Harshan Kumarasingham

Executive Power 60 Years On Has Anything Changed?

When changed its electoral system from After being prime minister for three terms, the Labour leader conceded defeat first-past-the-post (FPP) to mixed member proportional after a convincing loss at the general election. The long and eventful Labour representation (MMP), the move was heralded as the end administration was to be replaced by a of old politics. Prime ministers and their Cabinet would National one headed by an energetic and ebullient leader untested in experience as no longer be the ‘elected dictatorship’. The executive would prime minister, but primed and prepared now be constrained by greater checks and balances. The for power. , the 11th National Party leader, in 2008 replaced Helen two-party system that had held New Zealand politics Clark, the 11th leader, as prime minister after nine years just as Sid hostage for at least 60 years would end and instead a greater Holland succeeded Peter Fraser almost 60 diversity of interests would be represented in the House of years earlier. Key, like Holland (except for a few Representatives, a House that could better hold the executive months in the War Cabinet in 1942), to account. This was the aim, but has it happened? This became prime minister without having critical experience of government, and article examines recent instances of executive actions that are yet both Key and Holland had long held the ambition to become leader of New akin to those taken in the FFP era that MMP has been unable Zealand. They had also both campaigned to eliminate. It also offers suggestions for how to increase on the promise that National had something new to offer the electorate after the accountability of the executive by strengthening the the long years of Labour rule. However, Holland and Key astutely did not seek constitution and other branches and offices of state. to tamper with many of the successful policies of the previous administration. Harshan Kumarasingham is currently the Henry Charles Chapman Fellow Instead they projected their vitality and in Commonwealth Studies at the University of . He previously worked for the New Zealand Treasury, and is the author of Onward with freshness, because, although government Executive Power: Lessons from New Zealand 1947-57 (: had become almost synonymous with Institute of Policy Studies, 2010), which this article is based upon. ‘Old Peter’ and ‘Aunty Helen’, the

