Migration into the conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime

Olga Demetriou

PCC REPORT /201

Olga Demetriou is Associate Professor in Post Conflict Reconstruction and State-Building at the Durham Global Security Institute, School of Government and International Affairs, University of Durham. She is a social anthropologist and holds a PhD (2002) from the London School of Economics. She was Senior Research Consultant at the PRIO Cyprus Centre between 2006 and 2018. She has carried out fieldwork in western Thrace and Cyprus and has been working on issues of human rights, minority-state relations, refugeehood, gender, and migration. She is particularly interested in processes of subjectivisation in conditions of conflict and inequality. Her work has appeared in several anthropological and inter-disciplinary journals, and in two monographs. The first was published in 2013 by Berghahn under the title Capricious Borders: Minority, Population and Counter-Conduct between and and the second in 2018 with the State University of New York Press, entitled Refugeehood and the Postconflict Subject: Reconsidering Minor Losses. She has been involved in a number of social justice initiatives in Cyprus, including the Gender Advisory Team (since 2009) which seeks to mainstream gender equality concerns in the peace building agenda.

T

MIGRATION INTO THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND THE CYPRIOT CITIZENSHIP REGIME

Olga Demetriou

Report 2/2019 Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Hausmanns gate 7 PO Box 9229 Oslo NO-0134 OSLO, Norway Tel. +47 22 54 77 00 Fax +47 22 54 77 01 Email: [email protected] Web: www.prio.no

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ISBN 978-82-7288-964-6 (online)

Production and Cover design: Crystal Graphics CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...... 2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...... 4 THE MIGRATION LANDSCAPE ...... 7 LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND IMPLEMENTATION ...... 14 THE CITIZENSHIP REGIME ...... 18 MIGRATION INFLECTED BY THE CYPRUS CONFLICT: TWO CASE-STUDIES ...... 22 DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE OF MIGRATION CONTROL ...... 25 RECEPTION AND RECOGNITION POLICIES ...... 29 INTEGRATION POLICIES ...... 31 MIGRATION SINCE 2015 ...... 33 CONCLUSION ...... 36 RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 38 REFERENCES ...... 39 2

INTRODUCTION

n 8 March 2017, news reports stated that a boat carrying 24 Syrians had reached the coast of Akamas, which lies at the northwestern tip of Cyprus. 1 The group was Omade up of eight men, five women, and eleven children. They were taken to a first reception facility for health checks by police and emergency service, under the immigration control scheme ‘Nafkratis’, until their status was clarified. On 5 December of the same year, another boat carrying 38 Syrians landed nearby, on the coast of a village just beyond the Green Line that separates the island’s north from south, two areas controlled by different administrations. 2 They were taken to the reception centre in Kokkinotrimithia village in the mainland, before their statuses were ascertained. The bodies of nine people were found on 13 and 14 May by Turkish-Cypriot police in the northern part of Cyprus. 3 On 23 May 2018, there were news reports that Syrian refugees living in the areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus (henceforth RoC) had identified the bodies in the region of Karpaz as their relatives. 4 On 13 June 2018 another boat arrived on the western coast carrying 61 people. 5 In recent years, i.e., since 2015, patterns relating to irregular migration in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean have changed dramatically. Even though Greece was the main site of the most spectacular of those changes (see Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris, 2016; Papataxiarchis, 2016; Panourgia, 2014; Rozakou, 2016; Cabot, 2014), with an estimated one million people arriving on its shores in 2015 en route to other European countries, 6 by the time of writing in summer 2018, other Mediterranean countries are also witnessing mass arrivals. Cyprus is one of the countries where such changes have been slower and less impactful. Numbers of arrivals have been lower, humanitarian response less strained, and deaths infrequent. One

1 http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/news/411432/syroi-metanastes-prosaraksan-ston-akama (all web references last accessed 23 July 2018) 2 http://cyprustimes.com/2017/12/05/metaferonte-stin-kokkinotrimithia-38-syri-pou-eftasan-pliario-ston-pyrgo/ 3 http://www.kibrispostasi.com/c89-KARPAZ/n251305-karpaz-sahilinde-can-pazari!-karaya-vuran-ceset-sayisi-8-old 4 http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/kypros/eixan-syggeneis-edw-oi-syroi-poy-pnigikan-anoikta-toy-rizokarpaso 5 https://pafospress.com/ υπό -8 ημερη -κράτηση -ένα -άτομο -σε -σχέση -με / 6 https://www.migrationpolicy.org/country-resource/greece Introduction 3 significant change, however, is the fact that boats have been landing on parts of the coastline that are policed by the authorities of the RoC, compared to earlier patterns where irregular migrants arrived from Turkey to the north of the island, and then crossed the Green Line. This is only one way in which the political problem in Cyprus, ongoing since the 1960s, inflects migration dynamics. In this case it spells the difference between the two routes. But in other cases, it may also determine the difference between greater and lesser chances of regu - larization. 7 As the conflict and migration dynamics in the region continue to remain in flux, the relation between local conflict dynamics and refugee reception will remain uncertain and problems already appearing could be exacerbated. This report provides an overview of these dynamics and relations, with a view to providing recommendations on how current challenges could be taken up more efficiently.

7 This is explored in detail in Demetriou (2018). 4

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

yprus has a long history of migration and forced displacement. The island is often presented in local discourse, including history books, as having diachronically sat ‘at C the crossroads of civilizations’, and cultural influences are celebrated for their blending of eastern and western elements. Significantly, all of Cyprus’s local population groups identify their origins elsewhere. Greek-Cypriots often trace their cultural lineage all the way back to the Achaean Greeks who colonized the island from the 12th century BC. Maronites find their roots in communities that emigrated from present-day Syria and Lebanon from the 9th century AD and through the Middle Ages. Latins claim heritage from Levantine groups that settled on the island during the Crusades and particularly the Lusignan and Venetian rulers (1192-1489 and 1489-1521). In the absence of a formalised history of the Roma population, it is speculated that the Roma settlement on the island took place in the 14th century and was related to population movements during the time of the Crusades. Turkish-Cypriots trace their roots to the Ottomans who conquered the island in 1521, and Armenians often have family histories of descendants settling in Cyprus after the genocide of 1915. Thus, the population of the island is a population identified by migration as well as by conflict. 8 And if migration and conflict are important diachronic elements in the , they mark the island’s modern history even more starkly. The violence between the two main ethnic communities on the island, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, drove many to emigrate—beginning in the 1950s at the end of British colonial rule (1878-1960). Following independence in 1960, inter-ethnic violence persisted and resulted in the separation of the territory, with Turkish-Cypriots leaving the power-sharing government and taking refuge in enclave pockets scattered around the island. At that point, large numbers of the Turkish- Cypriot population became displaced and significant numbers also emigrated to other countries in the Commonwealth, the UK and Australia being favoured destinations. But members of other groups were also displaced, for example, Armenians (who, under the terms

