The Role of Media in Alleviating Sectarian Conflict: an Exploration of Peace Journalism in Egypt

The Role of Media in Alleviating Sectarian Conflict: An Exploration of Peace Journalism in Egypt

by Aya Sharaby

B.A. (Journalism), Misr International University, 2013

Extended Essays Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

in the School of Communication Faculty of Communication Arts and Technology

Copyright in this work rests with the author. Please ensure that any reproduction or re-use is done in accordance with the relevant national copyright legisla Approval

Name: Aya Sharaby Degree: Master of Arts The Role of Media in Alleviating Sectarian Title: Conflict: An Exploration of Peace Journalism in Egypt Program Co-Directors: Yuezhi Zhao, Adel Iskandar

Adel Iskandar Senior Supervisor Assistant Professor Yuezhi Zhao Program Director Assistant Professor

Date Approved: August 28, 2018

ii Abstract

Through looking at Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt, this research delves into the dynamics that showcase media’s complicity in violence committed through denial of existing sectarian problems and the reinforcement of status-quo inequities. It explores how the model of Peace Journalism can be applied to foster more inclusion, as well as mitigate conflict.

Keywords: sectarian conflict; Peace Journalism; Muslim-Christian relations; Egypt

iii

Dedication

To my mother Hala Shaker;

To my supervisor Adel Iskandar;

To my mentor Amr Khalifa; and

To those who accept the “other”, no matter how different they may be.

Table of Contents

Approval Error! Bookmark not defined. Abstract iii Dedication iv Table of Contents v Introduction 1 Tolerance, Citizenship, and Religion 2 A Brief History of Sectarianism in Egypt 5 Representation of Copts and Christian-Muslim Relations in the Media 9 Diversity 9 Understanding Alienation 11 Strategies for Media Reform and the Peace Journalism Model 13 Media’s Cognitive Effect on the Public 17 Research Methodology 18 Case One: The Dragging of Souad Thabet in Upper Egypt 19 Al-Ahram’s Coverage 19 Youm7’s Coverage 22 Case Two: The Displacement of Copts from Sinai 26 Al-Ahram’s Coverage 26 Youm7’s Coverage 29 Peace Journalism and Sectarian Conflict in Egypt 32 Language 32 Content 34 Pockets of Peace Journalism 40 Limitations of Peace Journalism in Egypt 42 Conclusion 43 References 46

Introduction

In May 2016, tens of men in the Upper Egyptian village of Al-Karm attacked seven Christian houses, and burnt them down. They went into one specific home, dragged a 70-year-old woman out and paraded her through the streets, ripping her clothes off. The mob attack is said to have resulted from a rumour that the grandmother’s son had an affair with a Muslim woman (The New Arab, 2017).

Egypt is home to several marginalized ethnic and religious communities that are often forgotten both by the state and the general public. Although they came into the limelight more following the January 2011 Revolution, these communities have been suffering exclusion and oppression under all regimes. The groups of Nubians1, Copts2, Bedouins3, as well as religious minorities such as Baha’is4 and Shiites5 altogether form around 20 percent of Egypt's population (Salah, 2013). Egypt’s Christians get more media exposure than other marginalized groups. However, it is still limited, and mostly in relation to negative events. Living in a Muslim-majority country, the number of Egypt’s Christians, called Copts from the country’s ancient name, has been a source of controversy and politicization over the years. Between 8 and 15 million people, estimates have served either the Coptic camp, the Islamists, or the state6. At times regarded as “siblings” to the Muslim majority, or at times referred to as “visitors” to the country, they are driven into their own communities, away from the public sphere and its media. Concurrently, Islamist policies--the notion that public and political life should be guided by Islamic principles--have effectively pushed them out of these realms. It is of importance to note that state media not only lack sufficient representation of Copts, but also ignore injustices committed against them. Egyptian state television ignored the crackdown on a mostly Coptic Christian group of rights protesters outside its own Maspero building in October 2011. Most of the dead had been killed by live ammunition or crushed under the army’s armoured vehicles. State television then called upon “the

1 People living in southern Egypt who are descended from an ancient African civilisation (The Economist, 2016). 2 The largest Christian denomination in Egypt 3 The native inhabitants of Egypt’s desert domains (Ellis, 2018) 4 Those who belong to the Baha’i faith. See http://www.bahai.org/ 5 A branch of Islam which holds that Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law Ali is his rightful successor (Momen, 1985). 6 See Playing the Numbers Game: Copts and the Exercise of Power (Malak, 2013)

1 good citizens of Egypt” to go down to the streets and “support the Egyptian army against the Copts.” While the state is one party to the maltreatment, the media forgo the role of remedying the deeply rooted sectarianism in Egyptian society. Society itself is also deeply complicit in this discrimination.

In Egypt, media have always been a tool for the ruling power to enhance its gains, barely giving a platform to the general public, let alone to marginalized communities. This paper explores how the Peace Journalism model can be applied within the Egyptian context to foster more inclusion, as well as to mitigate conflict. It takes Muslim-Coptic relations as a case study, looking into how media are complicit in the violence through the denial of any existing sectarian problem and thereby reinforcing the status-quo.

Tolerance, Citizenship, and Religion

In current day politics, particularly in Western national contexts, commonly held ideas of citizenship are derived from the theoretical framework of liberalism. The theory of liberalism is based on two main pillars: the protection of each citizen from tyranny and according equal rights for all. Liberals believe in religious tolerance, that religious differences should not be a cause for discriminatory treatment (Spinner, 1994). For the purposes of this paper, tolerance is defined in the liberal sense as "respect for people as human beings, that is, respecting their choices freely (so long as they do not harm others)” (Makari, 2007).

Makari distinguishes between legal citizenship and social citizenship, defining legal citizenship as how citizenship is determined from a juridical perspective; it has merit with respect to the courts and entitlement from the nation. On the other hand, social citizenship is concerned with members of society including or excluding others and allowing others to enjoy the rights to which they are entitled. In Egypt, Christians citizens are unequal to Muslim citizens, whether legally or socially, as will be discussed below. Dating back to the Ottoman rule of Egypt, the state has relied largely on “a millet system” to determine social and political rights and legal status which "limits the right of individuals to revise their conceptions of the good" (Kymlicka 1996). The term “millet” was “traditionally used to refer to the confessional group to which one belonged… [that]

2 slowly came to incorporate the modern sense of minority to refer to nationally protected religious groups” (Mahmood, 2012, p.425). This millet system has set up a structural relationship between different communities of faith in the country and organized the state’s patronage of each on that basis.

In addition to the millet system, for decades, unquestioned Islamic fundamentalism has shaped Egyptians’ worldviews emerging from Al-Azhar,Egypt’s premier Islamic institution for legal jurisprudence (sharia) and the oldest Islamic university in the world, as well as radical groups and sheikhs (locally and regionally) belonging toto extremist Salafi7 orders. This trend has resulted in deeply-rooted misconceptions and beliefs, used to navigate through everyday lives, and manifested in daily interactions. Refusal to accept the “other,” anyone having a different faith (or lacking one), has become pervasive. One of the biggest societal conflicts resulting from this is an entrenched sectarian divide between Muslims and Coptic Christians. The vast majority of Egyptians rely heavily on religion in identifying themselves. Lisa Schirch (2001) highlights three points with respect to identity and its role in conflict situations. First, people have a human need to define themselves in relation to others. Second, people are prepared to kill and die in defence of particular sociocultural identities. Third, people’s understanding of the self is usually formulated upon how they perceive an adversarial “other.” Schirch adds that "individuals and groups search for cognitive consistency by ignoring or rejecting information that contradicts their worldview [...] in shaping perceptions of [...] the 'other'" (p.150).

Contemporary Egyptian thought is characterized by non-violent bigotry and religious supremacism, whereby “the normalization of notions of second-class citizenship, even through non-violent ideologies or practices, creates a more permissive environment for sectarian violence” (Hanna, 2016, para. 4). Every year, people reach out to Islamic scholars for fatwa (edicts and rulings according to Islamic law) to make sure that it is not sinful to extend holiday greetings to Copts. It is not uncommon to hear the phrase “mseehy bas kowys” (“A Christian, but nevertheless a good person”), on the assumption that Christians are an alien group of people whose intentions are unknown. Acceptance of the choice of faith, if one wishes to convert from Islam, is almost non-existent. One

7 A more conservative Muslim movement. The name Salafi comes from as-salaf as-saliheen, the ‘pious predecessors’ of the early Muslim community (Stanley, 2005). 3 instance found a woman who chose Christianity over Islam slaughtered by her own family (Abdel Rahman, 2017). The discovery of romantic involvement between a Christian and a Muslim spirals into violence, in many instances leading to the burning down of homes and churches. Tadros (2010) notes that a petty crime, or a dispute between two citizens of different faiths such as an argument between a vegetable seller and a customer can escalate into communal violence if one party is Christian and the other Muslim. Sedra (2013) points out an increasing scarcity of Egyptian Muslims having the experience of lived relationships with Copts.

Many Copts complain that they are rejected from job posts or denied promotions because of their Christian identity. The perception that a Copt might never become president, and that Copts are not appointed in prominent state positions that concern the security of the country or as university presidents, is prevalent (Shenoda, 2011).

Additionally, differences in sociopolitical and socioeconomic levels affect the absence or presence of tolerance in Egyptian society (Makari, 2007). The capital Cairo is a “freewheeling megacity where sheer size dilutes prejudice,” hence violence is less rampant (Walsh, 2017). In the villages of the less developed, and less central Upper Egyptian city of Minya, where Christians comprise 30 percent of the population, rumors of secret churches frequently result in Muslim mobs attacking Christians and burning their homes. Ultraconservative clerics or politicians often spearhead such attacks. Indeed, Tadros (2010) states that the Christian poor, the socially and politically marginalized Copts living in deprived communities, suffer the “full force of sectarianism.”

Parvaz (2011) explains that discriminatory state policies have greatly defined the Coptic community. Samuel Tadros (2016) went as far as saying that Egyptian laws are designed to remind Copts of their second-class nature. Christians must follow Islamic inheritance laws. An unofficial one percent quota (far less than the most conservative estimates of Coptic proportion in the Egyptian population) for Christians is upheld in the police, military, judiciary, and foreign service (Tadros 2016). Building Christian houses of worship remains one of the main controversial policies. A law passed in 2016 stipulates the authorization of the local provincial governor to build a church (after decades of being an authorization in the hands of the country’s president on the basis of a 1856 Ottoman decree). Human Rights Watch (2016) denounced the law on the basis that it

4 does not include a method to appeal when a governor denies a permit, and that the provision taking into account “security and public safety” could pave way for mob violence to dictate the permission for church construction. Tadros (2016) describes building a church as a “herculean task.” The same could be said about religious conversion from Islam to Christianity (or any faith other than mainstream Sunni Islam). A 2015 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom report found that while Sunni Muslims are the recipients of the majority of charges, those who end up being sentenced to prison for blasphemy are mostly Christians, along with Shi’a Muslims, and atheists, usually based on flawed trials (USCIRF, 2015). In addition, the state denies the presence of sectarianism. At the dawn of every attack or violent incident, “the government responds to what is at root a problem in political culture with half-hearted sloganeering and heavy-handed security intervention” (Tadros, 2011). It’s regular practice is forcing both parties into reconciliation sessions instead of punishing the aggressor.

