Constructivism, Contestation and the International Detention Regime: The Case of the Blair Government and Bush Administration 2001-2006 SubmittedbyJodieAnstee,totheUniversityofExeterasathesisforthedegreeof Doctor of Philosophy inPolitics,September2008 ThisthesisisavailableforLibraryuseontheunderstandingthatitiscopyrightmaterial andthatnoquotationfromthethesismaybepublishedwithoutproper acknowledgement. Icertifythatallmaterialinthisthesiswhichisnotmyownworkhasbeenidentifiedand thatnomaterialhaspreviouslybeensubmittedandapprovedfortheawardofadegree bythisoranyotherUniversity. (signature)......

1 Acknowledgements

IwouldliketothankProfessorTheoFarrell,DrMiljaKurki,ProfessorTimDunneand ProfessorDavidArmstrongforalltheirintellectualsupportandguidanceduringthe courseofwritingthisthesis.IwouldalsoliketothankJocelynVaughnforallher comments,stimulatingdiscussion,andpeersupport,aswellasRobAnstee,whose broadersupporthasbeencrucialfromthestartofmyPhDjourneyrightthroughto completion.

2 Abstract

Theinternationaldetentionregimehasbeenplacedunderaconsiderableamountof straininthecontextofthewaronterror.PoliticalelitesinboththeUSAandUKhave significantlychallengedacceptedstandardsofappropriatenessregardingdetention,even thoughthesestatesaretraditionallystronglyassociatedwiththepromotionofhuman rightsinternationally.Suchdefectionsandcontestationspresentresearcherswithan intriguingprocesstounderstand,asthesepractices,bydefinition,challengeoursettled assumptionsaboutthepostColdwarinternationalorder.Thisthesisexaminesone elementofthispuzzle,assessinghowthenormativeconstraintsassociatedwiththe internationaldetentionregimewerenegotiatedbytheBlairgovernmentandBush administrationsoastoallowforcontestationandapparentdefectionin20012006. Generally,theIRliteratureonnormshasfocusedontheirconstrainingpower, consideringsimpledichotomiesofcomplianceanddefection,oftendrawingonpre definedintereststoexplainbehaviour.Whilstconstructivistshaverecognisedthe constitutivenatureofnorms,theylackapersuasiveaccountofthemicrofoundational processesofnorminfluencewhichpreventsthemfromengagingwiththecontestation ofseeminglyembeddedinternationalnormativestandards.Inordertoaddressthis problemIdrawfromthesocialidentityapproachinsocialpsychology,wherescholars focusonthemultiplicityofsocialidentitiesandtheinteractiveprocessesofnorm influenceandcontestationatamicrofoundationallevel.Idemonstratethatbyfirmly embeddingindividualsinthebroadersocialidentitiescontextandfocusingonthe managementstrategiesemployedbypoliticaleliteswecanbetterunderstandthenature ofnormativeconstraintinthesecases,andwhetherornotanenablingframeworkfor suchcounternormativepracticeswasestablished.Thisthesisaimstobridgesomeof thegapthatexistsbetweenresearchthatfocusesoninternationalnormsandthatwhich concentratesonstateleaders,demonstratingtheimportanceofthebroaderinteractive processesofcontestation,generallymissingfromcurrentconstructivistaccountsof internationalnorms.

3 Table of Contents

Introduction 5

Chapter 1: Norms, Influence and Expectations 19

Chapter 2: The Contribution of Psychology 61

Chapter 3: The Social Identities Contexts of the USA/UK 91

Chapter 4: The Management of Social Identities: The Case of the UK 117

Chapter 5: The Management of Social Identities: The Case of the USA 159

Conclusion 206

Bibliography 215

4 Introduction 'I was in extreme pain and so weak that I could barely stand. It was freezing cold and I was shaking like a washing machine. They questioned me at gunpoint and told me that if I confessed I could go home’ (, a British citizen held in Guantánamo Bay, cited in Rose, 2004a) ‘Nobody should feel defensive or unhappy about the quality of treatment they’ve received. It’s probably better than they deserve’ (US Vice President Cheney, cited in Kampfner, 2004: 150) Theinternationaldetentionregimehasbeensignificantlyunderminedinthecourseof theUSledwaronterror. 1Imagesof,abuse,andtheharshconditionsof detentionhave,incertainspheres,cometodominatetherepresentationofcounter terrorismpolicies.Manyofthemeasuressoughtclearlyindicatedarevisionof internationalstandardsofappropriateness.Whathasbeenparticularlysurprisingabout suchpracticesisthecentralityoftheUKandUSA.Theirdetentionpolicieshave createdavastamountofcontroversyandnormativedebateamongstacademics, lawyers,politicians,journalists,andthegeneralpublic.Thesepracticesdonotappearto fitwellwiththeliberaldemocraticidentitiesofthesestates,andindeedtheirassociation withhumanrightspromotionandmovestoeradicatetortureintheworld.Indeed,they significantlychallengeourexpectationsduetothestrong‘negative’associationbetween tortureandidentity,asindicatedinthestatement‘thetorturerhasbecomelikethepirate andtheslavetraderbeforehim, hostis humani generic ,anenemyofallmankind’ (Kaufman,1980). TherhetoricandpoliciesofpoliticalelitesintheUKandUSA,withregardsto detention,suggestanunravellingofestablishedcodesofpractice.Thisisinaglobal contextwherehumanrightsprogressionhaslongbeenassumed,andforstateswhere humanrightshavearecognizedroleinpoliticalpreferencesandpolicies(Hunt,2007). Whilst,anoverwhelmingamountofantiterrorlegislationhasbeenenactedacrossthe worldsincetheSeptember11 th attacksinNewYorkin2001(Ramraj,Hor,andRoach, 2005),thedetentionpracticesofrepresentativesoftheUKandUSAin20012006are particularlychallenging.Thisisbecausepoliticalelitesfromthesestateshave previouslybeeninstrumentalinthecreationofsuchnormativeregimes,andare 1Forthesakeofclarity,thisthesisusestheterm‘internationaldetentionregime’torefertothe internationalnormativeregimeprescribingminimumstandardsfordetentionandprohibitingtorture.I employtheterm‘regime’toindicateanormativeandconstitutivecollectionofinternationallyrecognized standards.Thisdiffersfromtheneoliberaluseoftheconcept,whereregimesareunderstoodinan institutionalandregulativemanner.TheinternationaldetentionregimethatIrefertointhisstudyis definedindetailtowardstheendofChapter1. 5 generallyseenasnorminnovatorsininternationalsociety.Duetotheirpositioning, theirpolicieshaveasignificantinfluenceonotherstatesintermsofexamplesettingand demonstratingstandardsofappropriateness,challengestowhichareverydifficultto reverse(Roach,2007).TheUSdetentionfacilitiesandproceduresatGuantánamoBay, Cuba,areperhapsthemostvisiblesymbolcontestingtheinternationaldetentionregime, whichhasbeenaccompaniedbytheresurrectionofdebatesontortureandaccepted interrogationpractices.Thesebehaviours,whicharecontrarytogeneralexpectations, createaconsiderabledemandforresearcherstounderstandtheprocessesinvolved;in particular,howinternationalnormativeregimesactuallyinfluencethebehaviourof politicalelitesgivensuchstarkexamplesofcontestation.Thisthesisaddressesthe followingoverarchingquestion: How have the normative constraints regarding detention practices been negotiated by the USA and UK in the war on terror so as to enable contestation of the international detention regime? Forexample, howcan weaccountfortheprocessesthatallowforcontestationatamicrofoundationallevel? Howwasconstraintmanifestinthisperiodgiventhatitlooksliketheregimefailed? And,werethepoliticalelitesintheUSAandUKsuccessfulincreatinganenabling frameworktoallowforsustainableactioncountertothenormativeregime? Theliteratureininternationalrelations(IR)providesuswithdifferentwaysto understandtheseeminglycounternormativepracticesconcerningdetentionsoughtby theUKandUSAin20012006.Insightsfromrealistandneoliberalscholarshave focusedonpowerandpredefinedintereststoexplaindefectionsfrominternational norms(GoertzandDiehl,1994;Slaughterand Raustiala,2002).However,such approachesrelyveryheavilyonasimpledichotomybetweencomplianceanddefection, whichobscuresvalueconflictsandisolatesstatesandstateleadersfromthebroader normativecontext.Theyneglecttoengagewiththeprocessesofcontestationthat accompanyseeminglycounternormativebehaviours,anddebatesaboutwhatexactlyis inthestate’sinterestsinthesecircumstances. Constructivistscholarshaveontheotherhandadvancedourunderstandingand appreciationofinternationalnormativeregimesbyrecognisingtheirconstitutive,as opposedtopurelyregulativenature,anddemonstratingtheirimportanceintheconduct ofinternationalaffairs.Theyhavenot,however,providedapersuasiveaccountofthe processesbywhichthesenormativestandardsareembeddedaswellascontested, allowingforfluctuationsininfluence.Theneedtoaccountforrevisionism,defection

6 andcontestationisagapthatisidentifiedintheliterature(Cardenas,2004,Dunne, 2007).2Constructivistscholarsareoftenlimitedintheirengagementwiththese questionsagainduetoacentralfocusonthedichotomybetweencomplianceand defectionmentionedabove.Hownormativeconstraintsarenegotiatedsoastoallowfor deviations,aswellastheroleofthebroadersocialidentitiesandnormativecontextin whichpoliticalelitesmakedecisionsandformulatepolicy,isfrequentlyoverlooked. Inordertodelvedeeperintotheprocessesofnormativeinfluenceandadvanceour understandingofcontestationsoftheinternationaldetentionregimebytheUKand USA,thisthesisengageswithinsightsfromsocialpsychology,drawingindividuals firmlyintoanalysis.Movestoutiliseinsightsfrompsychologyisagrowingtrendin constructivistscholarship(e.g.Shannon,2000;ShannonandKeller,2007;Flockhart, 2005;2006),however,oftenthisseemstofocustooheavilyontheindividualas opposedtoviewingtheminrelationtotheirinteractiveenvironment(e.g.Shannon 2000;ShannonandKeller,2007). 3Againsuchresearchdoesnotengagewiththe processesofcontestationandchanginginterpretations. Toaddressthisgapintheliterature,Idrawoninsightsfromthesocialidentityapproach insocialpsychology,wheretheresearchfocusisonunderstandingprocessesofsocial influence.Manysimilaritiesexistwithconstructivistscholarship,forexampleaconcern withsocialidentitiesandtheroleofnormsininfluencingbehaviour.InthisthesisI demonstratehowthemicrofoundationalinsightsdevelopedbysocialidentityscholars significantlyadvanceourunderstandingofnorminfluencebyengagingmorewiththe roleofindividuals.Thisapproachfocusesonthemicrofoundationsofthemultiplicity ofsocialidentities,wherenormsfunctionasameansbywhichtovalidatemembership orassociationwiththesedifferentsocialidentities,bothtoselfandothers.Bydrawing fromthisframework,theresearchinthisthesisisorientatedawayfromgeneral membershipofinternationalsociety,towardsthemultiplesocialidentitiesassociated withthestate,thosethatarewellestablished(althoughnotstatic)aswellasthosethat 2HedleyBull(1977)certainlyprovidesearlyinsightsinthisarea,intermsofvariationintheviolationof internationalrulesandtheimpactonorderininternationalsociety.However,thisthesisengages predominantlywiththeconstructivistliteraturewheretherehasbeenmoreemphasisonthefunctioningof internationalnormsinrelationtostateidentity. 3Whilstnotengagingindetailwiththebroaderstructureagencydebate,duetoaspecificconcernwith understandingtheprocessesinvolvedinthecontestationoftheinternationaldetentionregimebytheBlair governmentandBushadministration,thisthesisdoessharesomeofthesameprinciples.Forexample,a recognitionthatseparatingstructuresandagentsisproblematicandthat‘agentsarealwayscontextually boundanddonotactinsocialvacuums’(Wight,2006:290). 7 areemergingandevolving.Inthisbroadersocialidentitiescontextnorminfluenceand contestationisadynamicandinteractiveprocess.Thevalidationofassociationor membershipofsocialidentitiesisnotaonewayprocessanddependsonacceptanceby variousaudiencesincludingothermembers.Leadershipisnotsimplyacaseofhaving certainpersonalityattributes,butisaprocessofdoing,oneofmanagingthedifferent socialidentitiesassociatedwiththestate.IRresearchintonormsoftenobscuresthese socialrelations,whicharecrucialtounderstandingtheinteractiveprocessesof contestationandnormativeinfluence.Ignoringthesefactorscanleadtoinaccurate expectationsofstatebehaviour,taking‘progression’towardshumanrightsnormsfor grantedininternationalsociety,andconcealingtheneedfornormativeregimesto constantlyberemade. Thus,themainquestionposedinthisthesisaskshownormativeconstraintisnegotiated soastoallowforthecontestationofinternationaldetentionstandardsbytheUKand USA.Asmentionedabove,inordertoaddressthisquestionIdelvedeeperintothe processesnorminfluence,focusingonthemicrofoundationalinsightsgeneratedinthe socialidentityapproach.Doingsoprovidesarobustframeworkforanalysisandleadsto thefollowingcentralargument,whichisadvancedthroughoutthisthesis,namelythat the contestation of the international detention regime is an interactive and dynamic process embedded in a broad social identities context .Therearethree interrelatedclaimstothisargument: 1. Tounderstandprocessesofcontestationandinfluenceweneedtoconsiderhowthe socialidentitiesassociatedwiththestateareconstructedandmanagedbypolitical elites 2. Wecannotexpectsocialinfluencewherethesocialidentitiestowhichnormative regimespertainarenotdeemedtobeimportant. 3. Validationofsocialidentitymembership,orassociation,isnotaonewayprocess. Interactionconstrainsjustificationsofcounternormativebehaviour,andthe capacitytoconstructasustainableandenablingframeworkforcontestation. Asthefocusofthisthesisisonunderstandingtheprocessesofcontestationand normativeinfluenceascontextuallysituated,Idonotaimtobuildapredictive frameworktotesttheseclaims.FurthermoreIdonotaimtoisolatefactorstoexplain whypoliticalelitesintheUKandUSAsoughtpoliciesthatchallengedtheinternational

8 detentionregime.Todosoisbeyondtheconcernsofthisthesis,andwouldnotfitwith thetheoreticalorientationoutlinedinChapters1and2.Instead,Ifocusonthequestion andargumentsaboveinrelationtothedetentionpoliciesoftheUKandUSA. Method Case Selection Asalreadymentioned,thisthesisfocusesonthepoliciesanddiscourseoftheBlair governmentandtheBushadministrationinthecontextofthewaronterror.Indoingso Idonotsuggestthatthesetwocountriesarealoneintheircontestationofthe internationaldetentionregime,orthattheirpracticesin20012006aresomehowthe ‘worst’intheworld.WeonlyhavetoflickthroughtheannualreportsofAmnesty Internationaltorealisethatthecontestationofbasichumanrightsismuchmore prevalentthanwemayhavehoped. However,giventheeffortsoftheUSAandUKtopromotehumanrightsinternationally, involvingtheinvestmentofavastamountoftimeandresources,contestationby politicalelitesinthesestatesismuchmoredifficulttounderstandandislikelytohavea widerimpactondetentionstandardsacrosstheglobe.Thesecasesareparticularly fascinatingduetotheroleoftheUSAandUKinnormcreationandnormsetting.An approachthatcanaccountfortheprocessesofnorminfluenceandcontestationby representativesofthesestateswillprovideamuchfullerunderstandingoftheroleof normativeregimesininternationalrelations.Theimportanceoftheliberaldemocratic socialidentityfortheUSAandUK,frequentlystressedbyconstructivistscholars,also makesthesecasesveryintriguingasexpectationsarecreatedfornormcompliancewith regardstodetentionpractices.Challengingtheinternationaldetentionregime compromisesassociationwiththisinternationalsocialidentityasthelatterisconstituted inlargepartbyobservanceofhumanrightsstandards.Assuch,thesecasesdemanda frameworkthatdelvesdeeperintonorminfluenceandnegotiation. Sources and Analysis Inordertoexaminetheoverarchingquestionposedinthisthesis,howthenormative constraintsarenegotiated,Iadoptadiscourseanalysisapproach.Thereismuch variationinhowdiscourseanalysishasbeenusedintheacademicliterature.The processesofinvestigationundertakeninthisthesisarepredominantlyinformedbythe

9 writingsofFairclough(1992)andPotterandWetherall(1987).Whilsttraditional qualitativemethodologiesassistresearcherswhoaimtounderstandthesocialworldas itexists,thepurposeofdiscourseanalysisistoexaminehowthiscomesintobeing,is challengedandevolves.Languageisasitewheremeaningsarebothcreatedand changedasopposedtosimplyreflectingandrevealingsocialphenomenon(Wetherell, TaylorandYates,2001).Discourseanalysisenablesthegenerationofinsightsintohow ‘identitiesareconstructedonacontinuous,interactive,discursivebasis’(Phillipsand Hardy,2002:14).Suchanapproachiscrucialtoinvestigatetheargumentsadvancedin thisthesis,whichfocusesontheinteractiveprocessesofsocialidentitymanagementto understandthecontestationoftheinternationaldetentionregime.Thisisalso complementarytoaconstructivistframeworkthatengageswiththeconstructivenature oflanguage(Gergen,1999),wherediscoursesreproduceorcontestthenormative assumptionsofsocialgroupsandsocieties.Fromthisperspective,common understandingsandinterpretationsarepromotedbythosewithaccesstothemedia (Burnham,2004);forexample,politicalelites,aswellaslobbygroups(e.g.thehuman rightsandhumanitariansocialgroup),andlessfrequentlyprofessionalgroupssuchas lawyersormilitaryleaders.Inlinewiththeperspectiveadoptedinthisthesis,identities areseenas‘constantly…soughtafter,contested,validated,maintainedandsoon throughtheuseoflanguage’(Burr,1995:46). Thebenefitsofadiscourseanalysisapproacharewellrecognisedbyacademicscholars. DavidHowarthforexamplestatesthatthroughsuchadiscursiveapproachwecan examine,‘thecomplexitiesofpoliticalidentityanddifference;theconstructionof hegemonicformations;…andtheconnectionbetweentheroleofidentitiesand interestsinthesocialsciences’(2000:6).Thepurposeofthissectionisnot,however,to giveanindepthaccountofthedifferentapproachestodiscourseinthesocialsciences (seeforexample,PhillipsandJørgensen,2002),butisinsteadtoarticulatetheposition adoptedinthisthesis.Inbrief,thenotionofdiscourseisunderstoodhereasthemeans bywhichnormativestandardsarearticulated,communicatedandcontested. 4Fairclough (1989:77),forexample,arguesthat‘conventionsroutinelydrawnupindiscourse embodyideologicalassumptionswhichcometobetakenasmere“commonsense”’, thussettingnormativestandardsforsocialgroupsandsocieties.Therefore,normative standardsareconstructedandrecognisedindiscourse,wherediscoursealsoreflectsthe

4WhilstIfocusonnormativestandards,thispositionisconsistentwiththattakenbyvanDijk(1998)and Fairclough(1989)withregardstoideology. 10 meaningsattachedtonormativestandards,whetherwidelyseenas‘commonsense’or contested,bothconsciouslyorsubconsciously. AsFairclough(2001)states,discourseanalysisisoftenusedtolookathowaproblem arisesandthewaysinwhicharesolutionissought.Theresearchinthisthesisfocuses predominantlyonthelatterelement–hownormativeconstraintisnegotiated,thushow aresolutionissoughttomanagethenegativeeffectsofcounternormativebehaviour. Thisisintermsoftherestrictionssuchactionsandpoliciesplaceontheabilityto validateassociationwithcertainsocialidentities.Thewaysocialcategorizationsare madeandhowtheyareusedintheprocessofthenegotiationofnormativeconstraint willbeconsidered.Thisisnotasaroutetosomethingbeyondthetextlikeattitudes,as socialtextsarenotseenasa‘transparentinformationchannel’(Fairclough,1992:160), buttoidentifywhatthemesareapparentandwhatfunctionstheseserveintermsof managementstrategies.AsFairclough(1992:225)andmanyotherdiscourseanalysts havenoted,thereis‘nosetprocedurefordoingdiscourseanalysis’soIshallnow clarifywhatthisapproachmeansintermsoftheprocessofinvestigationandanalysis adoptedinthisthesis. Thefocusofanalysisinthispieceofresearchisonpublicstatements,speeches,and publiclyavailablepolicydocuments,asopposedtointerviewdata.Thisreflectsthe orientationoftheoverarchingquestionofthisthesistowardspublicrepresentations. Chapter3,forexample,usesavarietyofsourcestodefinethesocialidentities considered(understoodintermsofsocialgroups).AstheaimoftheChapterissimply tobuildabasicpictureofeachofthesocialidentities,Irelyonpubliclyavailable information.Whereprimarysourcesarenotavailable,secondarydataisusedto supplementanalysis.Thecentraldefiningprinciplesandnormativeelementsofthese socialidentitiesareestablishedthroughaprocessofidentifyingthekeydefiningthemes apparentinthesourcesanddrawingfromtheexistingacademicliterature.Chapters4 and5arebasedonamorethoroughanalysisofthepoliticalspeechesandstatementsof theBlairgovernmentandtheBushadministration,availablefromtheNumber10and WhiteHousewebsites. 5Alsoincludedinanalysisaretheargumentsandconcernsraised bythesocialgroupsconsideredinChapter3.Thisistogenerateaninteractive assessmentofcontestation.ThestudyfocusesonthetimeperiodrunningfromJanuary 5Discourseanalystsengagewithawiderangeoflinguisticandnonlinguisticmaterial(forexample actionsandimages)(Howarth,2000).However,thisthesisfocusespredominantlyonthespeeches, statementsandpressconferencesofPrimeMinisterBlairandPresidentBush. 11 2001untiltheendofDecember2006.Thiscoversseveralareasofchallengetothe internationaldetentionregime,andissufficientinlengthtotracktheseinteractive processes. Abroadrangeofdataisavailableforbothofthesestateleaders,andistakentobe representativeoftheconsensualviewsoftheirinnercircles.Whereappropriatethiscore ofdatawillbesupplementedwiththestatementsofotherclosemembersof government.Certainly,therehasbeenadivergenceofopinioninboththeBlair governmentandtheBushadministrationwithregardstodetention.However,the discourseoftheleaderisthemostimportantvoiceinconstructingprioritiesand establishingpolicies.Thesearenotreducedtotheindividual,butinsteadareunderstood asrepresentativeoftheconsensusestablishedwithclosemembersofthegovernment andtheirinnercircleofadvisers.Publicdiscoursetendstobecarefullycraftedandis generallytheproductofeffortsfarbeyondtheindividualthatdeliversthem.As Woodward(2004:134)writeswithregardstoBush,‘presidentialspeecheswere policy’. Afurtherpointtoclarifybeforedetailingtheactualprocessofanalysisisthefocuson politicaleliteswhoareseeminglydistantfromtheactualoccurrencesofabusein detention,forexamplethatatAbuGhraib.Imuststressherethatcompliance,defection orcontestation,arenotconsideredtoinvolvejustthepracticeoftorturebuthighly centralaregovernmentpoliciesthatshouldbedesignedtopreventorpunishthe perpetratorsoftorture.IndeedasKelmanargues(2005:124),researchmustgo‘beyond thecharacteristicsoftheindividualperpetratorsorevenofthesituationsinwhichthe tortureispracticed…focusingattentiononthelargerpolicycontextinwhichthe practiceoftortureisembedded’.Suchpoliciesandthevaluesthatleaderspromote certainlyhaveasignificantroleinframingacultureinwhichtortureandabusemay occur(Reicher,HaslamandHopkins,2005).AsJackson(2007:354)states,they‘create thewiderlegitimacyandsocialconsensusthatisrequiredtoenactpolicy’.Philip Zimbardo’sbook, The Lucifer Effect providesaverygoodaccountofthe‘trickledown’ effectfromthesepoliciesandvalues(alsosee,Bandura,Underwood,andFromson, 1975;andMilgram,1974;forfascinatingclassicstudiesintodehumanizationand obedience).Thisthesisconsidersthepoliciesthatcontesttheinternationaldetention regimeonabroaderbasisthanjusttorture,howevermostcontestationsalsocontribute

12 insomewaytomakingtheoccurrenceofabusemorelikely.Thus,contestationsby politicaleliteshaveamuchbroaderimpactthanmayhavebeenintended. Chapters4and5arebasedontheanalysisof705speeches,statementsandpress conferences,345byTonyBlairand360byGeorgeW.Bush.Amaximumof60are takenfromeachyear,averaging5amonth(forBlairthenumberofrelevantand availablesourcesfallsshortofthistargetin2001,thelowernumberof45areincluded). Thosesourceswithlessthan250wordsspokenorwrittenbythestateleaderinquestion arenotincluded.Somemonthsproducemoredatathanothers,forexampleinthe aftermathoftheSeptember11 th attacksorinthebuilduptohostilitiesin,whereas otherswillberelativelyquiet.Sourceswereselectedonthebasisofrelevancetothe topicofdetentionandthesocialidentitiesassessed.Thisinvolvedabroadrangeof materialinordertosufficientlycaptureinteractionswiththedifferentsocialgroups. Thiscorebodyofdataissupplementedbymaterialfromothercentralmembersof governmentwherethisisavailable,aswellassecondarymaterialwhichhelpstosituate thediscourse. ThereareseveralstagestotheprocessofanalysisIundertake.Initialcodingofthe sourcematerialwasinverybroadterms,summarizingthediscoursebymeansofthe socialidentitiesthatareengagedwith.Thedatawascodedwherethestateleadersmade referencetothesesocialgroups,addressedtheircoreelements(asoutlinedinChapter 3),orrespondedtotheargumentsandconcernsraisedbythesegroups.Thiswasto narrowdownthecorpusofmaterialtofocusonthatwhichwill‘yieldasmuchinsight aspossible’(Fairclough,1992:230).Thiswasdoneasinclusivelyaspossible, borderlinecaseswereincludedandthelargebodyofdatawasmanagedusingNVivo computersoftware.Duetothepublicandopennatureofthediscourse,certainphrases wherecategorizedinrelationtomorethanonesocialidentity(e.g.phrasesreferringto Part4ATCSA,and non-refoulment areexamplesthatconcernboththehumanrightsas wellaslegalsocialidentities).Thesecondstageofcodingfocusedonidentifyingthe keythemesthatemergedfromacloserreading,inrelationtothedifferentsocial identities.Saturationpointwasreachedwhennonewthemeswereapparentinthe discourseforthetimeperiodandsocialidentityconsidered.Alargelistofthesethemes wascondensedwheretherewasoverlap(definitionsofthesethemesandexamplesare providedinthetablebelow).Thisenabledthepresentationofclearconceptstoconsider

13 inrelationtotheframeworkofmanagementstrategiesprovidedbyRoccasandBrewer (2002)(seeChapter2). Akeyfeatureoftheassessmentinthisthesisistherecognitionthatvalidationof associationwithsocialidentitiesisatwowayprocess,thusresponsesandpreceding argumentstothegovernment’sconstructionsfrommembersofthesocialgroups consideredareusedtocomplementthemainanalysis.Thisiswiththeaimofcapturing someoftheinteractionsthatareapparentin20012006.Unfortunately,theneedtouse publicdiscourse,whichisnotadirectconversationbetweenthegovernmentsandthe differentsocialidentities,placeslimitationsonthedegreetowhichthisispossible;the analysiscannotprovideanassessmentofdirectinteractionsaswouldbethecasein conversationanalysis.Theinteractionscapturedarethosebasedonwhetherornot argumentsareaccepted,aswellaschangestothemanagementstrategiesandtechniques employed.Finally,intermsofthevalidationofresearchfindings,toshowthatthe argumentsarerecognisedbyBushandBlairwouldbeverydifficultindeed.Instead, validationinthisthesisisbasedonthescopeoftheschematomakesenseofthecases assessed. Discourseanalysisofpoliticalspeechesandpressconferences,accompaniedby statementsfromthesocialgroupsassessedinthisthesis,helpstoillustratethe interactivenatureofnormativeconstraintinthesecases,asopposedtoanobjectiveand staticapproach(withfixedmeaningandapplication),todefectionandcompliance.As thisanalysisisbasedonaninterpretiveapproachIacknowledgemyownroleinthe researchprocess.Icertainlybringtothisprojectmyownnormativeleanings,whichI mustclarify.Forexample,Ibelievethatcompliancewiththeinternationaldetention regimewouldbenefittheobjectiveoftacklingterrorismandthattorturedoesmuch moreharmthanitcaneverdogood.Irejectthe‘tickingbomb’scenario(popularisedin showslike 24 ),andinsteadagreewiththehistoricalaccountsandmorerecent psychologicalstudiesoninterrogationthatshowthattorturedoesnotwork(seeHolmes, 2006;ArrigoandWagner,2007).Furthermore,Ithinkthatresortingtosuchmeasures damagesthereputationandmoralstandingofstates,alienatescommunities,and increasesthefutureriskofattacks.Thisisinadditiontotheintrinsicmoralobjectionsto harmproduction.However,duetothesebeliefsIamverykeentounderstandhow contestationsevolvedinboththeUKandUSA.Inordertoovercomethepotentialbias inmyrepresentationIshalldocumenttheanalysisinaclearandtransparentwayto

14 readers,demonstratinginanopenwayhowIreachcertainconclusions.TodosoI remainclosetothetextsthatIanalyse,drawingonnumerousexamplesintheChapters tosupportthepointsImake.Themainthemesthisprocessgeneratesaredetailedinthe tablebelow.Ionlyuseoneexampletoillustrateeachtechniqueinthesummarytableof keyconcepts.Howevertheprocessofresearchisbasedontheemergenceofthetheme acrossarangeofstatements.Assuchthesingularexampledoesnotillustratethewhole ofthetechniqueanddefinitionforallinclusionsinthetable. Table 1: Key Concepts Management Strategy Technique Definition Example Merging Blurringof Ideasandsocialidentitiesare ‘themoralistsandtherealists (alldiversesocial boundaries combined arepartners’(Blair,2001zv) identitiesareheld despitetheirlackof Centrality Theimportanceofthesocial ‘theroleourlegalsystemplays convergence) grouptoallaspectsofthe inthelivesofeveryAmerican’ stateandthelifeofcitizensis (Bush2001l) stressed Dominance Directing Reframingorarticulatinga ‘[w]hydoesn'ttheUnited (thesubordinationof newpurposeforthesocial Nationsstandupasabodyand therelevantsocial identitybasedonsuper showtheworldthatithasgot identitiestoonesuper ordinateidentification,as thecapacitytokeepthepeace’ ordinategroup interpretedbypoliticalelites (Bush,2003c) identification–all inthecontext techniquesarebased thissuperordinate Challenging Stronglyquestioningthe ‘NGOsandpressuregroups identification) normativebasisofthesocial withsinglecausescanbe group,therelevanceoftheir benevolentbutcanalso arguments,and/or exerciseakindofmalign constructingthemasa tyrannyoverthepublicdebate’ restraintonappropriatepolicy (Blair,2006zf) Denial Refusaltoacknowledgeself ‘theanalogieswiththingslike engagementincounter internmentarejustfatuous normativebehaviour frankly’(Blair,2005zr) Dismissal Rejectionofthearguments ‘myexperienceofthese andcriticismsarticulatedby debatesisthatveryswiftlya thesocialgrouponthebasis civillibertiesissueturnsintoa ofsuperordinateimperatives nationalsecurityissue’(Blair, 2003zw) Reassuring Stressingtherightnessofthe ‘thesacrifice[ofthemilitary] socialgroup’sactionsinthe hasbeenworthit’(Bush, faceofcriticism 2006zzh) Blaming Thesocialgrouphasforced ‘[theDTA]providesmore thegovernmentor clarityforourprofessionals administrationtoactoutside [thanGenevaIII]’(Bush, ofinternationalnormative 2006zv) regimes,ortolegislatefurther tobringthemselvesbackin Threatening Circumstancesareframedasa ‘thatthegreaterdangertothe testforthesocialgroup,with UNisinaction’(Blair,2003n) warningsoffuturedamageto authority

15 Displacing Criticismistransferredonto ‘Americahasnointerestin others beingtheworld'sjailer’, however,‘manycountrieshave refusedtotakebacktheir nationalsheldat [Guantánamo]’(Bush,2006zt) Embedding Firmlygroundingthesocial ‘You[theUSMilitary]are groupinthemissionand bringingalongtraditionof contextasdefinedbythe dutytothisnewandurgent governmentoradministration task’(Bush,2003zc) Leading Emphasisisexplicitlyplaced ‘Americaisleadingtheworld onthepositionofleadingthe withconfidenceandmoral socialgroup clarity’(Bush,2004zp) Dividing Constructingdistinct ‘astrugglebetweenfanaticism categoriesandboundariesin andextremismontheone theinternationalsphere hand,andpeoplewhobelieve infreedomandintoleranceon theother’(Blair,2003zy) Intersection Bolstering Stressingareasofoverlap, ‘Icaredeeplyaboutthecivil Representation oftenpraisingthesocial libertiesofthiscountry’(Blair, (focusingontheareaof group’sroleandinfluence,as 2005zm) overlapbetween wellastheirnormativebasis diversesocial identities) Unifying Stressingareasofconsensus, Focusingonthe‘Millennium drawingdivergentopinions DevelopmentGoalson together poverty,oneducation,[and] acrossarangeofindicatorsfor Africa’(Blair,2005l) Utilising Drawingonthecredibilityof ‘whatyouhavenowisa thesocialgrouptoestablish UnitedNations authority process…whichallsensible peopleshouldbebacking’ (Blair,2005ze) Defenceof Supportingtheiractionsinthe ‘theactionsofthepeoplein group faceofcriticismbystressing thatprisondonotreflectthe sharedobjectivesandvision natureofthemenandwomen whowearouruniform’(Bush, 2004t) Compartmentalisation Context Emphasisingthenatureofthe ‘itisimportantthatwenever (socialidentitiesare dependent situationtojustifyaction losesightofourbasicvalues. seenasapplicablein countertothenormativebasis Butwehavetounderstandthe differentcircumstances ofthesocialgroup natureoftheenemyandact orinrelationto accordingly’(Blair,2001q) differentissues) Separation Distancing Thegovernmentor ‘Webelievethatthejust (withdrawingor administrationispresentedas demandsoftheinternational keepingapartfroma separatefromthesocialgroup communitymustbeenforced, socialidentity) andadegreeofdistanceis notignored.Webelievethisso established stronglythatweareactingon ourconvictions’(Bush,2003t)

16 Structure of the Thesis Chapter1providesatheoreticalgroundingforthisthesisintheliteratureofIRand outlinestheconstitutiveelementsoftheinternationaldetentionregime.Iconsider mainstreamapproachestothestudyofnormsandnormdefection,focusing predominantlyontheconstructivistresearchprogramme.Iarguethatthelatterdoesnot haveaconvincingaccountofthemicrofoundationaldynamicsofnorminfluenceand defection,andisthusunabletoprovideasuitableframeworkfromwhichto comprehendtheprocessesofcontestationregardingtheinternationaldetentionregime, asisexaminedinthisthesis. Theselimitationsprovidetheimpetusforanengagementwithpsychology,whichisthe subjectofChapter2.Iconsiderthewaysthatinsightsfromthedisciplineofpsychology havebeenusedtoexplaineventsaswellasadvanceourunderstandingoftheissuesof concerninIR.Aftercriticallyassessingtheuseofpsychologyinconstructivism,Iargue foranenhancedengagementwithresearchconductedwithinthesocialidentity approachinsocialpsychology.Chapter2providestheframeworkforanalysisinthis thesis,focusingonthemicrofoundationaldynamicsofthemultiplicityofsocial identities,andtheinteractiveprocessesofnormcontestation.Iarguethattounderstand thenegotiationofnormativeconstraint,andfluctuationsinsocialinfluence,research needstofocusontheinteractionsofpoliticaleliteswiththebroadersocialidentities context. Chapter3providesanaccountofthedifferentsocialidentitiesassociatedwiththeUK andUSAthatwillbeassessedinthisthesis.Thesearebasedonthefollowinglarge socialgroups;humanrightsandhumanitarian,legal,military,theUnitedNations,and theliberaldemocraticinternationalsocialidentity.Definitionsofthesesocialidentities andjustificationfortheirinclusionwillformthebasisofChapter3. Chapters4and5examinethemanagementstrategiesemployedinrelationtothissocial identitiescontext,highlightingtheinteractiveprocessesofthecontestationofthe internationaldetentionregime.Chapter4focusesontheBlairgovernment,whilst Chapter5assessesthediscourseoftheBushadministration.TheseChaptershighlight thevalueaddedofanengagementwiththesocialidentityapproach,which,Iargue, allowsusto,(1)rejectthesimpledichotomybetweendefectionandcompliancethat permeatesnormsresearchinIR,(2)providesuswithamicrofoundationalframework

17 fromwhichtounderstandandexaminethecontestationoftheinternationaldetention regime,and(3)bridgessomeofthegapbetweenpoliticalelitesandinternational normativeregimes.Thisapproachwidensourunderstandingofthenatureofnormative constraintascontextuallysituated,andindoingso,allowsustoassesstheprocessesof contestationbytheUKandUSAthatchallengedacceptedstandardsofappropriateness andourexpectationsforrightfulconduct.

18 Chapter 1: Norms, Influence and Expectations Examininghowthenormativeconstraintsregardingdetentionpracticeshavebeen negotiatedbytheUSAandUKfirstrequiresadefinitionofnormsandinparticularhow weexpectthemtobeinfluentialininternationalpolitics.Normsfeatureheavilyin researchacrossthesocialsciencesaswellasinIRhoweverwhatweactuallymeanby theconceptclearlyvariesdependingonourtheoreticalorientation,asdoesthe significanceattributedtotheirrole.ThisChapterprovidesadefinitionofnorms groundedintheconstructivistresearchprogramme.Ijustifythispositionwithreference tobothrealismandneoliberalism.ThefirstsectionofthisChapterdrawsoutthe centralprinciplesgoverningtherealist,neoliberalandconstructivistapproachtonorms inIR.Iarguethataconstructivistunderstandingprovidesthebestframeworkfor analysisasthiscapturesmanyfacetsthattheotherperspectivesneglect,forexample, theconstitutive,asopposedtopurelyregulative,natureofnorms.Thesecondsection considersvariationswithinconstructivismregardingnorms,comparingresearchfrom boththeconventionalandthickendsoftheconstructivistspectrum.Fromthisbasis sectionthreeprovidesanoutlineofthetheoreticalunderstandingunderpinningthis thesis,assituatedwithincurrentconstructivistdebates.Buildingonthisframework,the thirdsectionalsoestablisheswhatismeantbytheinternationaldetentionregimeand whatexpectationsthisgeneratesforbehaviourinternationally.ThroughouttheChapterI highlightsomeofthechallengespresentedbythecasesexaminedinthisthesis.This providesthemotivationalbasisforasubsequentengagementwithpsychology.

1. Norms and Theoretical Divergence in IR Normshaveahighlysignificantroleininternationalrelationsscholarship,largelyasa resultofthegrowthinregimetheoryandthesurgeinconstructivistliteratureoverthe pasttwodecades.1Definitionshavecentredonnormsascollectiveunderstandingsof appropriatebehaviour.Thereishowevermuchdivergenceregardingthedetailsofsuch adefinition,aswellastheexpectedinfluenceofnormsonbehaviour.Iarguethata constructivistapproachisthemostilluminatingwithregardstonorms,andindeedtakes intoaccountanumberofhighlysignificantinsightsfromthebroadersocialsciences, forexample,thoseprovidedbyWittgenstein(1958),Winch,(1970a;1970b),andSearle

1WhilstnormsarealsoafeatureoftheearlierEnglishSchoolliterature,thisapproachdidnottheorise,to thesamedegree,theprocessesofinfluenceonstateactions,butfocusedmoreontheroleofnormsinthe constitutionofinternationalsociety. 19 (1995).Whilstscholars,suchasthesehave,foralongtime,highlightedtheimportance ofnormstosociallife, 2thissectionispredominantlyconcernedwithhownormsare characterisedintheliteratureofIRandthereforefocusesonthekeyperspectivesof realism,neoliberalismandconstructivism. ScholarsfromthevariousapproachestoIRdiffergreatlyonhowtheyconceptualise norms,whattheyexpectnormstodo,andthemannerinwhichnormsaredeemed relevanttothestudyofinternationalpolitics.Thishasprofoundimplicationsforour understandingofdefectionandcontestation,andinparticular,thequestionsraisedby theempiricalcasesexaminedinthisthesis.Thedifferentperspectivesprovidediverging explanationsastowhyandhownormsinfluencebehaviour,ifindeedtheydo,aswellas underwhatconditions.Thissectionjustifieswhytheconstructivistapproachtonormsis privilegedinthisstudy,andindeedinformsthecentraldrivingquestions.

1.1 Realism Realismattachestheleastsignificancetonormsintermsoftheirinfluenceonbehaviour intheinternationalsphere.Statesarenotconsideredtobeboundbynorms,andwhen otheroverridingimperatives(suchasthosegeneratedinthedomesticsphere)take precedence,theyaresimplythoughttogiveway.ThisapproachtoIRpresidesonthe assertionthat‘[i]nternationalpolitics,likeallpolitics,isastruggleforpower’ (Morgenthau,1985:31).Themostimportantfactorinexplainingorpredictingthe actionsofstatesisthereforethedistributionofpowerintheinternationalsystem. Norms,consequently,areepiphenomenal.Wheretheydofeatureinanalysistheyare presentedasanadjuncttorealistexplanations(Desch,1998),asopposedtobeing grantedanyindependentvalue.Thebehaviourofactorsintheanarchicsystemis not thoughttobealteredinanyfundamentalway,bychangesinthenormativecontext (Fischer,1992). Norms,fromarealistperspective,aredeemedtobethepreferencesofthemost powerfulstateorstatesintheinternationalsystem.Theywillthusbemodifiedor replacedinaccordancewithchangesintheinterestsofpowerfulstates,orshiftsinthe fundamentaldistributionofpowerinthesystem,asinneorealism(Waltz,1979).The

2Theoreticalinterestinnormsandsocialrulesiscertainlynotnew.Winch’skeyinsight,thatallhuman behaviourisrulegoverned,asrulesprovidemeaningtohumanbehaviour,providesafundamentalbasis forcertainstrandsoftheconstructivistapproachtonorms.Suchanapproachindicatesthatwecanonly understandsociallifeifwecanunderstandtherulesthatgiveitmeaning. 20 functioningofnormsislargelylimitedtothatofthe‘convenienttools’ofstatecraftfor thosestatesinpositionsofpower;firstlyinprovidingamoralslanttojustifybehaviour, andsecondlytoinducecomplianceinweakerstates,inawaythatfallsinlinewiththe interestsofthepowerful. 3 Greatpowersarethoughtbyrealiststodeploynormstojustifytheirbehaviour.Inthis sense,theyareabletochooseamongnormsorindeedcreatenewones.Thisispartlya consequenceofthenatureofnorms,which,asKrasnersuggests‘canbe contradictory…andthereisnoauthoritystructuretoadjudicatesuchcontroversies’ (1999:6).Hurrell(2002)givestheexampleofthedetentionof‘illegalenemy combatants’atGuantánamoBayandthetensionsbetweendifferentlegal,moraland politicalnormsgoverningbehaviour.Valueconflictsareunderstoodheretoreducethe influenceofnormsonpowerfulstates,asopposedtoprovokingaprocessof contestationwherebystatesnegotiatecompetingnormativeconstraints. WhilstpowerfulstateshaveanimportantroleinnormsettingIarguethatthisdoesnot makethemsomehowseparatefromthenormativecontextinwhichtheyaresituated. Thatstatescansimplyjustifytheirbehaviourwithreferencetoconflictinginternational normsnegatestheimportanceoftheaudience,andacceptanceofsuchclaims. Competingnormsandthepowertoconstructdominantnarrativesdetermining appropriatenessarekeyconsiderations,however,reducingtheinfluenceofnormsin internationalpoliticstoanaccountofpowerleavesagreatdealoutofassessment(such astheroleofidentity),whichhasbeenshowntobehighlysignificantfortheanalysisof behaviourintheinternationalrealm.Suchresearchwillbeconsideredlaterinthis Chapter. Internationalnormsarealsooftenstudiedincloseassociationwithalliancesand institutions.Fromarealistperspective,statesarethoughtonlytoentersuchcollective agreementsbasedonselfinterest,forexamplewhentheydesirerestraintonspecific issuesandjoiningisseentobetotheiradvantage.Mitigatingtheuncertaintyofthe securitydilemmaaswellasestablishingmechanismstoenhancetradetothebenefitsof

3Gilpin(1981:35)suggeststhatthe‘primaryfoundationofrightsandrulesisinthepowerinterestsof thedominantgroupsorstatesinasocialsystem’.Indeedaconvergencecanbeseenbetweeninternational normsandthenationalinterestsofthepowerful,intermsofnormspromotingfreetrade(Goertzand Diehl,1994:106).Normsinthissensecanbeseenasameansbywhichtocreateaninternationalorderin favourofthepowerfulstatesinthesystem. 21 thepowerful(GoertzandDiehl,1994),providetwosuchareas.Underlyingpoliticalor economicfactorsareconsideredtodriveactorstoenterintoagreements,resultingin abandonmentwhentheregimenolongerfulfilstheselfinterestsofthestate.TheUSA, duetoitsgreatpowerstatus,isoftenconsideredtobeabletopursuesuchastrategy. Manycriticismsandcounterargumentshavebeenpresentedconcerningtherealist perspectiveonregimes(e.g.Haas,1983;Stein,1983;Krasner,1983;Linden,2000; Glaser,2003;Desch,2003)howeverthesearebeyondthescopeofthisChapter,whereI meanonlytobrieflyhighlightthecentralconcernsofarealistunderstandingofnorms. Tosumup,realistsdorecognisearolefornormsininternationalpoliticshoweverthis isalwayssubordinatetopower.Cruciallyforrealists,normsarenotconsideredtobe bindinguponstateswhentheyareinoppositiontotheirinterests(DunneandWheeler, 2004).Assuchtheytendtobeconsideredaslargelysuperfluoustoaction,andthefocus hasfallenontheuseofnormsasarhetoricalmoralguisefortheactionsofpowerful states,forthepurposesofinducingcomplianceinweakerstates,and,intermsof regimes,reducinguncertaintyandtheconditionsofthesecuritydilemmawhenthisisin theinterestsofpowerfulstates.Forrealiststhen,powerandnotnormsaretheimportant conceptininternationalbehaviour. Ifweweretoagreethat,‘patternsofinternationalinteractionscanbesatisfactorily analysedintermsofpower’thentheemploymentofnormsinourexplanationdoes indeedbecome‘superfluous’(Kratochwil,1989:47).However,thisconceptualisation createscertainproblems,forexamplecanitreallybesaidthatthosewhoholdpower cansimplychoosetocomply,defect,orchoosefreelybetweendifferentnorms?Surely thiswouldhaveimplicationsintermsofunderminingthelegitimacyofpowerfulstates andtheirabilitytosettheinternationalagenda.Furthermore,evenifpowerfulstates createnormsintheirinterests,itseemslogicaltosuggestthattheywouldstillbe constrainedbytheseiftheyhopetoretaininfluenceandpoweroverthosetheyexpectto comply?Thesequestionslargelycomedowntoourunderstandingoftheconcepts, whetherweseenormsorpowerinsocialorpurelymaterialterms(seeReusSmit,2004 foradiscussionofsocialpower).Iwouldquestionwhetherwithoutlegitimacyand socialinfluencewecanreallyholdpowerintermsofbeingabletoinfluenceand enforceourwilluponothers,andbesuccessfulintheprocess.

22 Theveryfactthatnormsareemployedtojustifybehavioursuggeststhatthereare limitationstothechoicesavailabletostates;notallactioncanbejustifiedintermsof conflictingnormsinawaythatwillbeacceptedaslegitimatebysignificantothers.We cancertainlyseemanyproblemswiththeUSA’sappealtonormsofsecurityinrelation totheirdetentionpoliciesinthewaronterror.Despitetheirmanyclaimstobeacting appropriatelyinthecontext,theBushadministrationhasnotbeenabletogain legitimacyinternationallyforsuchpractices,orevendomesticallyforthatmatterifwe lookatthecampaignpromisesoftheObamaandMcCaincampsinthebuilduptothe 2008presidentialelection. 4Interpretationsofconflictingnormsaswellaslegitimacy claimsarerestrictedbythesharedunderstandingsandpracticesofothers(Hurrell, 2002).Defectionsandcontestationsarenotasimpleonewayprocess. Furthermore,scholarshavedemonstratedthatwaritself,whichfeaturesheavilyinthe conflictualworldofrealism,issubjecttoregulationandlimitation(Farrell,2005a).In thiscontext,theuseofcertainweaponsorpracticesisdeemedillegitimate(suchas chemicalorbiologicalweapons)andstatepracticehaslargelyfollowedsuit(Legro, 1995;1997).Eventhepossibilityofwarissociallyconstructedasopposedtopurelythe resultofshiftsinthebalanceofpower(Alkopher,2007;Finnemore,2003).Realism thereforestrugglestocomprehendactionbystatesthatdoesnotappeartobeintheir materialinterests,basedonadesireforpower,butinsteadisconsideredtobesocially appropriatefortheirpositioninthehierarchyofstates.5 1.2 Neo-Liberalism Scholarsfallingwithintheresearchdomainofneoliberalism,tendtoacceptmanyof theprinciplesofrealism(asoutlinedabove),particularlyneorealism(Keohane,1986). However,neoliberalsgivemoreweighttotheroleofnormsininternationalpolitics. Indeed,institutionsandregimesaredeemedtohavesomeindependentvalueand influenceoverstatemembersaftertheirconstruction(Keohane,1984).Institutionsand notmerelythebalanceofpowerstructureaffectstatepreferences.However,whilstthe neoliberalapproachdoesallowagreaterrolefornorms,generatingmoreinsightsinto theirfunctioning,thisislimitedtoarationalistandinstrumentalstandpoint.

4Obamainparticular,focusedontheneedtoclosethedetentionfacilitiesatGuantánamoBay. 5Theroleofnormsinthecalculationofstateinterestsisalsonegated. 23 Incontrasttorealistandneorealistenquiry,neoliberalsaskthequestionofhowthe developmentofnormscanreducethecompetitivenatureoftheinternationalsystemand resultincooperation.Acentralpurposeofinternationalregimesisarguablytoeasethe creationof‘mutuallybeneficialagreementsamonggovernmentssothestructural conditionofanarchydoesnotleadtoacomplete“warofallagainstall”’(Keohane, 1983:148).Neoliberalssuggestthattheroleofnormsandtheemergenceofregimesis downtothedesireofactorstoovercomethedilemmasofcommoninterestsand commonaversionby(incertaincircumstances)forgoingindependentdecisionmaking. 6 Regimesemergewhenthecostsoutweighthebenefits(MartinandSimmons,1998).7 Neoliberalsalsoproposethatregimesmayalterthepreferencesofactorsovertime. Thisisanareawhereneoliberalismsignificantlyadvancesourunderstandingofnorms fromthatofrealism.Normsareinfluentialbecausethey‘notonlyreflect,butalso affect,thefactsofworldpolitics’(Keohane,1984:57).Waever’s(1998)exampleof NATOisappropriatehere.Statesmayhaveformedtheallianceinlinewiththe predictionsofneorealismandbalancingpoweragainstacommonthreat,however members’preferenceshavegenerallydevelopedbeyondtheseinitialintereststofavour mutualcooperationinlinewiththevaluesoftheinstitution.Thecostsofnon compliance,resultinginalackofcooperation,consequentlyweighinheavily. Compliancewithnorms,asembeddedinpoliticalinstitutions,ishoweverapproachedin aninstrumentalfashion,wheretheyareassessedbymeansofcostbenefitcalculations. Normsarepresentedas‘intermediatefactors,or“interveningvariables”between fundamentalcharacteristicsofworldpoliticssuchastheinternationaldistributionof powerontheonehandandthebehaviourofstatesandnonstateactors…ontheother’ (Keohane,1984:64). Whilstneoliberalscholarstendtorecognizethatpreferencesmaychange,theyalso generallycontendthat‘vitalnationalinterests…[are]unlikelytobemodifiedor relegatedinthefaceofinstitutionalimperatives’(Simpson,2000:458).Interestsare stillpredominantlyexogenouslygivenandinfluencetheprocessesofcostbenefit 6Anillustrationofthiscanbefoundin‘Thetragedyofthecommons’(Hardin,1968).Anexamplethat seemstofitthismodelcanbedrawnfromdisputesoverfishingincertainareas,alongsideagreementsto stopthedepletionofresources(Stein,1983).Scholarsrecognisethatinordertoachievethis,theregime mustbespecificaboutwhatconstitutescooperationandcheatinginorderforstatestofeelassuredenough toparticipateandstriveforsuboptimalindependentgain. 7MorerecentlyDai(2005:364)hasnotedtheimportanceofconsideringgamessuchasthePrisoners Dilemmainthedomesticaswellasinternationalrealmasgovernmentsmayfacean‘entirelydifferent strategicenvironmentdomestically’. 24 calculationswithregardstointernationalnorms.Thus,intermsofdefectionfromthe internationaldetentionregime,therewouldbetheassumptionofa‘cost’tocompliance, andthatthisiscountertostateinterestsincertaincircumstances.Costbenefitanalysis, wouldthereforeoverrideaconcernwithcompliance.Thisreasoning,however,misses severalpoints.Forexample,arethecostsofcompliancereallythatclear?Whydo certainstatesviewnoncomplianceasthemostbeneficialcourseofactionandothersdo not,particularlygiventhemanystudiesthatsuggestthereislittleutilitytotorture(see Ross,2005)?Primarily,whydotheyviewsuchactiontobeintheirinterests?The internationaldetentionregimeforexample,includesprohibitionsontorturewhichhave arguablyshapedstateintereststoprefercomplianceduetothedetrimentalaffectnon compliancewouldhaveonstateidentity.Theimportanceoftheseideaswillbeexplored ingreaterdepththroughoutthecourseofthisChapter. Inadditiontoaskingwhycertainpracticescometobeseenasinastate’sinterests,other empiricalresearchhasfurtherhighlightedthelimitationsofaneoliberalapproachto normsbydemonstratingthe‘effect’ofnormswhicharecontrarytostates’strategicand economicinterests.Klotz(1995)providestheexampleofSouthAfricaandthe introductionofsanctionsbythegreatpowersinthe1980s.Sanctionswereimposedby the‘UnitedNations(UN),theCommonwealth,theEuropeanCommunity,theNordic states,Britain,France,Germany,Japan,andtheUnitedStates’eventhoughtheyheld strategicandeconomicinterestsagainstsuchaction(Klotz,1995:451).Thiscase demonstratesamodificationofcompetingglobalnormsinfavourofthosepromoting racialequality,andasubsequentreformationofstateinterestsintermsofthese internationalnorms.Klotzfurthersthispointbystatingthat‘internationalactors–even greatpowerssuchastheUnitedStates–inherentlyaresociallyconstructed;thatis, prevailingglobalnorms,suchasracialequality,partiallydefinetheirinterests’(Klotz, 1995:460). Byfocusingprimarilyonnorminfluenceasa‘straightforwardresultofrational adaptationtostrategiccircumstances’,neoliberalsmissmanydynamicsofstate behaviour,forexample,thefactorsinvolvedintheconstructionofthe‘nucleartaboo’ (Tannenwald,2005:7),orindeed,themorerecentconstructionofatreatybanningthe useofclustermunitions(BBC,2008;LandmineAction,2008).AsHawkins(2004) furtherpointsout,thosethatrelyonpowerandinterestsasexplanationsforbehaviour, areoftenextremelylimitedintheircapacitytoaccountforchangesintheprocessof

25 treatynegotiation,particularlywhentherearecostlyimplicationsforsovereignty. 8In termsofthisthesis,theemphasisonpredefinedinterestsandasimpledichotomy betweencomplianceanddefectionagainmissestheinteractiveprocessesof contestation. Thus,therearesignificantlimitationswithboththerealistandneoliberalapproachesto norms,primarilyduetotheirnegationofsocialpower,considerationofvitalnational interestsasexogenouslygiven,andtheirconcentrationontheregulativefunctionof internationalnorms.AsIarguebelow,abasisinconstructivistunderstandings,withan emphasisoncoconstitutivedynamics,providesgreaterdepthtoourunderstandingof theinternationaldetentionregime,andisessentialtoexaminetheoverarchingquestion ofthisthesis;thatis, how have the normative constraints regarding detention practices been negotiated by the USA and UK in the war on terror? 1.3 Constructivism and Constitutive International Norms Constructivismdivergessignificantlyfromtheaboveperspectivesofrealismandneo liberalism.Insteadoflimitinginternationalnormstopurelyregulativefunctions, constructivistsprivilegethesocialnatureofinternationalnorms,howtheyconstitute identity(particularlystateidentity),andconsequentlytheveryinterestsofstates. 9 Internationalnormsarethereforefundamentaltoourunderstandingofinternational politics.Fromsuchaperspectivescholarsareabletoaccountforagreaterrangeof compliancebehavioursthantheaboveutilitarianpositionsallow.Inthecourseofthis sectionIwilloutlinewhyIfindthisamoreconvincingpositiontotakewithregardsto thestudyofinternationalnormativeregimes.Thiswillleadusintosectiontwoofthis 8Hawkinsprovidesaveryinterestingaccountofnegotiationsregardingthe Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),particularlywithregardsto provisionsforuniversaljurisdiction.Theauthoridentifiesthenormsofprecedence,thatinternational cooperationisthebestwaytotacklemost‘identifiablesocialproblems’,andtheneedtopreventbodily harmasprovidingamoreinformativecontextwithinwhichtounderstandthetreatynegotiations.The roleofidentityinthisprocessisdeemedtobecrucial(2004:786). 9Thesocialfoundationtonormsisbynomeansuniquetoconstructivism.IndeedImentionedthework ofWittgensteinandWinchatthebeginningofthisChapter,whoalongwithscholarssuchasHabermas andothers,haveprovidedtherootsforsomeofthemorecriticalperspectivesofIR.Therehasalsobeena longtraditionofresearchreferringtothesocialnatureofnormsevidentintheEnglishSchool;indeed therehasbeenmuchoverlapbetweenthisandcertainstrandsofconstructivismwithsomescholars seeminglyclaimedbybothtraditions(seeAdler,2005foranassessmentoftheirdifferences).Certainly researchoninternationalsociety(whereinternationalnormsareakeycharacteristic)providesthe backdroptomuchconstructivistresearch;indeedtheexistenceofaninternationalsocietyisan assumptionwithoutwhichmuchresearchoninternationalnormsislikelytoprovefutile.Writingsinthis domainundoubtedlypredatetheriseofconstructivisminIRbyseveraldecades.However,itislargely thoseworkingunderthebannerofconstructivismthathavebroughtquestionsconcerningthefunctioning ofnorms,particularlyregardingtheirinfluenceandrelationshiptoidentity,totheforeinIRresearchin morerecenttimes. 26 ChapterwhereIassessvariationsintheconstructivistapproachinordertooutlinethe theoreticalbasistothisthesis. Constructivistshavedefinednorms,atabasiclevel,asstandardsforappropriate behaviourforactorswithagivenidentity.Thecrucialdifferencetotheprevious perspectivesistheinclusionofidentityintheanalysisofnormsininternationalpolitics. Internationalnormsaresharedunderstandingsfoundedinaninternationalsociety, wherememberscanjudgetheappropriatenessofeachothers’actions(Risseand Sikkink,1999).Theyaresocialastheyarebasedontheagreementofothermembers, whetherimplicitlyorexplicitly,astothedynamicsofthenorm–i.e.whatbehaviours thenormcoversandwhenitisapplicable.Internationalnormsareunderstood,by constructivistscholars,asexpectationsthatareinasensegeneratedbymembershipof internationalsociety.10 Someinternationalnormshavebeenshowntoplacesignificantdemandsontheforeign anddomesticpoliciesofmemberstates,forexampleintermsoftheemergenceofan environmentalregime(Eckersley,2007).Othershaveservedtoguidepractices,for examplethroughtheirinfluenceonthedevelopmentofmilitarydoctrine(Farrell, 2005b),understandingsabouttheappropriateuseofforce(Alkopher,2007;Finnemore, 2003)anddeterminingwhatactorscanbelegitimatelyinvolvedinwarfare(Percy, 2007a;2007b).Thisisnotbasedonautilitariancalculationfoundedonexogenous interests;insteadinternationalnormsinformtheinterestsofstatesandplacedemands onbehaviourthroughbeingconstitutiveofidentity.Theroleofsocialpracticesinthe establishment,reproductionandchallengetointernationalnormshasalsobeenheavily emphasised.AsKratochwilputsit,‘[a]ctorsarenotonlyprogrammedbyrulesand norms,buttheyreproduceandchangebytheirpracticethenormativestructuresby whichtheyareabletoact,sharemeanings,communicateintentions,criticizeclaims, andjustifychoices’(1989:61).Thedegreetowhichthiscoconstitutiveprocessis accountedforinconstructivistresearchcertainlyvaries,however,itremainsa fundamentalprincipletothisapproach.

10 Thisdoesnotmeantheyarerestrictedtotheinternationalrealm,indeed,intermsofdetentionand prohibitionsontorturesuchnormativestandardsareverymuchpartofthedomesticsphereforcertain states.Howthismanifestsitselfandtheinteractionbetweennormativeregimeswillbeexaminedinthe empiricalChaptersofthisthesis. 27 Constructivistsconsiderinternationalnormstobeconstitutiveinthesensethatthey formtherulesofthegameandtheoptionsavailabletoactorswithinit;indeedthey ‘createtheverypossibilityofengaginginconductofacertainkind’(Schauer,1991:6). Internationalnormsareenablingaswellasconstraining,forexampleintermsof facilitatingwarfareininternationalsociety(Alkopher,2007),orlegitimizingthe participationofpreviouslydisempoweredactors(Klotz,1995;Finnemore,1996).Such anaccountisneglectedinneorealismandneoliberalism. Thus,aconstructivistapproachtothestudyofnormsprovidesamuchfulleraccountof theirfundamentalroleininternationalpolitics.Anyassessmentofhowtheinternational detentionregimeisnegotiatedbytheUSAandUKinthewaronterrorwouldbe limitedwithoutthemeansbywhichtoaccountfortheimportanceofidentity.Indeed, suchaquestionrequiresanapproachthatmovesbeyondarelianceonmaterialpower andpredefinedinterests.Inordertoprovideamoreindepthassessment,thisthesisis anchoredinaconstructivistapproachtonorms. 2. Variations in Constructivism Thissectionbuildsontheaboveinsightsbyfocusingonvariationinconstructivism withregardstothestudyofinternationalnorms.Asthisthesisisgroundedinthe constructivistresearchprogramamoredetailedassessmentisrequiredthanhasbeen providedintheprevioussection.Whilstconstructivistsmaylargelyagreeonabasic definitionofinternationalnormsasoutlinedabove,thereismuchdivergenceinthe literatureintermsofresearchfocus. 11 Whilstsomescholarshaveseparatedthesetwo approachestoconstructivismintodifferentcamps,basedonepistemologicaldifferences (seeFierke,2007),Iviewthemonacontinuumacrossaspectrumofconstructivist understanding.ThispositionissupportedbyscholarssuchasThomasRisse(2008),and allowsresearcherstobenefitfromthebroadrangeofinsightsintonormsthat constructivistshaveprovided.Thus,whilstIconsiderbothperspectivesinturnforthe sakeofclarity,ImuststressthatIviewthemonaspectrumwherethereisadiffering 11 Conventionalconstructivistshavetendedtoconcentrateondemonstratingtheimpactofrelatively stableinternationalnormsonstatebehaviour,oftenwiththeaimofcounteringtherealistrelianceon materialpowerinexplainingtheactionsofstates.Thickconstructivistshave,however,privilegedthe studyofnormconstructionandidentifyingthenormsgeneratedinhistoricaleventstoprovidean enhancedunderstandingofhowcertainsituationscameintobeing.Weldes(1999),forexample,provides averyilluminatingaccountoftheCubanmissilecrisis.Thefocusisonmeaningsasopposedtothe assessmentofpreviouslydefinednormsofbehaviour.Hopf(1998)isoneofthefirstofmany constructiviststodrawadistinctionbetweenvarietiesofconstructivism. 28 emphasisasopposedtoclearlydefinedlinesofseparation.Ishallexplorethese variationsbyfirstfocusingontheconventionalconstructivistapproachtothestudyof internationalnorms. 2.1 Conventional Constructivism Conventionalconstructiviststendtoviewnormsasstandardsofappropriatebehaviour thatguideinteractionsandinfluencetheinterestsandthusbehaviourofstates.Norms aregenerallyviewedas‘singlestandardsofbehaviour’withstrong‘evaluative dimensions’(FinnemoreandSikkink,1998:891).Duetotheirfunctionasameansby whichtojudgebehaviour,evidenceoftheirexistenceisprovidedbythejustificatory trailofdiscoursethataccompaniestheactionsofstates.Scholarsworkingtowardsthis endoftheconstructivistspectrumhavefocusedonquestionsregardingtheemergence ofinternationalnormsaswellashowtheyexertaninfluenceonstates,attemptingto explainvariationsinstatebehaviour–forexamplewhysomeinternationalnormsare influentialforsomestatesandnotothersandwhenthisislikelytobethecase. Emergence and Development Aclassicstudyregardingtheemergenceofinternationalnormsisprovidedby FinnemoreandSikkink(1998)whointroducedthenotionofanormlifecycleto internationalpolitics.Themodelproposesthreestagestothedevelopmentand acceptanceofanorminternationally.Theinitialstage,normemergence,is demonstratedtobedowntotheworkofnormentrepreneurswithorganizational platforms(suchasNGOs)fromwhichtopromotetheirconceptionsofappropriate behaviour.Throughtheeffortsofentrepreneurs,normsmakethetransitionfromthese organisationalplatformstotheinternationalrealm.Oneoftheexamplesgivenisthe workofHenryDunantinthepromotionofnormsprotectingmedicalpersonnelinwar time,leadingtotheestablishmentofwhatisnowknownastheInternationalCommittee oftheRedCross(ICRC)andthevariousGenevaConventionsoutlininghumanitarian law.Themotivesforsuchactionarethoughttolieintheconvictionofnorm entrepreneursthattheseideasformthemostappropriateguidetobehaviour,basedon theirideationalcommitment,empathyandaltruism(FinnemoreandSikkink,1998: 898).Assuch,theactionsofnormentrepreneursareaimedatconvincing‘acritical

29 massofstates(normleaders)toembracenewnorms’throughareframingoftheissues athand(FinnemoreandSikkink,1998:895). 12 Oncethis‘tippingpoint’ofpersuasionhasbeenreached,FinnemoreandSikkink suggestthatthesecondstageofthenormlifecycleisledbythesestates,and/or internationalorganizationswiththeaimofsocializingnormcomplianceinotherstates andpromoting‘socialnormfollowing’asopposedto‘rationalnormfollowing’(Farrell, 2005b).Thisiswiththeobjectiveofinitiatinga‘normcascade’throughthe mechanismsofsocialization,demonstrationandinstitutionalisation.Variousscholars haveexploredthisnotionofsociallearning,forexampleCheckel(2001),anditis generallyseenasfundamentaltotheconventionalconstructivistunderstandingofnorms –stateslearnthenormsofinternationalsocietyandthroughthisprocesstheybecome partofidentityandareinfluential.Motivationforstatestorespondemanatesfromthe ‘pressureforconformity,desiretoenhanceinternationallegitimation,andthedesireof stateleaderstoenhancetheirselfesteem’(FinnemoreandSikkink,1998:895). Alargeamountofresearchinthisareahasfocusedonnormpromotionbyinternational institutions(e.g.Checkel,2005),whetherthisisrelatedtothefirststageofthenormlife cycleintermsofnormformation,forexampletheUN’sroleinestablishing internationalnormsassociatedwithdecolonization,humanrights,education,andnorm development,orbuildingonandregulatingthatwhichisalreadyrecognizedandwell known(BarnettandFinnemore,2004).Inthisprocessinternationalinstitutionsare givenmuchmoreautonomythaninthepreviousperspectivesofrealismandneo liberalism.Indeed,in Rules for the World BarnettandFinnemore(2004:7)demonstrate thatinternationalorganisationssuchasUNHCR,theWTOandtheIMF‘usetheir knowledgeandauthoritynotonlytoregulatewhatcurrentlyexistsbutalsotoconstitute theworld,creatingnewinterests,actors,andsocialactivities’.Theauthorsconstructan argumentthatsuggeststhatinternationalorganisationshaveoftenservedtodefinewhat isconsideredasgoodgovernance,inbothregulativeandconstitutiveways,duetothe authorityandautonomythattheyhold.Sointermsofnormsetting,theseinstitutions havebothautonomyandinfluence.

12 TheissueofframingandpersuasionisexploredinmoredetailbyscholarssuchasPayne(2001),andis alsoseenasacrucialmechanismassociatedwithnormchange(e.g.Finnemore,2003). 30 Thefinalstageinthelifecycleisnorminternalization,wheretheseinternationalnorms achieveatakenforgrantedquality,ascanbeseenforexampleinnormsagainststate sponsoredslaveryandpiracyaswellasthoseprotectingmedicalpersonnelinwartime. Theseareareaswherethestandardsforappropriatebehaviourhavemovedbeyond debateandaresowidelyacceptedthattheytakeonqualitiesassociatedwithhabit. Constructivistshavetracedthedevelopmentandevolutionofmanyinternationalnorms. Studieshavefocusedon,forexample,theriseofaproNGOinternationalnorm (Reimann,2006),theinternationalnormsforelectionmonitoring(Kelley,2008),the nucleartaboo(Tannenwald,2005),ortheantimercenaryinternationalnorm(Percy 2007b).Scholarshavealsoassessedpotentialinternationalnormsthathavefailedto comeintobeing,forexampleinthedomainofantiwhaling(Bailey,2008).Forthose internationalnormsthatareestablished,changestodefinitionsovertimearealso monitored,forinstancewithregardstotheinternationalnormsgoverningtheuseof force(Finnemore,2003;Alkopher,2007).Theprocessesoftreatydevelopmenthave beenidentifiedasoneveryilluminatingwaytotracethedevelopmentofan internationalnorm.Hawkins(2004)suggeststhatthenegotiationsfortheConvention againstTorturearearevealingrecordofhowtheinternationalnormsprohibitingtorture progressed.AlthoughasbothTannenwald(2005)andPercy(2007a)demonstratethis doesnotmeanthatinternationalnormsarereducibletolaw,infactstronginternational normsmaybeveryweakinlawastheauthorsshowtobethecasewithregardstothe nucleartabooandantimercenarynormsrespectively(alsoseeScottandAmbler,2007). Certainlythestageatwhichtheinternationalnorms,orpotentialinternationalnorms, areinthislifecycleframeworkisimportantforhowweviewquestionsregarding defectionandcontestation.Theexpectationsweholdregardingbehaviourwillbe differentdependingonthestageinthenormlifecycle.Ifactorsdefectedinstageoneof themodel,weareunlikelytoexpectotherinternationalactorstoregardtheiractionas defectionfromthenorm,asthisnormwouldnotyetbeestablishedinternationally.In stage2however,anumberofstates(normleaders)willhaveacceptedthenormandbe promotingitinternationally,indoingsothesenormsbecomeconstitutiveofwhatis meantbybeingalegitimatememberofinternationalsociety(e.g.humanrights compliance;Donnelly,2003).Defectionatstage2asopposedtostage1ismore challenging,asthisbecomescontrarytotheidentityofalegitimatememberof internationalsociety.Internationalnormativeregimes,suchasthoseassociatedwith

31 humanrightsanddetention,aresocloselyassociatedwithwhatitmeanstobealiberal democraticstate(Risse,RoppandSikkink,1999),challengetothesenormsbystatesfor whomthisidentityisimportantraisesanumberofquestions.Forexample,whatdoes thismeanforourunderstandingofcomplianceintermsofthebenefitstoselfesteem andlegitimation?Hastheinfluenceofinternationalnormsbeenvastlyoverstatedby constructivists?Ismaterialpowerreallytheoverridingfactor?Or,asDunne(2007) asks,caninternationalnormssomehowunravelinnewcontexts?Defectionatthispoint inthelifecyclebystatesconsideredtobenormleadersisparticularlydifficultto understandgiventherelationshipbetweennormsandidentityandtheprogressivistbasis tomostconstructivismresearch. 13 Researchthatexaminesthedevelopmentandevolutionofinternationalnormsis certainlyveryvaluableasitprovidesaframeworkwithinwhichtounderstandchanges instatebehaviourovertime.However,thereareissuestoaddressinrelationtothis bodyofwork.Primarily,thenormlifecyclehasoftenbeentakentosuggestaprocess towardstheinternalizationofaparticularnormattheinternationallevel.The‘cycle’ privilegesemergenceoverdecline,anddoesnoteasilyaccountforchangesinthe meaningofnormsastheygothroughthevariousstages,andindeedcontinuetochange evenonceinternalized(KersbergenandVerbeek,2007;Sandholtz,2008). 14 Thereis oftentheassumptionof‘moral’developmentand‘progression’,yetasKeene(2007: 335)pointsout,whilsttheremaybeprogressinonearea(hisexampleisthatofanti slavery),this‘canbecounterbalancedbymorequestionabledevelopmentsinanother (theexclusionofAfricanstatesfromthefamilyofnations)’. 15 Thechangingdynamicsofinternationalnormsaswellastheinteractionsbetween differentnormativeregimesarecertainlyafascinatingfeatureoftheinternational environment.Withregardstotheinternationalnormsprohibitingtorture,Hawkins (2004)suggeststhatviolationsofsuchnormshavebecomepartofanenablingstructure forinterventioninthedomesticaffairsofastate,andinextremecircumstancesmilitary intervention.However,whathappenswhenstatessuchastheUSA,whoaregenerally

13 Thiswouldbeunlesstheseparticularstates(normleaders)areconsideredtobesomehowseparateand exemptfromtheinfluenceofnorms. 14 Researchofsuchanature,focusingontheconstantlychangingmeaningofnorms,hastendedtofall towardsthethickerendoftheconstructivistspectrum. 15 Thereseemstobeanunderlyingassumptionthatinternationalsocietyismoving‘forward’,whichmay bethecase,however,‘blips’ormoresubstantialperiodsofregressionneedtobeaccountedforasthey canbeverysignificantinchangingdirectionandshapingsharedunderstandings. 32 consideredtobenormleaders,alsodefectfromtheseinternationalnorms?Can defectionfromthenormsprohibitingtorturestillremainpartofanenablingframework forintervention?Theeffectofsuchdefectionscouldfurtherchangetheframework,and thusthenatureofintervention.Whilstthisisspeculation,suchscenariosdemonstrate whychangesinthedynamicsofnormsandinteractionsbetweenregimesarea significantpartofthelifecycleofinternationalnorms,whichconsequentlyhavea bearingonthepracticesofinternationalpolitics.Internationalnormativeregimes certainlydonotstaythesame,astheindepthhistoricalstudiesofFinnemore(2003) andPercy(2007b)havehighlighted,noraretheylikelytodoso.Thisthesisisbasedon thepremisethat,evenonceestablished,therewillbeaconstantbattleovermeaning, andinternationalnormativeregimesarebynomeansimmunefromdecline.Thisdoes nothowevernegatethesignificanceoftheirinfluenceonbehaviourintheinternational sphere. Normative Influence Havingestablishedthepresenceofcertaininternationalnormsandbroadernormative regimesintheinternationalsphere,constructivistscholarshavebeentaskedwith demonstratinghowtheyareimportantandhowexactlythey‘shapeactorsandagencyin worldpolitics’(Farrell,2002:56).Evidencingtheexistenceofaninternationalnorm doesnotautomaticallyequatetocompliancebehaviour.Indeed,alargeamountof constructivistresearchhasbeenbasedonthecallforscholarstogivegreater specificationtothemechanismsinvolvedintheinfluenceofinternationalnorms, explaininghowandwhytheyare‘compellingtoactors’(Yee,1996:102).Conventional constructivistscholarshaverespondedwithresearchthatproblematizesstateinterests andidentity. Internationalnormscaninfluencebehaviourintheinternationalspherebyshapingthe termsofdebatethatunderpinpoliticaldecisions.AsDimitrakopoulos(2005)suggests, internationalnormshavebothproblemsolvingandlegitimisingdynamics.Theauthor claimsthatinternationalstandards‘affectpoliticaloutcomesbyprovidingamenuof legitimateformsofactionfromwhichactorschoosethosethatareconsideredlikelyto solveagivenpoliticalproblem’(Dimitrakopoulos,2008:330).Dimitrakopoulos,like variousconventionalconstructivistscholarsbefore,emphasisesthewaynorms influencetheinterestsofstates,inthiscaseby‘link[ing]perceivedintereststo

33 appropriatestrategy’(2008:320),whichsometimesresultsin‘normativelockin’ (2008:322)–actorsaretiedtoaparticularstrategy. Suchresearchfollowsearlierinsightsthathaveproblematizedtheinterestsofstates. Finnemore(1996),forexample,suggestedthatinordertounderstandtheinterestsof statesweneedtoappreciatethewidersocialstructureinwhichstatesareembedded. These‘densenetworksoftransnationalandinternationalsocialrelations’thensocialize statestowantparticularthings(Finnemore,1996:2).Indoingso,statesmouldtheir viewoftheworldaswellastheirunderstandingoftheirparticularroleinit.State interestsarethereforeseentobeconstructedthroughthisprocessofsocialinteraction and‘inthecontextofinternationallyheldnormsandunderstandingsaboutwhatisgood andappropriate’(Finnemore,1996:2).Overtimeasthenormativecontextchanges therearecorrespondingalterationsinstateinterests. 16 Internationalnormsinthissensecanchangethepreferencesofactorsinthe internationalrealmandthepoliciestheyconsider.Empiricalexamplescanbetaken fromKlotz’s(1995)discussionofantiracialdiscriminationnormsandSouthAfrican apartheid(asmentionedearlier)aswellasPrice’s(1997)analysisofnormsprohibiting chemicalweapons.Thesestudies(amongothers)servetodemonstratethatthemeansby whichnormsareabletoinfluencethepreferencesofstatesisthroughtheirguidanceon appropriatebehaviourforactorswithagivenidentity.InPrice’sresearch,international normsareshowntoprovideameasureofidentitybydistinguishing‘civilized’states from‘savages’inassociatingadvancedtechnologywiththeformerandchemical weaponswiththebackwardideasofthelatter.Anydefectionfromtheseinternational normshasthepotentialto‘painfullynegate’astate’s‘owncommonandsupposedly superiorstandardofcivilizedidentity’(Price,1997:43). 17 Thismayrenderthe ‘thresholdofviolationsofsocialpractices…sohighthatcertainactionsexceedthe realmofintelligibility’(Price,1997:126).18 16 Thisinfluenceisofcoursenotonlylimitedtostates,scholarssuchasFarrell(2005a;2005b)have exploredtheimpactofinternationalnormsonmilitaryorganisations,whilstAtkinson(2006)hasfocused onUSmilitaryexchangeprogramsasamechanismofstatesocialisation. 17 ParallelscanbedrawwithKrebsandJackson’smorerecentclaimsthatthe‘Bushadministrationwas nearlyaspreoccupiedwithhowthecombatwasportrayedaswiththecombatitself’(2007:35). 18 Thereareofcourseverystrongnormativeleaningstothisfindinginsuggestingacorrelationbetween civilizationandcompliance,particularlyinthiscaseduetobenefitsthisrepresentationofrealityprovides tothosedominantininternationalsociety.However,suchinsightsdoservetoillustratetheconceived relationshipbetweennormsandperceivedidentity,regardlessofwhobenefits(althoughaconsideration ofthelatterisimportant). 34 Hawkins(2004)providesafurtherexamplewithregardstothetreatynegotiationsover theuniversaljurisdictionofthe UN Convention against Torture and Other, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)(1984).Hawkinssuggeststhat statesworkedveryhardtoavoidstandingagainstotherstatesparticularlywherethey sharedasimilaridentity.TheauthorcitesKamminga’s(anAmnestyInternational lobbyist)recollectionthat‘oneofAmnesty’smajorargumentswas,‘‘Howcanyoube inthesamecampasUruguayandArgentinaonthis?’’Whensomestatesbeganto switchtofavoruniversaljurisdiction,avarietyofotherstatesquicklyfollowed’(2004: 793).19 Tostandagainstuniversaljurisdictionontorturewouldputstatesagainstthose withwhomthereisasharedidentity,aswellassuggestingtoothersthatthestatein questioniseitherinfavouroftortureorfearsbeingfoundoutpursuingsuchpractices (Hawkins,2004:787). Internationalnormsarethereforeinfluentialforthosewhovaluetheidentitywithwhich thenormsareassociated.Forexample,normsdeterminingappropriatebehaviourand whatitmeanstobealiberaldemocraticstatewillbeinfluentialforactorswhoshare thisidentity.Asalludedtoabove,internationalhumanrightsnormsorthoseprescribing standardsfordetentionarestronglyassociatedwithwhatitmeanstobealiberal democraticstate,thusdefectionandcontestationbythosewhoshareinthisidentityis puzzling.Thisisbecausetheseidentitiesarethoughttoformthevery‘basisofinterests’ (Wendt,1992:398),aswhatwewantisperceivedtodependtoalargedegreeon‘who’ weare.Identitiesdefinetherangeofinterestsactorsconsiderbothpossibleand appropriateas‘identitiesconstituteinterestsandactions’(PriceandReusSmit,1998: 266267).Interestscanonlybedeterminedbyreferenceto‘theideasandnormsthatare thelensthroughwhichstatesinterprettheirinterestsandforgetheiridentities’(Sikkink, 2005:10).AshighlightedinFierke(2007:171)conventionalconstructivistscholars tendtosuggestthatthe‘identityasaliberaldemocracycannotbedetachedfroman interestincomplyingwithhumanrightsnorms’,andincreasinglyhumanrightsareseen asaconstitutivefeatureofwhatitmeanstobealegitimatestateininternationalsociety. Thus,internationalnormsinfluencestatebehaviourbyshapingthetermsofdebateand constitutingidentity,forexample–asintheaboveresearch,whatitmeanstobea legitimatestateintheinternationalsociety,thusofteninformingstateinterests.Thisis 19 SuchargumentsinrelationtorecentUSpracticesareunlikelytohavereceivedasmuchimpactas coalitionshavebeenbuiltbycloseassociationwithstatesthathavelessthanfavourablehumanrights records. 35 nottosuggestthatinternationalnormsalwayschangebehaviourorindeedinfluencethe actionsofstatesinsingularfashion.Thenormativeenvironmentwithinwhichdecisions aremadeisfartoocomplexandcrossestoomanycontextstosuggestthatthiscouldbe thecase.Scholarsaccountforsuchcomplexitytoagreaterorlesserdegree.An understandingthatengageswiththisisfundamentaltothisthesis,asIwillfurther outlinetowardstheendoftheChapter.Firsthowever,Iconsiderhowconventional constructivistshaveapproachedthisvaryingimpactofinternationalnorms.