8 Studies on the groups mentioned can be found in Varnava, Coureas and Elia (2009), Coureas (2000), Pattie (1997; 2013), Constantinou (2007), Nevzat (2005), Erdal Ilican (2011). Historical background 5 of the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, were counted as members of the Greek- Cypriot community) and Greek-Cypriots who lived in areas that became enclaves. The war of 1974, prompted by a military coup against the Greek-Cypriot government organised by the junta regime in Greece (1967-1974) with a view to effecting the island’s union with Greece, and the subsequent invasion by Turkey in order to protect the Turkish-Cypriot community from violence, left large numbers of the population displaced, the majority of them Greek- Cypriots. This Greek-Cypriot population, estimated officially at 200,000, has been the main referent of the appellation ‘Cypriot refugee’ for the last five decades – the implied exclusion of other population groups from this concept owes much to the political ways in which displacement has been read. Greek-Cypriot discourse prioritises 1974 over earlier periods, while Turkish-Cypriot discourse downplays the relevance of displacement as a traumatic experience by comparison to the deliverance found in the post-1974 situation (Demetriou, 2018a). This history of displacement in modern history is important to the reception of refugees today, because it has put in place structures and discourses that have an impact on such reception on both sides, to this day. Since 1974, migration into Cyprus has taken different forms. In the north, populations from Turkey were settled in various phases on order to boost population and development. They were incentivised by property and land offers— in houses and areas that had been vacated by Greek-Cypriot populations fleeing the war (Erdal Ilican, 2011). This policy of settlement has been heavily criticised by the RoC government, as well as international actors, as a measure designed to cement the effects of the war on the ground, in the absence of a political agreement ending the war. The populations thus defined as ‘settlers’ are hence largely seen on the Greek-Cypriot side as having illegitimate claims to being in Cyprus and their presence on the island over the last four decades is seen as an on-going war crime. Within that time however, further migrations took place into , of Turkish nationals who arrived independently of formal settlement policy, as well as of ethnic Turks from other areas, who arrived as part of such policies. One example of the latter is the population of Bulgarian Turks, who fled to Turkey to escape the Zhivkov regime (1954-1989), some of whom then settled in northern Cyprus (Demetriou, 2018b). In the south the effects of the war on migration took the form of emigration. Many of the Greek-Cypriot refugees who had lost their properties in the war migrated to countries of the region (Middle East and North Africa) where development projects were underway, and found jobs in the construction industry. Saudi Arabia and Libya are often cited as examples of such labour migration destinations. Others migrated more permanently to the UK and Australia. Some Turkish-Cypriots, although not in comparable numbers, also emigrated along these routes at the same time. Until the 1990s, however, in-migration in the south was minimal and not the subject of serious policy-making. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, migration patterns changed for both parts of the island. Ethnic Greeks and Turks from former Soviet Union republics could migrate to Greece 6 Migration into the Cyprus conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime and Turkey under repatriation schemes (Voutira, 1991; 2004; 2006; 2011), and from there to Cyprus. In the 1990s, as the economy—particularly in the south—was booming, labour migration policies were also instituted, allowing migration from the global south, mainly for domestic and agricultural work (Sainsbury, 2009). Irregularity and its policing gradually became more visible in public discourse, as visa permissions and restrictions became more stringently regulated. Similar work schemes in the north saw an increase in migration for domestic work, but targeted Turkic groups from Central Asia. Human rights issues also began to gradually surface, and trafficking for sexual exploitation gained attention as an issue on both sides as of the early 2000s (Agathangelou and Ling, 2003; Agathangelou, 2004; Vassiliadou, 2004). The system of refugee protection was put in place in the 2000s in the RoC, as it took over from UNHCR, which had been stationed on the island since the 1960s and whose activities had shifted over the decades from Cypriot displaced populations to foreign refugees. The entry of Cyprus into the EU in 2004 meant that the asylum system was streamlined with EU directives, and by extension, much of migration policy that hinges on irregular migration and refugee protection also came within the purview of EU legislation. Free movement within the EU also meant that migration from new entrant countries in particular also increased (Mainwaring, 2012; 2014; Trimikliniotis, 2001). At present, Cypriot migration policy is intimately tied to EU policies with respect to the south and to Turkish policy with respect to the north. This creates a situation whereby migration dynamics and demographics vary substantially between the two sides. The on- going stalemate of the conflict also means that there is no communication between the two sides so that policy may be coordinated. And yet, the policing of migration takes account of the conflict in various ways, starting with the status of the Green Line, and with the territorial dispute. The rest of the report outlines this situation in terms of demographics, legal frameworks, and public discourse, in order to highlight the main problems and their effects. 7

THE M IG RA TIO N LANDSCAPE

Repu blic of Cy prus

The reported migrant population in the Republic of Cyprus between 2007 and 2016 averaged

18,000 people, with a peak registered in 2011 (23,037) and a trough in 2014 (9,212), as shown T in the chart below (Figure 2.1). 9 Around 6,000 hailed from EU countries in each year between

2013 and 2 016, wit h a low 3,749 in 201 4 and a high 7 ,354 in 2 016. In the sa me de cade , there were a tot al o f 28, 590 n aturalizat ions a t an averag e of 3, 000 per yea r, with 3 ,327 o f the total ha iling fr om EU count ries. Brok en do wn by c ontin en t (Figure 2.2), the bigges t n um bers we re from A fric a and Asia . Resi den cy perm its were issue d o n an avera ge of 1 7,000 p er year between 2 008 and 2016 , ab out 15% of them for sh ort-ter m stay s (les s than 6 months) , 40% for medi um-te rm (6-1 2 m on ths) and 45 % for sta ys o ver o ne year lo ng (Fi gure 2.3). D uring t his pe riod, t here was a rela tively sharp drop in all resid ency perm its between 2 009 a nd 2012, and an ov eral l rise f rom 2 013 to 20 16. a r Figur e 2.1

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" " 8 Migration into the Cyprus conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime

Figure 2.2 Naturalizations

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I n all these statistics, which paint the general picture of regular migration, the period around 20 1 3 a ppea rs as a tur ning p o int, w ith low mig ration n um bers ac ross most c ateg ories. T his would m ost r e asonab l y b e related to the finan c ial c risis exper i enced in t hat ye a r, wh e n the country sa w th e near -colla pse of its ba n king s ec t or (Zenios, 2013; Pashardes a n d Pash ourtid ou, 20 13; Clerides , 201 4 ). T he impending cri sis had slow ed the economy slight ly

"" "" The migration landscape 9

prior to the collapse and impacted it severely for a long time after. This would have made Cyprus a not very attractive destination for labour migration. In contrast, the years at the end of the first decade of the millennium had seen a property boom (Michaelides, 2014; Clerides and Pashourtidou, 2007). Following Cyprus’s entry to the EU in 2004, this would have been a pull factor. Similar attraction can be gleaned in recent years, when the economy appears to be recovering. The same uneven pattern is observed in irregular migration. Persons classified as found to

be illegally present in the country numbered 8,230 in 2011. This was the highest number for

the years between 2008 and 2017, while a sharp drop to 4,980 was recorded in 2014, the

lowest number being 3,450 in 2016, with a rise the following year to 4,090. Across those years,

adult ma les co mprise d the majori ty of this po pula tion and gir ls the smallest m inori ty (Fig ure 2.4). Asylu m applic ations, fo r wh ich data is recorded in a lo nger ti mefra m e, clearly evi de nce an increase f ollowin g Cyprus’s en try to th e EU (from 950 in 20 02 to 9,6 75 i n 20 04), a s tead y drop f rom 2007 (6 ,780 ap p lication s) to 2013 ( 1,255 applica tions) and a s low rise until 2 016 (2,940 applicat ions ).

Figure 2.4 Perso ns fou nd to be illegally p resent

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10 Migration into the Cyprus conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime

Figure 2 .5 Asylum a pplications

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A comparison across the two graphs indicates an interesting point: that ‘illegal presence’ does not necessarily correlate with asylum applications. For example, the high number of “illegals” for 2011 (8,230) does not map onto, in any obvious way, the asylum application numbers for " " that year, which were less than 2,000. Irregular migrants and asylum-seekers might have strategies for ensuring the best chances of securing a living in Cyprus, but the link between the two statuses cannot be taken as obvious. Furthermore, in reading these numbers, one should keep in mind the argument that policing and categorization create the situations of ‘illegality’ that demography then documents (Luibheid, 2013). 10 At the same time, it should also be remembered that regularity and irregularity are hardly mutually exclusive. Shifts may occur between them, as when persons overstay their visas, or gain rights through work arrangements or marriage. Refugee protection is another area often discussed in terms of the shifts between regularity and irregularity (Schuster, 2005; 2011; Nyers, 2006; 2013). Asylum applicants are often vilified for having unfounded claims, whereas the asylum determination process is often delayed by serious flaws, especially as seen in Europe-wide policy post-2015. In this field, the situation in Cyprus has shown significant shifts. The rates of rejection have been diachronically high, falling only around 2013, when, as we have seen, application numbers were also lower, and then beginning to rise again (Figure 2.6). Also, in respect to positive decisions, until 2009 the protection offered was mostly under humanitarian status, i.e., not affording the full rights of refugee protection under the terms of the 1951 Convention. This would have had repercussions on the rights of people to create a settled life in Cyprus.

10 Critical studies of migration amply support this point from a number of angles (Andresson, 2014; Tazzioli, 2014; Rygiel, 2011). The migration landscape 11

To understand the meaning of these demographics better, it would thus be important to look at the legal framework guiding labour and refugee protection primarily, which the next section does, following the overview of the situation in the north.