Furthermore, the education system has a hand in fostering discrimination. Textbooks overlook the history of Copts and their contributions to Egypt. Christians learn a great deal about Islam at school, while most Egyptian Muslims have no knowledge of the Coptic faith or those who adhere to it (Tadros, 2016). Furthermore, the glorification of Islamic battles and the spread of the faith particularly to Egypt, is a cornerstone of the Egyptian religious curriculum.

A Brief History of Sectarianism in Egypt

Dating back to Ottoman Egypt, in the 16th century, discrimination against anyone who didn’t conform to the mainstream Muslim tropes of the time was rampant. A Copt was a Dhimmi—the Islamic term which means “protected person,”and was regarded as socially and politically unequal to Muslims (Mahmood, 2012).

Prior to the 1952 coup which overthrew the Egyptian monarchy, the larger Coptic community was represented by the descendants of powerful notable families, usually lawyers and landowners. Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the military leaders behind the coup who became president and introduced socialist measures, was “loathe to

5 cooperate” with those who collaborated with the old regime (Sedra 2014). Instead, he enshrined the hierarchy of the Coptic Church to be the exclusive representative of the Christian community in both religious and social affairs. The recognition and resources packaged into cooperation with the state made the relationship appealing to Church leaders. Mahmood (2012) writes that this political system, intact till today, lies “at the heart of the contested meaning of religious liberty in Egypt” and “as a result, the Coptic Church tends to deploy a communitarian understanding of religious liberty that serves to consolidate its authority over its followers” (para. 11).

Under the rule of President Anwar al-Sadat who followed Nasser, a rupture happened between the regime and Church, and then Coptic Pope Shenouda was placed under house arrest (Sedra, 2012). State-sponsored Islamization of politics intensified. Since the 1970s, Islamists’ movements thrived, their influence outpouring into the public. The state’s security apparatus blocked any political space that would allow the development of non-governmental organizations and non-partisan initiatives, leaving the outreach of Islamic groups uncontested (Tadros 2010). One key factor which aggravated the Islamization of society was that Islamic associations provided “badly needed” services which the government did not sufficiently offer (Makari 2007).

During Hosni Mubarak’s presidency before his ouster in 2011, it was evident that political Islam had become a significant agent in the sociopolitical scene. With louder voices and clear agendas advanced in professional syndicates, and consequently increased prevalence in main elected posts, the rise of Islamists was one marker of the decades- long process. Radical Islamist and militant activities, including attacks on Copts, notably heightened in the 1990s (Makari 2007). Makari lists some of these religiously-motivated attacks, such as burning a Coptic Orthodox church and the murdering Christians in Dairut, in the Assiut province of Upper Egypt in January 1991; the axing of four Christians to death in Tema, in the Upper Egyptian governorate of Assiut, and burning of more than sixty homes, dozens of Christian-owned shops, and a church in 1992, (Ibrahim in Makari); the killing of twenty-one Christians in Upper Egypt in the course of one month in 1997 (Cyprus Weekly in Makari, 2007). To indicate the gravity of sectarianism in the Egyptian society, Tadros (2010) points out that the sectarian attacks of the 2000s were carried out “not by militants seeking to establish an Islamic state but

6 by ordinary townspeople.” This makes sectarianism exceedingly more serious than in the 1970s, as it indicates that intolerance is “internally bred, not externally induced.”

Nevertheless, Egyptian society has had its moments of unity. Coptic Christians were a vital part of the 1919 Revolution which led to Britain recognizing Egypt’s independence in 1922, and a new constitution in 1923 (Nkrumah, 2017). In the 1940s and 1950s, Copts were equal actors in the struggle against British colonialism, and in the devising of the nationalist project (Mahmood 2012). Another defining moment would be the January 2011 revolution, which brought together millions of Egyptians in Tahrir Square, all calling for economic reform, freedoms, and social justice. Sedra (2012) illustrates this best:

What was so captivating and exhilarating about Tahrir, and the comparable sit-ins across the country inspired by the revolution, is that they were public spaces in which dialogue across faiths, across generations, and across ideologies was not only possible but promoted. Indeed, what came across so powerfully from the multitude of images and videos taken during those 18 days in January and February 2011 was the pluralism of the demonstrations (para. 7).

One of the most iconic photographs from the Square was that of Copts joining hands and encircling a group of Muslims to protect them while they pray. Following the uprising in February 2011, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) took over. In October of the same year, security forces clashed with Copts who were protesting an attack on a church in Aswan. Dubbed the Maspero incident, 26 Copts were killed and more than 300 were wounded. SCAF denied responsibility for the use of violence. Reciprocating the unity they showed in Tahrir Square, Muslims joined Christians in their protests against SCAF (Parfaz, 2011).

In 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi was elected as president of Egypt. During his year in power, discrimination against Copts was a daily practice. The government did not adopt inclusive policies on a social level. He pushed through a constitutional referendum that would enshrine Islamic principles as guidelines for legislation. A heavily Islamist parliament pushed for a more marginalized role of Christians and an negligent stance towards their views. In a 2016 lecture, at Christian

Solidarity International, Mariz Tadros (2016) explained that sectarianism intensified partially because most Copts did not vote for Morsi; “they were against Islamist rule because informally they had experienced the impact of Islamist political movements creating divisions in their community.” During the Morsi presidency which lasted a year, the elected parliament was 71.5% Islamist (BBC, 2012). There was an escalation of rhetoric against Christians (largely because they did not vote for Morsi), a major break with the Church, and a marked increase in attacks against Copts.

In June 2013, the military took over once again following demonstrations against the Muslim Brotherhood regime. Karim Malak (2017) writes that:

[T]here was a conscious effort to incorporate Copts into the nationalist fold, make them feel like equals […] it suddenly became in vogue to attack those who previously wronged or discriminated against Copts, if it often occurred by forgetting how the military too wronged Copts, this was done to promote a secular idea surrounding the June 30th, 2013 regime change. [...] Yet this form of secular solidarity was hollow (p. 22).

In positioning the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch Pope Tawadros II at his side as he announced the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated President Morsi’s ousting, the Minister of Defence (who later became president) Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was sending out a message. “The implicit assumption in this display was that Pope Tawadros endorsed the coup on behalf of the Coptic Christian community in Egypt” and was in line with the more than half a century old partnership between Pope and State (Sedra, 2014, para. 6). This hegemonic role of clerics ensures that the voices of middle-income and poorer Coptic citizens are muted (Tadros, 2011).

A survey conducted in 2014 to discover reasons why people revolted against Morsi found that the top third reason cited was a lack of security or not feeling safe. What is notable here is how participants defined security; it was not a matter of seeing policemen on the street, but a question of social cohesion, and feeling that one is part of the community. Tolerance for those who express their faith differently, or have no faith, has risen as an issue of security concern (Tadros, 2016). Hanna (2016) warns, “a society that views and treats a segment of its population as less than fully equal is also [a] society that produces violence and terrorism against it” (para. 6).

Representation of Copts and Christian-Muslim Relations in the Media

Diversity

Diversity is an attribute of major importance in any robust media system. Fair and balanced media thrive on the principles of inclusion, covering all sides of a story or an issue, and guaranteeing enough representation for religious, ethnic, geographical and socioeconomic minorities. There are many sides to diversity. While some tackle it in terms of media ownership and structures, making sure the media are not concentrated in the hands of the few (Doyle 2002; Einstein 2004), others focus on the diversity of media content and the extent to which this content represents the different groups in society (McQuail, 2007). The EU MPM Study (KU Leuven – ICRI et al. 2009) acknowledged that media diversity or pluralism is a broad concept, which includes not only aspects of media ownership and editorial freedoms, but aspects of political, cultural, geographical, structural and content- related diversity as well.

A series of four studies about media diversity (content, societal, geographical, and cultural perspectives) in Egypt over the course of two years were conducted by American University of Cairo Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication Rasha Abdulla. The analysis showed a “severe” under-representation of all minority and marginalized groups in society. At the same time, the press coverage ignored important issues of substance, and all issues related to inclusiveness and diversity as they relate to women, children, the elderly, religious minorities and ethnic minorities. Only the voice of the mainstream was emphasized in the press and on popular television talk shows, while voices of marginalized groups echoed further down the spiral of silence.

One study (Abdulla, 2015) examined the coverage of two state newspapers and two privately owned ones during Egypt’s first post-revolution parliamentary elections, the process for which started in November 2011 and concluded during the following month. Egypt, at the time, was ruled by the SCAF. For every 14.6 males interviewed or featured in newspaper stories, only one female was featured. Abdulla links this to the overall

9 representation of women in the Parliament, which turned out to be as low as 2%. Other minority voices were almost non-existent in the newspaper coverage. Only five people of different ethnic backgrounds such as Bedouins or Nubians were identified within the 14,001 individuals featured in the stories. There were also a total of only 11 people identified as persons with disabilities, 28 identified as elderly, five children, and only 416 individuals with recognizably Christian names (0.03%).

Egypt witnessed its most diverse media in terms of plurality of voices during the two and a half years following the January 2011 revolution, not necessarily out of efforts to enhance diversity as much as a result of the political power struggle in the country at the time between the old regime, the revolutionary camp, and the Muslim Brotherhood (Abdulla 2014). Even then, however, a series of reports issued by the civil society showed a severe lack of diversity on most fronts, most notably on the demographic front that led to a realization that the media suffered from a severe lack of diversity and was not doing a proper job of informing the audiences of what mattered (Abdullah, 2014).. “This is a very alarming issue since people use media messages to construct their social reality and their perceptions of these groups in society,” Abdulla concludes (p. 234).

The 2014 Constitution includes an article that mentions media diversity and inclusiveness, but leaves the specific regulation of which to potential media laws. Such laws, however, have not been issued. Demographic diversity, therefore, has always been under threat in Egypt. According to Abdulla:

Following Mubarak’s downfall, each regime that came to power until most recently that of former head of the Egyptian military Abdel Fattah el-Sisi seems to have been more brutal on the media than its predecessor...these outlets remain in the service of the regime, not the people (2014, p.3).

