DOCSLIB.ORG

Emergence and Reduction in Science. a Case Study

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Emergence and Reduction in Science. a Case Study Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 12-7-2011 12:00 AM Emergence and Reduction in Science. A Case Study Alexandru Manafu The University of Western Ontario Supervisor Dr. Robert Batterman The University of Western Ontario Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy © Alexandru Manafu 2011 Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd Part of the Philosophy of Science Commons Recommended Citation Manafu, Alexandru, "Emergence and Reduction in Science. A Case Study" (2011). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 345. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/345 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. EMERGENCE AND REDUCTION IN SCIENCE. A CASE STUDY (Spine title: Emergence and Reduction in Science. A Case Study) (Thesis format: Monograph) by Alexandru Manafu Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario, Canada © Alexandru Manafu 2011 THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION Supervisor Examiners ______________________ ______________________ Dr. Robert Batterman Dr. Sandra Mitchell Supervisory Committee ______________________ Dr. Marc-André Lachance ______________________ ______________________ Dr. Gillian Barker Dr. Gillian Barker ______________________ ______________________ Dr. Christopher Smeenk Dr. Christopher Smeenk The thesis by Alexandru Manafu entitled: Emergence and Reduction in Science. A Case Study is accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy __________________ _______________________ Date Chair of the Thesis Examination Board ii Abstract The past decade or so has witnessed an increase in the number of philo- sophical discussions about emergence and reduction in science. However, many of these discussions (though not all) remain too abstract and theoretical, and are wanting with respect to concrete examples taken from the sciences. This dissertation studies the topics of reduction and emergence in the context of a case study. I focus on the case of chemistry and investigate how emergentism can help us secure the autonomy of this discipline in relation to the underlying microphysics. I develop an account of emergence (called functional emergence) that is, I argue, capable of answering the question of why we have chemistry instead of just applied quantum mechanics. I argue that functionally emergent properties in chemistry – properties that are defined by their behaviour, not by some shared microphysical constituent – can help us defend the autonomy of chemistry; they allow for the existence of sui generis chemical regularities, which can be used in sui generis chemical explanations. Functional emergence generates difficulties for some accounts of inter-theoretic reduction, but unlike other theories of emergence it is compatible with weaker forms of reductionism. Keywords: emergence, reductionism, ontological autonomy, functional properties, constitutive properties, functional kinds, multiple realization, physics, chemistry, special sciences, micro-reduction, functional reduction, chemical properties, chemical laws, chemical explanations. iii Acknowledgments I thank Robert Batterman, my supervisor and mentor, who provided me with guidance and help; Chris Smeenk and Gillian Barker for discussion and feedback; Sorin Bangu for long and interesting philosophical exchanges; Nic Fillion, for technical help with LATEX; Guillaume Beaulac for coming up with an illuminating paraphrase; the members of the Rotman Institute, especially those who read my work in the philosophy of science reading group; James Overton, Matthew Ivanowich, Jason Marsh and the members of the ABD support group for discussion and feedback; Daniel Dennett, for endorsing my project and helping me see the “real patterns”. And I thank my wife, Monica, for support and for being so hard to convince. iv List of Tables 3.1 Microphysical description of alcohols. 81 4.1 List of sui generis chemical laws. 125 v List of Figures 2.1.1 Configurational forces and the conservation of energy. 33 2.2.1 Two overlapping dichotomies between properties........ 42 2.2.2 Triplet oxygen vs. singlet oxygen................. 52 3.3.1 Quartz unit cell. 90 3.3.2 Different views of a quartz unit cell. 90 4 – 3.3.3 A deformed SiO4 tetrahedron. 91 3.3.4 Sphalerite unit cell. 92 3.3.5 The electric double layer. 95 3.3.6 An experimental setup to show interfacial piezoelectricity due to the streaming current in gel or liquid. 96 3.3.7 The electric field pattern between the electrodes generated in the gel or liquid. 96 3.3.8 A cubic sample cut from a long bone. 99 3.3.9 The alpha-helix of polypeptides. 100 3.3.10 Bent femur bone. 101 vi Contents Certificate of Examination ii Abstract iii Acknowledgments iv List of Tables v List of Figures vi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 The question . .1 1.2 Tentative answers . .3 1.2.1 Historical autonomy . .3 1.2.2 Methodological autonomy . .4 1.2.3 Antireductionism . .5 1.2.4 Internal realism . .6 1.2.5 Emergentism . .9 1.3 What is needed? . 