Figure 2.6 Asylum decisions

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" " " " 12 Migration into the Cyprus conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime

Northern Cyprus Authorities in the north are not recognised in the international system as state authorities and the area is considered to be under occupation by the Turkish military, whose troops are thought to amount to 40,000. Turkey indeed exercises significant control over politics in the north, primarily through ensuring financial aid (Bozkurt, 2013), needed because of the inability of the north to trade internationally, and often exchanged for influence over policies, including population demographics. But this also means that institutions are not stringently monito red. A sign ifica nt impact of that is that stati stics pr oduced by T urkish-Cyprio t aut horit ies are consid ered generally un reliable. This is much mo re pron ounced in the ar ea of migration and pop ulation d em og raphics, d ue also to the polit ical effects o f set tlem ent po licies o utlin ed in the previous s ection. Given this, the statistics that do exist are scant and relatively arbitrary. The 2 011 populat ion cen sus registe red 286, 257 peo pl e in north ern Cyp rus , of wh om 190,494 held TRNC ci tizenship (66 .5%). Ano ther 80,55 0 were Turkis h citizens (dual ci tizensh ips counted wit hin the TR NC num be r), corre sponding t o 28% of the po pu lation . Al l oth er groups, 0.3% and 1. 3% of the total, nu mbere d jus t over 1,0 00 at mos t, and haile d fro m the UK, T urk ic

republics, Nigeria, Iran, Pakistan, and Bulgaria (Figure 2.8). 11

Figure 2.8 Census in the north

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The higher education sector has developed into one of the most important areas attracting foreigners to northern Cyprus (Katircioglu, 2010). There are currently 16 universities, reportedl y with a total student population of 101,000. Of those, 88,000 are foreign and hail from 135 countries, 56,000 of them from Turkey. 12 The education sector is increasingly being seen as one of the routes through which shifts between regular and irregular migration occur. For example, in the early months of 2018 concerns were raised about exploitation rings targeting Zimbabwean students. 13 In this field too, data is not readily available. Another significant drawback of collecting migration data for the north is the fact that there is no asylum system in place in the area and applications are dealt with through UNHCR, with decisions aimed primarily at relocation of those afforded protection. A law to institute a domestic framework for refugee protection has been discussed since 2015, and, at the time of writing, was expected to be passed within 2018-2019. The draft law prohibits refoulement and provides protections for minors, including unaccompanied minors, and provides rights to residence and work under a clause for humanitarian grounds. A 2012 report by the Refugee Rights Association registered 221 asylum applications in the years between 1999 and 2011, with yearly numbers ranging from 1 to 43 applications (Polili, 2012: 90). It also reported that the vast majority of applicants (85%) hailed from Iraq, Palestine, and Syria. A significant number of asylum applicants in the north are rejected and deported (ibid), while many are also reportedly pushed back at the border. But significant numbers of people seeking international protection who arrive in northern Cyprus actually cross the Green Line and file asylum applications with the authorities of the RoC. This is an important point which clearly shows how the Cyprus conflict is affecting migration and protection, and which is taken up section 6.

12 http://www.studyinnorthcyprus.org/?page_id=5422 13 https://www.herald.co.zw/zim-students-in-cyprus-journey-of-broken-promises/ 14

LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND IMPLEMENTATION

Labour The Republic of Cyprus has a number of policies in place regulating migration. EU nationals and their families enjoy rights of free movement and settlement according to EU laws (Art. 45, Treaty of Foundation). 14 However, restrictions to those rights have been reported, as for example, in cases of deportation or denial of entry to EU nationals who have been convicted of crimes or who are accused of entering into false marriages with third country nationals (Trimikliniotis, 2013). Equally, working conditions whereby EU nationals are in worse situations than Cypriots (e.g., paid less) but for this reason preferred over Cypriots, have also been reported (ibid). This situation has been exacerbated since the crisis of 2013, and one group that has been increasingly visible in the Cypriot labour sector is Greek nationals. Third country nationals are subject to national policies, which have had different foci over the years. Since the early 1990s domestic and unskilled workers have been targeted from the global south. In 2016 following the financial crisis, a naturalization scheme, entitled “Scheme for Naturalization of Investors in Cyprus by exception”, was instituted for investors in business and property in Cyprus. 15 Thus, there are two poles between which the treatment of foreign workers and professionals takes place in Cyprus, and the vast difference in that treatment is effectively a matter of class. For example, even though EU directives relating to the regulariza - tion of long-term residents (Directive 2003/109/EC) have been transposed into RoC law, their implementation has been problematic. A number of reports (mainly produced by the Ombudsperson’s office and the NGOs KISA [Movement for Equality, Support, and Anti-racism] and FWC [Future Worlds centre]) have noted practices of exploitation, problems with arbitrary arrest, detention, and deportation, discrimination, and police violence with racist features, as well as widespread denial of regularization in many cases where formal conditions are fulfilled. At the other end of the class scale, the new naturalization scheme grants Cypriot citizenship after 3 years to people who have invested 2 million Euro in infrastructural develop - ment projects or business in the Republic and own property worth at least 0.5 million. 16

14 Trimikliniotis, 2013, http://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/2/4/440/htm 15 http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/moi.nsf/All/36DB428D50A58C00C2257C1B00218CAB 16 http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/moi.nsf/all/A0CAA99287BD0E9DC225806C002988D0/$file/SCHEME%20FOR%20 INVESTORS%20NATURALISATION%2013.9.2016.pdf?openelement Legal frameworks and implementation 15

But differences also exist on the plane of gender. As mentioned above, domestic work has been one of the sectors on which migration policy has focused since the early 1990s. The hospitality sector was also another point of focus, both of them being largely gendered fields. This has meant that many third country nationals living in the RoC are women from the global south, who are often separated from their families and children back home. Reports and academic studies (KISA, 2014; Agathangelou, 2004; Pavlou, 2016; Angeli, 2016) have documented increased levels of vulnerability created by problematic work contracts and a high social tolerance for gender-based discrimination and abuse. Cases of sexual abuse of domestic workers have been numerous, and the result has often been the expulsion of the migrant woman. The systematic abuse of migrants’ rights has most clearly been documented in the area of trafficking, however. Since the 1990s, when visa policies targeted specific labour sectors, the entertainment business has featured as one of those. Of particular concern to gender rights organizations and to the US Department of State Trafficking in Persons reporting office, has been the existence, until the mid-2000s, of the scheme known as ‘artiste visas’, covering work in entertainment clubs, but widely understood to have targeted sex work. (MIGS, 2007). This scheme effectively condoned the trafficking of women who were lured into sexual exploita - tion under the guise of waitressing duties. Indicative of the extent of the problem is an ECtHR decision condemning the Republic for failing to protect one such trafficking victim and investigate her death after she lost her life in an attempt to escape her predicament ( Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Application no. 25965/04 ). 17 Following the banning of these visas concerns remained relating to the ability of the authorities to take effective measures to stem trafficking for both sexual and labour exploitation (the latter being the subject of much less scrutiny by organizations than the first). The year 2018 was the first in which Cyprus was categorised as Tier 1 status in the TIP (Trafficking in Persons) report. Trafficking is also the main topic on which there has been some reporting by organi - zations in the north. This exhibits continuities with labour migration frameworks in other fields that are closely related to Turkish policy, e.g., targeting education, and the attraction of ethnic Turks from various countries in the wider region. The general framework in place for labour migration follows a sponsorship logic, similarly to the RoC, whereby a local employer applies for a permit to the Department of Labour and obtains it for a specific type of work and for a specific individual, who, once arrived in the country, cannot change employer (Goynuklu, 2012). Although the law provides labour rights in principle (contractual agreements, minimum wage, leave, overtime pay, etc.), reports show that migrant workers are vulnerable

17 https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/legislation-and-case-law-case-law/rantsev-v-cyprus-and-russia-application-no- 2596504_en# 16 Migration into the Cyprus conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime to abuse of contract and exploitation, particularly when they overstay their permits, and have in practice minimal recourse to the law when rights are violated (ibid). Reports thus speak of forced labour phenomena, which include debt bondage, withholding of passports, violence and threat of violence, refusal of payment, and degrading living conditions. These general conditions have also been shown to impact on lower safety standards in work places, especially in the construction sector, and to be related to a number of serious and fatal accidents at work (ibid). Regarding sexual exploitation in specific, according to the 2017 TIP report, a conflict of interest is to be discerned in the high taxes that nightclub owners in the north pay to the state ($5.7-8.5 million annually), which would deter a crackdown on sexual exploitation going on in these clubs. 18 Anti-trafficking legislation is absent in the north, and as already seen, statistical and other reliable data is not available. The report also noted lack of shelters and support services for victims, as well as lack of funding for anti-trafficking campaigns, and no efforts to train police and other authorities. It also reported the lack of enforcement of the only law that relates to sexual exploitation, the “Nightclubs and Similar Places of Entertainment Law of 2000”, which prohibits entertainment provision other than dance. Failures to protect victims in specific cases were also reported. According to the report, 1,314 six-month “hostess” and “barmaid” work permits were issued in 2017 and 351 women worked under such permits. In 445 cases of deportation of women who had worked in nightclubs, investigations into possible trafficking offences had not been carried out.