Variation in Impact Demandsforconventionalconstructivistscholarstoexplainvariationincompliance withinternationalnormshasnaturallyfollowedfromtheenhancedinfluencewithwhich internationalnormsareaccredited.Howcanweknowwhenandforwhominternational normswillbeinfluential?Questionssuchasthishaveoftenbeentranslatedinto researchattemptingtodemonstratethecausalimpactofinternationalnormson behaviour,andthemechanismsbywhichtheyareinfluential.Thenatureofthenorm, thedegreeofinternalisationintothedomesticstructuresofthestate,andacombination ofrationalistandnormativeperspectives,areallareasthathavebeenexploredto approachsuchquestions. Researchfocusingonvariationduetothenatureoftheinternationalnormhasexplored boththerealmsofnormstrengthanddegreeoflegalization.Legro(1997)deviseda measureofnormstrengthbasedonspecificity(howwellthenormisdefined), durability(howlongithasbeenineffect/whetherviolatorshavebeenpenalised)and concordance(howwidelyitisacceptedindiplomaticdiscussionsandtreaties). 20 However,whilstitwouldseemsensibletosuggestthattherobustnessofinternational normsneedstobetakenintoaccount,thiswasnotfoundto‘directlyrelatetotheir[the internationalnorm’s]impactonthethinkingandactionsofactors’inWWII(Legro, 1997:57).Goldstein,Kahler,Keohane,andSlaughter(2000)havegeneratedsimilar measuresintermsoflegalisation.AsKahler(2000:679)suggestsattheendofthe specialissueof International Organization (focusingonlegalisation),thosenormsthat arecharacterisedby‘heightenedprecision,obligation,anddelegationassociatedwith legalizationaremorelikelytobesecured’andarethoughttoprovidea‘backstop normativeevolutionagainstretrogression’.

20 Thisapproachisbasedonthepremisethatevenwhennormshavebeenestablished(following FinnemoreandSikkink’slifecycle)theyarelikelytovaryin‘strength’. 36 Thisanalysisoflegalisation,however,doesalsorecognisethatsuchafactorneedstobe consideredinrelationtoidentity,theimportanceofwhichhasbeendemonstratedinthe previoussection. 21 Thelegalisationofnorms,forexample,‘servestoattachtheidentity of“lawabiding”(morevaluedinsomesocietiesthanothers)tothosewhoobserve particularnorms’(Kahler,2000:679),creatingreputationalcoststodefection.Thus internationalnormsareconsideredtobeinfluentialforthereasonsofidentitygiven above,butvariationinthisisfoundinthenormitselfintermsofthedegreeof legalization.Thiscertainlyseemslikealogicalargument,however,againthereare problemsfortheinternationaldetentionregimeconsideredinthisthesis.Prohibitions againsttorture,anaspectofthisnormativeregimeare,forexample,highlylegalized (LutzandSikkink,2000)sowewouldexpectthattheyarelesslikelytobechallenged ordefectedfromgiventhatlawisinplacetopreventretrogression.Furthermore,both theUSAandUKwouldseemtovaluetheidentityoflawabidinggiventheassociation oftheruleoflawwiththeprinciplesofliberaldemocracythoughttobeinformingthe actionsofsuchstates.

RisseandSikkink(1999)have,alternatively,focusedonthevariationsininternational norminfluenceintermsoftheprocessesofnorminternalisation,22 whichisbasedon ideasofsociallearninginthedomesticsphere.23 Theauthorspresenta5phasespiral modelbasedonhumanrightsdevelopment 24 appliedtoinitiallynormviolating countries.Inthemodelastateisthoughttopassthroughthestagesofrepression,then denial,tacticalconcession,prescriptivestatusandruleconsistentbehaviour. 25 Oncethe internationalnormsareinternalisedintothedomesticpracticesofthestatetheauthors

21 Asalsomentionedintheprevioussection,legalisationisnotnecessarilydirectlylinkedtotheimpactof internationalnorms;Percy(2007a)andTannenwald(2005)provideevidenceofcaseswherenormsare strongbutthecorrespondinglawisweak. 22 Koh(1997)hasalsotakenasimilarstancewithregardstointernationallaw. 23 WhilstFinnemoreandSikkink’s(1998)modellookedatnormdiffusioninternationally,Risseetal (1999)focusondiffusiondomestically.Onceideashavebecomenormsinternationally,theyapproachthe questionofhowthesenormstheninfluencethebehaviourofstatesatadomesticlevel. 24 Inthistheytendtofocusona‘centralcoreofrights–therighttolife’definedas‘therighttobefree fromextrajudicialexecutionanddisappearance’and‘freedomfromtortureandarbitraryarrestand detention’(RisseandSikkink,1999:2). 25 Thevariationinlevelofinternalisationandhencedomesticeffectofinternationalnormsisthoughtto bebasedonthreetypesofcausalmechanismthroughanoverallprocessofsocialization: • Processofinstrumentaladaptationandstrategicbargaining • Processofmoralconsciousnessraising,argumentation,dialogue,andpersuasion • Processofinstitutionalisationandhabitualization 37 arguethattheyformpartoftheir‘takenforgranted’behaviour,significantlyreducing theimpactofindividualstateleaders. 26 Certainly,thismodelprovidesinterestinginsightsgeneratedbycasestudiesformingthe chaptersofthebook.However,astheyareaimedatdemonstratinghowhumanrights normscanhaveaninfluenceininitiallyviolatingcountries,complianceisalmost assumedin‘Western’states. 27 Yetifweconsidertheactionsofthosethoughttobe normleaders,suchastheUSAandUK,therecertainlyappeartobesignificant anomaliesthemodeldoesnotaccountfor.Questionsareraisedsuchaswhetherthese stateshaveregressedfrom‘takenforgranted’ruleconsistentbehaviour,wherethe importanceoftheleaderisminimal,orwhethertheywereeverthereinthefirstplace. CertainlytheynowfallshortonseveralaspectsofPhase4(persistentbehaviour),asthis requiresthatactorsnormativeideasdonotchangewithcontextandwhotheyare interactingwith.WeonlyhavetoconsiderTonyBlair’spressconferenceofAugust 2005wheretheformerPrimeMinister(2005zb)emphasisedthat‘therulesofthegame arechanging’,aftertheattacksofJuly7 th 2005;contextclearlyhasarolehere.Also thereneedstobeastrongconsistencybetweenwordspromotinghumanrightsand actions–therearecertainlyexceptionstothisfortheUSAandUK.Indeed,aspectsof Phase2(denial)appeartobeevident,forexample,whilsttheredoeslargelyseemtobe agreementconcerningthemoralvalidityoftheinternationaldetentionregimewhich encompassesprohibitionsontorture,thereisatthesametimedisagreementasto applicability. Wearethenleftwithacontradictionbetweenidentityandpracticeleadingtovarious questionsregardingtheinfluenceofnorms.Theoriesofcompliancesuchastheabove arecertainlycriticisedforfocusingtoomuchontheroleofstructureandprocessatthe expenseofadequatelyaccountingforagency(Flockhart,2006).Theyarealsolimited bynotprovidingsufficientmeansbywhichtostudythechangingnatureofinternational norms;assumptionsregardingtheirmeaning,permanenceandonewayprogressionare veryapparent.

26 Internationalnormsareconsideredtohaveachievedatakenforgrantedstatusindependentfrom individualbeliefsystems. 27 Thesestatesarereferredtoashavingthe‘identityaspromotersofhumanrights’(RisseandSikkink, 1999:23)andhumanrightsnormsareseento‘bothprescriberulesforappropriatebehavior,andhelp defineidentitiesofliberalstates’(1999:8). 38 Variousauthorstakingtheconventionalconstructivistapproachhaveproposedto overcomesomeoftheseproblemsbygeneratingasynthesisbetweenconstructivismand moreinstrumentalperspectivestoexplaindefectionorstrategicaction.Thetendency hasbeentoweakentheinfluenceofinternationalnormsandsuggestthatthereisroom forstateactorstocreate‘rulesofexception’28 or‘exclusion’29 (Cardenas,2004). 30 Authorsseemtohavemovedtowardsafocusonstatedecisionmakingandroomfor manoeuvrewithintheparametersoftheinternationalnorm(e.g.Shannon,2000;Farrell, 2005b).Todososcholarshaveoftenreliedonacombinationofappropriateand instrumentalactionandhaveconcentratedonsuggestingwheneachislikelyto‘win out’;forexample,whenthelogicofconsequenceswilltakeprecedenceoverthelogic ofappropriateness(MarchandOlsen,1998).Yet,asHurrell(2002)suggests,thedivide betweentheselogicsofactionisbynomeansclear.Indeed,surelyweareinfact calculating what theLoCisbasedonbroadernormativeframeworks?Theconstitutive sidetonorms,wheretheyinformtheinterestsofstates,oftenappearstobeverydown playedinsuchresearch.Thefocusisinsteadonactorsdecidingwhetherornottofollow internationalnormswheretheirmeaningisassumed.Muchisleftoutofthepicturewith regardstodefectionandcontestation,forexample,theinteractiveprocessesof contestation.Thisreflectsthetopdownnatureofmuchworkinthe constructivism/rationalismdomain. Thus,whilstconventionalconstructivismprovidesmanyilluminatingcontributionswith regardstointernationalnorms,suchastheneedtoconsiderfactorssuchasthenatureof thenorm,thestageatwhichitislocatedinthenormlifecycle,andhowinternational normsareinfluentialbymeansofsocialisationandidentity,thereareseveralareas wheresignificantlimitationsareapparent.First,thefocusisoftenoninternational normswhere,whentheyachieveacertainstatus,meaningisheldconstant. 31 Ifindthis problematicandprefertoconsiderinternationalnormativeregimesasinaconstant processofchangewithregardstointerpretationsofmeaningandapplication,however fastorslowthismaybeatdifferenttimesinhistory.Second,thereappearstobea

28 Thesearerulesthat‘specifytheconditionsunderwhichastatecantradeonesetofnormsforanother, orwheninternationalnormscanbeviolated’(Cardenas,2004:222). 29 Thesemayoccur‘anywherethatpowerfulgroupsseeothersaslessequalthanthemselves’andcan servetojustifythesuspensionofhumanrightstoacertaingroup(Cardenas,2004:223)ashasoftenbeen thecaseintheU.S.led‘waronterror’. 30 Certainlyargumentsconcerningexceptionalismwillhavetobeconsideredwhenworkingthoughthe casesinthisthesis. 31 Thereareofcourseexceptionstothis,asmentionedFinnemore(2003)traceschangestothenorms governingtheuseofforce. 39 degreeofpermanencesuggestedwithregardstocompliancebehaviour.Ibeginfromthe premise,however,thatthereisalwaysroomchangeininterpretation,bothashuman agentschange,aswellasthedifferentnormativeregimesthatareinteractingatanyone time.Third,explanationsthatrelyonperceivedinterestscomingintoconflictwith internationalnormsonlyprovidepartofthepicture;understandingtheseinterestsand howtheydevelop,ratherthanmakingfixedassumptionsisgenerallymoreilluminating. Andfourth,muchoftheaboveanalysisrestsontheimportanceofaliberaldemocratic identityininternationalsociety.Theinterplayofdifferentsocialidentitiesintheprocess ofnormnegotiationisnotconsidered. Whilstthesearegeneralclaimsandassuchtheymaskcertaindivergenceswithinthe conventionalconstructivistresearchprogramme(asmentionedpreviouslyIview constructivismmoreasaspectrumsoscholarswillcomeupagainstthesecriticismto differingdegrees),theyserveasameanstoclarifythepositioningofthisthesis.Ishall nowrefinethisfurtherwithreferencetoscholarshipthatfallsmoretowardsthethick endoftheconstructivistspectrum. 2.2 Thick Constructivism Whilstsharingmanyofthesameprinciplesasconventionalconstructivism,intermsof aconcernwiththeconstructionofsocialrealityandthemutualconstitutionofstructure andagent,thoseconstructiviststowardsthethickerendofthespectrumplacemore emphasisontheimportanceoflanguageandthecontinuouslychangingnatureof norms.Thisiswithinaframeworkthatengagestoamuchgreaterextent,withthe multiplicityofidentity. Language Fundamentaltothisendofthespectrumofconstructivismisthefocusonlanguage(see Fierke,2003).Themeanstoachieveanunderstandingofsocialrealityrestsonthe discoveryoftheprocessesbywhichsocialfactsareconstitutedbylanguageandrules (Fierke,2003;2007).Scholarsinthisdomain,suchasOnuf(1989)andKractochwil (2000)havelocatedtheirargumentsinabroaderlineage(Fierke,2007)drawingonthe ‘linguisticturn’inphilosophyandinparticulartheinsightsofWittgenstein. 32 Thefocus hasbeenonareassuchastheinfluenceofdifferentspeechactsoninteractionsinthe

32 Thelinguisticturnhasinfluencedarangeofscholars,forexample,JohnSearle,JurgenHabermasand RichardRorty. 40 internationalsphere,wherethelimitsofsharedunderstandingsare,howpoliticiansset boundariestowhatispossibleinagivencontext,andtherelationshipbetweenlanguage andsharednorms(Fierke,2003:81).Emphasisisplacedonlanguagebothsustaining andenablingidentities. Thickconstructivismtendstobecharacterisedbyarejectionof‘gettingbehindour wordstocomparethemwiththatwhichtheydescribe’.Insteadlanguageisviewed‘asa formofactioninitself’(Fierke,1996:469,drawingfromWittgenstein,1958).Theact ofnamingaparticularcontext,forexamplelabellingthe‘war’onterrorandthe historicalanalogiesdrawnupon,willcreatecertainparametersforaction–theycreate ‘games’withinwhichactorsaresituated(Fierke,1996). Asopposedtogeneratingpredictivehypothesestotestinrelationtonormdefection,our focusisshiftedtounderstandingtheuseoflanguagebyactorsintheirconstructionof theworldandtheidentitiesandnormsthatareportrayedasimportantinthediscourse. Thiscreatesa‘game’whichthenaffectstheparametersforaction.Insteadofadirect concernwithintention,theemphasistowardsthisendofthespectrumofconstructivism ison‘thegenerationofmeaning,normsandrules,asexpressedinlanguage,bythe subjectsofanalysis’(Fierke,2007:176).Todetermineanisolatedorsingularcausefor something,suchasthedefectionandcontestationoftheinternationalnormsconcerning thedetentionandtreatmentofprisonersinthe‘waronterror’,driftsintotherealmof interpretation;howcanwereallydetermineasingularcauseforthisactionandis one reallylikelytoexist?Assuch,wearebetterplacedstudyingquestionsthatfocuson howthe‘socialfact’thatdetentionabuseshappenedbecamepossible,hownormative constraintwasnegotiatedtoallowforthis,andthevariationinmeaningattributedto theseactions(Fierke,2007).Thisapproachisfirmlygroundedinaconstitutive,as opposedtoHumean,conceptionofcause(Kurki,2008). Norms, Meaning and Interpretation Scholarswritingfromthethickerendoftheconstructivistspectrumcertainlyemphasise differentelementswithregardstointernationalnormativeregimes.Norms,atanylevel (institutional,domesticsocietyorinternationalforexample),tendnottobeinternalised byactorsashasbeenthecaseinmuchconventionalconstructivistthought(Onuf, 1998).Scholarsarelessdeterministicwithregardstotheimpactofinternationalnorms

41 onbehaviour. 33 Thispositionismoreconsistentwithmyconclusionsattheendofthe consistentconstructivismsection,movingawayfromasenseofpermanenceand allowingroomforinterpretation.Judgementgovernsthechosencourseofaction,based onthatwhichmakessensewithintheparticularcontextofrules.Variabilityinthe context,thearrayofrulesavailable,andtheirchangingnatureisbuiltintoour understanding. AsKratochwilsuggests,‘(n)ormsnotonlyestablishcertaingamesandenablethe playerstopursuetheirgoalswithinthem,theyalsoestablishintersubjectivemeanings thatallowtheactorstodirecttheiractionstowardseachother,communicatewitheach other,appraisethequalityoftheiractions,criticizeclaimsandjustifychoices’(1993: 7576).Theyservetoreducecomplexity,renderactionmeaningful,aswellasforming thebasisforjustificationandcommunication.Thustheyareinfluentialonactorsbutnot inthesamestable,isolated,andHumeancausationalmannerthattendstobeportrayed towardstheconventionalconstructivistendofthespectrum. Wiener(2004)providesausefulaccountofthedifferencesbetweenthesetwo approacheswithregardstonorms.Theauthorsuggeststhatscholarsworkinginthe conventionalconstructivistprogrammeemployalargelybehavioural 34 interpretationof internationalnormsasrelativelystablecausesforaction,ashasbeenexploredearlierin thisChapter.Thisisincontrasttothemorereflexiveapproachtonormsnowunder considerationwherenormsareseenascontestedandthefocusisontheconstructionof normsinpracticeasopposedtoinfluence.Theconcerniswithcontestedmeaningas locatedinpractice.Attentionisshifted‘towardssocialpracticestoassessthe meaning ofanorm’(2004:199)asopposedtomakingassumptionsastohowtheyare understoodandtestingforcomplianceordefection.Thisbringsintofocusquestions surroundingthe‘impactofvariationinthemeaning’ofnorms(Wiener,2004:200)as opposedtotheirdirectinfluencewheremeaningistakenasstableevenacrosscontext. Thismeaningisthoughttobelocatedindiscoursesuchas‘officialdocuments,policy documents,politicaldebatesandmediacontributions’(2004:201)andcanalsobe accountedforthroughinterviews(Wiener,2008).

33 Thisisnottosuggestthatconstructiviststowardstheconventionalendofthespectrumarecompletely deterministicintheirapproach,elementsarehoweverapparent. 34 Thisisnotintermsof““DoXtogetY,”normstakeadifferentform:“GoodpeopledoX””(Risseand Sikkink,1999:8,citingfromFearon,1997). 42 Thefunctioningofinternationalnormativeregimes(particularlythoseofaprescriptive nature)wouldcertainlybenefitfrombeinglocatedwithinthisframework,asopposedto isolatingsingularinternationalnormsfromthebroadernormativecontext.Itthen becomesaninterestingquestionastohowfarthesemeaningscanbecontested,andhow fairlystableinternationalnormativeregimes(whilststillcontestedtoadegree)retain influence,restrictingorenablingcertainbehavioursinthefaceofthiscontestation. Internationalnormativeregimescertainlyholdaninfluencerelatedtothatin conventionalconstructivismthroughinformingtheinterestsofstatesandsettingthe parametersofactionbymeansofidentity.Indeed,asWiener(2004:219)notesboth approaches‘areimportantstrandsofcomplianceresearch’,and‘pursuingthemin isolationunnecessarilyobscuresimportanttheoreticaladvancesinthefield’. Thus,asopposedtofocusingonabehaviouralaccountofnormswherethereisan isolatedandobservablecausalrelationshipbetweennormsandbehaviour,basedonthe assumptionofstableinternationalnormsexertinganinfluence,scholarstakingamore reflexiveapproachtonormstendtofocusontheirconstitutiveside;wheremeaningis interpretedindifferentcontextsofinteraction.Therefore,theapplicationandperceived parametersoftheinternationaldetentionregimewillbeinfluencedbycontextually basedinterpretationswhichareinaconstantstateofreproductionorchallenge;social consensusinternationallyleadingtothepresentationofstabilityoveraperiodoftime. Thisapproachpresentsadifferentperspectivetothepreviousaccountsgeneratedfrom theconventionalconstructivistapproachandallowsforinterpretationandcontestation, revisionismanddefection,fromrelativelystableinternationalnormativeregimes.This isachievedbyfocusingonmeaningandinterpretationassituatedinbroadernormative structures.However,howdoweconsidertheargumentsmadepreviouslyconcerning theinfluenceofinternationalnormsthroughconstitutingwhatitmeanstobea legitimatestateintheinternationalsociety,inlightofthismoreinteractiveanddynamic approach?Toaddressthisissueourfocusisshiftedtothevarioussocialidentities influencingandinformingdecisions. Multiplicity of Identity Issuesconcerningthemultiplicityofidentityhavebeengrantedmoreattentiontowards thethickendoftheconstructivistspectrum.Indeedquestionshavebeenposedasto whetherornotanaccountofmultiplesocialidentitiescanfitwithmoreconventional

43 constructivism.MajaZehfusshasbeenoneparticularlyprominentcriticofthetypeof constructivismputforwardbyWendt.AlthoughWendthimselfsuggeststhatactors haveseveralsocialidentities,Zehfuss(amongothers)pointsoutthatthisisstillbased onarelativelystablecharacterisationofidentity.Thereislittleroomformultiplicityor contestationaschangeisportrayedassimplymovingfrom‘onerelativelystable identitytoanother’throughinteraction(Zehfuss,2002:90).Wendt’spositiondoesnot accountforinsightsfromscholarssuchasJuttaWeldes(1999)whohavedemonstrated thatstateidentityisalwaysprecariousandinneedofstabilisationorreproduction. Indeed,Zehfuss(2002:89)notesthatWendtsimply‘reducesidentitytosomething negotiablebetweenstates’.Theauthoralsosuggeststhat‘Wendt’srecognitionthat domesticpoliticsinfluencestatebehaviourandstateidentityfailstoaddressthe complexityoftheissueathand’(Zehfuss,2001:335). 35 SteveSmith(2001:53)further supportsthispoint,arguingthattheperspectivepresentedbyWendtseemstobelargely ‘limitedtoexamininghowstatesconstructidentitiesandintereststhroughinteractions, andwillnotdelvedeeperintotheidentityofthestatethanthat’. Zehfuss(2001;2002)hasinvestigatedtheconsequencesofWendt’scharacterisationof identityinrelationtotheredefinitionoftheFederalRepublicofGermany’sidentityto allowformilitaryinvolvementabroad(suchactionwaspreviouslyunacceptable).The authorfoundthatanumberofexclusionswereneededtosustainWendt’sapproach negatingthecomplexityofidentityandthecontestationsthatareinherent,resultingina lossofunderstanding.Clearlythisisatheoreticalproblemthatisalwaysapproachedin thesocialsciences,thecompromiseoffocusingoneitherexplainingorunderstanding (HollisandSmith,1990)andhowparsimoniouswewishtobe,howeverforthe purposesofthisstudyIwouldquestionhowmuchwecanreallyexplainifwedonot havethemeansbywhichtounderstand.AlthoughZehfuss’(2001:317)accountis limitedtoWendt’sconceptualisationofidentity,thetensionsdemonstrateddonot reflectwellingeneralforthoseconstructivistswhodonotaccountsufficientlyforthe multiplicityandcomplexityofidentityintheiranalysis. Scholarstowardsthethickerendoftheconstructivistspectrumsuggestthatidentities arecontingentandchangeable.Thisisnottakentomeanthatstatessimplyswitch identitythroughinteractionbutthatweworkwithmultipleidentities.CertainlyIagree 35 IndeedZehfussgoesevenfurthertostatethat,‘[t]hecontingencyandeveninherentlycontradictory characterof…expressionsofidentityis…notonlyinvisiblethroughWendt’sframeworkbutintension withhisconceptualizationofidentity’(Zehfuss,2001:335). 44 thatweneedtomoveawayfromaunitaryaccountofidentitytoprogresspassedthe problemspresentedintheprevioussections.Ialsofeelthatmoreneedstobemadeof theinteractionbetweenthedomesticandinternationalasopposedtobeingseenas separatespheres.Questionsareraisedastohowweunderstandtheinfluenceofnorms intermsofsuchaframework.ThisiswhereIlooktopsychologyforguidance,interms ofhowtoapproachthestudyofmultiplesocialidentitiesinconjunctionwiththe influenceofinternationalnormativeregimes.InthenextChapterIprovidethemicro foundationsforsuchanapproachbydrawingfromthesocialidentityapproachinsocial psychology.Byemployinginsightsfromthesocialidentityapproach,wecanutilise bothareasofconstructivistresearchintonorms.BeforeIgoontothenextChapterI willhoweversumupexactlywhereIstandwithintheabovedebatesandoutlinehow thispositionrelatestotheinternationaldetentionregimethatisofconcerninthisthesis. 3. Approaching International Norms Drawingfromtheaboveliteraturereviewthissectionwilloutlinethespecificapproach totheinternationaldetentionregimetakeninthisthesis.ThecentralpointsIhighlight focusonrelatingthisinternationalnormativeregimetoaliberaldemocraticsocial identityinternationally,embracingthetensionsandcomplexitiesintheinternational normativeenvironment,andconcentratingonthemultiplicityofidentity. Ashasbeendemonstrated,therearevariouswaysinwhichinternationalnormshave beencharacterisedandstudiedwithintheconstructivistresearchprogramme.Ibegin fromthepremisethatinternationalnormsexistandhaveacausalimpactonbehaviour intheinternationalsphereinaconstitutive,notisolatedorsingular,manner.Theyare experiencedbyindividuals,anddonotexistwithoutthem,buttheyarenotsolely reducibletoindividualsasbydefinitiontheyareshared.Therearemanyareasinwhich thereissubstantialconsensusinternationallyfortheexistenceofnormativeregimes influencingtheactionsofinternationalactors.Forexample,researchersmoretowards theconventionalendofconstructivismhavehighlightednormsgoverningtheuseof force,mercenaryuse,humanrights,anddiplomaticarrangementsaspreviously mentioned.Suchnormsarebydefinitionsharedinternationally,althoughtheyare certainlynotrestrictedtothissphereassomehowseparatefromthedomestic. Internationalnormativeregimesnotonlyprovideguidanceastoappropriatebehaviour internationally,butalsodomestically,forexampleinrelationtohumanrights.

45 Predominantly,theinternationalnormsreferredtobyconstructivistsrelatetothose associatedwithbeingaliberaldemocracy,adominantsocialidentityinternationally. Whilstthenormsthatconstitutethissocialidentitypredatetheconceptofaliberal democraticstate(forexamplethehumanrightsregime),theyarenowtakentobea constitutiveaspectofwhatthissocialidentitymeans,whichisalsooftenseenas indicativeofbeingalegitimatestateinthebroaderinternationalsociety.Whilstthe liberaldemocraticsocialidentityisdominantintheinternationalsociety,takingthisas representativeofasingularinternationalidentitydoesnotaccountforthemultiplicityof socialidentitiesorindeedfitwiththeprinciplesofthesocialidentityapproachas furtherarticulatedinChapter2,whereIgroundtheseinsightsinthemicrofoundations providedbythisperspectiveinsocialpsychology.Thus,Irelatetheinternational detentionregimetoaliberaldemocraticinternationalsocialidentity.Giventhatthe internationaldetentionregimeconstitutes,inpart,whatitmeanstobealiberal democraticstate,Isharetheconventionalconstructivistassessmentthattheywillthen tosomeextentinformtheperceivednationalinterestsofthepoliticalelitesthat representindividualstates,wheretheyvaluethissocialidentity.AsWendt(1992:398) suggests,identitiesformthe‘basisofinterests’. Thus,internationalnormativeregimesareunderstoodingeneraltorelatetothe predominantsocialidentityininternationalsociety,thatofbeingaliberaldemocratic state.Assuchthesestandardscontributetotheconstructionofthenationalinterestby politicalelites.However,whereIdivergesignificantlyfromthosewhoarefirmly groundedtowardstheveryconventionalendofthespectrumofconstructivismisin accountingformultiplicity,bothintermsofidentityandinternationalnorms.As mentioned,muchconventionalconstructivistscholarshipfocusesonasingularstate identitywhichencompassesinternationalnorms.Assuchthereisoftenlittleroomfor divergenceintermsoftheirimpact,otherthantheexplanationsthatIhaveaddressed, suchasvariationsinnormstrength,variationsinthedegreeofinternalisationintothe domesticstructuresofthestate,orindeedaseparationofthelogicofconsequences fromthelogicofappropriateness.Thesearguments,whilstinsightful,dolittleto addresstheissueofmultiplicity,whichisfundamentalinternationally,particularlyin relationtothequestionposedinthisthesis.

46 Idisagreewiththeconceptofasingularidentityinwhichdifferentnormscompete.As Zehfusshaspointedout,multiplicityalsoappliestoidentity.Politicalrepresentatives arenotsimplyfacedwithasingularidentityofbeingaliberaldemocraticstateinthe internationalsociety;theyhavemanysocialidentities,somebasedonhistoricalties, othersoninternationalandtransnationalgroupingswithwhichtheyareassociated. Whilstthesemaynotappeartocontradicteachother,thevaryingnormativecontentcan beaccentuatedincertaincircumstances,forexamplethenormsofacountry’smilitary canbecomeoutoftunewiththoseofhumanrightsgroupings. Internationalnorms,asassociatedwithbeingaliberaldemocraticstate,interactwith thosefromothersocialidentities,toinformandgivemeaningtotheactionsofstates. Thus,anapproachthatisolatesinternationalnormsfromthebroadersocialidentities contextinwhichtheyaresituatedishighlyrestrictiveintermsoftheanalysisof behaviour. 36 Whilstidentitiesformthebasisofinterests,thereisalwaysroomfor judgementandnegotiationinthisbroadersocialidentitiescontextwithouthavingto relyonexogenousinterestsoraseparationbetweentheLogicofConsequencesandthe LogicofAppropriateness(seeMuller,2004:396).Actorsarecalculatingwhatisintheir interestsincertaincontextsbasedonbroadnormativeregimesrelatingtodifferent socialidentities;interestsarealwaysembeddedinsuchframesofreference. Theenvironmentwithinwhichpoliticalelitesarelocatediscertainlyexceptionally complex,withmanysocialidentitiesandnormativeregimesinfluencingbehaviour. 37 Defection,contestationandrevisionism,canrevealchangesandmodificationsto internationalnormativeregimes,theirapplication,andwhatismeantbythesocial identityofbeingpartofagroupofliberaldemocraticstates,whichthensetsthe frameworkforsubsequentdebates.Tosaythataparticularactviolatesaninternational normtellsusverylittleunlessweembedthisinthebroadernormativeandsocial identitiescontextencompassingpublicargumentswithopponentsonparticularpolicies. Analysismustcapturethesepublicnegotiations(Hasian,2007).Thus,focusingon singularisolatednormswithpermanentmeaningleavesmuchoutofthepicturethatis essentialtoourunderstandingofthenegotiationofnormativeconstraintsandprocesses ofinfluence.

36 IwillgivegreaterspecificitytoaccountforsuchfactorsinChapter2. 37 KowertandLegro(1996)raisethispointwithregardstocompetingandcontradictorynorms. 47 Inthisthesis,singularinternationalnormsarenotconsideredtobeinternalizedtothe extentthatthereisnoroomforindividualdecisionmaking;adegreeofcontestationis alwayspossiblebutthisreliesonaninteractionbetweentheindividualorgroupof individuals(embeddedinthesocialcontext),andthevariousaudiencesjudging behaviour.Suchactionsmayormaynotresultinchangestointernationalnormative regimes,dependingonbroaderacceptance.Themeaningsandinterpretationsatthe agentlevel(whetherindividualorcollective)arethereforeavitalconsiderationin understandingtheprocessesofdefectionandcontestationbymembersofthesocial identitytowhichtheseregimesrelate. Suchanapproachalsoenablesustocapturethecoconstitutiveprocessescentralto constructivistunderstandings.Thesignificanceofthisisoftenlostinresearchthat focusespurelyontheimpactofnormativeregimesonbehaviourintheinternational sphere.Theapproachtakeninthisthesisengageswithnorminfluenceintermsofan interactiveprocess,addressingconcernsraisedaboutpreviousresearchwherenorm entrepreneursandnormleadersoftenappeartobeseparatefromthenormativecontext, (seeKornprobst,2007forfurthercriticismalongtheselines).Normleadersandnorm entrepreneursareinsteadfirmlyembeddedinthebroadnormativeandsocialidentities context. 38 TheframeworkoutlinedinChapter2,basedonthemicrofoundationsof socialpsychology,willprovidethemeansbywhichtocapturesuchprocessesin relationtothepoliticalelitesthatrepresentthestate. Inrelationtoepistemologicalissuesthataregenerallyseentoseparatethedifferentends ofthespectrumofconstructivistresearch,Imustalsoclarifymyposition.Whilst constructivistsshareacommitmenttosocialsubjectmatter,themeansbywhichenquiry issoughthasoftenbeenframedverydifferently.Thisthesisgoessomewayto acknowledgingthe‘multiplenorms[that]caninfluenceactors–withcompetingoreven contradictoryprescriptionsforbehaviorandidentity’(KowertandLegro,1996:486). Asaconsequence,Iavoidfocusingonthepredictionofbehaviourinrelationtosingular andisolatedvariables,andinsteadfavouraconstitutiveapproachtocausationovera Humeanone.Iconsidertheunityofstateidentity,andtheconventionalconstructivist characterisationofnormsassinglestandardsofappropriatebehaviourexertingan influenceonstates,toorestrictive.AsIhavedemonstratedinthisChapterthereappear tobetoomanycontingentandcontestedfactorsforthistypeofresearch.Indeed,Ifeel 38 ThecontentofthesocialidentitiescontextconsideredinthisthesisisoutlinedinChapter3. 48 wearebetterplacedtoaimforaframeworkthatwillenhanceourunderstandingofthe processesinvolvedinthenegotiationofnormativeconstraint,thushighlighting influentialfactorsthatwemaynothavepreviouslyseen,asopposedtoaimingfor prediction.Whatexactlythisframeworkwillshowusthen,intermsofthenegotiation ofnormativeconstraintbecomesanempiricalquestion. Researchtowardstheconventionalendoftheconstructivistspectrumalsorestson‘a strongspecificationofthesubjectivemotivationsofindividuals’yettoachievethis wouldrequire‘unmediatedaccesstopeople’sminds’thatresearcherswouldnotbeable toobtaineventhroughtheprivatestatementsofstateleaders(KrebsandJackson,2007: 40).Intermsofthepositioningofthisthesis,Iagreewiththestandpointofscholars suchasKrebsandJackson(2007),thatwecannotgetbehindlanguagetocompareitto reality,languagehasahugelysignificantroleinconstructingreality.Tomissthispoint losesmuchofthevalueoftheconstructivistapproachtoenquiryininternational relations.Thus,thefocusofanalysisinthisthesisisonthelanguageusedtonegotiate internationalnormativeconstraintsandmanagesocialidentities,ascontextually situated.KarinFierke(2007)hasbeendirectinstatingthatthisislikelytoleadtoa separationintotwodistinctsectorsofconstructivism.However,againIhavetostress thatIviewthesedifferencesonaspectrumasopposedtoclearcampswithdistinct boundaries.Beforeprovidingthespecificframeworkforsuchanapproach,whichisthe subjectofChapter2,Imustalsodemonstratewhatthismeansfortheinternational detentionregime. 3.1 The International Detention Regime Inthissection,theChaptermovesfromageneraldiscussionofthedifferenttheoretical interpretationsofinternationalnorms,andtheapproachadoptedinthisthesis,toa specificfocusonthenormativeregimeofconcerninthisstudy.Standardsgoverning theuseofdetentionandappropriatetreatmentofprisoners,particularlyinwarfare,have alonghistory.Howeverwedonothavetolookfarbacktoseereasonsforthe constructionandcontinueddevelopmentofaninternationalnormativeregimetoprotect therightsofdetainees;thehorrorsofthetwoworldwarsinthisregardwillsuffice.This meansthattherearestrongimagesandclearmemoriesprovidingimpetusforthe internationaldetentionregimetodevelopevenfurther.Ithasindeedbecomemore prominentasasubfieldofhumanrightsinthelast2030years.

49 Thefoundationsforthenormativeregimeconcerningthedetentionandtreatmentof prisonerscanbetracedasfarbackasthecrusadeswithregardstotheideasof reciprocityandransom.Whilstnothugelyprevalentatthattime,Megret(2007) suggeststhatreciprocitypreservedasmallamountofhumanityinthisarea.Thiswas applicabletocertain‘likeminded’groups–athemecertainlyapparenttodayindebates overapplicabilityinthewaronterrorwithnonstateentities.Theideathatprisoners mightmeanprofitintermsofransomalsoprovidedincentivestotreatcaptiveswell,at leastthosewithmoney.Inthe19 th Centurydetentionpracticesshiftedawayfrom ransomtothemorelongtermholdingofprisoners(Neff,2007).Suchmoveswere accompaniedbyachangeinattituderegardingresponsibility,prisonerswerenolonger theresponsibilityoftheindividual(henceransomwasprevalent),butwereprisonersof thestate.Furthermore,thefocuswasnolongersolelyonmilitarynecessitywithregards todetention,butbegantoencompassideasabouttherightsofcaptives.Neffsuggests thatthisshifttohumanitarianismfrommilitarynecessitywasbasedinbroader intellectualtrends,suchastheRomanticMovementwhichstressedtherightsand dignityofindividuals,theantislaverymovement,theAmericanDeclarationof Independence,andthedevelopmentofrightsanddutiesintheFrenchrepublic.Whilst debatesensuedonapplicability,reciprocityandhumanitarianismaretakentoformthe sourcesoftheinternationaldetentionregime.Thereisalsoahistoricalbasisto argumentsconcerningthelackofutilitytotortureinsuchcontexts,datingbackto Aristotle,furtherstrengtheningthesenormativedevelopments(Ross,2005). Thesefoundationshavebeenreinforcedbytheconstructionoflegaltreatieswithwhich wearefamiliarwithtodayasdocumentedinhumanrightsandhumanitarianlaw,witha briefmentioninrefugeelaw.Humanitarianlawseemstohavethelongesthistoryinthis regardasmanyoftherootsforinstitutionalisednormshavetheiroriginsinthe principlesofreligionandancientpracticeswhichhavethenbeenreflectedin humanitarianlaw,otherwisereferredtoasthelawsofwaror jus in bello .39 Beforethetwentiethcenturythelegalbasisfortheinternationaldetentionregimeis largelyrestrictedtocustomaryinternationallaw,howevermentionismadeinthe Lieber Code of1863.Article56statesthat: 39 ForexamplesuggestionswereraisedinthesixthcenturyBCEbytheChinesewarriorSunTzuthat limitationsshouldbeplacedontheconductofwar.Warcrimeswerealsoreferredtoinaround200BCE intheHinducodeofManu.Laterin1625HugoGrotiuswroteonthehumanitariantreatmentofcivilians in On the Law of War and Peace (2004).Thisistonamebutafewofthetextsorcodesofconductthat havebeenconstructedtoregulatetheconductofhostilities(seeTrombly,2003). 50

Aprisonerofwarissubjecttonopunishmentforbeingapublicenemy,norisanyrevengewreakedupon himbytheintentionalinflictionofanysuffering,ordisgrace,bycruelimprisonment,wantoffood,by mutilation,death,oranyotherbarbarity. Thefirst Geneva Convention ,adoptedin1864,laidfurtherfoundationsforinternational humanitarianlawinthatitsetrulesfortheprotectionofvictimsofconflictandthe provisionofmedicalcareinconflictwiththeintroductionoftheredcrosssymbol.The Hague Conventions of1899howeverreferspecificallytothehumanetreatmentof prisonersofwar.Chapter2oftheannextoHagueIIisdevotedtoprisonersofwarand Article4refersspecificallytohumanetreatment.Thisisagainechoedin1907.These conventionsdonotspecificallyrefertotorturebutbybanningactionthatisinhumaneit wouldseemreasonabletodeducethattortureisofconcerninthisprovision.Article2of the Geneva Conventions in1929againreferstohumanetreatmentbutthisisexpanded toincludeprotection‘particularlyagainstactsofviolence,insultsandpubliccuriosity’. TheConventiongivesextensiveguidancetothetreatmentofprisonersofwarincluding provisionsfortheconditionsofdetention. Despitethisdurabilityitislargelythe Geneva Conventions of1949thatwelooktofor clarificationofinternationaldetentionstandardsintimesofconflict.Theconventions wereaimedatprovidinggreaterregulationtotheconductofhostilitiesandprotectionto thoseinvolvedthanwasexperiencedbeforeandduringWWII.Thetwoadditional Protocolstothe Geneva Convention of1977againrefertoprisonersofwar,and ProtocolIIspecificallyconcernshumanetreatment.Withrespecttothetreatmentof prisonersofwar,thelawsdevelopedstillinsomeaspectsgo‘farbeyondthatofrulesof humanrightslawrelatingtothetreatmentofprisonersinpeacetime’(Rodley,2002:3). Intermsofhumanrights,documentationofdetentionstandardscanbefoundinthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)whichclearlystatesthat: Everyonehastherighttolife,libertyandsecurityofperson(Article3.) Nooneshallbesubjectedtotortureortocruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentorpunishment(Article 5.) Nooneshallbesubjectedtoarbitraryarrest,detentionorexile(Article9.)

51 Theprotectionofdetaineeshasbeenfurtherdocumentedinthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)(1966),Article7referringtoprohibitionson tortureandArticle9,arbitraryarrestordetention.Thetopicofdetentionhashowever grownmuchmoresignificantlyasafieldofhumanrightslawinthelast20yearswith variouschangestothelegalnormsandinstitutionssettodealwiththearea.Major advancesincludetheGeneralAssemblyResolution3452(XXX)of1975containingthe DeclarationagainstTorture,alongsideGeneralAssemblyResolution3453(XXX) referringspecificallyto‘Tortureandothercruel,inhumaneordegradingtreatmentor punishmentinrelationtodetentionandimprisonment’.Thiswasfollowedbythe developmentofenforcementmechanismswiththepowertoinvestigate,suchasthe WorkingGrouponEnforcedorInvoluntaryDisappearances(1980),andthe appointmentofaSpecialRapporteuronSummaryorArbitraryExecutions.In1984the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment wasadoptedbytheGeneralAssembly.Laterin1985aSpecialRapporteur onTorturewasappointed.Withregardstodisappearancesthe International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance ,wasadoptedin2006. Regionaldevelopmentshavealsobeenhugelyprevalentwithreferencestointernational standardsfordetentionbeingfoundintreatiessuchasthe European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms(1950),the American Convention on Human Rights (1969),the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981),the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985), andthe European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987).Thelatterhasalsosetupproceduresforvisiting placesofdetention.Examplesofotherinstrumentsrelatingtodetentionare:

• StandardMinimumRulesfortheTreatmentofPrisoners(1977) • BasicPrinciplesfortheTreatmentofPrisoners(1990) • BodyofPrinciplesfortheProtectionofAllPersonsunderAnyFormof DetentionorImprisonment(1988) • PrinciplesontheEffectiveInvestigationandDocumentationofTortureand OtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishment(2000) • PrinciplesofMedicalEthicsrelevanttotheRoleofHealthPersonnel, particularlyPhysicians,intheProtectionofPrisonersandDetaineesagainst

52 TortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishment (1982) • CodeofConductforLawEnforcementOfficials(1979) • BasicPrinciplesontheUseofForceandFirearmsbyLawEnforcement Officials(1990) • UnitedNationsRulesfortheProtectionofJuvenilesDeprivedoftheLiberty (1990) • UnitedNationsStandardMinimumRulesfortheAdministrationofJuvenile Justice(1985)

Referencestodetentioncanalsobefoundinthe Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)albeitlimitedtoArticle31concerningpenalties(Art31(1))and restrictionofmovement(Art31(2)).However,thesebasicprinciplesweredevelopedas partofaUNExpertRoundtablein2001onArticle31.Theroundtabledecidedthat therewasaneedforgreaterelaborationparticularlyintermsofnationallegislationto ensurecompliancewiththebasicprinciplesabove. 40 Theconcernsgeneratedby detentionpracticeshaveincreasedtopresenttheneedforagreaterclarificationof Article31andtheprotectionsaffordedtorefugeesandasylumseekers. Wecanseefromthebriefconsiderationabovethatissuesconcerningdetentionare heavilyprevalentininternationallaw.Manyconventions,codesofconductand standardshavebeenputinplaceinternationally.Togethertheserepresentthe internationalnormativeregimeprescribingstandardsfordetentionandprohibiting torture.Intheinterestsofconcision,thisthesiswillrefertotheaforementionedasthe internationaldetentionregime.Asstatedintheintroduction,Iusetheterm‘regime’to refertotheaboveasacollectionofnormativeandconstitutivestandards.Thisdiffers fromthepurelyregulativeandinstitutionalapproachemployedbyneoliberals. Giventhatthereareavarietyoflegalstandardsandmechanismsinplace,whatcanwe deducetobethemainthemesthatemergeregardingtheinternationaldetentionregime? Clearlynormsconcerningtortureandinhumantreatmentoccupyacentralroleinthis

40 TheExpertRoundtableidentifiedthatdetentionmustbeconsideredanexceptionalresponseintermsof individualcases,andneededtobeundertakeninlinewithbothhumanrightsandrefugeelawnot introducedarbitrarily.JustificationforthedetentionofthosecoveredbytheRefugee Convention was foundintheprotectionofnationalsecurityandpublicorder,nottobeusedforthepurposesofdeterrence. Theconclusionssuggestedthatoverallusageshouldbeminimizedandtheauthorspointoutthatthereare infactmanyothermeansofrestrictionsonthefreedomofmovementthatdonotamounttodetention. 53 area;weonlyhavetolookattheamountofliteraturewrittenonthisspecificaspectof detentionandhumanrightsstandardstoestablishthis.Whilsttherearemanyother themeswhichIwillconsiderbelow,anumberofthesedoinfactrelatebacktotorture intermsofavoidingconditionsthatmayleadtotortureandabuse. ThestandarddefinitionoftortureemployedcanbefoundinArticle1ofthe United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT)as: anyactbywhichseverepainorsuffering,whetherphysicalormental,isintentionallyinflictedona personforsuchpurposesasobtainingfromhimorathirdpersoninformationoraconfession,punishing himforanactheorathirdpersonhascommittedorissuspectedofhavingcommitted,orintimidatingor coercinghimorathirdperson,orforanyreasonbasedondiscriminationofanykind,whensuchpainor sufferingisinflictedbyorattheinstigationoforwiththeacquiescenceofapublicofficialorotherperson actinginanofficialcapacity.Itdoesnotincludepainorsufferingarisingonlyfrom,inherentinor incidentaltolawfulsanctions. OnepointtodrawfromthisisthatStateswillbeinbreachofthisArticleiftheyprovide consentoracquiescencetoactionsthatdefectfromtheagreedinternationalnormative standardsinthisarea. Article2(2)isquiteclearinstating: Noexceptionalcircumstanceswhatsoever,whetherastateofwarorathreatorwar,internalpolitical instabilityoranyotherpublicemergency,maybeinvokedasajustificationoftorture. Thustheprohibitivestandardsarenotdeemedtobecontextspecificinanyway.A furtherthemeconcerningdetention,andrelatedtotorture,istheprincipleof non- refoulement .Article3(1)oftheCATstatesthat: NoStatePartyshallexpel,return("refouler")orextraditeapersontoanotherStatewherethereare substantialgroundsforbelievingthathewouldbeindangerofbeingsubjectedtotorture. ThispositionisgivenfurthersupportinArticle33ofthe Refugee Convention ,although underthislegaldocumentexceptionsaregrantedonnationalsecuritygrounds–there arehowevernoexceptionsunderpart3ofECHR,whichalsorefersto non-refoulement . TheCATalsoincludesprovisionsonthepreventionoftortureinprovidingeducation andinformation‘inthetrainingoflawenforcementpersonnel,civilormilitary,medical

54 personnel,publicofficialsandotherpersonswhomaybeinvolvedinthecustody, interrogationortreatmentofanyindividualsubjectedtoanyformofarrest,detentionor imprisonment’(Article10(1)). WhilstArticle31(1)doesallowforthedenouncementoftheConvention‘bywritten notificationtotheSecretaryGeneraloftheUnitedNation’thiscanonlycomeinto effectoneyearlater.Indeed,theabsolutenessoftheprohibitionisbackedupinthe ICCPRwherenoderogationispermittedfromArticle7concerningtortureand‘cruel, inhumanordegradingtreatment’.Article4makesclearthatthisappliesevenintimesof emergency.CommonArticle3ofthe Geneva Conventions alsoprohibits‘cruel treatmentandtorture’aswellas‘outragesuponpersonaldignity’.Additionallysupport forprohibitionsontorturecanalsobefoundinthevariouslegalinstrumentslisted earlierinthissection.Prohibitionsontorturearethereforerobust,absoluteandhighly specifiedacrosstimesofpeace,armedconflictandstatesofemergency.Therighthas achievedthestatusof jus cogens andassuchcannotbechangedbyalaterruleof customarylawortreaty,butcanonlybealteredthroughanopposingnewnormof jus cogens status.SuchastatusisreflectedintheJudges’opinionon Filártiga v. Peña- Irala (Kaufman,1980),that‘thetorturerhasbecome,likethepirateandtheslavetrader beforehim, hostis humani generis ,anenemyofallmankind’. Whilstcleardefinitionsareprovidedfortorture(givingusasubstantialbasisfrom whichtoconsiderdefectionandcontestation),thisislessthanpreciseforinhumaneand degradingtreatment.Referenceismadetotheinherentdignityofthehumanpersonin thepreambleoftheICCPRwhichsuggeststhisformsafundamentalpartofthe detentionregime,yetthereisnospecificdefinitionforthis.Therehasindeedbeenmuch debateintermsofpractice.TheICRCinterpretstheprovisiontoinvolveadegreeof suffering,eitherphysicalormental(Aeschlimann,2005).HoweverAeschlimannalso notesthat‘itispracticallyimpossibletoestablishprecisely,whethertechnicallyor legally,thethresholdofsufferingordegreeofpain“required”foreachcategoryhas beenmet,giventhateachindividualwillfeelandreactdifferentlywhensubjectedtothe samemethods’(Aeschlimann,2005:111).Thevariationinculturalconnotationsto differentformsofsuffering,areimpossibletocontrolfor.Thereisthereforescopefor interpretationonwhatconstitutesinhumaneanddegradingtreatment.However,thisis dependentonacceptancebyothermembersofthesocialgrouptowhichthispertains–

55 inthecontextofthisthesis,aninternationalsocialgroupofliberaldemocraticstatesis prominent. Prohibitionsonindefiniteimprisonmentareanotherareathatiscoveredbythecurrent detentionregime.IndefinitedetentionisincompatiblewithArticle9oftheUDHRas givenearlierinthissection;thisisagainsupportedbyArticle9oftheICCPR: Everyonehastherighttolibertyandsecurityofperson.Nooneshallbesubjectedtoarbitraryarrestor detention.Nooneshallbedeprivedoflibertyexceptonsuchgroundsandinaccordancewithsuch procedureasareestablishedbylaw. Similarsentimentscanbeseenregionally,underArticle5oftheECHR,Article7ofthe AmericanConventiononHumanRights,andArticle6oftheAfricanCharterofHuman andPeople’sRights.FurthertothiswealsofindintheICCPRthat: Anyonewhoisdeprivedofhislibertybyarrestordetentionshallbeentitledtotakeproceedingsbeforea court,inorderthatsuchacourtmaydecideonthelawfulnessofhisdetentionandorderhisreleaseifthe detentionisnotlawful(Article9(4)). Thebroadapplicationoftheserightsisdocumentedin‘GeneralComment15’ (Office oftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights,1986)where,‘the enjoymentofCovenantrightsisnotlimitedtocitizen’sofStatesPartiesbutmustalso beavailabletoallindividuals,regardlessofnationalityorstatelessness,suchasasylum seekers,refugees,migrantworkersandotherpersons,whomayfindthemselvesinthe territoryorsubjecttothejurisdictionoftheStateParty’. 41 Inadditiontotheabove,therightofadetaineetochallengethelegalityofhis/her detentionisheldinthewritof habeas corpus incommonlawcountries. Habeus corpus datesbacktothe Magna Carta of1215,whereArticle39statesthat‘Nofreemanshall beseizedorimprisoned,orstrippedofhisrightsorpossessions,oroutlawedorexiled, ordeprivedofhisstandinginanyotherway,norwillweproceedwithforceagainst him,orsendotherstodoso,exceptbythelawfuljudgementofhisequalsorbythelaw

41 TemporaryderogationcanbepermittedfromArticle9underArticle4oftheICCPRhoweverthisis restrictedtoa‘timeofpublicemergencywhichthreatensthelifeofthenation’and‘totheextentstrictly requiredbytheexigenciesofthesituation’.Derogationshavetobelimitedintermsofdurationandmust followtheprincipleofproportionality.Detentionwhichmaybeginaslegalmustalsobesubjecttoreview toavoiditbecomingarbitrary(Zayas,2005). 56 oftheland.’InheritedfromtheEnglishlegalsystemtherightto habeus corpus features, forexample,inArticle1(9)ofthe United States Constitution . Also,relatedtoprotectionsagainstindefinitedetentionaretherighttoafairtrialand essentialjudicialguarantees.Article14oftheICCPRsetsout‘minimum’guidelinesfor thisandreferstotheentitlementto‘afairandpublichearingbyacompetent, independentandimpartialtribunalestablishedinlaw’.Amongstotherrightsthe detaineeistobe‘informedpromptly’ofthechargesagainsthim.Thisrightfallsunder thesamerulesforderogationasincludedinfootnote41. Normsprohibitingdisappearancesalsofeatureintheinternationaldetentionregime. Article1ofthe UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (1992)suggeststhatactioninthisregardisconsideredtobean‘offence tohumandignity’.InhiswritingsonthematterRodley(2002:267)goesasfarto determinethatdisappearancescanbeseenas‘constitutingacrimeagainsthumanity’. Disappearancesmayamounttotortureoreventhearbitrarydeprivationoflife.The importanceofsuchprohibitionscanbeseenintheadoption,inDecember2006,ofthe International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance .Article1(2)oftheConventionstatesthat: Noexceptionalcircumstanceswhatsoever,whetherastateofwarorathreatofwar,internalpolitical instabilityoranyotherpublicemergency,maybeinvokedasajustificationforenforceddisappearance. Article2definesdisappearanceas: thearrest,detention,abductionoranyotherformofdeprivationoflibertybyagentsoftheStateorby personsorgroupsofpersonsactingwiththeauthorization,supportoracquiescenceoftheState,followed byarefusaltoacknowledgethedeprivationoflibertyorbyconcealmentofthefateorwhereaboutsofthe disappearedperson,whichplacesuchapersonoutsidetheprotectionofthelaw. Internationalnormsagainstsuchbehaviourareverystronggiventhehorrendousnature and‘unthinkabilityofthebehaviour’(Rodley,2002:243).Prohibitionson disappearancescertainlyseemtoplayastrongpartintheinternationaldetentionregime. Alongsidetheaspectsalreadycovered,theinternationaldetentionregimealsomakes provisionsforprohibitingextralegalexecutionsandthedeathpenalty,aswellas

57 inadequateordegradingconditionsofdetention.Ifweconsiderthisnormativeregimein termsofrobustnessorlegalizationwecanseethatprohibitionsontortureand disappearancesinparticularshouldbefairlyrobustandtheyarehighlylegalized,the otherareasvaryonthisdimension.However,asmentionedIdonotwishtoviewthese assinglestandards.InsteadIviewthemasacollectionofnorms,anormativeregime internationally,whichprescribesstandardsfordetention.Theabovedemonstrateswhat isentailedbythis;prohibitionsontortureandinhumantreatment,disappearances,and indefinitedetention,therightto habeas corpus ,afairtrial,and non-refoulment ,aswell asprohibitionsonextralegalexecutions,thedeathpenaltyanddegradingconditionsof detention. ThereisonefurtherpointofclarificationthatImustaddregardingtheterms‘prisoner’ and‘detainee’thatwillbeusedinthisthesis.IdrawontheconclusionsofRodley (2002:56)where: theterms‘prisoner’and‘detainee’(usedseparatelyortogether)shouldbetakenasreferringtoany personswhoaresopositionedastobeunabletoremovethemselvesfromtheambitofofficialactionand abuse. Thetermsarenotlimitedto‘apersonconfined,afterduelegalprocess,toaformal institutionofdetention,asaresultofconvictionforacriminaloffence,oronremand pendingtrial’(Rodley,2002:6).Althoughsuchprisonersareobviouslyalsoasentitled asanyotherstohavetheirbasichumanrightsrespected.Therightsdiscussedaboveare givenregardlessofthereasonsfororlegitimacyofdetention.Thisbroaddefinitionwill informtheanalysisinthisthesis. Theaboveoutlinehasdrawnveryheavilyfromthelegalspheretoestablishwhatfactors constitutetheinternationaldetentionregime.Thereareseveralreasonsforthiswhich requirefurtherclarification.First,Idonotviewnormativeregimessolelyintermsof internationallaw.IagreewithscholarssuchasPercy(2007a;2007b)andTannenwald (2005)thatinternationalnormativeregimescanbestrongevenifweakininternational law.Internationallawdoeshoweverprovideveryusefuldocumentaryevidenceof normativechangeandestablishmentintheinternationalsphere,asIhavedrawnupon above,howeverinternationalnormsandnormativeregimesarenotreducibletothis. Internationallawregardingdetentiondocumentsthesharedunderstandingsgoverning suchbehaviour,andindeedcontributestothefurtheranceoftheinternationaldetention 58 regime,yettheselegalagreementsarenottheregimeinthemselves–theshared understandingsasexperiencedbyindividualsare. Theruleoflawandthenormativestandardsdocumentedininternationallaware furthermoretakentobelargelyassociatedwiththeliberaldemocraticsocialidentityin theinternationalsociety,eventhoughthedevelopmentofthelattersocialidentityhas followedtheestablishmentofsuchstandards.Forthepurposesofthisthesis,itis sufficienttodrawfrominternationallawasanindicationofsharedunderstandings. FromthisbasisIfocusontheprocessesofnegotiationintermsofdefectionand contestation.Internationalnormativeregimesarenot,afterall,staticintheirnature, interpretationandcontestationareindeedthefocusofthisthesis.Internationallegal sourcesprovideuswiththelanguageandfoundationsfromwhichtoundertakesuchan analysis,generatingexpectationsforbehaviourontheselines.Withacleardefinitionof normsandtheinternationalnormativeregimegoverningdetentioninplace,wecan engagewithoverarchingquestionofthisthesis; how have the normative constraints regarding detention practices been negotiated by the USA and UK in the war on terror so as to enable contestation of the international detention regime? For example, werethepoliticalelitesintheUSAandUKsuccessfulincreatinganenabling frameworktoallowforsustainableactioncountertotheregime?Howwasconstraint manifestinthisperiodgiventhatitlooksliketheregimefailed?And,howcanwe accountfortheprocessesthatallowforcontestationatamicrofoundationallevel? Thesequestionsarecrucialifwearetounderstandthenatureofnormativeconstraintin thesecasesandtheprocessesofcontestationinvolved,thusenablingustoaddressthe puzzleofcounternormativebehaviourraisedinthisthesis. Conclusion MyobjectiveinthisChapterhasbeentoprovidethefoundationsforunderstandingthe internationaldetentionregime,asassessedinthisthesis.Ihaveconsideredthevarious waysinwhichinternationalnormshavebeenconceptualisedinIR,intermsofpower forrealistsandinterestsforneoliberals.Ithendemonstratedwhyaconstructivist characterisationofinternationalnormscapturesmanymoredynamicsoftheir functioning,whicharecrucialtounderstandinginternationalbehaviour.Thisisinterms oftheirsocialdimension,constitutivenatureandimportanceattributedtoidentityin understandingtheinfluenceofinternationalnorms.Isituatedthisthesis’conceptionof theinternationaldetentionregimeinthecurrentdebateswithintheconstructivist

59 approachandhighlightedexactlywherethisstudyfallsinthebroadspectrumof ‘constructivisms’.Themultiplicityofidentityandbroadernormativeenvironmentare centraltoanalysisinthisthesis,allowingforagreaterdegreeofcontestationand defection,withtheinfluenceofinternationalnormativeregimescharacterisedmoreas aninteractiveprocess.Internationallawwasthenutilisedtoprovidethefoundationsfor anassessmentoftheinternationaldetentionregimeandthelanguagethroughwhich suchanalysiscanbesought.Chapter2willgivegreaterspecificationtotheframework generatedinthisthesisbydrawingfromsocialpsychology,inparticularthesocial identityapproachtoprovideamicrofoundationalbasisforthiscontributionto constructivistresearch,focusingonthecontestationofinternationaldetentionregime.

60 Chapter 2 – The Contribution of Psychology Overthepastdecadepsychologyhasbeengrantedanincreasinglysignificantrolein constructivistresearch(e.g.Shannon,2000;ShannonandKeller,2007).Thedemand forscholarstogivegreaterspecificationtothefunctioningofnormativeregimes, particularlyregardingtheirinfluenceonthebehaviourofstates,hasprovideda considerablecatalystforsuchmoves.Psychologyhasproventobeofgreatassistancein thisarea.InthisChapterIwilldemonstratewhyanengagementwiththedisciplineof psychology,particularlysocialpsychology,iscrucialtounderstandingtheissuesof concerninthisthesis;thatistheprocessesofdefectionandcontestationofthe internationaldetentionregime.Inparticular,Iwillestablishwhysomeoftheinsights generatedinsocialpsychologyareessentialtoapproachtheoverarchingquestionofthis thesis ; how have the normative constraints regarding detention practices been negotiated by the USA and UK in the war on terror so as to enable contestation of the international detention regime? Psychology,likeothersocialsciencescontainsdifferentwaysinwhichtoviewthe worldandthenatureofitsemploymentinconstructivismcertainlyreflectsthis.This Chapterwillconsiderthesevariations,demonstratingwhysocialpsychology (particularlyinsightsfromthesocialidentityapproach)providesthemostbeneficial frameworkfromwhichtoengagewiththequestionsofthisthesis.Iarguethatthesocial identityapproach,providesaframeworkforunderstandingtheprocessesofcontestation inrelationtointernationalnormativeregimes(morespecifically,thatassociatedwith detentionpracticesasoutlinedinChapter1).Whereasresearchintothevaryingimpact ofnormativeregimesintheinternationalspherehastendedtofocusondisparitiesin normstrength(Legro,1995;1997),variationsininternalisationanddiffusionatthe statelevel(Risse,RoppandSikkink,1999;Flockhart,2006),andaseparationofthe logicofconsequencesfromthelogicofappropriatenessasassessedinChapter1,these insightsgenerallyrelyonadichotomybetweencomplianceanddefectionandlacka persuasiveaccountofbothinfluenceandcontestation.Thesocialidentityapproach, however,providesamicrofoundationalassessmentwhichhighlightstheinteractive processeswiththebroadersocialcontextthathaveasignificantimpactonnormative influenceandcontestationinternationally.Thus,thesecontributionsenableamuch morecomprehensiveanalysisregardingtheprocessesofnorminfluenceand contestation.

61 InordertosupportthispositionIbeginbyfirstlyconsideringthehistoricalengagement ofpsychologywithinternationalrelations,largelyintermsofleadershipstudiesand diplomaticstyle.Idemonstratehowthisbecamemuchmoreanalyticalinorientationin the1970s/80sreflectingchangesinpsychologyitself.Thegrowthinliteraturefocusing onforeignpolicyanalysis,leadershipanddecisionmaking,particularlyintimesof crisis,isreflectiveofthisperiod.FromthisbasisIevaluatethedifferentwaysinwhich psychologyhasbeenutilisedintheconstructivistresearchprogram,consideringboth thereasonsforengagementaswellastheimplications.Thiswillformthesecond sectionoftheChapter. InthethirdsectionIdemonstratethepotentialvalueoffurtherengagementwiththe socialidentityapproach,establishingaframeworkforassessingthenegotiationof normativeconstraintstoallowforcontestationanddefectionfromtheinternational detentionregime.Ioutlinethewaysinwhichthesocialidentityapproach(1)providesa microfoundationalassessmentoftheinfluenceofnormativeregimes,(2)demonstrates howtheprocessesofgroupmembershiparecrucialtounderstandingvariationsinthe influenceofnormativeregimes,and(3)drawsourattentiontothemanagementofsocial identitiesinthenegotiationofnormativeconstraint.Thesefactorsprovideuswitha frameworkfromwhichtoassessthemainquestionofthisthesis;howisnormative constraintnegotiatedsoastoallowforthecontestationofinternationaldetention standardsbytheUKandUSA?Furthermore,theyinformthecentralargumentofthis thesis; that contestation of the international detention regime is an interactive and dynamic process embedded in a broad social identities context . Thus,engagementwithpsychologyinthisthesisisnotintermsofassessingthebeliefs andvaluesofstateleaderstoexplaindefection(themotivationaldynamicthathasbeen popularwithmuchengagementwithpsychologyininternationalrelations),butinstead focusesonthemultiplicityofsocialidentityandprocessesofcontestationtogenerate furtherunderstandingwithregardstotheinfluenceofnormativeregimes.Thisapproach servestohighlighttheinteractivepracticesofleadership,asopposedtofocusingsolely onthepersonalqualitiesthatparticularleaderspossess.Thelatteriscertainlyan importantfactorininternationalrelationsscholarship,buttoaddresstheprocessesof defectionandcontestationoftheinternationaldetentionregimeinthecasesoftheUK andUSA,thisthesisneedsaframeworkthatbringstogethertheelementsofboth leadershipandthebroadercontextofsocialidentities.