Page 46 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 4 – November 2010 New Zealand people had decided it was business of government but has left she puts the emphasis on “prime”, being only fair to ‘give the other fellow a go’. untouched the essential ground-rules well briefed on what is happening across Clark, like Fraser, had generous of Westminster government … In its all portfolios, jumping on colleagues who experience of the Treasury benches and essential respects, the Cabinet system muck up and even taking over if things are had won three election victories. These New Zealand inherited in the 1850’s not fixed’ (Armstrong, 2008). The same Labour titans, however, after nine years in has remained remarkably resilient could have been written of Fraser. Clark the top job were both unable to persuade … From a constitutional perspective, had a loyal deputy prime minister and the voters to give them another term in there has been an almost seamless finance minister in Michael Cullen (just office, allowing the National Party to gain transition from the former plurality as Fraser had Nash concurrently in the office with a mandate for reform, but not voting system to MMP. The cabinet same positions) to buttress this state and revolution. remains much as it was before … provide much of the policy grunt required Retaining the confidence of the House to action prime ministerial edicts often The MMP era remains the axis around which the without the involvement of Cabinet. So, 60 years on is executive government entire system revolves. This imperative in New Zealand the same? No. The MMP facilitates the democratic ideal and representation system has revolutionised is the bedrock of the Westminster the electoral system and changed the system. It has been so ever since the political landscape without question. The cabinet system was introduced in The Clark government’s hegemony over the political system that 1856. (Joseph, 2008) decision to abolish Labour and National governments exerted under Fraser and Holland is effectively MMP has given more choice and more appeals to the Privy over. The two-party dominance is gone representativeness to the New Zealand and instead the House of Representatives voter, but this is not the same as giving Council and create and the Cabinet table must be shared by more formal or informal checks and a Supreme Court in other parties and partners in a way that balances on the political executive. a parliamentary historian would have to New Zealand in 2010 is still unitary, New Zealand as the look way back to the Massey–Ward era unicameral, and governed by an unwritten to find some form of precedent for. The constitution. The executive, and prime final appellate court proportional system has compelled the minister in particular, still retains many in 2003 was arguably, ‘Wellington model’ of the Westminster of the prerogatives that were available system to adopt governing arrangements to Fraser and Holland. In the Clark–Key after MMP, the biggest and parliamentary accommodations era there have been subtle and not so that would have been unthinkable and subtle executive emanations that have constitutional change unnecessary 60 years ago. demonstrated that prime ministerial However, many of the constitutional power is still alive and well. since the abolition of the issues that faced the era of Fraser and Legislative Council. Holland can also be seen in the era Enduring executive prerogatives of Clark and Key. The change to New ’s political style has been Zealand’s electoral system did not cause described as ‘presidential’ since ‘[h]er the evaporation of concerns over the focus is squarely in her ability to go over excesses of the executive. Indeed, it Parliament, front for the Executive and would be delusional to heap on MMP work her way through and around the Executive vs. judiciary the responsibility for curing all our constitutional checks and balances, and This method of government increased constitutional ills. The executive may no persuade New Zealanders of the rightness tension between the executive and longer be unbridled, but nor has it become and rectitude of her policies and unite judiciary as well. The Clark government’s completely bridled. The Westminster them behind her’ (O’Sullivan, 2005). The decision to abolish appeals to the Privy system’s innate flexibility allows many commentator cited admits, however, that Council and create a Supreme Court in of its core principles to continue despite ‘the move towards a more presidential New Zealand as the final appellate court in key changes that MMP has demanded. As style of direct action did not suddenly 2003 was arguably, after MMP, the biggest legal scholar Philip Joseph argues: emerge under Clark’s regime. Over the constitutional change since the abolition past 20 years New Zealand prime ministers of the Legislative Council. Unlike MMP, ‘The more things change, the less have increased the Executive’s reach’. An the abolition of the right to appeal to the they change.’ And so it is with MMP. analysis of Clark’s leadership by a respected Privy Council was not put to a referendum MMP has wrought major changes to political journalist assessed that Clark (Harris, 2006, pp.117-9). Thus, as with the the New Zealand political landscape. ‘imposed iron discipline on colleagues, her removal of the upper house, the Privy It has changed the way we do the and the party … As Prime Minister, Council appeal was eliminated from the

Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 4 – November 2010 – Page 47 Executive Power: 60 Years On Has Anything Changed?

Attorney-General v Ngati Apa1 with the National’s justice minister, Simon Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. Around Power, has carried on the executive ... New Zealand’s the same time the chief justice, Dame Sian tradition of expecting the other branch unicameral Parliament Elias, was also worried that the judiciary’s of state to keep away from its exercise independence was being eroded by many of power. Dame Sian delivered a speech is dangerously the of its administrative functions being taken which, among other issues, raised over by the Ministry of Justice (similar concerns about overcrowding in prisons ‘plaything of the concerns have been made about the Office and the question of whether alternatives executive’, lacking of Governor-General being administered to prison sentences might have to be by the Department of the Prime Minister discussed. Power immediately responded, even with its select and Cabinet) and it therefore being with the prime minister’s backing, stating ‘beholden to a minister’, further ensuring brusquely, ‘This is not Government committees ‘the multiple the judiciary to the executive. Clark policy. The Government was elected to set layers of consideration replied to Dame Sian’s position by stating sentencing policy, judges are appointed to she should ‘stick to the bench’. Further to apply it’. Even though Dame Sian’s speech that bicameralism this Clark appointed Cullen, ‘who had acknowledged that the elected politicians led the parliamentary charge against the must decide on this the head of the provides’. Chief Justice’, as attorney-general, thereby judiciary was again told to ‘stick to the charging a non-lawyer, finance minister bench’, even though constitutionally it is and deputy leader of the Labour Party within her role to discuss such matters, (among his other important political especially with her ‘extensive first hand New Zealand political landscape without roles) to become the ‘principal legal experience of criminal justice matters’ direct public involvement. Questions over advisor to the Government’ and ‘disregard (Geddis, 2009). judicial independence arose during the partisan advantage in exercising his duties’ Clark era when the government, clearly in recommending judicial appointments Strained conventions annoyed with the judiciary, overturned (see Stockley, 2006; NZ Herald, 2005). The new National-led government in its the Court of Appeal’s 2003 decision in short time in office has already tested many With Respect Parliamentarians, officials and judges too By Mark Prebble