Refugee Protection Cyprus signed and ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol in 1963 and 1968, respectively. As mentioned in the overview section, scrutiny over local refugee policy did not come into the fore until the 1990s, when new patterns emerged in migration movement, asylum-seeking and protection globally. The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, was involved in Cyprus in the 1960s because of the conflict, and was concerned, as seen earlier, with local displaced populations, primarily Turkish-Cypriots. In 1974, following the war, a UNHCR coordinator of humanitarian assistance was appointed on the island. Until 1998, local populations were the primary concern of the local UNHCR office, which assisted first with urgent humanitarian assistance, then development projects, and then aid to enclaved populations on both sides. When in the late 1990s refugees began to arrive from other countries, mainly after the Yugoslav wars, UNHCR’s attention shifted to them and local population needs were transferred to other UN offices. 19

18 https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2018/282642.htm 19 http://www.unhcr.org/cy/unhcr-in-cyprus/ Legal frameworks and implementation 17

At the same time, the RoC government transposed EU legislation regarding refugee protection in the process of accession, with the first comprehensive law on the asylum process passed in 2000. This also spelled a shift in the determination process from UNHCR to RoC authorities. Since 2000, refugee law has been amended many times and all relevant EU directives have been transposed. Their implementation is monitored by local organizations, national and EU bodies, UN committees, and INGOs. They have all, at different points in time, expressed concern with reception conditions, the asylum determination process and review of decisions, recognition rates, as well as arrest and detention of people and asylum-seekers, and deportation practices (e.g., Velaris, 2012). They have also raised issues with the management of the Green Line on both sides and the lack of effective policing of migrant crossings, which, as will be discussed later, is an issue that relates directly to the politics of the Cyprus conflict. In the north, as explained earlier, there is no regulated or official asylum process in place. The UNHCR does not maintain relations with authorities in the north since it is not a UN- recognised entity, but instead examines claims brought to its attention by the Refugee Rights Association. While the examination continues, asylum-seekers are effectively treated as migrants, without a specific framework regulating labour and social rights, so access to work and education can be arbitrary, as a local submission to OSCE (Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe) reported in 2009. 20 Local law has ratified the 1951 Convention but not the 1967 Protocol, which extends the scope beyond WWII refugees. In international law, Turkey has been deemed to exercise effective control over the north ( Loizidou v. Turkey, Application no. 15318/89 ), and this would mean that it is also responsible for refugee protec - tion there. However, Turkey’s ratification of the 1967 Protocol comes with a geographical restriction in recognising only European refugees (Polili, 2012: 98-99). This restricts the legal frame in both Turkey and the north to specific policy decisions at different points in time. The key concerns of human rights organizations in the north regarding refugee protection relate to denial of entry, access to UNHCR, and refoulement. International and RoC bodies, on the other hand, are often concerned with the effectiveness of Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot authorities to stop people from crossing the Green Line and seeking asylum in the south. These differing concerns, and the way in which they are related, point directly to the effect of the Cyprus conflict on refugee protection and migration policy more generally. But in order to understand this better it is important to consider how the conceptualisation of citizenship in Cyprus takes account of otherness and how such otherness is now being interpreted within migration policy.

20 Polili, https://www.osce.org/odihr/39301?download=true 18

THE CITIZENSHIP REGIME

nder the 1960 Constitution of the RoC, citizens of the Republic are separated into two distinct and mutually exclusive groups: Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots U(text box 5.1). 21 These groups are defined by ethnic origin, language, cultural identity, and religion, but all these characteristics are thought to coincide (Art.2, § 1-2). While it is recognised that some individuals may not share these characteristics with either of the two groups, the constitution provides that such individuals, communally or individually (§ 3-4), should choose one of the two communities and be members of it. The Armenian, Maronite and Latin communities, which as seen in section 1, have different origin myths and religions, became part of the Greek-Cypriot community under this provision in 1960. The Roma community was not asked and became automatically part of the Turkish-Cypriot community, presumably due to religion. And although the constitution affords the possibility of switching communities, the process by which this is done is laborious, and since 1963, largely defunct. Original assignment into communities, beyond the three religious groups mentioned above, was not a matter of choice and remains a question that is never asked. Where the constitution provides for an automatic switch between communities, the reference populations are women and children, who are by default assigned to the community of the husband or father, again without being asked, effectively rendering them the property of the male family head.

21 http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C225756F0023C6AD/$file/CY_Constit ution.pdf The citizenship regime 19

Text Box 5.1

Article 2 of the RoC Constitution relating to citizenship:

For the purposes of this Constitution: 1. the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church; 2. the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems; 3. citizens of the Republic who do not come within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article shall, within three months of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, opt to belong to either the Greek or the Turkish Community as individuals, but, if they belong to a religious group, shall so opt as a religious group and upon such option they shall be deemed to be members of such Community… 4. a person who becomes a citizen of the Republic at any time after three months of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall exercise the option provided in paragraph (3) of this Article within three months of the date of his so becoming a citizen; 5. a Greek or a Turkish citizen of the Republic who comes within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article may cease to belong to the Community of which he is a member and belong to the other Community upon - (a) a written and signed declaration by such citizen to the effect that he desires such change, submitted to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers; (b) the approval of the Communal Chamber of such other Community… 7. (a) a married woman shall belong to the Community to which her husband belongs. (b) a male or female child under the age of twenty-one who is not married shall belong to the Community to which his or her father belongs, or, if the father is unknown and he or she has not been adopted, to the Community to which his or her mother belongs.

The implications of this for migration are multi-fold. n First, it means that migrants and refugees who become naturalized are assigned communities, rather than choosing them. And because since 1963 the Communal Chambers, where community lists are held, have been defunct, and the Greek-Cypriot Chambers have been absorbed into RoC government structures, it means that naturalizations take place into the Greek-Cypriot community. 20 Migration into the Cyprus conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime n Second, it means that because political and social rights emanate from community membership, they are still determined today by such assignment, including in the case of voting rights, but also in cases of rights extended to migrant populations such as education (where children attend Greek-Cypriot schools). n Third, because the assignment into communities was for the purposes of maintaining a power-sharing governmental system, the definitions of community membership imply homogeneous groups who are, as stated above, mutually exclusive in their identities, and who are pitted against each other in an adversarial relationship. The size of each community is thus a driving factor in political decision-making, and the results of the only census undertaken prior to the eruption of the conflict, which counted 18% of the population as Turkish-Cypriot, 80% as Greek-Cypriot, and the remaining 2% as belonging to the three religious groups, is taken as a proportion that should be maintained. This has never explicitly been presented as an issue in the official design of migration and citizenship policies, but it has been mentioned in less formal settings (Demetriou, 2018a) and is often an unstated factor underlying restrictive logics. n Fourth, the implied presentation of communal affiliation in adversarial terms, as described in the previous point, also informs wider public discourse, most pronounced among the far right (see section 6) who see refugees, migrants, and naturalised citizens as potential enemies if they have identity traits that resemble those laid out in the description of the other community (religion, language, etc.). n Fifth, and extrapolating from these clauses, the development of the Cyprus conflict has led to de facto territorial division and rendered most constitutional clauses relating to Turkish-Cypriots defunct. This territorial division renders the Green Line an important point in migration routes through and within Cyprus, which is nevertheless not recognised as a state border under international terms. The movement of refugees and migrants across it thus becomes problematic, as previously stated, and entails further complications in an already complex situation. Most importantly, this movement is understood and policed by RoC authorities as related to adversarial policies instigated by Turkey. In this way, migration policy is even further securitised. n Finally, two further points relate to the citizenship regime set up in the 1960 Treaty of Establishment of the RoC rather than the Constitution per se. 22 On the one hand, the treaty further confirms the point about maintenance of population proportions, as it explicitly states the 4:1 ratio as one that needs to be maintained in naturalizations into the two communities (Annex D, Section 4, § 7d). And on the other hand, it also assigns two areas within Cyprus, to UK sovereignty, declaring them Sovereign Base Areas of the UK (Main text, Art. 1). However, no special citizenship arrangements are