62 1. Psychology’s Relevance to International Relations Psychologistsareconcernedwithunderstandingthemindsandbehavioursofhumans andotherorganisms.Therehasbeenalongfoundedroleforsuchadisciplinein internationalpolitics,particularlyinthestudyofleadershipanddecisionmaking.This sectionaimstoresituatetheuseofpsychologywithinthishistoricalframework, servingasabasisfromwhichtoconsiderthemorerecentemploymentinconstructivist researchandgenerateinformedaccompanyingdebate. Thehistoricaluseofpsychologyinthestudyofinternationalaffairshasbeen predominantlybasedonresearchintothedynamicsofleadership,inparticular,the valuesheldbyleadersandtheirmeansforconductingdiplomacy.Overalltheearly insightswerenotaimedatgeneralisation;insteadtheyprovidedspecificobservationsof particularleaderstounderstandcertaincircumstances.Accountsofthiskindarebased onthestrongassumptionthatleaderscanbethe‘agentsofchange’(Elock,2001:5)and thatleadershipstemsfromthepersonalqualitiesleaderspossess. Thestudyofpersonalityhassincebecomeincreasinglyanalytical,accompaniedbya drivetoestablishleadershipasaseparatefieldofinquiry(Paige,1972;Hermann, 1977).Throughthisprocessasignificantbodyofliteraturehasemergedfocusingonthe profilingofleadersandthedevelopmentofresearchmethodstoenableinvestigatorsto assesspersonalitytypesandleadershipstylefromadistance(e.g.FeldmanandValenty, 2001).Theimportanceofthistypeofexaminationisbasedontheassumptionthatthe beliefsheldbyindividualleadersarefundamentalindeterminingthecourseof internationalaffairs.IndeedJervis(1994)hassuggestedthatthishasbecomeevermore apparentintheincreasinglycomplexpostColdWarera. Inadditiontomovestomakethestudyofpersonalityandleadershipstylemore analytical,the1970sand1980salsosawagrowthinliteratureoncrisisdecision making.Thisresearchprogrammeaimedtogenerategeneralpropositionsaboutthe waysinwhichleadersdealwithcrisissituations.Studieswereconductedtodevelop guidanceconcerningthegeneralmistakesthatstateleadersmakeaswellasproposing meansbywhichtoavoidsuchmistakes.Significantillustrationscanbefound,for example,inIrvingJanis’developmentof Group Think (1982),andthestudyof Perception and Misperception in World Politics byRobertJervis(1976).Variousareas

63 ofpsychologyweregrantedamajorroleinidentifyingfactorsthatarelikelytohavean impactonthewaysthatdecisionmakersprocessinformationininternationalpolitics. Yetwhilstthetransferofpsychologicalinsightstothestudyofinternationaldecision makingandleadershipmayseemlikeanaturalandlogicalmovetomake,scholarshave advancedavarietyofobjections.Jervishimselfpointstoaproblemthatisoftenraised intheuseofpsychologyininternationalrelations,thatoftransferringresultsobtainedin anexperimental(oftenlaboratorybased)orinterpersonalsettingtointernational phenomena.AparticularlyinterestingpointthatJervis(1976:4)suggestsinrelationto hisownresearchisthat,‘veryfew[psychology]experimentsgivesubjectsincentivesto perceiveaccurately’whereasthistendstobeafundamentalconcerntopolicymakers. Inmoregeneralterms,relatingtotheuseofpsychologyininternationalrelations(orfor thatmatteranyotherdiscipline),aconsiderationoftheinitialaimsofthepsychological researchandtheconditionsinwhichtheoriginalstudieswereconductedarecertainly crucialelementstotakeintoaccount.Thesewilloftenhighlightconditionswhere specificfactors,suchastypesofidentity,were createdexperimentallyandthentested withcontrolsplacedonotherpotentiallyinfluentialelements. 1Thisprocessofcreation ismarkedlydifferenttothedisciplineofIRthatattemptstoexplainorunderstandpast eventsorenvironments,oftenwiththeaimofpredictingfutureactions. Wecannot,therefore,takeforgrantedthattheinsightsgeneratedinpsychologywill transfereasilytothecomplexworldofinternationalaffairswhereisolatinginfluence becomesamuchmoredauntingandperhapsundesirabletask.Thelatterisparticularly apparentwhentheaimofresearchistoassessthemultiplicityofinfluences,asopposed totestingtheimpactofsingularisolatedvariables.Whilstbothapproachesare importantforconstructivistscholars,dependingontheirorientation,multiplicityisof significantconcerninthisthesis. Thisbriefdiscussionhighlightsthepresenceofreservationsindrawingfrom psychologyevenwhenthereisasharedmethodologicalbasissuchasafocuson individualsandapositivistunderstandingoftheworldintermsofthe‘searchfor explanation,description,andprediction’throughtheisolationofvariables(McDermott, 2004:3).Ultimatelythough,thesecommonfoundationsandtheevidentlycrucialrole 1ForaconsiderationoftheexperimentalmethodandsocialpsychologyseeHaslamandMcGarty(2001). 64 ofpsychologyinthisareaofforeignpolicyanalysisanddecisionmaking,inadditionto thevalueofsuchanengagement,haveenabledscholarstoovercomethemisgivingsthat areraised.Thisiscertainlyreflectedinthesignificantgrowthofthefield,forexample intheexpansionofundergraduatemodulesfocusingonbothpoliticalpsychologyand psychologyandinternationalrelations,particularlyintheUSA(e.g.RoseMcDermottat theUniversityofCalifornia,SantaBarbaraandPaulKowertatFloridaInternational University;alsoseethe International Society of Political Psychology’s websitefor courselistings). Thissharedbasisisnotnecessarilytruehoweverofconstructivism.Cautionistherefore requiredintermsofthemannerofengagementwithpsychology.Thediscussioninthis section,whilstonlyprovidingacursoryglanceatthematerial,servestoprovideabasis fromwhichtoconsidertheexpandeduseofpsychologyinconstructivistresearch. 2. Psychology in Constructivism Havingbrieflyhighlightedvariousbenefitstotheemploymentofpsychologyinthe studyofissuessuchasleadership,diplomaticstyle,anddecisionmaking,aswellas someofthereservationsthathaveaccompaniedsuchmoves,Iwillnowassessthe differentcontributionsthatpsychologicalinsightshavemadewithintheconstructivist researchprogram.Thefactorsdiscussedabovewillbeveryimportanttoconsiderinthe courseofevaluatingthedifferentwaysinwhichconstructivistscholarshaveengaged withpsychologytodate.FirstIwillbrieflyoutlinewhyconstructivistscholarshave drawnoninsightsfrompsychology,asdespiteinitialreservationsasreferredtoabove, theuseofinsightsfrompsychologytoenhanceaspectsofconstructivismhasbeenon theincreaseoverthepast10years.Thishasbeenparticularlyapparentinresearchinto internationalnormsandnormativeregimes.Thissectionwillbrieflyexaminesomeof thereasonsforthisincreasedengagementwithpsychology. AsdemonstratedinChapter1,constructivistscholarshaveprovidedadiverserangeof literaturerevealingtheimportantroleofnormativeregimesininternationalaffairs. Thosetowardstheconventionalconstructivistendofthespectrumhavefocusedon questionssurroundingtheirvaryingimpactonstatebehaviour.Inallocatingsubstantial influencetointernationalnormativeregimes,defectionandcontestationbecomemore difficulttounderstandespeciallyincaseswherethesestandardsarethoughttobe

65 embeddeddomesticallywithinthestate.AssuggestedinthepreviousChapter,theways inwhichscholarshaveaccountedfordefectioninthecasesassessedinthisthesiswould benefitsignificantlyfromanalysisinformedatthemicrofoundationallevel,particularly wherethereismoreengagementwithprocessesofcontestation.Theissuesadvancedin Chapter1certainlyraisethequestionofhowdeepweneedtoresearchwithinthestate tounderstandthevariationinnormativeinfluence.2Ifwearetobringtheindividual decisionmakerintoanalysisthenitwouldseemthatpsychologyhasasubstantialrole toplay,thispositioncertainlyfitswithresearchhighlightedintheprevioussections concerningtheimportanceofindividualleadersinthestudyofinternationalaffairs.The questionofhownormativeregimesactuallyconnecttoindividualactorsisoneraisedby severalscholars(e.g.Yee,1996;Checkel1998)andisachallengethatistakenupby VaughnShannonwhoseworkIshallconsiderinmoredetailbelow.Therecertainlyisa needtoassesshowpoliticalelitesinterprettheirsituations,particularlyregarding internationalnormativeregimes,andassuchthemovetopsychologyseemsan appropriateonetomake. Psychologycanprovidethemeanstoaccountforthevariationinnormativeinfluence byfocusingourattentiononconstructivism’smicrofoundations,howconstructivist conceptsareinfluentialattheindividuallevel(Checkel,1998;GoldgeierandTetlock, 2001;McDermott,2004).Shannon(2000:298)isastrongadvocateofsuchaposition suggestingthatwecandrawonthe‘psychologicalneedsunderlyingconstructivist logic’tofurtherilluminatethefactorsinvolvedinnormativeinfluence. 3Utilising researchfrompsychologycertainlyprovidesabasisfromwhichtostudytheinfluence ofnormativeregimesatalevelbeyondthestate.Psychologycanprovideinsightsina waythatotherdisciplinescannotprimarilyduetotheirfocusonindividuals. ConstructivistscholarssuchasAlexanderWendthavecapitalisedonpsychological contributionsbydirectlytransferringthemtothestate,personifyingthestateby suggestingthatsuchentitiesfunctionjustlikepeopledo.Whilstsuchanapproach providesforveryinterestinganalysisthisisnotthepositiontakeninthisthesis.Indeed, IdisagreewithWendt’sstatementthatthestateaspersonhasbecome‘sodeeply embeddedinourcommonsensethatitisdifficulttoimaginehowinternationalpolitics mightbeconceptualizedorconductedwithoutit’(Wendt,1999:196).Suchaposition

2ThiswasalsoapointadvancedbyCheckel(1998). 3ThispointwillbefurtherdevelopedwhenIconsiderShannon’sworkinmoredetailbelow. 66 iscertainlytemptingparticularlyasstateleadersthemselvesoften‘engageinthe practiceofperceivingstatesaspeople’thuseffectivelycreatingsuchasocialreality (Greenhill,2008:346).However,thestateonlyhasthecapacityto‘act’basedon humanagents.Humanpoliticalactiontakesplacewithinthestructureofthestateand pertainingtothestate,butthestateaspersoncannotreplacetheactionsofindividuals inourassessmentofinternationalaffairs.Indeed,todosowouldmissmuchvariationin behaviour,particularlyintermsofcontestationrelatingtointernationalnormative regimes.AsFlockhart(2006)suggests,individualsaresocializedandact;this representsthepositiontakeninthisthesis.Thus,IagreewithscholarssuchasWight (2004)thatthestateisnotapersonandassuchcannotbeascribedpersonalqualities. 4 Insteadthefocusinthisthesisisonthepoliticalelitesinthestateandtheirinteractions withrepresentativesofthedifferentsocialidentitiesassociatedwiththestate.Thestate providesaframeworkandstructure–assuchitverymuchexistsasanentity,butthisis notseparatefromthesubjectsofanalysiswhicharetheindividual’sthatrepresentthe state. Onthisbasis,psychologyenablesustoexplorethenormativeandregimebasedinsights ofconstructivismattheleveloftheindividual.Suchanapproachprovidessignificant microfoundationalunderstandingtokeyconcepts,supplyinggreaterspecificityand capacitytoaccountforvariationsaswellasmechanismsforchangethataregenerally obscuredfromanalysis. AshighlightedattheendofChapter1,thereisagreatdealofmultiplicitytonormative regimesandinternationalsocialidentities.Constructivistresearchtowardsthethicker endofthespectrumcertainlygivesusthemeansbywhichtoacknowledgethis multiplicityandaccompanyingcontestation.Howeverweareleftwithoutamicro foundationalaccountbywhichtoassessnormativeinfluenceinthisframework. Certainly,scholarsdemonstratehowtheconstructionofnormssettherulesofthegame andtheparameterswithinwhichactioncantakeplace,developingbymeansof contestationandcoconstitutiveprocesses.However,greaterspecificitycouldbe providedtoassistscholarsinunderstandingtheseprocessesandthenegotiationof normativeconstraint,inaframeworkthatincorporatesbothcontestationandinfluence. Thisprovidesthemotivationforengagementwithpsychologyinthisthesis. 4AsWightfurtherargues,thisdoesnotmeanthestatecannothaveagency,asagency‘alsoresidesin structuralcontexts’(2006:293). 67 2.1 Psychology’s Added Value Giventhereasonsaboveforlookingtopsychology,howexactlyhavetheinsights generatedinthisdisciplinebeenusedtobenefitconstructivismtodate?Certainlythis hasvariedhugelyintermsofscopeandamountofpsychologyused.Whilstsome scholarshaveengagedwithpsychologyfairlyminimallytoillustratesmall modificationsorclarificationsofconstructivistconceptsothershavegonemuchfurther andprivilegedpsychologicalcomponents. WecanseereferencestopsychologyintheworkofWendt(asmentionedabove) particularlyintermsofhis‘“sociologicalsocialpsychological”formofsystemic theory’(1992:394)incontrasttotheeconomicbasisofneorealism.Wendtcertainly citesseveralsourcesfrompsychologyoratleastpoliticalpsychologyandthisprovides thebasisforthecognitiveconstructivismthathepresents.TedHopf(2002)alsofollows thiscognitivistlinetodevelopanunderstandingofhowidentityworks.Bydrawingon literaturefromexperimentalpsychology,identityisdemonstratedtofunctionina similarwaytoheuristics,schemasandscriptsprovidinguswiththemeansbywhichto classifyandmakesenseoftheworld.Identityallowsustointerprettheworld,andin turndictateswhatabouttheworldisconsideredrelevant.Partlyasaconsequenceofthis ‘individualsroutinelychooseonlyasmallfractionoftheactions,verbalandotherwise, thatareobjectivelyavailabletothematanygiventime’theyareinthissense‘bounded bythesocialcognitivestructure,itsdiscourses,andtheiridentities’(Hopf,2002:5). TheauthorproceedsfromthisbasistoprovideaninductiveaccountofRussianidentity, byalsodrawingonsociologyandsocialtheory. Thevalueofpsychologyintheaboveresearchisverymuchlimitedtoprovidingabasis forunderstandingthefunctioningofidentityasacognitiveshortcut.Hopfgivesclear reasonsforthislimitationintermsofthetheoreticalpreloadingassociatedwithother insightsfrompsychologyregardingidentity.Theauthorrefersinparticulartothe assumptionsthataregenerallymadeconcerningissuessuchasthedriveforgroup membershipthatunderpinsagreatdealofresearchinsocialpsychology.Withthe inductiveemphasisinHopf’sworkitisclearthatengagingwithpsychologyanyfurther wouldleadtoacompromiseoftheresearchobjectives.Psychologythushelpsby contributingtoanunderstandingofthefunctioningofthekeyconceptofidentityand providingabasisforsuchresearch.Howeverbeyondthistheroleofpsychologyis minimal.

68 Psychologyhasalsobeendrawnuponinthedomainofsociallearningandpersuasion (Finnemore,1996;Checkel,2001;Finnemore,2003).Finnemore(2003)forexample hasemployedconceptsfromsocialpsychologytoassistinhighlightingcertainfactors involvedinexplainingnormativechangewithregardstothechangingpurposeofthe useofforce.Socialpsychologyisusedtoidentifythemeansbywhichsocial movements‘changelawandinstitutions,aswellassocialnormsandunderstandings’ (2003:151).Finnemorespecificallyappliesinsightsfromsocialpsychologytoillustrate individuallevelmechanismsofchangesuchas‘persuasionandcommunicativeaction’, aswellasthe‘affectivemechanisms’oflikingandempathy. Withregardstothelatter,Finnemoresuggeststhataffectandemotionhavebeenlargely neglectedintheIRliteraturehowevertheyareconsideredbytheauthortobe‘essential tocreatingpurposesforsocialaction’andinitiatingchange(2003:154).Thisisapoint alsoraisedbyRoss(2006),who,alsoengagingwithpsychology,suggeststhat constructivistshaveneglectedtheimportantroleofemotionsinidentityformation. Finnemoredrawsonresearchfrompsychologythathasdemonstratedourtendencyto bemoreeasilypersuadedbypeoplewelike,aswellasinsightssuggestingthat increasedinteractionwithothersincreasesourliking.Finnemorealsofocusesonthe issueofempathy.Intermsofpolicythisareaisparticularlyinterestingaschangesin empathyareconsideredto‘createchangesinidentificationwithothers,ergochangesin politicalprioritiesforintervention’(2003:157). Farrell(2005b)alternatively,drawsmorespecificallyonsocialidentitytheoryfrom socialpsychology.Theauthorhighlightstheconceptsof‘normbolstering’and‘norm stretching’asalternativestrategiesthatmaybesoughtinrisingthreatconditions.Thisis inrelationtosituationswheremilitariesarefacedwithstrategiccircumstanceswhere theycomeintoconflictwiththenormativeregimesassetinhumanitarianlawandthose ofconventionalwarfare.Whichalternativeisadvancedissuggestedtodependonthe natureofthenorm;whetheritiswellorpoorlyestablished.Wherenormsarepoorly establisheditisthoughtthatthereismuchpotentialfornormstretching,althougha desireforlegitimacywillpreventviolation.Ifanormiswellestablishedactorsare thoughttoputmoreresourcesintobolsteringanormevenifthatcourseofactionisnot themostsatisfactoryintermsofstrategicimperatives.Psychologyisthereforeusedto illuminatethemeansbywhichactorscanbehavestrategicallywhilstatthesametime beingnormfollowers.

69 Fromthisbriefconsiderationofsomeofthewaysinwhichpsychologyhasbeenusedin constructivistresearchwecanseethatthishasbeenforavarietyofpurposes,buthas largelycentredontheneedforgreateragencyandunderstandingsatamicro foundationallevel.Thestudiesabovehavealltendedtousepsychologyinafairly minimalbutsignificantway.Thishascertainlysuitedthenatureoftheirresearch. However,Hopf(2002)highlightsfurtherreasonsforthisrestrictedusage.One particularlysignificantpointthatHopfraisesisthatpsychologyoftengoestoofarin focusingontheindividual,sacrificingtheimportanceofsocialstructures.Thisisan issuethatIwillconsiderinmoredetailbelowinrelationtotheworkofscholarssuchas VaughnShannonwhereindividualstateleadersareprivileged.IdemonstratewhyI agreewithHopf’sclaimsinthisrespect.Howeverthisdoesnotpreventfurther engagementwithpsychologyandutilisationofthemicrofoundationsthatthis disciplineprovides.ToovercomethisissueIengagetoamuchgreaterextentwiththe socialidentityapproachinsocialpsychology,whereindividualsarefirmlyembeddedin thebroadandcomplexnormativeandsocialidentitiescontext.

2.2 Decision-Making in a Normative Environment Onedistinctapproachtothequestionofdefectionfrominternationalnormativeregimes hasbeenputforwardbyVaughnShannon.Theauthorclaimsthatthesociologicalfocus ofconstructivismhascreatedanobstacletothestudyofnormviolation(ashetermsit). Insteadhisresearchcentresontheindividualdecisionmakeroperatingwithinthe internationalnormativeenvironment.Internationalnorms,inthissense,functionto constrainpolicymakersastheypursuetheirinterests,processinformation,andmake decisions.ToexplainthisShannondrawsonpsychologicalinsightsconcerning decisionmakingandarguesthatnormsoperateasshortcuts,basedonactors’needsto organizeandcomprehenddifficultsituations.Theyalsoindicatetoactorsthemeansby whichtosatisfytheirneedforsocialapproval 5andtheneedtomaintainapositiveself imagetoenhanceselfesteem.Assuchthey‘indicatepathwayslikelytobringpositive feedbacktoactors,andprovideareasonableheuristicforsuccessfulaction’(Shannon, 2000:300).Psychologicalneedsareusedtounderpintheconstructivistlogicofnorm compliance,whilstrecognisinginstrumentalimperativesaswell.

5Actorsareconsideredtobebothsociallyaware,aswellasconsciousoftheirowninterestsand instrumentalneeds. 70 Fortheviolationofinternationalnormstooccur,Shannonsuggeststhatleadersmustbe motivatedtoviolateduetoaconflictbetweentheir‘perceived“nationalinterests”anda givennorm’(2000:294).Thisconflictthendrivesactorstointerpretthesituationin suchawayastomitigatetherestraintsofthenormsotheyareabletojustifythe violationas‘sociallyacceptable’.Thisisparticularlyimportantifinternationalsocial standingisofgreatvaluetotheactor,andasaconsequenceviolationwillonlybe possibleifthereissufficientroomforinterpretingthenormorsituationinsucha fashionasitisjustified.Inthissensethe‘parametersofanormindicateunderwhat situationsthenorm’sprescriptionswillapply’(Shannon,2000:295).Toresolvethe dilemmaposedbyaconflictbetweenactorinterestsandsocialstructure,Shannon suggeststhatpolicymakersemploytheuseofaccounts.Accountgivingisaconcept studiedinpsychologyandinvolvesindividualsusingseveralmethodstojustifyaction thatisinviolationofanorm,toboththemselvesandothers(Fritsche,2002,providesa goodreviewofthetypologiesused).InShannon’sassessmentaccountstaketheformof apologies,denials,excusesandjustifications 6whichareusedto‘avoidnegativesocial judgments,andmaintainapositiveselfimage’(Shannon,2000:299).Ifactorshave boththewillandtheabilitytoviolateintermsoftheabove,violationisconsideredto beamorelikelycourseofaction. Shannondoesrecognisesomeofthefailingsofthisapproachinhislaterwork(Shannon andKeller,2007),forexamplethatthesimpleexistenceoftheabovecircumstancesis notenoughtoguaranteeviolation,andthatcomparativelyunambiguousnormscanbe violated.Nonetheless,thereisanotherissuethatIwouldliketoraisehere.Thatisthe usefulnessofframingargumentsintermsofcompliance/violationseeminglyas opposites,whichIalsoconsideredbrieflyinChapter1.Bydoingsoweappeartobe creatingavaluejudgement,associatingcompliancewith‘good’behaviourandviolation with‘bad’.Normssurelycanbeeither;thisisamatterofjudgementasappropriatedoes notnecessarilymeangoodorbad,althoughitisoftenportrayedassuchinconstructivist research(e.g.FinnemoreandSikkink,1998).Badnormscanspreadtoo,forexample Fujii(2002)exploresthediffusionofagenocidalnorminRwanda.Indeed,the normativeenvironmentisverycomplexwhereregimesoftenclash,complianceinone areamayleadtoviolationinanother–apointmissingfromassessmentthatfocuseson singularnorms.WhilstShannondoesacknowledgethatnormshavemanysources,our understandingwouldsurelybenefitfromaframeworkthatembracesthisasopposedto 6Eachhasadifferentpurposeandeffectonthenorminquestion. 71 focusingononeisolatedsourceandcomparingthistobehaviour.Inadditiontothis,by concentratingonviolationversuscompliance,italsobecomesmuchmoredifficultto considerissuessuchasthechangestothesharedmeaningofnormsthatcanresultfrom contestation.

Wecanthereforeidentifysomepotentialdifficultieswiththisapproachforthetypeof analysissoughtinthisthesisthatisheavilygroundedinmultiplicity.Thislargelyresults fromthestrictconceptsusedbyShannon.WhilstIhavefurtherreservationsaboutthis mannerofengagingwithpsychology,beforemovingontotheseIshallreflectonhow Shannonhasdevelopedthisapproach.HehasdonesopartlyincollaborationwithJon Keller,alsobasedintheUSA.Keller’sworklargelyfallsinthedomainofforeign policydecisionmakingandpoliticalpsychologysohasasimilarfocustothat consideredinthefirstsectionofthisChapter,consideringtherelevanceofpsychology totheissuesofIR. Keller’s(2005a;2005b)researchconcernstheimpactofdemocraticnormsofrestraint ondecisionmakers.Kellerfocusesondomesticconstraint,anddifferentiatesbetween directconstraintsandpotentialconstraints.Mostconstraintsarenotconsideredtobe direct,theyareinsteadpotentialinnature,andassuchtheymustbeinterpretedby leadersbeforetheycanexertaninfluenceonpolicy.Thecoreoftheargumentisthat potentialconstraintcannotbededucedfromtheapparentnatureoftheconstraintinstead thiscanonlybeunderstoodinrelationtothepersonalityinforminginterpretation. Theauthorproposestwoapproachestoconstraint,constraintrespectersandconstraint challengers.Theformerinvolvesleaderswhotendtointernalisetheconstraintsoftheir environment,whereasthelatterfocusesonconstraintsasobstacles.Theseconceptsare thenusedtoanalysedecisionmakingprocessesintimesofcrisis.Fourfactorswere consideredtobeparticularlyrelevantindeterminingwhetheraleaderwastobe characterisedasaconstraintrespecterorchallenger.Theseincludedacontinuumonthe followingaspects;taskorinterpersonalemphasis,theneedforpower,distrust,and nationalism.Thefirsttwoshapesensitivitytoconstraintsingeneralandthesecond,the tendencytopursueviolentpolicy. Kellerexplorestheimpactofthesefactorsintimesofcrisisasitisinthese circumstancesthat‘theconnectionbetweenleaders’characteristicsandtheirstates’

72 foreignpolicybehaviorislikelytobeparticularlystrong’(2005b:214).Theauthortests arangeofhypothesesrelatingtoexpectationsofthetechniquesthatconstraint respectersorchallengerswillemploytomanagecrisesanddomesticconstraint.Thisis regardingthecrisesofVietnam(1961)andLaos(1961)inrelationtoPresident Kennedy(ratedasaconstraintrespecter),andGrenada(1983)andLibya(1986)in relationtoPresidentReagan(ratedasaconstraintchallenger)(Keller,2005a). Whilsttherearesomesituationaldifferences,Keller(2005a:862)arguesthatthe‘very differentperceptionsandresponsestopotentialpacifyingconstraintsexhibitedby KennedyandReagan’cannotbeattributedtothesefactorsalone,butinstead demonstratetheimportanceofleadershipstyleinrelationtodomesticconstraint. Leadershipstyleisconsideredtobeahighlysignificantsourceofvariationinhow leadersperceiveandrespondtodomesticconstraints,yetKellercertainlydoesnot suggestthatthisfactorworksalone. 7 InalaterpaperauthoredbyShannonandKeller(2007)theseissuesofpersonalityand leadershipstylearerelateddirectlytotheviolationofinternationalnorms.Theauthors buildontheirrespectiveanalysisandproposethatviolationisinfactheavilyinfluenced bythebeliefsanddecisionmakingstylesofleaders.Twoareasareconsideredin determiningleadershipstyle–howsensitivetheactoristothe‘politicalcontext’and howthey‘viewtheinternationalenvironment’.Ifactorsaredeemedtobelowin sensitivitytopoliticalcontext,andviewtheworldintermsresemblingaHobbesian stateofnature,thentheyareconsideredtohavemotivationtoviolate.Thoseleaders consideredtobemoresensitivetotheirpoliticalcontextandwithamorefavourable worldoutlookaredeemedtobelesslikelytoviolateinternationalnorms. Theauthorsprovideanillustrationoftheseargumentswithreferencetothe2003 militaryinterventioninIraq.ThroughaconsiderationofU.S.officialsinvolvedinthe decisiontogotowarinIraq, 8ShannonandKellersuggestthat‘distrust’and‘ingroup bias’arethemostimportantfactorsinpredictingactors’orientationtowardsviolation. 9

7Kellersuggeststhatthereisaneedforamorecompletemodelthatalsoaccountsfortheinfluenceof situationalfactorsandthe‘precisecharacteroftheconstraintsthemselves’(2005a:860). 8PresidentGeorgeW.Bush,VicePresidentDickCheney,SecretaryofDefenseDonaldRumsfeld, SecretaryofStateColinPowell,andDeputySecretaryofDefensePaulWolfowitz.SenatorJohnKerryis alsoincludedtoincreasevariationonthedependantvariable.(Positionsasattimeofintervention). 9Task/interpersonalemphasis,needforpower,beliefinabilitytocontrolevents,selfconfidence, conceptualcomplexityweretheotherfactorstested. 73 ThismovesbeyondShannon’s(2000)previousworkconcerningthebeliefthatstates wishtoavoid‘antisocial’normviolationtoenhanceapositiveselfimage,andinstead focus’onvariationinthisduetopersonalityfactors. ShannonandKellerciteHermann’s(1999)previousconsiderationoftheseissuesfor clarificationonthedifferencesbetweentheconcepts.Hermannsuggeststhatforthose highindistrustandingroupbias: Internationalpoliticsiscenteredaroundasetofadversariesthatareviewedas“evil”andintenton spreadingtheirideologyorextendingtheirpowerattheexpenseofothers;leadersperceivethattheyhave amoralimperativetoconfronttheseadversaries;asaresult,theyarelikelytotakerisksandtoengagein highlyaggressiveandassertivebehaviour(1999:29). Forthosewhoarelowinthesetraits: [The]worldisnotathreateningplace;conflictsareperceivedascontextspecificandarereactedtoona casebycasebasis;leadersrecognizethattheircountry,likemanyothers,hastodealwithcertain constraintsthatlimitwhatonecandoandcallforflexibilityofresponse;moreover,therearecertain internationalarenaswherecooperationwithothersisbothpossibleandfeasible.[Their]focusisontaking advantageofopportunitiesandbuildingrelationships(1999:28) Itseemsfromthisthenthatthosewhoarehighinthetraitsofdistrustandingroupbias arelikelytodisregardinternationalnormsasineffectual.ShannonandKellersuggest thatallmembersoftheBushAdministrationstudied,exceptColinPowell,wererated highondistrustandingroupbias.Whilsttheauthorsdoacknowledgethatthis approachdoesnotdiminishtheimportanceofstructure(insteaditistosupplementthis) theimportancetheyplaceonindividualfactorssuchaspersonalityiscleartosee. Thisapproachtoconstructivismisbasedoninternationalnormsasenvironmental constraintstowhichdecisionmakersvaryintheirsensitivity. 10 Psychologyplaysa majorroleinanalysisofthiskindandisincorporatedinafairlydirectmanner. Psychologyisusedtoprovidethemeansbywhichtoassessthemicrofoundationsof constructivistideasconcerningtheinfluenceofspecificinternationalnormsandtheir effectonindividuals.ShannonandKellersuggestthatwhilstwehaveseenamoveto ‘secondwaveconstructivism’whereagents(individuals,collectivesorstates)are 10 Thisisalsotrueofotherauthorsthathaveconsideredtheroleofpsychologyinconstructivism,for exampleGoldgeierandTetlock(2001),intermsoftradeoffreasoningandboundeddecisionmaking. 74 deemedtointernalisenormstodifferingdegreesweshouldinfactmovebeyondthis understandingtofocusmoreonhownormsareperceivedorunderstoodbyindividuals andhowtheyfunctionwithinthepolicymakingprocess.Thisalsoreflectsmovesin politicalpsychologytoengagemorewithconstructivismtoprovideamoremainstream basisfortheirinsights(Houghton,2007). Suchanapproachdoesindeedfitwiththedirectionthatmanyhaveaskedof constructivismintermsofbridgingthegapbetweeninternationalnormsand individuals,givinggreaterspecificationofhowtheyfunctionandareinfluentialatthis level(forexampleYee,1996).Whilsttheauthorsdoclarifythattheydonot‘dismiss normsoutofhandasdorealists’(ShannonandKeller,2007:82),astheirpurposeisto approachquestionsofwhyviolationoccurs,itisquestionablehowmuchisleftofthe constructivistunderstandingofinternationalnormsparticularlyintermsoftheir constitutiveeffects.Theindividualisquiteisolatedfromthebroadernormative environment,interactiveprocessesarenegated,andconstraintssimplyseemtoboil downtoamatterofchoicewithlittleregardfortheroleofaudiencesinthisprocess. Byisolatingtheindividualandaspecificsingularinternationalnormtosuchanextent weseemtobemovingawayfromthecoreofconstructivism,perhapsmoretowardsthe domainofneoliberalism. Tobefair, someaspectsoftheaboveresearchsuggestthat internationalnormsareconstitutiveforsomeleadersandnotforothers.However,we mustthenaskwheredotheinterestscomefromforthoseleadersthatarenotinfluenced byinternationalnorms,aretheysingularlyheldinterests,intereststhataredominantin thedecisionmakinggroup,reflectiveofthewiderdomesticpopulation,orarethey somehow‘natural’?IwouldtendtofollowMeyer’s(2006:527)statementthat,actors ‘cannotextractthemselvesandtheirpotentialutilitarianconsiderationsfromthecultural andsocialcontextinwhichtheyareembeddedandtheiractionswillalwaysreflectthis context.’ TheapproachtakenbyShannonsuffersfromtoomuchtopdownemphasisin termsoftheinfluenceofinternationalnormsasopposedtoaninteractiveprocess;also themeaningoftheinternationalnorminquestionissimplyassumed.Thisagainreflects theissuesraisedinthepreviousChapter. Soisitreallytheindividualidentityoftheelitepolicymakersthatweshouldbe concernedwithinassessingtheinfluenceandcontestationofinternationalnormative regimes?Whataboutthesocialaspectsofidentity?Whataretheimplicationsofthis

75 individualanalysisforconstructivistresearch?Certainly,bypresentinginternational normsinthewaythatShannondoes,thelinkbetweennormsandidentity,andtherefore theirinfluence,appearstobemarkedlyreduced.Yet,giventhesocialandcollective natureofinternationalnormativeregimescanourunderstandingoftheseissuesreally comedowntoafewkeyplayersandtheirpersonalitytounderstandthenegotiationof internationalnormativeconstraints?AlthoughShannonandKellerarejustifiedin pointingtothepreviouslybroadclaimsmadebyconstructivisttheoristsconcerningthe powerofstructuralvariablestoconstrainstateaction,andhencetheirinabilityto accountforviolation,Iquestionwhethertheygiveslightlytoomuchagencytothe individualasopposedtoembeddingtheminbroaderstructures.IndeedIdisagreethat theindividualcantrulybeisolatedtosuchanextentasisrequiredinresearchofthis nature. 2.3 Norms, Identity and the Social Identity Approach Theresearchoutlinedaboveisbynomeanstheonlywaywecanengagewith psychologyinordertoprovideamicrofoundationalassessmentofnormativeinfluence andcontestationininternationalaffairs.TheareaIshallnowexploreisthepotential contributionofthesocialidentityapproachfromsocialpsychology. 11 WhilstShannon’s accountdoesnotreallyconsideridentity(thiswasonlyintermsofindividual personality),socialpsychologists,particularlythoseworkingfromthesocialidentity approachhaveincorporatedthe‘multifacetedandsituationallycontingent’natureof identityintotheiranalysis(Huddy,2001:127128),andassuchwouldseemtohave muchtoofferconstructivismonthebasisoutlinedinChapter1,wheremultiplicityand changinginterpretationsweredrawnoutaskeyfactorsfromtheliterature. Insightsfromthisapproachtopsychologyhavebeenappliedtoissuesininternational relationssuchasintergroupconflict(forexampleGibson,2006;Mercer,1995),to assesspotentialthreat(Gries,2005),societalsecurity(Thelier,2003),normdiffusion (Flockhart,2005,2006),andtheroleofrecognitioninidentityformation(Greenhill, 2008).WhilstthesecontributionsspandifferenttheoreticalapproachestoIR,inthis sectionIshallconcentratespecificallyonusageinconstructivism.Inmanyrespectsthe socialidentityapproachishighlycomplementarytoconstructivistresearch.Thisis partlyduetoasharedconcernwiththeimpactofnorms,socialinfluence,andthe

11 ThisapproachwasbrieflymentionedwithregardstotheworkofFarrell(2005b)earlierinthisChapter, whichspecificallyengagedwithSIT. 76 functioningofidentities.Asthesocialidentityapproachiscentredontherelationship betweentheindividualandsocialgroupsthisperspectiveisaparticularlyappropriate areaofpsychologywithwhichtoengage. Itisperhapssurprisingthen,thatconstructivistscholarshavenotgrantedmoreattention tothisdevelopingresearchprogram. 12 Logicalconnectionsarecertainlyripetobemade giventhesimilaritiesinresearchfocus.Infact,constructivistscholarshaveinthepast beencriticalofthevalueanyenhancedengagementmaybring(Checkel,1998:345). Thispositionisunderstandablegivensomeofthedifficultieswithearlyinsightsin termsoftheirapplicabilitytorealworldsituationsbeyondthelaboratory.Theposition advancedinthisthesis,however,reflectsthegrowingbodyofresearchwithinthesocial identityapproachthataddressestheseandotherconcerns. Thisapproachtosocialpsychologyisbasedonagrowingbodyofliteraturethat originatedinthe1970s.Unliketheformsofpsychologydrawnuponintheprevious section,thesocialidentityapproachconcentratesonsocialgroups ; socialidentityis definedintermsofgroupmembershiporassociationwithagroup.13 Thekeytenetsof thisperspectivearefoundinbothSocialIdentityTheory(SIT)andSelfCategorization Theory(SCT),which,takentogether,presentanaccountofthepsychologicalprocesses ofgroupmembershiprelatedtothecomparativecontextandbasedonassumptionsof motivationformembership. SITwasintroducedbyTajfelandTurnerin1979toexplainfindingsgeneratedina seriesof‘minimalgroupexperiments’ 14 (Tajfel,Billig,BundyandFlament.1971);how itwasthatindividualscametoexpresspreferencesforaningroupdefinedonthebasis ofminimalsharedcharacteristicssuchasbeinglabelledashavingapreferenceforthe paintingsofKandinskyorKlee.15 The‘simpledesignationofgroupboundaries’was

12 NotableexceptionsincludeFlockhart(2005;2006),Greenhill(2008). 13 Theconceptofsocialidentityhasvariousmeaningsacrossthesocialsciences.Forareviewofthe differenttypesofsocialidentityconceptionsseeBrewer(2001). 14 Thisinvolvesvolunteersthathavenotpreviouslymet.Afterbeingaskedtoestimatethenumberofdots onascreenparticipantsaredividedintogroups,whichtheyareledtobelieveisbasedontheirhaving overorunderestimatedintheirapproximation.Theallocationisactuallycompletelyrandom.Having beenassigned,thegroupsareaskedtodistributemoneybetweentheirgroupandtheother;thisisdoneon thebasisofpredefinedmatrices.Whilstwewouldexpectparticipantstohavenopreferenceon distribution,theyactuallyshowstrongingroupfavouritisminbothabsoluteandrelativeterms. 15 Threevariablesareconsideredtoinfluenceingroupfavouritism.Firstly,theextenttowhich individualsidentifywiththegroupandinternalizethegroupmembershipanditbecomespartoftheir selfconcept.Secondly,howmuchthecontextinwhichweareinmakescomparisonwitharelevantout groupmeaningful,andthirdlytherelevancethatthiscomparisonhas(TajfelandTurner,1979).Ishallnot 77 enoughtoleadtothebasicconstructionofasocialidentity,whichconsequentlyhadan impactonthedecisionmakingbehaviourofindividualsinthegroup(Huddy,2001: 133).HoggandAbrams(1988:16)suggestthatthisreflectsaprocessbywhichthe group‘installsitselfinthemindoftheindividual’;theindividualnotonlybecomesa memberofthegroup,butthegroupalsobecomesconstitutiveoftheindividual.As individualsaremembersofmanygroupstheyhavemultiplesocialidentitieswiththe potentialtoinfluencebehaviour.Thisinfluenceisdependentonsocialidentitysalience; thatwhichissalientformsthebasisofourselfconceptionintermsof‘oursenseofself andassociatedperceptions,feelings,attitudesandbehaviour’(HoggandVaughan, 2005:127).Thishasasignificantbearingforconstructivistswhenassessingtheimpact ofinternationalnormativeregimesonthebehaviourofstatesorpoliticalelitesasthere aremultiplenormativeinfluencestoconsiderthatmayormaynotbecomplementary– forexamplethoseassociatedwithmembershipofahumanrightssocialgrouping,the UN,orindeedthemilitaryprofession.Ourattentionisdirectedtosocialgroup memberships,withtheirvaryingcontent,tounderstanddisparitiesininternational normativeinfluence,thisisincontrasttootherareasofpsychologymentioned previouslythatconcentrateinvestigationontheattributesoftheindividual. SCTbuildsontheinsightsofSITbyhighlightingtheimportanceofcategorisationin theprocessofsocialidentitysalience.Categorisationintosocialgroupsservestosatisfy thebasichumanneedtoreducecognitivecomplexityandcreateadegreeofparsimony, withregardstothecomplexsocialworld.Weneedlooknofurtherthanthediscourseof stateleadersintheUSAandUKtoseeevidenceofsuchfactors,forexamplethevery broadcategorisationoftheworldintocivilizedandnoncivilizedgroupings.Through theprocessofselfcategorisationsocialidentitysalienceisreached.Thisinvolvesa seriesofstageswherethesocialidentityis‘ situationally accessible, and chronically accessible ’,ithasagood‘ structural fit ’,‘ normative fit ’,andcan‘satisfy uncertainty reduction ’and‘ self-enhancement ’tobecomepsychologicallysalient(Hoggand Vaughan,2005:128(seealsoTable2,page78)).Selfcategorisationasagroupmember enactstheassociatedsocialidentity(thenormativecontentisthoughttobelargely derivedfromprototypicalmembers),which,whensalientformsthebasisofour interests;ifweidentifyhighlywithaparticulargroupabenefittothegroupis

befocusingontheareasconcerningintergroupconflict.Thisisstillanareaverymuchunderdebatein theliterature,whetherornotmotivationtowardsaningroupwillleadtoconflict(seeGibson,2006). 78 consideredtobeabenefittotheself.Afavourablerepresentationofthesocialgroupis thereforetakenasapositivereflectionontheself. Wecantakeanexampleherefromconstructivistresearch,wherebeingaliberal democraticstateisgenerallyunderstoodtoinfluencethehumanrightsbehaviourof stateswiththissocialidentity. 16 Ifwefollowthemicrofoundationalinsightsgenerated inthesocialidentityapproach,beingaliberaldemocraticstateformsthebasisofan internationalgroupingofstateswithlikemindedpoliticalelites.Ifpoliticalelites identifyhighlywiththissocialgroupanditissalientinthecontextthenthenormsthat constitutethegroupwillbeinfluentialandfavourablerepresentationswillbeseento reflectpositivelyonmembers.However,asthiswillalwaysbeonlyoneofmanygroup memberships(evenifitgenerallydominates)themicrofoundationalinsightsprovided bythesocialidentityapproachallowsignificantroomforvariationininfluence dependingonshiftsinbothcontextandidentificationwiththesocialgroups.These factors,includingthesalienceofrepresentationsofthesocialgroupareessentialtoany assessmentofnormativeimpact.Inthecaseofthisthesis,thesalienceofmembership ofagroupofliberaldemocraticstatesisessentialtounderstandcontestationofthe internationalnormativeregimeprescribingminimumstandardsfordetentionand prohibitingtorture. Whilstthismakesitappearthatcontextdictatespreciselywhichisolatedsocialidentity ismostsalientforuswemustnotethat,‘socialidentitiesareemergenthigherorder productsthatare transformed bycontext,ratherthanmerelyaggregatedfromit’ (HaslamandEllemers,2005:72).Wedonotcompletelyswitchidentitydependenton oursituation,yetthereisadegreeofreorganisationwherecertainaspectsobtain greatersignificanceduetotheircontextualrelevance.Forexample,oursocialidentities suchasgenderoragewillvaryinsalienceacrosssituationsyettheydonotdisappear. Theemphasisisoncontexttoexplainsalienceandthiswillinturninfluence comparisonsthataremadetotheoutgroup.

16 SeeFierke’s(2007)reviewofconstructivismforthispoint. 79 Table 2. Social Identity Salience

Socialcategorisation‘X’is situationally accessible ,and chronically accessible

Hascategorisation‘X’gotgood structural fit ? Ifno–tryanew Doesitaccountforrelevantsimilaritiesand Categorisation differencesbetweenpeopleinthecontext?

Ifyes–hascategorisation‘X’gotgood Ifno–tryanew normative fit? Doesitmakesenseofpeople’s Categorisation behaviourinthecontext? Ifyes–doescategorisation‘X’satisfy Ifno–tryanew uncertainty reduction inthatcontext? Categorisation

Ifyes–doescategorisation‘X’satisfy Ifno–tryanew self-enhancement motivesinthatcontext? Categorisation

Ifyes–categorisation‘X’isthe psychologically salient basisforself conceptioninthatcontext. (TakenfromHoggandVaughan,2005:128)

Ifindividualscometodefinethemselvesintermsofaparticulargroupmembershipthen thenormsofthatsocialidentityareseenascrucialtoidentitymaintenance(Postmes, HaslamandSwaab,2005).Our‘beliefsaboutappropriatebehavior’aredeemedtobea directconsequenceofour‘selfperceptionasagroupmember’(Christensen, Rothgerber,WoodandMatz,2004:1296). Thereisofcoursemuchmoretothisapproach,furtherelementswillbehighlighted throughouttheremainderofthisChapterasIoutlinetheframeworkforanalysisinthis thesis.Thereisindeedawealthofliteratureinpsychologyexploringanddebatingthe differentfactorsinthisapproach.Fornowthoughwehaveasufficientbasisfromwhich toevaluatetheuseofthesocialidentityapproachinconstructivism. OneprominentexampleisthatofFlockhart(2005;2006)whoundertakesasubstantial engagementwithSITinordertounderstandvariationconcerningthediffusionof internationalnormsdomestically.Theauthorposesthequestionofwhy‘thesame normsmattersodifferentlytoapparentlysimilaragents’(2006:90).Asopposedtojust focusingontheelitelevel(asinShannon’swork),areconceptualisationofthestateis proposedintermsoftwodistinctsocialgroups,the‘mass’andthe‘elite’,varyingin socialconstructionand‘categorizationprocesses’,thusleadingto‘verydifferent conceptionsofinterestsandpoliticalpreferences’(2005:252).Thiswillthenaffectthe

80 perceptionofthenormset(Flockhart’sterm)inquestionandwhetherornotitwillbe influential;therelationsbetweenthesetwogroups(themassandelite),whethertheyare inagreementornot,isthoughttodependonthenormsetinquestion. Flockhart(2006)usestheexampleofDenmarktoillustratethatevenwhere‘the traditionaldomesticstructureconceptwouldbecharacterizedbyhomogenousrelations betweeneliteandmass,asocialdemocraticethosandaparticularsetofpolitical structuresandcoalitionprocesses,onewillfindthattheconstellationaroundstate/elite nation/peopleiscompletelydifferentinthecasesofEuropeanizationandHuman Rights’(2006:99100).Byviewingthestateintermsoftwodifferentsocialgroupswe appeartobebetterplacedtounderstandvariationsinnormativeinfluence. Toapproachthequestionofnormdiffusionhowever,Flockhartalsoneedstobeableto accountforshiftingnormsets.After‘acriticaljuncture’orsomeformof‘commonly destabilizingshock’(theexampleoftheendoftheColdWarisgiven)Flockhart suggeststhatagentsexperience‘anideationalvacuum,wherepreviouslyheldstable ideasnolongerprovideabaseforproblemsolvingandpolicymaking’(2005:259). 17 AsinHoggandVaughan’smodelofsocialidentitysalience,ifasocialidentityis unabletosatisfythosefactorsidentified,anewcategorisationoftheselfwillbesought intermsofadifferentsocialgroupmembershipbecomingsalientorindeedanewone beingdeveloped.Inthisperioddifferentideasetscompete,thoseofthepreferredsocial groupthenwinout.Theseideasarethengraduallyinternalisedintothedomestic structuresofthestate,successfuldiffusiondependingonacceptancebyboththemass andelite. TheframeworkthatFlockhartpresentsisquitecomplexandIdonotwishtore articulatethewholeargumenthere.InsteadIshalldrawoutthemainpointsthatthe socialidentityapproachadds.ThesebuildontheinsightsofMarcussen,Risse, EnglemannMartin,KnopfandRoscher(1999)suggestingthatchangeinthenormsets ofelitesistheresultofacriticaljuncture.Researchinthesocialidentityapproach proposesthatifthesocialgroupisnolongersatisfactoryintermsofthecriteriainthe model,thentherewillbeaneedfornewsocialmembership.Ifthereisadesirefor membership, 18 thesocialidentityofthegroupwillbeacceptedandhencetheassociated

17 InthisFlockhartisdrawingonMartinMarcussen’s(2000)ideationallifecycle. 18 Itisnotthoughttobepossibletosocialiseagentsthatdon’twishtobelong. 81 normsornormativeregimesbecomeinfluential. 19 Thesocialidentityapproachleadsus totheconclusionthatthesalientnormativeregimeswillbethoseassociatedwiththe socialgroupattributedwiththe‘mostpositivevalue’(Flockhart,2006:96).Thisrefers predominantlytothestatelevelandinternationalgroupmembership.However,within thestatethereisvariationintermsofsocialgroups.Flockhartreferstotheeliteandthe mass,althoughasIproposeinthefollowingsectionIintendtoextendthistoconsider othersectorssuchasthemilitary,legal,humanrightsandhumanitarian,UN,andliberal democraticsocialgroups.Ifmembershipofthenewinternationalgroupisnot consideredimportantforthesocialgroupofthemassorelite(itcanworkbothways) thenthechancesofacceptanceofnewnormsetsareheavilyreduced.

Thesecontributionsprovidesignificantadvantages,andservetodemonstratepotential benefitsforconstructivistsindrawingoninsightsfromthesocialidentityapproach. However,againtherearelimitations.GivenFlockhart’sconcernwithnormdiffusion emphasisisunderstandablyplacedonthis,internalisationinvolving‘successfulnorms transfer,achievedoncethebehaviouralattributesofthenormsetnolongerrequire activeenforcementandnormconsistentbehaviourhasachievedastatusof‘takenfor grantedness’’(2006:98).This,however,favoursafocusontheprogressionfrom previouslyheldnormsetstothoseinlinewiththeEuroAtlanticcommunity,desirefor membershipofthisgroupdeterminingnormacceptanceandleadingtoprocessesof diffusionandinternalisationdependingonthenation’speopleandpoliticalelite.Such anapproachseemstosuggestapositiveonewayprocesstowardsthenormsofthe EuroAtlanticcommunityandassuchadegreeoffinalityisimpliedinthenorms achieving‘takenforgrantedness’.Doesthisthenleaveuswiththesameproblemsthat werediscussedinChapter1,inthatwearepuzzledbytheemergenceofbehaviourthat appearstobecontrarytothesenormsorsuggestsadegreeofcontestationordefection aftertheyseemtobeembeddedintermsofthetwogroups? Certainly,Flockhart’sanalysisdoesrefertothepossibilityof‘desocialization’ofan ‘unacceptablenormset’either‘graduallythroughlongtermpersuasiveargument’or ‘followinganeventthatisperceivedasacriticaljuncturewithinthesociety/social groupinquestion’(2006:107).Thisistoexplainnormchangethrougheithertopdown orbottomupprocesses,changemayoccurthrougheithertheeliteormassfirst.

19 Althoughthisisthoughttovaryintermsofdegreeofidentificationwiththesocialgroup(e.g.Jetten,J., Postmes,T.,Mcauliffe,B.J.,2002). 82 However,thereseemstobeadegreeoftensionbetweenthestabilityimpliedin internalisationandthefluidityrequiredforthechangesinsocialidentitysalienceofthe socialidentityapproachthatneedstobefurtheraddressed.Conventionalconstructivism isbasedonarelativelystableunderstandingofnormsandidentity,whereasmuchlessis takentobeenduringinthesocialidentityapproach,asemphasisisplacedonthe contextspecificnatureofsocialidentity(Huddy,2001;2002).Indeed,thedegreeto whichidentityiscontextdependentorenduringiscontestedinthesocialidentity literatureandisgenerallytakentobeanempiricalquestion.Suchdisagreementsshould notbeignoredastheygeneratefurtheravenuesforenquiryasopposedtoassumptions tomake. Furthermore,theinsightsprovidedbyFlockhartdonottakeintoaccountthe multiplicityofsocialidentities(theEuroAtlanticcommunityandthesubgroupsofthe massandeliteformthefocusofanalysis)orthecomplexityoftheinternational normativeenvironmentthatareessentialtounderstandingthequestionsofconcernin thisthesis.Indeed,theaboveanalysisdoesnotengagewithmorerecentadvancements inthesocialidentityapproachthatmoveawayfromthepreviouslymechanistic causationalflowfromcontext,tothesalienceofaparticularsocialidentity,toactionsin linewiththatsocialidentity.Thedynamicandinteractivenatureofnormativeinfluence, contestationandmultiplicityarenotbroughttothefore.TheremainderofthisChapter engageswiththeseandothermorerecentadvancementsinthesocialidentityapproach, andindoingsobuildstheframeworkforanalysistakeninthisthesis. 2.4 Developments in the Social Identity Approach Thereareseveralareaswheretherehasbeensignificantprogressinthesocialidentity approach,thatarebeneficialtoconstructivistresearch.Theserevolvearoundquestions concerningidentityformation(Postmes,HaslamandSwaab,2005),causationalflows andtheroleandcharacterisationofcontext(Klein,SpearsandReicher,2007),aswell asissuesofleadership(HaslamandReicher,2007)andthemanagementstrategies employedtocopewithoftencompetingsocialidentities(RoccasandBrewer,2002; HaslamandReicher,2007).Ofprimaryconcernforthequestionsofthisthesisare causationalflows,leadershipandthemanagementofsocialidentities.Thesekeyareas willprovidethebasisfortheframeworkofunderstandingemployedinthisstudy.

83 Traditionallythesocialidentityapproachhasbeenassociatedwithahighlymechanistic andonewaycausationalflowfromcontexttosocialidentitysaliencetoaction. However,Kleinetal(2007)haveexpandedthisframeworktoincludereciprocalflows andengagewiththestrategicsidetoidentityperformance.Kleinetal(2007:41) provideempiricalresearchtosuggestabidirectionalapproachwhere‘causalitycanflow backfromperformancetoidentityandtocontext.’Theyoutlinevariouswaysinwhich thesedynamicrelationshipsmayoccur.Suchanapproachsharesgreatersimilarities withthekeytenetsofconstructivismrelatingtotheimportanceofpracticeswhichare bothaconsequenceofcontextandidentity,butalsoameansbywhichidentityand contextareshaped. 20 Thisisdevelopedandsupportedatalevelofanalysisthatdraws individualactorsintothepicture.Theinteractiveelementiscertainlyanessential componentofthepositiontakeninthisthesis,toassessthecontestationandnegotiation ofnormativeconstraintregardingdetentionpracticesintheinternationalsphere.This allowsforgreaterintegrationofstructureandagency,crucialwhenourobjectiveisto understandprocessesofdefectionandcontestation,withoutnegatingtheimportanceof thebroadernormativeandsocialidentitiescontext. AnotherinterestingfacetoftheresearchpresentedbyKleinetalreflectsagrowing trendinthesocialidentityapproachfocusingontheinfluenceofleadersinconstructing particularsocialidentities.Thisapproachdiffersconsiderablyfromotherwaysinwhich constructivistshaveengagedwithleadership,ofteneitherbynegatingtheimportanceof leadershiponcenormsareinternalized(Risseetal,1999)orbyfocusingonthe attributesleaderspossess(ShannonandKeller,2007).Researchinthesocialidentity approachprivilegessocialcategorymembership,asopposedtoindividual characteristics.Leadershipisdemonstratedtobefundamentallydependentonthe developmentofasharedidentityandincontrasttoaprioritisationofthespecific personalitytraits,beliefs,andattitudesheldbyindividuals,leadershipisseenas‘a muchmoredynamic,activeandpracticalprocessofsocialidentitymanagement’ (HaslamandReicher,2007:141). Researchinthisexpandingareaofthesocialidentityapproachhastendedtofocuson thecapacityforleaderstoreceivesupport, 21 basedonanalysisoffollowers(Duckand

20 Althoughthedegreeofseparationbetweenperformance,identity,andcontextsuggestedinKleinetal’s characterisationwillnotsuitallscholarsworkingwithintheconstructivistresearchprogramme. 21 Notingfactorssuchasleaders’prototypicality,distributiveness,fairness,oridentityaffirming behaviour. 84 Fielding,2003).HaslamandReicher(2007:125),however,argueforamoredynamic approachtothe‘relationshipbetweenleadership,socialidentity,andsocialreality.’ Throughstudyingtheinteractiveprocessesbetweenleaders,ontheonehandassharing identitieswithfollowers,andasontheothercreatingandmanagingthesesocial identities,wecanappreciatethe‘balancebetweenexistingconstraintsandfuture possibilities,’dependentonthewayinwhichactorsharnesssocialidentitiesand constructsocialreality(HaslamandReicher,2007:128).Ofteninconstructivist researchnormentrepreneursandnormleadersappeartobesomehowisolatedfromthe broadernormativecontext,asmentionedinChapter1.Thesocialidentityapproach addressesthisissuebyhighlightingtheinteractiveprocessesthatfunctionatthemicro level,intermsofthisthesis,inrelationtopoliticalelites. Thisapproachtoleadershipdiffersfromthatwhichisoftentakeninpsychologyand politicalpsychologyinthatitdirectsresearchtowardtheprocessesofsocialidentity management.AsHaslamandReichersuggest,leadership‘ismoreaboutdoingthan having’(2007:141).Incontrasttothemoretraditionalinterpretationsofthesocial identityapproach,thesedevelopmentsalsoallowagreaterroleforstateleadersand politicalelitesintermsofmanipulatingsocialidentitieswithregardstotheirfitto contextaswellassalience.Thisprocessisrestricted,however,byaudiencesand context.Thesefactorsareconsideredtobecentralininfluencingandorganizing constructionsofsocialreality. Theaboveinsightssharemuchincommonwithconstructivismbroadlyconceived,but focuspredominantlyonthecognitiveandsocialmicrofoundationsaswellasquestions ofleadershipprocesses,areasthatarehighlyrelevanttothequestionsofconcerninthis thesis.IntheremainderofthisChapter,Idemonstratehowaframeworkfocusing specificallyonthemanagementofsocialidentitiesbypoliticalelites,intermsofthe socialgroupsassociatedwiththestate,canprovidesignificantinsightintotheprocesses ofcontestationanddefectionfromtheinternationaldetentionregime. 3. A Framework for Understanding Asoutlinedabove,thesocialidentityapproachhasdevelopedintoamoreinteractive anddynamicperspective,muchmorebeneficialforunderstandingcontestationand defection.Insightspointtothecentralityoftheprocessesofsocialidentitymanagement

85 inunderstandingtheinteractionsbetweencontext,thesocialidentitiesassociatedwith thestate,normativeinfluence,andbehaviour.Iproposethatinordertoappreciatethe processesofcontestationregardingtheinternationaldetentionregimewehavemuchto gainfromassessingthemanagementstrategiesemployedbypoliticalelites.They provideaframeworkfromwhichtounderstandtheinteractivenatureofnormative constraintinspecificcases. Researchintothemanagementofsocialidentitiesisanotherareawheretherehasbeen significantdevelopmentinthesocialidentityapproach.Whilstpreviouslaboratory basedsocialidentitystudieshavetendedtofocusonclearlydefinedgroups,witha singularsalientingroupandoutgroup,thepoliticalcontextisclearlymuchmore complicatedthanthis. 22 Leadersinparticular,arelimitedinhowfartheycanoperateon astraightforwardingroup/outgroupdynamicsincethesocialenvironmentinvolves manymembershipsandaudiences.Thesocialidentityapproach,furthermore,has traditionallybeenbasedonahierarchicalunderstandingofsocialgroups,whereoneis morehighlyvaluedthantherest.Yetthisdoesnotreallycapturethecomplexitiesofthe politicalenvironmentandthenecessitytomaintaindifferentmembershipsandthus socialidentitiessimultaneously.Inthepoliticalspherewemustalsonotethat boundariesarelesslikelytobeclearlydefined. 23 Inlightoftheseconcernssocialidentityscholarshaveincreasinglyengagedwith questionsofmanagementstrategiesasopposedtorelyingonthatofhierarchyacrossall circumstances. 24 Scholarsarerecognising,moreandmore,thatcompetingframesof reference(basedonsocialgroupmembership)canbesimultaneouslysalientoroverlap (e.g.Reicher,HaslamandHopkins,2005).Thushowthesemembershipsarenegotiated, howweunderstandsocialinfluenceinlightofoverlappingandinterconnected categoriesandhowwedealwithcompetingnormativepressuresbecomesamatterof significantinterest.Indeed,thisisanareathathasalsooftenbeenneglectedincertain strandsofconstructivism,wheretheemphasishasbeenontheimpactanddefection

22 OneexampleofarealworldstudyhighlightingthisisprovidedbyGibson(2006).Inhisassessmentof ingroupattachmentthefindingssuggestthat‘theinfluencesonpeoplearenotpurified;instead,theyare oftenhighlycrosscuttingandcontextual’(2006:697). 23 Foraninterestingstudythatconsiderstheconstructionofboundariesbetweeningroupandoutgroup, wheretheyaredrawn,andtheirimplicationsforcooperationandconflictseeRousseau(2006). 24 Thehierarchicalrankingofsocialgroupsintermsofsalienceandimportance. 86 fromsingularinternationalnormsorshiftsfromoneidentitytoanothertoexplain change. 25 Anincreasingnumberofsocialidentitystudieshavedemonstratedthatwedonot simplyswitchbetweendifferentsocialidentitiesassimplisticinterpretationsofthe socialidentityapproachhavesuggested(e.g.Kleinetal,2007).26 Insteadweattemptto rendercompatibleourvariousdifferentsocialidentities.Onecomplicatingor constrainingfactorinthisprocessisthatofthevariousaudiencestowhichthereis potentialaccountability.Audiencescanbothjudgeandcontestanactor’sclaimtobe partof,orindeedrepresentativeof,aparticularsocialidentity,aswelltheir interpretationofthatwhichconstitutesthesocialidentity(Kleinetal,2007).The ‘multiplicityofaccountabilitypressures’,ascharacterisedbyKleinetal(2007:41),is certainlyevidentforleadersinthepoliticalsphere.Indeed,associalidentitiesareby definitionshared‘theindividualcannoteasilyredefineoradjustonesocialidentityto betterfitwithotheridentities’(Brewer,2001:122);thisisdependentonpersuasionand acceptancebythevariousaudiences.Inthecontextofinternationalpoliticsitis certainlyfairtosaythattherearesignificantpressuresandstrategicconsiderations regardingboththeselectionandpresentationofsocialidentities.Themanagement strategiesemployedwillundoubtedlybebasedonsuchdeliberations. OnetypologyofsuchstrategiesisprovidedbyRoccasandBrewer(2002).Theauthors focusonwaystoreduceinconsistenciesinmemberships,basedontheneedfor cognitiveconsistencyandcompatibilitybetweendifferentbeliefsandattitudes.Indoing sotheysuggestfourdifferentwaysinwhichmultiplemembershipsmaybeorganised. Thefirststrategy,dominance,involvesthesubordinationoftherelevantsocialidentities toonesuperordinategroupidentification.Thiscouldbeusedtomaskortoreconcile divergencebetweensubgroupsorasavehicleforsocialchange,intermsofidentity formationatasuperordinatelevelandassociatedemergentnorms. 27 Thedominant

25 Ofcoursethemultiplicityofidentityhasbeenmoreapparentinareasofconstructivismassociatedwith scholarssuchasMajaZehfuss(2001).However,thishastendedtobeintermsofsocialrolesandhasnot beenbasedonthemicrofoundationsformultiplicityandthecapacityformanagement. 26 Thetraditionalapproachislargelyaconsequenceoflaboratorybasedstudyasmentionedearlierinthe Chapter. 27 However,thisformofsocialidentitycouldleadtointoleranceespeciallywhenthesuperordinate groupisrepresentedinanoncomplexway,notrepresentingthe‘diversityofdimensions’butfocusing insteadon‘onesetofprototypicaldimensions’(Amiotetal,2007:368).Studiesarecitedthatalso suggestthemoreweseeourowningroupasprototypicalofthesuperordinatecategory,themoreour attitudestooutgrouparewillbenegative. 87 subgroupwithinthesuperordinatecategoryisseenasmostlikelytoimposeitsown characteristicsonthegroup(Amiot,Sablonniere,TerryandSmith,2007). Thesecondstrategyinvolvestheprocessofcompartmentalisation,wherethevarious socialidentitiesaredifferentiatedandseenasapplicableindifferentcircumstancesorin relationtodifferentissues.Thediversesocialidentitiesarekeptseparate,reconciliation isnotattemptedandcontextplaysanimportantroleindeterminingtheirrelevance,asis traditionallyassociatedwiththesocialidentityapproach. ThethirdstrategyidentifiedbyRoccasandBrewerinvolvesintersectionrepresentation wheretheoverlappingattributesofthediversesocialidentitiesareacknowledgedand theyareviewedonthisexclusivebasis.Onlytheattributescommontoallthesocial identitiesformtheareaoffocusasthebasisforanewandverynarrowcategory.The authorsgivetheexampleof‘women’and‘researcher’ascategoriestoformthe exclusivecategoryof‘womanresearcher’.Whilstthisprocessdrawsfromtheexisting socialidentitiestoconstitutetheexclusivecategory,HutterandCrisp(2005)havealso demonstratedthatwhenwecannotrelyontheattributesofthecategoriesthemselvesto explaintheconjunction,wegeneratenewemergentattributes.Theexampleisgivenofa ‘Harvardeducatedcarpenter’wheretheconjunctiondemandsnewattributesnotbased ineithercategory. ThefinalstrategyRoccasandBrewerhighlightisthatofmergingsocialidentities.All divergentsocialidentitiesarehelddespitetheirlackofconvergence,astheyallshareat leastsomecommonfeatures.Theyareallseenonthemostinclusiveterms. Whichofthesefourstrategiesischosenishighlydependentonthedegreeofconflict betweenthedifferentsocialgroupsandcorrespondingsocialidentities.Anadditive strategy(suchasRoccasandBrewer’sfinalcategory)ishighlyunlikelyintimesof contestationwhendifferencesareaccentuated.However,mergingislikelytobefairly easywhenconflictisnotapparent.Wherethereareconflictingnormativedemands managementiscrucialtoincreasetoleranceandeffortswilltendtobemadeat achievingcompromiseandreconciliation.Compartmentalisationasastrategycould alternativelyeitherexacerbateorreduceconflict,butincertaincircumstancesmaybe theonlystrategyavailable.

88 Expressionofthesestrategiescanvaryandmaybeexplicitinthelanguageactors employ.Alternativelyactorsmaymakeuseofmoresubtleimplicitsuggestions.Overall thesestrategiesaimtodrawtogetherordifferentiatebetweenmultiplesocialidentities, attimesthroughthegenerationofnewcategoriesofmembership,forexample internationalcoalitionsfightingterrorism,orchangestoexistingcategories,forexample constructionsoftheinternationalcommunityassuperordinate.Thestrategiesserve variousfunctions.First,toassistindividualsintheirabilitytocopewiththeirown multiplemembershipsandcompetingdemands,second,asamechanismbywhichto perceivethemultiplemembershipsofothers,andthird,forstrategicpurposessuchas mobilizationorsocialchange,particularlyforthoseinleadershippositions. 28 WhilstthecategoriesidentifiedbyRoccasandBrewerabovearequiteneatandappear tobeisolated,ImustnotethatthisisnothowIexpectthemtotranslateintothe complexpoliticalsphere.Indeed,aswillbeapparentintheempiricalChapterstothis thesis,theyoftenappearinconjunctionwitheachotherinthesamepassageandin relationtothesamesocialidentity.Intersectionrepresentationinparticular,doesnot featurepurelyintermsofforminganexclusivecategoryexactlyasRoccasandBrewer suggest.However,areasofoverlaparebolstered,alongsideotherarguments,generally tosupportdominance.Iusethisinterpretationofintersectionrepresentationinmy analysis.Themanagementstrategiesoutlinedaboveserveasaframeworkforanalysis butitisimportanttostressthatIdonotattempttoimposestrictandfalseboundaries aroundthem. Conclusion Inrelationtoconstructivismthereismuchvaluetoaconsiderationofhowpolitical elitesasrepresentativesofstatesmanagedifferentsocialidentitiesandwhatthistellsus abouttheinteractivenatureofnormativeinfluenceascontextuallysituated.Sucha frameworkprovidesuswithinsightsintocontestationprocesseswhichinternalisation andpersonalitybasedargumentsmissout.Thechangingandcontestablenatureof normsisoftenmarginalisedasaretheinteractiveprocessesofleadershipthatsocial identityscholarsemphasise.Thiscanhoweverbebroughttotheforeinanalysisby consideringhowthenegotiationsbetweencontext,socialidentitiesandinternational normativeregimesareconstructed.Thisiscrucialtoourunderstandingofhow

28 Thelatterusageneednotbedirectinconstruction,butinstead,asKleinetal(2007)pointout,theuse ofambiguityindiscourserelatingtomultipleaudiencesisapotentiallyverysignificantstrategy. 89 contestationsanddefectionsbecameviablepolicyoptions.Weareindeedledto stimulatingquestionssuchas,whatsocialidentitiesareatplay,howdotheyseemto interact,andhowaretheymanagedbypoliticalelitesinordertoallowforthe contestationofinternationalnormativeregimes?Thesequestionswillbeexploredinthe empiricalChaptersofthisthesisinordertoassesstheinteractiveprocessesof contestationinrelationtotheinternationaldetentionregimebytheUSAandUK2001 2006.Thevalueoftheframeworkprovidedbythesocialidentityapproach,particularly inrelationtothemanagementofsocialidentities,willbeevaluatedinrespondingtothe overallquestionposedbythisthesis;howarenormativeconstraintsnegotiatedsoasto allowforthecontestationoftheinternationaldetentionregime,bytheUSAandUKin thewaronterror?Iarguethatsuchanapproachishighlybeneficialtothedevelopment ofunderstandingsinthisarea. Inordertoshowthevalueofthesocialidentityapproachithasbeennecessaryto engagewiththerelevanceofpsychologytoIR,howinsightsfromthedisciplinehave beenused,particularlyinconstructivism,wheretherehasbeenanincreasein engagementoverthepastdecade.Ihaveprovidedjustificationforthetypeof psychologyemployedinthisthesis,thesocialidentityapproach,byevaluatingthe differentwaysinwhichinsightsfrompsychologyhavebeenusedbyconstructivist scholarsandtheimplicationsthesehaveforthestudyofnormativeinfluenceand contestation.Ihaveoutlinedthemannerofemploymentadoptedinthisthesis,building aframeworkforsubsequentanalysisbasedonadvancementsinthesocialidentity approach,inparticularthemanagementofsocialidentitiesbypoliticalelites. IntheremainderofthisthesisIevaluatehowfartheseargumentsarebeneficialin enablingustoaccesstheprocessesofcontestationinrelationtonormativeconstraints, essentialtoansweringtheoverallquestionofthisthesis.Thisisbasedonthemicro foundationalunderstandingoftheinfluenceofnormsandnormativeregimesprovided bythesocialidentityapproachinrelationtothemultiplicityofsocialidentities.Inorder toprovidesuchanassessment,Chapter3proceedsbyidentifyingthesocialidentitiesto beconsidered,providingjustificationfortheirinclusion,beforeChapters4and5assess themanagementstrategiesapparentin20012006.

90 Chapter 3 – The Social Identities Contexts of the USA/UK ThelastChapterestablishedtheframeworkfromwhichIwillassesstheinteractive processesofcontestationanddefectionfromtheinternationaldetentionregime,bythe USAandUKinthecontextofthewaronterror. 1Bydrawingfromthemicro foundationalinsightsprovidedbythesocialidentityapproachinsocialpsychology,our attentionisdirectedtowardsocialgroupmemberships(orassociationwithdifferent socialgroups),andtheirimportanceforunderstandingthenegotiationofnormative constraint.ThepurposeofthisChapteristohighlightthesocialgroupsofsignificance withregardstotheinternationaldetentionregime,buildingapictureofthesocial identitiescontextwithinwhichpoliticalelitesmakedecisionsandsetpolicies. ThenormativecontextwhichIRscholarsusuallyevaluatetendstobeverylimited, oftenfocusingononeidentityoroneinternationalnorm,asevidencedinChapter1. Thisthesismovesawayfromsuchanapproachbyidentifyingandassessingthe multiplesocialgroupsassociatedwiththestate,wherethesearerelevanttothe detentionregime.ThisChapter,unliketheothersinthisthesis,doesnotmake substantiveclaimsinitselfwithregardstothecontestationoftheinternationaldetention regime.Thelimiteddiscussionpresentedis,nonetheless,veryimportantto contextualiseandprovideclarityfortheChaptersthatfollow. Chapter3hasthreemainobjectives:(1)toidentifythesocialidentitiestobeexamined inremainderofthisthesis;(2)todefine,albeitinalimitedandgeneralisedmanner, thesesocialidentities;and(3)toarguewhytheyarerelevanttoexaminecontestationof theinternationaldetentionregimebytheUSAandUK.Practicalrestrictionspreventa moreweightyanalysisthanthatwhichIprovidebelow.Forexample,thematerialused forthisChapterhasbeenlimitedtothatwhichispubliclyavailable.Thesesourcesdo notprovideindepthinsightsintotheissuesofconcern.Whilstinterviewswithkey personnelfromthesesocialgroupsmayhaveovercomesomeoftheseconstraints,there arestillproblemsintermsofhowmuchwecangeneralisefromaverysmallsampleof individuals.Indeed,therearefurtherconstraintsintermsofaccesstoofficials,aswell asthefeasibilityofsuchanapproachwithintheconfinesofthisthesis,giventhat describingthesesocialidentitiesisnottheprimaryfocusofanalysis.Todefineeachof thesesocialidentitiesinsubstantialdepthwouldbeathesistopicinitself,andbeyond

1ThebasisfortheinternationaldetentionregimewasoutlinedattheendofChapter1. 91 therequirementofthisChapter,whichistocontextualisetheanalysisthatfollowsin Chapters4and5.Thus,Iprovideaverygeneralandlimiteddiscussionofthecomplex socialidentitiesofconcerninthisthesisinordertoprovidethereaderwithasufficient contextualbasisfortheanalysisintheremainderofthisthesis. ThisChapterconsidersthesocialgroupsoftheUKandUSmilitaries,thehumanrights andhumanitariansocialgrouping,theUN,theUKandUSlegalprofessions,and membershipofagroupofliberaldemocraticstatesinternationally,inthisorder.The optimalwaytoprovideavaluableframeofreferenceforChapters4and5istoconsider thesedifferentsocialidentitiesinrelationtoasetofthreeconsistentquestions.(1)What constitutesthesocialidentityofthisgroup?(2)Howisthissocialgroupimportantto theUKand/ortheUSA?(3)Howisthissocialgrouprelevanttotheinternational detentionregime(andviceversa)?ThisChapterbuildsontheframeworkestablishedin Chapters1and2,andgeneratesabasisfromwhichtoassessthemanagementofthese socialidentitiesinChapters4and5. Method Thesocialidentitiesassessedinthisthesishavebeenpreselectedforanalysis.Thisisa significantpointthatrequiresfurtherjustification.Thisthesisdoesnotattemptto recover,inductively,thesocialidentitiesthataremostsignificantinthediscourseof politicalelitesintheUSAandUK20012006.Thereareseveralreasonsforrejecting suchanapproach.First,focusingonlyonthesocialidentitiesevidentinthediscourse wouldnotcaptureexclusionsorsignificantissuesthatpoliticalelitesrefusetoaddress. Second,thiswouldrestrictourabilitytoassessinteractiveprocesses,asthebasisfor analysiswouldrestonthediscourseofpoliticalelites.Third,politicalelitesareunlikely toalwaysdirectlyrefertospecificgroups(theyaremorelikelytorefertoissues pertainingtothatgroup),therefore,weneedanunderstandingofthesocialidentitiesin ordertoaccessthemanagementstrategiesemployedinthediscourse. Thesocialgroupsincludedinthisthesishavebeenselectedonthebasisoftheiroverall importancetothestate,thustheneedforpoliticalelitestoconsidertheminthe formulationofpolicy,aswellastheirrelevancetotheinternationaldetentionregime (andviceversa).IhavenotincludedmembershiporassociationwiththeEUbecauseit isonlytheUKthatisactuallyamember.Ihavealsonotincludedreligionasasocial group.ReligionisofcoursehighlysignificanttobothBushandBlair,however,the

92 inclusionofreligionwouldgobeyondwhatisfeasibleinathesis.Thedifferentsections ofthisChapter,whichfocusonthesocialgroupsidentified,willprovidefurther justificationforthoseselected. ThereareseveralotherareasthatImustalsoclarifybeforeembarkinguponthe discussioninthisChapter.First,Idonotinanywaysuggestthatthesesocialidentities, understoodintermsofsocialgroups(seeChapter2),arestatic.Idonotengagewith changestotheminthisChapter,astotrackthesechangeswouldbeathesistopicin itselfandisthereforebeyondthescopeofthisresearchproject.Someattemptsto redefinethesesocialgroupswillbeconsideredinthecourseofChapters4and5,where relevanttothequestionsposed.Second,Irealisethattherearevariationswithinthe socialgroupspresented–theygenerallydonotformacoherentwholeonall dimensions,thereisofcourseroomforvariationasthereisinanyorganisationor grouping.ThepurposeofthisChapteristoprovideageneraloverviewofthebasisof thesesocialgroups,wherevariationswithinarehighlysignificant,thesewillbe acknowledged.Third,inordertoachievethisassessmentIwilldrawonkeydocuments anddiscoursepertainingtothesesocialgroups.Fourth,asmentionedabove,this Chapterdoesnotclaimtoprovideanindepthassessmentofthesesocialgroups. Variousscholarshavefocusedoneachofthesegroupsindividuallyandwhere appropriateIwilldrawontheirinsights.Idonothopetoreplicateinanywaystudies suchasthoseintomilitaryculture,orintotheorganisationalcultureoftheUN.Whilst thereistheriskofoversimplification,themodestobjectiveinthisChapteristo establishthebasicprinciplesofthesocialidentitiescontextwithinwhichdecisionsand policiespertainingtotheinternationaldetentionregimearemade. 1. The UK Armed Forces What constitutes the social identity of this group? ThesocialidentityoftheUK armedforcesisbasedonthesharedethosandvaluesofthethreeservices,theArmy,the NavyandtheAirForce.Whilstthereareclearlydifferencesbetweentheseservices,and evenbetweentheregimentsandbrigadeswithinservices,thisChapteraimstoidentify thegeneralandfundamentalprinciplesthatunderliethissocialgroup. Intermsoftheethos,valuesandstandardsthatdefinethethreeservicesthereismuch similarity.TheBritishArmy(2008a)forexample,emphasisesthecorevaluesof,self

93 lesscommitment,courage,discipline,integrity,loyalty,andrespectforothers, alongsidestandardsoflawfulandappropriatebehaviour,underpinnedby professionalismandexcellence.TheRAF(2008)andNavy’s(2008)approachalso reflectsthesecorevaluesandstandards.Theguidingprinciplesof‘humanity and victory’( emphasis added ,MinistryofDefence,2003a),alongsideduty(BritishArmy, 2008c)permeatethediscourseofthissocialgroup. TheoverallobjectiveoftheUKarmedforceshoweveristoservetheaimsofforeign andsecuritypolicyasdeterminedbytheBritishgovernment.Theseprioritiesfeaturein boththe Strategic Defence Review (1998)andthe New Chapter (2002),andare reiteratedinthe Defence White Paper (2003b): TodeliversecurityforthepeopleoftheUnitedKingdomandtheOverseasTerritoriesbydefendingthem, includingagainstterrorism;andtoactasaforceforgoodbystrengtheninginternationalpeaceand stability(MinistryofDefence,2003b:4). Certainly,manyfactorsthatcontributetothesocialidentityoftheUKarmedforces, particularlyregardingtheirpurposeandfuturedirection,aretheresultofgovernment policy.However,thispolicyisalsoinfluencedbythecharacterandexistingdoctrine andculturebuiltupbytheUK’sArmedForces.Thisisquitelogicalaspolicymustbe militarilypossibleintermsofculture,trainingandcapacity.Indeedthecomplex relationshipbetweengovernmentpolicyandmilitarydoctrineisidentifiedinthe publication, British Defence Doctrine (MinistryofDefence,2001a).Thevaluesand standardsidentifiedabovearethereforecrucialintheconstructionofgovernment objectivesandwillalsobecentralinestablishinghowtheseobjectivesshouldbe achieved.Normativeconstraintsarethereforeevident,however,themannerinwhich theywillbemanifestisnotclear.Thisisduetothecomplexityofcompetingfactors, suchas‘humanityandvictory’asmentionedabove. How is this social group important to the UK? TheUKarmedforcesformacentral componentoftheBritishgovernment’sforeignandsecuritypolicy(e.g.the Strategic Defence Review ,1998;Blair,1999).Blair’s‘DoctrineoftheInternationalCommunity’ speechin1999grantedacentralroletotheuseofmilitaryforce,withparticular emphasisonfightingforvalues,shouldcircumstancesrequiresuchaction.Thisbuilton UKinvolvementinBosnia(1995)andKosovo(1999),andsetthetonefortheuseof forceinSierraLeone(2001),Afghanistan(2001)andIraq(2003).Thearmedforcesare 94 alsoasignificantpartofUKsocietybasedonstronghistoricalroots,and responsibilitiesbetweenthenationandthearmedforcesascodifiedinthemilitary covenant(BritishArmy,2008c).Thus,theyareahighlysignificantsocialgroupin relationtotheUK. How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime?TheUK armedforceshavebeeninvolvedinthedetentionofprisonersinthewaronterror,both inAfghanistanandIraq.Theiractionsdirectlyrelatetotheinternationaldetention regime.Theyarepractitionersinthiscontextandareresponsivetotheinterpretationsof theBritishgovernmentregardingappropriatedetentionstandards. Thebasisforanassessmentofperceptionsoftheinternationaldetentionregimerestson thissocialgroup’sapproachtotheruleoflawandhumanrightsmoregenerally.The ruleoflawismentionedinthediscourse,largelyintermsofInternationalHumanitarian Law(IHL)andguidanceforsoldiersinfieldoperationsaswewouldexpect. The New Chapter tothe Strategic Defence Review stressesthatactionsmustonlybetaken‘when legallyjustified’(MinistryofDefence,2002:9)andconductmustbeinaccordance with‘internationallegalobligations’(2002:12).However,therestrictivenatureof internationallawisalsohighlighted,intermsoftheenemyknowingtherangeof optionsavailableandthepotentialforpermittedactionstobelessseverethanthose outsidethelaw.The‘increasingdemandsoflegislation,includinginternationallaw’ (MinistryofDefence,2001b:10)andgrowing‘judicialscrutinybyinternationalcourts’ (MinistryofDefence,2001c:16)areidentifiedbytheMinistryofDefence. Theneedtoaddressthisintensifyinginternationallegalclimateisacknowledgedin termsofthetrainingofservicemenandwomen,aswellas‘thedevelopmentand procurementofweaponsystems’thataremoresuitabletothisemergingenvironment (MinistryofDefence,2001c:16).Thegovernment’spublication, The Future Strategic Context for Defence (MinistryofDefence,2001c:31)suggeststhat: Weaponsystemsandtacticswillneedtoevolvetocopewithlimitationsonrulesofengagementcaused bypublic,internationalandalliedopinion,andbydevelopmentsininternationallaw. Thusthereismuchemphasisonthefuturerequirementsofinternationallaw,andpublic opinioninresponsetosuchaclimate.Meetingtheseobjectivesisconstructedas

95 somethingtostriveforwhilstatthesametimebeingcautiousaboutthe‘possibilitythat thesepressureswillaffectourabilitytofulfilmilitaryobjectives’,andmaybeseenasa weaknessbytheenemy(MinistryofDefence,2001c:16). Intermsofhumanrights,thereisahumanitarianfocusinmuchofthediscourse, indicatedbythemottofortheUKArmedForces‘aforceforgood’asmentioned previously.The‘[p]ressuretomountmilitaryoperationsfor"moral"reasons’is identifiedasanareathatwillcontinuetoincrease(MinistryofDefence,2001c:14). Therewillbeagreaterneedtotackleissuesofhumansecurityandsupporthuman rights.Thus,humanrightshavebecomepartofthearmedforce’sobjectives,yet concernsarealsoraisedaboutthepotentialfor‘unreasonableoperationalrestrictions’ thatmaybegeneratedbysuchanemphasis(MinistryofDefence,2001c:17).Thereis anexpresseddesirefordialoguewith‘otherGovernmentDepartmentsandNGOs’on theseissuesandforpublicdebatetobeproperlyinformedontheneedtobalancehuman rightswithoperationalrequirements(MinistryofDefence,2001c:17).Theneedfora positiveinternationallegalframeworktoencompassthesecompetingdemandsiscalled for. Thus,thereismuchcomplexitytothissocialidentity.Internationalnormativeregimes arehighlyvaluedandveryimportantinthestandardsandvaluesofthissocialgroup. However,theseareoftenjuxtaposedwithoperationalrequirements.Althoughthisdoes begintochangewith The Aitken Report (BritishArmy,2008)wheredefectionwith regardstodetentionisseenasdamagingtooperations.Tosetgovernmentpolicies contrarytotheinternationaldetentionregimeorthatplacestrainontheArmedForces intermsofcompliancewiththesestandardswouldunderminetheArmedForce’s reputationinternationally,sometimescompromiseeffectiveness,aswellasbecounter totheirvaluesandethos. 2Thestrongemphasisondutyinthearmedforcesmeansthe governmenthasaresponsibilitytoensurethatthesecircumstancesarenotcreated. Thus,thissocialgroupgeneratesnormativeconstraintsonthedevelopmentofpolicy relatingtodetentioninthecontextofwarbutthesearecounterbalancedbytheemphasis ontradeoffsasabove. 2Thisisintermsoftheinstitutionalreputation,valuesandstandardsofthisgroup,basedontheinductive anddeductiveinteractionsofthecollectionofindividualsthataremembersofthissocialgroup(Postmes, HaslamandSwaab,2005). 96 2. The US Military What constitutes the social identity of this group? AswiththeUKArmedForces,the USMilitaryisrunonajointservicebasis,eachwithaparticularhistory.Thereis indeedmuchjustificationintheUSMilitarydocumentsastothemeritsofeachservice, perhapsreflectiveofthenatureoffundingfordefenceintheUSAincomparisontothe UK.Asstatedpreviously,wheretherearespecificstoindividualcomponentsthesewill bementioned.However,againtheobjectiveofthissectionistobuildanoverallpicture ofthefundamentalaspectsofsocialidentityforthissocialgroup. Whilstsomedifferencesareapparentineachservice’screed,espousingthevaluesof whatitmeanstobeaUSsoldier,airmanorsailor,theoverallethosisverysimilar.Each emphasisesservicetotheUnitedStatesaswewouldexpect.TheUSNavyhowever placesparticularstresson‘Honor,CourageandCommitment’,‘excellenceandthefair treatmentofall’,aswellasobediencetothoseinhigherauthority(USNavy,2007).The USAirForceandArmybothunderlinetheprimaryplaceofthemission,thatthey‘will neveracceptdefeat’,‘neverleaveafallencomrade’(USArmy,2007)or‘anAirman behind’andthatthey‘willneverfalter’(USAirForce,2007).Answeringacalltoduty isalsostressedintheAirForcecreed,asitisthroughoutmuchofthemoregeneral Armydiscourse.Inthecurrentclimate‘theattacksofSeptember11 th ’serve‘astheCall toDutyfortoday'sgeneration’(USArmy,2006a),wheredutytoone’scountryisseen as‘anoblecallingand…amonglife'sgreatestwork’(USArmy,2006a).Thereisalso muchmentionofa‘warriorethos’,whichinvolvestheelementsstressedinthecreedsof theArmyandAirForcementionedabove.IntermsoftheArmythiswarriorethos ‘defineswhoSoldiersareandwhatSoldiersdo’(USArmy,2004:5).Armyvaluesand thewarriorethosarea‘nonnegotiableelementof…ArmyCulture’servingtoinfluence decisions,particularly‘whereexpediencymaycompetewithmorality’andhelping soldiersto‘understandwhat“doingtherightthing”means’(USArmy,2005a:4).As indicatedabove: SoldierswholivetheWarriorEthosalwaysputthemissionfirst,refusetoacceptdefeat,neverquitand neverleaveafallencomradebehind.Theyaretrainedandequippedtoengageanddestroytheenemiesof theUnitedStatesinclosecombat(USArmy,2005a:4). Othervaluesrevolvearoundissuesof‘sacrifices,courage,andheroism’(USArmy, 2006b),professionalismandpreservingfreedom.

