110 The Botha government’s riposte was a ‘total strategy’ of counter-revolution, in which every sphere of government activity was to be co-ordinated so as to prevent the perceived revolutionary onslaught from succeeding. The task of the armed forces was to prevent the enemy – chiefly the ANC–SACP alliance, but also the PAC and others – from establishing a viable rear-base outside while, in its domestic operations, the government developed the necessary political initiatives to win the support of the population, thus enabling it to survive the revolutionary onslaught.

111 There were four main pillars to the ‘total strategy’:

a the maintenance of state security at all costs;

b reform of the political environment;

c efficient and ‘clean’ government;

d the co-ordination of all state action.

112 The importance of a ‘total strategy’ was underlined by developments within the ANC. A joint meeting of the ANC’s National Executive Committee and Revolutionary Council received a report from senior members of the ANC, the SACP and MK who had undertaken a study tour of Vietnam in October 1978 as part of a strategic review. The delegation had spent some time with General Giap, the architect of victories over both French colonial and US forces. Based on insights gained on this mission, the ANC/MK decided on an adaptation to its insurgency strategy.

113 Abandoning an earlier emphasis on rural guerrilla warfare, the strategy aimed now at integrating political and military activity, while attributing particular importance to urban areas. A Politico-Military Strategy Commission consisting of Mr , Mr , Mr , Mr Moses Mabhida, Mr Joe Gqabi and Mr Joe Modise was established to oversee the new strategic direction and, in 1979, a Special Operations Unit was formed which reported directly to the ANC president.

114 Militarily, a campaign of ‘armed propaganda’ attacks by a specially-trained elite unit (‘Special Ops’) was designed less for immediate military effect than to advertise the existence of MK and to win publicity and support. This was to lead to a general uprising or, to use the idiom of the time, a ‘people's war’.

115 The ‘lessons from Vietnam’ were contained in a report which became known as The Green Book, finalised in March 1979. It envisaged a strategy involving the

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