22 https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/treaty_of_establishment.pdf The citizenship regime 21

made for people living in these areas (Main text, Art. 6), rendering them Cypriot citizens. The existence of these base areas creates zones of territorial exception, where the law is unclear as to whether refugees and migrants arriving in these spaces are under the jurisdiction of RoC or UK authorities. This complication is elaborated in the next section. n This further underscores the point that the Cypriot citizenship regime, complicated as it is because of the dichotomic split into communities, the assignment of non-conforming identities into this schema, and the existence of pockets of exceptional jurisdiction, creates a host of uncertainties for people seeking regularization in Cyprus, within or outside citizenship models (asylum-seekers, refugees, migrants, or persons pursuing naturalization). Because of the Cyprus conflict, naturalization (as the link between migration and citizenship) is a highly politicized question in the north and the south. Naturalization begins with the 1960 constitution and continues on the same governmental logic, which guides citizenship today. Thus, economic criteria are now being added to the factors considered in naturalization, as seen in the example of citizenship by investment, which targets Russian investors as a key group. The political influence of these investors on governmental decision-making has begun to be discussed in recent years. And in the north, naturalization has been and continues to be a highly politicized field, with Turkey widely believed to have a say in relevant policy, while at the same time the naturalizations of Turkish citizens in the north often come under the scrutiny of Turkish-Cypriot left parties. In a recent example, the newly appointed (left- wing party) Minister of Interior in the north, following elections in January 2018, withdrew 175 citizenships granted under the previous regime, causing controversy, through the reactions of nationalist circles. 23

Given the above, it is important to consider specifically how the existence of the Cyprus conflict, which inflects the citizenship regime as outlined in this section, affects policy, discourse, and the experience of migration. RoC policy is of major importance in this respect, even though what happens in the north is also relevant.

23 https://tr.sputniknews.com/dogu_akdeniz/201805121033413969-kibris-vatandaslik-iptali/ 22

MIGRATION INFLECTED BY THE CYPRUS CONFLICT: TWO CASE-STUDIES

Case Study 1: Richmond Village On 7 October 1998 a boat arrived on the shores of the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area carrying 74 refugees, from Iraq, Syria, Ethiopia and Sudan. One of the Syrian Kurdish women in the boat gave birth on it on that day. 24 They applied for asylum, and since they had arrived on British sovereign soil, their applications were at first relayed to the UK. Some were recognised as refugees by the SBA authorities in July 1999 and the rest in February 2000. They were subsequently moved to homes in the Dhekelia base, as a temporary measure. In 2001, they sought visas to settle in the UK but were refused. Since SBAs are overseas territories, they were considered to be in fact in Cyprus and not in the UK. Meanwhile, following Cyprus’s accession to the EU, which recognised the SBAs as sovereign UK soil but not within the EU, the RoC and the UK signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in 2005, according to which the RoC was rendered responsible for refugee protection of people who might arrive on the bases from then on. 25 The refugees were provided with welfare benefits by the SBA until 2007, when they were asked to leave the base and relocate elsewhere on the island. They refused, and many of them remain on the base 20 years later, some families having raised children there in the meantime. After a long legal battle, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales decided, in May 2017, that in fact the 1951 Refugee Convention did apply to the SBAs and that therefore the refugees should be allowed to migrate to the UK. It also left room to question the provisions of the MoU. 26 At the time of writing however, families still remain on the base. This case is exceptional within the protection landscape in Cyprus. However, it is highly significant in showing how the exceptional political situation that pertains in Cyprus impacts on migration and refugee protection. The exceptional arrangements relating to jurisdiction

24 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/21/refugee-families-marooned-raf-base-cyprus 25 Bashir and others v. Administrator of SBAs 26 http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2017/397.html&query=(bashir ) Migration inflected by the Cyprus conflict: Two case-studies 23 on the bases imply that for the purposes of their military function they are unequivocably considered UK territory (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005; Constantinou, 2008). And yet, where this jurisdiction is considered for the purposes of welfare and protection of people who are not UK citizens, it is found to be wanting. The exceptionality of the on-going political situation, where the Cyprus conflict remains unresolved, further cements this because it maintains the legitimacy of a UK presence in Cyprus and its bases, the constriction of which has been discussed only as a possibility after a settlement. It also further cements the exceptional arrangements made with the EU upon accession, whereby the whole of the island is recognised as having acceded but with EU laws suspended in the north (Protocol 10 to Treaty of Accession of 2004). This is particularly important in light of the May 2017 Court of Appeal decision and its castigation of the MoU, because Dhekelia base in fact extends to the Green Line, which as we have seen is a crossing location for refugees moving from the north to the south. In the current situation, it thus remains uncertain whether new claims could be made by refugees crossing into Dhekelia over land.

Case Study 2: Communal Assignment In 1948, a Palestinian refugee couple arrived in Cyprus and set up their home in a village at the foothills of Troodos, and had a daughter in 1950. At the end of the colonial period, they became Cypriot citizens and were registered into the Greek-Cypriot community. Their daughter married a stateless Palestinian refugee and in 1979 had a son, E. T., who was registered as a Cypriot citizen in the Greek-Cypriot community in 1982. His father was naturalised much later, in 2004. When E. T. married a Lebanese citizen and had a son of his own, however, he was informed that the Civil Registry and Migration Department could not register the child as a Greek-Cypriot because the religious affiliation of the father (a registered Greek-Cypriot himself) was Muslim, and therefore the child should be registered as a Turkish- Cypriot. The Department also suggested that the original assignment of E. T.’s ancestors into the Greek-Cypriot community three generations back had been flawed and therefore the whole family should now be re-assigned into the Turkish-Cypriot community. The case was taken up in 2014 by the Ombudsperson’s Office, which suggested that the Civil Registry and Migration Department was exhibiting bad faith in its management of the case and was attempting to rectify an old mistake by creating an unfavourable situation for the citizen concerned. “Taking into consideration the fact that for three generations the family of Mr E. T. belongs to the Greek-Cypriot community, whether this happened by mistake or not, and in any case through no fault of their own, I suggest the registration of his son as a Cypriot citizen in the Greek-Cypriot community immediately and without further delay”. 27

27 http://www.ombudsman.gov.cy/Ombudsman/Ombudsman.nsf/All/D53FDE86270D6FFCC2257E7C0028E7CB/$file/ ΑΚΡ 57_2013_14052014.doc?OpenElement 24 Migration into the Cyprus conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime

This is another exceptional case in terms of migration and citizenship. The family in question, of Palestinian origin, trace their roots in Cyprus for three generations. And yet, the overall treatment they have received from the Civil Registry and Migration Department, would suggest that officials there today treat them as ‘other’, akin to long-term migrants who have not quite become part of the community properly. Since the effective dissolution of the Communal Chambers in 1963, naturalizations have been occurring into the Greek-Cypriot community by default and they continue to do so today. Registrations into the Turkish- Cypriot community take place for individuals who can prove ethnic Turkish-Cypriot ancestry. The fact that in this particular case the strict definitions of the constitution have been applied, and indeed applied so retrospectively, does indeed corroborate the assessment that bad faith is being exhibited. But the concerning fact is that this bad faith arises due to two factors. The first is the adversarial terms in which citizenship is viewed, whereby Greek-Cypriots are interpreted as a population sharing common characteristics and Turkish-Cypriots as the population that is ‘other’. And the second factor is the persistence of the view that migrant populations remain ‘other’ in Cyprus even after they have gained citizenship. The combination of these perspectives can also be seen to guide other instances where citizenship has been refused to migrants and recognized refugees. 28 This is one way in which the Cyprus conflict cross-cuts the migration and citizenship regime. As the next section shows, it also cross-cuts discourse and practice of migration control, even from the initial stages of registering entry to the country.