13 1.4 Overview . 14 2 Accounts of emergence in chemistry 17 2.1 The British emergentist view of chemistry . 17 2.1.1 Broad’s view of chemistry . 18 2.1.2 Evaluating Broad’s account of emergence in chemistry 24 2.1.3 Conclusion . 34 2.2 The prospects for fusion emergence in chemistry . 36 2.2.1 Humphreys’ fusion emergence.............. 36 2.2.2 Previous criticisms of fusion emergence......... 39 2.2.3 The division of labor between properties and the notion of a physical operation.................. 41 vii 2.2.4 Humphreys’ examples.................. 43 2.2.5 Questioning the ionic-covalent dichotomy........ 45 2.2.6 The level-relativeness of fusion.............. 47 2.2.7 Entanglement to the rescue?............... 51 2.2.8 Conclusion......................... 53 2.3 Other contemporary accounts . 54 3 Functional emergence 63 3.1 Constitutive vs. functional properties . 66 3.1.1 The distinction between constitutive and functional prop- erties . 66 3.1.2 Functional properties and multiple realization . 73 3.1.3 Constitutive vs. dispositional, constitutive vs. relational 74 3.2 Constitutive properties in chemistry . 75 3.3 Functional properties in chemistry . 81 3.3.1 Acids and bases . 81 3.3.2 Oxidants and reductants . 84 3.3.3 Piezoeletrics . 87 3.3.3.1 Piezoelectricity in crystals . 89 3.3.3.2 Streaming current as a source of piezoelectricity 94 3.3.3.3 Piezoelectricity in bone . 98 3.3.3.4 A philosophical disagreement among scientists 102 3.3.3.5 “Promiscuous” laws . 104 3.3.3.6 Conclusion . 106 3.3.4 Other functional properties in chemistry . 106 3.3.5 Are constitutive definitions impossible? . 107 4 Functional emergence and reductionisms 113 4.1 Nagelian reduction . 114 4.2 Micro-reduction . 126 4.3 Functional reduction . 137 5 A defense of functional emergence 143 5.1 Shapiro’s challenge . 143 5.2 Kim’s argument from two metaphysical principles . 154 5.3 The argument from the general failure of special-science causal closure and the argument from the idiosyncratic nature of spe- cial science properties . 163 5.4 The analyticity objection . 171 viii 6 Conclusions 185 Bibliography 193 Curriculum Vitae 205 ix Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 The question If all there is consists of the kinds of entities that microphysics talks about, why do we have sciences other than microphysics? This thesis is an attempt to answer a question of this sort. But why should this question even be taken seriously, let alone be considered worthy of investigation? What are the prima facie motives for asking it in the first place? There are two motives for asking this question. First, there is an ontologi- cal motive, which rests on the asymmetry between the objects that form the subject matter of microphysics and the objects that form the subject matter of the other sciences (the special sciences). The asymmetry is this: if all the objects that form the subject matter of microphysics (elementary particles, fields, etc.) were to vanish, there would be nothing left; the objects that form the subject matter of the special sciences (molecules, organisms, etc.) will also vanish. They will necessarily disappear, for they are composed of the kinds of entities that microphysics talk about. However, if the objects that form the subject matter of the special sciences were to vanish, the objects that form the subject matter of microphysics may persist (e.g., as plasma). This asymmetry results simply from the direction of the composition re- lation: the objects that form the subject matter of the special sciences are composed of the objects that form the subject matter of microphysics, but not 1 viceversa. As a result, the latter may exist even in the absence of the former. In this narrow and precise sense then, the microphysical has ontological primacy. This prompts the following question. If one had a complete science of the microphysical (i.e., a complete inventory of all the microphysical entities and properties, and the laws governing them) couldn’t one just deduce the claims made by the special sciences? This is the other motive underlying the question formulated at the beginning, and I will call it the epistemological motive. As it stands, the question formulated above is too general. If the question is to be investigated in detail, it needs further specification. I will specify the question by referring to a couple of specific sciences that are usually perceived as adjacent, such as quantum mechanics and chemistry.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Myth of Supervenient Microphysicalism