Meanwhile, Aboulenein and Fahmy (2016) state that “sectarian attacks occur so frequently in Egypt that they rarely attract wide publicity” (para. 6).

Throughout the decades, the Egyptian government has “repeatedly and forcefully” renounced that sectarianism thrives in the country, a position echoed in the country’s media. “This taboo on acknowledging sectarianism...has prevented serious and much-

10 needed discussion of problems in Coptic-Muslim relations” (Sedra, 2013, para. 9). Whenever a big incident does make it to the media, official sources cite “foreign fingers” that are attempting to agitate sedition. This serves to close the case as quickly as possible, with the state proceeding to display Egypt as characterized by “national unity” (Tadros, 2010), with a “perfectly pieced together social fabric” (Shenoda, 2011).

Aside from attacks deemed worth reporting, the media barely represent or discuss Copts. In an article entitled “Reflections on the (In)Visibility of Copts in Egypt,” Anthony Shenoda (2011) writes that Copts become a visible religious community only when they are attacked. On the state’s typical responses to inter-religious clashes, he says:

“[It] hide[s] what has long been a problem that no one seems to want to address in Egypt: At best many Copts feel like foreigners and second- class citizens in their own country, at worst they feel invisible, as though they simply do not matter because they simply do not exist (Shenoda, 2011, para. 14).

On the other hand, Sedra (2012) points to the Islamists’ takeover of the Egyptian social and cultural spheres, such as the stardom of “televangelists” like Amr Khaled, and more recently Mostafa Hosni and Moez Masoud, and the expansion of conglomerates focusing on “Islamic media” development. With this came the shrinkage of the public sphere within which Egyptians of different faiths can come together.

On 4 March 2011, the Church of the Two Martyrs in Helwan was burnt down, which sparked demonstrations in front of the State’s Radio and Television Building, named Maspero. Paul Sedra (2011) remarks that the choice of place was deliberate: “The Coptic protesters want their distinctive lives and concerns publicly acknowledged by fellow Egyptians. This means inclusion, not separation.” They wanted to be visible to the media, which often neglect them. What better place to shout this out loud better than the national broadcasting building?

Understanding Alienation

Copts are pushed out, of, or alienated from, the Egyptian public sphere. The media, being part of this public sphere, only uphold such alienation, furthering sectarianism in society. Originally a Marxist term, Katherine Knoblotch (2014) looks into “alienation”--a

11 rejection of social institutions and processes--as an effect caused by the mediated public sphere. She argues that the current communication structures limit the public’s capacity to use communication for democratic empowerment. Five processes lead to such a limiting setting: commodification, isolation, meaninglessness, normlessness, and powerlessness. Some of these conditions can be seen within the Egyptian mediated public sphere, both by public and private media, with varying degrees between urban and rural areas, and between socioeconomic classes.

The second condition, isolation, is one of them. Isolation occurs upon preventing citizens from being engaged in the production of public opinion, as well as isolating citizens who do engage in the practice. The established capitalist system forces individuals out, and curtails opportunities for diverse members of local communities to deliberate on public affairs. Furthermore, media favour focusing on particular policies or events instead of entire communities. Media disseminating like-minded discussion can escalate extremism and group homogeneity, Knoblotch asserts, spurring polarisation, harming heterogeneous groups’ capability to identify common interests, and dwindling individuals’ opportunities to learn from each other. According to Knoblotch, media structures that produce one condition of alienation breed other conditions. Henceforth, alienating communication structures reinforce a top-down dynamic of opinion which allocates greater power over the generation of public opinion to political professionals.

Against such alienation, the 2011 revolution brought about a unifying, pluralist euphoria. Sedra (2012) describes it as “the cultural project of the revolution.” The historian says that “as Egyptians from all walks of life came together to protest the status quo and debate the country’s future, there was an explosion of creativity from which art, music, and poetry flowed” (para. 7). Sedra suggests that the one major lesson that Tahrir conveyed is Egypt’s dire need of public spaces for dialogue.

As an immediately available public sphere, prospects for media to capitalize on this cultural project seem promising. Through applying the Peace Journalism model, media can have a role in spreading tolerance and educating society about accepting the “other.”

Strategies for Media Reform and the Peace Journalism Model

Having critiqued the content and structures of the media, which (Des Freedman et al, 2016) name as a first step for media reform, this mainstream media is functionally delegitimized. The delegitimization is derived from media’s commitment to support the power structures to which they are tied, and over their inability to properly represent “our lives as they are lived.” Keeble et al (2010) decry the lack of a “reflective, analytical, ethical approach” in the “dominant journalistic culture” (p. 97).

Curran (2005) lists three main roles for the media: an independent watchdog over the state, an agent for citizens’ information and debate, and to act as the voice of the people to the state. Hackett and Carroll (2006) assert that media owners have influence over “what political issues enter the public sphere, and how they are framed, so their political interests have an unfair advantage.” With regards to reforming current media practices, Hackett and Carroll call for looking for “what is not in the news,” and Des Freedman et al (2016) suggest capturing the attention of mainstream media, and pressing for more ethical forms of journalism. A model that brings it all together would be Peace Journalism.

The foundations of Peace Journalism (henceforth PJ) lay in the peace studies of Johan Galtung (Lynch 1998), where he laid out the differences between “peace/conflict journalism” and “war/violence journalism.” The latter was described as the prevailing mode of covering conflict in mainstream media. It produced discernible patterns of inclusion and omission. War journalism dehumanizes the enemy, fixates on the visible effects of violence, is propaganda-oriented, elite-focused, and victory-oriented. It prioritizes official sources over “people sources,” event over process, and violence over peace. PJ, however, gives a voice to the voiceless, targets exposing all cover-ups, and puts a spotlight on the invisible effects of violence, such as trauma and damage to social structures.

A landmark work concerned with PJ is Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick’s book Peace Journalism (2005). Lynch and McGoldrick’s definition of PJ describes

“[W]hen editors and reporters make choices--of what stories to report and about how to report them--that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict [...] The model is a set of tools, both conceptual and practical, intended to equip journalists to offer a better public service (p. 5).

PJ is described as having four main pillars. The first is that it is peace/conflict-oriented, meaning that it delves into conflict formation, and attempts to show a possibility for prevention, or a ‘win-win’ outcome. PJ avoids a zero-sum game. Hence, it is neither a victory nor defeat for either party of the conflict. Properly testing what a conflict is “all about” requires “an awareness that causes are to be found not just in the conflict arena, but also in the broader conflict formation” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, p.13). So are the solutions or “exits.” In doing so, PJ partially prevents further escalation, explain the authors.

The second is that it is truth-oriented, thereby exposing untruths from all parties. “Dualism leads inexorably to Manicheism--us good, them bad--and to demonisation and dehumanisation of the ‘Other’,” say Lynch and McGoldrick (2005). The absence of well- defined policies [for interpreting developments in conflict] might enhance “self- manipulation” whereby news editors give priority to “incoming items that fit their own state-of-mind, psychological predispositions and news-value expectations, rather than to accept evidence from the field” (Shinar and Stoiciu in Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005, p.16). The PJ model shields audiences and journalists from being “oblivious to the way realities are being created around us” (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005, p.16).

PJ is also people-oriented in that it puts the spotlight on all suffering, and directs attention to people as peacemakers. It avoids the way mainstream media is elite- oriented. “Official sources” in a country are often misconceived as neutral or passive, and their statements result in reality-creation, discussion-shaping, and world- construction, hence pointing out the authors. PJ would, therefore, include official sources as part of the conflict but also go to alternative sources. It asks the right questions of the right officials, and finds non-violent responses and recommendations, and presents them in the public sphere.

Finally, it is solution-oriented, with resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation at the center of its focus.

With the notion of “War on Terrorism” in mind, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) observed that the media’s military coverage feeds the very violence it reports. PJ traces the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their journalism–the ethics of journalistic intervention. It puts responsibility on reporters glorifying state action, or continuously disseminating pro- violence press releases.

The model uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness, and accuracy in reporting. The claim that PJ produces more accurate representations of conflict lies in its deliberate strategy to emphasize backgrounds and contexts. In short, it links the conditions to the event. PJ explains why the situation is what it is.

Refuting a major criticism directed towards PJ, (Shinar in Keeble et al, 2010) maintains that the practice does not revolve around “good news” nor does it avoid hard questions, but rather channels a “fairer way to cover conflict, relative to the usual coverage and suggests possibilities to improve professional attitudes and performance; strengthen human, moral, and ethical values...and provide better public service by the media” (p. 3).

Agency

An awareness of the possibilities of journalistic activities both within and outside the corporate media is needed to bring about change (Hackett and Carroll, 2006). This is crucial for a media environment such as Egypt’s, where it seems like the regime’s media and the privately-owned allies have taken over to the extent of losing hope in a different narrative. To emphasize the role of individual agency within corporate media, Hackett (2006) draws on two models: Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) “hierarchy of influences” and Bourdieu’s “outlook of the media” as a relatively autonomous field. The former describes the media field's five layers of influence--the media workers with their roles and ethics, the daily work routines inside a newsroom, the organizational imperatives of

15 profit-oriented and hierarchically-structured media institutions, the extra-media influences such as governments, and lastly ideology (Hackett, 2007). Meanwhile, Bourdieu (1996) states that the journalistic field is different from industries that aim to maximize audience consumption. He believes that there is room for the deconstruction and investigation of politics for the public good and acknowledges that individual journalists are “active and creative agents.” Hence, Hackett stresses the “necessary role for dedicated journalists to take the lead.”

Furthermore, Keeble (in Keeble et al, 2010) extends the definition of a journalist beyond the ranks of the professionals to radical media activists, intellectuals, human rights campaigners, and citizens. Their ideas would be delivered both within the dominant and the alternative public spheres. Keeble also regards the internet and citizen journalism as a means to challenge the mainstream media. He argues that audiences are no longer passive consumers, but rather producers of written and visual media. He also stresses the role of radical intellectuals, research centers, political activists, peace movements, human rights organizations, and campaigners. Keeble notes that those who upload images of police brutality on YouTube, or who report on opposition movements via Twitter and other websites participate in the alternative media sphere. In doing so, citizens and campaigners challenge the concentration of institutional and professional media power and monopoly (Atton, 2009). Social networks are redictating the manners of war and conflict reporting. With the spread of the internet and cell phones, social networks fill the silences which suppression and censorship forged (Matheson and Allan, 2010).