With Respect is an important and students of politics, public law, public practical book about the people policy and public management. involved at the heart of government Mark Prebble is a Senior in New Zealand. It covers history, Associate at the Institute of Policy constitutional principles and the law, Studies. He was State Services but it is mostly about people and the Commissioner during 2004-2008. In roles they play. Recent events in New the course of his distinguished public Zealand are used to illustrate the key service career he was Chief Executive issues. The examples include court of the Department of Prime Minister cases, parliamentary inquiries and and Cabinet and Deputy Secretary to debates. Subjects range from the high the Treasury. drama of military deployments to the day-to-day business of parliamentary

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Page 48 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 4 – November 2010 constitutional conventions in asserting it wants’. Parliament would be relegated Guardians of the state the New Zealand practice of impressing to the inglorious role of being ‘a rubber Senior public servants have increasingly executive power over the other branches stamp that transforms the wishes of the had to deal with their advice competing for and offices of state. The legislature in government parties into law as quickly ministers’ attention with that of political the Westminster system has always been as possible’ (Geddis, 2008). The more advisers during the Clark–Key years.2 The open to dominance by the executive. deliberative democracy role of the House public service, as Colin James has argued, MMP has lessened this trend, but it has of Representatives hoped for under MMP has the ‘opportunity – I would say the duty not succeeded in completely evading this has not eventuated enough to stymie – to develop and keep in mind a longer political reality. In fact, the Key Cabinet is executive inclinations, as urgency has perspective on what constitutes the public almost like the FPP cabinets of old, since become a more frequent practice which interest’. However, National ministers, he there is only one party at the Cabinet table raises too few constitutional eyebrows. observes, like their Labour predecessors – the support party ministers sit outside Distinguished political and legal have taken on an influential phalanx of Cabinet – and has been acting like an FPP philosopher Professor Jeremy Waldron personal policy advisers, endowing them one. National’s November 2008 result recently argued that New Zealand’s with ‘mirror[ed] the certainty that had resulted unicameral Parliament is dangerously the quasi-public service status despite from elections under the FPP system’ ‘plaything of the executive’, lacking even being clearly political [they are often since ‘[f]or the first time under MMP it with its select committees ‘the multiple paid for by departments though seemed a coalition agreement would not layers of consideration that bicameralism answerable to the minister and not be necessary’ (Hayward, 2010, p.227). The provides’. Looking at our slender the chief executive] … Ministers are Clark ministry had already tested concepts institutional structures, Waldron confesses often frustrated by constitutional of ministerial and collective responsibility that he is ‘worried that New Zealand not niceties. They want things done. when Clark creatively allowed for an ‘agree only abandoned its second chamber, but Departments and agencies often fall to disagree’ concept to reign. However, abandoned also other safeguards in its this left, for example, a constitutionally legislative process’, leaving the country awkward situation and, especially for ‘with virtually none of the safeguards our international partners, the confusing that most working democracies take for Whether New Zealand spectacle of having a foreign minister granted’ (Waldron, 2008). The purity of (, the New Zealand First the executive largely remains. is a republic or realm, leader) vocally and publicly against critical Select committees were a New Zealand the necessity of checks aspects of foreign policy trade initiatives. innovation meant to provide a pragmatic Despite this, the foreign minister parliamentary check on the executive. and balances on the retained his authority over the ministry The appointment of the associate local that implements foreign policy and the government minister, John Carter, executive is critical. confidence of the Cabinet by representing in May 2009 to chair a special select the government overseas. In terms of the committee dealing with local coalition politics expected of MMP this government issues has been described as was pragmatic politics on the part of ‘unconscionable’ and an act that shows short of ministers’ hopes, for ideas Prime Minister Clark in accommodating the government ‘riding roughshod over and in execution. So ministers are Peters, but for the health of conventions parliamentary convention’, since it ‘draw[s] tempted to, and occasionally do, step and executive accountability it was a the executive too closely into Parliament’s over the boundary. (James, 2009b) further strain on responsible Westminster role of scrutinising how ministers spend constitutional practice. the money that Parliament votes for the Therefore, if the public service is not running of their portfolios’. Labour had guarding the guardians, who, asks James, Executive vs. legislature allowed comparable practices during its is? He states that although it should be After just a week in office the new term, and the Carter episode is a further the the governor-general this is actually government surprised many by using reminder ‘that the independence of select a nominal power, since the contemporary urgency to rush through five major committees is more a mirage than reality’ truth is that ‘in our constitution now the legislative enactments. The previous (Armstrong, 2009). And government Governor-General is the cabinet’s gopher’, administration had also used urgency. members of Parliament making up the which is a great concern when there is What this showed to one astute observer majority of the committee’s membership ‘a Prime Minister who is accumulating was that ‘National appears to be behaving is a further reminder of the danger of constitutional minuses’ (James, 2009a). no better. Its first week in control of select committees being facsimiles of the new Parliament indicates that it executive instruction as they were in the How to check the excesses of the executive? also intends treating this institution’s FPP days. What is the solution to all these lawmaking power as nothing more than a conspicuous exercises of executive power? convenient means of getting the outcomes Can they be remedied? Should they be

Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 4 – November 2010 – Page 49 Executive Power: 60 Years On Has Anything Changed?

changed? Do we care? Yes, we should the potential constitutional calamities no review of inquiry, no select committee care, but the solutions, remedies and that can arise in rapid sequence. hearings’. Temple and others such as Green changes are not as easy to determine. Party co-leader Metiria Turei believe ‘an There is no constitutional crisis in New Republic? independent review of how MMP was Zealand, but we cannot be mollified by Will becoming a republic allow New working with full public consultation that tired cliché ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix Zealand the comfort of being immune would be better in the first instance than it’. Crises are not in the habit of providing from constitutional emergency? No. If spending millions on a referendum’. a detailed agenda. Small events the country were to change from the Indeed, rather than weighing in against can quickly spiral into the chasm of Realm to the Republic of New Zealand or for MMP, many feel jilted by having constitutional unrest. We need only look it is almost certain that it would remain the issue decided by Cabinet decree with to comparable constitutional monarchies a parliamentary-based democracy, which its ‘simplistic yes–no referendum’ which for constitutional crises such as what means most of the same issues would apply. does not give opportunity to examine occurred in the during Comparable systems that have similar the merits and demerits of the electoral the early part of the 20th century, when characteristics of multi-party politics, system and any alternatives (NZ Herald, the monarch was actively drawn into a non-executive heads of state, Cabinet and 2009b). Justice minister Simon Power parliamentary fracas; in in 1975, parliamentary-based government which confirmed that a referendum will be held which witnessed ‘The Dismissal’ by Sir we could credibly emulate in becoming a in 2011 on MMP and that voters will be John Kerr of Gough Whitlam; and more republic are , Ireland and Italy. Their asked two questions: ‘the first will ask recently in Canada in December 2008, vaunted republicanism has not prevented voters if they wish to change the voting when the governor-general controversially executive excess. system from MMP. The second will ask prorogued Parliament, thus anticipating Whether New Zealand is a republic what alternative voting system they would a vote of confidence that could have or realm, the necessity of checks and prefer from a list of options’. However, brought down the government. In our balances on the executive is critical. even the Cabinet papers released with own backyard Pacific pool, Fiji (as both a However, most countries, including this October 2009 announcement voice constitutional monarchy and a republic) our own, have the checks and balances; concern about the potential that ‘voters and Solomon Islands have demonstrated the problem is how aware we and will not know the alternative voting our representatives are of them. A systems they will have to choose from’ and greater awareness and appreciation of therefore could ‘have difficulty in making The British prime the responsibilities and duties of our an informed choice’ (Power, 2009). governor-general, prime minister, Cabinet minister, like ours, and individual branches of state, and of A new separation of powers exercises ‘authority our own as conscientious citizens would Such feelings illustrate the need and the do much to limit the excesses of executive importance of knowing and being involved in the name of the power. Too often there have been major with our constitution before undertaking constitutional changes and executive system change. Whatever your view on Monarch without the actions without comprehensive review the change itself, it should be elementary or participation. The principal political that comprehensive contemplation and people and their elected actors have, knowingly or not, abdicated participation be demonstrated before any representatives in their responsibility. If not abdicated, then action is taken. A greater emphasis on they have willingly colluded to abuse and understanding of the separation of their Parliament being constitutional safeguards by their actions powers is required, and that relies on the or inactions that have resulted in change executive admitting and supporting the consulted’, and when to our system with worrying ease. fact that it is just one of the branches of using these prerogative state. A ‘new separation of powers’ could Get rid of MMP? see a ‘constrained’ prime minister and powers ‘it is difficult The prime minister as part of a campaign Cabinet by granting independence and pledge promised a referendum on the influence to ‘other checking institutions’ for Parliament to electoral system. This is more than what and give a renewed impetus to providing scrutinise and challenge Sid Holland did with the change to constant attention to checks and balances unicameralism, or Fraser with the end of (Akerman, 2000). government’s actions’. the country quota. How can a new separation of However, there is still a fear that despite powers be realised in New Zealand? Our a referendum being held in conjunction constitutional infrastructure is somewhat with a general election there would be, bare so it would require an enhancement in Philip Temple’s understanding (NZ – though sometimes nothing more than Herald), ‘no consultation with the voters, a realisation – of the powers of existing