97 IntermsofpurposeacrosstheMilitarythisisexpressedassupportingthegoalsand objectivessetoutinthe National Security Strategy (NSS)(TheWhiteHouse,2002; 2006),the National Defense Strategy (NDS)(DepartmentofDefense,2005;2008)and the National Military Strategy (NMS)(JointChiefsofStaff,2004).Thereisan emphasisonmakingadifferenceintheworldandhavingapositiveeffect,‘shapingthe worldtobeasaferplace’(USArmy,2000:10)aswellasabetterplace.Thestrategic objectivesidentifiedintheNDSinvolve,securingthenationfromdirectattack; ‘secur[ing]strategicaccessandmaintain[ing]globalfreedomofaction;establish[ing] securityconditionsconducivetoafavorableinternationalorder;andstrengthen[ing] alliancesandpartnershipstocontendwithcommonchallenges’(Departmentof Defense,2005:ExecutiveSummary).AdditionallytheNMSdefinesMilitaryobjectives as‘toprotecttheUnitedStatesagainstexternalattacksandaggression;preventconflict andsurpriseattack;andprevailagainstadversaries(JointChiefsofStaff,2004:viii). Again,thesefactorsaretheproductofaninteractionbetweenmilitarycultureandthe government’spoliticalaims. Thus,aswiththeUKarmedforces,normativeconstraintsareapparentintermsof militaryculture,however,thewayinwhichthiswilltakeshapeishighlycontext dependentduetothecomplexityofcompetingfactors–asisevidentinthewarrior ethositself. How is this social group important to the USA? TheUSMilitaryisheavilyengrained inUScultureandpoliticalobjectives.TheUSArmystressestheir‘vitalroleinthe growthanddevelopmentofournation’(USArmy,2006b)aswellastheircontribution toenabling‘Americatosurviveandflourishthroughoutthe21stCentury’(USArmy, 2004:21).Their‘centralroleinUSengagementaroundtheworld’and‘inshapingthe internationalenvironment’(USArmy,2000:3)isgivengreatimportancebothbythe Militarythemselves,aswellasinpoliticalrhetoric(thelatterwillbeaddressedinthe courseofChapter5).Thisroleisthoughttocomewiththe‘responsibilitiespre eminencerequires’(USArmy,2005b:1).TheUSArmyhighlightstheirfrequent position‘atthetopofopinionpollsasthemostrespectedinstitutioninthecountry’with soldiersservingas‘thefaceofAmerica’(USArmy,2006a).Theimportanceofsupport fromtheNationtofulfiltheirobjectivesisregularlyhighlighted.Thus,thissocialgroup andtheirnormativecontentarehighlysignificanttoUSpolicymakersandpolitical elites.

98 How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? TheUS Military,liketheUK,havebeeninvolvedinthedetentionofprisonersinthewaron terror,bothinAfghanistanandIraq.Theiractionsthereforearealsodirectlyrelatedto theinternationaldetentionregimeandtheinterpretationsgivenbythegovernment.The USMilitaryhavebeenimplicatedinmuchmorecontroversythantheUKwithregards todetentionpractices,forexampleatAbuGhraibandGuantánamoBay. Thebasisforanassessmentofperceptionsofdetentionstandardsagainrestsonthis socialgroup’sapproachtotheruleoflawandhumanrightsmoregenerally.The Geneva Conventions aregenerallyconsideredtobefirmlyembeddedinUSMilitary culture.Forexample,Woodward(2006:86),highlightsGeneralMyers’andColin Powell’sargumentsagainsttheBushadministration’sdenialofGenevaprovisions(also seeGoldsmith,2007:113114).Specificdetailsregardingdetentionarehoweverlimited tothefieldmanualsthatdealwithproceduresrelatingtoprisoners.Anewmanualwas releasedin2006(222.3)followingthe (2005)andthevarious controversiessurroundingdetaineeabuse.ThisreplacedtheArmy’sfieldmanual(34 52)from1992.Inthemoregeneraldocuments,theethosinformingsuchsituationsis thattherewillbe‘morallyuncertainsituations’(USArmy,2005a:4)withinwhich servicemenandwomenwillhavetomakedecisionsastohowtobalancethefactors involved. Thus,aswiththeUKArmedForces,therearenormativeconstraintsinrelationtothis socialgrouponthesubjectofdetention,basedonthecentralityofGenevaandthecore ethosofdoingtherightthing.However,againthereismuchcomplexitytothisdueto perceivedoperationalrequirementsandinstancesofmoralambiguity.Morerecently, detentionpracticesandthetreatmentofcivilianshavebeenincreasinglylinkedto operationalsuccess;howeverthisappearstobearelativelynewideathatisbeginningto emergeinrelationtotheUSMilitary(ChiarelliandMichaelis,2005). 3. The Humanitarian and Human Rights Social Group AswiththeUKArmedForcesandtheUSMilitaryconsideredabove,therearecertain difficultiesinplacingallhumanrightsandhumanitarianorganisationsunderone umbrellawhendetermininganoverallidentityforthissocialgrouping,howeverthereis alsomuchcommongroundtobefound.Thiswillbeestablishedthroughaconsideration

99 ofAmnestyInternational(AI)–withheadquartersinLondon,HumanRightsWatch (HRW)–withheadquartersinNewYork,andtheInternationalCommitteeoftheRed Cross(ICRC)–withheadquartersinGeneva.Whereappropriate,thedifferences betweentheseorganisationswillbehighlighted,whentheyshedlightonvarying aspectsoftheframeworkofsocialidentitieswithwhichstateleadersandpoliticalelites interactandgeneratepolicy. What constitutes the social identity of this group?The ICRChasthelongesthistory ofthethreeorganisations,foundedin1863astheInternationalCommitteeforReliefto theWounded,andlaterbecomingtheICRC.BasedonthevisionofHenryDunantand hisexperienceofthecasualtiesoftheBattleofSolferinoinItaly,theorganisationwas establishedwiththeobjectiveto,‘preserveameasureofhumanityinthemidstofwar’ (ICRC,2005:3).Inadditiontodirectassistanceintheformofestablishing communicationandreunificationwithfamiliesseparatedbyconflicts,providingfood andmedicalassistance,aswellasvisitingprisonersofwar,theICRCalsoaimsto increaseknowledgeandawarenessofIHL,promoteandmonitorcompliancewithIHL, contributetothedevelopmentofIHL,andwhereappropriatedrawattentionto violationsofthisareaofinternationallaw.OnesignificantfeatureoftheICRCisthatits roleisassignedbystates.However,atthesametimetheorganisationretains independenceinordertofulfilthefunctionsofitsmandate. Theorganisationisbasedonprinciplesofhumanity,impartiality,neutrality, independence,voluntaryservice,unityanduniversality.Theseprinciplesareseenas centraltotheidentityoftheICRC,whereperceptionbyothersalongtheselinesisof essentialimportanceintheworktheycarryout.Thisisparticularlytrueofimpartiality andneutrality;accessintomanyareaswheretheirworkisundertakenisdependenton thesecharacteristics.Thisisamatterwherethereisadifferenceinweightingbetween theICRCandHRW/AI.GreatervalueisplacedondialoguebetweentheICRCand governmentsasopposedtosystematicpublicdenunciation;thisallowsforaccessto facilitiesorareaswhereitmayotherwisehavebeendenied.Thereisanemphasisonthe ‘fosteringofacultureofresponsibility’(ICRC,2007)asopposedtodirectshaming,in ordertoincreasecompliancewithIHL. AIwasfoundedmuchlaterthantheICRCin1961,withthespecificpurposeof campaigningonbehalfofpoliticalprisonersacrosstheworld.Theorganisation’s

100 mandatesincethenhasdevelopedtoencompasshumanrightsissuesacrossamuch broaderspectrum.Influencetakestheformofletterstogovernment,increasingpublic awarenessandputtingafaceonthosesufferingfromhumanrightsviolations.The organisationprovidesavastrangeofreportsonviolationsinallareasoftheworld.AI’s ‘vision’isbasedon‘aworldinwhicheverypersonenjoysallofthehumanrights enshrinedintheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandotherinternationalhuman rightsstandards’(AI,2005a).Thereisanabsolutenaturetothisclaim,applicabletoall individualsacrosstheglobe. AswiththeICRC,AI’svaluesarebasedonabeliefintheruleoflawandcompliance withinternationalstandards.Thisiscertainlyacommonthemeacrossthissectoraswe wouldexpect.AIdefinesitselfasforming‘aglobalcommunityofhumanrights defenderswiththeprinciplesofinternationalsolidarity,effectiveactionforthe individualvictim,globalcoverage,theuniversalityandindivisibilityofhumanrights, impartialityandindependence,anddemocracyandmutualrespect’(AI,2005a).Aswe wouldanticipatethesecoverhugelysimilarifnotthesameprinciplesasthosesetoutby theICRC.Thereisagainabeliefintheuniversalityoftheissuesofconcern,inthiscase humanrightsvaluesthoughasopposedtotheICRC’sfocusonIHL.Theglobalreach oftheissues,thefeaturesofimpartialityandindependenceandinternationalsolidarity areechoedintheethosoftheICRCaswellasAI. HRWhastheshortesthistoryofthethreeorganisations.Foundedin1978,the organisationwassetupwiththepurposeofmonitoringcompliancewiththehuman rightselementsoftheHelsinkiAccordsintheSovietbloccountries.Subsequenttothis initialfocus,America’sWatchdevelopedinthe1980sconcentratingonhumanrights abusesinthewarinCentralAmerica.Theaimoftheorganisationwastocounterthe onesidedapplicationofhumanrightsnorms.In1988HRWbroughtalltheirconcerns indifferentareasoftheworldtogethertoformoneorganisationwiththeobjectiveof ‘protectingthehumanrightsofpeoplearoundtheworld’(HRW,2005a:1).The organisation’sstatedpurpose,aswithAI,istoreducetheamountofhumanrights abusesthroughpublicisingthemandasaconsequenceshamingthosewhoare responsiblefortheiroccurrence.Assuchthereisastrongrelianceoninternational normativeregimesprescribinghumanrightsstandardsinordertoachievethisobjective.

101 Whilstevidentintheotherorganisations,thediscourseofHRWreallyhighlightsthe socialnatureofpowerandhowthisenablescertainactions.Thereisthebeliefthat‘our strengthliesinourprinciple,ourcredibility,andthemanysupporterswhostandwith us’(HRW,2005a:3).Throughbeinglegitimate,effectivenesscanbeachieved.HRW referstothisprincipleintermsoftheirownactionshoweversuchabeliefwouldalso seemtoinformtheirunderstandingsofthebehavioursofotheractors,suchasthe politicalelitesthatrepresentstates. HRWalsoemphasizethelinksbetweenhumanrightsand‘civilizedsociety’–apoint frequentlyraisedinconstructivistresearch.Thisisexpressedasabeliefinthe‘basic valuesofdignityandjusticethatare,andshouldbe,markersofacivilizedsociety’ (HRW,2005a:19).Theseprinciplesformthebasisfromwhichtojudgethebehaviour ofactors,suggestappropriatewaystobehave,andisreflectiveoftheorganisation’s understandingoftheinternationalenvironment. Whilsttherearedifferencesinemphasisandfocuswecanseecommonthemesrunning throughtheseorganisations,forexample,inthebeliefinthevalueofstandardssetin internationallaw,theneedtoaddresshumanwrongs(whetherthisisintermsofpublic orprivatecontestation),theneedforalltobejudgedbythesamestandards,thebeliefin theuniversalityofHR/IHL,andthebeliefthatthissocialgroupcanurgechangesin policy.Inadditiontothevalues,beliefsandnormsexpressedabove,otherthemesthat emergedinthediscourseoftheseorganisationsrelatedtoissuessuchastheimportance ofhistory,theenduringqualityofIHL/HR,theneedformoralityinstateleaders,as wellasresponsibilityandaccountability.However,thereisaslightdifferencein expectations,howabsolutewecanbeintermsofexpectedcompliancewiththese standards;theICRCbeinglessabsolutistandnotplacingasmuchemphasisonpublic protestandshaming. How is this social group important to the USA and UK? Thehumanrightsand humanitariansocialgroupishighlyvisibleinwesternsociety,particularlyintheUSA andUK.Theyalsohaveasignificantroleinsupportingandinfluencingthe internationalnormativeenvironment.Thisisprobablymostvisibleintheworkofthe ICRCandtheirroleinthedevelopmentofIHL.Reimann(2006)howeverhasalso demonstratedhowNGOs,generallyspeaking,haveexperiencedsubstantialgrowthin theinternationalsphere.Theyhavebroadsupportfromintergovernmental

102 organisationssuchastheUNandEUaswellasWesterndemocracies.Reimann identifiestheliberaldemocraticandneoliberaleconomicideologythatdominatesin theinternationalsphere,assymbioticwiththeriseofaproNGOnorminternationally. WhilstpreviousconstructivistresearchhasfocusedonNGOsaspromotersofworld culture,ReimannhighlightsNGOdependenceonthenormativeenvironment.The importanceofNGOstostatessuchastheUSAandUKisemphasisedinthefollowing statement,that‘inordertobeaproperlyfunctioningfreemarketanddemocraticnation inthe1990sand2000s,itwasnownecessarytohaveaflourishing“civilsociety”sector thatincludedNGOsandothercitizenorganizedgroups’(Reimann,2006:59).Whilst thisisabroadstatement,itrelatestothehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroup underconsiderationinthissection.Theyhavepoliticalaccessandparticipate internationally,areimportantforthemaintenanceofinternationalnormativeregimes, andWesternstatesgenerallypromotethespreadofNGOstononWesternpartofthe world.Thissocialgroupishighlyinterlinkedwithwhatitmeanstobeamemberofan internationalgroupofliberaldemocraticstates,andusesaninternationaldiscourse, particularlyforjudgingbehaviour.Thus,thisgroupisextremelyimportantforstates suchastheUSAandUK. How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? Thehuman rightsandhumanitariansocialgroupareveryinvolvedininternationaldetention practices,albeitfromadifferentanglethantheUSandUKmilitaries.Theirinterestis inmonitoringtheimplementationofthesedetentionstandards,oftenvisitingsitesto assessconditionsandtreatment,andthenhighlightingpracticesthatfallshorttothe relevantauthoritiesandsometimespublicisinginthepublicrealm.TheICRChasalong historyofvisitingsitesofdetention,howeverasmentionedpreviouslythereportsare oftennotmadepublic.HRWandAIareinvolvedinsomesitevisitsandindeed campaigntobegrantedaccess,yettheiremphasisismoreonbringingabusesintothe publicsphere. Theinternationaldetentionregimeishighlyimportanttothissocialgroup,threatsto thisandothernormativeregimesarefrequentlycited.Forexample,AIstatesthatthe currentcontextisexperiencinga‘threattoperhapsthemostuniversallyacceptedhuman right–therightnottobetortured’(2006a:4).Theimplicationsandconsequencesof thesechallengesareemphasised.AIsuggeststhat‘[b]yfloutingfundamentalprinciples ofinternationallaw,theUSadministration’sdetentionpoliciesinthesocalled“waron

103 terror”riskmakingtheworldalesssecureplace’(AI,2004a:1).InsteadofILplacing anobstacletomeasuresdesignedtopreventterrorism,defectingfromthisframeworkis consideredtomakeusmorevulnerabletoterrorism.Furthermore,thereisalsothethreat thatdefectionfromIHLposestosoldiersinthefield.Ifthereisnostrongexampleof compliance,otherswhoarelessinclinedtocomply,mayinturnrejecttheseprinciples. Defectionbecomesanexcuseforotherstofollowsuit. UnliketheUKArmedForcesandtheUSMilitary,thedemandsofIHLarenotbalanced againstoperationalrequirements.Indeed,astheICRCstate,intermsofIHL,abalance wasstruckbetweenstatesecurityandindividualrightsinwarinthedraftingstages;the treatieswerecraftedwiththisinmind.IHLrecognisesthatharmfulactionsdohappen intimesofwarduetosecurityimperativesbutplaceslimitsonthese.TheICRCisnot unrealisticinthisrespect.Theyacknowledgethatinwartimethereisanemphasison factorsthatruncountertocertainprinciplesofIHLandthatwarisacontinuumof violencewheretherewillbeariskofbreakinghumanitarianrules.Yet,thisisnotthe sameasthembeingunderminedbypoliticalelites.Internationalnormativeregimesare avitalsymbolicresourceeveniftheyarenotalwaysadheredto;theyprovideimportant referencesforbehaviourintimesofwar.Thus,whilsttheICRCrecognisesthatthere willbedefectionsfromtheinternationalnormativeregimesprescribingminimum standardsinwarfare,anditisimpressivethattheyaresofrequentlyadheredtoinwar, degradationoftheactualregimesisverydangerous. Thereisastrongemphasisontheimportanceofinternationalnormativeregimesaswe wouldexpect,andthisiscertainlythecasewithregardstodetention.Theutilityin compliancewiththesestandardsintermsofthecredibilityandlegitimacythatthey granttoactionsisasalientfeatureofthediscourseoftheseorganisations.The importanceofrulesintheconductofinternationalaffairsisclearlyrecognised.Their applicationgenerallygoesacrossallsituationsandforallactors,particularlywith regardstonormativeprohibitionsontorture–defectionfromwhichisconsideredtobe illegitimateforanyoneinspiteofclaimstheymaymaketothecontrary. 4. The United Nations What constitutes the social identity of this group? Establishedin1945andnow inclusiveof192memberstatestheUNhasbeenmandatedinternationallytoassistin

104 preventingthe‘scourgeofwar’,establishlastingpeaceandfurthersocialprogressfor all.Thepurposeandaimsoftheorganisationareclearlysetoutinthepreambletothe Charterof1945andarefurtherarticulatedthroughmorerecentreportsandstatements bytheSecretaryGeneral(fortheperiodconsidered–KofiAnnan). TheUNhasmanyrolesandfunctionsacrossarangeofissueareas, 3however,themain goalsoftheorganisationareclearlyidentifiedintheCharterasaspiringforpeace, development,humanrightsandthepromotionofinternationallaw,allfoundedonan ethosofcooperation.Theroutetoachievingthefirstthreeofthesegoalsisunderpinned bythestrengtheningtheruleoflaw.Whilsttheseobjectivesrelatebacktothecontextof 1945,itisthoughtthattheystillremainhumanity’sgoalsinthenewmillennium (Annan,2000a),withhumanrightsbeingcentralto‘peoples’expectationsaboutthe futureroleoftheUnitedNations’(Annan,2000b:15).Theemphasisisonthe attainmentofbetterstandardsoflifethroughthepromotionofsocialprogressandthe achievementofa‘largerfreedom’,including‘freedomfromwantandfreedomfrom fear’(Annan,2000c:55).Theorganisationaspirestoassistincreatinga‘morepeaceful andjustworld’(ReportoftheSecretaryGeneral,2001:13)andto‘reaffirmfaithin fundamentalhumanrights,inthedignityandworthofthehumanperson,intheequal rightsofmenandwomenandofnationslargeandsmall’(UN,1945:Preamble).The UNischaracterisedas‘servingastheplacewherethecauseofcommonhumanityis articulatedandadvanced’(Annan,2000b:13). Theinfluenceofthissocialgroupinachievingthesegoalsisthoughttorestonitswork ‘increatingandsustainingtheglobalruleswithoutwhichmodernsocietiessimply couldnotfunction’(Annan,2000d:68).ThisroleisevidentintheCharterandotherUN mechanisms,‘tointroducenewprinciplesintointernationalrelations’thathavea positiveimpacton‘daytodayconduct’(Annan,2000e:6).Wecanseethisclearlyin theUDHR,articulatingcommonaspirationsforamoreequitableandjustworld. Thisnormativeroleisseenasessentialto‘formalgovernancestructures’suchasthe UN,in‘definingobjectives,settingstandardsandmonitoringcompliance’(Annan, 2000b:14)internationally.Essentialtothisfunctionisthesocialgroup’s‘capacityto

3ThosesetoutintheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsincludetargeting:climatechange,organisedcrime, HIV/AIDS,malaria,poverty,corruption,protectingthevulnerableespeciallyinemergencies,WMD, armsreductioneducation,conflictprevention,freedomofthemedia,racism,genderdiscrimination,and problemscausedbyincreasesintheworldpopulation. 105 inspire’(Annan,2000f:77)andtheneedforandbeliefinlegitimacy,whichappearas fundamentalaspectsofthesocialidentityconstructedinthediscourse,indeedthisis whereitisthoughtitsstrengthandcapacitytoinfluencelies.Thisisevidencedinthe twofollowingpassages: ThegreatstrengthoftheUnitedNationsremainsitslegitimacy,foundedonthebedrockprinciplesof internationallawacceptedbyallStatesandexpressedinthedecisionsofanOrganizationwhich representstheentireinternationalcommunity.Intheinternationalarenathereisnosubstituteforsuch legitimacy(ReportoftheSecretaryGeneral,2003:3). Weareanorganizationwithoutindependentmilitarycapability,andwedisposeofrelativelymodest resourcesintheeconomicrealm.Yetourinfluenceandimpactontheworldisfargreaterthanmany believetobethecase—andoftenmorethanweourselvesrealize.Thisinfluencederivesnotfromany exerciseofpower,butfromtheforceofthevalueswerepresent;ourroleinhelpingtoestablishand sustainglobalnorms;ourabilitytostimulateglobalconcernandaction;andthetrustweenjoyforthe practicalworkwedoonthegroundtoimprovepeople’slives(Annan,2000d:68).

Bothofthesepassagesdemonstratetheimportanceoflegitimacytothepurposeofthe UNandtoitscapacitytoinfluenceandfulfilitsgoals.Thevaluesthatcharacterisethe UNandprovideaspirationsforthememberstatesaregivenasfollows:freedom,equity, solidarity,tolerance,nonviolence,respectfornature,sharedresponsibility,pluralism, peace,andrespectforeveryhumanlife.Stressisplacedongoodgovernancebasedon theprinciplesof‘theruleoflaw,effectivestateinstitutions,transparencyand accountabilityinthemanagementofpublicaffairs,respectforhumanrights,andthe participationofallcitizensinthedecisionsthataffecttheirlives’(Annan,2000g:22). TheUNisconstructedasa‘guardianoftheCharterandthecorevaluesenshrined therein’aswellastheprinciplesabove(ReportoftheSecretaryGeneral,2002:4). FormalmembershipoftheUNisarticulatedintheCharterinArticle4(1): MembershipintheUnitedNationsisopentoallotherpeacelovingstateswhichaccepttheobligations containedinthepresentCharterand,inthejudgmentoftheOrganization,areableandwillingtocarry outtheseobligations. ThethreatofexpulsionisstatedinArticle6,shouldamemberstatepersistentlyviolate theprinciplesoftheCharter.Thusthereisaclearsensethatidentityasagroupmember iscompromisedifstatesdonotliveuptothestandardsasfoundintheCharterand

106 discourseofthesocialgroup,andassetbythoseconsideredtobeprototypical members.Thisisdespitethefactthatthechancesofexpulsionareextremelyslim. How is this social group important to the USA and UK? MembershipoftheUNis extremelyimportantininternationalsociety,particularlyintermsofcontributingto whatitmeanstobealegitimatestate.TheUNisthehometomanyinstitutionalised rulesandlawsgoverningbehaviourinternationally.HighhopeswereheldoftheUNat theendoftheColdWar,intermsofnewpossibilitiesforactionwithoutthethreatof paralysingvetoes.Indeed,thethenUSPresidentGeorgeH.W.Bush(1990)statedthat, ‘theruleoflawsupplantstheruleofthejungle’.TheUNprovidesabasisfor multilateralismandisveryimportantfortheUSAandUKintermsofproviding legitimacyforactionsandgivingsuchstatessocialstandinginternationally. 4 How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? TheUNis veryrelevanttotheinternationaldetentionregimeforsimilarreasonstothehuman rightsandhumanitariansocialgroup.Forexample,theyareinvolvedinmonitoring statepracticesandsettingstandardsinternationally.ThemainactivitiesoftheSpecial Rapporteurontortureandothercruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentorpunishment, include,‘transmittingurgentappealstoStateswithregardtoindividualsreportedtobe atriskoftorture,aswellascommunicationsonpastallegedcasesoftorture; undertakingfactfindingcountryvisits;andsubmittingannualreportsonactivities’ (OfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights,2008).TheUN HumanRightsCommissionhas,furthermore,increasedawarenessanddrawnattention tocasesoftorture,disappearance,andarbitrarydetentionintheworld,generating internationalpressureongovernmentstoimprovetheirrecordintheseareas(Stewart, 2008). Intermsoftherecentargumentsconcerningtheneedtobalancehumanrightsand securityinthewaronterror(particularlywithregardstodetention),KofiAnnanhas beenveryclearthat,‘[r]espectforhumanrights,fundamentalfreedomsandtheruleof lawareessentialtoolsintheefforttocombatterrorism–notprivilegestobesacrificed atatimeoftension’(Annan,2003a).TheformerSecretaryGeneralrejectedclaimsofa 4ThevaluethattheBlairgovernmentandBushadministrationplaceonsuchmembershipisclearly differentin20012006however,withthelatterviewingtheorganisationasanobstacletoavoidwith regardstotheinvasionofIraq.ThiswillfeatureinthefollowingChapters,butisbeyondthescopeof assessmenthere. 107 tradeoff(Annan,2003b),instead‘themoralvisionofhumanrights–thedeeprespect forthedignityofeachperson’isseenas‘amongourmostpowerfulweaponsagainstit [terrorism]’(Annan,2003c). Theargumentsforabalancearerejectedinfavourofa beliefinthepotentialofhumanrightsandtheruleoflaw.Thus,thedirectionof normativeconstraintfrommembershipofthissocialgroupiscleartosee. 5. The UK Legal Grouping Thelegalprofession,perhapsmoresothantheothersocialidentitiesdiscussedabove, containstoomanydifferencestogobeyondthefundamentalsofacultureinthis particulararea.Thelegalprofessioninvolves,forexample,thosewhoformpartofthe humanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroup,workasmilitarylawyers,arelawyersat theUNorareinvolvedinthejudiciary.Thus,thefollowingdiscussionisverygeneral. What constitutes the social identity of this group? Thelegalsocialgrouphasavery longhistoryintheUK.ThecharacteristicsthatIdrawonare,however,gleanedfrom thelegalsystemasitstandstoday.Hunt(1999:91)providesaveryusefulaccountof thelegalcultureintheUKbasedonthe‘habitsofmindandpatternsofthoughtonthe partofjudgesandpractitioners’.TwoparticularlysalientfeaturesthatHuntidentifies aretheprincipleofParliamentarysovereigntywhichdemandsabsolute‘unquestioning loyalty’toParliament,andanobjective,valueneutralapproach(Hunt,1999:92). Thereisaverypracticalbasistobothoftheseelements,wherevaluebasedchoicesare lefttoParliament.Inordertoretaintheauthorityofthissocialgroup,anobjective approachistakentothelaw,to‘protectthecourtsagainstthelossoftheirlegitimacy’ (Hunt,1999:94).Movingawayfromvaluebasedchoiceshastheeffectof ‘depoliticisingtheruleoflaw’(Hunt,1999:93).Thisnotionisgroundedina positivisticunderstandingofthelaw,wheretheemphasisisonfindingthe‘real meaning’oflegaltextsasopposedtoassessingtheir‘contingencyofmeaning’(Hunt, 1999:93).Thepositivisticemphasisisthoughttohaveastrongbearingontheculture ofthissocialgroup,restrictingtherangeofargumentsthataredeemedtobelegitimate inlegalterms.AsHuntstates,suchanapproach,‘dictate[s]averyparticularmindset whichsubscribeswholeheartedlytotheviewthatthecourtsaremerelyneutralarbiters applying‘legal’rulesandprincipleswhichneverembroilsthemincontroversialvalue choiceswhichmightthreatentheirlegitimacy’(Hunt,1999:92).Theindividualistic

108 weightinginthecourtroomisalsothoughttocontributetothismindset,oftencreating abarriertoconsiderationofsomeofthebroaderissuesthatmightbeathand(Hunt, 1999;ClementsandYoung,1999). AnotherfundamentalcomponentwhichtendstobeemphasisedinrelationtotheUK legalsocialgroupisthedualityofinternationalandnationallaw.Whilstadvanceshave beenmadeinthisarea,Dickson(2006a)suggeststhatitisstilluncommonfortheLaw LordstodrawonhumanrightsstandardsthatarenotyetpartofBritishLaw.Theymay existinternationally,andthegovernmentmayhaveindicatedadesiretocomplywith thesestandards,butuntiltheyactuallyformpartofBritishLaw,theLawLordsare unlikelytoutilisethesestandards.Thebasistothisprincipleisthat‘aninternational treatycreatesnorightsorobligationsatthenationallevelunlessanduntilithasbeen incorporatedthroughdomesticlegislation’(Dickson,2006a:336). LordSteyniscitedas anadvocateofamoveawayfromthisprinciple. Thesefactors,Parliamentarysovereignty,adistancingfromvaluebasedchoices,and theperceptionofdualityarefundamentalprinciplesthatinformthesocialidentityofthe legalsocialgroupintheUK.Yet,aswiththeothersocialgroups,thisdoesnotforma ‘monolithic’identitywherechangeisimpossible.Indeed,intheperiodassessedinthis thesis(20012006)thereisevidenceofincreasedflexibilityandassertionofthepower ofthejudiciary.Thisispartlydowntotheobligationsthatresultfrommembershipof theEuropeanCommunityaswellastheentryintoforcein2000ofthe Human Rights Act (1998).AnillustrationofsomeofthesechangesisprovidedbyDickson(2006b)in relationtorulingsconcerningtheIRAintheperiod19691993and19942005.The analysissuggeststhattherehasbeenasubtlemovetowardstheLords‘decidingcasesin accordancewiththeruleoflaw,ratherthanwithgovernmentpreferences’(2006b:415). How is this social group important to the UK? LiketheArmedForces,thelegal socialgroupisverymuchpartofthestateapparatus,andassuchexpectedonthewhole tosupportthegovernment.Thisgrouphasanimportanttaskintheimplementationof governmentlegislationandadvisingthegovernmentonthelegalcontextforproposed actions.PresentingalegalbasisforactionisextremelyimportantintheUKinorderto establishlegitimacy.Thissocialidentityisverymuchpartofthelanguageandfabricof societyintheUK.

109 Whilstnotalwaysframedinapositivemanner,thesignificanceoftheUKlegalsocial groupinthebroadersocialidentitiescontextisillustratedinthefollowingstatementby DavidBlunkettforBBCNews, ‘I’mpersonallyfedupwithhavingtodealwitha situationwhereParliamentdebatesissuesandthejudgesthenoverturnthem’(BBC, 2003a).Thus,theconcernsofthisgrouparehighlysignificanttotheUKgovernmentin termsofpossibilitiesforaction. How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? The internationaldetentionregimeishighlylegalised.Thestandardsinvolvedformpartof domesticlawintheUK.The Human Rights Act (HRA)(1998)hasgrantedmorepower tothissocialgroupintermsofjudgingthegovernment’sbehaviourincludingthat regardingtheinternationaldetentionregime.TheActstipulatesthatthejudiciarypass judgementonthecompatibilityoflegislationwiththeHRA,asubtlemoveawayfrom anabsoluteprincipleofParliamentarysovereignty(ClementsandYoung,1999). Thehumanrightsbasedapproachthathasdevelopedwithregardstothissocialgroupis somethingthatisnotedintheliterature.Thischallengesthe‘traditionalview…that judgescouldnotbetrustedwithhumanrightsatall’,suchmatterswerenotseentobe partoftheirremit,yetnow‘theLordsarefastobtainingaglobalreputationfortheir prohumanrightsapproachinlegaldisputes’(Dickson,2006a:330). Thishasindeed beensupportedinthediscourseofmembersoftheHouseofLords,suchasthenow retiredLordSterynandLordFalconer.SpeakingonhumanrightsatBangorUniversity inMarch2007,LordFalconerstatedthat‘humanrightsconsiderationsareattheheart nowofhowlawsaremade’,theyaremainstreamandapplytoeveryoneincludingour enemies.Thishumanrightsemphasisisnothoweverconsistentacrossthissocialgroup. TheprinciplesofdualityandParliamentarysovereigntymaygenerallyapply,however, theHRAhascreatedadifferentroleforthissocialgroup,onethatisstillemergingand isbasedonatensionbetweenthese,attimes,competingdemands.Thereare,therefore, normativeconstraintsfromthissocialidentitythatarehighlyrelevanttodetention standards.AsweshallseeinChapter4,thissocialgrouphasbeenveryimportantinthis regard,challengingthegovernmentonvariouscounts.

110 6. The US Legal Grouping What constitutes the social identity of this group? ThelegalsystemintheUSAhasa numberofdifferencestotheUK,however,overallthekeyprinciplesandnormsthat underpinthissocialgroupareverysimilar.Theseincludeavalueneutralinterpretation ofthelawwithemphasisonthelegitimacythisprovides,equalitybeforethelaw,and dualityintermsofdomesticandinternationallaw. ThejudiciaryformsonepartoftheUSgovernancesystem,alongsidetheexecutiveand congress,eachasindependentandseparatedpowers.Eachbranchcontributestothe legalsystemhoweverthejudiciaryismostcloselyalignedwiththeconceptionofaUS legalsocialgroup.TheSupremeCourtisonefundamentalaspectofthissystem.The purposeofthecourtisto‘preserveandprotect’theUSconstitution.TodosotheCourt ischargedwiththetaskofinterpretingtheconstitution,andhasthepowertoquash legislationthatisdeemedtobeunconstitutional.Doingsowouldrendertheproposed lawinvalid.AsMadisonwrote,‘constitutionalinterpretationmustbelefttothe reasonedjudgementofindependentjudges,ratherthantothetumultandconflictofthe politicalprocess’(USSupremeCourt,2008).Assuch,thereisanemphasisonthe authority,independenceandlegitimacyofthecourt’sopinioninprovidingafinal interpretationastothemeaningofthelegaltextsinquestion. ThisisverysimilartotheUKlegalsocialidentityintermsofanemphasisonbeing valueneutralandseparatefromtherealmofpolitics.Thesefactorscontributetoboth legitimacyandauthoritywhicharefundamentaltothissocialgroup.Goldsmith(2007) claimssuchculturaldynamicsalsopermeatetheOfficeofLegalCounsel(OLC)where neutrality,detachmentandpersonalintegrityareprivileged.TheOLChas,Goldsmith states,‘powerfulculturalnormsabouttheimportanceofprovidingthePresidentwith detached,apoliticallegaladvice,asifOLCwereanindependentcourtinsidethe executivebranch’(2007:33).Theseidealsaretherefore,partofabroadlegalculture, however,asGoldsmithgoesontosuggest,theywerehighlycompromisedinthewaron terrorinrelationtotheOLC.

TheUSSupremeCourtalsoplacesgreatemphasison‘EqualJusticeunderLaw’,these wordsbeingwrittenabovetheSupremeCourtBuilding’smainentrance,andtakento ‘expresstheultimateresponsibility’oftheCourt(USSupremeCourt,2008).Equal protectionandarighttodueprocessarepartofthe14 th Amendment(1868),andagain

111 arefundamentaltothissocialgroup;thisisalongsideanemphasisonprovingguilt beyondreasonabledoubt(USDepartmentofState,2004).ThevaluesoftheUSlegal socialgrouparefurtherarticulatedbytheAmericanBarAssociation(2008)as ‘promotingjustice,professionalexcellenceandrespectforthelaw’aswellasstriving forthedefenceofliberty. AswiththeUKthereisaseparationbetweendomesticandinternationallaw.Various voicesassociatedwiththissocialgrouphaveexpressedscepticismaboutthe‘creeping influenceofinternationallawonAmericanlaw’(Goldsmith,2007:21). 5Thiscertainly isacontestedissue,asintheUK.However,overall,thesystemisstillonethatreflects dualitywhere‘internationallawbecomespartofandisappliedbytheUSlegalsystem onlytotheextentthatitisincorporatedintotheUSlegalsystem’(Murphy,2004:6). Thus,avalueneutralapproach,equalityanddualityformthefundamentalcomponents ofthissocialgroup. How is this social group important to the USA? Thehistoricalimportanceoftherule oflawtotheUSAisastrongfeatureofAmericanculture,whereacentralroleis grantedtothissocialgroup.Thisislargelybasedoninterpretingthelaw(asmentioned above),andsettingparametersforaction. However,aswasthecasewiththeUKlegalsocialgroup,therearelimitationstothis. Forexample,theUSCourtsgenerallyrefuse‘toexaminethelegalityofUSactionsin foreignaffairs’intermsof‘internationalorgeneralfederallaw’aswellas‘their constitutionality’(Murphy,2004:86).AsMurphyfurtherstates,‘UScourtsare especiallyunlikelytoupholdachallengetoanactauthorizedbythepresidentthat allegedlyviolatesatreaty,becausethepresidenthasindependentconstitutional authorityinforeignaffairsthatallowshimtodenounceorotherwiseterminateatreaty evenifthisputstheUnitedStatesinviolationofinternationallaw’(2004:87).The courtsdohavethepowertodeclareexecutiveordersunconstitutional,however,asBell suggests,thistendstoberareinoccurrence‘largelybecauseoftheperceptionthatthe presidentisentitledtodirecthisstafftoactinwhateverwayhebelievesismost appropriate’(Bell,2004:203).Thus,whilstthissocialgroupisextremelyimportantto theUSA,andthediscourseoflawentersintomostaspectsofsociallife,theexecutive

5Scepticismregardingthebindingnatureofinternationallawiscertainlyrifeamongpoliticalelitesinthe USA(Murphy,2004:12). 112 retainsalargeamountofauthoritywithregardstointerpretationandapplicabilityof internationallawinforeignaffairs.Whilsttherehavebeenshiftsinpowerbetweenthe differentbranchesofgovernmentinhistory,theperiodoftheBushadministrationis generallyconsideredtobeonecharacterisedbydecreasedjudicialoversight.Aswewill seeinChapter5however,theCourtsbegantopresentsignificantchallengestothe administration’sinterpretations,in2004andafter. InadditiontopotentialconstraintsthroughchallengesintheCourts,thesalienceof legalismintheUSAhascreatedahighlyrestrictiveenvironmentduetothefearheldby politicalelitesofendingupbeforeaCourtorgrandjury(Goldsmith,2007).The Presidenthasaconstitutionaldutytofaithfullyexecutethelaw,andtheexecutiveis heavilyboundbylaw.Thus,thissocialgroupisclearlyimportantfortheUSAand significantconstraintsareapparent,yettheirremitiscomplex. How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? As mentionedwithregardstotheUKlegalidentityandhighlightedinChapter1,the internationaldetentionregimeishighlylegalised.ManyaspectsarepartofUSdomestic law.Thusthissocialgroupisveryrelevantintermsofinterpretingandsettingstandards forUSpracticesinthisarea.Thenormativeconstraintsofthissocialgroupintermsof equalityofjustice,therighttodueprocess,andvalueneutralinterpretationarevery importantinthiscontext.Thisishowever,complicatedbythedualityapproachand assertionsofpresidentialpowerinareasofforeignaffairs. 7. The International Social Group of Liberal Democratic States What constitutes the social identity of this group? Unliketheprevioussocialgroups assessedinthisChapter,theliberaldemocraticstatesocialidentityhasmoreabstract foundations.Itdoesnothaveanorganisationalbasisincomparisontomostofthe previoussocialgroups.Whilstthelegalsocialidentitiesalsohavelessofan organisationalbasistherearestillelementsofaclearstructurethatarenotsoapparent withregardstotheliberaldemocraticsocialgroup.However,thereareclear componentsthatconstitutethesocialidentityofthisgroup,anditcertainlyexistsasan influentialsocialidentityinternationally.

113 Variousstudieshaveidentifiedthekeyattributesofthissocialidentity,oftenwiththe aimofassessinghowcountriesscoreonthesemeasures(e.g.FowerakerandRoman, 2000).Liberaldemocraticpoliticalvaluesarebasedonbothlibertyandequalityas definedbyFowerakerandRoman(2000).Thesetwoconstitutivedynamicsarethought tobeachievedbymeansofvariouslegalandinstitutionalfactors.Thelegalvalues includecivil,property,political,andminorityrightswhereastheinstitutionalattributes focusonaccountability,representation,constraintandparticipation.Abeliefintherule oflawandinparticularhumananddemocraticrights,aswellasliberaltolerationand equality,arekeyelementsforthissocialgroup. Thecollectiveidentitythatisdominantintheinternationalsocietyisbasedonthese sharedcharacteristics.Constructivistscholarshaveinvestigatedvariouselements,most frequentlyhumanrights(e.g.Risse,RoppandSikkink,1999),aswellasmore specificallytheemergenceofaproNGOnorm(Reimann,2006),normsgoverning electionmonitoring(Kelley,2008),humanitarianintervention(Wheeler,2003)andthe developmentofthe‘ResponsibilitytoProtectDoctrine’basedonthenotionof expansiverights(Banda,2007;Welsh,2007). TheliberaldemocraticsocialgroupingwasidentifiedinChapter1asabasisforthe internationaldetentionregimethatisofconcerninthisthesis.Aswecanseefromthe assessmentinthisChapterthough,thisnormativeregime,likemanyothers,isbyno meanslimitedtothissocialgroup.Thereisindeedmuchgeneraloverlapbetweenthe liberaldemocraticsocialgroupandtheothersassessedinthisChapter.Thisisnotreally surprisingasthedifferentgroupsallrelateinsomewaytotheconstitutivecomponents oftheliberaldemocraticsocialidentity.AsmentionedatthebeginningofthisChapter, byseparatingthesesocialgroupsinthewayIhavedone,Idonotintendtodrawdistinct boundariesbetweengroups.Theydoindeedoverlapsignificantlyandarehighly interlinked.However,theyarenotreducibletooneoverarchingidentity,totakesuchan approachwouldobscurethecomplexitiesanddynamismofthesocialidentities environmentand,asIhavearguedintheprevioustwoChapters,thiswouldreduceour abilitytounderstandtheprocessesofcontestationregardingtheinternationaldetention regime. Afurtherpointtomentionagain,isthatthissocialidentity,aswiththeothersassessed inthisChapter,isnotconsideredtobestaticintermsofthatwhichconstitutesthesocial

114 identity,howthesefactorsareinterpretedbymembers,thepredominantnormative regimesofthesocialgroup,andindeed,whatitmeanstobeaprototypicalmemberof suchagroup.Thesefeatures,whilstslowtochange,areopentocontestationby membersbasedontheinterplaybetweendifferentmembershipsandemergingsocial identities.Asthereisnodefiniteorganisationalstructuretounderpinthissocialgroup, arguablyitismoreopentocontestationthantheothers.However,againanychangesare dependentonacceptanceacrossavarietyofaudiences,includingthesocialgroups identifiedinthisChapter.Thissocialgroupdoesprovideanotherbasisfromwhichto judgebehaviour,bothoftheselfandofothers,andprovidessharedguidelinesastohow tovalidatemembershipofandassociationwiththisgroup.Theliberaldemocraticsocial groupprovidesaninternationalsocialunitbeyondformalinstitutionsandcontains sharedunderstandingsaboutwhatitmeanstobealegitimateorprototypicalstateinthe internationalsociety.Itexiststhroughthepracticesofpoliticalelitesbutwhat constitutesthesocialidentityofthisgroupisnotreducibletomembersindividually,as bydefinitionthesocialidentityisshared. How is this social group important to the USA and UK? Theimportanceof membershipofthissocialgroupwashighlightedinChapter1inrelationto constructivistresearchthathasinvestigatedtheconstitutivecomponentsofthissocial group.Factorssuchasreputation,selfidentificationandsocialstandingthatrelateto membershipofthissocialgroupareallimportant,tovaryingdegrees,topoliticalelites intheUSAandUK.Theliberaldemocraticsocialgroupisdominantinternationallyso inordertobeaprototypicalmemberandinfluenceothermemberssocially,validating thisidentitythroughpracticesisessential.Sometimesbeingaprototypicalmemberof thisgroupwillbemoredesirabletotheUSAandUKthanothers.Indeed,whatit actuallymeanstobeprototypicalisofcoursenotstaticandisopentocontestationby members. How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? Thebasis forthiswasoutlinedinChapter1inrelationtohowtheinternationaldetentionregimeis understood.Thisnormativeregimeisacomponentofwhattheliberaldemocraticstate socialidentitymeans.Whilstthesesharedstandardshaverootsbeyondtheconceptof liberaldemocracy,theyarenonetheless,partlyconstitutiveofthisgrouptoday.Thus thissocialgroupisveryrelevanttoactionregardingtheinternationaldetentionregime intermsofprovidingabasisforjudgementandnormativeconstraint.

115 Conclusion InthediscussionaboveIhaveaddressedthethreequestionssetoutintheintroduction tothisChapterregardingeachofthedifferentsocialgroups.First,Ihaveidentifiedand defined,inverygeneralterms,eachofthesesocialidentities(bearinginmindthe restrictionssetoutintheintroductiontothisChapter).Second,Ihavedemonstrated howthesesocialidentitiesareimportanttoboththeUSAandUK.Third,Ihaveargued howtheseparticularsocialidentitiesarerelevanttheinternationaldetentionregime.All thesefactorsservetojustifytheinclusionofthesesocialgroupsinthisstudy.The limiteddiscussionabovegoessomewaytodemonstratinghoweachvarieswithregards tothesequestions,forexample,themilitarysocialidentityassociatedwiththestateis verydifferentinhowitisvaluedbypoliticalelitesinboththeUSAandUKthanthe humanrightsandhumanitariansocialidentity.Whilstthisisonlytobeexpected,itis importanttobeclearonthesepointspriortothesubsequentanalysisinChapters4and 5.Doingsoenablesamoreinformedexaminationoftheinteractionsbetweenthese socialgroupsandtheBlairgovernmentandBushadministration,givingusan appreciationofthepotentialforpubliccontestationfromthesegroups.Aswillbecome moreevidentinChapters4and5,thesocialgroupsoftheUKandUSMilitaries,the humanrightsandhumanitariansocialgrouping,theUN,theUKandUSlegal professions,andmembershipofagroupofliberaldemocraticstatesinternationally,are allpartofthecomplexcontextinwhichinterpretationsoftheinternationaldetention regimearecontestedbypoliticalelites. UnliketheotherChaptersinthisthesistherearenomainfindingstobedrawnfromthe abovediscussion.Theaimhasbeentocontextualisethesubsequentanalysis.An examinationoftheprocessesinvolvedinthecontestationoftheinternationaldetention regimerequirespriorunderstandingofthisbroadsocialidentitiescontext.Thisnotonly determinesthesocialgroupsthatarerelevanttotheanalysis,butbyalsoprovidingan informedbasisforsubsequentinvestigationintotheinteractionsbetweenthesesocial groupsandtheBlairgovernmentandBushadministration,thisChapterenablesgreater depthofanalysisintothecontestationoftheinternationaldetentionregime.Without thiscontextualbasissomeoftherichnessandnuancesofthesubsequentChapters wouldbelost.Tocontesttheinternationalnormativeregimeprescribingminimum standardsfordetentionandprohibitingtorture,politicalelitesmustinteractwiththese socialidentities;howthisismanifestwillbeexaminedinthefollowingChapters.

116 Chapter 4 – The Management of Social Identities: The Case of the UK ‘[T]he right not to be subjected to torture or other ill-treatment, which includes the right not to be removed to a country or territory where one would be at risk of such treatment - the protection against refoulement - applies to all individuals, irrespective of whatever offence they may have committed or are suspected of having committed, and is a rule of customary international law binding on all states. It has also been codified in treaty law’ (Amnesty International, 2005b)

‘[W]e hear an immense amount about their human rights and their civil liberties, but there are also the human rights of the rest of us to live in safety, and when people say to me, unless I can give absolutely cast iron guarantees, and they have all sorts of monitoring arrangements, we have got to keep people here who maybe engage actively in inciting terrorism in this country, I have to say I think we have got the world the wrong way round’ (Blair, 2006i). ThepreviousChapteridentifiedandexploredthevarioussocialidentitiesassociated withthestatethathavethepotentialtobesalientconcerningtheinternationaldetention regime.Thecontentofthesesocialidentitieswasestablished,inordertoformthebasis foranalysisinChapters4and5.ThisChapterwillbuildontheseinsightstoassessthe managementofthesesocialidentitiesbypoliticalelitesintheUK,inthiscasetheBlair government20012006.Asopposedtofocusingonstateleadersinrelationtospecific internationalnorms,thisthesisarguesthatabroaderunderstandingofthenormativeand socialidentitiescontextinwhichpoliticalelitesmakedecisionsandformulatepolicyis requiredtocomprehendboththeinfluenceofanddefectionfrominternational normativeregimes.Idemonstratethatbyexaminingthemanagementstrategiesof politicalelites,wearebetterplacedtounderstandtheinteractiveprocessesofdefection andcontestationoftheinternationaldetentionregime,thushowthesenormative constraintsarenegotiated. Theinternationaldetentionregimehasbeensignificantlycompromisedbyseveral policiesoftheBlairgovernmentbetween2001and2006;thisisinadditiontothe challengingandrevisionistrhetoricthathasaccompaniedthesechanges.Themainareas ofconcernrelatetodomesticantiterrorlegislation,thedeportationofterrorsuspects, andresponsestoUSpoliciessuchasthosepertainingtoGuantánamoBayandrendition. Contestationishighlyapparentinbothpolicyandrhetoric,particularlywithregardsto therighttoafairtrialandtherightnottobereturnedtocountrieswherethereisarisk thattheindividualwillbesubjectedtotortureandinhumanetreatment.Thisthesisaims

117 tounderstandhowsuchpractices,contrarytotheinternationaldetentionregime, becamepossiblebyfocusingontheinteractiveprocessesinvolvedinnegotiating normativeconstraint;thisisinrelationtothebroadersocialidentitiescontext.The managementstrategiesemployedbypoliticalelites,willprovideaninsightintothese interactions. TheUKisaparticularlyinterestingsiteofanalysis,asourexpectations,asestablished inChapter1,suggestthattheBlairgovernmentwillnotdefectfromtheinternational normativeregimeprescribingdetentionstandardsandprohibitingtorture.These expectationsarebasedontheemphasispoliticalelitesintheUKhavepreviouslyplaced onthepromotionofhumanrightsinternationally,forexamplethe‘ethicaldimension’to theUK’sforeignpolicyasoutlinedbyRobinCook(TheGuardian,1997),aswellasthe incorporationoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR)intodomesticlaw intheformoftheHumanRightsAct(1998).Furthermore,theBlairgovernmenthave arguedthatvaluesmustprovideaguideforaction,basedon‘[e]qualworth, responsibility,community’(2001i),‘humanityandcompassion’(2001b),aswellas inclusivity. 1AstheformerPrimeMinisterstates: Politicswithoutvaluesissheerpragmatism.Valueswithoutpoliticscanbeineffective.Thetwomustgo together(Blair,2001i). HowtheBlairgovernmentmanagetheinteractiveprocessofcontestationanddefection willbeextremelyilluminatingintermsoffurtheringourunderstandingofnormative influence,defectionandcontestationinthiscase. ThisChapterisbasedontheframeworkestablishedinChapters1and2,anddraws fromtheinsightsofChapter3regardingthespecificsocialidentitiesassessedinthis thesis.Assuch,theanalysiswilldemonstratetheutilityofemployingthesocialidentity approachinaconstructivistframework.Themainargumentadvancedisthat normativeinfluenceisnegotiatedthroughinteractionwiththesocialidentitiescontext. Wecannotsimplyrelyonthenatureoftheinternationalnorm,thedegreeof internalisation,orthepersonalityofthestateleaderstounderstandtheprocesses of 1ThisisnottoignoretheUK’srecenthistoryofinternmentandtheuseofstresspositionsintheNorthern Irelandconflict.HowevertheBlairgovernmenthaveemphasisedanewdirectionbanishingsuch measurestohistory.Whilsttheycancertainlybecriticisedfortheirinconsistencywithregardstohuman rights(e.g.seeKampfner,2004:76),IaminterestedinthefactorsthattheBlairgovernmentargueare fundamental,whichinfluencessocialidentityassociationsandexpectations. 118 defectionandinfluence.Bydrawingonthemicrofoundationalinsightsofthesocial identityapproachwecanincreaseourcomprehensionoftherelationshipbetween internationalnormativeregimesandthebehaviourofpoliticalelites,thusenablingusto avoidinaccurateexpectations. AnalysisinthisChapterisbasedonthreetimeperiods,20012002,20032004,and 20052006.Thisisinordertotracktheinteractiveprocesses.Withinthesetimebound sectionsinteractionswiththehumanrightsandhumanitarian,legal,ArmedForces, UnitedNations(UN),andinternationalliberaldemocraticsocialgroupswillbe assessed,forexamplehowthesesocialidentitiesaremanagedbytheBlairgovernment. Asapointofclarification,whenreferringtotheBlairgovernmentIdonotmeanthe wholeoftheLabourParty,memberscertainlyholdavarietyofviewpointsontheissues discussedinthisChapter.Instead,IammainlyreferringtotheformerPrimeMinister TonyBlair,hisclosealliesandinnercircleofadvisersingovernment.Idonotattribute theargumentspresentedsolelytoBlairhimself,eventhoughtherewascertainlya stronglycentralisedconcentrationofpoweringovernment(Kampfner,2004:195). WhenIdrawquotesfromBlair,orindeedotherclosemembersofthegovernment,they areunderstoodascarefullycraftedlanguagerepresentativeofthedominantviewpoint ofthissmallstateleadershipgroupthatthenformsthepartylineonsuchissues. ThemanagementstrategiesandtechniquesidentifiedareillustratedinTable3onthe followingpage.Theemphasisisverymuchondominance,directingandreframingthe differentsocialidentitiestofitwithanemergentsuperordinateinternationalsocial identity.However,themeansbywhichthisissoughtvarieswiththeinteractivecontext. Ascontestationincreasesdominanceishardertopursueandincertaincircumstances theBlairgovernmentareforcedtocompartmentaliseandheavilycompromisetheir associationwithsomeofthesocialidentities.Thereisonlysofarthiscanbepushed though,andasastrategythisisnotsustainablelongtermgiventheinteractivecontext, particularlyifthereisadesiretoremainassociatedwiththesocialidentitiesinquestion.

119 Table 3 – The Management of Social Identities by the Blair Government

Human Rights Dominance Dominance Dominance and Directing Directing Directing Humanitarian Challenging Challenging Challenging Denial Denial Denial Intersection Dismissal Dismissal Representation Intersection Intersection Bolstering Representation Representation Compartmentalisation Bolstering Bolstering Context Compartmentalisation Compartmentalisation dependent Context Contextdependent dependent Legal Dominance Dominance Dominance Directing Directing Directing Intersection Challenging Challenging Representation Intersection Dismissal Bolstering Representation Intersection Bolstering Representation Utilising Bolstering Compartmentalisation Contextdependent Military Dominance Dominance Dominance Directing Directing Directing Reassuring Reassuring Reassuring Intersection Dismissal Intersection Representation Intersection Representation Bolstering Representation Bolstering Bolstering Defenceofgroup Defenceofgroup UN Dominance Dominance Dominance Directing Directing Directing Intersection Challenging Intersection Representation Blaming Representation Bolstering Threatening Bolstering Utilising Intersection Unifying Representation Utilising Bolstering Unifying Utilising International Merging Merging Merging Blurringof Blurringof Blurringof boundaries boundaries boundaries Dominance Dominance Dominance Directing Directing Directing Dividing Dividing Dividing Challenging

1. Phase 1 - Initial Contestation: 2001-2002 ‘[A] new role for Britain in the World’ (Blair, 2002zc) 1.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity Thehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroupraisedanumberofconcernsaboutthe UK’sapproachtodetentioninthecontextofcounterterrorismin20012002.Even beforetheattacksofSeptember11 th inNewYork,AmnestyInternational(AI)was

120 criticalofchangestothegovernment’santiterrorlegislation. 2Theconcernsofthis groupintensifiedfurtherfollowingthe Emergency Anti-Terrorism Bill putforwardin November2001.AIwarnedthatthemeasurescontainedintheBillrisktheindefinite detentionofinnocentpeoplewithoutchargeortrial;theyevenrelatedthesereservations tothedetrimentaleffectofinternmentinNorthernIreland(AI2001b;seealsoAI, 2001c;AI,2001d;HumanRightsWatch(HRW),2001a).3Inparticular,bothHRWand AIhighlightthediscriminatorynatureofPart4ofthe Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCSA)(e.g.AI,2001e;2002b;2002c),whichviolatedinternational obligationsregardingdetentionandtherighttoafairtrial. 4 Thissocialgrouphasalsobeenveryvocalraisingobjectionstotheconditionsand proceduresforthedetentionofterrorsuspectsatGuantánamoBay.AI(2002e)has calledforactionwithregardstotheUKnationalsheldatthebase.Whilst,theBlair governmentisunlikelytohavehadanydirectcontroloverwhathasbeenanAmerican policyofseeminglyindefinitedetentionattheformerNavalBase,thereislittle commentinoppositiontotheUSpositioninthisperiod.Wemaynotexpectafirm publicrejectionofthepolicygiventhecloserelationshipbetweentheUSAandUK, howeverBlair’spositioninprivatewasalsolargelynoncritical(Cook,2004:82).In public,referenceismadetothe‘unusualsituation’(Blair,2002zc)fromwhichtheUSA andUKare‘stillgettinginformation’(Blair,2002x).Theimportanceofbeingableto interrogatedetaineesonthebasisofnewinformationandcheckingitwiththose prisonersheldatGuantánamoBayisoftencited(e.g.Blair,2002zc).Whilsttheposition articulatedbyBlairisnotreflectiveoftheentireLabourgovernment,(e.g.Cook,2004; Short,2005),suchanoutlookdoespresenta challenge totheinternationaldetention regimeandindeedthehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialidentity.Inordertosustain suchaposition,Blair’sdiscoursereflectsavarietyofstrategiesinvolving, dominance , intersection representation and compartmentalisation .

2Thiswasbecausethemeasuresinthe Terrorism Act 2000discriminatedonthebasisofmotivationfor crimeasopposedtotheseverityofthecrime(AI,2001a). 3Indeed,AIdidnotshyawayfromactuallycomparingthegovernment’smeasurestointernment(2001b; 2002d).AI(2002a)arealsocriticalofpracticesindomesticprisons,particularlywithregardstoyoung peopleindetention.Theorganisationstressesthatmanyinternationalobligationsarenotbeingfulfilled. Howeverthisthesisispredominantlyconcernedwithdetentionrelatingtoantiterrormeasuressoan assessmentofthedomesticdifficultiesintheprisonservice,whilstimportanttohighlight,isbeyondthe scopeofthisproject. 4Thismeasurewasthesubjectofmuchcriticismandwasreplacedin2004. 121 Intermsof dominance ,thissocialidentityisframedinlinewiththecounterterrorism agenda.Forexample,responsestothecriticismscitedabovearebasedontheprotection ofthemajorityandtherighttolifeandtolivefreefromterror(e.g.Blair,2001r).There aresubtleattemptsto direct theconstitutiveelementsofthehumanrightsand humanitariansocialidentityalongtheselines.Thisisinadditionto challenging the argumentsofthisgroupasmentionedabove,byseemingtodefendthesituationat Guantánamoindefianceofthecorehumanrightsethosofequality,andabsolute supportfortheinternationaldetentionregime. Interactionswiththissocialgrouparealsobasedon denials oftheargumentspresented. ThisisillustratedbyfrequentreferencestotheidentityoftheUKandinparticularthe identityoftheLabourgovernmentledbyBlair.Forexample,astheLabourgovernment promotesandvalueshumanrights,evidencedbytheHuman Rights Act (1998),the actionsoftheBlairgovernmentshouldbeviewedinthisframework.5Identityprovides abasisfordenialinresponsetoaccusationsthatthegovernmentiscompromisingthe humanrightsandhumanitariansocialidentity.Assuch, intersection representation is alsoapparentthroughbolstering thatwhichisshared.Howeverthisisbasedonasuper ordinatecounterterrorismagenda,suggestingthatintersectionrepresentationsupportsa strategyofdominance. Intersection representation isalsoevidentinBlair’sportrayalofthissocialidentityin termsoftherighttolifeandtherighttolivefreefromterror,asmentionedabovein relationtodominance(e.g.Blair,2001r).Throughbolstering elementsthatvalidate associationwiththissocialgroup,accusationsofrunningcountertoitcanbe minimised,allowingdetentionpoliciestostillbepresentedwithinahumanrights frameworkbothtothepublicandasameansbywhichtheBlairgovernmentcan reconcilethepotentiallydivergingdemandstothemselves.Suchastrategyappearsto allowroomformanoeuvrewithregardstothenormativeconstraintspertainingto detentionstandards.However,asdemonstratedabove,theseargumentsarenotaccepted bymembersofthissocialgroupthusassociationwiththehumanrightsand humanitariansocialidentityremainsinastateofcontestation.

5Whilstnotdirectlyrelatedtodetention,suchreasoningisalsoverynotableinrelationtothejustcause forinterventioninAfghanistan.Blairstressesonseveraloccasionsthatas‘we’arepeacefulpeople, interventionwillonlytakeplaceonthebasisofajustcause(e.g.2001zc);furthermore,‘[w]earea principlednation,andthisisaprincipledconflict’(Blair,2001zl). 122 Asaconsequence,weshouldnotbesurprisedthat compartmentalisation also accompaniesthestrategiesofdominanceandintersectionrepresentation.Evenwithin thediscourseassessed,contextisnotedashighlydeterminantinguidingchangesin foreignpolicy,thegoalsremainthesame,butwhatismeantbythemandhowtheyare bestachievedisseenasamatterofinteractionwith context .Suchanapproachis apparentinthefollowingpassage: Wearedemocratic.Theyarenot.Wehaverespectforhumanlife.Theydonot.Weholdessentially liberalvalues.Theydonot.Aswelookintotheseissuesitisimportantthatweneverlosesightofour basicvalues. But wehavetounderstandthenatureoftheenemyandactaccordingly(Blair,2001q, emphasis added ). Validatingthehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialidentityandstrengthening associationwiththisgroupisjuxtaposedwiththeapparentneedtotakemeasuresthat arecountertothis.Thesocialidentityiscompartmentalisedbasedonadifferentcontext andsituation(thisisalsoevidentinthestatementsoftheBlairgovernmentconcerning Guantánamo,ascitedonpage120). Thereisasignificantamountofcontestationwiththissocialgroupin20012002, reflectedinthenumerousstrategiesemployed,asoutlinedabove.Wecanseethat normativeconstraintsleadtocompartmentalisation,whichistheleastsustainableofall thestrategies.TheBlairgovernmentcannotsimplydefectfromtheinternational detentionregime,interactionswiththebroadersocialidentitiescontextthereforeplace significantrestraintsonthemeansbywhichsuchacourseofactioncanbepursued. 1.2 The Legal Social Identity ThelegalsocialidentityisalsoevidentinthediscourseoftheBlairgovernmentin 20012002.Significantchallengesfromthissocialgrouptocontestationsofthe internationaldetentionregimedonotemergeuntillaterperiods.However,in2002the governmentdoesreceiveasetbackwithregardstothepowertodetainforeignterror suspects,potentiallyindefinitely.ThisisinrelationtoaSpecialImmigrationAppeals Commission(SIAC)rulingthatdeterminedsuchmeasuresdiscriminatoryandnot compatiblewiththe European Convention (AI,2002b).Asifpreemptingthebacklash tocome,thediscoursefallswithinthecategoriesof dominance and intersection representation .

123 Thissocialidentity,likethatintheprevioussection,isverymuchreframedand directed inlinewiththebroaderwaronterror.Thereisanotableshiftinthediscourse fromaneedto‘protectatallcoststhecivillibertiesoftheinnocent’,toasystemthat focus’moreontherightsofthevictim,protectionofthegeneralpublicandconviction (Blair,2002k).Changeandreformareheavilyemphasised(Blair,2002k),withadegree ofsubordinationofthisgrouptoanemergentinternationalcounterterrorismsocial identity(Blair,2002i).Assuch,a dominant strategyisapparent. Thisissupported,however,by intersection representation intermsof bolstering the dimensionsonwhichthereismuchoverlapbetweenthelegalsocialidentityandthe emergentinternationalsocialidentity.Forexample,thestrengtheningoflawsisa particularlyprominenttheme,inrelationtoissuessuchasasylumandimmigration, counterterrorism,theincitementofreligioushatred,extraditionanddeportation.The needtotightenthelawtodealwithaminority,isdeemedtobe‘balancedand proportionatetotheriskweface’(Blair,2001y)andinlinewithmanyothercountries. 6 Strengtheningthelawisindeedarguedtoprovideaverypowerfulmessage‘fromthe civilisedworldtoterroristseverywhere’thateffectiveactionwillbetaken,andthisis consideredtoforma‘veryimportantdeterrent’(Blair,2001zzc). Whilstfrustrationsariseregardingthelackofacceptanceinthecourtsofsomeofthese measuresinlaterperiods,atthisstagetheemphasisisonsettingthedirectionfor changeaswellasstrengtheningandtighteningthelawtocopewiththeperceivedlevel ofthreat.Normativeconstraintsfromassociationwiththissocialidentityaretherefore channelledinacertaindirectiontofitwiththeBlairgovernment’scounterterrorism objectivessoastoenablevalidation.Asweshallseeinthesubsequenttimeperiods,as suchanapproachagainreliesonacceptancethereductionofnormativeconstraintfrom thissocialidentityisshortlived. 1.3 The Military Social Identity TheBritishArmedForcesarealsopartofthesocialidentitiescontextwithwhichthe Blairgovernmentinteracts.Theyplayasignificantroleinforeignpolicy,fundamental toavisionoftheworldbasedonabeliefinthepowerofdiplomacybackedbymilitary

6BythisBlairmeansothercountriesmakingchangesasopposedtothesamechangesastheUK. 124 force(Kampfner,2004:57).Theyalsoaddimmenselyto‘Britain'sstrengthand internationalstanding’(Blair,2001zv). WhilstmanyoftheissueshighlightedinthisChapterregardingdetentionarelargely politicalandnotmilitarymatters,certainaspectsdoaffectthissocialgroup. Forexample,thecontextinwhichthemilitaryoperationstakeplaceisonewherethere isaverycloseassociationwithAmericancounterpartsandUSforeignpolicymore generally.TheUSAisnotsubjecttothesameconstraintsastheUKunderthe InternationalCriminalCourt(ICC),raisingconcernsastowhetherthePentagonwillbe ‘attentivetoconductthatcouldresultinwarcrimescharges’inanyjointventures (Roth,2002).Furthermore,USpoliciestorestricttheapplicabilityoftheGeneva ConventionsandholddetaineesindefinitelyatGuantánamoBayaffectstheoverall contextinwhichUKtroopsoperateandarejudgedbypotentialadversaries.Admiral SirMichaelBoyce,thenChiefofDefenceStaffreportedlywarnedinDecemberof2001 that‘a‘singlemindedaim’ofdestroyingtheTalebanandalQaedawitha‘hightech WildWest’operationwouldnotbeenoughtowintheheartsandmindsacrosstheArab world’(Kampfner,2004:150).Counternormativebehaviourregardingdetention certainlycorrespondstotheseconcerns.However,thereisnodirectandsignificant contestationfromthissocialgroup,particularlywithregardstodetention,in20012002. Imustalsonotehoweverthatthescopeforcontestationisverylimited. 7 Inthiscontext,thediscourseoftheBlairgovernmentconcerningtheArmedForces, bothpriortothemilitaryinterventioninAfghanistanandafter,mainlyrevolvesaround thearticulationofpurposeintermsofsecurity,humanitarianissuesandthewider positiveimpactontheworld.Thereismuchemphasison direction (e.g.aspartofa broadercontextinwhich‘[f]ightingforthesevaluesisacausetheworldneeds’,Blair, 2002i).Thisisalongside re-assuring thissocialgroupinthefaceofsignificant criticismsandquestionsoverlegalityconcerningproposalsfortheirinvolvementin militaryinterventioninIraq.Forexample,inadditiontothethreatposedbyIraq,and keepingtheterrorattacksofSeptember11 th salientinpeople’sminds, 8Blair’sspeeches 7AsGeneralSirMikeWalkerhasstated,‘TheArmedForcesofthiscountrytaketheiroathofallegiance totheSovereignasHeadofState,andtheyareconstitutionallyboundtofollowthelawfuldirectionsof thedulyelectedGovernmentoftheday.ItwouldbeunthinkablefortheArmedForcesnottodoasthey aredirected–or,worse,toactwithoutauthorization.Thatistheroadtoanarchy’(Walker,2008:404). TheretiredGeneralisstronglyopposedtotheinvolvementofsoldiersinpolitics.However,asweshall seeinlaterperiodsothershavebeenmoreoutspokenwhenlegalityandresourcesareinquestion. 8Blairwarnsof‘arealdangerweforgetthelessonsofSeptember11’(2002i). 125 focusonthejustcauseofmilitaryinterventionandthehumanitariancomponentof goingtowar(e.g.2001zc;2002x;2002i).Inmakingthesearguments,Blairandhis innercircledrawondebatesinternationallyabouttheuseofforceformoralends. HistoricalanalogiesbasedoninvolvementinKosovo,SierraLeoneandAfghanistanare utilisedtosuggestthat‘unlessyoudohavethecapabilitytouseforceifnecessary,itis veryhardtomaketheworldamoresecureandmorepeacefulplace’(Blair,2002zr). KosovoinparticularisusedtoquellreservationsaboutactingoutsideUNauthorisation (Blair,2002t).Thesetechniquesaresuggestiveofa dominance strategywhereappeals aremadetosuperordinateunderstandings,asmentionedearlierwithregardsto directing,reflectiveofanemergentinternationalsocialidentity,largelybasedona particularapproachtocounterterrorism.Thisisalongsideexpressionsofpride,duty andcourageandrecognitionofthehighesteeminwhichtheArmedForcesareheld aroundtheworld.Blair(2001zc)suggeststhat,‘[t]hereisnogreaterstrengthfora BritishPrimeMinisterandtheBritishnationatatimelikethisthantoknowthatthe forceswearecallinguponareamongsttheverybestintheworld’, bolstering this socialidentity.Thelatteremphasisesanoverlap,indicatingasubtlestrategyof intersection representation toaccompanydominance. Aswiththelegalsocialidentity,normativeconstraintsfromassociationwiththissocial grouparechannelledinacertaindirectiontofitwiththegovernment’sobjectivessoas tominimisedigression.Thereislittlecontestationinthisperiodtochallengesuchan approach,sodominanceisonlysubtlyaccompaniedbyintersectionrepresentation. 1.4 The United Nations Social Identity Liketheprevioustwosocialgroups,thereislittlepubliccriticismfromtheUNwith regardstothecounterterrorismdetentionpracticesoftheUKin20012002.Instead,the UNmoregenerallyhighlightstheimportanceoftheruleoflawandhumanrightsin‘an increasinglydangerousworld’(Annan,2002a).Despitethis,thediscourseinrelationto thissocialidentityisstillveryrevealingwithregardstothemanagementstrategies employed,indicativeofthenatureofinteractions.Thestrategiesof dominance and intersection representation arebothapparent. Intermsof dominance ,thisislargelybasedonstatementstargetedatthe direction of thissocialidentity.Changeandreformarefrequentlystressed.Thereismuchreference

126 totheUNasinastateofbecoming, 9generatingadegreeofscopefordirectingthe organisation’sfuturepriorities(Blair,2002x).AsIhavearguedinrelationtotheother socialidentitiesalreadyassessedinthisChapter,thistendstobeinlightofanemergent superordinatesocialidentitylargelybasedonaparticularapproachtocounter terrorism,onewhereinactionisframedasweaknessandavoidanceasopposedto reasonedcalculation(Blair,2002x).Forexample,whilstthereisanexpressedbeliefin theUNroutetotacklethethreatofIraq,thisisonlyframedintermsofaction;action againstthe‘defiance’oftheUNbyIraq(Blair,2002zd). AttemptstostrengthenthispositionareevidentinthevariousreferencestoKofiAnnan, inparticular,theformerSecretaryGeneral’sstatedunderstandingthatdiplomacyneeds tobebackedbyforce,capitalisingonthelegitimacyanduniversalismthethen SecretaryGeneralconfers(Blair,2002x).10 ThelanguageoftheUN,intermsof Resolutions,isalso utilised toconstructalegalbasisformilitaryactioninIraq(Blair, 2002zd).Theneedtoframethediscourseinsuchtermsaswellasonthebasisof restraint(forexampleclaimsthattheUSAandUKarenotrushingtomilitaryaction)is veryapparent.ThereismuchemphasisonoverlapanddialoguewiththeUN(Blair, 2002x),especiallyinthebuilduptotheuseofforceinAfghanistan,thus intersection representation accompaniesthedominantapproach. RemainingwithintheUNframeworkiscertainlyofgreatimportancefortheUK, particularlywhenconsideringmilitaryinvolvement.Indeed,SallyMorgan,Blair’s adviserondomesticaffairsremindedhimpriortothemilitaryinterventioninIraqthat ‘everyLabourmanifestosince1945hadreferredtotheUNSecurityCouncilasthe highestinternationalauthority’(Kampfner,2004:192).Thissocialidentityisalsoa crucialcomponentofBlair’s‘DoctrineoftheInternationalCommunity’,andgreat emphasisisputonstrengtheningtheUNthroughreformtoenablethisdoctrinetobe putintopractice(Blair,2001zy).Thus, bolstering isconcurrentwith direction here . Theinfluenceofthissocialidentityappearstohavelimitationsoratleastallowsscope formanoeuvreasitisjuxtaposedwithdiscourseonchangeandreform. 9BlairisdrawingonthewordsofthenSecretaryGeneralKofiAnnanhere. 10 ReferencesarealsomadetoRuudLubbers,thenUNHighCommissionerforRefugees,inthebuildup tomilitaryinterventioninAfghanistan(Blair,2001x). 127 1.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity Ashasbeenadvancedthroughoutthisthesis,theliberaldemocraticsocialidentityin internationalsocietyhasbeenandcontinuestobeexceptionallyimportanttotheUK, bothintermsofhowpoliticaleliteshaveunderstood,andattemptedtorepresent,the UKinternationally.However,whatismeantbythishasbeensignificantlychallengedin 20012006.Thissectiondrawsattentiontothestrategiesof merging and dominance in relationtothislargeinternationalsocialidentitywhichareapparentin20012002. Merging betweendomesticandinternationalspheresisveryapparentinthediscourse assessed.Nationalselfinterestsandthecollectiveinterestsoftheinternational communityareviewedinunisonasopposedtoconflict(Blair,2002i).Blairpresentsa positionthatconfrontsthetraditionalunderstandingofinternationalrelationsby suggestingtherehasbeenamergingofutilitarianismandutopianism,withnomore spheresofinfluence. 11 Inrelationtothisbroaderunderstandingofinternationalrelations andtheinternationalcontextBlair(2001zv)statesthat‘[i]nthewaragainstterrorism themoralistsandtherealistsarepartners,notantagonists’.Thevisionpresentedisone basedonuniversalvaluesbehindwhichstatesmustunite,withBritainassuminga leadingroleinthesedevelopments. 12 Thesesentimentscertainlyseemtofitwith constructivistportrayalsofthepredominanceoftheliberaldemocraticsocialidentityin internationalsocietyasdemonstratedinChapters1and3. However,suchanapproachisalsoaccompaniedby dominance ,intermsof directing newnormativeunderstandings,emergentinternationalcoalitions,andaredefinitionof parameters.Thisislargelybasedonanoutlookthatfavourscloserelationswiththe USA.AsKampfnernotes,Blairinparticularhad‘anextremelyacutesenseofAmerican power’,basedonimmenseUScapabilityandreach(2004:152).TheUKispositioned sidebysidewiththeUSA,acceptingthedoctrineofpreemptionandotherUScounter terrorismpoliciesthatcomewiththiscloserelationship.Theobjectivesof‘beingatthe heartofEuropeandengagingwithChina,RussiaandIndia’aresubordinatedtosuch priorities(Kampfner,2004:236).Whetherornotthisunderstandinghasprovidedthe

11 Blair(2001l)alsotalksabout‘anotherdecisiveshiftawayfromselfishindividualismandtowardsa societybasedoncommunityandsharedvalues’inrelationtodomesticissues,butaswecanseethis communityapproachisalsoapparentinBlair’spublicstatementsregardingtheinternationalsphere. 12 Britain’sstrengththroughmembershipsofinternationalorganisationsandalliancesasaconsequenceof itshistoryisunderstoodbytheBlairgovernmenttoplacethisroleontheUK,particularlyasaunifier, evenbeforetheSeptember11 th attacks(Blair,2001e).Withthis,theystatecomestheresponsibilityto anddutytomaketheworldsafer. 128 UKwiththemostbeneficialcourseofactionisofcoursedebateable.Certainlythis approachseemstoneglectthenuancesofsoftpower,socialinfluence,andexample setting,arguablycrucialtoreducingtheoccurrenceofterroristattacks. Accompanyingsuchapositioningintheinternationalsphereisanemphasisonthe civilizedandnoncivilizedworldasbinaryopposites(e.g.Blair,2001q),13 astresson theneedforactionevenifthereisalackofsocialconsensus,14 andanagendabasedon enhancedengagementparticularlywherethereisaperceivedthreatfromdisorder (Blair,2002f).Thelatterisseeninexpeditionaryandinterventionistterms,wherethe negativeimpactofinactionisweighedmoreheavilythanmakingmistakesinaction (Blair,2002t).Alsoevidentinthisemergentsocialidentityisareductioninthe significanceofdeterrenceasapolicyoption,ifnottotalabandonment(Blair,2002t).