It is crucial to note that Lynch’s proposal for a “global standard” to practicing PJ bypasses the need for legislation and top-town governmental regulation (2014). It provides a way around freedom of speech oppression, and the much needed holistic media reform. It brings the role of agency to the forefront, as discussed above. Susan Dente Ross (in Shinar and Kempf, 2007) says that no “revolutionary” changes are needed for a transformation to PJ. It only calls for “subtle and cumulative shifts in seeing, thinking, sourcing, narrating, and financing the news.”

Media’s Cognitive Effect on the Public

Media play a huge role in shaping today’s public opinion. Egypt is no exception, with news articles, especially inflammatory ones, circulating rapidly, regardless of their accuracy. A look into how media, through using the Peace Journalism model, could have a positive cognitive effect on the Egyptian public, its opinion and its consciousness is imperative for the study. Peace Journalism can become Egypt’s anti-“fake news.”

Cognitive and psychological effects of exposure to media falls under social constructivism, as indicated by Scheufele (In Keeble et al, 2010). Gamson and Modigliani (1989) describe a feedback loop between journalism and its audience, saying that “media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct meaning, and public opinion is part of the process by which journalists… develop and crystallize meaning in public discourse” (p.2).

Clifford G. Christians (in Keeble Et Al, 2010), the world’s leading authority in communication ethics, notes that rather than being focused on peacemaking between intergovernmental bodies, the ethical principle of nonviolence advocates peaceful coexistence in community life. He states that Galtung’s PJ applies the principle, in a manner concerned with positive peace- “the creative, nonviolent resolution of all cultural, social, and political conflicts” (p.1).

PJ has a positive effect on the general public. It contributes to public understanding of the wider world and to the vitality of community discussion (Lynch, 2014). Embedded in pluralism and diversity, PJ prompts what Hall (1980) calls “negotiated” readings. It fulfills media’s role in providing citizens with enlightened information and debates.

Research evidence indicates that framing characteristics used by the PJ model, notably escalation and de-escalation, evoke distinctive cognitive responses (Shinar and Kempf, 2007). One study found the US television coverage of war in Iraq aggravated the subjects’ sense of meaninglessness of death. It was not the images that triggered the effect, but rather “political spin’ and “arbitrary realities,” thereby the context (Serlin 2006).

PJ, on the other hand, “represents a way of making news less potentially harmful to the psychological health of its consumers” (Lynch, 2014).

Research Methodology

The research component of this study, which is an exploratory discourse analysis of media sectarianism, delves into the coverage of two specific case studies in Al-Ahram and Youm7 newspapers in Egypt. Al-Ahram (meaning “The Pyramids”), semi- governmental publication, is the second oldest Egyptian newspaper, founded in 1875, and the most widely circulated (Ipsos, 2013). Youm7 (meaning “seventh day”), a privately owned newspaper, was established in 2008 as a weekly paper but has been published daily since 2011. It is self-declared as a paper for all social classes as opposed to “the political and financial elite.” These two papers have online platforms which have a wide readership among Arabic speakers.

The study identified two cases which will be analyzed to identify the various narratives associated with coverage of sectarian conflict.The first case is that of the 70-year old Souad Thabet, who was hauled out of her house in the rural village of Al-Karm in the Upper Egypt governorate Minya on May 20, 2016. A rumor circulating about a romantic relationship between Thabet’s son and a divorced Muslim woman prompted the woman’s divorcee to attack Thabet’s family and the houses of other Coptic residents in the village (Mada Masr, 2017). This incident was chosen as it manifests sectarianism in one of its ugliest forms, and because it got massive attention among public opinion. The video of Thabet being stripped and dragged was posted online and went viral causes a major uproar and public outrage. This in turn created pressure for media coverage and government action. Using the keywords “Souad Thabet” “Sayedet Al-Karm” (The Al- Karm woman) and “Sayedet Al-Minya” (Minya woman), this study looked into news coverage for eight months since the incident took place in May 2016, with the first news report being published on the 25th of the month. These terms were the most prevalently used by the Egyptian media to refer to the incident which garnered a significant amount of public attention.

The second case analyzed in this study is concerned with violent forced displacement, which in Arabic is often referred to as tahgeer. In February 2017, more than 150 Coptic families were forced to flee Al-Arish, in the northern region of the Sinai peninsula, to other governorates after either having their beloved ones killed, or after receiving threatening messages left on their doors or sent to their phone. The displacement of 150 families to seven governorates from the governorate of Northern Sinai is a sizeable and landmark one (Al-Ahram, 2017). Alongside attacks on Coptic communities and places of worship, forced displacements are likely the most prevalent form of violence against Christian communities in Egypt and they are typically ignored in the media or do not get as much coverage as other forms of violence. This particular case is exceptional, perhaps because it played precisely into the states’ “War on Terrorism” narrative. The keywords searched were “Al-Arish” and “a’aelat maseehya” (Christian families) covering an eight month period starting on February 24th, 2017 when the crisis was first reported.

The analysis looked at both the language and the content of reporting on the two cases. The focus was on news reports as they are what the Peace Journalism model is concerned with, rather than editorials or other types of journalism. For verification purposes and to ensure all articles are identified and analyzed, a comprehensive search using both the newspapers' online database and Google News search engine were compared to corroborate the data set.

Case One: The Dragging of Souad Thabet in Upper Egypt

Al-Ahram’s Coverage

Al-Ahram, being mostly state-owned, is often conservative in its address of issues of social strife. In the case of Souad Thabet, Al-Ahram adopted the typical line of denying sectarianism, as Egyptian media have always done for decades. Throughout the 20 news reports it published about the incident, the newspaper chose to interview heads of political parties that asserted and parroted the denial of sectarianism as an underlying factor behind the attack. For example, Head of Al-Wafd Party Al-Sayed al-Badawi,

19 maintained that it is a criminal offense not a sectarian issue, while also calling it an “isolated incident” (Anz et al, 2016).

The notion that there is an external factor rather than homegrown sectarianism igniting episodes of violence is a recurring one in many of the reported statements. Minya’s Governor, the highest gubernatorial official overseeing the site of the incident, initially denied the incident. But following widespread coverage and public uproar, he later blamed “foreign hands attempting a creating a schism” between Muslims and Copts. This is consistent with a common pattern of coverage related to sectarian matters, where state officials claim foreign intervention or “unidentified” meddlers responsible for the social strife between religious groups. He also said that people are taking advantage of the absence of Pope Tawadros II and Al-Azhar Grand Imam Ahmed El-Tayeb, as they were both traveling abroad at the time, to conspire against Egypt’s national unity, and to divide and destabilize society (Al-Ahram, 2016). In an interview with Pope Tawadros II a few months after Thabet’s ordeal, the Pope himself assures the public that “the incident represents a tone that is discordant with Egyptian society and the values of the Egyptian nature” (Sadeq, 2017). One report went as far as quoting the mayor of the village where the incident happened, Omar Ragheb, saying that the villagers feel that there is a “scheme to damage Al-Karm’s reputation” (Al-Husseiny, 2016). So denial of sectarianism is a trope that pervades most statements from the most senior government officials to the most local and across the spectrum of Al-Ahram’s coverage.

Another evident trope that appeared in Al-Ahram’s coverage pertained to second-class, protected “Dhimmi” status. While some reports referred to Copts as “siblings,” an identified implying that they are brothers and sisters in the nation alongside Muslims. For example, on for the politicians featured in the paper is the Head of Communications for the Mostaqbal Watan Party Ahmed Sami who also said “Islam’s Prophet commanded us to take care of Egypt’s Copts” (Anz et al, 2016). This tone that refers to Christians as either siblings or a diminutive constituency needing protection demonstrate at best a glaring paternalism and at worst a reminder that the status quo or the identity of society is by default Muslim. Egyptians are expected to be Muslims and their “siblings” are the Christians.

The sources who appeared in the news reports were predominantly the usual, elite officials such as Head of Cabinet Sherif Ismail and Minya Governor Tarek Nasr, as well as Church clergy. Indeed, Al-Ahram’s first report on the incident was the tale according to Bishop Macarius of Minya, the highest Coptic church official in Minya (Hesham, 2017). Only once did Al-Ahram talk to the family of the accused, getting their side of the story. The Muslim woman’s former husband’s uncle confessed to wanting vengeance for their disgrace, but did not know that matters would escalate and that there was a will to burn houses (Al-Husseiny, 2016). Al-Ahram published another, longer report in which the newspaper talked to villagers who oppose such vengeance, and others who described accounts of Muslims coming to the aid of their Christian neighbours when the attacks took place. What is worth noting is that the report was introduced as one distancing itself “from the tranquilizers and official statements designed to contain the crisis” (Al- Husseiny, 2016, para. 1).

Solutions offered in Al-Ahram’s reporting included the necessity to hold the offenders-- the mob which attacked Coptic homes--accountable through the rule of law. This referenced a quote from President Al-Sisi asserting that those who committed this wrongful act will be held accountable (Al-Ahram, 2016). One news story reported on how the security forces organized daily search campaigns to arrest 10 suspects who had fled. In addition, Bishop Rafael called for the dismissal of officials, such as the Minya’s Governor, from their positions for having allowed such violence to escalate without interfering. Other government officials called for “national unity.”

Al-Ahram’ coverage of Souad Thabet’s case, a a classical incident of sectarianism, upheld the Egyptian media practice of negating the involvement of sectarian strife. It also encouraged notions of guardianship over Copts, as opposed to them being equal to Muslim citizens in Egypt. Pretences of perfect harmony and national unity was vividly present in Al-Ahram’s news reports. The voice of Christians, other than church officials, was non-existent.

Youm7’s Coverage

The issue of Souad Thabet was covered heavily in privately-owned Youm7, sometimes up to four news pieces in one day at the peak of the story, with a total of 46 news reports published.

At the beginning and shortly after the attack, the private media outlet did acknowledge that it is a sectarian episode. Up until the second news report published by Youm7 about the incident, it was described as a sectarian one (Allam, 2016). However, on Thursday, 26th May 2016, the day after the incident was reported in the media, another Youm7 article framed it as a criminal offence, with the headline generically quoting Al-Karm village’s so-called “people” stating that what happened has nothing to do with religion (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Friday’s cover story for the print edition, which was also published online, was given a big manchette reading “The Minya Incident is Criminal and Not Sectarian Sedition.”