Page 50 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 4 – November 2010 institutions whose duty it is to check the outlined recommendations that would is subject to a pre-appointment executive and hold it accountable. restrict executive power to the benefit of hearing with the relevant select Parliament. The British prime minister, committee.3 An upper house? like ours, exercises ‘authority in the name Another recommendation is that the Parliament is the natural fulcrum and of the Monarch without the people and granting of honours has strictly limited forum of our system. I have argued their elected representatives in their political involvement. Indeed, an editorial elsewhere on the value an upper house Parliament being consulted’, and when by which backed could have added to the New Zealand using these prerogative powers ‘it is the Key government’s decision to bring system (Kumarasingham, 2010). Even difficult for Parliament to scrutinise and an appointed upper house could use its challenge government’s actions’. Based on position, despite a weak veto power, to the recommendations in the green paper, highlight legislative or political questions here are some proposals for reform that The Council of State about government policy. could restrict executive power in our own could act like a Privy A legislative council could have Westminster. copied Britain’s approach and created an • The royal prerogative powers exercised Council, but without independent and effective appointments by the prime minister are put onto a commission to make recommendations statutory basis and brought under political executive on ‘non-party-political members’. The stronger parliamentary scrutiny domination, advising the commission could have the power to ‘vet and control (though this does not all recommendations to the House of propose changes to the governor- governor-general in the Lords’, including political appointments, general’s ‘constitutional or personal which would enhance the convention of prerogatives, although in some areas discharge of the office’s political parity in the upper house (House the Government proposes to change powers. of Lords Appointments Commission, the mechanism by which Ministers 2008). Recent scholarship in the United arrive at their recommendations Kingdom argues for the importance on the Monarch’s exercise of those of an appointed chamber as a critical powers’). source of ‘deliberative democracy’. • A convention is developed under back titular honours in March 2009 Rather than focusing on elections and which the government could deploy nonetheless advocated that: voting procedures to define democracy, armed forces without the approval of The whole system should be taken ‘deliberative democrats concentrate on the House of Representatives. out of politicians’ hands. The the processes by which opinion is formed • A prime minister requires the approval honours are awarded in the Queen’s and alternatives debated’: as such, the less of the House of Representatives before name and there seems no reason that politicised House of Lords has the power asking the governor-general for a her representative, the Governor- with its ‘scrutiny and accountability role’ dissolution. General, could not appoint a panel to force government ‘to defend in public its • A majority of members of Parliament to sift nominations and recommend actions and intentions’ by being effective can ask the speaker to recall the a list of worthy recipients. So long in ‘drawing media or activist attention to House, ‘including in cases where the as it was one function for which the an issue’. Therefore, the House of Lords Government itself has not sought a office did not have to act on ministers’ can ‘catalyse public debate and influence recall’. advice, the system would be relieved the nature of that broader democratic • The attorney-general is no longer a of suspicion that it might be used for discussion’ (Parkinson, 2007). At the very senior member of the government political rewards. (NZ Herald, 2009a) least an upper house in New Zealand and attends Cabinet only when legal would have added another level for issues are directly concerned. This legislation to go through, and would have could enhance public confidence and Greater role for the governor-general? potentially halted the fast-tracking of bills trust in the office of attorney-general This conveniently suggests another and other constitutionally questionable as the chief legal adviser to the Crown proposal: strengthen the role of the methods of enacting controversial policy and his/her role as guardian of the governor-general as our de facto head (Cooke, 1999, pp.140-1). public interest. of state to act more confidently as the • Greater transparency, more ‘guardian of the Constitution’. This would More power to Parliament? consultation and a greater role give the office that sits atop the entire In response to the rumblings over his for Parliament in major public system a greater check on the system. predecessor’s creative constitutionalism appointments that are carried out Brown’s green paper for Britain did not and executive power, Gordon Brown and by executive instruction. In addition, make direct proposals for changing the his lord chancellor, Jack Straw, published for certain appointments, where Queen’s personal and constitutional a green paper in July 2007. The paper appropriate, the government nominee prerogatives (reserve powers), instead