Inconjunctionwiththesenormativepriorities,thedominantsocialidentity internationally(formedontheconstitutiveelementsabove)cametoencompassstates beyondthosesatisfyingthecriteriaofaliberaldemocraticsocialidentity.Forexample, relationswithPakistanwereformingandthosewithRussiaadvancinginthecontextof coalitionbuilding(e.g.Blair,2001zv;2001zo).Byintegratingsuchstatesintoan emergentcoalition,theimportanceofnormativeregimesgoverninghumanrightsand detentionappeartobevastlyreduced,asthesocialidentitytowhichtheylargelypertain nolongerappearstobedominantininternationalsociety,fromtheperspectiveofthe Blairgovernment.

Alongsidethisreformulationofadominantinternationalsocialidentity,significant divisions andparametersarealsoputup.Boundariesareveryapparent betweena ‘civilized’and‘noncivilized’world(asmentionedabove);suggestingthatacivilized worldexistsandthatthereareenemiesofit(Blair,2001q),andrenderingelementsof theworldverymuchexcludedfrom‘civilized’status. 15 Adefiningfeatureofsuch positioninginrelationtothesecategoriesisbasedonwhetherornotstatesstandwith theUSAinthefightagainstterrorism. 16 Thereisasharpeningofdistinctionsbetween 13 Kampfner(2004:216)notesBlair’sprivatecommentscomplainingthatBritishparliamentarianswere notaseagerasUSpoliticianstodotherightthing. 14 Forexample,Blair(2002t)statesthattheinterventioninIraqwouldbebetterdone‘withthebroadest internationalsupport…butitdoeshavetobedone’regardlessofwhetherornotthisisachieved. 15 StatessuchasSaudiArabiaareconsideredtobe‘friends’ofthecivilizedworld. 16 Thisstarkdivisionisveryclearinstatementsconcerning‘awar,ifyoulike,betweenthecivilised worldandfanaticism’(Blair,2001r),orabattle‘betweenthefreeanddemocraticworldandterrorism’ (Blair,2001o). 129 groupswiththeuseofbinariesandcomparisons,mostsignificantlythoseassociated withthecategoriesofjustice,goodandevil(Blair,2001zd;2001zv).17 Arangeofveryinterestingcomplexdynamicsareatplayintheshiftingstatusof internationalsocialidentities,andgroupmemberships.Thefactorsidentifiedabove formconstitutiveelementsofanemergentdominantsocialidentityininternational societyinthistimeperiod.Thesepresentasignificantchallengetoaliberaldemocratic socialidentitybasedontheruleoflawandhumanrights,acomplicateddynamicto manage,particularlygiventhenumberofaudiencesinvolved.Thisisnegotiatedby attemptingtoredefinethatwhichformstheprototypicalsocialidentityinternationally, supportedbyadegreeofmerging. 2. Phase 2 - Attempts to Sustain Contestation: 2003-2004 ‘11 September has changed the psychology of America. It should have changed the psychology of the world’ (Blair, 2003n). 2.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity Asin20012002,theBlairgovernment’sdetentionpoliciesareagainhighlycriticised bythehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroup.Alargesetofconcernsareraised whichiscertainlyverydamagingfortheBlairgovernment,significantlycompromising theirabilitytovalidatecloseassociationwiththehumanrightsandhumanitariansocial identity.Inresponsethereisanintensificationofthetechniquesemployedin2001 2002,fallingpredominantlyunder dominance, intersection representation, and compartmentalisation . AIandHRWhavebothbeenextremelycriticalofPart4ofATCSAsincethelegislation cameintoforcein2001.AI(2004b)referstoPart4asaformofinternment,andthe systemforappealsagainsttheSecretaryofState’sdeterminationofindividualsasterror suspectsthroughSIACtrials,asa‘shadowcriminaljusticesystem’thatfallsfarshortof fairtrialstandards(AI,2003a). 18 Furtherquestionswereraisedin2003astowhether

17 Whilstnotinthediscourseanalysed,aninterestingquestionposedbyBlairwasmentionedinaBBC ProgrampresentedbyJohnWare,‘NoPlan,NoPeace’(October2007).Contributorssuggestthatata meetingbeforetheinvasionBlairaskedagroupofIraqiexpertswhetherornotSaddamHusseinwas ‘uniquelyevil’. 18 Thepotentialforindefinitedetentionwithoutchargeortrialonthebasisofsecretevidenceis highlightedbyAIasaverysignificantconcern.Thisisalongsidethelowerburdenofproofthatis 130 someoftheevidencereliedoninSIACtrialswasgainedundertorture,whichAI (2003b)stressesisprohibitedunderinternationallaw. Suchargumentsarehowever dismissed .DavidBlunkett(2003a),forexamplemaintains thattheATCSAhasimprovedtheUK’sabilitytofightterrorism.Furthermore,with regardstoquestionsontortureevidence,theformerHomeSecretaryemploysadegree ofcompartmentalisationstating: Letmemakeitclear,weunreservedlycondemntheuseoftortureandhaveworkedhardwithour internationalpartnerstoeradicatethispractice.However,itwouldbeirresponsiblenottotakeappropriate accountofanyinformationwhichcouldhelpprotectnationalsecurityandpublicsafety(Blunkett, 2004d). JackStraw’sprivatecommentspublishedintheGuardianarealsolessthancriticalof theuseofevidencegainedthroughtorturebyathirdparty,presentinga challenge tothe argumentsofthissocialgroup.Heassertsthat: Itdoesnotfollowthatifitisextractedundertorture,itisautomaticallyuntrue(citedinLeigh,2005). Bothstatementscertainlydoverylittletostrengthentheinternationaldetentionregime, particularlywithregardstotorture. 19 Otherconcernsrelatingspecificallytotortureinvolveaccusationsthatcertain individualsarebeingheldunder‘cruel,inhumananddegradingconditionsinviolation ofinternationallaw’atBelmarshprison(AI,2004c),aswellascriticismsof governmentpolicytoestablishMemorandumsofUnderstanding(MoUs)withcountries knowntotortureinordertodeportterrorsuspects. 20 Overall,theBlairgovernmentis accusedofdefectingfrominternationalobligationsseekingdetentionpoliciesthat underminehumanrightsprotectionsaswellascompromisingthegovernment’sability toestablishaneffectiveantiterrorstrategy(HRW,2004c). requiredfromtheSecretaryofStatecomparedtonormalcourtproceedings(AI,2003b).AIarealso highlycriticalofthegovernment’sappealsagainstSIACacquittals(2004d). 19 Thesecomments,madeinNovember2004,areaftertheCourtofAppealrulinginAugust2004,that renderedtortureevidenceadmissibleincertaincircumstances(solongasUKpersonneldidnotinstigate, werenotinvolvedandtheabusedidnottakeplaceonUKsoil),underminingtheglobalbanontorture (HRW,2004a). 20 AIandHRWhighlighttheunreliabilityofsuchagreementsandthesignificantriskoftortureandill treatmentthatindividualswillface(e.g.HRW2004b). 131 InresponsetheBlairgovernmentfocusesonthenatureofthethreatfaced,andtheneed tostrikeabalancebetweenhumanrightsandsecurity.Sucharguments,employing elementsofcompartmentalisation,serveto direct thetermsofthedebate. 21 Blair (2003c)states,forexample,that‘peoplehavetounderstandifwewanttodealwiththis newmenacewehavetotakethemeasuresnecessarytodealwithitproperly’.The argumentsofthisgroupare dismissed onthebasisofsecurityimperativesanda differentunderstandingofcivillibertiesandhumanrights,privilegingtherighttolife andtherighttolivefreefromterror. Blair(2004ze)alsodrawsonhisbackgroundasa‘lawyerwithastrictbeliefintherule oflawandcivilliberties’tosupportthisposition.Blairgroundshisreasoninginthis identitywhichservestostrengthenhisargumentsthrough intersection representation . Blunkett(2004b)isequallyfirminemphasisinghis‘commitmenttohumanrights’and usesaspeechtoHarvardLawSchooltoalsochallenge and deny thenotionthattheUK andUSAare‘destroyingtraditionalhumanrightsandfreedoms’.Todosotheformer HomeSecretaryunderlinestheimportanceof‘themostfundamentalhumanrights… thoseoflife,libertyandsecurityofperson’,basedonthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights ,andwhichhavebeencompromisedbyterrorists.Hearguesthat ‘human rightsandtheinstitutionswhichsustainthem’mustbebalanced‘withthebasicrightfor lifeandfreedomfromfear’(Blunkett,2004b). TheBlairgovernmentalsofacesavastamountofcriticismregardingthesituationat GuantánamoBay.TheyareurgedtodomorewithrespecttotheUKnationalsand residentsheldatthebase,aswellastousetheirinfluencewiththeUSPresidentto ensurefairtrialstakeplace(Ross,2003).Blair’spublicresponsetothesituationat GuantánamoBayisagainlargelysupportiveoftheUSpolicy.Blairstressesthatthe governmentaresatisfiedwiththetreatmentofUKnationalsdetainedatGuantánamo (2003s)andremindsusofthecontextinwhichthesituationarose(2003zm),oneof ‘hugedangerforourselvesandourArmedForces’(2003zo).Indirectresponsetothe humanrightsandcivillibertiesconcernsraisedbyorganisationssuchasAIandHRW callingforUKresidentstobereturnedtotheUK,Blairstates: thepeoplewhoareoutinGuantánamoBayarepeoplewhogotthereviaaparticularprocesstodowith theAfghanconflictandIjustaskpeopletobealittleunderstandingofthefactthattherearealsoissuesto

21 Blunkett(2004a)callsfora‘rationaldebate…basedonfacts’. 132 dowithournationalsecuritythatwehavetobecarefulof,andmyexperienceofthesedebatesisthatvery swiftlyacivillibertiesissueturnsintoanationalsecurityissue(2003zw). 22 Thedangersofcivillibertiesarehighlighted,presentingasignificantchallenge tothe humanrightsandhumanitariansocialidentity.Blairalsodrawsattentiontothe ‘uncomfortablefact’that‘thereisstillinformationthatisbeingcheckedwithpeoplein GuantánamoBaythatdoeshaveagenuineinterestanduseforusinfightingterrorism’ (2003s),suggestingthatinthis context ,thenormativeconstraintsassociatedwiththis socialidentitydonottakeprecedence. 23 Inadditiontosuch compartmentalisation ,Blair(2003zy)minimisesthedegreeto whichthisseemstobeapparentbystressingthat‘theveryfactthatweareindiscussion aboutmakingsuretherearefairproceduresfortrial’isan‘indicationthatweactually treatpeopledifferently.Soeventhoughthisaroseoutofthisappallingbrutalattackon AmericaonSeptember11,nonethelesswemakesurethatjusticeisdoneforpeople’.24 ThedetrimentaleffectofcompartmentalisationontheBlairgovernment’sassociation withthehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialidentityisbysmallmeasurereduced. Thus,in20032004,thehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialidentityisaverydifficult onetomanage,againforcingtheBlairgovernmenttoadoptacompartmentalisation strategy,inadditiontodominanceandintersectionrepresentation,wherevalidationof associationisheavilycompromised. 2.2 The Legal Social Identity Interactionswiththelegalsocialgrouparequitemixedin20032004,however,onthe wholethegovernmentfacesmountingoppositionwithregardstoantiterrorlegislation, inparticularthatwhichaimstoestablishnewstandardsandproceduresfordetention. TheBlairgovernmentalsoencountersmuchcriticismwithregardstotheirpositionon

22 WhentheTipton3arereturnedandreleasedwithoutchargeBlairsimplystatesthatthereare2sidesto everystoryandtheirdetention‘aroseoutofasituationwherepeoplewerepickedupinAfghanistanin circumstanceswhereBritishandAmericantroopswerefightingAlQaedaandtheTaliban’(2004k).Blair alsoasksformorecredittobegiventotheAmerican’sintermsoftheirstandardsforfairtrials,the formerPrimeMinisterstatesthat,‘[a]nyMilitaryCommissionthattheyhaveissubjecttorulesthatI thinkwouldberegardedasreasonablystrictbyanybody(2003zo). 23 Indeed,HRWhighlighttheUK’sreportedinvocationof‘Article103oftheU.N.Chartertoarguethat itsobligationstotheCounterTerrorismCommitteeunderResolution1373tookprecedenceoverits obligationstotheHumanRightsCommittee’(HRW,2003a).Thecontextdependentnatureofthis argumentisclear. 24 BlairalsodrawscomparisonswithIraq’sdefianceoftheGenevaConventionsintermsoftheir paradingofprisonersinpublic(2003r). 133 GuantánamoBay.Theirresponseemploysthesamemanagementstrategiesasin2001 2002, dominance and intersection representation .However,furthertechniquesare employedinlightofincreasedcontestation. Muchofthecontestationin20032004centredonPart4oftheATCSA,asmentioned aboveinrelationtothehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroup.InDecember2004 Part4wasdeemedtobeinbreachoftheECHRbytheLawLords.Amajorityofeight tooneruledthattheprovisionsforindefinitedetentiondiscriminatedonthegroundsof nationality.AstherewasacomparablethreatfromUKnationalsasopposedtojust foreignnationals,Part4wasruledtobeinbreachofArticle14ofECHR.Thisruling compromisedthegovernment’sderogationunderArticle5ofECHR,becauseifUK nationals,whichwereacomparablethreat,werenotseentorequirethesametreatment thensuchderogationscannotbe‘strictlyrequired’(HRW,2004d). LordHoffman’s(2004)statementintherulingisclearinchallengingthegovernmentas heassertsthat: Therealthreattothelifeofthenation,inthesenseofapeoplelivinginaccordancewithitstraditional lawsandpoliticalvalues,comesnotfromterrorismbutfromlawssuchasthese. PriortotheLawLordsrulinginDecember2004,theBlairgovernmenthadspentmuch timepubliclydefendingPart4ATCSA. 25 InresponsetotheNewtonReportthat reviewedtheATCSAandconcludedthatPart4shouldbereplaced,DavidBlunkett (2003a)arguedthathewouldbe‘failing’inthe‘dutyofpublicprotectionifthePart4 powerswereremovedfromthearmouryofmeasuresavailabletoprotecttheUnited Kingdomfromspecificterroristthreats’. 26 TheLawLordsrulinginDecember2004 clearlyunderminesthesearguments.TheBlairgovernment’sattemptsto direct the termsofthedebatebydrawingonaframeworkofprotection,thatemphasisesthe‘basic rightforlifeandfreedomfromfear’(Blunkett,2004b),and‘securityandorder’asa directpathtoliberty(Blunkett,2003a),appeartohavebeenfirmlyrejectedbythis socialgroup.

25 ThiswasindeedsupportedbytheCourtofAppealinAugust2004,wheretheadmissibilityofevidence gainedthroughtorturewasalsoupheldforSIACproceedings. 26 TheconclusionsoftheNewtonReportarefurtherrejectedinthegovernment’sownreporton Counter- Terrorism Powers (SecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,2004:1011). 134 TheBlairgovernmentisalsovery challenging andcriticaltowardsthelegalsocial groupin20032004.TheformerPrimeMinister(2004k)focusesontheneedtokeep ‘lawuptodatewiththerealityontheground’,andappearstoviewtheCourtsasan obstacletosuchprogress.InrelationtotighteningdomesticlawBlair(2004zl) recognisesthat‘intheendwehavetoworkwithinaframeworksetdownbytheCourts aswell’,suggestingthatsuchproceduresareviewedasahindrancetoeffectivecounter terrorismpolicies. 27 TheformerHomeSecretary,DavidBlunkett(2004a)goeseven furtherandvergeson compartmentalisation inhisstatementthat: AsHomeSecretary,Imustbalancelegaltheorywiththepracticaljobofprotectingpeople. Thetraditionsoflegaltheoryarejuxtaposedwiththedemandsofthecontext,however, Blunkettisnotproposingtoworkoutsidealegalframeworkhere,buttodisputethe principlesthatpredominate. ThischallengingapproachisalsoapparentintheinternationalcontextwhenBlairuses hisspeechinSedgefieldin2004toquestioninternationallawandopposetheabsolute principleofnonintervention. 28 Hequestionsandrejectsthisprincipleasheperceivesit tocurrentlystand.EarlierintheyearBlairhadalsostressedthat: ourdemandisnotthatweshouldbesubjecttodifferentrulesfromtherestoftheworld,butonthe contrarythateverybodyshouldbewithinaproperframeworkofinternationallaw(2004q). TheBlairgovernmentexpects‘allinternationalcolleagues…[to]abidebythelawin thewaythatwedo’(2004f),yetthisisjuxtaposedwithrevisionism,averydifficult positiontoadopt.

27 Earlier,inMarchof2004,thegovernmentwasrefusedpermissiontoappealagainsttheSIACruling thathadrejectedtheSecretaryofState’sdeterminationofaLibyanmanasa‘suspectedinternational terrorist’(AI,2004e). 28 TheBlairgovernmenthavecertainlyreceivedavastamountofcriticismwithregardstothelegalityof interveningmilitarilyinIraq.OnenotablecasewastheresignationontheeveofthewarofElizabeth Wilmhurst,alegaladviserwhohadservedintheforeignofficefor30years(Kampfner,2004:304).Blair hasnotedthat‘lawyerscontinuetodivide’overthedecisiontointervene,yettheformerPrimeMinister attemptstoshiftthedebateawayfromoneoflegalitytothatofpoliticsbysuggestingthat‘theirlegal opinionsbear…aremarkablesimilaritytotheirpoliticalviewofthewar’(2004h).Forthelegalitytobe inquestionismuchmoredetrimentalthanpoliticaldisagreement.Additionally,thelackoflegalityforthe ‘occupyingforce’inIraqaftertheinitialcombatphasewasasignificantconcernforthegovernment,one raisedbytheAttorneyGeneralLordGoldsmith(Kampfner,2004:317;Short,2005).However,the legalityoftheIraqinterventionisnotthefocusofthisthesis.Imentionthisonlybrieflytodemonstrate Blair’soverallapproachtothissocialidentity. 135 Intersection representation isalsoapparentinrelationtothelegalsocialidentity, supportingthedominancestrategyoutlinedabove.Thisisintermsof bolstering this socialidentity.Therepeatedreferencesto‘tightening’and‘strengthening’thelawby membersoftheBlairgovernment,stressingtheimportanceoftheruleoflaw,are aspectsofthis.TheBlairgovernmentalsoemploythelanguageofinternationallawin relationtoIraq, utilising associationwiththisidentitytosuggestthatsuchactionisin defenceofinternationallaw,andthatthosethatactoutsideaframeworkofinternational lawareathreat(Blair,2004q). However,whilsttheBlairgovernmenthaveemployedthemanagementstrategiesof dominanceandintersectionrepresentationin20032004,thegovernment’sclose associationwiththelegalsocialidentityhasbeenbroughtintoquestion.Further criticisms,concerningthedetentionfacilityatGuantánamoBayandtheproposed militarytribunals,frombothLordSteyn(2003)andLordGoldsmith(2004)(theformer AttorneyGeneral),havechallengedthisevenmore,particularlygiventhegovernment’s defensiveresponsesoutlinedintheprevioussectiononthehumanrightsand humanitariansocialidentity. 29 2.3 The Military Social Identity DiscourseconcerningtheArmedForcesisagainfrequentin20032004,asexpected giventheircontinuingengagementincombatoperations.Againthereisnotmuch contestation,especiallypublicly,withthisgroup.Questionsarehoweverraisedofthe governmentinrelationtothissocialgroup(ifnotnecessarilybythemembersofthe ArmedForcesthemselves),particularlyconcerningthebetrayalofsoldiers.Thisis largelybasedonthereasonsforthemilitaryinterventioninIraq,legality,and equipmentshortagesinthefield.ArmedForcespersonnelwereledtobelievetheywere goingintocombattoprotectthecountryfromadirectthreatandtoliberateIraqfrom SaddamHussein,however,thissignificantlyshiftedtoabattletofreeIraqfrom terrorismandaglobalconflictbetweenideologies,subsequenttotheinitialinvasion. Also,variousmediasourcesreportedallegationsofanequipmentshortfall,bothin termsofmedicalkit(e.g.BBC,2004a)andprotectivearmour(e.g.BBC,2004b).

29 Thegovernment’sresponseonGuantánamoBayhasbeenoutlinedinrelationtothehumanrightsand humanitariansocialgroup.Clearlythereisasignificantoverlapherewiththelegalsocialgroup,however thediscourseofthegovernmentislargelydirectedattheconcernsraisedbythehumanrightsand humanitariansocialgroupanddoesnotalterthestrategiesidentifiedinrelationtothisgroup. 136 Whilstnotdirectlyrelatedtothedetentionofterrorsuspects,theBlairgovernment’s responsesformpartofthebroaderinteractionswithsocialidentitiesinthiscontext.

TheBlairgovernment’sstatementsagainlargelyfallwithinthecategoryof dominance . Thereismuchemphasisonhowcurrentmissionsdohelptoprotectthepeaceand securityofBritainandtheworldandthatthesoldiersdoseearealandpositive differenceinpeople’slivesinIraqasaconsequenceoftheirmilitaryactions(Blair, 2003f).The‘gloomladenobservationsofarmchairgenerals’(Kampfner,2005:316), are dismissed ,atthesametimeas directing thepurposeofthissocialgroup,asistheir jobtodo.Purposeisverymuchlinkedtothebroaderwaronterror,andasuperordinate socialidentitybasedonthecoalitionfightingterrorism,perhapsdetractingfromthe moreimmediatedivisionswithinthecountryandinternationallyregardingtheissueof theUKpresenceinIraq.Blair’s(2004a)expressionsofthegratitudeoftheinternational communitywhenaddressingthemilitaryprovideanindicationofsuperordinate orientationinrelationtotheUKArmedForces;onethatwasquestionedinprivateby AdmiralBoycewhoisreportedtohave‘expressedmisgivingsabouttheAmerican’s approachtothewaronterror’moregenerally(Kampfner,2004:305). Linkedtonotionsofpurposewerequestionsoflegality.Thisisastrongconcernforthe ArmedForces,givendevelopmentsintheinternationalspheresuchastheICC.As Kampfnernotes,‘militarychiefsintheUKweredeeplyworriedthattheyandtheir soldierscouldbeprosecutedattheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)ifthewarwere deemedunlawful’(2004:378). 30 Blairpublicly reassures membersoftheArmed Forcesthathewouldn’tcommitforcesunlesshebelievedsuchmeasuresweremorally right,thatmilitaryinterventionwasthelastresort(2003i),itwasajustcause(2003t) andwasabsolutelynecessary(2003b).Discourseconcerningthesubsequentmilitary presenceisalsoheavilylinkedtotheUNmandatepostintervention. ConcernsaboutoverstretchingtheArmedForceswerealsoraisedinprivatebyAdmiral BoyceaccordingtoKampfner(2004:305),whichcertainlyhadthepotentialto underminenormsofprofessionalismandcapacitytodeliversufficientlyonthe‘hearts andminds’componentofthewar.ThelatterisgrantedgreatimportancebytheBlair government,particularlytheneedtopersuadepeopletoturnawayfromtheideologyof 30 Inordertoaddressthisconcern,AdmiralBoyce,thenChiefofDefenceStaff,soughtdefinite assurancesfromtheAttorneyGeneralLordGoldsmithonthelegalityoftheplannedmilitaryintervention intheimmediatebuilduptohostilitiesinIraq(Jackson,2008:402). 137 terrorismandextremism.Suchanemphasisdivergesfromthefactorsdirectly associatedwithandwithinthecontroloftheArmedForces,involvingtheminaglobal battleofideologies.Doingso,intheglobalcontextof24hournewsmedia,highly legalisedwarfare,andanunpopularintervention,meantthattheconflictwassubjected toanunprecedenteddegreeofscrutiny. Thus,accusationsofabusebythearmedforces,particularlyinrelationtodetainees, wereparticularlydamaging.TheBlairgovernmentfrequentlyspeaktothe defence of this group ,stressingthatsuchbehavioursdonotapplytothevastmajorityofsoldiers, whoinverydifficultcircumstancesdoamagnificentjobandaretrainedverywell.Blair (2004a)isclearinarticulatingthatheisinaluckypositionasthePrimeMinisterofthe UK,tohavesuchconfidenceandstrengthintheArmedForces,stressingtheircapacity tobethe‘newpioneersofsoldieringinthe21 st century’.Admirationfortheirskill, professionalism,courageandsenseofdutyaresomeoftheissuestoucheduponinthe discourse,whichservestofurther bolster thissocialidentity.Thegratitudeforthework thattheArmedForcesaredoing,andtheirmajorroleintheforeignpolicyanddefence oftheUKbringtheabovetwotechniquesfirmlywithinthecategoryof intersection representation (Blair,2004zzc). Interactionswiththissocialgroupservetodemonstratetheimportanceoftheevolving superordinatesocialidentitypredominatelybasedoncounterterrorism,foundedonthe constitutiveprinciplespreviouslymentioned.Whilstintersectionrepresentationis evident,thisislargelytofacilitatethedominantapproach. 2.4 The United Nations Social Identity WhilstmostofthediscourseoftheBlairgovernmentin20032004thatrelates specificallytotheUN,focusesonissuesofinterventionandpostconflict reconstruction,variousareasofconcernareraisedbythissocialgroupregardingthe detentionpoliciesoftheUKinthewaronterror.Thislargelyrelatestothetradeoff betweenhumanrightsandsecurity,aswellasmorespecifically,thegovernment’s positionontheadmissibilityofevidencegainedbytorture,incourtproceedings.The Blairgovernment’sinteractionswiththeUN,whilstnotalwaysonthetopicofdetention arelargelybasedon dominance and intersection representation aswillbeadvanced inthissection.

138 In2004KofiAnnanspokeofaworldwheretherewasadangerouspossibilitythatthe fabricof‘rules,institutionsandprinciplesbuiltuptopromoteprosperityandprotect peace…maybestartingtounravel’atatimewhentheyaremostneeded(Annan, 2004a).IntermsofcombatingterrorismtheUNsuggeststhat‘anysacrificeofhuman rights…demeansusallandalsodiminishestheprospectsforsuccessfullycombatingthe scourgeofterrorism’(ReportoftheSecretaryGeneral,2004:4).Thenotionofatrade offisrejected.Humanrightsarealso,furthermore,stronglylinkedtolegitimacy,where ‘inorderforastatetocriticizeotherswithlegitimacy,thatStatemustpayattentionto itsownobservanceofhumanrights’(Corell,2004).TheUNisparticularlycriticalof theUK’sbreachofArticle15oftheCAT,concerningtheadmissibilityincourt proceedingsofevidencegainedthroughtorture(AI,2004f). 31 SuchargumentsdonotfitwellwiththediscourseoftheBlairgovernment,wherethere isagreatdealofemphasisonatradeoffbetweenhumanrightsandsecurity.Statements directedattheUNarehoweverlargelybasedontheinterventioninIraq. Dominance as astrategyiscertainlyveryevidenthere,intermsof directing , challenging ,and blaming ,aswellas threatening .TheBlairgovernmentisinsistentthat ‘wemust upholdtheauthorityoftheUnitedNations’(Blair,2003c);andactionmustbetakenif thewilloftheUNisbreached(Blair,2003b). 32 Thesituationisframedasatestofthe UN,onewheretheorganisation’sauthorityisatstake(Blair,2003e).Ontheeveofthe warBlair(2003n)furtherstated‘thatthegreaterdangertotheUNisinaction’. BlameisplacedontheSecurityCouncilfornotagreeingonasecondResolution regardingIraq,andforcingtheUSAandUKtoactoutsidetherulebasedsystem(Blair, 2004h).Accompanyingsuchrhetoricissignificantcontestationregarding‘howyou maketherulesandhowyoudecidewhatisrightorwronginenforcingthem’(Blair, 2004h).Blair(2004h)statesthatthe‘UNUniversalDeclarationonHumanRightsisa finedocument.ButitisstrangetheUnitedNationsissoreluctanttoenforcethem’.

31 TheBlairgovernment’sresponsestosuchcriticismshavebeenassessedinrelationtothehumanrights andhumanitariansocialgroupsowillnotbecoveredagainhere.Thepurposeofthissectionistodeal specificallywiththemanagementstrategiesemployedinrelationtotheUN,thusestablishingthecontext withinwhichconcernsfromthissocialgroupareviewed. 32 BlairisalsodirectingonotherissuesstressingthattheUNneeds‘tounderstandthatfacedwiththe threatswehave,weshoulddoallwecantospreadthevaluesoffreedom,democracy,theruleoflaw, religioustoleranceandjusticefortheoppressed,howeverpainfulforsomenationsthatmaybe;butthatat thesametime,wewagewarrelentlesslyonthosewhowouldexploitracialandreligiousdivisiontobring catastrophetotheworld’(2004h). 139 ThereisasenseofBlairknowingtherulespromotedbytheUNbetterthantheUN itself,despitethecontestationsregardingdetention. 33 Inadditiontodominanceasabove, intersection representation isalsoevident.The Blairgovernment utilises thelanguageoftheUNintermsofResolutions,andstresses thattheyremaincommittedtotheUN,andtheimportanceoftheirroleinthepost conflictphaseisportrayedassomethingaroundwhichmembersoftheUNcan unite (Blair,2003zu;Blair,2004m).34 Blair(2004q) bolsters thissocialgroupandhis government’sassociationwithitbystating: whateverdifficultiestherearehistoricallyabouttheUN'sroleinIraq,myassessmentisthatbothwithin Iraqandwithintheinternationalcommunity,theUNisthebodythathastheinternationallegitimacyto beabletocertifyandhelpguidetheprocessofpoliticaltransition. Despitedivisionsintherecentpast,BlairissuggestingtheUNretainssufficient legitimacytohaveauthorityontheIraqissueandisdrawingtheUKclosertothissocial identity.Thusdominanceiscloselyaccompaniedbyintersectionrepresentation, particularlyinthepostconflictphaseinIraq.Thecriticismsabovethatrelateto detentionarelikelytohavebeendrownedoutbytheargumentsconcerning intervention,whichoverallservedtocreateadegreeofdistancetothissocialidentity, weakeningthesocialinfluenceoftheUN’snormativearguments. 2.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity Challengestotheliberaldemocraticsocialidentityareagainapparentin20032004. Thediscoursecertainlydenotesshiftingdynamicsintheinternationalsphere,asthe Blairgovernmentattempttoestablishadegreeofunityunderacomplexsuperordinate identity,blendingelementscontainedinthedoctrineoftheinternationalcommunity,the liberaldemocraticsocialidentityandtheemphasesofthewaronterror.Thestrategies of dominance and merging arebothevident.

33 IndeedthisisreflectedintheinsistencethattheUK‘hadgonetowartoupholdUNresolutions–even thoughtheUNitselfhadsteadfastlyrefusedtobacktheverycausehewasmaking’(Kampfner,2004: 374). 34 Blairclaimsthat‘intheUnitedNationswehavecomebacktogethernow’(2003zi).TheUNbacking forthepresenceofcoalitionforcesisachievedthroughResolutions1483and1511andthelegitimacythis denotesissubsequentlystressed.TheUNHighLevelPanelReport(December2004)isalsoseenas somethingaroundwhichtounite(2004zz).Thereportfocusesonestablishinganewconsensusfor collectivesecurity,drawingonthemesfromthe‘ResponsibilitytoProtect’doctrine.Thisreportis constructedinthediscourseassomethingaroundwhichreformcantakeplaceenablingtheUNtoact effectively. 140 Theemphasisoncommunity,andtheworldasacommunity,continuesandindeedis increasinglyevidentin20032004.Thevalueofcommunitybothdomesticallyand internationallyisastrongtheme,withparallelscreatedbetweenthem.Thereisadegree of merging whereboundariesareagain blurred. Blair(2004h)buildsonthenotionof community,stating: Thedoctrineofinternationalcommunityisnolongeravisionofidealism.Itisapracticalrecognitionthat justaswithinacountry,citizenswhoarefree,welleducatedandprosperoustendtoberesponsible,tofeel solidaritywithasocietyinwhichtheyhaveastake;sodonationsthatarefree,democraticandbenefiting fromeconomicprogress,tendtobestableandsolidpartnersintheadvanceofhumankind. Blair(2003a)suggeststhat‘therehasneverbeenatimewhendomesticandforeign policyweresocloselylinked’,andlaterarguesthatsuchasituationdemands‘an entirelydifferent,morejustandmoremodernviewofselfinterest’,basedonblurred boundaries(Blair,2004h). 35 However,whatexactlyconstitutesthelargesocialidentitywithwhichtheBlair governmentappeartobeemployingamergingstrategyishighlycontested. Dominance isagainevident,particularlyintermsof directing, and challenging previous understandings.36 InhisSedgefieldspeechin2004Blair(2004h)speaks‘passionately’ ofthe‘mortaldangerofmistakingthenatureofthenewworldinwhichwelive’.The formerPrimeMinisterargueslaterin2004: Aworldthatisfractured,dividedanduncertainmustbebroughttogethertofightthisglobalterrorismin allitsforms,andtorecognisethatitwillnotbedefeatedbymilitarymightalone,butalsoby demonstratingthestrengthofourcommonvaluesbybringingfreedomanddemocracytoIraq,aswe havedonetoAfghanistan;bypursuingwiththesameenergypeaceintheMiddleEastbetweenIsraeland Palestine;byacceptingitisourdutytocombatpovertyandinjusticeonthecontinentofAfricaand elsewhereintheworld(Blair,2004zs). Thisagendadrawsavarietyoffactorstogetherandappearstoprovidetheconstitutive elementsofaninternationalsocialidentitybasedontacklingtheseandotherissues,as 35 WhilstthisethoshasbeenapparentthroughoutthediscourseoftheBlairgovernment,thisparticular statementclearlyhighlightswhyassumptionsregardingtheinterestsofastatemaynotalwaysbethat helpful,andindeedaconstructivistproblematisationofthisisessential. 36 Significantchallengeispresented,forexample,tonothinglessthanthetraditionalconceptionthat‘has heldswaysincethetreatyofWestphaliain1648;namelythatacountry'sinternalaffairsareforitandyou don'tinterfereunlessitthreatensyou,orbreachesatreaty,ortriggersanobligationofalliance’(2004h). 141 wellaspromotinguniversalvalues. 37 Globalthreatssuchasthatfrompoverty,global warming,WMDandterrorismareallstressed.TheformerPrimeMinisterisvery optimisticwithregardstothisagendaemphasisingthewillingnessoftheinternational community‘toconfrontthechallengeswehavetogetheronaconcertedbasis’(Blair, 2003zl).TheUK’sroleisconsideredtobecentralinbringingtogetherthedifferent actors,particularlytheUSAandtheEU,thusassumingadirectingpositioninrelation toanevolvinganddynamicinternationalsocialidentity. Aswiththepreviousperiod,thereisagainmuchemphasisonnewalliancesandgroup formationsinthechangingworld.Thisisparticularlynotableinrelationtoanalliance struckwithGeneralGaddafiofLibya.Blairsuggeststhatourviewoftheworldand wholethinkinghastochangeinthepostSeptember11 th world,andinresponsewemust offerleaderssuchasGaddafithechancetoworkwiththeWaronTerrorgrouping.This isseenbyBlairasasignalthattheUSAandUKcanworkwiththeArabworld. 38 Alongsidethisemphasisonnewmembers,parameters,boundariesand divisions are againextremelyapparentcharacterisedpredominantlyas‘astrugglebetweenfanaticism andextremismontheonehand,andpeoplewhobelieveinfreedomandintoleranceon theother’(Blair,2003zy). Thus,thereareavarietyofdynamicsatworkintheinternationalsphere.Muchofthe discourseoftheBlairgovernmentappearstobeattemptingtomergeelementsofthe liberaldemocraticsocialidentitywiththeantiterrorismagendathathasadifferent membershipbase.Therearemanycontradictoryfactorsherewhichareextremely difficulttomerge.OnehighlyvisibleexampleconcernsGuantánamoBay,wherethe internationalnormativestandardsandregimesassociatedwithaliberaldemocratic socialidentityarejuxtaposedwiththoseperceivedtopertaintothelooselyand dynamicallydefinedcounterterrorismsocialidentityintheinternationalsphere.We canunderstandhowtheinfluenceoftheinternationaldetentionregimeishighly contestedastheinternationalsocialidentitytowhichitlargelypertainsisbeingheavily challengedbytheBlairgovernment.Indeed,Blair’s(2003n)warningthatwecannot allowthe‘naturalurgesofourdemocracytowardspeace’tobeseenasaweaknessis

37 Blairpicturesaworldworkingtogether,basedon‘universalvalues’,andformutualbenefit(2004h). Thisapproachtointernationalrelationsisbasedontheambitionforhumanitytoreachthegoalsassetout intheUDHRandtheUNCharter,notablytheprotectionofhumanrights,freedom,democracyandthe ruleoflaw. 38 OthernotedrelationsinthisperiodarewithIndia,Pakistan,Poland,theUkraine(ofteninrelationtothe EU)andtheCommonwealth. 142 verytelling.However,asthisthesisargues, international socialidentitiesarenotthe onlycontextwithwhichpoliticalelitesmustinteract.Suchacontradictoryapproachis certainlyhardtosustaingiventhewidercontextofsocialidentitiesandsocialinfluence.

3. Phase 3 - The Unravelling of Contestation? 2005-2006 ‘Let no-one be in any doubt, the rules of the game are changing’ (Blair, 2005zb).

3.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity Manyofthekeycriticismsraisedbythehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroup regardingtheBlairgovernment’sdetentionpoliciescontinuetointensifyin20052006. Theresponseagainutilisesacomplexarrayof dominance, intersection representation and compartmentalisation ,employingthesametechniquesasinthe previousperiods,however,thediscourseusedisincreasinglydismissiveofthe argumentsofmembersofthissocialgroup. ThecontroversialPart4oftheATCSA2001wasreplacedin2005withcontrolorders inthe Prevention of Terrorism Act .Humanrightsgroupshavebeenverycriticalof thesenewmeasuressuggestingthattheyalsoviolatehumanrights(AI,2005c),donot meetinternationalhumanrightsobligations(HRW,2005i),andfallshortofthe requirementsoutlinedintheLawLordsrejectionofPart4ATCSA(AI,2005d). 39 HRW andAIarealsoextremelycriticalofthegovernment’sproposalstoincreasethelength ofpretrialdetentionforterrorsuspectsfrom14daysto90days.AIhasreferredtosuch measuresas‘draconianandunnecessary’,andwhich‘effectivelyamounttointernment inallbutname’(AI,2005e). Thehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgrouphasbeenhighlycriticalofthe‘serious attackonhumanrights’thattheBlairgovernment’sdetentionpoliciespresent.In additiontocompromisingtherighttoafairtrialasabove,thisgroupalsoaccusesthe governmentofunderminingtheglobalbanontorture‘attemptingtocircumvent’for exampletheprincipleofnonrefoulement (AI,2005f;HRW,2005b).HRW(2005c) suggestthattheBlairgovernmentisleadinga‘growingtrend’indefianceof internationallawbyseekingtoestablishMoUswithcountriessuchasJordanand 39 Priortopassageintolaw,AIcalledfor‘thewithdrawalofthePreventionofTerrorismBill(PTB),asit willeffectivelyendtheruleoflawandtheseparationofpowersbyplacingkeypowersinthehandsofthe executive’(2005g). 143 Algeriathatareknowntotorture.Theyare‘condoning’(Crawshaw,2006)and ‘encouraging’(AI,2006g)torturethroughtheirdetentionpolicies,includingtheir statementsinfavouroftheadmissibilityofevidencegainedthroughtortureincourt proceedings. Thegovernment’sresponseandinteractionwithsuchcriticismsfromthisgroupisto againattempttoreformulatetheconceptofhumanrights.Whilst intersection representation isapparentintermsofstrengtheninghumanrightsand bolsteringthis group, dominance and compartmentalisation areparamount.Forexample,Charles Clarke(2005a),theformerhomesecretary,statedonseveraloccasionsin2005that: Ourstrengtheningofhumanrightsneedstoacknowledgeatruthwhichweshouldallaccept,thattheright tobeprotectedfromtortureandilltreatmentmustbeconsideredsidebysidewiththerighttobe protectedfromthedeathanddestructioncausedbyindiscriminateterrorism. WhilstBlair(2006i)himselfdoesnotgosofarastoovertlybalancetorturewith security,theformerPrimeMinisterdoes dismiss theconcernsofthehumanrightsand humanitariansocialgroupwithregardstothelackofreliabilityofMoUs,andargues thatthehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroup‘havegottheworldthewrongway round’. Furthermore,theECHRisframedbyCharlesClarke(2005a)asoutdated,‘established over50yearsagoinaquitedifferentinternationalclimate’,onewhereJohnReid(2006) suggestsconcernssuchas‘unlawfuldetention…tortureandpunishmentwithouttrial camecentrestage’duetotheveryrecenthorrorsofWWII.Blair(2006zf)arguesthat ‘traditionalcivillibertyargumentsarenotsomuchwrong,asjustmadeforanother age’;thedebatenowisnot‘aboutwhetherwerespectcivillibertiesornot;butwhose takepriority’(Blair,2006zb). Compartmentalisation ,informedbysuperordinate priorities,isthereforeapparent,ashumanrightsaredeemedtobe context dependent in relationtotheindividualsconcerned.Thishasagainbeenevidentwithregardsto GuantánamoBay.WhilstBlair(2006m)concededthat‘itwouldbebetterthatitis closed’,thisisagainjuxtaposedwithareminderofthecircumstancesinwhichthe situationarose–theattacksofSeptember11 th .Theseissuesaregroundedin Blair’s (2006zb)suggestionsthatourframeworkforevaluatingtheappropriatenessofthe

144 proposedproceduresneedstoshifttooneplacinggreateremphasisonprotectionand therightsofthe‘lawabidingmajority’. 40 Thus,thegovernment’sinteractionswiththissocialgroupalsolargelyfallwithinthe categoryof dominance ,wherepoliticalelitesattemptto direct thetermsofthedebate. Theyalso deny thehumanrightsconcernsarguingthat‘theanalogieswiththingslike internmentarejustfatuousfrankly’(Blair,2005zr).Indeed,inresponsetocriticisms regardingtheproposed90dayprechargedetentionperiodBlair(2005zr)remarks‘I finditreallyoddforpeopletosaythisissuchaterriblethingbecauseitseemstome thatifyoubalanceitupproperlyitisperfectlyfair’.Further dismissals suchasthisare alsofoundinrelationtotheUSpracticeofrendition.Blair(2005zzf)rejectsaccusations that‘I,ortheAmericans,oranybodyelseapproveorcondonetorture,orilltreatment, ordegradingtreatment’as‘completelyandtotallyoutoforderinanysetof circumstances’.However,thisclearlydependsonthedefinitionoftortureaspractices suchaswaterboardinghavefeaturedonalistofapprovedinterrogationtechniquesfor theUSA,andasJohnBellingerhasstated,hasbeenusedonthreeoccasionsbetween 2001and2003,mostfamouslyonKhalidSheikhMohammed. More challenging howeverareaccusationsthatcriticsaredetachedfromtherealityof thesituation(Blair,2005zzb),andshouldnotbedominatingthedebate.Blair(2006zf) suggeststhat‘NGOsandpressuregroupswithsinglecausescanbebenevolentbutcan alsoexerciseakindofmaligntyrannyoverthepublicdebate’.Blair’s(2005zm) frustrationsthatthegovernmentisforcedtobedistantfromthissocialidentityare apparentinthefollowingstatement: IamnotdoingitbecauseIamauthoritarianordon'tcareaboutthecivillibertiesofthiscountry.Icare deeplyaboutthecivillibertiesofthiscountry,butIcareaboutonebasiccivillibertywhichistherightto lifeofourcitizensandfreedomfromterrorismandIthinkifthesemeasuresarenecessaryweshouldtake them. Also,inresponsetoanepetitionfromLiberty,Blair(2006zzh)emphasisesthatall counterterrorismmeasuresareset‘inthecontextofourgeneralcommitmenttohuman rightsandtheprotectionofindividualfreedoms,includingtheenactmentoftheHuman

40 Thisalsorelatestorhetoricconcerningreformofthecriminaljusticesystem.Blair(2006a)goeseven furtherthanpreviousperiodsin2006toproclaimtheunsuitabilityofthe19 th Centuryvalues underpinningthecriminaljusticesystem,forthe21 st CenturyWorld. 145 RightsAct1998whichmadetherightsenshrinedintheEuropeanConventionon HumanRights(ECHR)enforceableindomesticcourts’.Selfidentityinforming interpretationofone’sownactionsandstressingoverlapwiththisidentityagainappears tobeathemehere,indicativeof intersection representation .As‘we’arethe governmentthatintroducedthesehumanrightsprotectionsintodomesticlaw,current actionscannotbeseenasanythingotherthanextremelynecessary. Theabovecertainlydemonstratesattemptstoreframecivillibertiesandhumanrights withnarrowprioritiesthatareperceivedtofittheglobalwaronterrorandtheevolving superordinatesocialidentitythatappearstodominatefortheBlairgovernment.Whilst AIandHRWarguethattheUKshouldbetakingaleadingroleinpromotinghuman rightstotackleterrorism,theglobalimpactoftheirdetentionpoliciesisthoughttohave theoppositeeffect.

3.2 The Legal Social Identity Thereisalsoacontinuationofcontestationwiththelegalsocialgroupin20052006. TheBlairgovernmentfacedsetbackswithregardstotheLawLordsrulingrendering tortureevidenceinadmissibleincourt,inlinewithinternationallaw(HouseofLords, 2005;BBC,2005a),aswellastheHighCourtrulingthatcontrolordersare incompatiblewithhumanrightslaw(Ford,2006).ThethenAttorneyGeneral,Lord Goldsmith(2006)wasalsoincreasinglyoutspokenagainstproceduresatGuantánamo Bay, 41 contradictingBlair’searlierclaimsofutilitywithregardstothedetention facility.Contestationregardingtheproposalstocircumventnonrefoulement didnot begintosurfacewiththisgroupuntilafter2006(seeFord,2007;GardhamandRayner, 2008),however,muchoftheBlairgovernment’sdiscourseappearstobepreempting suchabacklash.Theirinteractionswiththelegalsocialidentityfallunderthecategories of dominance and intersection representation asinthepreviousperiods.However,in 20052006thelanguageemployedinrelationtodominanceintensifiesandattimes compartmentalisation isalsoapparent. Intermsof dominance and directing ,theBlairgovernmentareextremelyforthrightin makingacaseforarevisionofthecriminaljusticesystembasedonunderstandingsof thecurrentcontext.Blair(2005zm)arguesthat‘newtypesofcrime’cannotbetackled

41 WhilstLordGoldsmithusuallystressestheimportanceofabalancebetweensecurityandfundamental rights(seeGoldsmith,2006),thisisnotdeemedtobeproportionatewithregardstoGuantánamoBayand theUSmilitarytribunals.Indeed,whilstsupportiveofcontrolorders,deportationsand90daydetention, theformerAttorneyGeneralarguesthattherighttoafairtrialisonethatcannotbecompromised. 146 ‘bytherulesofthegamewehaveatthemoment’.Thecurrentlegalsystemis characterisedintermsofrestraint,anobstacleforthegovernmenttofindawayaround toconfronttheproblemsoftheday.TheformerHomeSecretaryCharlesClarke (2005b)calledfor‘alegalframework’wherethereisabetterbalancebetweenrightsas, ‘[w]ecannotproperlyfightterrorismwithonelegalhandtiedbehindourback’. Theconcernsthathavebeenraisedbymembersofthelegalsocialgroup,inparticular thosemadebyLordHoffmanattheendof2004,aredismissed basedonachanging context.LordHoffman’s(2004)statementisworthrepeatinghere: Therealthreattothelifeofthenation,inthesenseofapeoplelivinginaccordancewithitstraditional lawsandpoliticalvalues,comesnotfromterrorismbutfromlawssuchasthese. Blair(2005y)argues,intheweeksfollowingtheattacksofJuly7 th 2005inLondon, that,‘Idoubtthosewords…wouldbeutterednow…Ithinkthemoodonthisthing doeschange’.InlightofthistheBlairgovernmentimpliesthatitwouldbeirresponsible toblockproposalsconcerningthedetentionanddeportationofterrorsuspects. TheBlairgovernment’sdiscourseconcerningthelegalsocialidentitycertainlytakeson a challenging toneintheaftermathoftheJuly7 th attacks.Blair(2005zb)arguesthat ‘[s]houldlegalobstaclesarise’inrelationtodetentionpolicies,thegovernment‘will legislatefurtherincluding,ifnecessary,amendingtheHumanRightsActinrespectof theinterpretationoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights’.42 Thesituationis almostasthoughwarhasbeendeclaredonthecourts,indeed‘anongoingbattleinthe CourtsandinParliamenttodealwiththeissueofdeportation’iscertainlyrecognised (Blair,2006zi). Thereisaclear,ifguarded,messagesignalledtothejudiciarywithregardsto90day detention,to‘beawarethatthereisaproperroleforthejudiciaryandthereisaproper roleforgovernmentandforParliament’(Blair,2005zm).Blair(2005zm)stressesthat the‘threatisreal’andasthepoliceareaskingforthesepowers‘youhavegottohave goodreasonstosaynotothat’.Whilsttheindependenceofthejudiciaryisrecognised asa‘principleofourdemocracy’thatmustbeupheld(Blair,2005y),suggesting

42 TheHRAwasdesignedforthejudiciarytopassjudgementonthecompatibilityoflegislationwiththe HRA,movingawayfromanabsoluteprincipleofParliamentarysovereignty(ClementsandYoung, 1999),however,thisstatementsuggestsareversalofsuchsafeguards. 147 elementsof bolstering and intersection representation ,theemphasisondirectionand thisgroupasanobstacleisparamount. 43 Blair(2005zm)denies‘tryingtobrowbeatthe Judiciaryortosubstitutetheroleofgovernmenttotheproperroleofjudges’,yetthe needforthosememberstounderstand‘therulesofthegame’ashedoesismadevery clear.Adegreeofincomprehensibilityand‘alarm’isevidentinrelationtocourt decisions,astheformerPrimeMinisterstresses‘theabsoluteurgencyforpeopleto understandthisisanactivethreatandwehavetodealwithitwiththemeasuresthatare necessary’(Blair,2006zi,alsoseeReid,2006). Averyinterestingpassagearticulatingthisviewandtheneedforrevisionofthelegal socialidentityfollows.Blair(2006zb)statesthat: itisthecultureofpoliticalandlegaldecisionmakingthathastochange,totakeaccountofthewaythe worldhaschanged.Itisnotthisorthatjudicialdecision;thisorthatlaw.Itisacompletechangeof mindset,anavowed,articulateddeterminationtomakeprotectionofthelawabidingpublicthepriority andtomeasurethatnotbythetheoryofthetextbookbutbytherealityofthestreetandcommunityin whichrealpeoplelivereallives. WithspecificreferencetotheECHR,theformerHomeSecretaryJohnReidisalsovery directinchallengingthissocialgroup.HearguesthattheConvention: drawnupbyBritishlawyersintheaftermathofthesecondworldwarwasshapedinevitablybythatwar andbywhatwashappening,notonlyduringthatwarinplaceslikeGermanybutacrosstheironcurtain. Andfromthestruggletodefeatfascismandthefasciststate,andstanduptoStalinism,camean understandablefocusonprotectingtheindividualfromtheoverweeningevilpowerofthefasciststate (Reid,2006).

Thisisnotconsideredtoberelevanttoday,butinsteadisframedasa context dependent setofprinciples.JohnReidgoesontobehighlycriticalofthe Chahal judgementbyEuropeanlawyersthatpreventsthedeportationofterrorsuspectstotheir homecountriesifthereisariskoftortureandilltreatment.Healsoemploysa comparativeargument,stressingthattheterrorists: wouldhavenocompunctionaboutallunlawfulkillingordetention.Theywouldhavenocompunction breakingallthelawsofwarintheGenevaConventionswhiledemandingtheprotectionoftheGeneva Conventions.Thatiswhatwearetryingtotacklewiththemeansofanincreasinglyconstrained 43 AttemptstostaywithinthelegalframeworkarealsoapparentwhenBlairisquestionedontheUS practiceofrendition.Hestates,‘italldependsonwhatyoumeanbyrendition.Ifitissomethingthatis unlawfulItotallydisapproveofit;ifitislawful,Idon'tdisapproveofit’(Blair,2005zzf). 148 democraticsocietyconstrainedbyinternationalconventionsandlaws,soastheenemyhasbecomeless andlessconstrainedinintentionandcapability,wehavebecomemoreconstrainedbytheintrusion, inspectionandstandardswhichwesetuponourselvesinconductingthatstruggle,rightlyso(Reid,2006).

Theemphasisisverymuchonthissocialidentityasaconstraintonaction,asan obstacletotheprotectionofthemajority.Whilsttheimportanceoftheruleoflawis recognised(noteReidsays‘rightlyso’attheendofthispassage),andstrengtheningthe lawisgivenpriorityduetoitsroleindeterringterrorsuspectsfromenteringtheUK (Clarke,2006),theemploymentofdominanceandcompartmentalisationsuggestthat bolsteringisonverynarrowterms. 3.3 The Military Social Identity QuestionsstarttoberaisedbyvariousmembersoftheUKArmedForcesin20052006 withregardstotheBlairgovernment’spolicies.Forexample,intheannualDimbleby LectureofDecember2006,thethenrecentlyretiredheadoftheBritishArmy,General SirMikeJackson,identifiedadangerous‘mismatchbetweenwhatwedoandthe resourceswearegivenwithwhichtodoit’.ApreviousstatementbyGeneralSir RichardDannatt(publishedinthe Daily Mail (Sands,2006))seemedtoprovidethe catalystfortheemergenceofamorepublicdialoguebetweenthegovernmentandthe militarythanhadbeenevidentpreviously.However,thisbecomesmoreapparentafter theperiodofanalysis,in2007and2008. TheArmedForceshavecertainlybeenplacedinaverycomplexsituation,wherethey arecaughtinthe‘potentialcrossfire’betweensocietyandgovernment(Strachan,2006: 73).Indeed,inthecontextofanunpopularwarinIraqthereisthesignificantworry raisedbyGeneralSirMichaelWalkerin2005that‘[s]omeoftheopprobriumattached tothewar[inIraq]isalsoattachedtothefactthatthearmedservicesaretakingpartin it.Weare,ifyoulike,guiltybyassociationwithadecisiontogotowarthatnotthe wholeofthiscountryenjoined’(ascitedinSchofield,2005). Aswiththepreviousperiods,theBlairgovernmentattemptstocountersuchperceptions byemphasisingthepurposeoftheArmedForces’actions.Thewiderimplicationsofthe military’sjobinbothAfghanistanandIraq,forboththeregionandtherestoftheworld, arestressed.Thisislargelysituatedinabroaderframeworkofanevolving dominant superordinatesocialidentityinternationally.Blair(2006zzd)suggestsforexamplethat, ‘[w]earenotfightingastate,wearefightingasetofideas,anideology,agroupof

149 extremiststhatsharethesameperspectivethatisahatredofourwayoflifeandwhat webelievein’.Theimmenseimportanceofthemilitary’staskisunderlined.Whilstthe Blairgovernmentrecognisethatthisisnotsomethingsoldiersprobablythoughtthey wouldeverbeinvolvedinwhentheyjoined,nowduetothechangedcontextandthe differenttypeofenemy,thisisthecaseandthereisnoalternative.Soldiersarenowon thefrontlineintheGlobalWaronTerror,inabattleofideologiesthatgoesfarbeyond thetraditionalcapacityoftheArmedForces.Valuesaretakentoformthebattleground inthiscontextasweareremindedthattheconflictsinIraqandAfghanistanare ‘notjust aboutsecurityormilitarytactics.Itisaboutheartsandmindsaboutinspiringpeople, persuadingthem,showingthemwhatourvaluesattheirbeststandfor’(Blair,2006zh). Direction ofpurposealongsuchlinescertainlyplacessignificantifnotunrealistic constraintsonthisgroupintheirapplicationofmilitaryforceandprovidesaframework fromwhichtheiractionswillbeseverelyjudged. IntheyearstocomeBlair(2006l)arguesthat‘thesacrificemadebyBritishtroops,and alsobyothercountries'troops,willbeseenforwhatitisasacrificeinthenameof freedomanddemocracy’.Hesuggests,inaspeechtothemilitary,that‘[w]hatwehave donethereforeininterveninginthisway,isfarmoremomentousthanpossiblywe appreciatedatthetime’(Blair,2006zh).Legitimatisationthroughreferencestothe electionsinIraq,thesupportoftheIraqipeople,andthepresenceofapostconflictUN Resolutionarealsohighlysalientmeansof re-assurance .Thisisaccompaniedby defence of the group inrelationtoaccusationsofabuse,withtheBlairgovernment emphasisingthegoodworkoftheBritishArmedForces(Blair,2005e).44 Thereisalsoadegreeof intersection representation hereinexpressionsofpraiseand gratitudethatgenerallyaccompanythesecomments,aswellasidentificationofthe pridethat‘shinesthrough’(Blair,2006zv).Thisisrelatedtotheneedforsupportfrom thegeneralpublicfortheforcesincombat.Theneedtobeproudofthesesoldiersin theirdefenceof‘ourcountry'ssecurityandthatofthewiderworld’inhostileconditions (Blair,2006zh),precipitateslaterstatementsbyGeneralSirRichardDannatt(2007)on thelackofunderstandingandsupportfortheArmedForcesintheBritishpublic.Such

44 TheUKArmedForcesbehaviourintermsofdetentioninIraqwasalsocomingunderincreasing scrutiny,forexample‘holdingaround10"securityinternees"inIraqwithoutchargeortrial,includingat leastonepersonwhoholdsbothUKandIraqicitizenship’(AI,2005h). 150 rhetoricservesto bolster thissocialidentityandclearlyfocusesonareasofoverlap betweentheactionsofthisgroupandtheBlairgovernment’sobjectives. Asmentionedinprevioustimeperiods,whilsttheBlairgovernment’sdetentionpolicies arenotchallengedbythissocialgroup,theyarestillpartofthecomplicatedsocial identitiesenvironmentinwhichpoliciesaremade,andinteractionsgiveafurther indicationofsuperordinateorientation.

3.4 The United Nations Social Identity ThemainareasofconcernthatareraisedbytheUNin20052006withregardsto detention,relatetotheuseofdiplomaticassurancesorMoUstoreturnterrorsuspectsto countriesknowntotorture,aswellasmoregenerallystressingtheimportanceofhuman rightsandtheruleoflawincounteringterrorism(thisisincontrasttobeingseenasan obstacletotacklingsuchthreats).TheBlairgovernment’sinteractionswiththissocial grouparelessconfrontationalthanin20032004,buttheoverallstrategiesof dominance and intersection representation remain. KofiAnnanstressedin2005that‘theprominenceofhumanrightsandtheruleoflawin ourconductofinternationalaffairs’needstobeelevated(Annan,2005a).Indeedthe formerSecretaryGeneralidentifiesa ‘lackofrespectforhumanrightsandhuman dignity[as]thefundamentalreasonwhythepeaceoftheworldtodayissoprecarious, andwhyprosperityissounequallyshared’(Annan,2006).Fromsuchaperspective ‘compromisinghumanrightscannotservethestruggleagainstterrorism’(Annan, 2005b).InstarkcontrasttotheBlairgovernment’srhetoricthathasstronglyjuxtaposed therequirementsofcounterterrorismwithhumanrights,evenprohibitionsontorture, KofiAnnan(2005c)expressesthejudgmentthat‘[h]umanrightslawmakesample provisionforstrongcounterterroristaction,eveninthemostexceptional circumstances’.Thus,theBlairgovernment’spreviousattemptstobringthissocial identityinlinewiththeirperceptionoftheglobalwaronterrorandtheevolvingsuper ordinatesocialidentity,hasclearlynotbeenaccepted. Indeed,theBlairgovernment’sdetentionpoliciesareonthereceivingendofmuch criticism,particularlywithregardstononrefoulement .ManfredNowak(2006:2),the UNSpecialRapporteurontorture,hasstatedthat:

151 diplomaticassurances,whichattempttoerodetheabsoluteprohibitionontortureinthecontextof counterterrorismmeasures.…arenotlegallybindingandundermineexistingobligationsofStatesto prohibittorture,areineffectiveandunreliableinensuringtheprotectionofreturnedpersons,and thereforeshallnotberesortedtobyStates. Hefurtherhighlightsthat: Diplomaticassurancesaresoughtfromcountrieswithaprovenrecordofsystematictorture,i.e.thevery factthatsuchdiplomaticassurancesaresoughtisanacknowledgementthattherequestedState,inthe opinionoftherequestingState,ispractisingtorture(Nowak,2006:10). SuchsentimentsaresupportedbyLouiseArbour,theHighCommissionerforHuman Rights.HeraddressonHumanRightsDay,onthe10thofDecember2005,arguesthat: evenifsomepostreturnmonitoringwerefunctioning,thefactthatsomeGovernmentsconcludelegally nonbindingagreementswithotherGovernmentsonamatterthatisatthecoreofseverallegallybinding UNinstrumentsthreatenstoemptyinternationalhumanrightslawofitscontent.Diplomaticassurances basicallycreateatwoclasssystemamongdetainees,attemptingtoprovideforaspecialbilateral protectionandmonitoringregimeforaselectedfewandignoringthesystematictortureofother detainees,eventhoughallareentitledtotheequalprotectionofexistingUNinstruments. Thus,representativesoftheUNhavespokenoutveryclearlyagainstakeycomponent oftheBlairgovernment’sapproachtoterrorism. 45 Someoftheresponsestosuch criticismshavebeendiscussedearlierinrelationtothehumanrightsandhumanitarian socialidentity,wheretheopposingargumentscontinuetobestressed.HereIshallfocus onthediscoursedirectlyrelatingtotheUN.

InsupportoftheBlairgovernment’spositionthestrategiesof dominance and intersection representation areemployedinrelationtothissocialidentity.Aswith previousperiodsa directing approachisutilised,forexampleintermsofrestructuring theUNtomeetglobalchallenges–especiallytheissueofreformingtheSecurity Counciltoincreaselegitimacy,andtheneedforleadershipfromtheUNonarangeof issues(Blair,2005zd;2005zg;2005zt;2006x).Blair(2006y)inparticularexpressesthe needfortheUNtoactearliertotackleglobalconcerns,thatproblemsareurgentand thattheconsequenceswillbefeltallaroundtheworld.Theemphasiscontinuestobeon action,withinactionviewedasaweakness. 45 Thedeportationofterrorsuspectswasonetrackofatwintrackapproachtocounteringterrorism (Clarke,2005c). 152 However, dominance in20052006islargelylimitedtothis,perhapsgiventhetroubled relationshipapparentin20032004andthesignificantcriticismsabove. Intersection representation addressessomeoftheseissues,drawingthesocialidentitycloser,to publiclyandsymbolicallyvalidatemembership.BlairstressesthattheUNcanbe absolutelyessentialinsolvingtheworld’sproblemsincertaincircumstances, bolstering thissocialgroup.IndeedtheformerPrimeMinisterarguesthat‘[t]he principlesoftheUNhavealwayshadamoralforce’yet‘[t]odaytheyreceivethe sharperimpulseofselfinterest’(Blair,2005zg).Thusthevaluesandprincipleshave beenthereforsometime,butthesenowhavemuchmorepotentialastheyaresotiedup withan‘enlightened’viewofselfinterest.Suchexpressionsappeartotakeonboard someoftheSecretaryGeneral’sconcernswithregardstothejuxtapositionofhuman rightsandsecurity.However,thisiscertainlynotyetreflectedinthedetentionpolicies oftheBlairgovernment. Unifying underthe‘MillenniumDevelopmentGoalsonpoverty,oneducation,[and] acrossarangeofindicatorsforAfrica’(Blair,2005l)aswellasundertheUNprocesses inplaceinAfghanistanandIraqisalsoemphasised.Blair(2005ze)arguesthat: whateverfeelingspeoplehaveabouttheoriginaldecisioninrespectofAfghanistanorIraq,whatyou havenowisaUnitedNationsprocessinwhichallsensiblepeopleshouldbebackingtherightofthose twocountriestoelecttheirowngovernment. Inadditiontounifying, utilising isalsoatplayhere.UNinvolvementcertainly strengthensthelegitimacyandcredibilityofBlair’scallforthecountryandtheworldto uniteandallowstheformerPrimeMinistertodrawthissocialidentitycloser,almost settingtheUKupasaprototypicalmember. 46 Suchastrategyisalsoemployedin relationtocounterterrormeasuresathome.CharlesClarkearguesthatthe‘ambitions oftheSecurityCouncilresolution’oncounterterrorismneedtobemet,andthisiswhat thenew Prevention of Terrorism Bill seekstodo(Clarke,2005b).Suchanargument wouldhoweverappeartobequitedifficulttosustaingiventhecriticismsraisedbythe UNoutlinedabove.

46 InresponsetotheactionsofIran,BlairdirectsthemtostopmeddlinginacountrygovernedbyaUN processandwhereUNsupportedmultinationalforcesarepresent.TheUNclearlystrengthensstatements andgrantsavastamountoflegitimacy. 153 3.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity TheportraitthatispaintedbytheBlairgovernmentofinternationalsocialidentitiesis increasinglycomplexin20052006.TheeffectofSeptember11 th isstillveryprominent asareotherwaysinwhichtheworldischanging,forexample,‘[n]ewpowersare emerging’,andasBlair(2006zt)furtheracknowledges,‘[i]nthedecadestocomethere willbemanyinternationalnegotiations,debates,occasionally,ifonlyinadiplomatic sense,confrontations’.However,thestrategiesthatareemployedinthiscomplex environmentarestillthoseof merging and dominance . Theemphasisisagainonthedoctrineoftheinternationalcommunitywitha‘strongly activist’andvaluebasedapproachtomilitaryintervention,‘climatechange,world trade,AfricaandPalestine’(Blair,2006n).Inthiscontextthe boundaries are blurred bothbetweenthedomesticandtheinternational,aswellasintheinternationalsphere itself.Blair(2006zt)argues,forexample,thatBritain’snationalinterestscanonlybe pursuedin‘closeconcertwithothers’,asinterdependencecontinuestobea fundamentalcharacteristicoftheinternationalenvironment.Insuchaclimate, particularlywithregardstoterrorism,Blair(2006zh)arguesthatthereisnopossibility forisolationism,as‘globalterrorismmeanswecan'toptoutevenifwewantedto’. Blair(2006zh)goesontostatethat‘[t]obeengagedisonlymodernrealpolitik’,as‘all countriesdependfortheirstrengthontherelationshipsthattheycanhavewithother countries’(Blair,2006l). Theneedtoactasaunifiedinternationalcommunityisprominentinthediscourse. 47 Blairsuggeststhatthe‘divisionsofthepast’mustbeputbehindthemandtheemphasis isonunifiedmessages.Forexample,theformerPrimeMinisterarguesthat: itistimewesentoutaclearunifiedmessagefromtheinternationalcommunityandsaidthatisnolonger legitimate,notmerelyintermsofcommittingactsofterrorismbutintermsofsupportingorincitingit, thatthatisnotsomethingthatcanhaveanyhidingplaceinrespectableopinion(Blair,2005zd). Thepoweroflegitimacyorinthiscasedelegitimisingactivityisclearlyrecognisedas istheneedtobuildsocialconsensusinordertoachievethis.TheattacksofSeptember 11 th continuetobeseenasattackson‘thecivilisedvaluesoftheentireworld’(Blair, 2006l),andthe‘we’thatemergesisnotdeemedtoberestrictedtotheWest,butall 47 Whilstatallothertimesunifyinghasbeenindicativeofanintersectionrepresentationstrategy,hereit isverymuchusedto direct underasuperordinatesocialidentity. 154 ‘thosewhobelieveinreligioustolerance,opennesstoothers,todemocracy,libertyand humanrightsadministeredbysecularcourts’(Blair,2006n). Thus,the merging processisagainlimitedbytheconstructionofparametersand divisions .Settingadefinitionof‘we’basedontheabove,servestoexcludethosewho donotmeetthesecriteria.ThisislargelyframedinthecontextofterrorismwhereBlair suggestsweareseeing‘theageoldbattlebetweenprogressandreaction,betweenthose whoembraceandseeopportunityinthemodernworldandthosewhorejectits existence;betweenoptimismandhopeontheonehand;andpessimismandfearonthe other’(Blair,2006n).Dictatorshipisalsoseenasinthelongrunincompatiblewith humanprogress(Blair,2005b),providingfurtherexclusions. Thestrategyof dominance isapparenthere,intermsdividingasabove,aswellas directing anddefiningthesuperordinatesocialidentityinternationallyand subordinatingotheridentitiestothis.Internationalrules,forexample,areunderstoodto providethebasisforrelationsbetweenstates(Blair,2006b);however,Blair(2005zb) suggeststhattheserequiregreaterclarification.Certainrulesaregivenpreferencefor examplethat‘youdon'tinanyshapeorformimplicitlyorbyanyactsupportterrorism orassassinationin…othercountries’(Blair,2006b).Thisishighlightedinrelationto IranandSyriaastheyaregiventheoptionto‘eithercomeinandparticipateasproper andresponsiblemembersoftheinternationalcommunity;ortheywillfacetheriskof increasingconfrontation’(Blair,2006ze). Blair(2006zh)extendsthisnotionof‘fightingawar’basedontacklingterrorism,toone basedoninfluencing‘howtheworldshouldgovernitselfintheearly21stcentury’, foundedonglobalvalues.Aninternationalagendamovingbeyonddirectperceptionsof securitytoonethatwilltackleglobalissuessuchastheMiddleEastpeaceprocess, povertyinAfricaandclimatechangeissuggestedinorderto‘getrealsupportforthe toughactionthatmaywellbeessentialtosafeguardourwayoflife(Blair,2006n).A socialidentitybasedontacklingtheseissuesissituatedwithinacounterterrorism framework,basedonaction,engagement,andvalues.However,thecapacityoftheUK tobeleadingsuchanagendaisclearlyquestionablegiventhecriticismsraised throughoutthisChapterwithregardstodetention.