“The Minya Incident is Criminal and Not Sectarian Sedition”

Similar to Al-Ahram, Youm7 mostly featured Church clerics as sources rather than having spokespeople from the diverse Christian community. As is the case with Al- Ahram, the first report that came out of Youm7 was merely a repetition of Bishop Macarius’ tale (Allam, 2016). The only voice from the Christian side, other than Church clerics, was republishing the old lady’s testimony recorded in the police investigation, thereby vetted by the police and not a direct account (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). It is not

22 clear if there was a news moratorium on interviews with her, if she refused to speak to the media, or if the Church intentionally monopolized access to the victim. Youm7 did publish the accused’s lawyer asking why the other side of the story is not being listened to, but the newspaper never sought the information he was attempting to point to (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016).

Youm7’s coverage followed the narrative that the violent incident does not represent the nature of Egyptians, stressing national unity. It quoted President Sisi saying that “such incidents do not reflect in any way the nature and traditions of the Egyptian people” who “fought to spread peace” (vividly a military-oriented statement, and a securitized and violent take on peace), who provide an ideal model for national unity (Al-Gali, 2016). The paper reported on a call between Pope Tawadros II and the old lady Souad Thabet, quoting the Pope asserting that “the incident is fleeting and will not affect the relationship between Muslims and Christians” (Allam, 2016). One MP representing another region in Minya proposed that “the nation's enemies” want to hinder its progress (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). A report quoted Minya’s Governor saying that “invisible hands” are trying to create a split between Muslims and their “Christian siblings”, who have been “one entity” for thousands of years (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Yousry Al-Moghazi, a parliamentarian and a member of the Egypt’s Support Coalition, condemned those with “foreign agendas” for targeting Egypt’s stability (Saeed, 2016). Major General Saad Al-Gammal, head of a political coalition called Egypt’s Support Coalition, even blamed the widely used scapegoat term “terrorism” (often used to refer to the criminalized Muslim Brotherhood) for trying to split ranks between Egyptians (Fakhri, 2016).

In a somewhat uncharacteristic manner, at least compared to Al-Ahram, Youm7 did incorporate a quote from the former Minya deputy Ihab Ramzy denouncing the inaction of security forces upon receiving a threat complaint from the old lady (Allam, 2016). Besides this quote, Youm7 demonstrated various courses of action in response to the incident in their coverage.The paper quoted Minya’s Governor reassuring that those who were negligent and violators of the law will be held accountable (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). It also quoted Fady Youssef, a coordinator at the Coalition of Coptic Egypt, who called for the dismissal of the governor and the Minister of Interior (Allam, 2016). One pastor called for “radical solutions,” however his suggestion was the use of “an iron fist” against the external extremist elements (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Mayor of Al-Karm, Omar Ragheb,

23 prevented those whose houses got burnt from leaving the village (a common official practice that follows agreements agreements in reconciliation sessions) (Allam and Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Party members and MPs sent a delegation to contribute in solving the crisis (Reda, 2016). So between calls for heavy-handed responses to perpetrators to accountability from government officials, Youm7 represented a wider range of critical perspectives than Al-Ahram, where mention of government responsibility or negligence were absent.

Youm7 being a private newspaper often thrives on distribution, sales, and online traffic, numerous reports aired on the side of sensationalism, showcasing tranquilizing measures, such as how Abu Qurqas MP Ashraf Shawqi kissed the victim Souad Thabet’s head (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016), and the invitation she received from parliament, and having received given an award (Guirges and Abdallah, 2016), as well as being presented with an Egyptian flag (Abdel Galil, 2016). These actions constitute an attempt to soothe the anger and frustration caused by the attack as opposed to addressing the root causes behind it.

One relatively progressive and different solution was also mentioned, albeit in relation to gender violence rather than sectarianism. Hence, allowing the official rhetoric of framing the incident as a criminal gender-based act of violence as opposed to one based on sectarian and religious motivations. In fact, the Ministry of Justice’s Women and Child Affairs Department decided to open an office for assisting women against violence following this incident (Qassem, 2016).

As is the case in many reports that are seen as disruptive in Egypt, the militarization of solutions is rampant. For instance, there was a report on Youm7 about the presidency’s orders for the armed forces to reconstruct and restore all buildings and facilities affected (Al-Gali, 2016), and another included the armed forces’ plan to remove the fire ruins “amid hope for a going back to regular life” (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). These are exemplars of the primacy of the armed forces as saviour and resolver of quagmires in Egypt is persistent even in cases of public sectarian strife. While the default and typical “reconciliation sessions” often take place after such incidents involving members of different faith communities, one of the reports from Youm7 identifies a meeting held between Minya’s governor, Al-Azhar representatives,

Church representatives, a parliament delegation, Ministry of Interior officials, and Thabet’s husband. Youm7 quoted one pastor refusing to call it a “reconciliation session” (but practically speaking that is what it was) (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Bishop Raphael, Secretary of the Holy Synod of the Coptic Church and Bishop of the Churches of Central Cairo, refused the concept of reconciliation sessions and called for the rule of law (Abdallah, 2016). This is a departure from the typical decorum which accepts the “reconciliation sessions” as the formal means to resolve conflicts of sectarian nature. Even former Secretary-General of the Arab League and former presidential candidate Amr Moussa stressed that the constitution protects all citizens’ rights, including having a safe life. He called for justice and also refused reconciliation sessions (Reda and Abdallah, 2016). This appeal for justice and rule of law seemed more common in the private Youm7 coverage than the governmental Al-Ahram reporting.

Despite these differences, this did not change the portrayal of the regime and its President Sisi as the hero, a tone that rang extremely loud. Youm7 reported on how Sisi refused to label Thabet through religion, referring to her as an “Egyptian woman,” because “we are all one and we have equal rights and duties” (Hamdi and Al-Ghoul, 2016). Following Sisi’s speech, Youm7 wrote: “a state of optimism and satisfaction prevailed among everyone in the village of Al-Karm in Minya governorate after the president's apology to Souad Thabet" (Allam and Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Many reports included quotes parliamentarians, party members, and others praising the president’s wisdom, and and applauding how he and the Pope handled the situation. Coptic MP Margaret Azer referred to Sisi’s “good, humanitarian soul” (Arafa, 2016). Bishop Macarius also praised the president’s interference (Allam, 2016). The MP of Abu Qirqas region, where Al-Karm Village is located, stated Sisi’s apology “soothed our hearts” (Allam and Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Yousry Al-Moghazi, a parliamentarian and a member of the Egypt’s Support Coalition praised Sisi, and how he is a president “for all Egyptians,” as opposed to the Muslim majority only (Saeed, 2016). Hence, it is evident that the untouchability of the executive branch is especially clear in incidents of sectarian nature, whereby the President is often presented as resolver of such dilemmas.

Although Youm7 discussed the stripping of the elderly woman more extensively than Al- Ahram, content and language differences between the two papers were stark. Youm7’s reporting substantiated that the incident was alien to the Egyptian society, and that there

25 wasn't any discrimination based on religion. Aside from republishing Thabet’s investigation testimony, the coverage excluded viewpoints and educated solutions from the wider public, be it Christians or Muslims.

Case Two: The Displacement of Copts from Sinai

Al-Ahram’s Coverage

Compared to the case of Souad Thabet from Minya, the displacement of Copts from Sinai garnered far greater coverage in Al-Ahram. The paper published 124 news reports about the issue. This might be due to the perception of the incident as a graver ordeal affecting a larger number of persons (150 families), or perhaps because of the geographic location and parties involved, it served the regime’s “war against terror” narrative. We cannot say with any certainty which is the driving force or intention behind this coverage but we can say each of these or all of them combined.

When it comes to coverage depicting government support, it is often presented akin to a gift, rather than an obligation. This is evident by the sheer amount of reporting on the actions taken and the number of headlines featuring the government or government officials offering a service or visiting a camp. For example, the paper reported on how the Minister of Education Tarek Shawqi exempted the transferred students from paying school fees (Shehata, 2017). Hassan et al (2017) wrote, “the State, with all it ministries, has spared no effort to provide support for the incoming families.” There were multiple news reports about the government providing apartments and jobs for the families (for example see Ibrahim, 2017) and how officials were paying visits to the camps hosting the displaced Coptic families. This information was not part of other news reports and is unconfirmed, but appears to be “in accordance with the directives of President Sisi” (Ibrahim, 2017 and Zalata, 2017).

Despite the aggrandizement of the services provided, the state downplayed the suffering of the Coptic families. For one thing, they refused to call it what it is: tahgeer (forced displacement). The Governor of Ismailia Yaseen Taher stated that “what happened with the Christian siblings [emphasis added] coming from Sinai cannot be described as a

26 type of forced or organized displacement,” pointing out that the transfer was based on decisions of individual Christian families and personal initiatives from the Evangelical Church (Ibrahim, 2017). As well, Minister of Interior Magdy Abdel Ghaffar said “we did not ask any of the citizens living in North Sinai to leave their homes” (Al-Ahram, 2017). Instead, the paper used the phrase “incoming families” or “moving families,” completely avoiding labeling it tahgeer.

Unlike the case of Souad Thabet, Al-Ahram actively spoke to the displaced Copts, exposing stories about attacks on homes, murdered brothers, fathers, and family members complaints of daily kidnappings, waking up to the sound of blasts, constant sound of bullets, and not being able to leave their homes out of fear. Salah Salam, president of the Human Rights Council in North Sinai, stated that 255 people have been killed in Sinai, without specifying a time period (Selim and Al-Sherif, 2017).

The event and this type of victim-oriented coverage conveniently feeds the state’s “War on Terror” narrative in Northern Sinai, a narrative it uses to solidify its grip and force the “unification” of the public behind it. None of the news reports were devoid of the word “terrorism.” All blame was placed on terrorism, and none was placed on members of the civilian public who threatened their fellow Christian villagers or the government for ignoring the conflict until it became the crisis that it was. “The more Egyptians unite, the darker the terrorists' hearts become” read one report (Hassan et al, 2017). Head of parliament, Ali Abdel Al, held that “these events aim at striking national unity” (Eissa and Lasheen, 2017). Al-Azhar once again strongly condemned the terrorist attacks against the Christian siblings in North Sinai, stressing that this is a crime against all Egyptians (Al-Basheer, 2017). One parliamentarian was reported to say that terrorist acts “cannot break Egyptian unity” and that they will “only increase our resolve to eliminating the hotbeds of terrorism and remove it from its roots, thanks to the strength and determination of our armed and police forces” (Ibrahim, 2017).

While Al-Ahram may have spoken to the displaced families, at no point did there appear to be a contradiction between their interviews and state’s official discourse. As if parroting the government’s narrative, they too decried terrorism which “wants to create a chasm” between Egyptians and it will not be able to because of Egyptians’ unity. As with the conflict itself, the media dealt with its resolution like it is for a temporary situation.