28 See Demetriou (2018a) and a number of Ombudsman’s reports over the last 5 years. 25

DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE OF MIGRATION CONTROL

he impact of the Cyprus conflict on migration policy can be seen not only in exceptional situations like those outlined above, but also in routine practices of T migration control, beginning with the categorization of people. In policing as well as official statements, there is a consistent labeling of irregular crossers from the north as ‘illegal migrants’ ( lathrometanástes ), who then become ‘asylum-seekers’. This appears to imply that there are two strands of asylum seekers, those who come from the north with relative ease and those who come directly to the south and face more barriers in the process. Building on this categorisation there is the further implication that those who come via the Green Line are less genuine as claimants of refugee protection – they are, in a sense, more ‘illegal’. 29 In police annual reports from 2007 until 2011, the categories used by the Aliens and Immigration Unit to count ‘illegal migrants’ consistently differentiated their point of entry as being from the occupied areas or not. In 2007, the Unit arrested 666 ‘illegal migrants’, deported 2,892 persons but also dealt with 7,770 ‘illegal migrants’ including ‘asylum seekers from the occupied territories [ etités asílu apó ta katehómena ] ( Force, 2008: Appendix J). This consistent categorization is repeated in the reports of 2008 (appendix H), 2009 (appendix E), 2010 (appendix E), and 2011 (appendix F). In 2012, numbers are given in the main section of the report for the years 2010-2012, using the same dual categorisation: entry from free areas or occupied areas (2012: 27), and the same is repeated in 2013 and 2014 for the previous three years in each case (2013: 31; 2014: 37). In the 2015 report, entry from the British bases is also registered, for 67 cases in 2015 (2016: 36). This consistent catego - rization raises a question as to whether some asylum seekers are automatically classified as illegal migrants and thus not granted equal access to the asylum process as other asylum seekers. It is as if crossing the Green Line becomes a prima facie reason for additional scrutiny of applications. And yet, when the numbers are broken down into the different categories, it appears that for most years, overall there have been fewer entrants from the north than from the south (Figure 6.1). Furthermore, it is worth considering that migration also happens in the opposite direction: domestic and other workers who run into difficulty with employers or

29 See further in Demetriou (2018a; 2018b).

26 Migratio n into the Cy prus co nfl ict and the C ypri ot cit izenship r egi me

whose visas h av e expired have sometim es cro ssed to the no rt h and so ught work ther e (Dem etr iou, 2018a) . Cro ssi ngs s uch as these ar e not the su bjec t of public dis course and a re n ot secu ritiz ed. In shor t, what this c ate g orization p oints to is a securitiza tion of m igration th at focuse s o n th e Green Line as a s pace of e xce ption an d d oes so selec tively and in on ly one direc tion. Im pl icitly , thi s also casts t he Gree n Line as a sp ace that prod uce s crim inality in a ‘spect acle’ sense (D e Geno va, 201 3)– indee d , in some of the reports cited here, crossers are counted in the general, also including locals. The effects of this are exacerbated by the securitization of migration in public discourse, most prominently voiced by the far right.

Figure 6.1

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The far right has been represented in the RoC parliament by the political party ELAM (National Popular Front) since 2016, having secured 3.7% of the vote in those elections, a percentage it raised to 5.7% in the presidential elections of 2018. Even though this is only a

very crude indication of its appeal, it points to the fact that extreme positions have become

m ore accept ab le in re ce nt yea rs , an d specifically on the t wo issue s that ELAM b ases it s 30 rheto r ic, mi gration and the C yp rus issue. A t the in ter sect ion o f the se issues is the cal l for closing t he che ckpoints al on g the G reen L ine. Part of the s tap le rh etor ic of EL AM has bee n that the movement of people and goods across the Green Line is a liability for the RoC in " "

30 See Katsourides (2013) for a historical overview. Discourse and practice of migration control 27 terms of security, politics, and economics. Relevant statements in the last two years, taken as indication, raise the issue of tourists visiting the north from the south and thus diminishing profits in the south; they point to health hazards from the consumption of produce from the north; they warn against the free movement of criminals that they see happening as long as checkpoints remain open; and they demand their immediate closure to stem illegal migration and the infiltration of terrorists who may be targeting the British bases. One exemplary statement is reproduced in part in text box 7.2. 31 It exemplifies the way in which the adversarial encounter with Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots is presented as a zero-sum game in economy, politics, and security, as well as the way in which this becomes connected to the securitization of migration. The effectiveness of this discourse is augmented by the fact that it builds on much older arguments, which have existed since the early 2000s, and which held that the crossing of migrants from the north to the south was organized on the state level by Turkey, which aimed at flooding the south with foreigners, and particularly foreigners professing the Muslim faith (also in Demetriou 2018b). In this sense, the very survival of the population of Greek-Cypriots as a cultural and racial homogeneous group (which ELAM professes) 32 is seen as hinging on the closing of the checkpoints.

Text box 7.2

Excerpt from ELAM statement 5 August 2016

…the occupied areas are a transit point for ISIS terrorists, and the British bases constitute a target for them, raising grave security concerns for our people; the rise in travel through the illegal airport of Tymbou, yesterday’s news item that over 6 million Euro was spent in the occupied areas and in Turkey, as well as the fact that the entry of illegal immigrants from the occupied to the free areas has risen by 30%, smuggling, and many other issues, cannot leave us unperturbed. As ELAM we ask the government and all political forces to assume their share of responsibility, rather than demand the opening of more checkpoints. We demand that the checkpoint close as soon as possible for many different reasons, which are clear to anyone. Let’s make the interest of our homeland and the security of our people our first and foremost concern.

31 http://elamcy.com/2016/08/05/ti-allo-perimenoume-na-kleisoun-amesa-ta-odofragmata/ 32 http://elamcy.com/2014/11/13/ratsismos-i-diki-mas-apopsi/ 28 Migration into the Cyprus conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime

Although judging from the electoral results these views do not represent a large portion of the population, it is significant that support of ELAM has now crossed the electoral barrier, which means among other things that the party’s views are also now given more media attention (see Ellinas, 2010, on the links between the two). Indeed, ELAM has not been the only party to call for the closure of the checkpoints, even though more mainstream parties have made such calls only sporadically and without making them formally a key part of their rhetoric. Furthermore, even government statements have at times been made that present migration over the Green Line is part of Turkish policy (more in Demetriou, 2018a). The significance of this discourse is thus that migration is seen as intersecting the Cyprus conflict and the solution of the problem is seen as lying with the policing of the Green Line. This exacerbates both the confrontational discourse between north and south as well as anti- migrant sentiments. And this conflation, as the next section shows, also persists in other fields beyond first reception. In the north the securitization of migration is very different. Because of the involvement of the Turkish state, threats from migration are not primarily focused on state security (e.g., through appeals to the threat of terrorism). Rather, they sometimes take a racist hue within an anti-state discourse that sees Turkey as imposing demographic engineering in the north. This stark difference indicates that the securitization of migration is less about objective threats and realities and more about local power structures. And they are also important in shaping policy. 29