155 Conclusion TheanalysisinthisChapterhasdemonstratedwhypreviousassessmentsofdefection andcomplianceareextremelylimited.Anemphasison‘doing’andinteractionscreates averydifferentnarrativeofnormativeinfluenceandcontestationtothatwhichis generatedbystudiesfocusingonpersonality,degreeofinternalisation,thenatureofthe norm,orindeedtheoverridingimperativesofpowerandinterestsasexploredin Chapter1.Suchanapproachadvancesourunderstandingofthecomplexandinteractive processesinvolved,asgroundedinthemicrofoundationalinsightsprovidedbythe socialidentityapproach.Decisionstodefectfromorcomplywiththeinternational detentionregimearenotstraightforwardassessments;theyareinteractiveprocessesthat evolve. AsevidencedthroughoutthisChapter,adominanceapproachtothesesocialidentitiesis themostprominentstrategyapparentinthediscourse.Thishasinvolvedappealstoan emergentsuperordinatesocialidentitydefinedpredominantlyintermsofaparticular approachtocounterterrorism.Theconstitutiveelementsofthissocialidentity,as apparentinthediscourseassessed,areanemphasisonpreemption(thisinfluences perceptionsofdetentionnotjustmilitaryintervention),action(withinaction characterisedasaweakness),atradeoffbetweenhumanrightsandsecurity,the privilegingoftherighttolifeandtolivefreefromfear,andthenotionthatrules(both domesticandinternational)musttakeaccountofthisverynewcontextwithinwhich currentdecisionsaremade.Thesefactors,inadditiontothosethataremoredirect(for example,notsupportingterrorismandtaking‘appropriate’measurestotackle terrorism),formthebasisformembershipinanemergentbutdominantinternational socialgroupfromtheperspectiveoftheBlairgovernment. However,suchasocialidentitycannot,itappears,beisolatedfromotherimperatives, creatingaverycomplexanddynamicprocessofconstructionwithregardstosocial identitiesininternationalsociety.Indeed,theBlairgovernmentattempttomergethe counterterrorismagendawithelementsoftheliberaldemocraticsocialidentityand notionsoftheDoctrineoftheInternationalCommunity.Giventheframeworkof understandinggeneratedinChapters1and2thatsuggestsnormativeregimeshave socialinfluenceasameansbywhichtovalidatesocialidentitymembership,itisnot surprisingthatinthiscomplexandshiftingsocialenvironment,theinfluenceofthe internationaldetentionregimeisnotconsistentlyevident.

156 Nevertheless,ashasbeenadvancedthroughoutthisthesis,wecannotlimitour understandingofinternationalnormativeregimestotheinternationalsphere.Analysis alsoneedstoaccountformoredomesticallyorientatedsocialidentities.Suchan assessmentdemonstratesthatasuperordinateframework,suchasthatconstructed,is noteasilyacceptedbythevarioussocialgroupsrelevanttocounterterrorismdetention policies.ThefrustrationsthisgeneratesareevidentastheBlairgovernmentisforcedto compartmentalise,andtheopportunitytovalidateassociationwithsocialidentitiessuch ashumanrightsandhumanitarian,andlegal,aremarkedlyreduced.Attemptsto minimisethenegativeconsequencesofsuchdistancingbymeansofintersection representationarecertainlyapparentbutthelackofacceptanceherehasfurther restrictedtheBlairgovernment’sabilitytobeassociatedwiththesesocialidentities. Theevidenceofthemultiplestrategiesemployedgosomewaytodemonstratinghow importantthesocialidentitiesaretotheBlairgovernment,theydonotsimply compartmentaliseorrejectthem. Thus,tounderstandthenatureofconstraintregardingtheinternationaldetentionregime weneedtoconsiderthebroadersocialidentitiescontextandtheroleofinteractionsin processesofdefectionandcontestations.WhilstscholarssuchasKeller(mentionedin Chapter2)haveidentifiedtheroleofpersonalityfactorssuchassensitivitytonormative restraints,thisonlyaccountsforpartofthepictureofcontestationanddefection.How constraintsaremanifestcanonlyactuallybedeterminedthroughinteraction;‘having’ doesnotequateto‘doing’asisarguedinChapter2,andindeedcandevelopandevolve intheinteractivecontext.Whilstresearchfocusingonpersonality,internalisation,the natureofthenorm,orpredefinedinterestsmayincreaseparsimony,theyreduceour understandingoftheprocessesinvolvedandleadtoinaccurateexplanationsand expectations.Theapproachadvancedinthisthesismaynotmakespecificpredictionsas towhendefectionwilloccur,however,itdoesallowustofurtherunderstandthe‘how possible’questionsassociatedwithseeminglycounternormativebehaviour.With regardstothesustainabilityofsuchpractices,thesocialidentitiescontextisclearlynot managedsufficientlytodiffusecriticismandvalidationofassociationremainsheavily challenged.Thisisnotasustainableapproachtowardssocialidentitiesthatarecoreto theUK. Therearealwaysmanypossibleviewpointsonhowtoapproachissuesofpublic protectionandtherighttolifeandtolivefreefromterror,whichhavebeenemphasised

157 bytheBlairgovernmentthroughout20012006.Despitetheimportanceofinternational normativeregimes,suchasthatprescribingstandardsfordetentionandprohibiting torture,individualshavemanymembershipsorassociationswithsocialidentitiesto drawon.Someoftheseemergeincertaincircumstancesthroughindividualinteractions oftenonasmallscale.Therewillalwaysberoomforchallengeanddifferent interpretationsregardlessofhowinternalisedatacollectivelevelnormativeregimes appeartobe,astheroleofindividualsandinteractionsisveryimportant.Indeed,the useofinternmentandstresspositionsbytheUKismorerecentthanweoften acknowledgewithregardstotheconflictwiththeIRA. ThisChapterhasdemonstratedthesignificanceofinteractionswiththebroadersocial identitiescontexttounderstandprocessesofnormativeinfluence,contestationand defection,inahardcasewheredefectionmayleadonetoimmediatelyresorttopre definedintereststoexplainbehaviour.Tolimitresearchonthisbasiswouldmissthe interactiveprocessesthatarekeytounderstandingthehowpossiblequestionsraisedby contestationanddefection.Chapter5willfurtherexaminetheframeworkdevelopedin thisthesisinrelationtotheUSAwhichpresentsanevenhardercaseastheinternational detentionregimeismoreheavilycompromisedandtheroleofthebroadersocial identitiescontextisverymuchinquestion.

158 Chapter 5 – The Management of Social Identities – The case of the USA ‘Very simply the reason for their detention is that they're dangerous. Were they not detained, they would return to the fight and continue to kill innocent men, women and children…It is a security necessity, and I might add it is just plain common sense.’ (Rumsfeld,2004a)

‘There seems to be a new world order, an acceptance of utter illegality. You have all these wonderful treaties after World War Two – the Geneva Conventions, bans on torture – and all of them have been torn up. Effectively you are allowing international law to be re-written’ (GarethPierce,lawyerforMoazzemBegg,citedinRose,2004b:39) TheinternationaldetentionregimehasbeenplacedundersignificantstrainbytheBush administrationduringthecourseofthewaronterror.Defectionshavebeenwell documentedbyacademics,journalists,andlegalprofessionalsaswellaspolitical commentatorsandpractitioners.CriticismshaveincludedUSpracticesregardingunfair trialprocedures,denialof habeas corpus rights,indefinitedetentionwithoutchargeor trial,arbitrarydetention,prolongedincommunicadodetention,secretdetention, enforceddisappearances,humiliatinganddegradingtreatment,aswellastorture,cruel orinhumantreatment.Tortureinparticular,longassociatedwithonlythemost ‘barbaric’regimes,hasbecomethesubjectofintensedebate,enteringintomainstream publicdiscourseintheUSAshortlyaftertheSeptember11 th attacks(Rutenberg,2001). Leakedphotographsdocumentingabusealongsidemediaimagesofthedetention facilitiesatGuantánamoBay,Cuba,havebeenextremelydamaginginthebattlefor publicperception.Guantánamohasbecomewhatsomecommentatorsrefertoasan ‘iconofoppression’(Rose,2004b:11),othershavegonefurtherandaccusedtheBush administrationofconstructinga‘secretcultureoftorture…intheheartofaliberal culture’(Luban,2006:52). Thisthesishasbeenengagedwiththequestionofhowsuchpolicies,contrarytothe expectedbehaviourofliberaldemocraticstates,becamepossible,intermsofthe negotiationofnormativeconstraints,particularlyforstatessuchastheUSAandUK. Thesestateshaveinvestedagreatdealoftimeandresourcesintheestablishmentof humanrightsregimes,standardsforpracticesregardingdetention,andcampaignsaimed attheeradicationoftorture.TheUSA,thefocusofthisChapter,isthehomeofthe Lieber Code (1863),whichprovidesanearlycodificationofcertainprivilegestowhich

159 prisonersofwarareentitled. 1TheUSAhasfurthermore,ratifiedalltheGeneva Conventions,withtheexceptionofthetwoprotocolsin1977.Later,in1988,theUSA signedthe Convention against Torture (CAT)(1984)whichtheythenratifiedin1994. FederallawintheUSAalsofirmlyprohibitstheuseoftorture,aswellas‘severemental painorsuffering’thatisprolongedinnature( US Code ,Title18,Article2340). 2 TheBushadministrationhasalsostressedtheircommitmenttotheruleoflaw,human dignity,andfreedom,aswellasissuingproclamationseachyearonHumanRightsDay (earlyDecember)insupportofhumanrightsglobally(e.g.Bush2001zzf;2002zzg; 2003zzf;2004zzf;2005zzd;2006zze).Yet,manyofthesestatementsappearhollowand hypocritical.Forexample,theHumanRightsReportsoftheStateDepartmenthave stronglycriticisedtheharshinterrogationpracticesofvariouscountries,suchasBurma, Turkey,SaudiArabiaandIran.Yettheseverysamepractices(forexample‘stressand duress’techniquessuchassleepandfooddeprivation,uncomfortablepositions,or exposuretocold)havebeenusedbytheUSAintheinterrogationofterrorsuspectswith theapprovaloftheDefenseDepartment(Malinowski,2005:140). IntheaftermathoftheSeptember11 th attacks,2001,theBushadministrationfocused attentiononfightinganewwar,supportedbynewrules,inachangedinternational context.Thedetentionofterrorsuspectsand‘unlawfulenemycombatants’wasbrought totheforeinthepublicarena,largelybecauseofcontestationanddefectionfrom internationallyheldappropriatestandards.Detentionwasalsograntedaparticularly prominentrolebyPresidentBushhimself,throughrepeatedassertionsofthenumbers ofterrorsuspectscapturedbytheUSAandherallies. 3Revealingthesenumbersinthe earlymonthsofthewaronterrorseemstobeused(problematicallyImustadd)asa meansofdemonstratingprogressintacklingthethreatofterrorism. 4Detentionwas

1The Lieber Code isthefirstattempttocodifythelawsofwar.SectionIIIcoversprisonersofwar, hostagesanddeserters,andarticle76ofthecodespecificallystressesthatprisonersofwar(PoWs)must be‘treatedwithhumanity’.SectionVIreferstotheexchangeofPoWsandSectionVIIparoleforPoWs. 2Article2340referstotheprolonged‘severementalpainorsuffering’thatiscausedby‘intentional inflictionandthreatenedinfliction’,theadministrationorthreatenedadministrationof‘mindaltering substances’,the‘threatofimminentdeath’,orthreatsthatanotherpersonwillbesubjectedtodeathor abuse. 3BushbeginsassertingnumbersasearlyasOctober1 st 2001wherehestates,‘[t]here's150detained,and moretocome’(Bush,2001zj).Thisnumberrapidlyrisestoover1000arrestedinAmericabyOctober 26 th (Bush,2001zu),andover2400,asapartofbroadercoalitionefforts,byJune11 th 2002(Bush, 2002zf). 4Thelatterisbasedonthelogicthatthelargerthenumberofsuspectedterrorists‘hunteddown’and detainedthesmallerthethreatofattackbecomes.Alsotheharshertheconditionsseemthemoresuch practiceswillserveasadeterrenttoterroristactivity.Asimilarlyproblematictactichasalsobeen employedbyBushinrelatedtothenumberofinsurgentskilledinIraq;thisistakentoshowthatthereare 160 placedfirmlyonawartimefooting,focusingontheremovalofterrorsuspectsfromthe USA,theremovalofinsurgentsor‘unlawfulenemycombatants’fromthebroader battlefieldincludingAfghanistanandIraq,andusingdetentionforthepurposesof interrogationandintelligencegathering.Detentionwasnotorientatedtoward rehabilitationorevenprosecution.Rehabilitationwasdismissedveryearlyonas impossibleforthe‘evildoers’detained,andprosecutioncertainlyfellwellbehindthe priorityofpreventinganotherattack.Therewasalsoastrongdeterminationofguilt, regardingthedetainees,throughoutthediscourseassessed.Indeed,thesefactorshave framedmanyaspectsoftheBushadministration’sdetentionpolicies,particularlyinthe PentagonandJusticeDepartment,aswellasfilteringintotheethosoftheFBIand CIA. 5 PartoftheCATandtheinternationaldetentionregimeistopreventtheoccurrenceof conditionsthatarelikelytoleadtotortureorabuse.Thishascertainlynotbeenthecase withthedenialofGenevaprotections,theuseofindefinitedetention,pretrialassertions ofguilt,keepingsomedetaineeshiddenfromICRC,disappearingdetaineesthrough rendition,andholdingtheminundisclosedlocationsaroundtheworld.Thereisavast arrayofscholarshipregardingtortureandhowtopreventit,withorganisationssuchas ICRCcampaigningtoincreaseawareness(SeeICRCwebsite;alsoFresard(2004); MunozRojasandFresard,2004).Theimpactofthedecisionsandstatementsofthe Bushadministrationwouldnothavebeenunknown.Thus,weareagainleftwitha puzzle.ThisChapter,aswiththatpreviously,focusesonthequestion, ofhowsuch practices,contrarytotheinternationalnormativeregimeprescribingdetentionstandards andprohibitingdetention,becamepossible.Iagainfocusontheinteractiveprocesses involvedinnegotiatingnormativeconstraint,inrelationtothebroadersocialidentities context. 6ThemanagementstrategiesemployedbypoliticalelitesintheBush administration,willprovideaninsightintotheseinteractions.

nowlessinsurgentstofight.Thepossibilitythatharshermeasuresmaycreatemoreinsurgentsduetothe multipleaudiencesandvarietyofcommunicativestrandstothesepoliciesdoesnotgainanyattentionin thediscourseoftheadministration. 5InresponsetoFBIDirectorMueller’sassertionthatitwouldbeimportantnottotaintanyevidence regardingterrorsuspectssoastoassurepotentialforprosecution,thethenAttorneyGeneralJohn Ashcroftisreportedtohavestressedtheneedto‘thinkunconventionally’andfocusonpreventionas opposedtoprosecution(Woodward,2002:42).Bushhimselfstatedin2001,‘[t]hecultureinouragencies havechanged.Wearenowinterestedinpreventingattack.We'renowinterestedinfindingthosewho mayattackAmerica,andarrestthembeforetheydo’(Bush,2001zu). 6WhilstothershavefocusedonthefluctuatingbalanceofpowerbetweentheExecutive,Congressand theCourts(forexample,KroenigandStowsky,2006;Lindsay,2003;Rudalevige,2006),orindeedthe contestationacrossgovernmentdepartments(Roberts,2007),thisChapterisconcernedwiththepublicly 161 Table 4 – The Management of Social Identities by the Bush Administration

2001-2002 2003-2004 2005-2006 Human Rights and Dominance Dominance Dominance Humanitarian Dismissal Dismissal Dismissal Denial Denial Denial Challenging Compartmentalisation Challenging Compartmentalisation Context Displacing Context dependent Compartmentalisation dependent Intersection Context Intersection Representation dependent Representation Bolstering Intersection Bolstering Representation Bolstering Legal Dominance Dominance Dominance Directing Denial Directing Compartmentalisation Compartmentalisation Denial Context Context Blaming dependent Dependent Challenging Merging Intersection Compartmentalisation Centrality Representation Context Bolstering dependent Intersection Representation Bolstering Military Dominance Dominance Dominance Directing Directing Directing Embedding Embedding Embedding Intersection Intersection Intersection Representation Representation Representation Bolstering Bolstering Bolstering Defenceof group United Nations Dominance Dominance Dominance Directing Directing Directing Defining Defining Defining Threatening Dismissal Dismissal Intersection Denial Denial Representation Intersection Intersection Bolstering Representation Representation Bolstering Bolstering

International Dominance Dominance Dominance Directing Directing Directing Leading Leading Leading Dividing Dividing Dismissal Separation Defining Dividing Distancing Separation Intersection Distancing Representation Bolstering Utilising

ThisChapterfollowsthesameformatasChapter4andisbrokendownintothreetime periodstoallowchangestobetrackedandhighlighted,20012002,20032004,and

articulatedmanagementstrategiesandnegotiationofnormativeconstraintsinrelationtothesocial identitiesexaminedinChapter3. 162 20052006.Table4onthepreviouspagedetailsthestrategiesandtechniquesthatare apparent.AgainIfocuspredominantlyonthediscourseofthestateleaderas representativeoftheadministrationandcloseadvisers.WhenreferringtoPresident GeorgeW.Bush’sstatementsthesearenotunderstoodaspurelyreducibletoBush himself,butgenerallyreflectcarefullycraftedlanguagerepresentativeofthesmallstate leadershipgroup.ThePresident’sstatementsareagainsupplementedwiththoseofother membersoftheadministration.ThemanagementstrategiesemployedbytheBush administrationinrelationtothesocialidentitiesthatareunderconsiderationinthis thesis,largelyresemblethatof dominance ,7butarealsosupplementedwith compartmentalisation , intersection representation and merging .Thetechniques evidentinpursuitofthesestrategiesagainvarywithbothsocialidentityandtime period. 1. Phase 1 - Initial Contestation: 2001-2002 ‘The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today’ (Bush, cited in Woodward, 2002: 37) 1.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity Thehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroupbegantoraisemanyconcerns regardingthedetentionofterrorsuspectsin20012002.HumanRightsWatch(HRW) (2001b)wereearlyto‘cautionagainstillconsideredchangestoU.S.lawandpolicythat woulderodebasicrightstopersonalliberty’,includingchangestodetentionpolicies. 8 Theorganisationwasparticularlycriticalofthebroadreachofthe Military Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, issuedonNovember13,2001(Bush,2001zzb). 9HRWandAmnestyInternational(AI) alsoexpressconcernswithregardstothesituationatGuantánamoBay(e.g.Fellner, 2002),withAI(2002f)callingfortheprotectionoflawtobegrantedtoGuantánamo detainees.Tortureisalsoanissueaboutwhichthereissignificantuneasein20012002. Forexample,inresponsetotheresurgenceofdebateonthetopicintheUSA,HRW 7Thisstrategyisconsistentwiththeinsightsofscholarswhohavehighlightedtherhetoricalconstraints onpoliticaloppositionintheUSAatthistime(KrebsandJackson,2007),inparticular,drawingattention totheframingofthreatandtheimpactofnormsdeterminingwhatconstitutespatrioticbehaviour (Cramer,2007). 8HRW,aswellasAI,alsoraiseconcernsaboutthedetentionofforeignterrorsuspectsunder immigrationchargesintheUSA(HRW,2001d;AI2002h,HRW,2002a). 9HRW(2001e)arguethattheOrder,whichdetailstheuseofmilitarycommissions,‘sacrifices fundamentalrightstopersonallibertyandtoafairtrialthatgofarbeyondwhatispermittedevenintimes ofcrisis’.WhilstimprovementtotherulesgoverningthesemilitarycommissionsisrecognisedinApril 2002,HRW(2002b)suggesttheyarestillflawed. 163 (2001c)expresstheirbeliefthattortureissimplynotanoption. 10 AI(2002g)goesonto highlighttherisksoftortureandilltreatmentinherentintheBushadministration’suse ofincommunicadodetention. 11 ThediscourseoftheBushadministrationin20012002 largelyreflectsa dominance approachbasedondismissal , denial and challenge tothe aboveconcerns.Thisisaccompaniedby compartmentalisation ofhumanrightsinthis context,andverylimited intersection representation . Rumseld(2002a),forexample,is dismissive ofthe‘hyperbole’and‘allegations,that havebeenmadebymanyfromcomfortabledistance’.Hesuggeststhatsuchreports‘are undoubtedly[made]bypeoplewhoareuninformed,misinformedorpoorlyinformed’. Thefollowingtwopassagesareparticularlyrevealingwithregardstoboth denials and dismissals : Youknow,it'sperfectlypossibleforanyonetostandupandsay,"HennyPenny,thesky'sfalling,isn't thisterriblewhat'shappening?"andsaythat;andhavesomeoneelsesay,"Gee,Iviewwithalarmthe possibilitythatthesky'sfalling!"Andthenitgetsrepeated.Andthensomebreathlesscommentator repeatsitagain.Andthenitgoesonforthreedays.Now,doesthatmakeitso?No.Atsomepointdoes theaircomeoutofthatballoon?Youbet. Ithink…ifsomeonelookeddownfromMarsontheUnitedStatesforthelastthreedays,theywould concludethatAmericaiswhat'swrongwiththeworld.Americaisnotwhat'swrongwiththeworld.And what'stakingplacedownthere[GuantánamoBay]isresponsible,it'shumane,it'slegal,it'sproper,it's consistentwiththeGenevaConventions.Andafteraperiod,thatwillsinkin,lettherebenodoubt. SuchargumentsarefurthersupportedbythePresidenthimself,whostatesthat: there'snoevidencethatwe'retreatingthemoutsidethespiritoftheGenevaConvention.Andforthose whosayweare,theyjustdon'tknowwhatthey'retalkingabout(Bush,2002g).12 Indeed,thedangersofcivillibertiesarehighlightedinthefollowingstatement, challenging thehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialidentity: wemustnotletforeignenemiesusetheforumsoflibertytodestroyliberty,itself.Foreignterroristsand agentsmustneveragainbeallowedtouseourfreedomsagainstus(Bush,2001zzc). 10 HRW(2002c)arealsocriticalofUSoppositiontothedraftoptionalprotocoltoCATthatwould establishasystemofinspections,internationally,tovisitplacesofdetention. 11 Theseconcernsareaccompaniedbymanyexpressionsoftheimportanceofhumanrightsinthepost September11 th period,frombothorganisations. 12 PresidentBushemphasisesthatthedetaineesarebeingwelltreatedandhavegoodmedicalcare. 164 Suchapositioncertainlygoesbeyondarejectionoftheargumentsofthissocialgroup, suggestingtheiridealsfacilitatetheterroristcause.Predominantlytheemphasisabove hasbeenon denials and dismissals andconstructinga dominant narrative.However, thislaststatementalsogoessomewaytodemonstratinghowthissocialidentityhas beensubordinatedtothedominantframeworkofcounterterrorism. Inadditiontotheaboveapproach,humanrightsarealso,attimes,juxtaposedwith context .Bush(2002i),forexample,speaksofthe‘needtorespectpeople’srights’ whilstatthesametimebalancingthiswiththe‘mostimportantjob…toprotect innocentAmericans’.Justificationofmilitarycommissionsisalsoalongtheselines (Bush,2001zzd).WhilstBushoftenrefersto‘inalienablerights’(2002za),theextension ofthesetodetaineesatGuantánamoiscertainlyrestricted,asthey‘arekillers’,‘[t]hey don'tsharethesamevaluesweshare’,and‘[t]heywouldlikenothingmorethanto comeafterAmerica,orourfriendsandallies’(2002s). 13 Comparisonisusedtobackup such compartmentalisation ,particularlythatrelatingtomilitarycommissions,inthat detainees‘willbegivenaheckofalotbetterchanceincourtthanthosecitizensofours whowereintheWorldTradeCenterorinthePentagonweregivenbyMr.binLaden’ (Bush,2001zzh). Theeffectsof compartmentalisation areslightlyreducedbyverylimited intersection representation .BeforetheSeptember11 th attacks,Bush(2001n)referstotheUSAas ‘oneofthegreatbastionsofhumanrights’.However,subsequenttotheattacksthisis generallylimitedtothe‘chief’right,therighttolife(Bush,2002d).Thus,whilstsome bolstering isapparentinrelationtothissocialidentity,thisiseitherjuxtaposedwith threat(asaboveregardingcompartmentalisation),orthisishighlyrestrictedtotheright tolife.Theemphasisondefending‘freedomnomatterwhatthecost’(Bush,2002n), greatlyreducesthesalienceofthissocialidentity,indeed,attimesitisseenasa weakness,usedbytheterrorists. 1.2 The Legal Social Identity Whilst300lawprofessorssignedalettercriticisingBush’s Military Order (as mentionedabove),callingthemilitarycommissions‘legallydeficient,unnecessaryand unwise’(Seelye,2001),therewerenofurtherpublicchallengesfromthelegalsocial

13 Theutilityintermsofintelligencegatheredfromthesedetaineesisalsoemphasised. 165 groupin20012002.Variousmanagementstrategiesare,however,stillapparent.These rangefrominitial merging toboth dominance and compartmentalisation . Theruleoflawisfrequentlypresentedas central toUSidentity;thisisindeedthecase throughoutthewhole20012006periodofanalysis.TheUSAischaracterisedas‘a nationoflaws’(Bush,2002m),wheretheruleoflawprovidesthebasisforUS democracy(Bush,2001l).ThejudiciaryiscreditedasanintegralpartoftheUSsystem ofgovernance,with‘astrongandindependentjudiciary’beingessentialtofreedom (Bush,2001l).ThereisindeedanannuallawdayatthebeginningofMay‘tocelebrate [US]legalheritage’(Bush,2001l).PresidentBush,furthermore,referstotheequalityof lawwhere‘[n]ooneisabovethelaw,andnooneisbeneathit’(Bush,2002m)lawis simply merged withallotheraspectsofidentity. AftertheattacksofSeptember11 th however,adegreeoftensionisalsoapparentwith regardstothissocialidentity. Merging isstillevidentyetelementsoffrictionandslight divisionsfromthissocialidentityarealsovisible.Forexample,Bushoftenremarksthat alQaedamusthavethought,‘thatallwewoulddoaftertheattackwasmaybefilea lawsuitortwo’(e.g.Bush,2002zf).Thefrequentuseofthisstatementsuggestsa questioningofthecentralityofthelegalsocialidentityandisindicativeofan associationoflawwithweaknessandinaction. Bushalsojuxtaposestheidentityofbeing‘anationoflaw’,withbeing‘anationunder attack’(Bush,2001zd): Oursisalandthatvaluestheconstitutionalrightsofeverycitizen.Andwewillhonorthoserights,of course.Butwe'reatwar,awarwe'regoingtowin(Bush,2001zi). Thereisasensethattheadministrationwillabidebylawandtheconstitutionbecauseof thecentralitytoidentity,butthe context maydetermineotherwise,suggestingadegree of compartmentalisation .ThemessagesthataregeneratedareatoddsinthattheUSA willabidebylaw,butatthesametimetheUSAwillnotallowlawtogetinthewayin thefightagainstterrorism.Thereareconstantremindersthat‘[w]e’redealingwith terrorists’(Bush,2001zzc),whorequireadifferentsetofrules.Thisisevidentinthe memorandumsignedbyBushonFebruary7 th 2002,wheretheadministrationrejected thelegalprovisionsoftheGenevaConventions,particularlycommonArticle3,

166 governingthetreatmentofdetainees(GreenbergandDratel,2005). 14 Thereisan apparentlackoftrustwhenitcomestothejudicialprocessandtheircapacitytotry terrorsuspects,withtheadministrationoftensecondguessingtheactionsofthelegal profession(Greenberg,2006:7). LawisfurthermarginalisedintermsofBush’s Military Order settingupthesystemof militarycommissionstotryterrorsuspects.Kassop(2003:520) arguesthat: Todismisswithabroadbrushtheabilityofthejudicialbranchtoreviewgovernmentalactionssimply becausethesubjectmatterisforeignpolicyorwaroverlookspastprecedentsandsuggestsaviewthatis uncomfortablyatoddswithbasicprinciplesofconstitutionalgovernment. However,tosaythatthelegalsocialidentityhassimplyreducedinsalienceinrelation tothewaronterror,andthatthisidentityenjoyslessapplicabilityinthiscontext,would betomissoutsomeoftheimportantnuancesoftheapparentchangeininteractionswith thisgroup.Bush(2002a)mayhavebeendismissiveattimes,statingforexample,‘I wasn'tinterestedinlawyers,Iwasn'tinterestedinabunchofdebate’, 15 yetthePresident couldnotsimply‘switchoff’thissocialidentity.Instead,astrategyof dominance emergeswhereattorneysareplaced‘onthefrontlineofwar’(Bush,2001zq),withthe OfficeofLegalCounsel(OLC)chargedwith‘pushingantiterrorismeffortstothelimits ofthelaw’(Goldsmith,2007:42).Asopposedtoatraditionalfocusonlegalprecedent (bynaturebackwardlooking),thePresidentismoreencouragingoflookingforwardto circumstancesthatmayarise,bothtoavoidrestraintonactionsthatmayberequiredby theUSAaswellastopreventpossiblefutureterroristactivity(Goldsmith,2007:133 134). 16 Thissocialidentityisbroughtintolinewiththepreventiveandforwardleaning postureoftheBushadministration.Thereisthusmuchemphasison direction and dominance asthelegalsocialidentityisdrawnintotheoverallsuperordinate frameworkofthewaronterror,and merging isrestricted.

14 CommonArticle3wasdeterminednonapplicabletoeitheralQaedaorTalibandetainees,andthe GenevaprovisionsmorebroadlywereseenasnonapplicabletotheconflictwithalQaeda. 15 Therewastobeno‘lawyeringthisthingtodeath’onlyademonstrationofresolve(Woodward,2002: 96). 16 Inthecontextoftacklingterrorismtheroleoflawandthelegalprofessionwasoneofmakingsurethe USAwasnotrestrainedaswellasavoidingthesubsequentprosecutionofadministrationofficials. Scholarshavecriticisedthischaracterisationof‘lawyerasabsolver’(Luban,2006:68)orlawyers ‘lend[ing]suchpoliciesapatinaofrespectability’(Holmes,2006:119).Thisisinacontextwherethe decisiononhowtolegallyinterpretthesituationofdetaineesisemergingandevolving(Bush,2002g). 167 Thus, merging , compartmentalisation and dominance areallevidentinthisperiod, demonstratingthateventhoughtherewerenotanysubstantialchallengesfromthelegal socialgroupin20012002theneedtomanagethissocialidentitywasveryapparent.At thisstage,thesestrategiesdoappeartobeacceptedasthereislittlecontestation;this mayhoweverbelargelyreflectiveofthetimeittakesforcasestocometocourt. 1.3 The Military Social Identity WhilstlawwasoftenassociatedwithweaknessbytheBushadministrationinthepost September11 th context,themilitarywereportrayedasashowofstrengthandmight. Thisemphasisisapparentevenbeforetheterrorattacksin2001,andwasacentral elementofBush’s2000electioncampaignaswellasthebroaderneoconagenda.The managementstrategiesapparentin20012002predominantlyreflecta dominance approach,supportedbyelementsof intersection representation . TheUSmilitaryaregrantedmuch centralityinthediscourse,contributingtothe ‘meaningandconscienceandsoul’ofthecountry(Bush,2001p). 17 Furthermore,service personnelarecreditedwithbeing‘ambassadorsfromthelandoffreedom’(Bush, 2001p).Centrality iscertainlysuggestiveofamergingstrategywithothersocial identities,yetthediscourseisveryfocusedand directed .Thereisagreatdealof emphasisfrombothBushandRumsfeldonchange,buildingaforceforthefuture, movingawayfromnationbuilding, 18 and‘redefiningthetermsofwar’(Bush,2001e). 19 Rumsfeld’sinteractionswiththemilitarycertainlyindicatea dominant approach, promotingrisktakingandforwardthinking(Woodward,2006:53),establishingachain ofcommandthroughtheSecretaryofDefensetotheWhitehouse,wrestlingback civiliancontrolofthePentagon,andtakingon‘entrenchedmilitaryinterests’ (Woodward,2006:363). 20 Thus,thelinehasbeencrossedfrom merging to dominance evenbeforetherewasaclearoverarchingmissionoferadicatingterrorism.

17 Bush,CheneyandRumsfeldeachgivealargenumberofspeechestothedifferentservicesintheUS military,oftenstressingthatthemilitaryis‘[o]urfirstpriority’(Bush,2002e).Thesespeechesareoften usedtoarticulatenewdefenceandsecuritypoliciessuchaspreemption(Moens,2004:170) 18 NationbuildingwasseentohavecontributedtoadropinreadinessunderClintonduetoreduced combattraining.Suchmissionswerealsoconsideredtoberelatedtounderfundingandlowmorale (Moens,2004:37). 19 ThisisreflectiveoftheforwardleaningstrategyoftheBushadministrationmoregenerally. 20 Theindependenceofmilitaryadvicewasalsobroughtintoquestion. 168 AftertheSeptember11 th attacks,withamoresalientagenda,thisonlyintensifies. 21 Manyoftheconstraintsonmilitaryplanningwerefurtherreduced(Woodward,2004: 37),forexample,Rumsfeldisreportedtohavestressedtheneedtothink unconventionally,and,throughusingfewertroops,elevatetheriskinmilitaryplanning (Woodward,2004:35). 22 Inrelationtothequestionsofconcerninthisthesis,alesser numberoftroopsisunlikelytohavehelpedavoidtheconditionsconducivetotheabuse ofdetainees. TheBushadministrationalsowentagainstmilitarycultureinrenderingtheGeneva Conventionsnonapplicable.AsMajorMichaelDanMorioutlines,‘[i]nthemilitary, youcapturesomeoneandassumethatheisaprisonerofwaruntilyouhaveahearing thatsaysheisnotaprisonerofwar…intheDavidHickscase,themilitarywasstopped bycivilianleadership’,thiswasduetoRumsfeld’smemodatedJanuary22 nd 2002 (Neuborne,Priest,Lewis,Dratel,MoriandGillers,2006:26).TheChairmanofthe JointChiefsofStaff,GeneralRichardMyers,isalsoreportedtohavearguedagainstthe administration’spositionstatingthattheGenevaConventionsare‘ingrainedinU.S. militaryculture’,that‘anAmericansoldier’sselfimageisboundupwiththe Conventions,’,andthat‘[a]swewant our troops,ifcaptured,treatedaccordingtothe Conventions,wehavetoencouragerespectforthelawbyourownexample’(from Feith(2004)citedinGoldsmith(2007:113114)). 23 WhetherornottheGeneva Conventionstechnicallyappliedinalegalcontextwasthereforenottheonlyissueof concernforthemilitary(Woodward,2006:86).Thispositionwasoverruled. 24

21 Rumsfeldhasexpressedtheopinionthat,‘thewartransformsthemilitary’(Woodward,2002:135). Theimplicationsofthewarschosenwerecertainlynotlostontheadministrationwhowantedastrong militaryreadytofightwars,nottobuildnations. 22 Rumsfeld’sclasheswitha‘riskadverse’militaryculturearewelldocumentedbyWoodward(e.g. 2006:53).DisputesovertroopnumbersbetweenneoconsandrealistsintheBushadministrationhave alsobeennotedbyscholarssuchasDolanandCohen(2006:5152).Powellinparticularwasconcerned thatthemilitarywouldbetalkedintousingtoosmallaforceinIraq(Woodward,2004:80). 23 Roberts(2007:202)reportsthattherewerefurthermemosinthisperiod‘whichshowhowstrenuously manyqualifiedexpertsinthegovernmentandthearmedforcesarguedagainstthedeparturesfromthe GenevaConventionsbutfailedtocarrytheday’.However,thevoicesofmilitarylawyersareoften overlookedasmuchhasyettobedeclassified,despitetheprotestsofsomemilitarylawyerstohavetheir objectionsmadepublic.WedoknowthatconcernswereraisedbytheUSmilitarythoughin2002(Mora, 2004)regardingRumsfeld’sauthorisationofabusiveinterrogationtechniques(seeHaynes(2002)in GreenbergandDratel(2005:237)).Mora’sopinionsdidnothoweverreflectaunitarymilitaryvoiceon thematter. 24 AsHasian(2007:711)latersuggests,inresponsetoRumsfeld’s‘flippantremarks’aboutthelengthof timedetaineescouldbemadetostand(seeHaynes(2002),inGreenbergandDratel,2005:237),‘[r]eal warriorsneedleaderswhounderstoodboththeletterandspiritoftheselaws’asopposedtobelittlingtheir content. 169 InordertosupportthesepoliciestheBushadministrationappearstohavefocusedon embedding themilitaryinthesuperordinateframeworkofthewaronterrorand celebratingtheirachievementsinthiscontext(forexample,theheroismdisplayed (Bush,2001zm),theweaponstechnologyusedinthiswar(Bush,2001zzg),andthe sheerpatriotismonshow(Bush,2001zm)). Intersection representation isapparent through bolstering areasofoverlap.Techniquesinvolve,praise,appreciation,emphasis oncapability(Bush,2001ze;Bush,2001zr),aswellashighlightingfundingandthe administration’sconcernsforthelivingconditionsofsoldiersaswellastheirfamilies (Bush,2001b;2002b).Remindersof9/11,juxtaposingthemilitary’shumanitarian actionswiththoseoftheenemy,andemphasisingtheir‘noblemission’todefend civilization,allfurtherservethispurpose(Bush,2001zr).Bush(2001zm)addresses someofthenormsofthemilitary,stressingtheirclearobjectivesandjustgoals,atthe sametimeasheavilyembeddingthissocialidentityinthesuperordinatewaronterror framework. However,severalotherkeynormsoftheUSmilitary,forexample,theneedto overestimatethenumbersofsoldiersrequired,theneedforclearexitstrategiesand GenevaConventionapplicability,wereunderminedin20012002.Themain managementstrategyevidentinthediscourseis dominance ,attemptingtofitthe militaryintothesuperordinateframeworkoftheBushadministration’swaronterror. Whilstthereisunrestbehindthescenes,thisdoesnotsurfacein20012002,indeedthis wouldhavebeeninappropriateaschallengescouldhavecreatedsignificantuncertainty amongstpersonnel.Publiclythereisacceptanceofthissuperordinateframework. 1.4 The United Nations Social Identity InteractionswiththeUNdiffersignificantlyfromtheprevioustwosocialidentities, perhapsnotsurprisinglygiventhattheneoconagendaevenpriortoSeptember11 th , wasverycriticalofinvolvementinmultilateralinstitutions.The20012002periodof analysisbeginswithratherstrainedrelationsduetothedecisionto‘kicktheUnited Statesoff’theHumanRightsCommissionandpermitSudantojoin(Bush,2001m). 25 Bush(2001zz)stateslaterintheyear,thatsuchamove‘underminesthecredibilityof thisgreatinstitution’,andjeopardisesthe‘moralauthority’onwhichtheUNdepends. BysuggestingthattheUNlackscredibilityandhaslostitsway,thestageiscertainlyset

25 USproposalsforexemptionsfortheirpeacekeepersfromICCjurisdictionwerealsorejectedbytheUN SecurityCouncilin2002(HRW,2002d). 170 forastrategyof dominance ,whichisfacilitatedbyelementsof intersection representation . Inthediscourseassessed,theUNis defined almostsolelyintermsofthesuperordinate frameworkofthewaronterror;theorganisation’scapacitytomeetitsresponsibilities andupholditsvaluesispresentedthroughthislens.Bush(2001zz)emphasisesthatthe ‘struggle’ofthewaronterrorisa‘definingmomentfortheUnitedNations’andthat the‘UnitedNationswasfoundedinthiscause’.TheattacksofSeptember11 th are furthermoreframedasanattackontheUN,buttheadministrationarguesthattheUNis tooweaktostandupforitself. TheUSAisalsopositionedasmorehumanitarianthantheUN,wheretheformeris fulfillingadutytofuturegenerationsinconfronting‘thetruechallengesofthe21 st century’(Bush,2002zl).Bush(2002zj)remindslistenersthatthe‘UnitedStateshelped foundtheUnitedNations’.Thustherearehintsatintersection representation , bolstering thatwhichtheUSAshareswiththeUN,aswellascitingtheUNSC ResolutionstheUSAisattemptingtouphold.Howeverthisisexceptionallynarrowand verylimitedin20012002,withdiscoursemorefirmlyreflecting dominance .The followingstatementishighlyillustrativeofthisformof dominance ,facilitatedby intersection representation : AndmymessagetotheUnitedNationswasthis:Wewantyoutosucceedasa[n]internationalbody.The worldisdifferent,thethreatsarereal,wecandoabetterjobifweworktogetherthroughtheUnited Nations,andhere'syourchancetosucceed.Youhaveachoice,andthechoiceiswhetheryou'llbean effectivepeacekeepingorganization,orwhetheryou'llbeliketheLeagueofNations.Yourchoice(Bush, 2002zq). 26 Wherethereisoverlap,thisisemphasised,howeveriftheUNperceivestheworldina differentwaytothat directed bytheBushadministration,theargument threatens that theorganisationwillceasetoberelevant.VicePresidentCheneypartiallyinstigated thisapproachinsistingthatiftheUSAwentdowntheUNrouteinthebuilduptothe Iraqwar,theframingofsuchactionmustbeintermsoftestingtheUN’sresolve 26 Smith(2004:212)notesthatthislineofattackmayhavemadeIraqthemostprominentissue,‘butit didnotcreateanenvironmentwheremanymemberstateshadmuchincentivetocooperate’.Theauthor goesontohighlighttheproblemsofsuchanapproach,suggestingthatthiswillhavemadeitmore difficultfortheUSAto‘passeventhemostbenignresolutions’inthefuture(2004:212).Whilstsuch rhetoricmayhavebeenusefulforpreparingtheUSpublicforwar,Smithsuggeststhat‘thissamerhetoric clearlyhadadirectnegativeimpactonthenegotiatingenvironmentinNewYork’(2004:212). 171 (Kamfner,2004:193). 27 ResponsibilityforUSactionisshiftedontothecontextandthe organisationitself.Indeed,waitingfortheUNtomakeadecisionisruledoutasun fittingforanyrepresentativeoftheUSAincludingany‘electedmemberoftheUnited StatesSenateorHouseofRepresentatives’.InsteadBush(2002zk)stressesthat‘if you'rerepresentingtheUnitedStates,yououghttobemakingadecisiononwhat'sbest fortheUnitedStates’.Anynormativepressuresfromtakingastancecontrarytothis socialidentityarethereforeheavilyreduced. JohnKampfnernotestheremarksofamemberofBlair’sinnercirclestatingthat‘Bush givestheimpressionthattheUNisjustaprocesstogetthrough’(2004:274).TheUN isalsodescribedbytheadministrationas‘adiplomaticmudpit’(Woodward,2004: 189).Thusanyidentificationwiththissocialidentityisexceptionallylimitedin2001 2002,allowingtheadministrationtobelargelyfreefromthenormativepressuresto validatemembership.

1.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity Anothersocialidentityunderconsiderationinthisthesisisthatoftheliberaldemocratic stateininternationalsociety.Suchanidentityisnothighlyapparentinthediscourse assessed.WhilstBushmakesclaimsthattheadministrationhas‘rejected isolationism…andprotectionism’theyactuallybegin2001onadecidedlynon internationalistandmoreregionaliststance.ConcernsaboutAmericanwithdrawalwere rife,withtheadministrationendingtheABMtreaty,aswellaspullingoutoftheKyoto agreementandtheInternationalCriminalCourt,thelatterraisingdoubtsovercontinued supportforpeacekeepingmissionsintheBalkans.Thereareindicationsofanew approachinternationallyevenbeforetheattacksofSeptember11 th ,asBush(2001k) states‘[w]emustalllookattheworldinanew,realisticway’;howeverwhatthis actuallymeansbecomesmuchmoreapparentaftertheattacks.Thepredominant managementstrategyevidentinrelationtosocialidentitiesininternationalsocietyin 20012002is dominance .However,adegreeof separation isalsoapparent. The dominant frameworkthatemergesafterSeptember11 th focuseson‘oneuniversal law,andthat'sterrorismisevil’(Bush,2001zy).Theaccompanyingdiscourseof 27 CheneyhadlittleconfidenceintheUNrouteinthebuilduptomilitaryinterventioninIraq(Moens, 2004:176).TherewastheperceiveddangerthatanewUNResolutionwouldseparatethedualgoalsof disarmamentandregimechange,understoodbytheBushadministrationaspartofthesameoverallgoal (Moens,2004:182). 172 PresidentBushcertainly directs anyinternationalsocialidentitiesalongtheselines.He arguesthat‘thecivilizedworldmusttakeseriouslythegrowingthreatofterrorona catastrophicscale’(Bush,2002r)andfocusesonthegoalofachievingfreedomand peaceintheworld(Bush,2001zf).Bushclearlyassertsa leadership position,stating that‘theworldisreadyforleadership’(Bush,2001zf)andatthis‘definingmomentin history…thiscountrymustlead’(Bush,2002a). Asopposedtofocusingonaninternationalliberaldemocraticsocialidentity,theBush administrationismuchmorepreoccupiedwiththenotionof‘coalitionsofthewilling’, orasKampfnerterms,‘multilateralism a la carte ’(Kampfner,2004:159).28 Cameron (2002:68)providesanotherterm,‘utilitarianmultilateralism’,tocapturethelackof concernforthecredentialsofthosestatestheUSAengagedwithonthespecific issueof terrorism.Coalitionsarebuilt,whosemembershipisbasedonthosethat‘understandit's nowtimetounitetodefeatevil’(Bush,2001zk),areworkingtoisolateterrorists(Bush, 2001zv)andaresharing‘theresponsibilitiesandsacrifices’ofthe‘cause’(Bush, 2002o).WhilstBushsuggeststhatthefundamentalprinciplesofthisinternationalsocial identityarefoundedon‘progressandpluralism,toleranceandfreedom’(Bush, 2001zh),theofferto‘jointhiscause’isextendedto‘[a]nynationthatmakesan unequivocalcommitmentagainstterror’(Bush,2002o). Theadministrationwasalsodeeplyconcernedwiththeneedtoavoidothercountries influencingthetermsofinterventionandtheprosecutionofthewaronterror(Hurrell, 2002:200). 29 AsPresidentBushisreportedtohavestated,theremaycomeapoint wheretheyare‘theonlyonesleft’.Hecontinues,‘That’sokaywithme.Weare America’(Woodward,2002:81).TheBushadministration’sgeneralsentimentsare summedupinthefollowingstatementbyPresidentBushinaninterviewwithBob Woodward(2002:341):

28 Theideaofcoalitionsofthewillingisnotnewtothistimeperiod.Theideaemergedasaneocon initiativeinthe Defense Planning Guidance 1992,thedraftofwhichwassupervisedbyWolfowitz, CheneyandLibby(DolanandCohen,2006:43).Debatesregardingunderstandingsofcoalitionsare apparentinWoodward(2002:113;180;281). 29 Imustpointoutthoughthatthiswasnotaconsensusacrosstheadministration.Therewasinfactmuch divisionbetweenthosetakingamorerealistapproachtotheinternationalrealmandthoseinformedby neoconservatism.ThatthePresidentdidappealformultilateralsupportisoftentakentobeacompromise betweenthetwo(DolanandCohen,2006:51). 173 action–confidentactionthatwillyieldpositiveresultsprovideskindofaslipstreamintowhichreluctant nationsandleaderscangetbehindandshowthemselvesthattherehasbeen–youknow,something positivehashappenedtowardpeace. Thisperspectiverecognisesthatnationswillneverallagree,youjusthavetoact,deal withthe‘internationalhyperventiliation’(Rumsfeld,2002b),andtheywilleventually seethatthecourseofactionyousoughtwasright.Assuchadegreeof separation and distancing isapparent.Thisisalsoevidentinthefollowingstatement: Iunderstandthepropagandamachinesarecrankedupintheinternationalcommunitythatpaintsour countryinabadlight(Bush,2002zzf). Thereisnoindicationthatthismaybeasignthattheparticularcourseofactionmaybe ‘wrong’,ornotbeneficialtotheworld,insteadtheUSAisattimesinrhetorical oppositiontomembershipofanyformofinternationalsocialidentity.Whilstthenotion thatnationswillneverallagreecertainlystandsasatruism,thisapproachtocriticism, basedonabsolutismisnotconducivetointeractionthatwouldservetogenerate normativeinfluence. Furthermore,theBushadministration’sapproachtointernationalsocietyingeneral,is alsovery divisive inorientation.Themessagethatyouareeitherwithusoragainstus hasbeenheavilypluggedbytheBushadministration(e.g.Bush,2001zk),basedona dividebetweenthosewholovefreedomandthosewhoareclassifiedas‘barbaric’and setthemselves‘againsttheentireworld’(Bush,2001zze). 30 Bush(2002zl)articulatesa ‘straightforward’choice‘betweenaworldoffear,oraworldofprogress’,wherethe ‘worldcommunity’mustmakeastand.WhilstthePresidentarguesthatthe‘vast majorityofcountriesarenowonthesamesideofamoralandideologicaldivide’ (Bush,2001zzg),SaddamHusseinbeingisolated‘fromthecivilizedworld’(Bush, 2002zr),thisbinarylogicwasn’tpopularinmuchofEurope. 31

30 ThereisadangerherethatcountriessuchasSyriaandIranareforcedintothepositionofanoutgroup developingtheirownalternativeoroppositionalnorms,countertoBlair’sstrategyofattemptedinclusion asmentionedinChapter4. 31 TheFrenchPrimeMinisterJeanPierreRafferinreproachedthosewith‘asimplisticvisionofwar betweengoodandevil’,which,whilstnotnamingtheUSAortheBushadministration,talkstotheir characterisationofthesituation(Moens,2004:187).JavierSolana,theEUforeignpolicychief,also chidedtheUSAforthisbinaryposition,stating,‘[i]tisallornothing.ForusEuropeansitisdifficultto dealwithbecausewearesecular.Wedonotseetheworldinsuchblackandwhiteterms’(citedin Kampfner,2004:248). 174 Giventheemphasisondivisionandseparationfromanyinternationalsocialidentity thatfallsoutsidethedominantframeworkofthewaronterror,thenormativeinfluence oftheliberaldemocraticsocialidentitywouldappeartobeexceptionallyweak. Thus,consideringthesocialidentitiescontextasawholein20012002,thepotential constraintsoftheinternationaldetentionregimearevastlyreduced. 2. Phase 2 - Attempts to Sustain Contestation: 2003-2004 ‘We do not condone torture. I have never ordered torture. I will never order torture. The values of this country are such that torture is not a part of our soul and our being’ (Bush, 2004zi) 2.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity Criticismsfromthehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroup,regardingtheBush administration’scounterterrorismdetentionpolicies,continuetoincreasein2003 2004.HRWandAIpublishedalargenumberofreports,andwrotevariousletterstothe Bushadministrationexpressingconcernoverthetreatmentofdetaineesandtheir indefinitedetention.ThepracticesoftheBushadministrationarecharacterisedasa ‘backwardstepforhumanrights’(AI,2003c).Theadministration’sresponseagain employsthestrategiesof dominance (particularly denials ), compartmentalisation and intersection representation . Muchofthediscourseisbasedon dominance, dismissing argumentsthatsuggestthere hasbeenanywrongdoing,andutilisingarangeofdenial techniques,including dissociation(StuckeyandRitter,2007).Againthisispredominantlyintermscompeting forthedominantnarrativeasopposedtodirectlyappealingtoasuperordinate framework.PrecedingthereleaseoftheinfamouspicturesfromAbuGhraib,Rumsfeld (2004b)addressesthemountingaccusationsoftortureatGuantánamoBay, 32 rejecting suchclaimsandstatingthat: WhenIhearthosestories,thosereports,thethoughtthatcomestomymindisnotthedetaineesandnot GuantánamoBay,Cuba.ItisFidelCastroandtheprisonersheholds. 32 ForexampleHRWcalledforastoptotheuseofinterrogationtechniquesthatamounttotorturesuchas ‘stressandduress’(Roth,2004),suggestingsuchmeasures,whichareconsideredcontrarytohuman rights,arenotthewaytofightterrorism. 175 Suchstatementsaresignificantinthattheydrawoncomparisontostrengthendenials, placingactionsontoothers. Whenthepicturesdobreak,theadministrationarefacedwithaccusationsthatmuchof theblameforthe‘systemicabuse’(AI,2004g)ofdetaineesrestswiththeBush administration,andtheirlawyers(HRW,2004e;HRW,2004f;HRW2004g;Ross, 2004);thisisfirmlyrejectedbytheadministration.Inresponsetothepictures documentingabuseatAbuGhraib,thePresidentstresseshisrepulsion(Bush,2004zf), that‘[t]heysickenedmystomach’,andthatthe‘actswereabhorrent’(Bush,2004u). 33 Theabuseisrestrictedtoafewpeople(Bush,2004s)andBush(2004r)stressesthatthis is‘notthewaywedothingsinAmerica’.Consequently,thepresidentisquickto dissociateAmericafromthesepractices,statingthat‘[t]hesehumiliatingactsdonot reflectourcharacter’(Bush,2004y). TheBushadministrationalsoemploysidentitybaseddenialstofurtherdissociate themselvesfromtheabuses.Forexample: Wedon'ttorturepeopleinAmerica.Andpeoplewhomakethatclaimjustdon'tknowanythingaboutour country(Bush,2003zy). Furthermore: Idon'tlikeitwhenthevaluesofourcountryarearemisunderstoodbecauseoftheactionsofsome peopleoverseas(Bush,2004zk). Bush(2004u;2004w)stressesthatinvestigationsareunderway,thattheyareactingto stopsuchpracticesoccurring,anddetaineesarebeingtreatedhumanely;afundamental differencedistancingthemfromthepracticesofdictatorships.Predominantlythe emphasisisondenialsanddismissalsandconstructinga dominant narrative.However, alackoftransparencyandaccusationsofimmunity(someoftheveryfactorsBushuses todifferentiatethepracticesoftheUSAfromthosecountrieswhosehumanrights recordstheycriticise),arebroughtintothelimelightbythehumanrightsand humanitariansocialgroup.Indeed,Bush’s(2004zi)statementsthattheUSA‘donot 33 Thereisofcoursenoadmissionthattheactsdepictedinthephotosshowtorture,theyareinstead classifiedasabuse.Rumsfeldnotesthat,‘[w]hathasbeenchargedsofarisabuse,whichIbelieve technicallyisdifferentfromtorture.I’mnotgoingtoaddressthe‘torture’word’(quotedinHochschild, 2004). 176 condonetorture’,andthatthe‘valuesofthiscountryaresuchthattortureisnotapartof oursoulandourbeing’,aresignificantlycompromisedbymemosshowingDepartment ofJusticeLawyersandPentagonlawyerstryingtoworkoutwaystotoughen interrogationandredefinetorture. Withregardstothetermsandconditionsofdetention,thehumanrightsand humanitariansocialgroupalsohighlight,forexample,‘TheLegalLimboofthe GuantánamoDetainees’(AI,2003d),thedenialoftherighttoafairtrialthroughtheuse ofmilitarycommissions(HRW,2003b),andthedeportationofterrorsuspectstobe tortured. 34 Compartmentalisation (supportedbydrawingonasuperordinate framework)isagainapparentasaresponse;thereisareminderofthecontext,the dangerousnatureofthedetaineesandtheneedtokeepthemoffthebattlefield.For example,Bush(2003x)arguesthat‘someterroristsarejustplaincoldbloodedkillers. Assuch,‘[s]urelynobodywantstoletacoldbloodedkilleroutofprisonthatwould helpderailtheprocess…itdoesn'tmakeanysense’(Bush,2003zp).Inthese circumstancesthepredominantemphasisisonhaulingterrorsuspectsinsotheyareno longeraproblem(Bush,2003a;Bush,2003b).Thehumanrightsandhumanitarian socialidentitydoesnotappeartobesalient. However,theaboveisalsoaccompaniedby intersection representation ,perhapsto drawthissocialidentitycloserinthefaceofmountingcriticism.Forexample,Bush (2004a)stressesthattheUSA‘remainssteadfastlycommittedtoupholdingtheGeneva Conventions’;thatthey‘aredriventodefendthehumanrightsofothers’(Bush, 2003zc);andhaveavisionfora‘morepeacefulworld’,‘baseduponhumanrights, humandignityandjustice’,aswellasaworldthatdoesnotdiscriminate(Bush. 2003zzc).Bushfurther bolsters associationwiththissocialidentitybydrawingfrom history.ThePresidentremindsthevariousaudiencesthat: Wearethenationthatliberatedcontinentsandconcentrationcamps.WearethenationoftheMarshall Plan,theBerlinAirliftandthePeaceCorps.WearethenationthatendedtheoppressionofAfghan women,andwearethenationthatclosedthetorturechambersofIraq(Bush,2003zc).

34 AIfurtherdescribesGuantánamoas‘anaffronttotheruleoflaw’(2004h),asa‘Scandal’(2003e)and as‘ADeepeningStainonUSJustice’(2004i).BothAIandHRW,aswellasICRC,havealso experiencedproblemsingainingaccesstodetaineesandcourtproceedings(seeHRW,2004h;HRW, 2004i;HRW,2004j;alsoRose2004b:106108.ThelatterdetailsICRC’s2003concernsofthisnature). 177 OntheUNInternationalDayinSupportofVictimsofTorture,Bush(2004zj)also statesthat: Thenonnegotiabledemandsofhumandignitymustbeprotectedwithoutreferencetorace,gender,creed, ornationality.Freedomfromtortureisaninalienablehumanright,andwearecommittedtobuildinga worldwherehumanrightsarerespectedandprotectedbytheruleoflaw. Tortureisfirmlyassociatedwith‘repressiveregimes’(Bush,2004zj).Additionally, ‘Terroristsandtheirallies’areframedastheenemiesofhumanrights,believingthat ‘theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandtheAmericanBillofRights,andevery charteroflibertyeverwritten,arelies,tobeburnedanddestroyedandforgotten’(Bush, 2004zu). However,regardlessoftheseattemptsat intersection representation ,giventhe accusationsfromthissocialgroup,theBushadministration’sassociationwiththis socialidentityishighlycompromised.Anapparentdesiretodrawthissocialidentity closerisnotaccepted. 2.2 The Legal Social Identity Challengesfromthelegalsocialgroupalsointensifyin20032004.Afterthesuccessful convictionofJohnWalkerLindhinOctober2002,andthe110yearjailsentence handedouttoRichardReid(thesocalledshoebomber)inJanuary2003(seeBBC, 2003b),theBushadministrationbegantoencounterdifficultieswiththecourtsin relationtoterrorsuspects.InanOpinionissuedonDecember18 th 2003,theU.S.Court ofAppealsforthe2ndCircuitdisagreedwiththeBushadministration’sdesignationof JosePadillaasanenemycombatantanddeemedthathecouldnotbedetained indefinitelyonthePresident’sdeterminationashewasnotpickedupin‘azoneof activecombat’.InJuneof2004,theBushadministrationreceivedanothersetback,this timefromtheSupremeCourt.In Hamdi vs Rumsfeld (2004),theCourtdidsupport Hamdi’sdetentionuntiltheendoftheconflictinAfghanistan,however,thetraditional militarypowersofthepresidentwerechallengedwithregardstothebroaderconflict withalQaeda.Restrictionswereplacedonthepresident’spowersinthattheywerenot consideredtobeindefinite.Onthesameday,in Rasul vs Bush (2004),theUSSupreme CourtruledthatforeignnationalsdetainedattheGuantánamodetentionfacilities,had thewritof habeas corpus ,theyhadtherighttochallengethelegalityoftheirdetention.

178 FederaljurisdictionwasdeemedtoapplytoGuantánamo,eventhoughtheUSAdidnot have‘ultimatesovereignty’. JackGoldsmith,formerheadoftheOfficeofLegalCouncil(OLC),October2003June 2004,suggeststhatUS‘legalculturehadbecomeverysuspiciousofthe administration’sgrandassertionsofexecutivepower’(2007:135).JusticeSandraDay O’Connor’sopinion(in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld )thattheadministrationdidnothavea ‘blankcheck’inwartimeisoneindicationthatpreviousattemptsat dominance and compartmentalisation werenotaccepted.However,theseCourtrulings,whilst significantdidnotdemandagreatdealfromtheBushadministrationandonthewhole upheldthetraditionalwartimepowersofdetention. Furtherlegalchallengesdidemergein20032004though,inrelationtothe establishmentofmilitarycommissions.JackGoldsmithdrawsattentiontothemilitary lawyerswho,‘committedtotheirownwelldevelopedlegalsystem–theUniformCode ofMilitaryJustice–threwuproadblockafterroadblocktothe[ir]development’(2007: 121).Rose(2004b:136)alsosuggeststhatwhentherulesformilitarycommissions werereleasedin2003,‘theyprovokedoutrageamonglawyers’astheyrestrictedthe defendant’srighttochoosehislawyeranddeniedthedefensecounselthemeans requiredtoprepareaneffectivedefence. InresponsetheBushadministrationemploys dominance (predominantlyintermsof constructingadominantnarrativethrough denial ), compartmentalisation (supported byasuperordinateframework),andelementsof intersection representation to counterthechallenges.Inresponsetoquestionsoninterrogationtechniques,Bush (2004zg)usesidentitybased denials (dominance) andadegreeof intersection representation stressingthat: Theinstructionswentouttoourpeopletoadheretolaw.Thatoughttocomfortyou.We'reanationof law.Weadheretolaws. AslawispartofUShistory,weareaskedtoassumethatcurrentactionsarein compliance.AccusationsthattheUSAisnolongeranationoflawsaredismissedas ‘unfair’criticism.Bush(2004zzh)argues:

179 ourcourtshavemadearuling,theylookedatthejurisdiction,therightofpeopleinGuantánamotohave habeasreview,andsowe'renowcomplyingwiththecourt'sdecisions. However,atthesametime,Bush(2004zzh)highlightsthedilemmafacedbythe administration,that‘thesearepeoplethatgotscoopedupoffabattlefield,attemptingto killU.S.troops’andthereisadangerthatifreleasedtheywill‘comebacktokillagain’. WhilstBush(2004zl),ontheonehanddrawsattentiontoAmerica’sproudhistoryof equalitybeforethelaw, 35 where‘peopleareinnocentuntilprovenguilty’(Bush, 2004y)36 ontheotherthePresidentsuggeststhatthecounterterrorism context is exceptional.TheintelligencegatheredfromdetaineesatGuantánamoisjuxtaposedwith theimportanceofletting‘theworldknowthatwefullyunderstandourobligationsina societythathonorsruleoflaw’(Bush,2004zzh).Thishighlightsastrategyof compartmentalisation, informedbyadominantsuperordinateframework,challenging legalconstraintinthesecircumstances.AlbertoGonzales’privatestatement,‘Idon’tsee howterroristswhoviolatethelawsofwarcangettheprotectionsofthelawsofwar’,is alsoillustrativeof compartmentalisation inrelationtoterrorsuspects(Goldsmith, 2007:41).Suchastrategy,supportingdominance ,suggeststhatlawischaracterisedas aconstraintinthecounterterrorismcontext,assomethingtoworkaroundorbringinto line.

2.3 The Military Social Identity In20032004theUSMilitarywereinvolvedinthreewars,inAfghanistan,Iraqandthe globalwaronterror.Thiscertainlyreducedthescopeforchallengefromthissocial group;militarygeneralsandofficerswouldnotwanttocreateapublicbacklashwhilst thetroopswereincombatandriskingtheirlives(Hasian,2007). 37 Individualconcernsdidhoweveremergeinthisperiod.Forexample,inameetingwith JaymieDurnan,January8 th 2003(aSpecialAssistanttoSecretaryRumsfeldandDeputy SecretarytoPaulWolfowitz),NavyGeneralCounselAlbertoMorastressed,‘In 35 Thisisinrelationto‘TheCivilRightsActof1964[which]givesallAmericansanotherreasontobe proudofourcountry…thelawsofthisnationandthegoodheartofthisnationareonthesideof equality’(Bush,2004zl). 36 ThisstatementisinrelationtoaccusationsandinvestigationsintoabusebyUSsoldiers. 37 Hasian(2007:697)suggeststhatscopeforcriticismfromthemilitarywasverymuchrestrictedas officersandgeneralswouldnotwantto‘givetheimpressionthattheyareleadingsomerebellionagainst thepoliticalleadership’.Thismeantthatoptionssuchasmassresignationswereruledoutinfavourof moregradualtacticsofreform.Involvementintheactionsthatweredisapprovedoffurtherrestrictedthe formthatcriticismcouldtake.Hasiansuggeststhishadtobedirectedatthe‘decisionmakerswhoare violatingthenation’sguidingprinciples’(2007:697).However,Hasianalsonotesadesirenotto embarrassthePresident. 180 additiontotheirunlawfulness,theabusivepractices–oncetheybecomeknowntothe Americanpublicandmilitary–wouldhaveseverepolicyrepercussions:thepublicand themilitarywouldrepudiatethem’(Mora,2004:10).Inameetingthefollowingday, Moragoesontostress,that: EvenifonewantedtoauthorizetheU.S.militarytoconductcoerciveinterrogations,aswasthecasein Guantánamo,howcouldonedosowithoutprofoundlyalteringitscorevaluesandcharacter?Societal educationandmilitarytraininginculcatedinoursoldiersAmericanvaluesadversetomistreatment. Wouldwenowhavethemilitaryabandonthesevaluesaltogether?(2004:11). Mora’smemoemphasisesthatmembersofthemilitaryinvolvedincoercive interrogationwerenota‘rogueelement’(2004:12),andthattherewasachainof commandtothehighestlevelsoftheDepartmentofDefense(DoD).Healsoarguesthat suchpracticescouldnotbejustifiedbythe‘tickingbomb’scenarioasthiswasnotthe casewithdetaineesinGuantánamo.Moraendshismemostatingthatheisconfident thatprisonerabusesstoppedafterJanuary15 th 2003,howeverdiscussionsaboutthe OLCmemosandthepresident’sauthoritytoauthorisetorturecontinue. IdonotclaimthatwecantakeMora’sopinionstoreflectthewholeofthemilitary’s thinkingontheissueofdetentionandabuse.Indeed,GeneralMyerswasquickto commentinatelevisioninterviewshortlyafterthereleaseofthephotosfromAbu Ghraibthattheywereisolatedincidentsby‘roguesoldiers’(Zimbardo,2007:325). Furthermore,LieutenantColonelJeraldPhiferhadpreviouslywrittentothe(DoD)in October2002aboutfrustrationsthatharsherinterrogationtechniqueswerenot authorizedinGuantánamo.Certainly,therewasadivergenceofopiniononissuesof detention.Yetthepresenceofdiscontentwasdefinitelyapparent,leadingtotheleaking ofthephotosandthelaterreleaseofpersonalaccountsfromsoldiersreferringtothe degreeofuneasinesscausedbythewithdrawalofGenevaprotectionsandtheconfusion thatthisproduced(Zimbardo,2007:424). TheBushadministration’sdiscourseduring20032004inrelationtothemilitaryskims overthiscontestationandisverysimilartothatin20012002.Inthiscontext,theBush administrationlargelyemploysa dominance strategy.TheUSmilitaryare‘calledto defendourfreedom’,and‘toprotectAmericaandourfriendsandalliesfromthese thugs’(Bush,2003i),suggestiveofa directing approach.TheimportanceoftheUS militaryinthe dominant frameworkofthewaronterrorisalsofrequentlyexpressed,

181 embedding theminthiscontext.Indeed,troopsarepoliticisedtoadegree,astocriticise thewarisdeemedtobeacriticismofthetroopswhilsttheyarefightinginthefield (Lindsay,2003:538). Whenrallyingthetroops,Bush(2003a)repeatedlystressesthattheenemy‘killwithout regardfortherulesofwar’,thattheyare‘nothingbutabunchofcoldbloodedkillers, andthat’sthewaywe’regoingtotreatthem’,that‘terroristswillnotbestoppedby mercyorconscience’,that‘[t]herearenorulesofwarforthesecoldbloodedkillers’ (Bush,2003i)andthattheenemyhas‘rejectedeveryruleofwarfareandmorality’ (Bush,2003zc).Thesestatementsconstructadehumanizedimageoftheenemy, antitheticaltoaspectsofmilitaryculture,whichthenprovidesaframeworkwithin whichthemilitaryaretaskedtoperform. 38 Sucha dominant agendawouldcertainly servetoreduceanypotentialforpublicchallengetotheBushadministration’sdetention policiesfromthissocialgroup. Toaccompanysuchanapproachtherearealsonumeroussentimentsofsupport, 39 an emphasisondefensespending,gratitudetomilitaryfamilies,andprominencegivento the‘exceptionalskillandcourage’(Bush,2004w),alongsidecapabilitythattheUS militaryhasshown, bolstering thissocialgroup.TheBushadministrationemploysa degreeof intersection representation toassistinembeddingtheUSmilitaryinthis framework.PresidentBushalsospeakstothenormsofthissocialgroupstressingthe clearnessofthemissionathand,that‘noonewhofallswillbeforgotten’(Bush,2003s), thatwarhasbeen‘forceduponus’(Bush,2003g),andthattheUSmilitary‘servethe greatidealsofAmerica’(Bush,2003zc)as‘partofagreatforceforgoodinthisworld’ (Bush,2004zh).Additionally,theroleoftheGeneralsinplanning,decidingtroop numbers,andreportingbacktothePresidentthesituationonthegroundisfrequently stressed(e.g.Bush,2003zh;Bush,2003zzb;Bush,2004m;Bush,2004zzh). 40 Defence of the group isalsoapparentinrelationtoaccusationsofabuse.WithregardstoAbu

38 Hasian(2007:708)alsoidentifies‘Rumsfeld’sconstantlyvacillatingpositiononthetreatmentof detainees’,whichhasbeenrecognizedasacontributingfactortoabuse.Thisinturn,has‘helpedtarnish thereputationofalltheAmericantroopswhoreliedonexpertleadership’(2007:708). 39 BushoftenreferstothewebsitesetupbytheDepartmentofDefense–AmericaSupportsYou.mil. 40 Thisaddressesaccusationsthattherewasnotaclearmilitarystrategy(Woodward,2006:336)andthat therewasamismatchbetweenmilitaryandpoliticalconcerns(2006:300).TheMilitaryposition reportedlycouldnotgetthroughtotheadministration.Woodwardindeedreferstotheadministration closingoffanynegativeorcounterpositionsfromthemilitary(e.g.2006:371).Strachen(2006:65)goes furthertocriticisethissubordinationof,asopposedtoharmonisationwith,militaryadvice. 182 Ghraib,Bush(2004t)statesthat‘theactionsofthepeopleinthatprisondonotreflect thenatureofthemenandwomenwhowearouruniform’. A dominance strategyisthereforeapparentbothpubliclyand,onesuspects,privately, wheretheUSmilitaryareembeddedintheframeworkofthewaronterror. Intersection representation isalsoevidentinthepublicdiscoursefacilitatingsuchan approach. 2.4 The United Nations Social Identity WithregardstotheUNin20032004,disagreementsaremuchmoreovert.Whilst disputesarepredominantlyovertheinvasionofIraq,theyalsoinvolveissuesrelatingto detention.Forexample,theHumanRightsCommissionruledinMarch2004,that governmentshavearesponsibilitytoensurehumanrightsviolationsdonotoccur wherevertheyhaveeffectivecontrol,thusextendingtheseprovisionstoGuantánamo Bay.Theimportanceofhumanrightstreatyobligations,asopposedtojustthelawsof war(thepredominantfocusinthediscourseoftheBushadministration),isalso stressed.KofiAnnanfurthermoreremindsstatesthatinternationallawisnotaluxury thatcanbediscarded,insteaditis‘theplatformuponwhichtheedificeofdemocracy rests’(Annan,2004b).Despitethesecriticisms,theBushadministration’sdiscourse regardingtheUNagaindemonstrates dominance through directing and defining ,as wellas dismissaland denial .Thisisalsoagainsupplementedby intersection representation . PresidentBushbegins2003,inhisStateoftheUnionaddress,stressingthattheUSA doesnotneedtheauthorityoftheUNtoinvadeIraq(Bush,2003b).Thistheme continuesinMarch2003asBush(2003m)asserts: I'mconfidenttheAmericanpeopleunderstandthatwhenitcomestooursecurity,ifweneedtoact,we willact,andwereallydon'tneedUnitedNationsapprovaltodoso. This dismissal representsatechniqueof dominance asthesocialidentityisonly deemedcredible,intermsoftheirfitwiththeoverarchingandsuperordinate frameworkofthewaronterrorasunderstoodbytheadministration.Othertechniquesto achievedominanceagaininclude defining thepurposeoftheUNand directing the socialidentitylargelyonaverynarrowissuebasis.Forexample,‘[w]ehavecalledon theUnitedNationstofulfilitscharterandstandbyitsdemandthatIraqdisarm’(Bush, 183 2003b);‘[w]hydoesn'ttheUnitedNationsstandupasabodyandshowtheworldthatit hasgotthecapacitytokeepthepeace’(Bush,2003c);and‘[i]fthemembersrisetothis moment,thentheCouncilwillfulfilitsfoundingpurpose’(Bush,2003l). 41 Thisstrategyisfacilitatedbyadegreeof intersection representation ,reflectedin Bush’sstatementsthattheUSAis‘enforcingthedemandsoftheUnitedNation[s]’ (2003r),that‘[i]nconfrontingIraq,theUnitedStatesisalsoshowingourcommitment toeffectiveinternationalinstitutions’,that‘Iwasthepersonthattooktheissuetothe UnitedNations’and‘[w]e’vebeenworkingthroughtheUnitedNations’(2003m). WhilstthismaynotbetrueofallmembersoftheBushadministration,Bush’s assertionsservetoconstructadegreeofidentificationwiththeUN,focusingonthe elementssharedbytheUNandtheUSA.Forexample: AsanoriginalsigneroftheU.N.Charter,theUnitedStatesofAmericaiscommittedtotheUnited Nations.AndweshowthatcommitmentbyworkingtofulfiltheU.N.'sstatedpurposes,andgivemeaning toitsideals.ThefoundingdocumentsoftheUnitedNationsandthefoundingdocumentsofAmerica standinthesametradition(Bush,2003zv). Thisdemonstrationof intersection representation accompanies denials thatthe administrationwentroundtheUN,andremindersofResolution1441(Bush,2003zf)as wellasthepreviousResolutionsthatwerearguedtoprovideabasisformilitary intervention. Thus,thestrategiesemployedinrelationtotheUNshow dominance through directing , defining and dismissal ,aswellas denial thattheUSAhasgoneroundthe UN. Dominance isfurtherservedby intersection representation ,narrowly highlightingsharedvaluesandidentification.Whilstmuchofthediscoursesuggestsa lackofpotentialnormativeinfluencefromthissocialidentity,wemustalsonotethatin 20032004theadministrationwasbecomingincreasinglyawareofhowcrucialtheUN wouldbetothepoliticalprocessfollowingtheinitialconflictinIraq.AsKampfner (2004:351)writes,suchrhetoricwastakenbyoneseniorUKofficialinIraqas evidence‘theBushadministrationhad‘slowlyandreluctantly’beguntounderstand‘the

41 SaddamHusseinisframedasathreattotheUNinthat,‘themoreheignoredthem,theweakerthe UnitedNationsbecame’(Bush,2004c). 184 legitimisingroleoftheUN’’. 42 However,thisdoesnotyetextendtoUSdetention policies.