Headlines like “Compensation given to the people of North Sinai affected by terrorism” (Selim and Al-Sherif, 2017) were published.

Due to the militarization of North Sinai because of an active insurgency, it was clear that the armed and security forces were seen as the actors responsible for resolving the situation that precipitated the displacements. Minister of Culture Helmy Al-Namnam asserted that “what is happening in El-Arish is an interceptive, temporary phase, all of which will end soon, thanks to our heroes from the armed forces and their ongoing sacrifices” (Ibrahim and Bahig, 2017). Major General Alaa Abed, head of the Parliament’s Human Rights Committee, asserted that Christians are part of Egypt’s fabric, asking armed forces and the police to “avenge” them (Ibrahim, 2017). Subsequently, all the solutions were extremely militarized.

An increased security campaign launched, upon the instruction of Minister of the Interior Magdy Abdel Ghaffar, to “impose security control” on the city of Al-Arish and to prosecute and arrest the “terrorist elements present in the midst of citizens” (Shouman, 2017). Military spokesman Tamer Rifai said that arrests of suspects come “as a continuation of the efforts of the armed forces and the civilian police in raiding terrorist strongholds and prosecuting the takfiri elements in the city of Arish” (Mostafa, 2017). One report went as far as MP affirming that “terrorism taking its last breath” (Mobasher, 2017).

Using the same language by referring to Copts as “siblings,” Vice Admiral Mohab Mamish, the chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, noted that the enemies “cannot affect the unity of the Egyptians, especially after the June 30 revolution, which witnessed the unity of all, and delivered Egypt to safe shores.” He further stated that “Every spot of soil in this country belongs to all of you and these events have increased the cohesion between the presidency, the army, the police, and the people” (Ibrahim, 2017). Most noteworthy in this quote is the majority of actors being of the security forces and with the civilian Egyptian public listed last on the list. This speaks further of the militarization of society at large.

The militarization of media discourse of this incident was coupled with the continuous attempt to frame the regime as the saviour of the Copts. Media coverage was

28 consistently punctuated with particular frames, even though violent attacks in Egypt have mounted since the coup, especially on Copts. For example, Naji Assaad, Coordinator of the Orthodox Church, said that “we feel like full citizens under the leadership of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, and that there is no difference between a Muslim and a Christian” (Ibrahim, 2017). This suggests that the predecessors of President Sisi and their governments treated Copts as lesser citizens. Coptic MP Margaret Azer, herself a Coptic Christian, made it a point to note that “there has been targeting of the army, police, and Copts in the Sinai” (Eissa and Lasheen, 2017). Putting them all in one sentence within the context of the crisis only served to strengthen the mental link of victimhood, sacrifice, and heroism in the mind of the reader.

Al-Ahram’s reporting on the coptic families’ flight vastly reflected the state’s wanting to turn a blind eye to forcible displacement (as part of the larger issue of sectarianism) of Copts in Egypt, while parallely using the crisis to serve its interests. The “War on Terror” pretext has been used by the June 2013 military regime as a cover for extrajudicial killings, the rounding up political opponents, and the violation of freedoms. All solutions mentioned in conjunction with retribution for the victims of the displacement were violent, militarized responses, and none looked at prevention of future conflict.

Youm7’s Coverage

Despite the differences in readership, ownership, and revenue generation between Al- Ahram and Youm7, their news coverage (consisting of 119 published articles) of the Coptic displacement from Sinai case was similar to Al-Ahram’s.

Youm7 also had excessive coverage of what the government provided for the forcibly displaced Copts. The newspaper published an article every time a government or military official visited the camps hosting the displaced families. Denial of forced displacement and obfuscating the constant suffering of Copts was also the common media practice here. The private media platform reported on Ismailia Governor Yasin Taher saying that the families “are not considered forcibly displaced” since they can “go back any time they want” to Al-Arish (Haragy, 2017). Labeling them “incoming” or “moving” Coptic families, Youm7 quoted an official source without naming them having said “the security services did not ask the Coptic citizens living in North Sinai to leave

29 their homes and go to the neighboring provinces” (Abdel Rady, 2017). Pope Tawadros II himself is quoted saying that “the expression of displacement that has become common in the media is totally unacceptable,” hoping that “these events are just a passing crisis,” thereby refuting the fact that these families were either forcibly displaced or intimidated into departure (Allam, 2017). Most reports referred to them as “incoming” or “moving” Copts, while maintaining the usage of the phrase “Coptic siblings” in some (See Ragheb, 2017 as an example). By neutralizing the language, there is no perpetrator nor a responsible government entity.

Despite this intransigent narrative that denies displacement, when the newspaper interviewed the people who were displaced (none from those still in Al-Arish), they recalled how they had received threats written on the doors of their homes or sent as text messages to their mobile phones. They said that they “were forced to leave” (Azzam, 2017).

The Church’s patronage over the Egyptian Christian community was depicted heavy- handedly in Youm7’s coverage of the forced displacement. It reported that initially it was the Anglican Church in Ismailia that invited the threatened families, rather than the government interfering to help them (Haragy, 2017). Ghanem (2017) wrote that families were settled “with the knowledge of” Ismailia’s Bishop Youssef Shoukri. Minister of Manpower Mohamed Saafan visited the Church and showcased the job opportunities they provided for the displaced Copts (Ragheb, 2017).

Meanwhile, Pope Tawadros II and the entire Church adopted the usual “national unity under threat from an external factor” line. Youm7 was also quick to use the term “terrorism.” It reported that families moved because of “terrorism attacks” (Wahba and Ghanem, 2017). Terrorism was treated as foreign and not a product of local dynamics, often referred as “imported from abroad” (Gomaa, 2017). The Pope insisted that “the armed forces, police, state institutions and our Egyptian Coptic children, as well as Muslims, are exposed to this violence” in Egypt (Allam, 2017). Bishop Daniel of Maadi stated that Egypt’s Muslims and Christians coexist, and “if there is an ideological deviation, it is an outsider” to society (Allam, 2017). Father Bolis Oweida, professor of ecclesiastical law, also confirmed that terrorism “wants to hit Egypt by playing on the strings of national unity,” but “so long as Holy Al-Azhar’s minaret reaches high into the

30 sky and embraces that of the Church, Egypt will be well.” Father Oweida failed to mention the people themselves, finding it enough to speak about the institutions the state has used to supposedly represent them (Mostafa, 2017). Furthermore, he asserted that “Egyptians worship one God” (Mostafa, 2017), even though Egyptians do not see belonging to different religions as the worship of one God, thus his statement did not address the root problem of acceptance.

The militarized and security mentality was also overpowering in Youm7’s reporting. It published a statement by the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs which disclosed that the crisis is a serious development in Egypt’s “War on Terror,” delivering the message that “all Egyptians should rally behind the military and police forces” (Middle East News Agency, 2017). Three days after the first report on the “incoming” Coptic families came out, Youm7 published an article with the headline “Security agencies avenge Copts’ blood in Northern Sinai,” discussing how the security apparatus conducted wide raids on outlaws and extremists (Abdel Rady, 2017). Reports on raids and arrests in several areas in North Sinai “to control the elements of takfiri8 groups and suspects who target and intimidate civilians of North Sinai” continued (see AlQady, 2017).

Reports did not deviate from the “regime as a saviour” narrative particularly from Church officials who seemed to find refuge in the patronage and protection of the state. Orthodox Church cleric Nagy Asaad was quoted to have said that “despite the current crisis, Egypt’s Copts feel safe and secure under the rule of President Abdel Fattah al- Sisi” (Haragy, 2017). The Pope expressed his “trust in the state and President Sisi’s efforts” to mitigate the crisis (Allam, 2017). Father Boulos Oweida asserted that “terrorism’s hands will not reach Egypt like it did in Syria and Iraq” (Mostafa, 2017). The Egypt’s situation is “better than Syria and Iraq” is a frequently-used adage by the state and media in Egypt to implore the public to be thankful that their predicament is better than other countries in the region that have broken out into full fledged conflict. It is often articulated to suggest Egyptians should accept military governance as the only alternative to outright social disintegration and terrorism.

8 Derived from the word kufr (impiety), takfiri is a term often used to describe a person or doctrine that perceives most other interpretations of the faith as kufr. 31

Although a private paper, Youm7 was very much in line with the state’s rhetoric in their coverage of the displaced Sinai Copts. Yet again, the masquerade of unity between the Church and Al-Azhar, and among Egyptians, was accentuated. The paper did not hold the state accountable for neglecting the poor, underdeveloped area. It did not address these conditions which help breed sectarianism and radical ideologies. Militarized solutions were paraded, and the regime was depicted as bulwark of social stability the guardian angel of Coptic rights.

Peace Journalism and Sectarian Conflict in Egypt

Before considering the possibility and applicability of a model like Peace Journalism (PJ) to the context of Egyptian religious conflict, it is important to note the definitional characteristics of the model as articulated by Lynch and McGoldrick (2005). They offer a 17-point plan as a condition for practicing PJ. They have been rearranged to group the points related to language together, and those related to content together. Each of these points is reflected on below in relation to the mediated coverage of sectarian conflict in Egypt.

Language

1. PJ refuses distinctions between “self” and “other,” which lead to constructing the sense that “another party is a ‘threat’ or ‘beyond the pale’ of civilised behaviour.” Such descriptions justify violence.

To understand how the Egyptian state specializes in othering, one need not look further than its utilization of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories are used consistently in the official press and government speeches to explain sectarian circumstances to avoid acknowledging state failures or social problems that could be precipitating these incidents. Usually the conspiracy theories involve perpetrators from who are external forces, foreign meddlers, or local opposition. The exact identities are always intentionally left vague to justify violence and or oppression towards a more diffuse and broad constituency of state adversaries.

2. Language which victimizes a party, such as “devastated,” “defenceless,” “pathetic,” and “tragedy,” should be avoided, as it disempowers and puts limitations on possibilities for change. Coping mechanisms and solutions from the people should be included.

Terminologies implying Christian inferiority like “Christian siblings”, which are pervasive in Egyptian media coverage, should not be used. Furthermore, in cases where the perpetrators of the violence are seen as state enemies, the victimization of the parties suffering is highlighted. In cases where state negligence or social strife are more convincingly the cause behind the incidents, the victimhood of those suffering is comparatively stripped away and the problem becomes one affecting all Egyptians, who are themselves victimized using this language.

3. PJ refrains from inaccurately using emotive words such as “genocide,” “assassination,” and “massacre.” It does not belittle suffering but is meticulous, otherwise “you will beggar the language and help to justify disproportionate responses which escalate the violence” (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005).