    The myth of supervenient microphysicalism Juan Diego Morales1 (Universidad de Cartagena) So my aim is only to establish conditional claims of the form: even if certain facts are emergent vis‑à‑vis the microphysical realm, Physicalism can still be true. Papineau, 2008: 132 1. What physicalism is Let us begin with the idea that physicalism is the ontological theory which claims that the entities that constitute our world are physical enti‑ ties, phenomena which the physical sciences must discover and articulate in their theories.2 Following the naturalistic trend of philosophy in recent times, con‑ temporary philosophers have considered that physicalism is both an a pos‑ teriori and contingent thesis. Its a posteriori sense derives from the fact of being a position that tries to overcome the problems of its direct predeces‑ 1 [email protected]. My thanks to Alejandro Rosas, Brian McLaughlin, Reinaldo Bernal, and Larry Shapiro, for helpful and clarifying comments on drafts of this paper. 2 Here I will use the general sense of “entity” and “phenomenon” for including both particulars (as objects, events, processes, and so on) and what many theorists take as universals (as properties, relations, and laws). Philosophica, 48, Lisboa, 2016, pp. 47-61. Philosophica 48.indd 47 22/11/2016 9:26:50 PM 48 Juan Diego Morales sor, materialism. The latter was established as a metaphysical doctrine that attempted to specify the entities of our world in an a priori way, in terms of a specific set of features that supposedly defined the material; features such as conservation, deterministic and on contact interaction, impenetrability, inertia, and solidity.3 But this a priori specification proved to be wrong.
    [Show full text]
  • Linguistics As a “Special Science”: a Comparison of Sapir and Fodor Els Elffers
    Chapter 4 Linguistics as a “special science”: A comparison of Sapir and Fodor Els Elffers Independently of each other, the linguist-anthropologist Edward Sapir (1884–1939) and the philosopher of mind Jerry Fodor (1935–2017) developed a similar typol- ogy of scientific disciplines. “Basic” (Fodor) or “conceptual” (Sapir) sciences (e.g. physics) are distinguished from “special” (Fodor) or “historical” (Sapir) sciences (e.g. linguistics). Ontologically, the latter sciences are reducible to the former, but they keep their autonomy as intellectual enterprises, because their “natural kinds” are unlike those of the basic sciences. Fodor labelled this view “token physicalism”. Although Sapir’s and Fodor’s ideas were presented in very different periods of intel- lectual history (in 1917 and 1974) and in very different intellectual contexts (roughly: Geisteswissenschaften and logical positivism), the similarity between them is strik- ing. When compared in detail, some substantial differences can also be observed, which are mainly related to contextual differences. When applied to linguistics, Sapir’s and Fodor’s views offer a perspective of autonomy, albeit in different ways: for Fodor, but not for Sapir, linguistics is a subfield of psychology. 1 Introduction In 1974, Jerry Fodor (1935–2017) introduced “token physicalism”, a non-reductive variety of physicalism, which applies to “special sciences”.1 According to Fodor, special sciences, such as economics, psychology and linguistics cannot be en- tirely reduced to physics, which is a “basic science”. Such a reduction would im- ply that special sciences actually disappear as autonomous sciences. According to Fodor, special sciences retain their autonomy, because reduc- tion is possible only with respect to the events they describe (“tokens”), not with 1Token physicalism belongs to a larger class of non-reductive types of physicalism.
    [Show full text]
  • On Interpreting Strong Supervenience
    Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College 12-1996 On Interpreting Strong Supervenience Zachary J. Ernst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Ernst, Zachary J., "On Interpreting Strong Supervenience" (1996). Master's Theses. 3475. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/3475 This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ON INTERPRETING STRONG SUPERVENIENCE by Zachary J. Ernst A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The Graduate College in partial fulfillmentof the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of Philosophy Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan December 1996 Copyright by Zachary J. Ernst 1996 ON INTERPRETING STRONG SUPERVENIENCE Zachary J. Ernst, M.A. WesternMichigan University,_ 1996 J aegwon Kim's definitionof strong supervenience has found application in such areas as the mind-body problem, aesthetics, morality, and the relationship between physics and the special sciences. The main reason forthe popularity of supervenience is that it purportedly has a long laundry list of virtues. For instance, it has been claimed that supervenience accounts are non-reductive, capable of empirical verification, simple with respect to ontology, and explanatorily powerful. In this paper, I examine Kim's definition of strong supervenience, arguing that a fundamental ambiguity in the definition makes it impossible for strong supervenience to possess all of these virtues simultaneously.
