cryptoleaks è stato il primo scoop “Cryptoleaks” was the first media des Medienjahres 2020. Am 11. Februar de l’année 2020. Le 11 février, l’émis- mediatico del 2020. L’11 febbraio, scoop of the year 2020. On 11 Feb- enthüllte die Rundschau des Schweizer sion Rundschau de la Télévision suisse la trasmissione della Televisione sviz- ruary, the Rundschau programme Fernsehens SRF, wie amerikanische SRF a révélé comment le CIA et le zero-tedesca SRF, Rundschau, ha of Swiss TV broadcaster SRF revealed Geheimdienste und der deutsche Bun- Service fédéral de renseignement alle- svelato come i servizi segreti america- how the American secret services desnachrichtendienst mit manipulierten mand avaient espionné durant des ni e il Servizio federale di spionaggio and German Federal Intelligence Ser- Chiffriergeräten der Schweizer Firma décennies plus de cent pays grâce à tedesco avevano spiato per decenni vice had spied on over a hundred Crypto AG jahrzehntelang über hun- des dispositifs de cryptage trafiqués più di cento Paesi grazie a delle appa- countries for decades, using manipu- dert Staaten ausspioniert hatten. Der de la société suisse Crypto AG. Ce recchiature di cifratura manomesse lated encryption devices from the Skandal, an dessen Aufdeckung die scandale, au dévoilement duquel le dalla società svizzera Crypto AG. Que- Swiss company Crypto AG. The scan- Washington Post und das ZDF mitge- Washington Post et ZDF ont collaboré, sto scandalo, che il Washington Post dal that the Washington Post and arbeitet hatten, ging um die Welt. a fait le tour du monde. e la ZDF avevano svelato in collabora- ZDF had worked to uncover, went Nur: «Cryptoleaks» war zu diesem Toutefois, «Cryptoleaks» n’était zione, ha fatto il giro del mondo. around the world. Zeitpunkt eigentlich gar keine Breaking déjà plus un scoop à ce moment-là. «Cryptoleaks», però, a quel mo- However, “Cryptoleaks” was not News mehr. Le 18 novembre 2019, une série mento non era già più uno scoop. exactly breaking news by this point. Am 18. November 2019 geht auf de vidéos en cinq parties avait déjà Il 18 novembre 2019, una serie di On 18 November 2019, a five-part der Website des Westschweizer été mise en ligne sur le site de la télé- video in cinque puntate veniva messa video series went online on the web- Fernsehens RTS eine fünfteilige Video- vision suisse romande RTS. « La Suisse online sul sito della televisione romanda site of French-speaking Swiss televi- serie online. «La Suisse sous couver- sous couverture » décrivant une Suisse RTS. «La Suisse sous couverture» (La sion station RTS. “La Suisse sous cou- ture» dokumentiert eine Schweiz als « centre d’espionnage », qui n’a jamais Svizzera sotto copertura) descrive una verture” (Switzerland Undercover) «Mittelpunkt der Spionage», die nie hésité «à sacrifier sa neutralité au Svizzera «centro dello spionaggio», che documents Switzerland’s role as the gezögert habe, «ihre Neutralität den profit des intérêts politiques, écono- non ha mai esitato «nel sacrificare la “centre of espionage” that has never politischen, ökonomischen und mili- miques et militaires ». Partie 1 de série propria neutralità agli interessi politici, hesitated to “sacrifice its neutrality tärischen Interessen zu opfern». Teil 1 web : « Agents infiltrés ». Sujet : « l’affaire economici e militari allo scopo di pre- to political, economic and military der Webserie: «Agents infiltrés». Crypto AG ». Répercussions : aucune. servare la sua bella faccia». Parte 1 della interests». Part 1 of the web series: Thema: «l’affaire Crypto AG». Resonanz: Pendant dix ans, le journaliste serie web: «Agents infiltrés» (Agenti in- “Agents infiltrés” (Undercover Agents). keine. indépendant Mehdi Atmani (36 ans) filtrati). Tema: «L’affaire Crypto AG» (Il Topic: “l’affaire Crypto AG” (The Cryp- Zehn Jahre recherchierte der freie a effectué en mission secrète des caso Crypto AG). Risonanza: nessuna. to AG Affair). Fallout: none. Journalist Mehdi Atmani (36) über die recherches sur la Suisse aux États- Per dieci anni il giornalista indipen- The freelance journalist Mehdi Schweiz in geheimer Mission, in den Unis, en Grande-Bretagne, en Alle- dente Mehdi Atmani (36 anni) ha svolto Atmani (36) spent ten years research- USA, Grossbritannien, Deutschland, magne, en France et en Belgique. Il ricerche sulla Svizzera in missione se- ing Switzerland on a secret mission, Frankreich, Belgien. Die Crypto-Affäre résume l’affaire Crypto dans un film greta, negli Stati Uniti, Gran Bretagna, in the USA, Great Britain, Germany, fasste er in einem 14-minütigen Film de 14 minutes. Germania, Francia e Belgio. Riassume France, and Belgium. He summarises zusammen. Atmani avait depuis le début il caso Crypto in un film di 14 minuti. the Crypto affair in a 14-minute film. Atmani hatte von Anfang an die l’ambition de diffuser cette histoire à Atmani fin dall’inizio aveva l’ambi- From the very beginning Atmani Ambition, die Geschichte national zu l’échelle nationale. La version en langue zione di diffondere questa storia su had aspired to make the story known Roland Lanz verbreiten.
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