PJ within the Egyptian setting would attempt to more accurately and e more definitively and proportionately explain the conditions, describe circumstances, and a consider the most appropriate language to best represent the situation, with sensitivity to both personal and collective predicaments. Furthermore, the state and media’s use of the words associated with “terrorism” would cease to avoid leading to zero-sum solutions, extreme acts of reprisal, and violent retribution. All of these further inflame the situation and accentuate the likelihood of further violence.

4. & 5. Demonising adjectives like “vicious,” “cruel,”, “brutal,” and “barbaric,” as well as labels Dlike “terrorist,” “extremist,” “fanatic,” “fundamentalist” are criticized as describing one side’s view of the other. Their usage places the journalist on that side and encourages the justification for the escalation of reactive violence. These words also indicate that “the people labelled are unreasonable, which weakens the case for reasoning (negotiating) with them” (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005, p.30). Lynch and McGoldrick advise that description must be precise. They give the example of using “bombers” or, for the attacks of September 11th, “suicide hijackers” in place of “terrorists.” This choice both lessens partisanship and gives more accurate information.

Dehumanising perpetrators of violence or crime in the manner of the Egyptian media does render them expendable. Labeling attackers as “outsiders” (or “takfiris” as Youm7 did with the second case) permits the state to launch violent attacks, leaving perpetrators wanting more violence, and through reprisal against state counterattacks, the Copts become targets again and suffer further. The vicious cycle only reinforces sectarianism and does not solve the conflict. If war journalism's chief sin is emotionally- imbued language, it is the clear goal of PJ to find precise language to describe the challenges that lay before the Egyptian nation.

Content

6. PJ avoids writing about a conflict as if it is a tug of war between only two sides, making the natural result a winning party and a losing one. Rather, it breaks down the conflict into different small parties with varying goals, needs, and interests. In doing so, a journalist paves the way for a spectrum of solutions.

In the Egyptian context of sectarian conflict, media should avoid framing the struggle as one simply between bad Islamists and Copts, or between terrorists and the rest of Egypt. This also means that the sole reliance on the government and state to serve as paternal guardian of all Egyptians, the religious institutions (The Coptic Church and Al-Azhar) as sole mediators, and the military as resolver is very problematic. The excessive binaries in responsibilities and value judgment only render sectarianism a more retractable problem.

7. It avoids handling a conflict like it is “only going on in the place and at the time that violence is occurring.” It looks into how variables are linked together, and what consequences they have in the present and the future. Questions like which stakeholders are involved in the outcome, who benefits from the conflict, how they are influencing it, and what lessons can be taken away, should be addressed.

This is possibly one of the most important concerns for coverage of sectarianism in Egypt as it uncovers the complexities and nuances of the issue and how it involves so

34 many factors. Rather than blaming it on individuals or sporadic circumstances, it is necessary for the journalistic coverage of sectarianism to demonstrate the social, political, economic, cultural, religious, and educational developments in Egypt’s modern history that have precipitated the meteoric rise of this phenomenon. Understanding and relaying to the public the root causes and what contributes to sectarianism is more beneficial at rooting out violent actions in relations to this issue. Writing that Copts were “avenged” after a single violent attack or that “matters were back to normal and the village is calm and nobody is talking about the incident.” (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). This gives the impression that these incidents are singular and unrelated to preexisting conditions instead reducing them to one-offs that can easily be rectified by a modest involvement from the state or or Church. Addressing the root causes of sectarianism makes the media part of the solution.

8. A journalist ought to avoid merely writing about violent acts and depicting “the horror,” excluding other elements in the situation. In doing so, they imply that the violence is only explained by past violence, namely revenge. PJ suggests describing people’s conditions that led to violence, such as being “blocked and frustrated” or suffering from deprivation.

Sinai and Upper Egypt, the sites of both the case studies of sectarian incidents analyzed in this study, lack infrastructure and basic services such as healthcare and education. It is, thus, not abnormal for radical ideologies to find fertile ground and flourish there. The very services the government took pride in providing for the displaced families, and those the media propagated for, should be discussed as essential needs in the villages of both Upper Egypt and Sinai on a long-term basis. The current proposed quick fixes and the parsing out of services on the basis of victimhood can only infuriate those left behind, increasing the likelihood of more tension. They should be part of a development strategy rather than a short-term remedy for only those experiencing suffering. As Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) assert, fixing a problem requires diagnosis.

9. Instead of discussing the merits of violent acts or the observable effects of policies alone, PJ seeks to report on the invisible outcomes such as the long-lasting psychological damage and trauma which could make the people or groups affected more violent.

In Egypt’s case, the state’s decades-long harsh policies and negligence of regions like the Sinai contributed significantly to the radicalization and extremism of communities there. Furthermore, each act of violence would be placed in its social and economic context by showcasing what predicaments afflicted the community that may have precipitated these incidents. The media, in step with the state’s approach, simply rallied behind such policies, further alienating these communities. One example of this are the acts of retribution or reprisal. The Head of the Parliament’s Human Rights Committee, Alaa Abed, mentioned that terrorist groups targeted Copts because “the former’s leaders have been killed” in a military mission in Al-Halal Mountain. He stated that “once police and military forces take control, the terrorists feel weak and resolve to actions like attacking Copts.” Although he did correlate violence with violence, he was denouncing it, but rather to support security forces in their “war on terror” (Fakhry, 2017). Indeed, on Monday 27 February 2017, the newspaper’s main story manchette read “The cleansing of Mount Halal is behind the targeting of the Copts of Sinai” (Youm7, 2017). A peace journalist would explain the dirty face of violence instead of its glorification with words like “cleansing.”

10. PJ refrains from having parties define themselves through merely restating their leaders’ usual demands or positions. Alternatively, it examines what people on the ground want changed, and who speaks up for them other than political leaders. The usual government and Church officials are always sourced in Egypt’s media, solidifying and justifying the same old, violent response as course of action. A peace journalist would include viewpoints of locals and activists, what people on the ground want changed. In doing so, they “seek to invert the hierarchy of access” to the news, as Chris Atton says (2002). Peace Researcher John Paul Lederach elaborates:

I have not experienced any situation of conflict […] where there have not been people who had a vision for peace… Far too often, however, these same people are overlooked and disempowered either because they do not represent “official” power (Lederach in Keeble et al, 2010, p. 95).

11. The PJ model shies away from concentrating on what divides different parties, and attempts to ask questions which shed light on areas of common ground.

Highlighting common history could contribute to a true sense of unity. Civil rights and equality, rather than religious differences, should also be an area of discussion within the Egyptian media. In addition, the regime that alleges that it seeks democracy and unity as avenues for change has that in common with the social construct in a post revolutionary Egypt, for both Muslims and Christians. Since it is one of the primary goals of PJ, this could be a positive starting point for media. In a more direct manner, by bringing the history of Copts out of obscurity and demonstrating the manner in which they have contributed to Egyptian society, culture and life, there could be progress made in overcoming their perception as “others.” Highlighting common understandings, values, livelihoods, and aspirations among Egyptians of all backgrounds can disrupt the tone of exceptionalism that pervades society and the media.

12. Reports should examine mutual problems and their consequences instead of blaming one party for “starting it.”

Daily struggles, a lack of education, and conditions of poverty are suffered by both Muslims and Christians, all fanning the flames of sectarianism in Egypt. Yet media usually point fingers at the “extreme Islamists” for starting a crisis. Accusation and blame is a classic symptom of journalism in Egypt specifically. Rather than creating enemies, and wielding blame as a weapon, those fingers must be used constructively to build bridges to solutions to rising sectarianism.

13. PJ avoids giving attention to one group’s disadvantages and concerns and not the other, which leads to the division of “villains” and “victims” and as such the solution would be punishing the bad party.

Preferential treatment is an endemic problem when it comes to the way in which the Egyptian media write about various groups in society. Historically, Christians are underrepresented and rarely interviewed or featured in the print press. In the few instances where they are in the media limelight, it is in conjunction with crises or sectarianism. As a sizeable community in Egyptian society, they are often rendered politicized subjects. Their adversaries and perpetrators of violence against them are perceived and represented by the media as terrorist and villains. This divisive

37 representation only entrenches greater animosity between them. Each is seen as a victim of the other. PJ would challenge this by considering all parties as “equally newsworthy,” thereby showing that both Christians and Muslims suffer the same underdevelopment and the consequences this has on their education and learnt relations.

14. Human rights abuses and wrongdoings from all sides should be reported, rather than those conducted from one side only, all the while striving to find evidence that backs up allegations of the misdemeanours.

An example of this is that while the government portraying itself as the saviour, the media should highlight the amount of civilian casualties, destruction, and devastation that accompany violence. In Sinai, between 1,200 and 2,000 homes have been destroyed, hundreds of hectares of farmland razed, and 3,200 families forcibly evicted since 2015 (Aziz, 2017). This was all done and justified by the government’s pursuit of extremist insurgents. PJ would reject the military press releases which praise these actions as well as the extremely common practice of extrajudicial killings.

15. Opinions or claims should not be depicted as fact. “This is how propaganda works,” explain Lynch and Mcgoldrick (2005, p.30). Phrases like ‘“said to be,” “thought to be,” and “it’s being seen as” do not reveal who is “doing the saying.” A reader should be told who said what so that the journalist and their news service avoid implicitly endorsing the allegations made by one side in the conflict against another.

In one report following the displacement of Copts from Al-Arish, Youm7 pointed to a link between Muslim Brotherhood and Ansar Beit Al Maqdes, the militant group who are in allegiance with ISIS in the Sinai (Arafa, 2017). By doing so, the newspaper hinted that the Muslim Brotherhood, which were ousted from office by the coup in 2013 and are often used as a boogeyman prop, are described as terrorists and implied as being behind the attacks. This report was not evidenced, validated or corroborated. Instead it served to point fingers at without documentation. No attempts at verification of information can help transform reports into propaganda statements. In other examples of this ambiguity, some reports in the Egyptian media generalize to all Copts and all Muslims without specificity or context. The victims of violence are rarely agents to be

38 interviewed but rather subjects to be discussed by officials and clergy. Entire communities and villages are referred to en masse. Sometimes headlines are so hyperbolic, they will attribute quotes to whole families rather than persons. The PJ approach would deem this very problematic and counterproductive in alleviating sectarianism in coverage.

16. Writing about military victory or a ceasefire should not be equated to creating peace. PJ looks into lingering matters, notably the needs of those afflicted by violence. It attempts to emphasize what is required in order to eliminate motives for further violence, what steps are being taken to resolve possible conflict nonviolently, and what is being done to provide structural needs in the society and to construct a culture of peace.