    [Show full text]
  • 05 M211rsj121020 24
    Quantum mechanics Mark Herbert, PhD World Development Institute, 39 Main Street, Flushing, Queens, New York 11354, USA, [email protected] Abstract: Quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory in physics that describes the physical properties of nature at small scales, of the order of atoms and subatomic particles. It is the foundation of all quantum physics including quantum chemistry, quantum field theory, quantum technology, and quantum information science. Most contents are from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics). [Mark Herbert, PhD. Quantum mechanics. Researcher 2020;12(10):24-37]. ISSN 1553-9865 (print); ISSN 2163- 8950 (online). http://www.sciencepub.net/researcher. 5. doi:10.7537/marsrsj121020.05. Keywords: Quantum mechanics; theory; physics; nature; atom; field theory; quantum technology; science Introduction problem, and the correspondence between energy and Most contents are from Wikipedia, the free frequency in Albert Einstein's 1905 paper which encyclopedia explained the photoelectric effect. Early quantum (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics). theory was profoundly re-conceived in the mid-1920s Quantum mechanics cannot predict the exact by Niels Bohr, Erwin Schrödinger, Werner Heisenberg, location of a particle in space, only the probability of Max Born and others. The original interpretation of finding it at different locations.[1] The brighter areas quantum mechanics is the Copenhagen interpretation, represent a higher probability of finding the electron. developed by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg in Quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory in Copenhagen during the 1920s. The modern theory is physics that describes the physical properties of nature formulated in various specially developed at small scales, of the order of atoms and subatomic mathematical formalisms.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy of Science Reading List
    Philosophy of Science Area Comprehensive Exam Reading List Revised September 2011 Exam Format: Students will have four hours to write answers to four questions, chosen from a list of approximately 20-30 questions organized according to topic: I. General Philosophy of Science II. History of Philosophy of Science III. Special Topics a. Philosophy of Physics b. Philosophy of Biology c. Philosophy of Mind / Cognitive Science d. Logic and Foundations of Mathematics Students are required to answer a total of three questions from sections I and II (at least one from each section), and one question from section III. For each section, we have provided a list of core readings—mostly journal articles and book chapters—that are representative of the material with which we expect you to be familiar. Many of these readings will already be familiar to you from your coursework and other reading. Use this as a guide to filling in areas in which you are less well- prepared. Please note, however, that these readings do not constitute necessary or sufficient background to pass the comp. The Philosophy of Science area committee assumes that anyone who plans to write this exam has a good general background in the area acquired through previous coursework and independent reading. Some anthologies There are several good anthologies of Philosophy of Science that will be useful for further background (many of the articles listed below are anthologized; references included in the list below). Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J.D. Trout, eds., The Philosophy of Science (MIT Press, 991). Martin Curd and J.