2.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity Aninternationalliberaldemocraticsocialidentityisagainnotveryapparentinthe discourseoftheBushadministration.Instead,theemphasisisonissuespecific coalitionsandthespreadoffreedomaroundtheworld;withtheUSAleadingtheworld, yetseparatefromtheconstraintsofanysocialidentityinthissphere.Thisisinacontext wherethereissignificantcriticismregardingthedecisiontoinvadeIraq,particularly fromrepresentativesofEuropeanstates, 43 andincreasingconcernandcontestation aboutUSdetentionpolicies.VariousscholarshavenoteddecliningUSlegitimacyand influence,alongsideagrowthinantiAmericanism,particularlyinEurope,asaresultof theprisonabusescandalsandUSdetentionpolicies(Kagan,2004;Nye,2004;Tucker andHendrickson,2004).Kahl(2007:8)alsohighlightsthe‘widespreadsentimentthat theUnitedStateshasdiscardedtheGenevaConventionsaltogether,includingtheir prohibitionsagainsttargetingcivilians’in20032004. 44 Thestrategiesemployedbythe Bushadministrationinthiscontextareagainreflectiveof separation ,and dominance . Inthediscourseassessed,theBushadministrationclearlycontinuestoassumea leading rolefortheUSAintheworld.Forexample,Busharguesthat‘Americaisstilltheleader infreedom'scause’(2003i),thatAmericaisthe‘beacon’forfreesociety(2004p), spreading‘freedomacrosstheearth’(2004zu),andthat‘Americaisleadingtheworld withconfidenceandmoralclarity’(2004zp).Assuch,theUSAis,toadegree,setapart fromtherestoftheworld.ThePresidentoftenreferstotheUSAascommunicating withtheworld,intermsoflaying‘outthefactsfortheworldtosee’(Bush,2003i), sendinga‘signaltotheworld’throughaction(Bush,2003r),orindeedbeing ‘misunderstood’duetothepicturesofdetaineeabuseatAbuGhraib(2004zk).Scholars haveindeedcommentedonthe‘veryseriousdivide’,basedonbothpolicyanddoctrine

42 AlthoughWoodward(2004:360)reportsthatthiswasnottobetakenastheUNrunningthecountry. Indeed,inhis2006book, State of Denial ,WoodwardalsohighlightsGarner’sdifficultiesgettingthe administrationtoengagemorewiththeUNand‘internationalize’theeffort(2006:135). 43 Theseareoftendismissedassimplyreflectingthe‘ascendencyofpowerinEurope’(Woodward,2004: 346). 44 KahlalsoreferstothePewGlobalAttitudesstudyfromJune2003,where‘morethan90percentof Jordanian,Moroccan,Palestinian,andTurkishrespondentsandmorethan80percentofIndonesianand PakistanirespondentsfeltthattheUnitedStates“didn’ttryveryhard”toavoidIraqiciviliancasualties’ (2007:7).Kahladdsthatthis‘viewwassharedoutsidetheMuslimworldbymorethan70percentof Brazilians,French,Russians,andSouthKoreans’(Kahl,2007:7). 185 that‘separatestheUnitedStatesfromitsclosestfriendsandallies’(Dombrowskiand Payne,2003:400). WhenBushdoesrefertoan‘internationalcommunity’thisappearstobehighly dependentontheimmediateaudience,forexamplewhenholdingajointpress conferencewithTonyBlairinNorthernIreland(2003t),withPrimeMinisterBerlusconi (2004zf),andduringaPresidentialdebatewithJohnKerryin2004(2004zy). 45 Inthe firstreference,withTonyBlair,Bush(2003t)remarksthat: Webelievethatthejustdemandsoftheinternationalcommunitymustbeenforced,notignored.We believethissostronglythatweareactingonourconvictions. Twothingsareinterestingaboutthisstatement,firstitprovidesaveryonedimensional portrayaloftheinternationalcommunitybasedontheirdemandsforIraqtodisarm,and second,itdemonstratesamajorcontradiction.Ontheonehandthereisconsensusinthe internationalcommunity;ontheotherthereisaneedtobe separate andactalone.This supportsthenotionabovethattheUSAis,toadegree,setapartfromanyinternational socialidentities. America’staskisunderstoodasoneofadvancing‘humanfreedominaworldatpeace’ (Bush,2003a).Bush(2003a)argues,thatthis‘isthechargehistoryhasgivenus,and thatisthechargewewillkeep’.Assuch, direction isapparentontheselines.Bush assertsthattheworldmust‘risetothismoment’,to‘keepthepeace’withregardsto Iraq(2003e),and‘cometogether’tosenda‘clearmessage’toIranandSyria(2003zq). Theinterestsoftheworldare defined onthebasisofa‘spreadofdemocraticvalues, becausestableandfreenationsdonotbreedtheideologiesofmurder’(Bush,2003l). BushalsoarguesthatEuropeandAmericainparticularmust‘worktogethertopromote …humanrightsandhumandignityandruleoflawandfreedomandjustice’(2004ze; 2003ze).Whilstsuchwordsdobegintoechotheliberaldemocraticsocialidentity,this isverylimitedinthediscourseassessed.Indeed,associationwiththissocialidentityis

45 Oneotherreferencewasapparentin20032004byPresidentBush,inaradioaddresstothenation (2003zza),however,thisisinthecontextofareferencetotheinternationalcoalition.Thisisbasedonthe speechesandstatementsassessedinthisthesisandmaynotincludeallreferencesinthisperiod.Mention oftheinternationalcommunityishoweverfoundinthediscourseofColinPowell. 186 alsorestrictedduetothelevelofcontestationapparentwithregardstothekeypriorities inthewaronterror. Moreprominentagaininternationallyistheemphasisoncoalitions.Bush(2003za) highlightsthefactthat‘Americaandalargecoalitionofnationsarewagingaglobaland unrelentingwaragainsttheterrorists’.Commoninterestsandcommongoalsareshared amongmembersofthecoalition(Bush,2003zza;Bush,2004zk),thenumbersthis involvesfluctuatedependingonthetimeperiodandthedefinitionofthemission,this rangesfrom30(Bush,2004zw)to84(Bush,2004i).InthiscontextBush(2004b) suggeststherehasbeenanincreaseininternationalcooperationbetween‘likeminded nations’,particularlywithregardstothedetentionofterrorsuspects(Bush,2003zi). AccusationsthattheUSAisgoingalonearedismissed(Bush,2004zw). 46 Bushalsoreferstoa‘communityoffreenations’,suggestiveofabroadlydefined internationalsocialidentityfoundedonthisfundamentalelementofbeingfree.Thefree worldisarguedtohaveanobligationtomakeIraqsuccessful(2004y),andcannot‘be neutralinthefightbetweencivilizationandchaos’(2003zu).Bush(2003y)extends membershipandAmericanfriendshiptoallthosewhowantpeaceandanyone‘who worksandsacrificesforfreedom’.However,thisisjuxtaposedwithacontinuationof divisions ,basedonthe‘principle:eitheryou’rewithus,oryou’rewiththeenemy’ (Bush,2003a);aworldwherethe‘civilizedworld’isagainsttheterrorists(Bush, 2003zu). Thus,thereareavarietyofdynamicsatplaywithregardstointernationalsocial identitiesandtheUSA.Theliberaldemocraticsocialidentityiscertainlynotvery prominent.Theemphasistendstobeoncoalitionsbasedoncounteringterrorism, dealingwithIraq,andestablishingworldpeacebythemeansprivilegedbythe administration. Dominance ishighlyapparentintermsofsuperordinatepriorities,asis adegreeof separation oftheUSAfromanyinternationalsocialidentitypartlythrough anemphasisonleadership.

46 IndeedBushstates,‘[i]tdenigratesanalliancetosaywe'regoingalone,todiscounttheirsacrifices. Youcannotleadanallianceifyousay,you'regoingalone…They'resacrificingwithus’(Bush,2004zw). Inaddition,Wehner(2008)citesmultilateraleffortsinrelationtoLibya’sabandonmentofitschemical andnuclearweaponsprogrammesinoppositiontoaccusationthattheUSAisgoingitalone. 187 3. Phase 3 - The Unravelling of Contestation? 2005-2006 ‘The men and women who protect us should not have to fear lawsuits filed by terrorists because they're doing their jobs’ (Bush, 2006zt)

3.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity CriticismfromhumanrightsgroupssuchasAIandHRWwasagainhighlyevidentin 20052006.TherewerecontinuedcallsfortheclosureofGuantánamoBay,highlighting theplightofchildprisoners(e.g.AI2006b), 47 aswellasthesuicideattempts(e.g.AI 2006c)andhungerstrikes(e.g.AI,2006d)takingplaceatthedetentionfacility.AI arguedthat‘thisprisonisadisgracetoAmericanvaluesandinternationallaw’(Khan, 2005a).Additionalreportsandtestimonywerealsoprovidedbybothorganisationson theUSpracticeofrendition(e.g.AI,2006e), 48 andtheunfairtrialsproposedthrough theuseofmilitarycommissions(e.g.HRW,2006a). AIandHRWhavehighlightedtheseconcernsalongsidethepublicationoftestimony fromprisoners,aswellasfromUSsoldierswhohavewitnessedorbeencaughtupin theabuseofdetainees(e.g.AI,2005i;HRW,2006b).Again,bothorganisationshave calledfortheprosecutionofthoseinvolvedintortureandabusemuchfurtherupthe chainofcommandthanhasbeenthecasetodate.ForHRWthisstretchesasfaras DonaldRumsfeld(HRW,2006c),GeorgeTenet(HRW,2005d)andPresidentBush (HRW,2005e).TheBushadministrationhasagainrespondedwith denials , dismissals andtrivialisationoftheseaccusations,aswellas challenging suchcriticismsby suggestingtheyservetheinterestsoftheterrorists. 49 Themainstrategyis dominance , supportedbyelementsof compartmentalisation and intersection representation . ThepublicdialoguebetweentheBushadministrationandthehumanrightsand humanitariansocialgroupiscertainlyverytensein20052006. 50 TheBush administrationhasrespondedtoallegationsoftortureandabusewithforceful denials . SecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRice(2005a),whenpressedonthespecificsoftheCIA

47 Aswellasthechildren of prisoners. 48 OneprominentexampleisthetestimonyofMaherArar,aCanadiancitizenwhowasintransitinNew YorkwhenhewasdetainedandsenttoJordanthenSyria.Hewasreportedlytortured(LaHoodfor,2005). 49 Thisisaccompaniedbyagreatdealofabsolutism.Interestingly,Woodward(2006:406)notesthat Bushwasadvisedtobelesspigheadedregardinghiscritics. 50 WhilstthediscourseoftheBushadministrationdoesnotspecificallyaddressthissocialgroupvery frequently,membersspeaktotheconcernsthatthehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgrouphave highlighted,oftenthroughjournalists.Thisprovidesthebasisformyassertions.Criticismsthatabuseis ‘SystematicandChronic’(HRW,2005f),andthatthegovernmenthasbeen‘creating[a]"climateof torture"’(AI,2006e)areparticularlydamning. 188 renditionflightsinaSkyNewsinterviewwithJulieEtchingham,employsidentity baseddenials,stating: Weareacountryoflawsandwedonotbelieveintortureasappropriateintheinternationalsystem. Rice(2005b)alsostressesUSobligationsunderdomesticlawandinternational conventions,which‘extendtoU.S.personnelwherevertheyare’.PorterGoss(headof theCIAJune2004May2006)hasalsomadecommentsalongsimilarlines,stating: Thisagencydoesnotdotorture.Torturedoesnotwork.Weuselawfulcapabilitiestocollectvital information,andwedoitinavarietyofuniqueandinnovativeways,allofwhicharelegalandnoneof whicharetorture(citedinDiamond,2005). Gossalludestothe‘hugeamountofmisinformationswirlingaboutonthesubjectof detainees’(Diamond,2005).HRWhoweverarequicktopointtotheexistenceof severalcontraryreportsbyCIAofficials(HRW,2005d). 51 Bush(2006zt)employsasimilartacticnotingthe‘conflictinginformationabout Guantánamo’thathasbeenpresentedtothepublic,andstressesthatICRChasthe ‘opportunitytomeetprivatelywith all whoareheldthere’( emphasis added ), 52 and thatthefacilityhasreceivedvisitsfrom‘governmentofficialsfrommorethan30 countries,anddelegationsfrominternationalorganizations’.Busharguesthat Guantánamodoesliveuptotheobligationsof‘thosewhoespousehumanrights’,that thereare‘veryfewprisonsystemsaroundtheworldthathaveseensuchscrutiny’,and heinvitescriticstovisitthefacilitytoseeforthemselves(2005ze;2005zi). GuantánamoisportrayedasafacilityUStroopsandtheAmericanpeoplecantakepride in,onewhichisvitalinthe context ofthewaronterror,keepingdangerouspeopleoff thebattlefield,andwheredetaineesaretreatedhumanely(Bush,2005ze;Bush,2006d). Bush(2006zt)also displaces someofthecriticismarguingthat‘Americahasnointerest inbeingtheworld'sjailer’,however,‘manycountrieshaverefusedtotakebacktheir nationalsheldatthefacility’.Whilstcontextismentionedasajustificationfor Guantánamo(suggestingadegreeof compartmentalisation ),andthereissome 51 GossisalsoreportedtohaverefusedtodiscussreportsofsecretdetentioncentresinEasternEurope suggestingthatthesesortsofstorieshavethecapacitytoprovoketerrorattacksasactsofrevenge, particularlyagainstalliesthatareaccusedofbeinginvolvedincaptureandinterrogation(Diamond, 2005). 52 Thisisinacontextwhere,in2005,JohnBellingeradmittedkeepingsomeprisonersawayfromthe ICRCinotherlocations(BBC,2005b). 189 displacement ofresponsibility,thepredominantfocusison denials thattheBush administrationisactinginappropriately.Thisstandsinstarkcontrasttothereportsand headlinescomingoutofbothAIandHRW. PresidentBushis dismissive oftheseaccusations,particularlytheassertionbyIrene Khan(2005b),SecretaryGeneralofAI,thatGuantánamois‘thegulagofourtimes’. ThePresidentreferredtosuchallegationsas‘absurd’,stressingthat‘everysingle complaintagainstthedetainees’isinvestigated(2005za).PresidentBush(2005zz)also rejectsreportsthatsuggesttheUSAhasbeencomplicitintorture,evenwithregardsto accusationsofusingsecretprisonsinEurope. 53 Furthermore,hesuggeststhat: Itseemedliketometheybasedsomeoftheirdecisionsonthewordof–andtheallegations–bypeople whowereheldindetention,peoplewhohateAmerica,peoplethathadbeentrainedinsomeinstancesto disassemble–thatmeansnottellthetruth.Andsoitwasanabsurdreport.Itjustis(Bush,2005za). Throughassociationwithterroriststhissocialidentityissignificantly challenged .54 As EdmundMcWilliams(2005),RetiredSeniorUSForeignServiceOfficer,suggests,such forcefuldismissalanddisparagingresponsesveryrarelycomefromtheleadersof democraticstates,especiallythoseclaimingtobeattheforefrontofhumanrights promotion,aswellasleadingthecampaignagainsttheuseoftorture.TheBush administrationhasgonesofarastoimplythataccusationsofhumanrightsviolations arepartoftheterroriststrategy(e.g.intheabovequote,seealsoGoldsmith,2007:59). Whilstthismaybetrueinsomecases,thisdoesnotchangetheevidenceofabuse,the memosredefiningtorture,andtheBushadministration’slegalwranglestorenderthe GenevaConventionsnonapplicableto‘enemycombatants’(alsoseeRoberts,2007: 200).Indeed,asIreneKhan(2005c),SecretaryGeneralofAIhasstated: PresidentBush'sclaimthatprisonersatGuantánamoBay"arebeingtreatedinaccordancewiththe GenevaConvention"isbeliedbyhisownExecutiveOrderofFebruary7,2002inwhichheorderedsuch treatment"totheextentappropriateandconsistentwithmilitarynecessity."Theenormousloopholehe

53 Directreferenceisagainmadetothehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroupin2006,wherethe PresidentrespondstoaquestionreferringtothecriticalreportsofAIandHRW,regardingthe‘U.S. handlingofterroristsuspects’;thePresidentstates,‘Ihaven'tseenthereport,butifthey'resayingwe torturedpeople,they'rewrong.Period’(Bush,2006r). 54 Interestingly,thePresidentneglectstomentionwhotheallegationswouldcomefromifnotthosewho sufferedtheabuse,hencepeoplewhoreportedly‘hateAmerica’,asisstatedintheabovequote.Thus,any suchcriticismappearstoputtheaccuser,inlinewithterrorists. 190 authorizedgaveagreenlightforabuse,fromtheuseofstresspositionsforuptotwentyhour[s]…to prolongedisolation,theuseofdogsandsexualhumiliation.55 GiventheadmissionthatKhalidSheikhMohammedwaswaterboarded,atechnique employedthreetimesinthe20012003period,thereislittlesurpriseBush’s reassurancesthat‘[t]heseproceduresweredesignedtobesafe,tocomplywithourlaws, ourConstitution,andourtreatyobligations’werenotacceptedbythehumanrightsand humanitariansocialgroup. Nevertheless,Bush(2006zt)goesontostressthelawfulnessoftheCIAprogram employing‘alternative’interrogationtechniques,thenecessityofandsuccessesfrom theprogramintermsofintelligencegainedandthattheprogramremains‘oneofthe mostvitaltoolsinourwaragainsttheterrorists’.Suchargumentsarepresentedinaway thatsuggeststherightoftheUSAtopursuesuchpracticesshouldbeobvioustoall (Foot,2006).HRW’sresponsetoBush’sargumentswastodemandcrueltybecalled whatitis(Malinowski,2006),andhighlightthefactualinaccuraciesthathaveresulted fromtheCIAprogram. 56 InresponsetotheseandotheraccusationstheBushadministrationhas dismissed these claimsashelpfultoterrorists,inaccurateandfalseevenwherethereisevidencetothe contrary.IndoingsotheBushadministration’sassociationwiththehumanrightsand humanitariansocialidentity,isextremelystrainedanddistant. Intersection representation isapparenttoadegree,drawingthesocialidentityslightlycloser.For example,BushstressestheUSA’shistoryofspeakingoutfor‘humanrightsandhuman dignity’andthattheywillcontinuetodoso(2005c),thattheUSAisacountry‘that safeguardshumanrightsandhumandignity’(2005j),andthathumanrights‘arenot determinedbyraceornationality,ordiminishedbydistance(2005zh).However,the strongemphasison denials restrictsthisasitisanextremelyconfrontationalwayto interactwiththissocialgroup. 3.2 The Legal Social Identity Contestationswiththelegalsocialgroupalsocontinuein20052006withtheSupreme Courtrulingin Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006).Thisrulingisgenerallyseenasacritical

55 KhangoesontociteRumsfeld’sapprovalofunlawfultechniquesinDecember2002. 56 Onepieceofinformation,‘whichturnedouttobeentirelywrong–wasusedinSecretaryofStateColin Powell’sspeechtotheUnitedNationstojustifywarwithIraq’(Malinowski,2006). 191 turningpointintheadministration’scounterterrorismdetentionpoliciesasthecourt struckdownthesystemofmilitarycommissionsauthorizedbyPresidentBushin November2001,largelybecausetheylackedcongressionalapprovalanddidnot complywiththeUSmilitary’s Uniform Code of Military Justice ortheGeneva Conventions’CommonArticle3(Roberts,2007).Themilitarycommissionswere deemedtofallshortoffairtrialstandards.Additionally,theSupremeCourtruledthat CommonArticle3appliedtothearmedconflictwithalQaeda.Thus,theCourthad ruledthatalldetainees,regardlessofthepresidentialdeterminationofstatus,mustbe treatedhumanelyinallcircumstance.Thishadimplicationsbeyondthemilitary commissionsthatwerethefocusofthecase,andputtheadministration’sCIA interrogationprogramontheline.Thesefactorsforcedtheadministrationtoreveal manyofthepracticespreviouslykeptsecret,inordertoseekcongressionalapprovalas theCourt’srulingdemanded.TheBushadministration’sresponseagainemploysthe strategiesof dominance , compartmentalisation and intersection representation . Aswiththepreviousperiods,theidentitythat‘we’reanationoflaw’(Bush,2005zzb), andthat‘anyactivityweconduct,iswithinthelaw’(Bush,2005zz)isstressed.Law andlegalityarecontinually bolstered ascentraltotheUSidentity.ThePresident remindstheaudienceonseveraloccasionsthathehastaken‘anoathtoupholdthe ConstitutionandthelawsoftheUnitedStates’(2006i;2005zzg),thus intersection representation isevidenttoadegree. Theoverallperspectiveis,however,verymuchoneofpolicydrivinglawasopposedto lawdrivingpolicy,suggestinga dominant and directing approachtothissocial identity.Lawhasgottofitwiththedemandsoffightingaglobalwaronterror,ifnotit isdeemedtobeahindrance.Forexample,whentheCIAprogramofinterrogationof ‘highvalue’detaineeswasdealtaseriousblowbytheSupremeCourtin Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ,theBushadministration’sresponsewastohighlightthevalueofthis program, 57 andthatthepersonnelinvolvedwouldnotbeabletoproceediftheythought theywereviolatingthelaw.Thisisasopposedtorecognisinganybasisforthese restrictiveprotections.TheBushadministrationfocusesonthe‘vagueness’ofCommon Article3tomakethisargument.Thebasisoftheargumentisthatthese‘alternative’ 57 AsBush(2006zx)states,the‘mostpotenttoolwehaveinprotectingAmericaandfoilingterrorist attacks,…istheCIAprogramtoquestiontheworld’smostdangerousterroristsandtogettheirsecrets’. Thedebatesurroundingthisprogramisconstructedasone‘thatreallyisgoingtodefinewhetherornot wecanprotectourselves’(Bush,2006zv).Law,couldtherefore,standinthewayofnationalsecurityand thefightagainstterror. 192 ‘tough’interrogationtechniquesareneeded,andifthelawisdeemedtohavebeen brokeninthisrespect,itisthelaw’sfault,notthepersonnelorthepolicy.TheBush administrationsetouttoattackthe‘vaguestandards’(Bush,2006zv),providing clarificationthroughthe Detainee Treatment Act 2005,andthe Military Commissions Act 2006.TheSupremeCourtis blamed forintroducingthislackofclarity. TheGenevaConventionswerealsoportrayedasahindrancedirectlyonthebattlefield. InhistestimonybeforetheSenateJudiciaryCommittee,AttorneyGeneralGonzales statedthat‘noonecanexpectmembersofourmilitarytoreadMirandawarningsto terroristscapturedonthebattlefield,orprovideterroristsonthebattlefieldimmediate accesstocounsel,ormaintainastrictchainofcustodyforevidence.Norshouldterrorist trialscompromisesourcesandmethodsforgatheringintelligence,orprohibitthe admissionofprobativehearsayevidence’(citedinHRW,2006a). 58 Theselawsare portrayedasharmful,andcounternormativebehaviourisdeniedinthis context , suggestingadegreeof compartmentalisation isalsoapparent. InadditiontobeingahindrancetoUSstrategy,lawisalsocharacterisedbytheBush administrationasa‘weapon’ofthe‘enemy’.Thisthemeisapparentin The National Defense Strategy (DepartmentofDefense,2005:6),wherethereisapassagedescribing thechallengeposed‘bythosewhoemployastrategyoftheweakusinginternational fora,judicialprocesses,andterrorism’.Rumsfeldisreportedtohavebeenparticularly concernedwith‘lawfare’and‘thejudicializationofinternationalpolitics’fromtheearly daysoftheadministration(Goldmith,2007:59). 59 PresidentBushalsocharacteriseslaw asaweaponoftheterrorists,significantly challenging thissocialidentitybystating: I'maskingthatCongressmakeitclearthatcapturedterroristscannotusetheGenevaConventionsasa basistosueourpersonnelincourts–inU.S.courts.Themenandwomenwhoprotectusshouldnothave tofearlawsuitsfiledbyterroristsbecausethey'redoingtheirjobs(Bush,2006zt).

58 Gonzalezhimselfcameundercriticisminthisperiod.HRWcitealetteraddressedtoGonzalezfrom ‘morethan100U.S.lawprofessors’which‘statedunequivocallythatistorture,andisa criminalfelonypunishableundertheU.S.federalcriminalcode’(HRW,2006d). 59 ‘Lawfare’referstoenemytacticstocriticisetheUSforlegalviolationsastheyareunabletomatchthe USmilitarily.OneexamplenotedbyGoldsmithisenemiesclaimingtheyhavebeentortured,damaging USidentityandsupport.Thiswasmentionedintheprevioussectiononthehumanrightsand humanitariansocialgroup.Woodward(2006:486)alsonotesRumsfeld’sfrustrationswiththerestrictions andofParliamentsandbureaucracy.RumsfeldisreportedtohaveviewedEurope‘andthehumanrights industrythatsupportedtheiruniversaljurisdictionaspirations’asemployingaformoflawfaretoserveas acheckonU.S.power(Goldsmith,2007:59).Thisperspectivesurfacedinthe NDS 2005. 193 Bush(2006zl)alsoemphasisestheprotectionofthepublic,andassertsthat‘[t]he Americanpeopleneedtoknowthatthisruling,asIunderstandit,won'tcausekillersto beputoutonthestreet’. TheSupremeCourtrulingin Hamdan v. Rumsfeld certainly‘impaired’theBush administration’s‘abilitytoprosecuteterroriststhroughmilitarycommissions,and… putinquestionthefutureoftheCIAprogram’(Bush,2006zt). 60 However,theCourt alsodeclinedtohearthecaseofJosePadilla.Thisdecisionservedtoupholdthe‘Bush administration’sassertionthatitcanunilaterallyandindefinitelydetainwithoutcharge anyone,anywhere,onthegroundsthattheyarean“enemycombatant”’(HRW,2006f). Bush(2006zn),indeed,citesthecourtrulingasupholdingthe‘decisionaboutcreating Guantánamointhefirstplace’oratleast,thatthey‘weresilentonit’istakenas support.TheBushadministration,furthermore,appearstohavebeenabletocircumvent manyoftheissuesraisedin Hamdan throughfurtherlegislation.Thus,thescopeofthe legalchallenge,whilsthighlysignificant,hasbeenfairlynarrow. TheBushadministrationwasforcedtoputmanyoftheirdetentionpoliciesona strongerlegalfootingin20052006,andthisisexactlywhattheydid.Lawisasocial identitythatisfundamentaltotheUS,yetinthecurrentcontextthereappearstobea degreeofmistrust,viewinglawasahindrancetotheadministration’spolicies,andasa toolofterrorists.Centralityistakentobeaweakness.Thus,intermsofmanagement, thisisverymuchbasedon dominance ,withinthesuperordinateframeworkofthewar onterror,supportedby compartmentalisation and intersection representation . 3.3 The Military Social Identity 20052006seesmoreinstancesofmembersoftheUSmilitaryspeakingoutagainstthe policiesoftheBushadministrationbothininvadingIraq,andtheirpoliciesfor detention.Forexample,organisationssuchas Iraq Veterans against the War (founded inJuly2004), 61 and Veterans against Torture (2005)weregaininginprofile.In2006

60 JohnYoo(2006)alsoexpressedsignificantconcernthatBush’s‘wartimejudgement’,withCongress’ support,wasbeingreplacedwiththe‘speculation’offivemembersoftheUSSupremeCourt.Yoo criticisestheCourtforviewingmilitarycommissionsinthesameframeworkascriminaljusticecourts. Thesubsequent Military Commissions Act of2006isheraldedbyBush(2006zzb)as‘oneofthemost importantpiecesoflegislationinthewaronterror’. 61 Thisorganisationaimstogiveavoiceandsolidaritytothoseservicepersonnelwhoareagainstthewar foravarietyofreasons,includingtheillegalityofthewar,civiliancasualties,thedehumanizationof Iraqis,andtheoverstretchthewarhascausedinthemilitary.Morerecently,in2008,thisorganisation wasinvolvedinthefourday‘WinterSoldier’event,whichalsohappenedafterVietnam.Thisevent 194 HRWpublishedareport,‘ No Blood, No Foul ’,detailingthefirsthandaccountsof soldierswhohadseenabuseinIraq(HRW,2006b).Soldiershadspokenouttoshow howsystemicdetaineeabusewas,andtheproblemsinherentinrenderingtheGeneva Conventionsnonapplicable. 62 Certainly,opinionswithinthemilitaryvary.However, thereisevidenceofagreaternumberofpersonnelspeakingoutagainsttheBush administration’spolicies,withmanyleavingtheArmy(Shanker,2006a).Oneofthe fiercestcriticismscamefromLieutenantGeneralGregNewboldwhoalleged,in Time Magazine ,that‘thecommitmentofourforcestothisfightwasdonewithacasualness andswaggerthatarethespecialprovinceofthosewhohaveneverhadtoexecutethose missions–orburytheresults’(Newbold,2006). Indeed,inApril2006,therewererepeatedcallsfromretiredGeneralsforthe resignationofDonaldRumsfeld. 63 GeneralZinni(2006:228)highlights‘poor intelligence,lackofplanning,faultypoliticalmotivation,incompetentorinexperienced peopleplacedinkeypositions,flawedassumptions,lackofunderstandingoftheIraqi culture,arrogance,spin,andthelistgoesonandon’.AsHasian(2007:696)notes, whilst‘therearemanytimeswhenpresidentsandtheirsubordinatescansummarily dismiss,trivialize,domesticate,orotherwiseignorethosewhodisagreewiththeir policies…eventhestrongestofunitaryexecutiveshastolisten…whendisgruntled soldiersgaintheattentionofbroaderAmericanpublic’. 20052006alsoseesthepublicationofthe US Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation issuedbythePentagon.Themanualrulesthat‘tortureandcruel, inhumaneanddegradingtreatmentisneveramorallypermissibleoption,evenin situationswherelivesdependongaininginformation’(citedinDaskal,2006). Furthermore,themanualrecognisesthatabuseleadstoalossof‘morallegitimacy’, losingthisisacknowledgedtobedetrimentaltosuccessinwar. 64 Themanualexplicitly

enabledservicepersonneltodiscusstheirexperiencesandtherealityofthewaronthegroundinIraq. Indeed,thesegroupshavegainedmuchmorepressattentionin20072008. 62 Indeed,theJAGinvolvementin Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ,directlychallengingtheadministration’suseof militarycommissions,wassubstantial.AsLieutenantCommanderCharlesSwiftnotes,‘mostcountries, whenamilitaryofficeropenlyopposesthepresident,itiscalledacoup.IntheUnitedStates,itiscalled Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ’(Swift,2007). 63 Thisisdocumentedinaseriesof New York Times articlese.g.Janofsky(2006);Shanker(2006b); CloudandSchmitt(2006);Cloud,SchmittandShanker(2006).Hasian(2007:702)suggeststhat Rumsfeldprovidedasourceofcriticismforthemilitarythatwouldavoiddirectlyembarrassingthe President. 64 Woodward(2006:410;469)highlightssuchmovementsinmilitarythinking.Furthermore,Major GeneralChiarelliandMajorMichaelis(2005)identifythedifferentroledemandedofthemilitaryinIraq, 195 prohibitstheuseofwaterboarding.AsLieutenantGeneralJohnKimmons,Army DeputyChiefofStaffforIntelligence,statedinresponsetothepublicationofthis manual: Nogoodintelligenceisgoingtocomefromabusivepractices.Ithinkhistorytellsusthat.Ithinkthe empiricalevidenceofthelastfiveyears,hardyears,tellusthat(Kimmons,2006). Furthermore,withspecificreferencetotheGenevaConventionsandtheBush administration’spolicyonthis,formerJudgeAdvocateGeneraloftheNavy,Rear AdmiralJohnHutsonhasstated‘Idon’tthinkwecanwinthewarunlesswelivewithin CommonArticle3’(citedinHRW,2006a).Counterinsurgencydoctrinehasalso developedinthisperiod,identifyingsimilarthemes,andnotingthesubstantialamount oftroopsrequiredforsuchmissions,indirectchallengetoRumsfeld’spreviousaimof troopreduction(Gordon,20062007). 65 TheBushadministration’sstrategyinthisperiodseemstofluctuatebetween intersection representation and dominance .Theincreasedchallengefrommembers ofthisgroup,alackofsuccessontheground,andrepeatedmediaquestionsregarding trooplevelsandstrategy,seemtohaverenderedadominant approachlessfeasibleand intersection representation isevermoreapparentinthiscontext.Bush(2006zzc)is keentoemphasisethatheislisteningandtalkingwiththeUSGeneralsinIraq‘allthe time’. 66 BushexpresseshisconfidenceinGeneralCasey,andthetroopnumbersthe Generalsuggests(2005zzf;2006y).

involvingmorehumanitariantasks.Theauthorsalsonotethelimitsofmilitarypower,inanarticlefor MilitaryReview. 65 TheHaditha‘incident’alsoemergesinthisperiodwithaccusationsofamassacreof24Iraqimen, women,andchildren(Asser,2008).Whilstthedetailsofthedeathsarecontestedtheydidleadtothere trainingofpersonnelinthecorevaluesofthemilitary. 66 AlthoughWoodwardpointsoutthatthisisoften‘sugarcoatedinformation’(2006:477).Criticalviews fromthemilitarydidnotapparentlygetthrough(Shanker,2006b;Woodward,2006:400),andmilitary adviceonnotreportingbodycountswascertainlydiscarded(2006:483).Woodwardhighlightsthelack ofindependentmilitaryadvicebeingsoughtbytheBushadministration(2006:404,470),andgoesonto suggestthatthisledto‘groupthink’(2006:454).WhilstthislargelypresentsapictureoftheBush administrationexcludingmilitaryviewpoints,WoodwardalsocitesAndrewCard’s(thenWhiteHouse ChiefofStaff)suggestionsthathadtheGeneral’ssaidmoreBushwouldhavelistened(2006:455456). Indeed,inresponsetoaccusationsthatcriticalmilitaryadvicewasstifledRumsfeldsuggeststhatthe issuesemerginginthepublicwereneverraisedwithhim.ADefenseDepartmentmemowascirculatedto thiseffect,‘stat[ing]thatseniormilitaryleaderswereinvolvedineverydecisionmakingprocess,and RumsfeldwassaidtohavemethundredsoftimeswiththeJointChiefsofStaffandmanyseniorfield commanders’(Hasian,2007:709).Rumsfeld,alsoportraysasetofcircumstancesmorecomplexthan thosedepictedbytheGeneralswhohadspokenout(Rumsfeld,2006). 196 ThereisaclearbenefitfortheBushadministrationintakingastepbackfromapublic strategyof dominance ,tofocuson intersection representation wherethereisgreater roomforinfluencefromthissocialgroup;thisrenderstheadministration’sdecisions morecredibleinthecircumstances.Theadministrationalsofocusesonthehonourthe troopshaveearned,speakingtomilitarynorms.Whendiscussinghisinteractionswith militaryfamilies,Bushusesthisnotionofhonourtostrengthentheadministration’s positionregardingIraq.Hestates: OneopinionI'vecomeawaywithuniversallyisthat,youknow,weshoulddoeverythingwecantohonor thefallen.Andonewaytohonorthefallenistolaythefoundationforpeace(Bush,2005zm). TheneedforacontinuingpresenceinIraqispartiallybasedonthehonourofthosewho havedied,tomakesure‘thesacrificehasbeenworthit’(Bush,2006zzh). 67 Thereis quiteabitofcontestationoverthispointin20052006,particularlyduetotheprotests ofCindySheehan,whosesondiedinIraq,callingforthetroopstobebroughthome, andrejectingthepresident’suseoffallensoldiers,likeherson,tojustifycontinuingUS presenceinIraq.Bushdealswiththiscriticismbysuggestingherviewsarenot representative,thatforcewasusedasalastoption, 68 andthatthemissioninIraqis‘vital toAmerica’ssecurity’(2005zo;2006zzc;2006zzh).Supportformilitaryfamiliesmore generally,isagainastrongthemeinthediscourseoftheBushadministration(e.g. Bush,2005b;2005zm;2005zx).69 ThegravityoftheUSmilitary’sroleinthe‘landmarkeventsinthehistoryofliberty’is frequentlypraisedbytheBushadministration(Bush,2005b).Inacontextwherethe purposeofthetroopsinIraqhasbeenbroughtintoquestioninvariousforums(e.g. media,politicalandacademic),forexample,therearemanyaccusationsofalackof strategy,orindeedthat‘politicians[are]pretendingthatpolicyisstrategy’(Strachen, 2006:61),thisemphasisfacilitatesthedrawinginofthissocialidentitytoasuper ordinateframeworkbasedonfightingthewaronterrorforamorepeacefulworld.Ina speechtothegraduatingmidshipmenattheUSNavalCollege,Bush(2005z) determinedthatthosegraduatingwere‘nowpartofthegreatestforceforfreedominthe

67 InhisvisitstomilitaryhospitalsBushencountersthosewiththeopinionthatthewarinIraqwasnot worthit(Woodward,2006:437;438). 68 Riceandothershavesupportedthisnotionthatforcewasusedonlyasalastresort(Woodward,2006: 396). 69 CynthiaEnloegaveafascinatingassessmentoftheimportanceofmilitaryfamiliesandgirlfriends,and theirtargetingbytheBushAdministrationinaplenarylectureatBISA2007,Cambridge. 197 historyoftheworld–theArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates’.Inthiscontext,thetroops areagainhighlypoliticisedascriticismofthewarinIraqisframedascriticismofthe troops(Woodward,2006:423;490). Anincreaseincriticismhasrendereda dominance strategyhardertoachieveonits own,thusgreater intersection representation isapparentin20052006.Thisis accompaniedbypositivemessagesaboutthe‘clear’strategythatis‘working’(Bush, 2005z)andthat‘retentionishigh,recruitmentismeetinggoals,andpeoplearefeeling strongaboutthemission’;thereforetheUSmilitaryisingoodshape(Bush,2006g). Althoughthefactthattheadministrationwaslookingtoattemptto‘increasethe permanentsizeofboththeUnitedStatesArmyandtheUnitedStatesMarines’suggests thisonlyrevealshalfastory(Bush,2006zzh). 3.4 The United Nations Social Identity InteractionswiththeUNin20052006areagainquiteconfrontational.SeveralUN reports,suchasthejointreportonthe‘SituationofDetaineesatGuantánamoBay’, (UN,2006a)cameoutagainsttheBushadministration’sdetentionpolicies.The administrationalsocameunderparticularlystrongcriticismfromtheUNCommittee againstTorture.WhilstpraisewasgiventotheUSAincertainareasintheirprogressto combattorture,inotherstheywerefoundtofallfarshort.Forexample,theCommittee callsfortheUSAto: ceasetodetainanypersonatGuantánamoBayandclosethisdetentionfacility,permitaccessbythe detaineestojudicialprocessorreleasethemassoonaspossible,ensuringthattheyarenotreturnedtoany Statewheretheycouldfacearealriskofbeingtortured(UN,2006b:6). TheUNHumanRightsCommittee,inJulyof2006,alsoreleasedacriticalassessment oftheUSgovernment’shumanrightsrecord,bothathomeandabroad(HRW,2006e). ThecommitteecalledontheBushadministrationtoprovidetheopportunityforthose heldatGuantánamotochallengethelawfulnessoftheirdetention,toholdallthose responsibleforabusesaccountable,andtoendtheuseofsecretprisons.Further criticismwasaimedattheinterrogationtechniquesemployedbytheUSA,suchas stressandduress,whichtheyhadnotrecognisedascruel,inhumananddegrading. ManyoftheseconcernsarealsoechoedinastatementbyMartinScheinin,theSpecial Rapporteuronthepromotionofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedomswhile 198 counteringterrorism.Scheinin(2006)expressesuneaseabouta‘numberofprovisions oftheMCA[ Military Commissions Act ]’which‘appeartocontradicttheuniversaland fundamentalprinciplesoffairtrialstandardsanddueprocessenshrinedinCommon Article3oftheGenevaConventions’.Thisisinadditionto: theprotectionofhumanrightsinthecontextofcounteringterrorismsuchasthePatriotAct,immigration lawsandpolicies,CIAsecretdetentioncenters,renditionflights,breachesofnonrefoulementandthe Government'sdenialofextraterritorialhumanrightsobligations. Thus,thedetentionpoliciesoftheBushadministrationhavebeenbroughtunder significantscrutinybytheUNin20052006. 70 Thesecriticismsaremetwithstrong denials and dismissals ,asweresimilarconcernsraisedbythehumanrightsand humanitariansocialgroup.Forexample,whenU.N.HighCommissionerforHuman Rights,LouiseArbour(2005),statedonHumanRightsDaythat: Theabsolutebanontorture,acornerstoneoftheinternationalhumanrightsedifice,isunderattack.The principleoncebelievedtobeunassailable–theinherentrighttophysicalintegrityanddignityofthe person–isbecomingacasualtyofthesocalled"waronterror", theUSAmbassadortotheUNJohnBoltonisreportedtohaverespondedthatitwas ‘inappropriateandillegitimateforaninternationalcivilservanttosecondguessthe conductthatwe’reengagedin[in]thewaronterror,withnothingmoreasevidencethan whatshereadsinthenewspapers’(HRW,2005g).Thisreflectsthetoneofresponsethat wasaimedatthehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroupatthebeginningofthis sectionon20052006,whereaccusationswereboth denied and dismissed . WithparticularreferencetotheUN,thisisaperiodwheretheHumanRights Commissionwasseverelydiscredited(anassessmentsharedbySecretaryGeneralKofi Annan),andreplacedbytheHumanRightsCouncilwhichwasalsotosufferproblems (HRW,2006f).AccusationsofcorruptionattheUNwerealsorife,andUNreformwas verymuchontheagenda.Inthiscontext,thestrategyof dominance canperhapsbe moreeasilysoughtdespitetheabovecriticisms.

70 ThelackofaccesstodetentionfacilitiesgrantedtoUNexpertsisalsohighlightedbyAIandHRW(AI, 2005j;HRW,2005h). 199 TheBush(2005zr)administration(asreflectedinthediscourseofBushinparticular) focuseson defining theoverarchingmissionoftheUN.The direction stressedisbased onthe‘calling’to‘advance…freedomandsecurity’.Bush(2005zr)goesontoargue that‘theworldneedstheUnitedNationstoliveuptoitsidealsandfulfilitsmission’, demonstratingelementsof intersection representation , bolstering thissocialidentity tosupportthedominantapproach.However,Bush(2006zv)goesfurtherandquestions thecommitmentoftheUNayearlater,stating: IhopetheUnitedNationsstillstronglystandsforliberty.Ihopetheywouldsupportmycalltoend tyrannyinthe21stcentury. TheUSAisplacedinaleadershipposition,ignoringthepreviousreports,andinstead focusesontheoverarchingquestforfreedomandliberty.Frustrationsarehighly apparentinthediscourseinthisregard,particularlywiththeperceivedlackof commitmentoftheUNtothecoremissionoftheBushadministration.Bush(2006zc) assertshisvisionfortheUNasonethatis: effective,onethatjoinsusintryingtoridtheworldoftyranny,onethatiswillingtoadvancehuman rightsandhumandignityatitscore,onethat'sanunabashedorganization–isunabashedintheirdesireto spreadfreedom. Bushsupportssucha directing stanceandemphasisonreformbyalludingtothelack oftrustthathasdevelopedregardingtheUNintheUSpublic. 71 Thisisgivenasa reasonwhyJohnBoltonwasdeemedtobesuchagoodcandidateforUNambassador. Bush(2005za)statesthat: Wepayover$2billionayearintotheUnitedNations,anditmakessensetohavesomebodytherewho's willingtosaytotheUnitedNations,let's–whydon'tyoureform?Let'smakesurethatthebodyworks wellandthere'saccountabilityandtaxpayers'moneyisspentwisely. AstheUNis defined insuchfluidtermsthe dominant strategywouldseemeasierto achieve.Furthermore,suchanapproachservestonegatethenegativeimpactof criticismsfromthissocialgroup.Therearehintsat intersection representation , focusingonthatwhichtheUSAandUNshare,however,theprimarystrategyisoneof dominance . 71 Oneinterestingcommentwasasfollows,‘someofyouwereprobablyconcernedhereinKentuckythat itseemedlikethePresidentwasspendingalittletoomuchtimeintheUnitedNations’(Bush,2006c). 200 3.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity In20052006perceptionsofUSmoralauthoritycontinuetobenegativelyaffectedby theircounterterrorismdetentionpolicies(Foot,2006),andthemeansbywhichthey canvalidatealiberaldemocraticsocialidentityarehighlylimited.Indeed,asBetts (2005:1)argues,‘muchoftheworldseemsexasperatedbyAmericanforeignpolicy’.In thisclimate,theBushadministrationlargelyemploysa dominance strategy,whichat timesissupportedby intersection representation . PresidentBushagaindiscusseswhattheworldisdoingandmustdo( directing ).Thisis generallyintermsofspeakingwithonevoiceonsecurityissues,suchasdifficulties withSaddamHussein(2005i;2005l)andKimJongilofNorthKorea(2006zn). BeginninginSeptemberof2005though,Bushstartstorefertotheinternational communitymore,forexampleindiscourseconcerningtheinternationalcommunity’s demandsofSyria(2005zza),theirresponsibilitiesinIraq(2006b),their‘working togethertohelpAfghanistan'syoungdemocracysucceed’(2006j),theneedforthe internationalcommunitytobefirmwithHamas(2006l)andspeakwith‘onevoiceto theradicalregimeinTehran’(2006l).Theimportanceofhavingothersinthe internationalcommunity(ortheworld–Bushcontinuestousebothterms)‘sendthe samemessage’isfrequentlystated(Bush,2006zza). Accompanyingthismoremultilateralrhetoricisacontinuationofemphasison leading theworldinthedirectionoffreedom,heading‘towardanidealworld’(Bush,2005c), andseeking‘theendoftyrannyinourworld’(Bush,2006h).This dominance approach isunderpinnedbystrongnotionsofuniversalism.Forexample,‘universalvaluesand universalideas’(Bush,2005c),thatfreedomandlibertyareuniversal(Bush,2006w) andthatthe‘waronterrorisuniversal’(Bush,2006n).Inresponsetoaccusationsthat theUSAareimposingtheirvaluesonothers,Bush(2006x)suggeststhat‘thosearethe folkswhomustnotthinkthatfreedomisuniversal’,that‘itjustappliestoonlya handfulofus’.Theemphasisisonendgoalsasopposedtothemeansbywhichtheyare sought,whichservesto dismiss criticism.Bush(2006x)arguesthat: Muchofmyforeignpolicyisdrivenbymyfirmbeliefthateverybodydesirestobefree;thatembeddedin thesoulofeachmanandwom[a]nonthefaceoftheEarthisthisdeepdesiretoliveinliberty.That's whatIbelieve.Idon'tbelievefreedomisconfinedjusttotheUnitedStatesofAmerica,nordoIbelieve thatweshouldshyawayfromexpressingourdeepdesirefortheretobeuniversalliberty.

201 Bushdismissesclaimsthatsuchgoalsare‘misguidedidealism’arguingthat‘thefuture securityofAmericadependsonit[theirrealization]’(2006h).Thisispartlybecause ‘[d]emocraciesdon'twarwitheachother’(2005zi),72 butalsobecauseofthegreat ‘ideologicalstruggle’intheworld(2005zi).Onewherethosewhooppose‘human rights,freedomofreligion,[and]theabilityforpeopletoexpressthemselvesinthe publicsquarewithoutfearofreprisal’,areusing‘tacticsthataretryingtodriveusfrom theworld’(Bush,2005zi).Bushfurtherarguesthatwhilst‘[s]omewouldlikeustolook attheworldthewaywewouldhopeitwouldbe.MyjobasyourPresidentistolookat theworldthewayitis’(Bush,2006i).Thus,thesuperordinateframeworkclearlytakes precedence,andagaingenerates divisions basedonbinarylogic internationally. Intersection representation isalsoapparenttoadegreein20052006.Forexample, BushfrequentlystressestheUS’ssharedvalueswithEuropeandthatdisagreementsin thepastdonotmeantheycannotcooperatenow(2005o;2005u).Indeed,inrelationto Iraq,Bush(2005zg)arguesthatdespitepreviousdifferences,‘theworldunderstands thatsuccessinIraqiscriticaltothesecurityofournations’.WithregardstoIranthe Presidentalsohighlightsthat‘theworldiscoalescingaroundthenotion’thatthey shouldnotbeabletodevelopanuclearweapon(Bush,2005zm).However,eachof thesestatements,whilstdrawingonareasofoverlap,isstilllargelybasedonthesuper ordinateframeworkofthewaronterrorasunderstoodbytheBushadministration. Intersection representation isverymuchintermsof bolstering and utilising the overlap,forexample,asmentionedearlier,drawingontheextrastrengththatspeaking withonevoiceintheinternationalcommunitygenerates. Whilstthereisstillalsomuchemphasisontransientcoalitionsto‘defeatthedangersof ourtime’(Bush,2005d),thereisgreaterengagementwithinternationalsocialidentities in20052006.Therhetoricislessconfrontationalandtheseparationapparentinthe previoustwotimeperiodsisnotsoevident.Thereisstillagreatdealofemphasison leadershipinthissphere,howeverthisisfirmlygroundedina dominance strategyin 20052006,perhapsbecauseofthesetbacksinthewaronterrorintermsoftheless thandesirablesituationsinIraqandAfghanistan.Complexdynamicsarecertainlyat workinthisperiodwithavarietyoffactorsbroughttogetherunderadominantsuper ordinatesocialidentityfoundedonthewaronterror.AsJackGoldsmith(2007:212)

72 Bush(2006l)laterinsertscaveatswhenmakingthesestatements,assertingthatdemocracydoesnot havetolooklikeAmericandemocracyandisdifferentindifferentcultures. 202 notes,theadministrationhasmade‘littleattempttoworkwiththeotherinstitutionsof government’,perhapsthenthereislittlereasontoexpecttheadministrationtoengage anyfurtherwithanyinternationalsocialidentities. Conclusion ThisChapterhasagaindemonstratedthatdefectionfromtheinternationaldetention regimeneedstobeunderstoodasaninteractiveprocessofcontestation.Politicalelites cannotsimplydefectfrominternationalnormativeregimesiftheirargumentsarenot acceptedinthebroadersocialidentitiescontext.Researchthatreliesonmaterialpower andinterestsorapersonalitythatismore‘prone’todefectiondonotengagewiththis interactiveprocesswhichcertainlyinfluencesthesustainabilityofsuchpractices.By viewingtheinfluenceofinternationalnormativeregimesasoutlinedinChapters1and 2,asameansbywhichtovalidatemembershiporassociationwithasocialidentity(of whichtherearemany)wecanmoreeasilycomprehendcontestationsandfluctuationsat thesametimeasinfluence.Includingthebroadersocialidentitiescontextinour analysisbetterequipsustoapproachthehowpossiblequestionsofdefectionandthe negotiationofnormativeconstraintsbyorientatinganalysistowardsthemanagement strategiesemployed. AswiththepreviousChapter,allofthemanagementstrategiesidentifiedinChapter2 areapparentinthediscourseoftheBushadministration.Thetechniquesusedinrelation tothesestrategiesagainvarywithsocialidentityandtimeperiod.Dominanceisthe mostprominentstrategy,mostfrequentlymanifestinarangeofdenials,dismissals,and challengestothecriticisms.AlsosignificantinthisChapterisamuchweakeremphasis oninternationalsocialidentitiesthanwasapparentinrelationtotheBlairgovernment. Additionally,separationisevident,whichwasnotthecaseinChapter4. Withregardstosocialidentitiesininternationalsociety,thediscourseoftheBush administrationcertainlydivergesfromthatoftheBlairgovernment.Thereismuchless engagementwithformsofsocialidentityinternationally;indeedattimeswesee evidenceofseparation.Thisishighlysignificantfortheframeworkestablishedinthis thesis,wheremembershipanddesireformembershiparecrucialfornormative influence.Wecannotexpectinternationalnormativeregimestohaveinfluenceifthe membershiptowhichtheypertainisnotapparentfortheBushadministration;insuch caseswheremembershipisnotexperienced,thereisthusnoimperativetovalidate

203 membershipthroughcompliancewiththeconstitutivenormativeregimes.Muchnorms researchassumesmembershipoftheinternationalsocietyingeneralandleaveslittleif anyroomforchangesinthepositioningofindividuals(asrepresentativesofstates),in relationtodifferentinternationalsocialidentities. ThediscourseoftheBushadministrationisveryissuespecificinrelationto internationalsocialidentities,toamuchgreaterextentthanwasevidentinChapter4. TheemphasisisontransientcoalitionswheretheUSAleadsagroupofstates,brought togethertotackleparticularproblems.Therearemovestoengagemoreinternationally in20052006,wherethevalueofamorecollectiveapproachseemstogainfurther recognitionandthediscourseislessconfrontational.However,thepredominant emphasisisonaninternationalsocialidentitybasedonfightingthewaronterror.Like inChapter4,thiscreatesacomplexframeworkofuniversalismanddivision,equalityof humanrightsandrestrictionsonhumanrights,aswellastheinclusionofadiverse rangeofmemberswherecounterterrorismisthesharedethos.Theinfluenceofthe internationaldetentionregime,asassociatedwiththeliberaldemocraticsocialidentity, isheavilycompromisedinthisdominantandseparatedapproachtointernationalsocial identities. However,asIhavearguedthroughoutthisthesis,wealsoneedtoconsiderthebroader socialidentitiescontextwhenassessingthecontestationoftheinternationaldetention regime.ThemainstrategyemployedbytheBushadministrationisagainoneof dominance,focusingondenials,dismissalsandchallenges,butoftenonthebasisof constructingadominantnarrative.Thesetechniques,apparentinrelationtoseveralof thesocialidentities,forexamplehumanrightsandhumanitarian,legalandUN,arevery confrontational.Thisisclearestwithregardstochallenges,wherethecriticismsofthese socialgroupsarearguedtoservetheterrorist’scause.Thesesocialidentitiesare constructedunderthesuperordinateframeworkofcounterterrorism,asunderstoodby theadministration,andareexpectedtofallinline. Thepredominantrelianceondenials,dismissalsandchallengesinthediscourse assesseddoesnotappeartobeasustainablestrategy,ifthereisadesiretomaintain associationwiththesesocialidentities,giventhemountingevidenceofactionsthat disprovestatements.Arguingthatsuchpracticesareappropriategiventhecontextalso doeslittletodrawthesocialidentitiescloserorgainanystatusfromprototypicality.

204 Cheney’sstatementthat,‘[n]obodyshouldfeeldefensiveorunhappyaboutthequality oftreatmentthey’vereceived.It’sprobablybetterthantheydeserve’(Sanger,2002; Kampfner,2004:150) 73 isanexampleofthisandfundamentallychallengesthe constitutiveelementsofequalityandhumanetreatmentthataregenerallyinherentinthe socialidentitiesassessed.Theuseofintersectionrepresentationwhichcouldbolster associationdoesnotonthewholeappeartobeacceptedbythedifferentsocialgroups. Relianceonhistoricalassociationandidentitybasedreasoningtojustifycurrentactions suggeststhattheprocessofsocialidentityvalidationwasapproachedinavery one-way fashion,whichinevitablyleadstofrustrationswhenconfrontedwithchallenges. Overall,thestrategiesemployedandthemeansbywhichtheyaresoughtisindicativeof alackofappreciationfortheinteractiveprocessofsocialidentityvalidation. Associationwiththesesocialidentitiesistakenforgranted. However,thesesocialidentitiescannotsimplyberejected,evenbytheUSA,whois oftenconsideredtoexperienceveryfewconstraintsontheiractions.Bushcertainly pushesassociationtothelimits,butretainsafragiledegreeofidentificationthrough intersectionrepresentation.Theapparentfearofconstraints,thesalienceofattacks,and theexistenceofaveryharshpenalsystemalreadyintheUSAareallfactorsthatwill havecontributedtothedefectionfromandcontestationoftheinternationaldetention regime.Therearemultiplefactorsforindividualsandsmallleadershipgroupstodraw onandthereisalwaysroomtochallengeinterpretations. Theyalsohoweverneedtomanagethebroadersocialidentitiescontextforsuch policiestobesustainable.ThepresidentialcampaignsofJohnMcCainandBarack Obamain2008appeartohaverecognisedthedetrimentalaffectoftheadministration’s detentionpolicies,speakingoutastheyhaveagainstGuantánamoBay.Obama’scamp, furthermore,havemadevariousnoisesabouttakingamore‘Europeanapproach’tothe conflictbetweenRussiaandGeorgia.Thedifferencesinthemanagementstrategiesand interactiveprocessesinthisfuturecontextwillbefascinatingtosee.

73 ThisstatementwasmadeataRepublicanfundraiserinCincinnati,January2002.Whilstthefulltextof thespeechisnotavailable,severalrespectedjournalistshavecitedthephrase. 205 Conclusion Thisthesisbeganwiththefollowingquestion;howhavethenormativeconstraints regardingdetentionpracticesbeennegotiatedbytheUSAandUKinthewaronterror, soastoallowforcontestationoftheinternationaldetentionregime?Imagesofthe abuseofdetainees,harshconditionsofdetention,andstrongrhetoriccontestingthe applicabilityoftheinternationaldetentionregimehavebeenhighlyprevalentin2001 2006.Thesepracticeschallengeourexpectationsforbehaviour.AsarguedinChapter1 suchexpectationsforcompliancewiththeregimearegeneratedbytheassociationof theUSAandUKwithaliberaldemocraticstateidentity,andindeedtheinvolvementof thesestatesinhumanrightspromotionandmovestoeradicatetortureintheworld.The seeminglycounternormativebehavioursofthesestateswithregardstotheinternational detentionregimenecessitateanexplanationofhowinternationalnormativeregimes actuallyinfluencethebehaviourofpoliticalelitesgivensuchstarkexamplesof contestation.Nottodosoleadstoerroneousexpectationsofstatebehaviour,takes ‘progression’towardshumanrightsnormsforgrantedininternationalsociety,and concealstheneedfornormativeregimestoconstantlyberemade. Inordertodelvedeeperintotheprocessesinvolvedinthecontestationofthe internationaldetentionregimeIhavedrawnonconstructivistresearchaswellas insightsfromthesocialidentityapproachinsocialpsychology.Theframework establishedinChapters1and2hasenabledthefollowingfindings: 1. Thenormativeconstraintsoftheinternationaldetentionregimearenegotiated throughmanagementofthesocialidentitiesassociatedwiththestatebypolitical elites 2. Verycomplexsocialidentitydynamicsareapparentininternationalsocietyfor boththeBushadministrationandBlairgovernment,whichcontributetoour expectationsforbehaviourpertainingtotheinternationaldetentionregime 3. Contestationoftheinternationaldetentionregimeisabroadandinteractive process,asopposedtooneway.Politicalelitesdonotsimplydefectfromor complywiththisnormativeregimeinthecasesexamined.Interactionwiththe socialidentitiescontextconstrainsjustificationsofcounternormativebehaviour, andthecapacitytoconstructasustainableandenablingframeworkfor contestation.

206 Inrelationtothefirstpointabove,thisthesishasfoundthatinordertoconsiderhowthe normativeconstraintsoftheinternationaldetentionregimearenegotiatedweneedto focusonthemanagementofthedifferentsocialidentitiesassociatedwiththestate, thosethatarerelevanttothisregime.AsIcontendinChapter1,theliteratureon internationalnormsdoesnottendtoengagewiththisbroadersocialidentitiescontext butinsteadgenerallyfocusesonasingularinternationalnorm,anddefectionor compliancebythestateorstateleaders(e.g.ShannonandKeller,2007;Cardenas, 2004).Scholarsworkingfromthesocialidentityapproachinsocialpsychologyhave, however,demonstratedwhyitissoimportanttoconsiderthebroadersocialidentities contextinwhichpoliticalelitesaresituated,whenevaluatingthecontestationof internationalnormativeregimes,asIarguedinChapter2.InChapters4and5I demonstratedthatinteractiveprocessesofcontestationareevidentforboththeBlair governmentandBushadministrationwiththesocialidentitiesdiscussedinChapter3.I foundthatthediscourseofBushandBlairgenerallyconcentratesonthegenerationofa superordinatesocialidentity,basedonthewaronterror,withinwhichsubordinate socialidentitiesarereframed(thisishowevermoreapparentforBlairasopposedto Bush).Thisservestofacilitatecontinuedvalidationofassociationormembershipwith thesedifferentsubordinatesocialidentities,suchasthehumanrightsandhumanitarian socialidentity(bothcollectivelyandatanindividuallevel),despitethecontestationof theinternationaldetentionregimebytheUSAandUK.Thisapproachtherefore accountsforcontestationatamicrofoundationallevelthroughutilisationofthesocial identityapproach.

Second,verycomplexinternationalsocialidentitydynamicsareapparentforboththe BlairgovernmentandBushadministration.Thepredominantemphasisisonthenew international,andsuperordinate,socialidentity,developedthroughbothcomparison (e.g.civilizedasopposednoncivilizeddivisionsinternationally)andinteraction(e.g. betweenpoliticalelitesacrossthecoalitionsestablishedinthewaronterror).This emergentsocialgroupcertainlychallengesnotionsofaninternationalliberaldemocratic socialidentityasdominantforthesestatesinthiscontext.Giventhatthesocialidentity approachsuggeststhattheinfluenceofnormativeregimesdependsonthesalienceof themembershiptowhichtheypertain,wecanunderstandhowappealstoasuper ordinatesocialidentityfacilitatethecontestationoftheinternationaldetentionregime

207 bytheUKandUSA. 1However,thediscoursealsoportraysverycomplexanddynamic formationsofinternationalsocialidentitiesforrepresentativesofthesestatesin2001 2006,forexample,universalismanddivision,equalityofhumanrightsandrestrictions onhumanrights,aswellastheinclusionofadiverserangeofmemberswherecounter terrorismisthesharedethos.Suchcomplexityiscertainlyverydifficulttomanage,with manycompetingnormativedemands.Theframeworkoutlinedinthisthesisallowsusto understandapparentfluctuationsintheinfluenceofinternationalnormativeregimesin thiscontext,astheliberaldemocraticsocialidentityiscompetingwithvariousothers. Whereassomescholars(asmentionedinChapters1and2)havesimplifiedinternational socialidentities,thisthesishasembracedtheapparentcomplexity,and,assistedbythe microfoundationalinsightsofthesocialidentityapproachleavesroomforchangesin thepositioningofindividuals(asrepresentativesofstates),inrelationtodifferent internationalsocialidentities. Third,thepoliticalcontextisoneinwhichmultiplesocialidentitiescompeteforsocial influence,andwhereleadersmanageassociationsaswellasdevelopandattemptto createnewsocialgroupings.Thishasbeenhighlightedabove.Relianceonasuper ordinatesocialidentitybasedonthewaronterrorhas,however,beencomplicatedas theseconstructionsarenotacceptedbytheothersocialidentitiesassessed,thusasa strategythisdoesnotappeartobesustainable.Ashasbeenadvancedthroughoutthis thesis,wecannotlimitourunderstandingofinternationalnormativeregimestothe internationalsphere.Contestationisnotaonewayprocess,wherepowerfulstate leaderscansimplyactastheychose;interactionwithmultiplesocialidentitiesisalsoa significantpartofthepicture.InthisthesisIhaveprovidedevidencetochallengethe dominantapproachtonormsinIRwhichfocusesonthecounterveilinglogicsof complianceanddefectionbehaviours(e.g.GoertzandDiehl,1994;Slaughterand Raustiala,2002) .InsteadIhavedemonstratedhowthisisatwowayprocessof contestation,wherevariousaudiencesandmembersareinvolvedinthisinteractive process.BushandBlair,forexample,bothrelyontheircountry’shistorical involvementinhumanrightspromotionandpreviouscompliancewithhumanrights standardsattimeswheretheyareaccusedofdefectingfromtheseinternational standards(BlairalsoreferstothepreviousachievementsoftheLabourpartyinthis regard).Forexample,astheBlairgovernmentintroducedthe Human Rights Act in

1AsevidencedinChapter5,thediscourseoftheBushadministrationalsodemonstratesadegreeof separationandlessengagementwithformsofsocialidentityinternationally. 208 1998,theyaskforcurrentactionstobeseeninthislight.Ashasbeendemonstratedin thisthesis,suchidentitybasedargumentsarenotacceptedbythehumanrightsand humanitariansocialgroupandassociationwiththissocialidentitybecomesvery strained,evidencedbycompartmentalisationandconfrontationalinteractionswithboth BlairandBush.Researchthatreliesonmaterialpowerandinterestsorapersonalitythat ismore‘prone’todefectiondonotengagewiththisinteractiveprocesswhichcertainly influencesthesustainabilityofsuchpracticesiftheactorswishtovalidateassociation withthissocialidentity.Politicalelitescannotsimplydefectfrominternational normativeregimesiftheirargumentsarenotacceptedinthebroadersocialidentities context. Thesefindingsalladvanceourunderstandingofhowthenormativeconstraints regardingdetentionpracticeshavebeennegotiatedbytheUSAandUKinthewaron terror,soastoallowforcontestationoftheinternationaldetentionregime.Thisthesis hasdemonstratedthatdefectionfromtheinternationaldetentionregimeneedstobe understoodasaninteractiveprocessofcontestation.AsadvancedinChapter1, constructivistslackapersuasiveaccountofthemicrofoundationalprocessesofnorm influencewhichpreventsthemfromengagingwiththecontestationofseemingly embeddedinternationalnormativestandards.Theframeworkestablishedinthisthesis accountsfortheinfluenceofsocialidentitiesandinternationalnormativeregimes, whilstatthesametimeallowingustounderstandcontestation.Ihavedemonstratedthat byfirmlyembeddingindividualsinthebroadersocialidentitiescontextandfocusingon themanagementstrategiesemployedbypoliticaleliteswecanunderstandthe interactiveprocessesofcontestationgenerallymissingfromcurrentconstructivist accountsofinternationalnorms.Whilstresearchfocusingonpersonality, internalisation,thenatureofthenorm,orpredefinedinterestsmayincreaseparsimony, theyreduceourunderstandingoftheprocessesinvolvedandleadtoerroneous explanationsandexpectations.Decisionstodefectfromorcomplywiththe internationaldetentionregimearenotstraightforwardassessments;theyareinteractive processesthatevolve. Scholarsfromthesocialidentityapproach(e.g.HaslamandReicher,2007)have highlightedtheimportanceofconsidering,ontheonehand,politicalleadersassharing andbeingassociatedwithcertainsocialidentities,whilstontheothermanagingand constructingthiscontext.Thesignificanceofassessingexistingconstraintsalongside

209 thecreationoffuturepossibilitiesisoftenmissedincertainstrandsofconstructivist researchonnorms,wheretheemphasisofthestudieshastendedtonegatethe importanceofleadersandindividuals,orgonetoofarinisolatingtheleaderfromthe broadersocialidentitiescontext.Thesocialidentityapproachprivileges‘doing’as opposedto‘having’intheirassessmentofleadership.‘Doing’isaproductofboththe personandtheinteractivecontext.Arelianceonpersonalitygenerallymissesthispoint, andwouldseemtoruntheriskofconflatingpersonalitymeasureswiththeproductof interactions,particularlyasmeasuresofpersonalityareoftentakenatthetimeofthe eventsstudied. Therearecertaindangerstosuchanapproach.Forexample,assessmentsofSaddam Hussein(particularlythosearticulatedbyBushandBlair)appearedtobeveryisolated fromtheinteractivecontextinwhichhewassituated.Theindividualisclearly important,however,simplyattributingactionstoindividualpersonalitywithout recognisingthebroaderconstraints(andenablingfactors)ontheirbehaviourcanleadto misconceptions(seeJervis,1976).SuchaperspectiveisalsoevidentintheBush administration’sapproachtodetention,wheretheemphasisisonhuntingdownand haulinginthe‘evildoers’,believingthatthemorewhoarecaptured,thelessthereare tofight.Asmentionedpreviously,arelianceonthisideaignoresthepossibilityof creatingmoreterrorists.Thisthesishasattemptedtodemonstratetheimportanceof interactionsand‘doing’processes,withregardstothecontestationofdetention standardsbytheUSAandUK.Whilstotherstudieshaveconcentratedonhowthese practicescameabout,Ihavedelveddeeperintothenegotiationofnormativeconstraint inthebroadsocialidentitiescontext,basedonthemicrofoundationalinsightsofthe socialidentityapproach. Despitetheimportanceofinternationalnormativeregimes,suchasthatprescribing minimumstandardsfordetentionandprohibitingtorture,therewillalwaysberoomfor challengeanddifferentinterpretationsregardlessofhowinternalisedatacollective levelnormativeregimesappeartobe;theroleofindividualsandinteractionsisvery important.Individualshavemanymembershipsorassociationswithdifferentsocial identitiestodrawon.Someoftheseemergeincertaincircumstancesthroughindividual interactionswhichareoftenonasmallscale;othersarealreadyapparentbutnotsalient.

210 Aninterestingfeatureoftheanalysisinthisthesishasbeenthesignificantoverlapinthe useofthedifferentmanagementstrategies.BothBushandBlairemploydifferent strategiesconcurrentlywiththesamesocialidentity.Indeed,certainpassagesthatIhave includedinChapters4and5areindicativeofcompartmentalisation,intersection representationanddominancesimultaneously.Furthermore,attimes,strategiessuchas intersectionrepresentationappeartofacilitatedominance,andatothertimes,dominance seemstoallowforcompartmentalisationorviceversa.Politicalrhetoricdoesnotfall neatlyintothetypologyofstrategiesidentifiedbyRoccasandBrewer(2002).Thisdoes notnegatetheusefulnessofsuchanapproachbutsimplygoessomewayto demonstratingthecomplexityofsocialidentitymanagementinthepoliticalsphere.I haveincludedtechniquesunderthedifferentstrategyheadingstogiveaclearer indicationofvariationsintheuseofthesestrategiesas,whilsttheyareapparent,there aredifferencesinhowtheyaremanifestacrossbothtimeandsocialidentity.Simply focusingonthestrategiesidentifiedbyRoccasandBrewerwouldhaveobscuredsome ofthedifferencesandnuancesinthisanalysis.Thus,utilisingtheseinsightsinthe politicalrealmhasdemonstratedtheirvalueinthiscomplexcontext,buthasalso highlightedcertainparticularitiesforthistypeofanalysis,whichmayalsobeofinterest forsocialidentitytheoristsinpsychology. ThereareofcoursecertaindrawbackstotheapproachadoptedinthisthesisthatImust mentionhere.AsIhaveargued,theframeworkprovidesameansbywhichto understandprocessesofcontestationandnormativeinfluence.However,theframework doesnotgenerateinsightsinthesecasesthatcanbegeneralisedwithregardstothese processes.Insightsarecontextuallysituated.Duetotheemphasisoninteractionsthey willvarybothwithdifferentcircumstancesandactors.Thesocialidentitiescontext,for examplecanbeverydifferentforcertainstates,certainlythiswouldbeveryinteresting toexplore.Themicrofoundationalframeworkoutlinedinthisthesiswillstillprovidea veryusefulbasisfromwhichtoconductsuchanalysis.IndeedIbelievethisframework willprovetobeveryvaluableinunderstandingthedifferentbehavioursofstateswith regardstointernationalnormativeregimes. Therearealsoavarietyofotherwaysthattheresearchoutlinedinthisthesiscanbe developed.Forexample,thesocialidentitiesincludedforanalysisarebynomeans comprehensive.AsImentionedinChapter3,otherfactorssuchasreligionarevery important.Whilstithasnotbeenpossibletoexploreanymoreintheconfinesofthis

211 thesis(thosecoveredhavecertainlyprovidedaverybroadresearchproject)thismaybe aconsiderationforfutureresearch.Althoughthissuggestsexpandingtheresearch further,theinsightsinthisthesiscouldalsobedevelopedbydeepeninganalysis.For example,investigationintointeractionswiththedifferentsocialidentitiescouldbe enhancedbytheinclusionofinterviewdata.Forexample,interviewdatacouldhelpto expandanalysisbyenablingustodelvedeeperintotheprocessesofcontestation,to assesshowinteractionsareperceivedbymembersofthesesocialgroups,andindeed governmentofficialswhereaccessispossible. Oneoftheaimsofthisthesiswastobridgesomeofthegapbetweeninternational normativeregimesandindividuals.Indeedthishastendedtobethemainmotivational driverformanymovestoengagemorewithinsightsfrompsychologyinconstructivist research.Ihaveapproachedthisbydrawingonresearchinthesocialidentityapproach wherethepredominantemphasisisonunderstandingtherelationshipbetweenthe individualandthegroup,particularlysocialinfluenceinthiscontext.Themicro foundationalinsightsprovidedbysocialidentityscholarshaveledmetofocuson politicalelites,theprocessesofnegotiationofnormativeconstraintthatareapparentin thediscourse,andtheinteractionswiththedifferentsocialidentitiesassociatedwiththe state.Themanagementofthesesocialidentitieshasprovidedsignificantinsightintothe processesofcontestationoftheinternationaldetentionregimeinthecasesoftheUSA andUK. However,movestobridgethegapbetweeninternationalnormativeregimesandagents couldbedevelopedevenmorebyinterviewingindividualstofurtherassesshow differentnormativeconstraintsandsocialidentitiesaremanaged.Whilstaccessforthis wouldbeverydifficultforpoliticalelites,thiscouldperhapsbepossibleformilitary personnelwhoalsooperateinaninternationalcontextwithcompetingnormative demands.Trackinginternationalnormstotheindividual,investigatinginterpretations, aswellasthemanagementofcompetingnormativedemandsandsocialidentities, wouldalsoassistinadvancingourcomprehensionofnormativeinfluencewhichhas beendemonstratedbyconstructiviststobefundamentaltoourunderstandingof internationalaffairs. Therearealsofurtherquestionsthatemergefromtheassessmentinthisthesis.For example,howhasthenegotiationofnormativeconstraintandthemanagement

212 strategiesevidentinthediscourseinfluencedperceptionsoftheinternationaldetention regimearoundtheworld?Certainlyverymixedmessageshavecomefrombothofthese countrieswithregardstotheneedtobetoughonterrorism,butatthesametime meetinghumanrightsobligations.Theemphasisonatradeoffbetweenthetwohas beenverysalient,ashasthehierarchicalinterpretationofrights,stronglyprivilegingthe righttolifeandtolivefreefromterroraboveallothers.Thefrequencyofdismissals anddenialsinboththediscourseoftheBlairgovernmentandtheBushadministration, inrelationtotheargumentsofthehumanrightsandhumanitariansocialgroup,would seemtohaveprovidedammunitionforothercountriesaroundtheworldtopursuesuch measures.Asmentionedearlier,whilstbothBushandBlairemployidentitybased reasoningtojustifytheirownactions,theexamplesettoothersaroundtheworldhas notfeaturedasasignificantconcern.AsMalinowski(2005:141)writes: StateDepartmentofficialscancontinuetourgeSaudiArabiaandEgyptandAlgeriatotreatpeople humanely,butwhenthegovernmentsofthesecountriescanquoteU.S.governmentmemorandatodefend theirbrutalactions,whatcananAmericandiplomatsayinresponse? Indeed,Zayas(2005)drawsattentiontoMalaysia’sInternal Security Act ,whichhas resurrectedpreventivedetentionthatwasintroducedasatemporarymeasurein1960to fightacommunistrebellion.TheimpactoftheargumentsoftheBushadministration andtheBlairgovernmentoninterpretationsoftheinternationaldetentionregimeby differentpoliticalelitesaroundtheworldwouldcertainlybeafascinating,albeitvery difficult,areatoassess.Thiswouldalsogosomewaytoestablishingthecurrentstateof thisinternationalnormativeregime. Additionally,itwouldbeveryinterestingtoconsiderhowthesemanagementstrategies andtheargumentsemployedhaveinfluencedthemoralstandingoftheUKandUSA aroundtheworld.Thisisveryimportantintermsofthesocialinfluenceofpolitical representativesfromthesestatesandthemoralauthoritythattheiropinionsonglobal problemsorinternaldifficultiesinotherstates,haveinthefuture.Indeed,asrecent assessmentshaverecognised,humanrightsarecrucialtotheresolutionofsomeofthe mostpressinginstabilitiesintheworld,thecapacityoftheUSAandUKtoadvancethis agendaiscertainlyquestionable.The National Security Strategy oftheUK(2008)for example,stressestheimportanceofarulebasedapproachandsociallegitimacyis stronglyvalued,yethowfarthisispossiblegivenrecentactionsandapparent

213 contradictionsiscertainlydebatable.Thus,theimplicationsofthemanagement strategiesemployedprovideseveralavenuesforfutureresearch. Thisthesishasonlyfocusedononesmallbutsignificantareaofconcernwithregardsto theinfluenceandcontestationofinternationalnormativeregimes.Ihave,however, providedfurtherdemonstrationofwhyitissoimportantforconstructivistscholarsto engagewithandproviderobustmicrofoundationsfortheirresearch.Drawingfromthe socialidentityapproachIhaveshownthebenefitsofthisforunderstandinghow normativeconstraintsareinfluentialandcontestedwithregardstothedetentionpolicies ofboththeUSAandUK.ThroughoutthisthesisIhavedemonstratedthatcontestation oftheinternationaldetentionregimeandthenegotiationofitsnormativeconstraintsare aninteractiveanddynamicprocessembeddedinabroadsocialidentitiescontext,which hasimplicationsforthesustainabilityofcounternormativepractices.Ihavealso bridgedsomeofthegapbetweeninternationalnormativeregimesandindividuals,and hopetohaveprovidedamicrofoundationalbasisformanymorefuturedevelopments.

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251 Speeches, Press Conferences and Statements from the Blair Government and Bush Administration

Blair,T.(1999)."DoctrineoftheInternationalCommunity."Retrieved12/08/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297 . Blair,T.(2001a)."SpeechbythePrimeMinisterTonyBlairatthePeelInstitute26th January."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1577 . Blair,T.(2001b)."PM'sSpeechontheHolocaust28thJanuary."Retrieved12/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7446 . Blair,T.(2001c)."BirminghamChamberofCommerce:HelpingPeopleThrough Change2ndFebruary."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1578 . Blair,T.(2001d)."Thegovernment’sagendaforthefuture8thFebruary."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1579 . Blair,T.(2001e)."SpeechbythePrimeMinistertotheCanadianParliament23rd February."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1582 . Blair,T.(2001f)."‘Environment:thenextsteps’6thMarch."Retrieved12/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1583 . Blair,T.(2001g)."PrimeMinister'sspeechatAMECYard15thMarch."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1585 . Blair,T.(2001h)."StockholmEuropeanCouncil:StatementtotheHouseofCommons 26thMarch."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1587 . Blair,T.(2001i)."PMSpeechtotheChristianSocialistMovement29thMarch." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3243 . Blair,T.(2001j)."PrimeMinisterTonyBlairafterthe2001GeneralElection8th June."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1592 . Blair,T.(2001k)."PressconferencebythePrimeMinisterandPresidentMbekiof SouthAfrica14thJune."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1591 . Blair,T.(2001l)."SpeechbythePrimeMinister:ReformofPublicServices16th July."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1594 . Blair,T.(2001m)."SpeechinSaoPaulo,Brazil30thJuly."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1593 . Blair,T.(2001n)."PressconferencewithPrimeMinisterTonyBlairandthePresident ofArgentina2ndAugust."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1595 .