RECEPTION AND RECOGNITION POLICIES

igrants in Cyprus have access to basic services throughout their stay. However, depending on status these are often rudimentary. Irregular migrants are identified M in the first reception centre of Kokkinotrimithia, mainly to determine whether they are asylum-seekers. Health checks are also undertaken there. While asylum claims are being examined, applicants are afforded food and shelter, either in the form of accommodation at the reception centre of Kofinou, or through the provision of a monthly stipend (since 2013 in the form of coupons) and the right to work in designated fields (mainly manual work). There is access to basic healthcare and children have access to the education system. Throughout the last two decades, NGOs and international organizations have reported problems on various fronts related to reception conditions. Both of the centres mentioned above have come under scrutiny for their infrastructure, and Kofinou has been reported as overcrowded on a number of occasions, while the remoteness of the area has been cited several times as a major disadvantage. In a recent visit in February 2018, the parliamentary committee on human rights reported shortage of staff, inadequate infrastructures, and problems with health provision and children’s welfare. 33 In May 2008 the Ombudsperson also noted problems with infrastructure, medical support, frequent overcrowding, psychosocial services, support for those leaving the centre to live on their own, identification of vulnerable indi - viduals, as well as in the coordination of the various authorities involved, and in the management of the centre by private companies. 34 Exacerbating these problems is the fact that people often stay in the centre for prolonged periods of time, even though the centre is designed for short stays. This is related to the length of time it takes for applications to be examined, in many cases stretching into years. The examination process is three-stage, with a first-instance decision taken by the Civil Registry and Migration Department and appeals available in two further stages, on substantive and administrative groups by the Refugee Reviewing Authority and on administrative groups by the Appeals Court. 35 Deportation orders can be suspended by both

33 http://www.philenews.com/koinonia/eidiseis/article/494016/aftopsia-boylefton-sto-kentro-filoxenias-kofinoy 34 http://www.ombudsman.gov.cy/Ombudsman/Ombudsman.nsf/All/93282125BB72DB73C225829C003BF948/ $file/ ΑΔ 1_2018_22052018.pdf?OpenElement 35 http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/cyprus/short-overview-asylum-procedure-0 30 Migration into the Cyprus conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime reviewing authorities. Protection can be granted under refugee status, subsidiary protection status, and, since 2014, humanitarian status. As seen earlier, full refugee protection is granted in the minority of cases. This limits access to rights relating to family reunification and other aspects of social protection. Once recognised, refugees are no longer accommodated in Kofinou, but they are not immediately placed on the state support scheme. Most of time the jobs open to them in practice are deskilling. As stated above, refugee recognition in the north is absent. During the time that UNHCR assesses asylum applications, asylum-seekers live as migrants, with no government support and limited access to work (Polili, 2012). All this renders Cyprus an overall unwelcoming destination for refugees and this explains the unwillingness of many to claim asylum once they land on the island’s shores. 36 In addition, problems further persist with integration, examined in the next section.

36 http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/08/23/refugees-on-the-move-shun-cyprus/ 31

INTEGRATION POLICIES

he Migrant Integration Policy Index ranked Cyprus 36th out of the 38 countries examined for 2014. 37 The study noted that migrants are generally treated as T temporary workers and have few chances of long-term regularity, while family reunification appeared as a major barrier to integration. Negative attitudes were also noted, and the class-based differences in policy between the treatment of wealthy foreign investors and non-EU workers and students appear to have widened since the 2013 financial crisis. One of the areas where the score appeared better was education. Access to schooling is available for migrant children. This is for public schools that operate in the Greek language medium, since English language schools are fee-paying. The Ministry of Education operates a guidance page to the local education system in 9 languages. 38 The Ministry’s key integration policy is the set up of schools under a scheme called ‘Zones of Educational Priority’ (ZEP). ZEP schools receive some extra funding and training to help them implement policies to improve the integration of pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds, mostly in areas with a high migrant concentration. This policy was instituted in 2003 and by 2008 teething problems were noted (Neophytou and Koutselini, 2008), primarily to do with planning a holistic and effective policy, training teachers, and lacking a vision that exceeds numeracy and literacy focus. Other research has probed the more general question of views about migrants in the school system (Zembylas and Lesta, 2011). Limited availability of facilities to help students in their mother tongue was noted in specific, even though Greek language learning was positively evaluated. In 2015, a European Commission report noted much higher drop-out rates for foreign in relation to local students (19.5% and 4.6%, respectively). 39 The policy was further strengthened through a new law targeting refugee children in 2016. 40 A major issue in the function of the ZEP schools is the effective segregation from mainstream society. This occurs because the high concentration of pupils

37 http://www.mipex.eu/cyprus 38 http://www.moec.gov.cy/odigos-ekpaidefsis/index.html 39 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/repository/education/tools/docs/2015/monitor2015-cyprus_en.pdf , page 6. 40 https://www.minedu.gov.gr/publications/docs2016/ ΖΕΠ .pdf 32 Migration into the Cyprus conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime who are disadvantaged in terms of language ability downgrades the schools in the perceptio n of Cypriot locals, who prefer to move their children to other schools, thus leading to ghet - toiza tion of migrant education. Migrant integration into civil society structures remains low, on the formal level at least. The MIPEX report notes low political participation of, and low levels of consultation with, migrant bodies. The main organizations dealing with migrant rights are KISA, an anti-racism and migrant support NGO, and also FWC. 41 Most migrant communities are self-organized, more or less informally, and hold cultural events on special occasions and for yearly festival celebrations. One important basis for such organization is religion. On this front, the Cypriot citizenship regime also plays a role, particularly in two ways. The first relates to the functioning of Muslim places of worship. Mosques in major towns in the south, which had remained disused following the displacement of Turkish-Cypriot communities in the 1960s and after 1974, have been given over to Muslim communities to operate. Such arrangements remain at the discretion of the authorities who oversee the management of Turkish-Cypriot properties and other government departments. Policy and organization appears patchy, however, and access issues have from time to time surfaced in the media. 42 The second way in which integration intersects with the citizenship regime is in the religious organization of the Latin community. The Latin Church operates under the direct authority of the Vatican, whose embassy is located in the Church premises in south Nicosia. Its congregation had been dwindling in recent decades, but in the last few years it has incorporated members of the Catholic community of migrants from South East Asia and thus functions also as an important cultural centre for these communities, primarily comprising female members who work in Cyprus as domestics. Overall, integration policy suffers primarily from the lack of positive measures as well as the absence of a concerted and effective policy aimed at long-term integration and prosperity.

41 https://kisa.org.cy/ and http://www.futureworldscenter.org 42 For example issues regarding the use of the Paphos mosque in 2017 – see https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/05/15/paphos- muslims-left-with-no-worship-space-for-ramadan/mosque-final/ . 33

MIGRATION SINCE 2015

hile many of the issues overviewed in this report are long-standing and many of the problems diachronic, there is a need to consider briefly, before concluding, W the challenges posed since 2015. The escalation of the crisis in Syria has rendered Cyprus’s position as a relatively peaceful European Union outpost in the region immensely significant. In the last quarter of 2015, there were three shipwrecks close to the southern shoreline, a phenomenon that had not been seen for years. Many of the applications for refugee protection in the RoC had, until then, been filed by individuals crossing from the north or by individuals who had entered as migrants and had lost their regular status. This change is indicative of wider, and more profound changes to the patterns and routes of migration, which seem set to continue in the coming years and as long as conflicts in the region remain unresolved. Continuing instability in Syria, the capacity of neighbouring countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, to accommodate refugees, their policies vis-à-vis the EU, the terms of operation of FRONTEX, the EU’s border agency, in the region, border policies in the region and the EU, as well as migration and refugee protection policies in the EU and beyond, are all factors impacting on refugee and migrant arrivals in Cyprus. Collecting data both on movement and on policies is thus crucial to identifying the changing position and role of Cyprus in this crisis— in the region, and in the EU. Considered analysis that projects from the analysis in this report can identify ways in which Cyprus can play a positive role in this crisis, from mapping the local situation in terms of humanitarian responses thus far, policy frameworks currently under formation, and public discourses on migration which make reference to security threats and concerns and to humanitarian needs. Also relevant to consider is the relation between local dynamics around the negotiations: how far peace- building arrangements, for example, account for regional instability and threats, as well as the need to integrate growing migrant and refugee populations in the federal state are important questions that have not been discussed in the negotiations. Equally, the ways in which failure to reach an agreement will impact on refugee protection capacities in the two polities and on future migration routes also needs to be considered. Currently, what we know is that there is a relative change in the routes refugee boats carrying people from Turkey take. The arrivals with which this report began are indicative. Whereas previously the shores of disembarkation were those under the control of the authorities in the north, since 2015 some boats, even though numbers remain low, and 34 Migration into the Cyprus conflict and the Cypriot citizenship regime

especially by comparison to Greece, have been disembarking in the south (map 9.1). The difference in distance between the two locations is minimal, making it evident that the authorities in charge of first reception matter to those organizing the movement. Equally, even though previously refugees from boats disembarking in the south (mostly southern shores) had refused to file asylum applications in Cyprus because they preferred their claims to be examined elsewhere in Europe, for more recent arrivals Cyprus seems to be a desirable destination. As previously stated, the numbers of arrivals in Cyprus are miniscule by compari - son to the arrivals on the Greek Aegean islands in the last three years, Cyprus counting in the low thousands, while Greece over a million. Nevertheless, this subtle change is indicative of possible trends in the future, perhaps indicating a continual rise. Even though Cyprus has been known, also through the reports cited herein, to be inhospitable to migrants by comparison to other European states, and to be a place from where access to onward routes is difficult due to the island’s location, those albeit low numbers are significant.