    [Show full text]
  • Emergence in Science and Philosophy Edited by Antonella
    Emergence in Science and Philosophy Edited by Antonella Corradini and Timothy O’Connor New York London Contents List of Figures ix Introduction xi ANTONELLA CORRADINI AND TIMOTHY O’CONNOR PART I Emergence: General Perspectives Part I Introduction 3 ANTONELLA CORRADINI AND TIMOTHY O’CONNOR 1 The Secret Lives of Emergents 7 HONG YU WONG 2 On the Implications of Scientifi c Composition and Completeness: Or, The Troubles, and Troubles, of Non- Reductive Physicalism 25 CARL GILLETT 3 Weak Emergence and Context-Sensitive Reduction 46 MARK A. BEDAU 4 Two Varieties of Causal Emergentism 64 MICHELE DI FRANCESCO 5 The Emergence of Group Cognition 78 GEORG THEINER AND TIMOTHY O’CONNOR vi Contents PART II Self, Agency, and Free Will Part II Introduction 121 ANTONELLA CORRADINI AND TIMOTHY O’CONNOR 6 Why My Body is Not Me: The Unity Argument for Emergentist Self-Body Dualism 127 E. JONATHAN LOWE 7 What About the Emergence of Consciousness Deserves Puzzlement? 149 MARTINE NIDA-RÜMELIN 8 The Emergence of Rational Souls 163 UWE MEIXNER 9 Are Deliberations and Decisions Emergent, if Free? 180 ACHIM STEPHAN 10 Is Emergentism Refuted by the Neurosciences? The Case of Free Will 190 MARIO DE CARO PART III Physics, Mathematics, and the Special Sciences Part III Introduction 207 ANTONELLA CORRADINI AND TIMOTHY O’CONNOR 11 Emergence in Physics 213 PATRICK MCGIVERN AND ALEXANDER RUEGER 12 The Emergence of the Intuition of Truth in Mathematical Thought 233 SERGIO GALVAN Contents vii 13 The Emergence of Mind at the Co-Evolutive Level 251 ARTURO CARSETTI 14 Emerging Mental Phenomena: Implications for Psychological Explanation 266 ALESSANDRO ANTONIETTI 15 How Special Are Special Sciences? 289 ANTONELLA CORRADINI Contributors 305 Index 309 Introduction Antonella Corradini and Timothy O’Connor The concept of emergence has seen a signifi cant resurgence in philosophy and a number of sciences in the past couple decades.
    [Show full text]
  • Demystifying Emergence
    AN OPEN ACCESS Ergo JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Demystifying emergence David YateS Centro de Filosofia, Universidade de Lisboa Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal explanations, but that’s no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist world- view require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it’s natural to suppose that they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has it that if we want special science properties to bestow genuinely new causal powers, we must reject physical realization and embrace a form of emergentism, in which such properties arise from the physical by mysterious brute determination. In this paper, I argue that contrary to this orthodoxy, there are physically realized prop- erties that bestow new causal powers in relation to their realizers. The key to my proposal is to reject causal- functional accounts of realization and embrace a broad- er account that allows for the realization of shapes and patterns. Unlike functional properties, such properties are defined by qualitative, non-causal specifications, so realizing them does not consist in bestowing causal powers. This, I argue, allows for causal novelty of the strongest kind. I argue that the molecular geometry of H2O— a qualitative, multiply realizable property— plays an irreducible role in explaining its dipole moment, and thereby bestows novel powers. On my proposal, special science properties can have the kind of causal novelty traditionally associated with strong emergence, without any of the mystery.
    [Show full text]
  • A Global Enhanced Vibrational Kinetic Model for Radio-Frequency Hydrogen Discharges and Application to the Simulation of a High
    A Global Enhanced Vibrational Kinetic Model for Radio-Frequency Hydrogen Discharges and Application to the Simulation of a High Current Negative Hydrogen Ion Source by Sergey Nikolaevich Averkin A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Aerospace Engineering by _____________________________ February 27, 2015 APPROVED: ______________________________________________________________________________ Dr. Nikolaos A. Gatsonis, Advisor Professor, Aerospace Engineering Program, Mechanical Engineering Department ______________________________________________________________________________ Dr. John J. Blandino, Committee Member Associate Professor, Aerospace Engineering Program, Mechanical Engineering Department ______________________________________________________________________________ Dr. Lynn Olson, Committee Member Senior Scientist, Busek Co. Inc., Natick, MA ______________________________________________________________________________ Dr. Seong-kyun Im, Graduate Committee Representative Assistant Professor, Aerospace Engineering Program, Mechanical Engineering Department 2 Abstract A Global Enhanced Vibrational Kinetic (GEVKM) model is presented for a new High Cur- rent Negative Hydrogen Ion Source (HCNHIS) developed by Busek Co. Inc. and Worcester Pol- ytechnic Institute. The HCNHIS consists of a high-pressure radio-frequency discharge (RFD) chamber in which the main production of high-lying vibrational states of
    [Show full text]
  • Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back Author(S): Ned Block Source: Philosophical Perspectives , 1997, Vol
    Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back Author(s): Ned Block Source: Philosophical Perspectives , 1997, Vol. 11, Mind, Causation, and World (1997), pp. 107-132 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2216126 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Perspectives This content downloaded from 128.122.149.96 on Wed, 07 Apr 2021 20:45:57 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Philosophical Perspectives, 11, Mind, Causation, and World, 1997 ANTI-REDUCTIONISM SLAPS BACK Ned Block New York University For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English- speaking countries) that reductionism is a mistake and that there are autonomous special sciences. This consensus has been based on an argument from multiple realizability. But Jaegwon Kim has argued persuasively that the multiple realiz- ability argument is flawed.' I will sketch the recent history of the debate, arguing that much-but not all-of the anti-reductionist consensus survives Kim's cri- tique. This paper was originally titled "Anti-Reductionism Strikes Back", but in the course of writing the paper, I came to think that the concepts used in the debate would not serve either position very well.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Is There Anything Except Physics? Author(S): Barry Loewer Source: Synthese, Vol
    Why Is There Anything Except Physics? Author(s): Barry Loewer Source: Synthese, Vol. 170, No. 2 (Sep., 2009), pp. 217-233 Published by: Springer Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40271331 Accessed: 12-06-2019 12:51 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:51:49 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Synthese (2009) 170:217-233 DOI 10.1007/sl 1229-009-9580-2 Why is there anything except physics? Barry Loewer Received: 2 June 2009 / Accepted: 2 June 2009 / Published online: 4 August 2009 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim's objections Jerry Fodor asks "So then, why is there anything except physics?" By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences.
    [Show full text]
  • Universal Chemical Markup (UCM) - a New Format for Common Chemical Data
    Universal Chemical Markup (UCM) - A new format for common chemical data Background: We wish to introduce a new chemical format called UCM (Universal Chemical Markup). The format is based on XML (Extensible Markup Language) and its first version focuses on recording chemical structures and their properties. Results: UCM currently supports structures containing isotopes, ions and various types of bonding s t including delocalized bonds. Properties can be expressed by combining UCM with UnitsML n i r (Units Markup Language). Using UnitsML one defines quantities with scientific units, and P e then refers to them in UCM when recording property values. Users can also add literature r P references with BibTeXML (BibTeX Markup Language) and annotate the recorded data using plain text or XHTML (Extensible Hypertext Markup Language) descriptions. In contrast to presently available general-purpose chemical formats, UCM offers built-in validation, which combines both grammar and pattern-based XML schema languages. Thus, all recorded data can be precisely validated by UCM schemas in standard XML validators. Conclusions: We developed the structure for UCM from scratch on the basis of an analysis described in our previous article. Starting from scratch allowed us to integrate BibTeXML, UnitsML and XHTML as well as chemical line notations and identifiers into UCM. It also helped us to avoid unnecessary redundant parts and create the implementation that aims to minimize ambiguity and is designed to be easily extensible in the future. PeerJ PrePrints |
    [Show full text]
  • Contextual Emergence Yes
    Philosophica 91 (2017) pp.145-192 STRONG EMERGENCE NO, CONTEXTUAL EMERGENCE YES Michael Silberstein ABSTRACT It will be argued that strong/radical emergence while possible is problematic on a number of fronts, in particular it is neither explanatory nor unifying. Fortunately, there is a better, more unifying and explanatory alternative that be will called contextual emergence. The notion of contextual emergence will be explicated and defended against competitors. 146 M. SILBERSTEIN 1. Introduction The first section of the paper will be devoted to defining and refuting strong emergence. Section 3 will introduce an alternative conception of emergence called contextual emergence. The conclusion will briefly mention some examples of contextual emergence and will briefly discuss to what extent contextual emergence might help with the mind/body problem, hard problem or generation problem. 2. Strong emergence One immediate problem with discussions about emergence is that different people use the same terms to mean very different things, the expression “strong emergence” is no exception. For more details about how different people use the term strong emergence and for more taxonomic background generally see Silberstein 2012. This paper will focus almost exclusively on ontological emergence (though not exclusively on strong emergence) as opposed to merely weak or epistemic emergence. No doubt there are cases of emergence that straddle these dichotomies, but that won’t be the focus here. People often claim that in order to be in some sense ontologically emergent a phenomenon X must depend on the basal phenomenon Y in some ontic sense and yet be irreducible to it in some ontic sense.
    [Show full text]