252 Blair,T.(2001o)."September11attacks:PrimeMinister’sstatement11thSeptember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1596 . Blair,T.(2001p)."September11attacks:PrimeMinister’sstatementincluding QuestionandAnswersession12thSeptember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1597 . Blair,T.(2001q)."StatementtoParliamentinresponsetoterroristattacksintheUS 14thSeptember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1598 . Blair,T.(2001r)."Thewaronterrorism:PrimeMinister’sinterviewwithCNN16th September."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1599 . Blair,T.(2001s)."Doorstepinterview:PrimeMinisterTonyBlairandPresidentChirac 20thSeptember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1600 . Blair,T.(2001t)."Pressconference:PrimeMinisterTonyBlairandChancellor Schroeder20thSeptember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1601 . Blair,T.(2001u)."PM’sbriefingtothepressenroutetoNewYork21stSeptember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1602. Blair,T.(2001v)."PM’sdoorstepinterviewinBrussels24thSeptember."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1603 . Blair,T.(2001w)."Statementat10DowningStreet25thSeptember."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1604 . Blair,T.(2001x)."PM’smeetingwithleadersoftheMuslimcommunitiesinBritain 27thSeptember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1605 . Blair,T.(2001y)."StatementtoParliament(USterrorattacks)4thOctober." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1606 . Blair,T.(2001z)."BriefingbythePMenroutetoLondonfromIndia5thOctober." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1607 . Blair,T.(2001za)."PressconferencebetweenPMTonyBlairandthePresidentof Pakistan5thOctober."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1614 . Blair,T.(2001zb)."Pressconference:PrimeMinisterBlairandPresidentPutin5th October."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1608 . Blair,T.(2001zc)."StatementonmilitaryactioninAfghanistan7thOctober." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1615 .

253 Blair,T.(2001zd)."PrimeMinister’sstatementtotheHouseofCommons8th October."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1621 . Blair,T.(2001ze)."PrimeMinisterTonyBlair’sinterviewwithAlJazeera9th October."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1624 . Blair,T.(2001zf)."Pressconference:PrimeMinisterBlairandPresidentMubarak 11thOctober."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1625 . Blair,T.(2001zg)."ArticlebythePrimeMinister12thOctober."Retrieved12/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1628 . Blair,T.(2001zh)."Pressconference:TonyBlairandYasserArafat15thOctober." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1630 . Blair,T.(2001zi)."SpeechonPublicServiceReform16thOctober."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1632 . Blair,T.(2001zj)."PressconferencegivenbythePrimeMinisterTonyBlairtoarab journalists"Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1634 . Blair,T.(2001zk)."DecommissioningofIRAweapons24thOctober."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1635 . Blair,T.(2001zl)."SpeechtotheWelshAssembly30thOctober."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1636 . Blair,T.(2001zm)."Pressconference:PMandPresidentAssadofSyria31st October."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1637 . Blair,T.(2001zn)."InterviewgivenbythePrimeMinister,TonyBlair,inRiyadh, SaudiArabia1stNovember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1638 . Blair,T.(2001zo)."PressConference:PMandPresidentArafat2ndNovember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1640 . Blair,T.(2001zp)."Doorstepinterview:PMandPrimeMinisterLeszekMillerof Poland2ndNovember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1641 . Blair,T.(2001zq)."SpeechtotheCBI5thNovember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1642 . Blair,T.(2001zr)."PM:coalitionis‘remarkablystrong’6thNovember."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1643 . Blair,T.(2001zs)."PrimeMinister:‘Thecauseisjust’8thNovember."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1644 .

254 Blair,T.(2001zt)."DoorstepInterview:PrimeMinisterTonyBlairandPresident Musharraf9thNovember"Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1654 . Blair,T.(2001zu)."DoorstepInterviewbetweenthePrimeMinisterandKingAbdullah ofJordan9thNovember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1645 . Blair,T.(2001zv)."LordMayor’sBanquet12thNovember."Retrieved12/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1661 . Blair,T.(2001zw)."PrimeMinister’sstatementonAfghanistan13thNovember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1664 . Blair,T.(2001zx)."Doorstepinterview:PMandIndianPrimeMinisterMr.Vajpayee 13thNovember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1667 . Blair,T.(2001zy)."PrimeMinister’sstatementtoParliamentonthewaronterror14th November."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1668 . Blair,T.(2001zz)."Doorstepinterview:PMandPrimeMinisterGuterresofPortugal 14thOctober."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1670 . Blair,T.(2001zza)."DoorstepinterviewwiththePMandChancellorWolfgang SchuesselofAustria16thNovember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1671 . Blair,T.(2001zzb)."‘Britain’sroleinEurope’speechtotheEuropeanResearch Institute23rdNovember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1673 . Blair,T.(2001zzc)."Pressconference:PMandUSSecretaryofStateColinPowell 11thDecember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1675 . Blair,T.(2001zzd)."LaekenPrimeMinister’sstatementtoParliament17th December."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1676 . Blair,T.(2001zze)."InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce21stDecember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1678 . Blair,T.(2001zzf)."Pressconference:PMandPresidentVladimirPutin22nd December."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1679 . Blair,T.(2001zzg)."PM’sNewYear’smessage."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1680 . Blair,T.(2002a)."PublicServicesspeech25thJanuary."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3008 .

255 Blair,T.(2002b)."SpeechtoGhana’sParliament2ndFebruary."Retrieved12/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3451 . Blair,T.(2002c)."CommonwealthHeadsofGovernmentMeeting,Australia6th March."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1703 . Blair,T.(2002d)."PressConferencePMandVicePresidentDickCheney11th March."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1704 . Blair,T.(2002e)."StatementonEuropeanCouncilinBarcelona18thMarch." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1705 . Blair,T.(2002f)."InterviewgivenbythePrimeMinisterTonyBlairforNBC4th April."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1709 . Blair,T.(2002g)."PM’sinterviewwithBBCWorldService5thApril."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1710 . Blair,T.(2002h)."PressConference:PMandPresidentGeorgeBush6thApril." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1711 . Blair,T.(2002i)."SpeechattheGeorgeBushSeniorPresidentialLibrary7thApril." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1712 . Blair,T.(2002j)."PMarticleontheMiddleEast10thApril."Retrieved12/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1713 . Blair,T.(2002k)."PMspeechon‘Rebalancingofcriminaljusticesystem’18th June."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1717 . Blair,T.(2002l)."Pressconference:PMandSpanishPMJoseMariaAznar19th June."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1718 . Blair,T.(2002m)."PressConferencebythePrimeMinisterTonyBlair20thJune." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page2999 . Blair,T.(2002n)."StatementonEUSevillesummit24thJune."Retrieved12/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1719 . Blair,T.(2002o)."DoorstepinterviewatG8summit28thJune."Retrieved12/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1720 . Blair,T.(2002p)."PMstatementonG8summit"Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1721 . Blair,T.(2002q)."SpeechonforthcomingComprehensiveSpendingReview12th July."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1722 . Blair,T.(2002r)."PrimeMinister’sPressConference25thJuly."Retrieved12/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3000 .

256 Blair,T.(2002s)."SpeechtotheWorldSummitonSustainableDevelopmentinSouth Africa2ndSeptember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1724 . Blair,T.(2002t)."PrimeMinister’sPressConference3rdSeptember."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3001 . Blair,T.(2002u)."PMspeech:‘SaddamHusseinisathreatthathastobedealtwith’ 10thSeptember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1725 . Blair,T.(2002v)."Speechontacklingpovertyandsocialexclusion18thSeptember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1726 . Blair,T.(2002w)."PrimeMinister’sIraqstatementtoParliament24thSeptember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1727 . Blair,T.(2002x)."PrimeMinister’sPressConference2ndOctober."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3002 . Blair,T.(2002y)."PMdoorstepinterviewwithBulgarianPM8thOctober." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1728 . Blair,T.(2002z)."PMinterviewwithBBCWorldService9thOctober."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1729 . Blair,T.(2002za)."PrimeMinister’sspeechonNorthernIreland18thNovember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1732 . Blair,T.(2002zb)."PMstatementonEUSummitinBrussels28thOctober." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1730 . Blair,T.(2002zc)."PrimeMinister’sPressConference4thNovember."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3003 . Blair,T.(2002zd)."PMstatementonIraqfollowingUNSecurityCouncilresolution 8thNovember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3206 . Blair,T.(2002ze)."PMspeechattheLordMayor’sBanquet11thNovember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1731 . Blair,T.(2002zf)."Pressconference:PMandPolishPMLeszekMiller18th November."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1733 . Blair,T.(2002zg)."PM’skeynotespeechtoeSummit19thNovember."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1734 . Blair,T.(2002zh)."Pressconference:PMTonyBlairandPresidentGeorgeBush21st November."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1736 .

257 Blair,T.(2002zi)."PM’sStatementtoParliamentonNATOSummit25thNovember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1737 . Blair,T.(2002zj)."PMPressConference25thNovember."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3004 . Blair,T.(2002zk)."PM:‘AclearcourseforEurope’28thNovember."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1739 . Blair,T.(2002zl)."DoorstepinterviewonEUCouncilmeetinginCopenhagen13th December."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1740 . Blair,T.(2002zm)."PMstatementonEuropeanCouncilmeeting16thDecember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1742 . Blair,T.(2002zn)."PM’sarticleintheFTonthevisitoftheSyrianPresident16th December."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1743 . Blair,T.(2002zo)."PressConference:PMandSyrianPresidentAlAsad16th December."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1744 . Blair,T.(2002zp)."PressconferencefollowingtheEUCouncilinCopenhagen16th December."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1745 . Blair,T.(2002zq)."PM’sNewYearaddresstotheFalklandIslands20thDecember." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1746 . Blair,T.(2002zr)."PMinterviewwithBritishForcesBroadcastingService20th December."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1741 . Blair,T.(2002zs)."PMarticle:Palestiniantalksof‘paramountimportance’25th December."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1750 . Blair,T.(2003a)."PrimeMinister’sNewYearmessage1stJanuary."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1747 . Blair,T.(2003b)."PMspeechtoForeignOfficeConferenceinLondon7thJanuary." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1765 . Blair,T.(2003c)."PMPressConference13thJanuary."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3005 . Blair,T.(2003d)."Pressconference:PMTonyBlairandPresidentGeorgeBush31st January."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1767 . Blair,T.(2003e)."Pressconference:PMandSpanishPMJoseMariaAznar31st January."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1768 . Blair,T.(2003f)."StatementtoParliamentfollowingsummitwithPresidentBush3rd February."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1770 .

258 Blair,T.(2003g)."PMstatementonIraq25thMarch."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3088 . Blair,T.(2003h)."Jointpressconference:PMTonyBlairandSpanishPMJoseMaria Aznar28thFebruary."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3166 . Blair,T.(2003i)."PManswersIraqquestionsatMTVForum11thMarch."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3250 . Blair,T.(2003j)."Pressconference:PMBlairandRomanianPMNastase11th March."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3249 . Blair,T.(2003k)."PressConference:PMBlairandPortuguesePMBarroso11th March."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3248 . Blair,T.(2003l)."PMstatementfollowingtheAzoresSummit16thMarch." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3282 . Blair,T.(2003m)."PMoutlinesvisionforIraqandtheIraqipeople17thMarch." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3283 . Blair,T.(2003n)."PMstatementopeningIraqdebateinParliament18thMarch." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3294 . Blair,T.(2003o)."PrimeMinister’sAddresstotheNation20thMarch."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3327 . Blair,T.(2003p)."PressconferencefollowingEUSummitinBrussels21stMarch." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3329 . Blair,T.(2003q)."PMinterviewwithBritishForcesBroadcastingService23rd March."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3335 . Blair,T.(2003r)."PMstatementonEuropeanCouncilmeeting2021March24th March."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3337 . Blair,T.(2003s)."PM:Saddamandhisregimewillberemoved25thMarch." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3347 . Blair,T.(2003t)."JointpressconferencewithPresidentBushatCampDavid27th March."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3376 . Blair,T.(2003u)."PMarticlefortheArabpress30thMarch."Retrieved12/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3379 . Blair,T.(2003v)."PMinterviewwiththeBBCWorldService4thApril."Retrieved 12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3423 . Blair,T.(2003w)."PrimeMinister’sinterviewwithArabictelevision4thApril." Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3434 .

259 Blair,T.(2003x)."PMmessagetoIraqipeople8thApril."Retrieved12/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3449 . Blair,T.(2003y)."Pressconference:PMTonyBlairandPresidentGeorgeBush8th April."Retrieved12/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3448 . Blair,T.(2003z)."PM:AstrategyforpeaceinIraq14thApril."Retrieved14/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3494 . Blair,T.(2003za)."PM:‘TheimportanceoftheUNinpostconflictIraq’16thApril." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3506 . Blair,T.(2003zb)."PMfocusesonIraqanddomesticagenda28thApril."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3535 . Blair,T.(2003zc)."Jointpressconference:PMTonyBlairandRussianPresident VladimirPutin30thApril."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3559 . Blair,T.(2003zd)."Jointpressconference:PMandAustralianPMJohnHoward7th May."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3611 . Blair,T.(2003ze)."PrimeMinister’sPressConference22ndMay."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3764 . Blair,T.(2003zf)."PMstatementtotroopsinIraq29thMay."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3781 . Blair,T.(2003zg)."PrimeMinister’sspeechonEuropeinWarsaw30thMay." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3787 . Blair,T.(2003zh)."PMinterviewedonIraq,WMD,EuropeandtheEuro31stMay." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3797 . Blair,T.(2003zi)."PMsaysheis‘100percent’behindIraqevidence2ndJune." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3803 . Blair,T.(2003zj)."PMstatementontheG8Summit1st3rdJune."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3817 . Blair,T.(2003zk)."PMdoorstepinterviewatEuropeanCouncilmeetinginGreece 20thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3988 . Blair,T.(2003zl)."PressconferencewiththePrimeMinisterandPresidentPutinof Russia26thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4039 . Blair,T.(2003zm)."PressconferencewithPresidentBushattheWhiteHouse17th July."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4227 . Blair,T.(2003zn)."PrimeMinister’sspeechtotheUnitedStatesCongress18thJuly." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4220 .

260 Blair,T.(2003zo)."InterviewwithSkyTVinJapan20thJuly."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4231 . Blair,T.(2003zp)."PMspeechinTokyo,Japan21stJuly."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4235 . Blair,T.(2003zq)."PMdoorsteppressconferenceinChina21stJuly."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4242 . Blair,T.(2003zr)."PMdoorstepinterviewinHongKong23rdJuly."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4249 . Blair,T.(2003zs)."PrimeMinister’spressconference30thJuly."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4295 . Blair,T.(2003zt)."PrimeMinister’sPressConference4thSeptember."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4413 . Blair,T.(2003zu)."PressConference:PM,GermanChancellorandFrenchPresidentin Berlin20thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4508 . Blair,T.(2003zv)."DoorstepinterviewinBrussels17thOctober."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4673 . Blair,T.(2003zw)."PrimeMinister’sOctoberPressConference23rdOctober." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4716 . Blair,T.(2003zx)."PM’sspeechattheLordMayor’sBanquet10thNovember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4803 . Blair,T.(2003zy)."PressConference:PMTonyBlairandPresidentGeorgeBush 20thNovember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5004 . Blair,T.(2003zz)."DoorstepinterviewwithTonyBlairandtheSpanishPrime Minister,JoseMariaAznar24thNovember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5009 . Blair,T.(2003zza)."JointpressconferencewithPresidentChiracofFrance24th November."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4884 . Blair,T.(2003zzb)."PrimeMinister’spressconference2ndDecember."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4921 . Blair,T.(2003zzc)."PMstatementontheCommonwealthHeadsofGovernment meeting,Nigeria9thDecember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page4961 . Blair,T.(2003zzd)."PMstatementatDowningStreetonSaddamHussein14th December."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5006 .

261 Blair,T.(2003zze)."PM:‘Greatdealofprogress’madeatEUenlargementtalks15th December."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5016 . Blair,T.(2003zzf)."PMinterviewwiththeBritishForcesBroadcastingService16th December."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5025 . Blair,T.(2003zzg)."PMinterviewwiththeBBCArabicService16thDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5021 . Blair,T.(2003zzh)."PMwelcomesLibyanWMDannouncement19thDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5077 . Blair,T.(2004a)."PMthanksUKarmedforcesinBasravisit4thJanuary."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5094 . Blair,T.(2004b)."PrimeMinister’spressconference15thJanuary."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5157 . Blair,T.(2004c)."PMstatementonHuttonreport28thJanuary."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5232 . Blair,T.(2004d)."DoorstepinterviewinGermanywithChancellorSchroeder13th February."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5365 . Blair,T.(2004e)."PMpressconferenceinBerlin18thFebruary."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5380 . Blair,T.(2004f)."PMpressconference26thFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5431 . Blair,T.(2004g)."PressConferencewithKingAbdullahofJordan2ndMarch." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5450 . Blair,T.(2004h)."Speechonthethreatofglobalterrorism5thMarch."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5461 . Blair,T.(2004i)."PM’sopeningremarksatapressconferenceinPortugal24th March."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5565 . Blair,T.(2004j)."PressconferenceinTripoli,LibyafollowingtalkswithColonel Gaddafi25thMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5566 . Blair,T.(2004k)."PMPressConference1stApril."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5606 . Blair,T.(2004l)."PressConferencewithIraqiForeignMinister6thApril."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5624 . Blair,T.(2004m)."PressconferencewithPresidentBushinWashington16thApril" Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5653 .

262 Blair,T.(2004n)."PMandUNSecretaryGeneralmeetthemediainNewYork16th April."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5652 . Blair,T.(2004o)."StatementtoParliamentonthePM’svisittoAmerica19thApril." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5668 . Blair,T.(2004p)."StatementontheEUWhitePaperandtheEUConstitution20th April."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5669 . Blair,T.(2004q)."PMPressConference22ndApril."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5691 . Blair,T.(2004r)."PM’sinterviewwithSkyNews1stMay."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5753 . Blair,T.(2004s)."PM’sinterviewwithBBCNews241stMay."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5751 . Blair,T.(2004t)."PM’spressconferencewiththePolishPresident6thMay." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5761 . Blair,T.(2004u)."PM’sQandAwithFrenchPresidentinParis9thMay."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5780 . Blair,T.(2004v)."PM’sBBCRadioLancashireinterview12thMay."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5795 . Blair,T.(2004w)."PrimeMinister’sPressConference25thMay."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5860 . Blair,T.(2004x)."PM’sUNspeechinGeorgia8thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5924 . Blair,T.(2004y)."PMandPresidentBushPressConferenceinGeorgia9thJune." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5930 . Blair,T.(2004z)."PM’sPressConferenceinGeorgia10thJune."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5935 . Blair,T.(2004za)."PM’sG8Statement14thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5957 . Blair,T.(2004zb)."PrimeMinister’spressconference15thJune."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5965 . Blair,T.(2004zc)."PMpressconferencefollowingagreementontheEUConstitution 18thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/page5988.asp . Blair,T.(2004zd)."PM’sstatementontheEuropeanCouncil21stJune."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5993 .

263 Blair,T.(2004ze)."PM’sPressConferenceinIstanbul28thJune."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6025 . Blair,T.(2004zf)."PM’sInterviewwithIraqiya28thJune."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6045 . Blair,T.(2004zg)."PM’sInterviewwithChannel4inIstanbul28thJune."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6044 . Blair,T.(2004zh)."PMandPresidentBushPressConferenceinIstanbul28thJune." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6032 . Blair,T.(2004zi)."PM’sNATOandEuropeanCouncilStatement30thJune." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6046 . Blair,T.(2004zj)."StatementonButlerReport."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/page6109.asp . Blair,T.(2004zk)."PMPressConference22ndJuly."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6153 . Blair,T.(2004zl)."PMPressConference7thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6297 . Blair,T.(2004zm)."PMspeechonclimatechange14thSeptember."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/output/page6333.asp . Blair,T.(2004zn)."PressconferencewithIraqiPrimeMinister19thSeptember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/output/page6356.asp . Blair,T.(2004zo)."PM'sPressConferencewithIndianPM20thSeptember" Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/output/page6363.asp . Blair,T.(2004zp)."SpeechonAfrica7thOctober."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6452 . Blair,T.(2004zq)."PMmeetsUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneral19thOctober." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6461 . Blair,T.(2004zr)."PMPressConference25thOctober."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6480 . Blair,T.(2004zs)."PM’sspeechonUSElections3rdNovember."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6526 . Blair,T.(2004zt)."PM’sParliamentaryStatementonEuropeanCouncil8th November."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6546 . Blair,T.(2004zu)."PressconferencewithPresidentBushattheWhiteHouse12th November."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6573 .

264 Blair,T.(2004zv)."PM’sspeechattheLordMayor’sBanquet15thNovember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6583 . Blair,T.(2004zw)."PressconferencewithPresidentChirac18thNovember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6602 . Blair,T.(2004zx)."PressConferencewiththeHungarianPrimeMinister,Ferenc Gyurcsany19thNovember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6608 . Blair,T.(2005a)."PMPressConference6thJanuary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page6875 . Blair,T.(2005b)."PMmakesspeechatWorldEconomicForusinDavos,Switzerland 26thJanuary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7006 . Blair,T.(2005c)."PrimeMinister’spressconferenceonpovertyinAfricaattheWorld EconomicForum27thJanuary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7014 . Blair,T.(2005d)."PM’sAfricaCommissionPressConference24thFebruary." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7220 . Blair,T.(2005e)."PM’sPressConference25thFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7215 . Blair,T.(2005f)."TonyBlair/MahmoudAbbasPressConference1stMarch." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7237 . Blair,T.(2005g)."PrimeMinister’sremarksatthelaunchofCommissionforAfrica report11thMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7314 . Blair,T.(2005h)."PM’sspeechatFaithworks22ndMarch."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7375 . Blair,T.(2005i)."PM’sEuropeanCouncilStatement24thMarch."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7397 . Blair,T.(2005j)."TranscriptofPM’sPressConference12thMay."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7481 . Blair,T.(2005k)."SpeechonCompensationCulturegivenatUniversityCollege London26thMay."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7562 . Blair,T.(2005l)."MeetingwiththeAfricaCommissioninRome27thMay." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7577 . Blair,T.(2005m)."TonyBlairandGeorgeWBushjointpressconference7thJune." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7600 .

265 Blair,T.(2005n)."PM’spressconferencefollowingBrusselsEUSummit18thJune." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7686 . Blair,T.(2005o)."PM’sPressConferencewithPMofSweden21stJune."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7704 . Blair,T.(2005p)."SpeechtotheEUParliament23rdJune."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7714 . Blair,T.(2005q)."PM’sPressConference27thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7728 . Blair,T.(2005r)."PressConferencewithPrimeMinisterofIraq27thJune." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7745 . Blair,T.(2005s)."PM’sEUPresidencypressconference1stJuly."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7782 . Blair,T.(2005t)."PM’smakePovertyHistoryPressConference6thJuly."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7843 . Blair,T.(2005u)."PresidencyPressConferenceatGleneagles8thJuly."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7891 . Blair,T.(2005v)."PressconferencewithTonyBlairandAfghanPresidentHamid Karzai19thJuly."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7955 . Blair,T.(2005w)."PM’sstatementafterLondonattacks21stJuly."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7969 . Blair,T.(2005x)."PressConferencewithTheFrenchPrimeMinister25thJuly." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7998 . Blair,T.(2005y)."PM’sPressConference26thJuly."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page7999 . Blair,T.(2005z)."PressConferencewiththeSpanishPrimeMinister27thJuly." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8011 . Blair,T.(2005za)."PM’sPressConferencewithHMTheKingofBahrain27thJuly." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8027 . Blair,T.(2005zb)."PMsPressConference5thAugust."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8041 . Blair,T.(2005zc)."PressconferencewithPremierWenJiabaoandPresidentBarroso 6thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8133 . Blair,T.(2005zd)."PressconferenceatlaunchofIndiaEUStrategicPartnership7th September."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8145 .

266 Blair,T.(2005ze)."JointpressconferencebetweenTonyBlairandManmohanSingh 8thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8152 . Blair,T.(2005zf)."StatementtoUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilonterrorism14th September."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8191 . Blair,T.(2005zg)."SpeechtotheGeneralAssemblyatthe2005UNWorldSummit 15thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8195 . Blair,T.(2005zh)."JointpressconferenceatUNWorldSummitbetweenthePMand PervezMusharraf15thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8194 . Blair,T.(2005zi)."PMandBobGeldofglobalpovertypressconferenceatUNSummit 16thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8209 . Blair,T.(2005zj)."PressconferenceatEURussiasummit5thOctober."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8258 . Blair,T.(2005zk)."JointpressconferencewithIraqiPresidentJalalTalabani6th October."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8272 . Blair,T.(2005zl)."PMandPresidentChiracspeaktojournalistsafterinformaltalks 10thOctober."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8278 . Blair,T.(2005zm)."PM’smonthlyDowningStreetpressconference11thOctober." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8294 . Blair,T.(2005zn)."DoorstepwithMaltesePrimeMinisterLawrenceGonziinDowning Street24thOctober."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8362 . Blair,T.(2005zo)."PressconferenceatEUinformalsummitHamptonCourt27th October."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8393 . Blair,T.(2005zp)."StatementonInformalEUHeadsofStateorGovernmentMeeting 31stOctober."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8475 . Blair,T.(2005zq)."DoorstepinterviewwithMasoudBarzani,Presidentofthe KurdistannregioninIraq31stOctober."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8408 . Blair,T.(2005zr)."MonthlyDowningStreetpressconference7thNovember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8493 . Blair,T.(2005zs)."PMreflectsonterrorlawdefeat10thNovember."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8510 .

267 Blair,T.(2005zt)."LordMayor’sBanquetspeech14thNovember."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8524 . Blair,T.(2005zu)."DoorstepinterviewwithIraqivicepresidentAdilAbdulMahdiin Number1014thNovember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8521 . Blair,T.(2005zv)."DoorstepofTonyBlairandPolishPMKazimierzMarcinkiewiczin Number1024thNovember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8582 . Blair,T.(2005zv)."PressconferencewiththePakistaniPrimeMinisterShaukatAziz 25thNovember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8590 . Blair,T.(2005zw)."PressconferencewiththePresidentoftheEuropeanCommission andthePalestinianPresident27thNovember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8593 . Blair,T.(2005zx)."SpeechtotheCBIConference29thNovember."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8606 . Blair,T.(2005zy)."PressconferencewiththePresidentofUkraineandthePresidentof theEuropeanCommission1stDecember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8704 . Blair,T.(2005zz)."PressconferencewiththePrimeMinistersofEstonia,Lithuaniaand Latvia2ndDecember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8705 . Blair,T.(2005zza)."PM’sacceptancecommentsforStatesmenoftheDecadeaward 8thDecember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8737 . Blair,T.(2005zzb)."Peopleshouldnothavetoliveinfear,saysPM12thDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8745 . Blair,T.(2005zzc)."CommonsstatementonEUCouncilmeeting19thDecember" Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8807 . Blair,T.(2005zzd)."PMcommentsatEUParliament20thDecember."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9351 . Blair,T.(2005zze)."SpeechattheShaibaLogisticsBaseinIraq22ndDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8841 . Blair,T.(2005zzf)."MonthlyDowningStreetpressconference22ndDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8834 . Blair,T.(2005zzg)."DoorstepinBasra22ndDecember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8842 .

268 Blair,T.(2005zzh)."InterviewwithBritishForcesBroadcasting23rdDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8823 . Blair,T.(2006a)."PM’sRespectActionPlanspeech10thJanuary."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8898 . Blair,T.(2006b)."PMpressconference23rdJanuary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8938 . Blair,T.(2006c)."StatementtotheAfghanrebuildingconference31stJanuary." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8983 . Blair,T.(2006d)."InterviewattheLondonConferenceonAfghanistan31stJanuary." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8985 . Blair,T.(2006e)."SpeechonthefutureofEurope2ndFebruary."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9003 . Blair,T.(2006f)."CarteBlancheInterview11thFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9046 . Blair,T.(2006g)."PressConferencewiththeMembersoftheGlobalGovernance Summit12thFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9045 . Blair,T.(2006h)."PressconferencewithAngelaMerkelinBerlin17thFebruary." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9082 . Blair,T.(2006i)."Monthlypressconference23rdFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9098 . Blair,T.(2006j)."KeynotespeechtoAsia2015conference7thMarch."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9152 . Blair,T.(2006k)."MeetingwithStudentsinBratislava10thMarch."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9181 . Blair,T.(2006l)."JointPressConferencewithTheCzechPrimeMinister10th March."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9180 . Blair,T.(2006m)."PM’smonthlypressconference16thMarch."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9212 . Blair,T.(2006n)."ForeignPolicySpeechI21stMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9224 . Blair,T.(2006o)."ForeignPolicySpeechII27thMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9245 . Blair,T.(2006p)."PressconferencewiththeAustralianPrimeMinister28thMarch." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9254 .

269 Blair,T.(2006q)."JointpressconferencewiththeNewZealandPrimeMinister29th March."Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9261 . Blair,T.(2006r)."DoorstepwithBulgarianPresidentGeorgiParvanov4thApril." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9283 . Blair,T.(2006s)."PM’smonthlypressconference24thApril."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9353 . Blair,T.(2006t)."PM’smonthlypressconference8thMay."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9400 . Blair,T.(2006u)."PM’sremarksatmeetingwithMuslimWomen10thMay." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9425 . Blair,T.(2006v)."PressconferencewithTonyBlairIraqiPrimeMinisterNouriMaliki 22ndMay."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9509 . Blair,T.(2006w)."InterviewwithAlJazeeraTV24thMay."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9537 . Blair,T.(2006x)."ForeignPolicySpeech326thMay."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9549 . Blair,T.(2006y)."JointpressconferencewithGeorgeBush26thMay."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9545 . Blair,T.(2006z)."PM’sinterviewwithDowningStreetwebsite6thJune."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9566 . Blair,T.(2006za)."PM’smonthlypressconference8thJune."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9578 . Blair,T.(2006zb)."OurNation’sFuture23rdJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9737 . Blair,T.(2006zc)."AyearafterGleneagles26thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9746 . Blair,T.(2006zd)."JointpressconferencewithAbdelazizBouteflika11thJuly." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9832 . Blair,T.(2006ze)."PressConferencewithPresidentBush28thJuly."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9938 . Blair,T.(2006zf)."SpeechtoNewsCorps,PebbleBeach,California30thJuly." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9937 . Blair,T.(2006zg)."ClintonClimateInitiative1stAugust."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9961 .

270 Blair,T.(2006zh)."SpeechontheMiddleEasttotheLosAngelesWorldAffairs Council1stAugust."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9948 . Blair,T.(2006zi)."PM’smonthlypressconference3rdAugust."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9960 . Blair,T.(2006zj)."PressconferencewithLebanon’sPrimeMinisterFouadSiniora 11thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10049 . Blair,T.(2006zk)."PressconferencewithWenJiabaoinDowningStreet13th September."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10056 . Blair,T.(2006zl)."PressconferencewithPrimeMinisterofIndia10thOctober." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10184 . Blair,T.(2006zm)."StatementwiththeHungarianPrimeMinister11thOctober." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10194 . Blair,T.(2006zn)."SpeechatCanadaUKchamberofcommerce16thOctober." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10222 . Blair,T.(2006zo)."PM’smonthlypressconferece17thOctober."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10228. Blair,T.(2006zp)."PMdefendsIDcardsschemeforTheDailyTelegraph6th November."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10360 . Blair,T.(2006zq)."Monthlypressconference6thNovember."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10368 . Blair,T.(2006zr)."PressconferencewiththePresidentofPoland7thNovember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10383 . Blair,T.(2006zs)."PressConferencewiththeNewZealandPrimeMinister10th November."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10400 . Blair,T.(2006zt)."PM’sworldaffairsspeechtoLordMayor’sBanquet13th November."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10409 . Blair,T.(2006zu)."PM’sinterviewwithDowningStreetwebsite16thNovember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10436 . Blair,T.(2006zv)."PM’saddresstoTroopsinKabul20thNovember."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10455.

271 Blair,T.(2006zw)."PressConferencewiththePresidentofAfghanistan20th November."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10453 . Blair,T.(2006zx)."DoorstepatNATOSummitinRiga29thNovember."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10505. Blair,T.(2006zy)."ParliamentarystatementonTrident4thDecember."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10532. Blair,T.(2006zz)."Monthlypressconference6thDecember."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10589 . Blair,T.(2006zza)."PressConferencewithPresidentBush7thDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10565 . Blair,T.(2006zzb)."SpeechonMulticulturalismandintegration8thDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10563 . Blair,T.(2006zzc)."DayofActiononDarfur9thDecember."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10569 . Blair,T.(2006zzd)."AddresstotroopsinIraq17thDecember."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10620 . Blair,T.(2006zze)."PressConferencewiththeIsraeliPrimeMinister18th December."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10653 . Blair,T.(2006zzf)."SpeechtoBusinessLeadersinDubai20thDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10661 . Blair,T.(2006zzg)."ChristmasinterviewwithChrisEvans20thDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10663 . Blair,T.(2006zzh)."libertyepetitionreply20thDecember."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10666 . Blunkett,D.(2003a)."ResponseToTheReportOfTheAntiTerrorism,CrimeAnd SecurityAct2001Review."Retrieved30/08/08,from http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press releases/Response_To_The_Report_Of_The_An?version=1. Blunkett,D.(2003b)."SecurityandJustice,MutualityandIndividualRights." Retrieved30/08/08,fromhttp://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speeches archive/sphssecurityjustice0403?view=Binary . Blunkett,D.(2004a).DavidBlunkett:FreedomfromTerroristAttackisalsoaHuman Right.TheIndependent .Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/davidblunkettfreedom fromterroristattackisalsoahumanright556280.html

272 Blunkett,D.(2004b)."DefendingtheDemocraticStateandMaintainingLiberty–Two SidesoftheSameCoin?"Retrieved30/08/08,from http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/defending.pdf?view=Binary . Blunkett,D.(2004c)."ThreattotheUK."Retrieved30/08/08,from http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/threat_to_UK.pdf?view=Binary . Blunkett,D.(2004d)."CourtOfAppealJudgmentStatementFromTheHome Secretary."Retrieved30/08/08,from http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/Court_of_Appeal.pdf?view=Binary Bush,G.W.(2001a)."PresidentGeorgeW.Bush'sInauguralAddress20thJanuary." Retrieved14/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural address.html . Bush,G.W.(2001b)."RemarksbythePresidenttotheTroopsofFortStewart12th February."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20010212.html . Bush,G.W.(2001c)."RemarksbyPresidentGeorgeW.BushandPresidentVicente FoxofMexicoinJointPressConference16thFebruary."Retrieved14/09/08, fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/200102163.html . Bush,G.W.(2001d)."RemarksbythePresidentandPrimeMinisterBlairinJointPress Conference23rdFebruary."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/200102261.html . Bush,G.W.(2001e)."RemarksbythePresidentatChristeningCeremonyfortheUSS RonaldReagan4thMarch."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010305.html . Bush,G.W.(2001f)."RemarksbythePresidenttoCentralIntelligenceEmployees 20thMarch."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/200103205.html . Bush,G.W.(2001g)."PressConferencebythePresident29thMarch."Retrieved 14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010329.html . Bush,G.W.(2001h)."RemarksbythePresidentandGermanChancellorSchroederin PhotoOpportunity29thMarch."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/200103292.html . Bush,G.W.(2001i)."RemarksbythePresidentUpontheReturnFromChinaofU.S. ServiceMembers12thApril."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/04/200104126.html . Bush,G.W.(2001j)."RemarksbythePresidenttotheOrganizationofAmericanStates 17thApril."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/04/200104174.html .

273 Bush,G.W.(2001k)."RemarksbythePresidenttoStudentsandFacultyatNational DefenseUniversity1stMay."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/2001050110.html . Bush,G.W.(2001l)."LawDay,U.S.A.,20011stMay."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/200105015.html . Bush,G.W.(2001m)."PresidentAnnouncesProposalforGlobalFundtoFight HIV/AIDS,MalariaandTuberculosis11thMay."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/200105111.html . Bush,G.W.(2001n)."PressConferenceofthePresident11thMay."Retrieved 14/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010511 3.html . Bush,G.W.(2001o)."RemarksbythePresidentatMilitaryReenlistmentCeremony 23rdMay."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/200105238.html . Bush,G.W.(2001p)."RemarksbythePresidentatU.S.NavalAcademy Commencement25thMay."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/200105251.html . Bush,G.W.(2001q)."RemarksbythePresidenttoLosAngelesWorldAffairsCouncil 31stMay."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/200105318.html . Bush,G.W.(2001r)."JointPressConferencewithPresidentGeorgeW.Bushand PresidentJoseMariaAznar12thJune."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/200106126.html . Bush,G.W.(2001s)."PressAvailabilitywithPresidentBushandNATOSecretary GeneralLordRobertson13thJune."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/2001061310.html . Bush,G.W.(2001t)."RemarksbythePresidentinAddresstoFacultyandStudentsof WarsawUniversity15thJune."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/200106151.html . Bush,G.W.(2001u)."RemarksbythePresidenttotheWorldBank17thJuly." Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/200107171.html . Bush,G.W.(2001v)."RemarksbythePresidentinRoundtableInterviewwithForeign Press"Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010718.html . Bush,G.W.(2001w)."PressConferencebyPresidentBushandPrimeMinisterTony Blair19thJuly."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/200107195.html .

274 Bush,G.W.(2001x)."RemarksbythePresidenttotheAmericanTroopsinKosovo 24thJuly."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/200107241.html . Bush,G.W.(2001y)."RemarksbythePresidenttotheVeteransofForeignWars20th August."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/200108201.html . Bush,G.W.(2001z)."RemarksbythePresidentandSecretaryRumsfeldin AnnouncementofChairmanandViceChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff 24thAugust."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010824.html . Bush,G.W.(2001za)."PresidentDiscussesDefensePrioritiesatAmericanLegion 29thAugust."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/200108292.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zb)."StatementbythePresidentinHisAddresstotheNation11th September."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/2001091116.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zc)."PresidentUrgesReadinessandPatience15thSeptember." Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109154.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zd)."RemarksbythePresidentUponArrival16thSeptember." Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109162.html . Bush,G.W.(2001ze)."GuardandReserves"DefineSpiritofAmerica"17th September."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109173.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zf)."PresidentChiracPledgesSupport18thSeptember."Retrieved 14/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010918 8.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zg)."PresidentBuildingWorldwideCampaignAgainstTerrorism 19thSeptember."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109191.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zh)."AddresstoaJointSessionofCongressandtheAmerican People20thSeptember."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109208.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zi)."President:FBINeedsToolstoTrackDownTerrorists25th September."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109255.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zj)."President:"We'reMakingProgress"1stOctober."Retrieved 14/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011001 6.html .

275 Bush,G.W.(2001zk)."PresidentUnveilsBacktoWorkPlan4thOctober." Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/200110048.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zl)."PresidentDirectsHumanitarianAidtoAfghanistan4th October."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011004.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zm)."PresidentialAddresstotheNation7thOctober."Retrieved 14/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007 8.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zn)."GermanLeaderReiteratesSolidaritywithU.S.9thOctober." Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/2001100913.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zo)."PresidentUnveils"MostWanted"Terrorists10thOctober." Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/200110103.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zp)."NATOChiefStressesInternationalResolve10thOctober." Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/200110106.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zq)."PresidentWelcomesNewChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff 15thOctober."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/2001101510.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zr)."PresidentRalliesTroopsatTravisAirForceBase17th October."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/2001101720.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zs)."PresidentBushandRussianPresidentPutinDiscussProgress 21stOctober."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/200110213.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zt)."PresidentSignsAntiTerrorismBill26thOctober."Retrieved 14/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011026 5.html. Bush,G.W.(2001zu)."PresidentBushCallsforActionontheEconomyandEnergy 26thOctober."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/200110269.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zv)."PresidentBush:"NoNationCanBeNeutralinThisConflict" 6thNovember."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/200111062.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zw)."PresidentDiscussesWaronTerrorism8thNovember." Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/2001110813.html .

276 Bush,G.W.(2001zx)."PrimeMinisterBlairSaysCoalitionisStronger8th November."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/200111081.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zy)."PresidentMeetswithPrimeMinisterofIndia9thNovember." Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/200111092.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zz)."PresidentBushSpeakstoUnitedNations10thNovember." Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/200111103.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zza)."PresidentAnnouncesReductioninNuclearArsenal13th November."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/200111133.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zzb)."PresidentIssuesMilitaryOrder13thNovember."Retrieved 14/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113 27.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zzc)."PresidentSaysU.S.AttorneysonFrontLineinWar29th November."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/2001112912.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zzd)."PresidentAsksGlobalLeaderstoPlayAnthemsonDec11 5thDecember."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/2001120511.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zze)."President:We'reFightingtoWinAndWinWeWill: RemarksbythePresidentontheUSSEnterpriseonPearlHarborDay7th December."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011207.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zzf)."PresidentProclaimsHumanRightsDay&BillofRightsWeek 9thDecember."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011209.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zzg)."PresidentSpeaksonWarEfforttoCitadelCadets11th December."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/200112116.html . Bush,G.W.(2001zzh)."President,GeneralFranksDiscussWarEffort28th December."Retrieved14/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/200112281.html . Bush,G.W.(2002a)."PresidentHoldsTownHallForumonEconomyinCalifornia 5thJanuary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/200201053.html . Bush,G.W.(2002b)."PresidentSignsDefenseAppropriationsBill10thJanuary." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/200201105.html .

277 Bush,G.W.(2002c)."RemarksbythePresidenttotheWorldAffairsCouncilNational Conference16thJanuary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002011613.html . Bush,G.W.(2002d)."NationalSanctityofHumanLifeDay,200218thJanuary." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002011810.html . Bush,G.W.(2002e)."PresidentThanksReserveOfficersAssociationforCommitment 23rdJanuary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002012316.html . Bush,G.W.(2002f)."PresidentAnnouncesSubstantialIncreasesinHomelandSecurity Budget24thJanuary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/200201241.html . Bush,G.W.(2002g)."PresidentMeetswithAfghanInterimAuthorityChairman28th January."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002012813.html . Bush,G.W.(2002h)."PresidentDeliversStateoftheUnionAddress29thJanuary." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002012911.html . Bush,G.W.(2002i)."U.S.PakistanAffirmCommitmentAgainstTerrorism13th February."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/200202133.html . Bush,G.W.(2002j)."PresidentRalliestheTroopsinAlaska16thFebruary." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/200202161.html . Bush,G.W.(2002k)."PresidentBush,PrimeMinisterKoizumiHoldPressConference 18thFebruary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020218.html . Bush,G.W.(2002l)."PresidentSpeakstoU.S.TroopsinSeoul21stFebruary." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/200202216.html . Bush,G.W.(2002m)."PresidentBushSpeaksatTsinghuaUniversity22nd February."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020222.html . Bush,G.W.(2002n)."PresidentReiteratesCallforCorporateResponsibility8th March."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/200203084.html . Bush,G.W.(2002o)."PresidentThanksWorldCoalitionforAntiTerrorismEfforts 11thMarch."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/200203111.html .

278 Bush,G.W.(2002p)."PresidentBushHoldsPressConference13thMarch." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/200203138.html . Bush,G.W.(2002q)."PresidentProposes$5BillionPlantoHelpDevelopingNations 14thMarch."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/200203147.html . Bush,G.W.(2002r)."PresidentCallsforQuickPassageofDefenseBill15thMarch." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020315.html . Bush,G.W.(2002s)."RemarksbythePresidenttotheTravelPool20thMarch." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/2002032017.html . Bush,G.W.(2002t)."NationalFormerPrisonerofWarRecognitionDay,20024th April."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/200204048.html . Bush,G.W.(2002u)."PresidentBush,PrimeMinisterBlairHoldPressConference 6thApril."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/200204063.html . Bush,G.W.(2002v)."PresidentOutlinesWarEffort17thApril."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020417 1.html . Bush,G.W.(2002w)."PresidentPromotesCompassionateConservatism30thApril." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/200204305.html . Bush,G.W.(2002x)."PresidentCallsonSenatetoAddressVacancyCrisisinFederal Courts3rdMay."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/200205031.html . Bush,G.W.(2002y)."PresidentBushThanksGermanyforSupportAgainstTerror 23rdMay."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/200205232.html . Bush,G.W.(2002z)."PresidentBush,RussianPresidentPutinSignNuclearArms Treaty24thMay."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/2002052410.html . Bush,G.W.(2002za)."RemarksbythePresidenttoCommunityandReligiousLeaders 24thMay."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/2002052412.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zb)."NATORussiaCouncilEstablished28thMay."Retrieved 15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020528.html .

279 Bush,G.W.(2002zc)."PresidentBushDeliversGraduationSpeechatWestPoint1st June."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/200206013.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zd)."RemarksbythePresidentinAddresstotheNation6thJune." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/200206068.html . Bush,G.W.(2002ze)."PresidentMeetswithCongressionalLeadersonHomeland Security7thJune."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/200206071.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zf)."PresidentDiscussesNation'sCriticalInfrastructure11thJune." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/2002061110.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zg)."PresidentDiscussesSecurityandDefenseIssues21st August."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/200208211.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zh)."PresidentDiscussesForeignPolicywithCongressionalLeaders 4thSeptember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/200209041.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zi)."PresidentBush,PrimeMinisterBlairDiscussKeepingthePeace 7thSeptember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/200209072.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zj)."President'sRemarksattheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly 12thSeptember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/200209121.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zk)."PresidentBushDiscussesIraqwithReporters13th September."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020913.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zl)."PresidentDiscussesGrowingDangerposedbySaddam Hussein'sRegime14thSeptember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020914.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zm)."RemarksbythePresidentatRepublicanGovernors AssociationFallReception19thSeptember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/2002091914.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zn)."PresidentBushCallsonCongresstoActonNation'sPriorities 23rdSeptember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/200209232.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zo)."PresidentBush,ColombiaPresidentUribeDiscussTerrorism 25thSeptember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/200209251.html .

280 Bush,G.W.(2002zp)."RemarksbythePresidentatFlagstaff,ArizonaWelcome27th September."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/200209275.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zq)."RemarksbythePresidentatBobEhrlichforGovernor Reception2ndOctober."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/2002100214.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zr)."PresidentBushOutlinesIraqiThreat7thOctober."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007 8.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zs)."PresidentHighlightsHumanitarianEffortsinAfghanistan11th October."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/200210113.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zt)."PresidentDiscussesForeignPolicyMatterswithNATO Secretary21stOctober."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/200210218.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zu)."RemarksbythePresidentonJudicialConfirmations30th October."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/200210306.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zv)."PresidentOffersSolutionstoFixJudicialCrisis2nd November."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021102.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zw)."PresidentOutlinesPriorities7thNovember."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021107 2.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zx)."PresidentPleasedwithU.N.Vote8thNovember."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021108 1.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zy)."PresidentBushSalutesVeteransatWhiteHouseCeremony 11thNovember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/200211112.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zz)."PresidentBushPushesforHomelandSecurityDepartment 12thNovember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/200211121.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zza)."InterviewofthePresidentbyRadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty 18thNovember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/200211187.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zzb)."PresidentBushPreviewsHistoricNATOSummitinPrague Speech20thNovember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/200211204.html .

281 Bush,G.W.(2002zzc)."PresidentBushWelcomesRomaniatoNATO23rd November."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/200211237.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zzd)."PresidentBushSignsHomelandSecurityAct25th November."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/200211256.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zze)."PresidentSignsNationalDefenseAuthorizationAct2nd December."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/200212028.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zzf)."PresidentBushSignsChildInternetSafetyLegislation4th December."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/200212041.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zzg)."HumanRightsDay,BillofRightsDay,andHumanRights Week,20029thDecember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/2002120910.html . Bush,G.W.(2002zzh)."PresidentDiscussesIraqandNorthKoreawithReporters 31stDecember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/200212311.html . Bush,G.W.(2003a)."PresidentRalliesTroopsatFortHood3rdJanuary."Retrieved 15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030103.html . Bush,G.W.(2003b)."PresidentDelivers"StateoftheUnion"28thJanuary." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/2003012819.html . Bush,G.W.(2003c)."PresidentBushMeetswithPrimeMinisterBlair31stJanuary." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/2003013123.html . Bush,G.W.(2003d)."PresidentDiscussesMeasurestoProtecttheHomelandfrom Bioterrorism3rdFebruary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/2003020313.html . Bush,G.W.(2003e)."PresidentBush:"WorldCanRisetoThisMoment"6th February."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/2003020617.html . Bush,G.W.(2003f)."PresidentBush:"ThisisaDefiningMomentfortheU.N. SecurityCouncil"7thFebruary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/200302073.html . Bush,G.W.(2003g)."PresidentBushDiscussesFaithBasedInitiativeinTennessee 10thFebruary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/200302101.html .

282 Bush,G.W.(2003h)."PresidentBushMeetswithPrimeMinisterHowardofAustralia 10thFebruary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/2003021010.html . Bush,G.W.(2003i)."PresidentSalutesSailorsatNavalStationMayportin Jacksonville13thFebruary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/200302133.html . Bush,G.W.(2003j)."PresidentSpeaksatFBIonNewTerroristThreatIntegration Center14thFebruary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/200302145.html . Bush,G.W.(2003k)."PresidentCallsforActiononJudicialNominee26thFebruary." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/200302263.html . Bush,G.W.(2003l)."PresidentDiscussestheFutureofIraq26thFebruary." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/2003022611.html . Bush,G.W.(2003m)."PresidentGeorgeBushDiscussesIraqinNationalPress Conference6thMarch."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200303068.html . Bush,G.W.(2003n)."PresidentSaysSaddamHusseinMustLeaveIraqWithin48 Hours17thMarch."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200303177.html . Bush,G.W.(2003o)."PresidentBushAddressestheNation19thMarch."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319 17.html . Bush,G.W.(2003p)."PresidentRalliesTroopsatMacDillAirForceBaseinTampa 26thMarch."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200303264.html . Bush,G.W.(2003q)."PresidentBush,PrimeMinisterBlairHoldPressAvailability 27thMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200303273.html . Bush,G.W.(2003r)."PresidentSalutestheMilitary28thMarch."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030328 6.html . Bush,G.W.(2003s)."PresidentDiscussesOperationIraqiFreedomatCampLejeune 3rdApril."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/200304033.html . Bush,G.W.(2003t)."PresidentBushMeetswithPrimeMinisterBlairinNorthern Ireland8thApril."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030408.html .

283 Bush,G.W.(2003u)."PresidentDiscussesIraq,Syria13thApril."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030413 1.html . Bush,G.W.(2003v)."PresidentBushOutlinesProgressinOperationIraqiFreedom 16thApril."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/200304169.html . Bush,G.W.(2003w)."PresidentDiscussestheFutureofIraq28thApril."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030428 3.html . Bush,G.W.(2003x)."RemarksbyPresidentBushandPresidentUribeofColombiain PhotoOpportunity30thApril."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/2003043025.html . Bush,G.W.(2003y)."PresidentBushAnnouncesMajorCombatOperationsinIraq HaveEnded1stMay."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/2003050115.html . Bush,G.W.(2003z)."PresidentBush,P.M.HowardDiscussOperationIraqiFreedom 3rdMay."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/200305031.html . Bush,G.W.(2003za)."PresidentBushPressesforPeaceintheMiddleEast9thMay." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/2003050911.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zb)."PresidentCallsforJudicialReform9thMay."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030509 4.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zc)."PresidentDeliversCommencementAddressatCoastGuard 21stMay."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/200305212.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zd)."RemarksbythePresidentat2003President'sDinner21st May."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/2003052112.html . Bush,G.W.(2003ze)."RemarksbythePresidenttothePeopleofPoland31stMay." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/200305313.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zf)."PresidentBush,RussianPresidentPutinSignTreatyofMoscow 1stJune."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/200306012.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zg)."PresidentTalkstoTroopsinQatar5thJune."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030605 1.html .

284 Bush,G.W.(2003zh)."PresidentDiscussesMiddleEast,IraqandtheDollarinCabinet Meeting9thJune."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/200306094.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zi)."PresidentBushWelcomesPresidentMusharraftoCampDavid 24thJune."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/200306243.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zj)."PresidentBush,EuropeanLeadersActtoFightGlobalTerror 25thJune."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/2003062512.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zk)."PresidentDiscussesProgressinAfghanistan,Iraq1stJuly." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/200307019.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zl)."PresidentBushDiscussesUpcomingAfricaTripwithReporters 3rdJuly."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/200307035.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zm)."PresidentBushHonorsMilitaryinFourthofJulySpeech4th July."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/200307041.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zn)."PresidentReaffirmsStrongPositiononLiberia14thJuly." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/200307143.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zo)."PresidentBush,PrimeMinisterBlairDiscussWaronTerrorism 17thJuly."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/200307179.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zp)."PresidentBushWelcomesPrimeMinisterAbbastoWhite House25thJuly."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/200307256.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zq)."PresidentBushDiscussesTopPrioritiesfortheU.S.30th July."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/200307301.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zr)."President'sInterviewwithArmedForcesRadioandTelevision Service14thAugust."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/200308185.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zs)."PresidentBushThanksMilitary14thAugust."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/20030814 2.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zt)."PresidentAddressestheNation7thSeptember."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907 1.html .

285 Bush,G.W.(2003zu)."PresidentBushCommendsMilitaryinSpeechatFortStewart, Georgia12thSeptember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/200309123.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zv)."PresidentBushAddressesUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly 23rdSeptember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/200309234.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zw)."PresidentBushSignsHomelandSecurityAppropriationsBill 1stOctober."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/200310014.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zx)."RemarksbythePresidentatthe2003RepublicanNational CommitteePresidentialGala8thOctober."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/200310089.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zy)."InterviewofthePresidentbyLaurenceOakes,Channel9TV 14thOctober."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/200310184.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zz)."RoundtableInterviewofthePresidentwithAsianPrint Journalists14thOctober."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/200310161.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zza)."President'sRadioAddress25thOctober."Retrieved 15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031025.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zzb)."PresidentBush,AmbassadorBremerDiscussProgressinIraq 27thOctober."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/200310271.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zzc)."InterviewofthePresidentbySirDavidFrostofBBCTV 12thNovember."Retrieved16/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/200311171.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zzd)."InterviewofthePresidentbyTrevorKavanaghof"TheSun" 14thNovember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/200311173.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zze)."PresidentBushDiscussesIraqPolicyatWhitehallPalacein London19thNovember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/200311191.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zzf)."HumanRightsWeek,200310thDecember."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031210 3.html . Bush,G.W.(2003zzg)."PresidentBushHoldsPressConference15thDecember." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/200312153.html .

286 Bush,G.W.(2003zzh)."PresidentBushMeetswithWoundedSoldiersatWalterReed 18thDecember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/200312181.html . Bush,G.W.(2004a)."StateoftheUnionAddress20thJanuary."Retrieved15/09/08, fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/200401207.html . Bush,G.W.(2004b)."PresidentDiscussesAmerica’sLeadershipinGlobalWaron Terror22ndJanuary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/200401226.html . Bush,G.W.(2004c)."PresidentBushSpeakswithNation'sMayorsatWinterMeeting 23rdJanuary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/200401232.html . Bush,G.W.(2004d)."PresidentAnnouncesNewMeasurestoCountertheThreatof WMD11thFebruary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/200402114.html . Bush,G.W.(2004e)."PresidentMeetswithUSMilitaryPersonnelatFortPolk, Louisiana17thFebruary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/200402175.html . Bush,G.W.(2004f)."RemarksbythePresidenttotheNationalGovernorsAssociation 23rdFebruary."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/200402233.html . Bush,G.W.(2004g)."PresidentMarksHomelandSecurity'sAccomplishmentsatYear One2ndMarch."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/200403022.html . Bush,G.W.(2004h)."PresidentBushMeetswithMilitaryPersonnelatFortCampbell 18thMarch."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/200403183.html . Bush,G.W.(2004i)."PresidentBushReaffirmsResolvetoWaronTerror,Iraqand Afghanistan19thMarch."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/200403193.html . Bush,G.W.(2004j)."PresidentBushWelcomesSevenNationstotheNATOAlliance 29thMarch."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/200403294.html . Bush,G.W.(2004k)."PresidentDiscussesHomelandSecuritywithWIFirst Responders30thMarch."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/200403306.html . Bush,G.W.(2004l)."RemarksbythePresidentatBushCheney2004Dinner31st March."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/200403316.html .

287 Bush,G.W.(2004m)."PresidentAddressestheNationinPrimeTimePressConference 13thApril."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/2004041320.html . Bush,G.W.(2004n)."Bush,BlairDiscussSharonPlan;FutureofIraqinPress Conference16thApril."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/200404164.html . Bush,G.W.(2004o)."PresidentBushCallsforRenewingtheUSAPATRIOTAct 19thApril."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/200404194.html . Bush,G.W.(2004p)."PresidentBush:InformationSharing,PatriotActVitalto HomelandSecurity20thApril."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/200404202.html . Bush,G.W.(2004q)."PresidentBush,SwedishPMShareVisionforFreedom28th April."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/200404283.html . Bush,G.W.(2004r)."PresidentBushWelcomesCanadianPrimeMinisterMartinto WhiteHouse30thApril."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/200404302.html . Bush,G.W.(2004s)."PresidentBushMeetswithAlArabiyaTelevisiononWednesday 5thMay."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/200405052.html . Bush,G.W.(2004t)."PresidentBush,JordanianKingDiscussIraq,MiddleEast6th May."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/200405069.html . Bush,G.W.(2004u)."InterviewofthePresidentbyAlAhramInternational6th May."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/200405077.html . Bush,G.W.(2004v)."President'sRadioAddress8thMay."Retrieved15/09/08, fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040508.html . Bush,G.W.(2004w)."PresidentBushReaffirmsCommitmentsinIraq10thMay." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/200405103.html . Bush,G.W.(2004x)."PresidentDeliversCommencementAddressatConcordia University14thMay."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/200405144.html . Bush,G.W.(2004y)."InterviewofthePresidentbyAlZamanNewspaper20thMay." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/2004052013.html .

288 Bush,G.W.(2004z)."PresidentOutlinesStepstoHelpIraqAchieveDemocracyand Freedom24thMay."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/2004052410.html . Bush,G.W.(2004za)."President'sDiscussesMemorialDayinWeeklyRadioAddress 29thMay."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040529.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zb)."PresidentBushDiscussestheIraqiInterimGovernment1st June."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/200406012.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zc)."InterviewofthePresidentbyRaiItalianTelevision2ndJune." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/200406022.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zd)."RemarksbythePresidentataJointPressAvailabilitywith AustralianPrimeMinisterJohnHoward3rdJune."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/200406033.html . Bush,G.W.(2004ze)."InterviewofthePresidentbyParisMatchMagazine4thJune." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/200406042.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zf)."RemarksbyPresidentBushandPrimeMinisterBerlusconi5th June."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/200406051.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zg)."PresidentBushHoldsPressConferenceFollowingtheG8 Summit10thJune."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/2004061036.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zh)."PresidentSalutestheMilitaryatMacdillAirForceBasein Tampa16thJune."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/200406164.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zi)."PresidentBushWelcomesPrimeMinisterofHungary22nd June."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/200406224.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zj)."President'sStatementontheU.N.InternationalDayinSupport ofVictimsofTorture26thJune."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/2004062619.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zk)."RemarksbyPresidentGeorgeBush,PrimeMinisterofIreland BertieAhern,andPresidentoftheEuropeanCommissionRomanoProdiin PressAvailability26thJune."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/2004062616.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zl)."PresidentCommemorates40thAnniversaryofCivilRightsAct 1stJuly."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/2004070110.html .

289 Bush,G.W.(2004zm)."PresidentCelebratesIndependenceDay4thJuly."Retrieved 15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040704.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zn)."PresidentBushMeetswithNorthCarolinaJudicialNominees 7thJuly."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/200407073.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zo)."PresidentBushDiscussesProgressintheWaronTerror12th July."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/200407125.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zp)."President'sRemarksatDuluth,MinnesotaRally13thJuly." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/2004071312.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zq)."PresidentBushDiscussesProgressinHomelandSecurityin Illinois22ndJuly."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/2004072212.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zr)."President'sRemarksonIntelligenceReform2ndAugust." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/200408022.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zs)."PresidentMeetswithDefenseTeam23rdAugust."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040823 4.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zt)."President'sRadioAddress11thSeptember."Retrieved 15/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040911 3.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zu)."PresidentSpeakstotheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly 21stSeptember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/200409213.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zv)."PresidentBushandPrimeMinisterAllawiPressConference 23rdSeptember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/200409238.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zw)."RemarksbyPresidentBushandSenatorKerryinSecond2004 PresidentialDebate9thOctober."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/200410092.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zx)."PresidentandGeneralTommyFranks'sRemarksataVictory 2004RallyinMorrison,Colorado11thOctober."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/2004101113.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zy)."RemarksbyPresidentBushandSenatorKerryintheThird 2004PresidentialDebate14thOctober."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/200410141.html .

290 Bush,G.W.(2004zz)."President'sRemarksonHomelandSecurityinNewJersey 18thOctober."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/2004101811.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zza)."RemarksbyPresidentBushandNATOSecretaryGeneralde HoopScheffer10thNovember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/200411106.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zzb)."PresidentandPrimeMinisterBlairDiscussedIraq,Middle East12thNovember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/200411125.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zzc)."PresidentDiscussesStrongRelationshipwithCanada1st December."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/200412014.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zzd)."PresidentBushandPresidentMusharrafDiscussInternational Relations,Commerce4thDecember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/200412042.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zze)."PresidentThanksMilitaryPersonnelandFamiliesForServing OurCountry7thDecember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/200412072.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zzf)."HumanRightsDay,BillofRightsDay,andHumanRights Week,200410thDecember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/2004121017.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zzg)."PresidentSignsIntelligenceReformandTerrorismPrevention Act17thDecember."Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/200412171.html . Bush,G.W.(2004zzh)."PresidentHoldsPressConference20thDecember." Retrieved15/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/200412203.html . Bush,G.W.(2005a)."PresidentThanksUSAIDEmployeesandNGOPresidents10th January."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/200501106.html . Bush,G.W.(2005b)."PresidentThanksArmedForcesat'SalutingThoseWhoServe' Event18thJanuary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/200501184.html . Bush,G.W.(2005c)."PresidentHoldsPressConference26thJanuary."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050126 3.html . Bush,G.W.(2005d)."StateoftheUnionAddress2ndFebruary."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202 11.html .

291 Bush,G.W.(2005e)."PresidentHoldsPressConference17thFebruary."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050217 2.html . Bush,G.W.(2005f)."PresidentDiscussesAmericanandEuropeanAllianceinBelgium 21stFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050221.html . Bush,G.W.(2005g)."PresidentMeetswithE.U.Leaders22ndFebruary."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050222 8.html . Bush,G.W.(2005h)."PresidentandSecretaryGeneraldeHoopSchefferDiscuss NATOMeeting22ndFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/200502223.html . Bush,G.W.(2005i)."PresidentThanksU.S.TroopsatWiesbadenArmyAirfieldBase 23rdFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/200502238.html . Bush,G.W.(2005j)."PresidentandPresidentPutinDiscussStrongU.S.Russian Partnership24thFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/200502249.html . Bush,G.W.(2005k)."PresidentDiscussesWaronTerror8thMarch."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050308 3.html . Bush,G.W.(2005l)."PresidentandPresidentBăsescuDiscussU.S.Romanian Partnership9thMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/200503093.html . Bush,G.W.(2005m)."President'sRemarksatNationalRepublicanCongressional CommitteeDinner15thMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/200503159.html . Bush,G.W.(2005n)."President'sPressConference16thMarch."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050316 3.html . Bush,G.W.(2005o)."PresidentMeetswithPresidentFoxandPrimeMinisterMartin 23rdMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/200503235.html . Bush,G.W.(2005p)."PresidentDiscussesFreedomandDemocracy29thMarch." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050329.html . Bush,G.W.(2005q)."PresidentSpeakstoPressPool8thApril."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050408.html .

292 Bush,G.W.(2005r)."PresidentDiscussesWaronTerroratFortHood12thApril." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050412.html . Bush,G.W.(2005s)."PresidentAddressesAmericanSocietyofNewspaperEditors Convention14thApril."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/200504144.html . Bush,G.W.(2005t)."PressConferenceofthePresident28thApril."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050428 9.html . Bush,G.W.(2005u)."InterviewofthePresidentbyDutchTVNos5thMay." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/2005050518.html . Bush,G.W.(2005v)."PresidentDiscussesFreedomandDemocracyinLatvia7th May."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/200505078.html . Bush,G.W.(2005w)."PresidentandPresidentSaakashviliDiscussNATO,Democracy 10thMay."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050510.html . Bush,G.W.(2005x)."PresidentAttendsInternationalRepublicanInstituteDinner 18thMay."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/200505182.html . Bush,G.W.(2005y)."PresidentBushMeetswithDanishPrimeMinisterRasmussen 20thMay."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/200505201.html . Bush,G.W.(2005z)."PresidentDiscussesWaronTerroratNavalAcademy Commencement27thMay."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050527.html . Bush,G.W.(2005za)."President'sPressConference31stMay."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050531.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zb)."PresidentWelcomesBritishPrimeMinisterBlairtotheWhite House7thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/200506072.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zc)."PresidentDiscussesPatriotAct9thJune."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050609 2.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zd)."PresidentVisitsNationalCounterterrorismCenter10thJune." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/200506104.html .

293 Bush,G.W.(2005ze)."PresidentHostsUnitedStatesEuropeanUnionSummit20th June."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/2005062019.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zf)."PresidentWelcomesIraqiPrimeMinisterJaafaritotheWhite House24thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050624.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zg)."PresidentAddressesNation,DiscussesIraq,WaronTerror 28thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/200506287.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zh)."PresidentDiscussesG8Summit,ProgressinAfrica30th June."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050630.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zi)."PresidentandDanishPrimeMinisterRasmussenDiscussG8, Africa6thJuly."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/200507063.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zj)."PresidentandPrimeMinisterBlairDiscussAfrica,Trade, ClimateChange7thJuly."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050707.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zk)."PresidentEncouragesRenewalofPatriotActProvisions20th July."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/200507204.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zl)."PresidentDiscussesSecondTermAccomplishmentsand Priorities3rdAugust."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050803.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zm)."PresidentMeetswithDefenseandForeignPolicyTeams11th August."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/200508111.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zn)."PresidentHonorsVeteransofForeignWarsatNational Convention22ndAugust."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/200508221.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zo)."PresidentDiscussesIraqiConstitutionwithPressPool23rd August."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050823.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zp)."PresidentAddressesMilitaryFamilies,DiscussesWaron Terror24thAugust."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050824.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zq)."PresidentAddressesUnitedNationsHighLevelPlenary Meeting14thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050914.html .

294 Bush,G.W.(2005zr)."PresidentAddressesUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil14th September."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/200509144.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zs)."PresidentMeetswithHomelandSecurityCouncil19th September."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050919.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zt)."PresidentMeetswithGeneralsAbizaidandCasey,Discusses WaronTerror28thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050928.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zu)."PresidentNominatesHarrietMiersasSupremeCourtJustice 3rdOctober."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051003.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zv)."PresidentHoldsPressConference4thOctober."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051004 1.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zw)."InterviewofthePresidentbyALArabiya24thOctober." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/200510246.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zx)."PresidentAddressesJointArmedForcesOfficers'Wives' Luncheon25thOctober."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051025.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zy)."PresidentBushDiscussesDemocracyintheWestern Hemisphere6thNovember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/200511063.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zz)."PresidentBushMeetswithPresidentTorrijosofPanama7th November."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051107.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zza)."PresidentCommemoratesVeteransDay,DiscussesWaron Terror11thNovember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/200511111.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zzb)."PresidentToursBorder,DiscussesImmigrationReformin Texas29thNovember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/200511292.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zzc)."PresidentOutlinesStrategyforVictoryinIraq30th November."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/200511302.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zzd)."HumanRightsDay,BillofRightsDay,andHumanRights Week,20059thDecember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/200512093.html .

295 Bush,G.W.(2005zze)."PresidentMeetswithMcCain&Warner,DiscussesPosition onInterrogation15thDecember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/200512153.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zzf)."President'sAddresstotheNation18thDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/200512182.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zzg)."PressConferenceofthePresident19thDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/200512192.html . Bush,G.W.(2005zzh)."PresidentDiscussesAccomplishmentsandFuturePriorities 22ndDecember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/200512182.html . Bush,G.W.(2006a)."PresidentDiscussesWaronTerrorFollowingPentagonBriefing 4thJanuary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060104.html . Bush,G.W.(2006b)."PresidentAddressesVeteransofForeignWarsontheWaron Terror10thJanuary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/200601101.html . Bush,G.W.(2006c)."PresidentParticipatesinDiscussionontheGlobalWaronTerror 11thJanuary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/200601117.html . Bush,G.W.(2006d)."PresidentWelcomesGermanChancellorMerkeltotheWhite House13thJanuary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/200601131.html . Bush,G.W.(2006e)."PresidentDiscussesGlobalWaronTerroratKansasState University23rdJanuary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/200601234.html . Bush,G.W.(2006f)."PresidentVisitsNationalSecurityAgency25thJanuary." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/200601251.html . Bush,G.W.(2006g)."PressConferenceofthePresident26thJanuary."Retrieved 18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060126.html . Bush,G.W.(2006h)."PresidentBushDeliversStateoftheUnionAddress31st January."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/2006013110.html . Bush,G.W.(2006i)."PresidentDiscusses2006Agenda1stFebruary."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060201 5.html .

296 Bush,G.W.(2006j)."PresidentDiscussesProgressinWaronTerrortoNationalGuard 9thFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/200602092.html . Bush,G.W.(2006k)."PresidentDiscussesGlobalWaronTerrorFollowingBriefingat CENTCOM17thFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/200602174.html . Bush,G.W.(2006l)."PresidentAddressesAmericanLegion,DiscussesGlobalWaron Terror24thFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060224.html . Bush,G.W.(2006m)."InterviewofthePresidentbyPTV,Pakistan24thFebruary." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/200602244.html . Bush,G.W.(2006n)."InterviewofthePresidentbyDoordarshan,India24th February."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/200602245.html . Bush,G.W.(2006o)."President'sRemarkstotheRepublicanNationalGovernors Association27thFebruary."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060227.html . Bush,G.W.(2006p)."PresidentThanksU.S.andCoalitionTroopsinAfghanistan1st March."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/200603013.html . Bush,G.W.(2006q)."PresidentDiscussesStrongU.S.IndiaPartnershipinNewDelhi, India3rdMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/200603035.html . Bush,G.W.(2006r)."PresidentBushandPresidentMusharrafofPakistanDiscuss StrengthenedRelationship4thMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/200603042.html . Bush,G.W.(2006s)."PresidentSignsUSAPATRIOTImprovementand ReauthorizationAct9thMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/200603094.html . Bush,G.W.(2006t)."PresidentAddressesNationalNewspaperAssociationConference 10thMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/200603102.html . Bush,G.W.(2006u)."PresidentDiscussesWaronTerrorandOperationIraqiFreedom 20thMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/200603207.html . Bush,G.W.(2006v)."PressConferenceofthePresident21stMarch."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060321 4.html .

297 Bush,G.W.(2006w)."PresidentDiscussesWaronTerror,ProgressinIraqinWest Virginia22ndMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/200603223.html . Bush,G.W.(2006x)."PresidentDiscussesDemocracyinIraqwithFreedomHouse 29thMarch."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/200603296.html . Bush,G.W.(2006y)."PresidentBushDiscussesGlobalWaronTerror6thApril." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/04/200604063.html . Bush,G.W.(2006z)."PresidentBushDiscussesGlobalWaronTerror:ThePaulH. NitzeSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies10thApril."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060410 1.html . Bush,G.W.(2006za)."InterviewofthePresidentbySabineChristiansenofARD GermanTelevision7thMay."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/200605073.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zb)."PresidentBushDiscussesGlobalWaronTerror22ndMay." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/200605221.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zc)."PresidentBushandPrimeMinisterTonyBlairoftheUnited KingdomParticipateinJointPressAvailability25thMay."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060525 12.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zd)."PresidentDeliversCommencementAddressattheUnited StatesMilitaryAcademyatWestPoint27thMay."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/200605271.html . Bush,G.W.(2006ze)."PresidentBushandPrimeMinisterRasmussenofDenmark ParticipateinJointPressAvailability9thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/200606092.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zf)."PresidentBushVisitsTroopsinIraq13thJune."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060613 2.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zg)."PressConferenceofthePresident14thJune."Retrieved 18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060614.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zh)."PresidentAttendsInitiativeforGlobalDevelopment's2006 NationalSummit15thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060615.html .

298 Bush,G.W.(2006zi)."PresidentDeliversCommencementAddressattheUnitedStates MerchantMarineAcademy19thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/200606191.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zj)."PresidentBushParticipatesinPressAvailabilityat2006U.S. EUSummit21stJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/200606216.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zk)."PresidentBushMeetswithSupportersofU.S.MilitaryinIraq andAfghanistan26thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/200606262.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zl)."PresidentBushandJapanesePrimeMinisterKoizumi ParticipateinaJointPressAvailability29thJune."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/200606293.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zm)."PresidentBushThanksMilitaryonIndependenceDayatFort Bragg,NorthCarolina4thJuly."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060704.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zn)."PressConferencebythePresident7thJuly."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060707 1.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zo)."RoundtableInterviewofthePresidentbyForeignPrintMedia 10thJuly."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/200607113.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zp)."PresidentBushandPrimeMinisterBlairoftheUnited KingdomParticipateinPressAvailability28thJuly."Retrieved18/09/08, fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/200607281.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zq)."PresidentDiscussesForeignPolicyDuringVisittoState Department14thAugust."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/200608143.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zr)."PressConferencebythePresident21stAugust."Retrieved 18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060821.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zs)."PresidentDiscussesGlobalWaronTerror5thSeptember." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/200609054.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zt)."PresidentDiscussesCreationofMilitaryCommissionstoTry SuspectedTerrorists6thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/200609063.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zu)."President'sAddresstotheNation11thSeptember." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/200609113.html .

299 Bush,G.W.(2006zv)."PressConferenceofthePresident15thSeptember." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/200609152.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zw)."PresidentBushAddressesUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly 19thSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/200609194.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zx)."PresidentThanksSenateforAgreementonPendingWaron TerrorLegislation21stSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/200609213.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zy)."PresidentBushandPresidentMusharrafofPakistanParticipate inPressAvailability22ndSeptember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060922.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zz)."PresidentBushDiscussesGlobalWaronTerror29th September."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/200609293.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zza)."PressConferencebythePresident11thOctober."Retrieved 18/09/08,fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061011 5.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zzb)."PresidentBushSignsMilitaryCommissionsActof2006 17thOctober."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/200610171.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zzc)."PressConferencebythePresident25thOctober."Retrieved 18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061025.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zzd)."PressConferencebythePresident8thNovember." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/200611082.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zze)."HumanRightsDay,BillofRightsDay,andHumanRights Week,20068thDecember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/2006120811.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zzf)."PresidentBushMeetswithSeniorU.S.DefenseOfficialson Iraq13thDecember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/200612135.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zzg)."PresidentAttendsArmedForcesFullHonorReviewfor SecretaryRumsfeld15thDecember."Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/200612157.html . Bush,G.W.(2006zzh)."PressConferencebythePresident20thDecember." Retrieved18/09/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/200612201.html .

300 Cheney,R.B.(2006)."InterviewoftheVicePresidentbyScottHennen,WDAYat RadioDayattheWhiteHouse"Retrieved19/04/08,from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/200610247.html . Clarke,C.(2005a)."LibertyandSecurity:StrikingtheRightBalance."Retrieved 30/08/08,fromhttp://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speechesarchive/sp europarliament1005 . Clarke,C.(2005b)."TerrorismBillTheGovernment'sApproach."Retrieved 30/08/08,fromhttp://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speechesarchive/12 05spterrorismbill . Clarke,C.(2005c)."MeasurestoCombatTerrorismPowersinpart4oftheAnti terrorism,CrimeandSecurityAct2001."Retrieved30/08/08,from http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speechesarchive/stcombatterrorism 0105 . Clarke,C.(2006)."HomeSecretaryCharlesClarke'sLettertoSimonCarr,Columnistat theIndependent."Retrieved30/08/08,from http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speechesarchive/hslettersimoncarr . Cook,R.(1997)."SpeechontheGovernment'sEthicalForeignPolicy."TheGuardian Retrieved26/08/08,from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy . Rice,C.(2005a)."InterviewWithJulieEtchinghamofSkyNews."Retrieved 25/04/08,fromhttp://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57678.htm . Rice,C.(2005b)."PressAvailabilityWithUkrainianPresidentViktorYushchenko" Retrieved25/04/08,fromhttp://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57723.htm . Rumsfeld,D.(2002a)."DoDNewsBriefingSecretaryRumsfeldandGen.Pace." Retrieved04/03/08,from http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2254 Rumsfeld,D.(2002b)."DoDNewsBriefingSecretaryRumsfeldandGen.Myers." Retrieved04/04/08,from http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t02082002_t0208sd.html . Rumsfeld,D.(2004a)."SecretaryRumsfeldRemarkstoGreaterMiamiChamberof Commerce."Retrieved10/06/08,from http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2075 Rumsfeld,D.(2004b)."GreaterMiamiChamberofCommerce."Retrieved16/04/08, fromhttp://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=99 . Rumsfeld,D.(2006)."TelevisionInterviewwithSecretaryRumsfeldandTalalAlHaj onAlArabiya."Retrieved15/05/08,from http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1244

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