Map 9.1

Eq ually, in the last three years, and because of changes in wider EU policy, local reception po licies have also changed. Responding to a call for ‘burden sharing’ in September 2016, the Ro C government announced it would accommodate 300 families of Syrian refugees, pre ferably of the Christian Orthodox faith. 43 The announcement came under scrutiny by

a 43 http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/politiki/217928/?ctype=ar

E l c

g i

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 4

# " " Migration since 2015 35 human rights organizations and political parties for being discriminatory, with the Minister of Interior who had made the statement responding it was never the intention to be such. The fact that religious identification however was chosen as the key criterion for applying EU reception policy, is indicative again of the connections between concepts about identity, and the long shadow that the religiously based separation between communities in the Cyprus citizenship regime and the conflict still casts on the ways in which others are seen. Since 2015, reception infrastructures in Cyprus have been given more attention, and the Kofinou reception centre has seen a number of changes in its management, primarily relating to the outsourcing of services and security. Problems, as we have seen above, still persist. During a visit to the centre in October 2017, lack of staff was reported in a number of areas. The most glaring was the lack of translators for certain languages needed for processing applications, one of them being Turkish. 44 Given the fact that Turkish is one of the two official languages of the RoC, such lack is a stark reminder of how the separation that emanates from the conflict impacts seemingly irrelevant fields of governance, creating problems that might not otherwise have existed. On the other hand, the exceptionality of Cyprus because of its conflict has also has positive effects on reception. The EU-Turkey statement issued in March 2016, under which migrants can be returned to Turkey in exchange for the relocation of Syrian refugees, has been catalytic in stemming the numbers of arrivals in Greece and is perhaps one of the most significant policy documents in organizing the review process there (albeit not being a legal document strictly speaking). By comparison, the statement bears no relevance for policy- makers in Cyprus, who do not maintain relations with Turkey because of the conflict. Whether this will have any substantial effect on patterns of migration vis-à-vis Cyprus is still to be seen. But having in mind that the statement has been criticized heavily by human rights organizations, the RoC’s choice not to apply it would appear to afford some space, albeit little, for better protection than that afforded in places where the statement is applied. Cyprus participates in the operations of FRONTEX and has hosted meetings on the island. Although information on this relationship is scant, possibilities for tighter cooperation are likely if migration dynamics intensify. 45 Given current trends, it appears that the field of migration into Cyprus will still change in the coming years. It also appears that as long as the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, the impact on migration, along the lines mentioned here, and perhaps in new ways yet to be seen, will continue. As the report has tried to show, it is an area that deserves more attention from policy-makers and researchers, if better conditions and procedures are to be put in place in an effective manner.

44 Interview with official at the centre. 45 http://www.police.gov.cy/police/police.nsf/All/C513B54A8B39D23EC2257A2F002CC76C 36

CONCLUSION

his report has attempted an overview of the field of migration in Cyprus at the moment. The major concern has been to outline the connection between this field T and the Cyprus conflict, an issue that has not adequately been addressed as yet. In the course of this exploration, the major connections outlined have been the following:

(i) The relevance of the Green Line as a space from which migrants and refugees cross. This is primarily considered through the movement from north to south, and appears to be given weight in the asylum process. It has also been important in the stance of the EU vis-à-vis Turkey and its attempts to control migration at its borders. The impact on policing and adversarial rhetoric has been shown to be important in the reception of refugees and in the perpetuation of conflict rhetoric. There is need for further consideration of these connections in more depth. In addition, one aspect that has not yet been considered in research and policy is the movement in the opposite direction, i.e., of migrants in the south who choose, for various reasons, to cross to the north and seek employment there or in Turkey. 46 The factors involved in this movement remain to be explored, alongside their impact on the migration field more generally. (ii) The relevance of the Cyprus conflict in structuring the rhetoric on migration. In this respect, the discourse espoused by the far right has been given particular attention and shown to contribute substantially in the securitization of migration in conjunction with the call to close the checkpoints. At the same time, the adversarial logic on which perceptions of demographics are based and which emanate from as far back as the constitution of 1960 and its citizenship regime, has also been shown to still guide the wa ys in which migrants and refugees are treated. A key area of concern here is integration , which has been shown to be particularly difficult in Cyprus, and as one of the case- studies shows, remains so in cases of naturalization, even if this occurred generations prior. The picture painted in this respect is bleak, and is perhaps the main area on which efforts should be expended, i.e., creating more welcoming conditions of living.

46 Indicatively explored in Demetriou (2018a).

Conclusion 37

(iii) Another difficulty with perceptions of migration pertains to the north, where the demo- graphic orientation of Turkish policy in settling people at different points through the years has cemented views of intolerance amongst Turkish-Cypriots, including even the progressive pro-peace side. This hampers communication on the issue between the sides, and effectively precludes possibilities of coordination, even on the civil society side, except for NGOs focussing explicitly on refugee rights. Better communication on this issue will undoubtedly be beneficial to the coordination of policy, reception, and integration, and could prove an entry point for a breakthrough in the peace nego - tiations as well. (iv) Th e impact of new dynamics post-2015 is yet to be determined, but the noted indications must be given further consideration and examined explicitly for their intersection with local conflict dynamiacs.

In sum, the current migration regime indicates serious problems, a substantial proportion of which emanate from factors relating to the Cyprus conflict. New dynamics developing in the region around Cyprus need to be seen as opportunities for addressing these problems, rather than allowing them to become further complicated. The last section of the report outlines a number of recommendations for steps that can be taken in this direction. 38

RECOMMENDATIONS

n For the immediate term: (i) Improve communication between north and south (ii) Expand the human rights framework on migrant and refugee rights beyond the currently restricted policies emanating from the EU, including by prioritizing refugee protection over other alternative protection statuses, and developing a viable protection framework in the north n In terms of research: (i) Expand the scope of research to address data relating to the rights, welfare and integration of refugees and migrants and upgrade the provision, collection, and accessi bility of data in the north (ii) Encourage further research into the economic impact and the contribution of migration to a more informed debate about the benefits and problems of migration n In terms of the citizenship regime and peace negotiations: (i) Use the negotiations as an opportunity to revise the citizenship regime, starting with a thorough revision of communal ascription. Community ascription should be made more flexible and allow scope for voluntary identification, without adverse repercussions on the enjoyment of rights. (ii) Given the power-sharing framework within which the peace negotiations have proceeded, political rights that attach to communal affiliation should be disentangled from social and cultural rights that relate to everyday life and the integration of communities within a larger whole, within and beyond the two main communities. (iii) Issues arising from migration should provide an opportunity for the negotiations to move beyond the binary logic of ethnic antagonism that has stalled the negotiations thus far. 39

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The report can be ordered from: PRIO Cyprus Centre P.O.Box 25157, 1307 Nicosia, Cyprus Tel: +357 22 456555/4 [email protected]

In recent years patterns relating to irregular migration in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean have changed dramatically. Cyprus is one of the countries affected even though these effects have been less spectacular than in other countries such as Jordan, Turkey, or Greece. However, the situation in Cyprus poses particular questions, as these dynamics come to cross-cut issues related to the Cyprus conflict. As the conflict and migration dynamics in the region continue to remain in flux, the relation between local conflict dynamics and refugee reception will remain uncertain and problems already appearing could be exacerbated. This report provides an overview of these dynamics and relations, with a view to providing recommendations on how current challenges could be taken up more efficiently.

 (online)

The report can be ordered from: PRIO Cyprus Centre P.O.Box 25157, 1307 Nicosia, Cyprus Tel: +357 22 456555/4 [email protected]