This problem is an endemic one in the Egyptian media particularly during this period in the country’s history. With the military at the helm of many governmental affairs, militarized and securitzed solutions to many problems, including sectarianism, are the new status quo. Whether it is the military’s pledge to defend Copts from attack or rebuilding their places of worship and homes or repatriation and services, the military should not be seen as a party in these incidents and certainly not replace the role of civilian institutions. Alternatively, and in response to violence, the military has become the go-to actor that is tasked with responding to any act of violence in the country. Perpetrators of sectarian violence, when it serves the political objectives of the military- dominated government, themselves become targets of state violence. Those who are not deemed to be nemeses of the state, are spared the wrath of the armed forces. Within the current Egyptian media, both governmental and private, the militarized solutions are celebrated. Under the PJ model this must be discontinued and questioned as counterproductive path to end conflict.

17. The PJ model dictates not to wait for “leaders on ‘our’ side” to propose solutions, but digs for them in peace initiatives “wherever they come from.” Exploring peace perspectives that are not in line with established positions could stimulate dialogue.

Egyptian media should make it a point to go beyond the official rhetoric and trace peaceful discourse from organizations, peace activists, and local people who take initiative or have propositions or opinions which could foster change in society. Agency

39 can play an important role in that all parties within the Egyptian society must begin to look from within for solutions, rather than imploding discourse with destructive blame.

Pockets of Peace Journalism

Even though the coverage of both cases of sectarian conflict offered little to no non- militarized, tangible, and long-lasting civic solutions for sectarian conflict in Egypt, there were a small number of instances where some characteristics of PJ could be found in the two newspapers. While these may be scarce and seemingly inconsequential, they may be of potential if harnessed as techniques in the future.

In the case of Minya’s grandma, seven months after the incident, a report by Mohsen Abdel Aziz (2017) in Al-Ahram, addressed many core issues of the sectarianism question. It read:

Those who ask about the endemic terrorism in the villages of Upper Egypt need to dig their feet in dusty roads and narrow streets, take a look at hospitals and schools [...] where negligence resides. Poverty walks the streets on two legs.[accessing a] football field is a distant dream, but the existence of cinema, theater or even a cultural center is untenable[...] Even the music and entertainment classes have disappeared from schools and made way for terrorist groups and radical extremists to instill fanaticism and hatred in young minds...And then we wonder after every sectarian incident why it happened .. nothing will change in Egypt so long as the causes exist, and treatment is absent [...] As usual, after every incident, the government gets angry, but the anger quickly diminishes, after having merely just extinguished the flames without paying attention to the fire beneath the ashes, which are always ready to flare elsewhere.

Abdel Aziz listed that the illiteracy rate in Minya is 38%, tens of villages have no sewage system, no cultural seminars, and no sports. Minya Governor Tarek Nasr expounded on the matter of Minya in an interview (Al-Ahram, 2016), focusing on several areas. He insisted that the responsibility of facing extremist ideas should not be placed on security

40 only, as was the case in the 1990s. “Security currently bears the errors of education, culture and education,” he said. Nasr stressed the importance of culture, and sustainably developing health services and infrastructure, including sewage systems, the manufacturing industry, and the tourism sector. The governor invited investors to Minya, “a promising governorate.” Lastly, he mentioned the role of media and houses of worship in educating the public. Meanwhile, officials quoted in Al-Ahram maintained that “a modern civil state is based on citizenship and law, and there is no difference between any citizen and the other” (Al-Husseiny, 2016).

There were also a few instances of PJ in Youm7’s coverage. For example, Bishop Macarius did state that Minya governorate suffers numerous problems ignored by successive governments over the decades (Allam, 2016). Addressing the issue of reconciliation sessions, the MP of Abu Qirqas region, where Al-Karm Village is located, stated that religious institutions must stay away, as their interference is unhealthy (Allam and Abdel Ghaffar, 2016).

The second case’s of Souad Thabet’s media coverage also saw some characteristics of PJ as well.

Although alone in his opinion in the middle of denial on the platform, a legal expert interviewed by Al-Ahram said that the incident was indeed considered a form of forcible displacement: “what happened in El-Arish and Egyptian Christians having to exit and move into safer areas as a result of their general feeling that there is a serious threat to their lives and property embodied in the targeting, killing, slaughtering and burning of innocent people” (Al-Ahram, 2017). This is truly exceptional and goes against the paper’s pattern of avoiding the use of the word displacement as an attempt to avoiding controversy.

Al-Ahram also reported on how Muslims hosted some of the Coptic families (Selim and Al-Sherif, 2017). It also published a news story about a Muslim woman fully covered in burqa who, “amid anticipation,” brought food and supplies into the church, promising to cook lentils for Coptic religious fast (Hesham, 2017). Although such stories may appear to serve “the national unity” theme, they are certainly not statist but rather pave the way

41 for acceptance, normalcy, and learning about the “other” religion. They are also indications of humanist goodwill among citizens and serve as exemplars.

In addition, one MP, although in a half sentence at the very end of a report, mentioned the necessity of facing terrorism with knowledge and education, nevertheless coupling them with security (Eissa and Lasheen, 2017). This benevolent and forward thinking approach to addressing “terrorism” as a social phenomenon rather than an exclusively security situation exemplifies the PJ approach. During his visit to Ismailia governorate, where most families and their children fled, Minister of Culture Helmy Al-Namnam said that “these children are the future, and what we have seen from their artistic creations is Egypt's soft power” (Ibrahim and Bahig, 2017).

In Youm7, Bishop Daniel of Maadi emphasized that the church's relationship with the state is (ideally) based on the basic principles of the developed countries which is the separation of religion from the state. He adds that when religion interferes with the state, “this weakens religion and affect the state” (Allam, 2017). This can be seen as an implicit critique of the state’s religious identity which is predominantly Islamic and thereby perceives Christians and “others.” Such opinions in the media, particularly from Christian clergy governed by the Coptic church are considered anathema. Most public pronouncements from church officials are overly cautious and deny any institutional discrimination against Christians.

Despite the grim nature of coverage of sectarian conflict particularly in these two cases in the governmental and private news media, there were a handful of exceptional, albeit infrequent, instances of peace journalism being inadvertently observed in both newspapers. If built upon these examples can become a promising approach to the address of highlight combustible situations such as sectarian violence.

Limitations of Peace Journalism in Egypt

Violation of freedom of speech remains the number one obstacle for all reporters and attempt at challenging the norms of news reporting in Egypt. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (2017), Egypt is ranked the third worst jailer of journalists in the

42 world. An anti-terror law passed in 2015 criminalizes any reporting that strays from official accounts. Ismail al-Iskandarani, a prominent Sinai researcher and journalist, was arrested in December 2015 on charges of spreading false news and being a member of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. The charge of spreading “fake news” is currently a powerful instrument in the hands of the government which they can use in draconian ways to repress (Michaelson, 2018). Thus, deviation from the official line on any incident related to violence is both a challenge and a risk.

In addition, initiatives offering alternative or peaceful solutions are rare. Non- governmental organizations are being shut down, and activists are being silenced or arrested. The new NGO law issued by Sisi in May 2017 “making it impossible for them to function independently.” The law prohibits NGOs from conducting activities that “harm national security, public order, public morality, or public health,” which are “vague terms that can be abused to constrain legitimate activity” (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

The regime itself, and its President Sisi (himself the former Minister of Defence and Head of Military Intelligence), are holistically militarized. Violence is a characteristic of the state, and is most often initiated by it. Moreover, the violence a modus operandi for military men, has effectively become a regime maintenance mechanism. Violence is not an outgrowth but rather a tool that facilitates the very existence of the regime, with the case in point being the very coup d’etat which brought the military complex to the executive office. The use of that violence is given rhetorical cover by a war journalism which constitutes a growing majority of the state and private media in Egypt. The need for an interruption of this trend and the enshrinement of a new model of reporting which can alleviate the impetus for violence could not be more urgent today.

Conclusion

War journalism is the prevailing mode of covering conflict in Egypt. This is explicitly evident in the reporting of sectarian circumstances in the country. Omission or marginalization in reporting is the norm; different parts of the story which deserve more attention are routinely missed or systematically obfuscated. The media depict the state,

43 its military, and the Church as paternalistic over the larger Coptic community, thus leaving Copts in need of salvation from these institutions. Neither public nor private newspapers pave the path for tolerance and acceptance in the community, nor do they present an exit for sectarianism in Egypt. Both failed to elaborate that violence begets violence. This doesn't leave room for an open discussion about issues such as social responsibility, policy, or education, which in turn provide alternative solutions and peace- oriented methods to avoid future violence. The typical approach of turning backs on the problems facing Christian Egyptians will not make them disappear.

With the revolution of 2011 opening the door for people to be more outspoken, and the 2013 military regime painting itself as a friend to Egypt’s Christians, the Coptic community has become more outspoken. This is evident in their refusal of typical reconciliation sessions and condemnation of security laxity and neglect. Nevertheless, it was religious clerics, rather than lay people, who spoke in the name of the community. They were consistent with the Church’s tone of supporting the state, alongside praise for the president and the pope, regardless of the miniscule change in Copts’ affairs since Sisi’s reign. The old practices of denying sectarianism and blaming external factors for every violent incident saturate the media. All conflict resolution is short-lived and tainted with securitization. A Copt is still portrayed as a second-class citizen. Even though people complain about discrimination taking place for years, these tales of terror are not reported until things escalate into violence and only when they serve to reinforce the benevolence or messianic role of the state.

While Peace Journalism (PJ), the model examined in this study, was a product of, and mainly addresses, wars, its concepts can be applied to other types of conflict with the hope of helping alleviate them. Anchored on pluralism and diversity, this model would have positive effects on the general public. It is designed to contribute to public understanding of the wider world and to the vitality of community discussion. PJ looks beyond immediate news impulses and considers the responsibility that journalism has to support long-term solutions. While the media scene may not seem promising, this model can be beneficial for many societal and political contesting parties in Egypt beyond interfaith relations: LGBTQ+, women’s rights, political opponents such as the Muslim Brotherhood, marginalized groups, and minorities. The diversity of voices in online spaces and digital communities--begotten by the 2011 revolution--make the possibilities

44 of a novel Peace Journalism possible by making available alternative t forms of reporting and a greater array of voices.

Even though there is a general sense of defeat among Egypt’s youth and revolutionaries, the change the protests starting in 2011 promised can be fulfilled through social change and a pluralistic Egyptian identity rather than a radical reform of the state system. A few lines in a report, the odd article, a journalist truly believing that they have agency, might seem like small steps, but given the status quo, they are giant strides in the direction of a more peaceful future.

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