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concentrating on those the government making other judgements concerning such No magic formula or constitutional exercised in her name. However, it is responsibilities as Crown appointments fantasy will make New Zealand into useful to reform (not remove) those and honours, could rely on a ‘Council of some democratic utopia. There can be no ancient prerogatives to strengthen a State’ to assist and add credence to the hope of some divine oracle announcing governor-general’s authority over them. his or her choices. This Council of State granite laws of constitutional perfection Sir Michael Hardie Boys has outlined the with a membership similar to the Irish to a Moses or Maui on Mount Sinai or five powers, ‘which need not be exercised Council of State4 could act as an ‘integrity Mount Ruapehu. We should, however, be in accordance with advice’, as being: branch’ (Akerman, 2000, pp.294-6) made ever mindful of the dangerous potential • to appoint a prime minister; up of the highest practitioners from the for executive excesses that have been • to dismiss a prime minister; three branches of state and chaired by the demonstrated since before the time of • to refuse to dissolve Parliament; governor-general (see Power, 2008). The Fraser and Holland, and certainly since, • to force a dissolution of Parliament; Council of State could act like a Privy due to ignorant or lazy observance and and Council, but without political executive understanding of the New Zealand • to refuse assent to legislation. (Hardie domination, advising the governor- constitution. We would do well to be Boys, 1997) general in the discharge of the office’s vigilant and prevent further misuse. These five powers are all, or at least powers. The Council of State would thus 1 [2003] 3 New Zealand Law Reports 643 can be if the situation is not clear, strengthen the governor-general by not 2 For a more thoroughgoing analysis of these issues see controversial and critical. However, a only providing expert advice, but also Boston and Halligan (2009). 3 These recommendations are taken directly from Secretary of governor-general in such situations where by removing through its existence and State for Justice (2007). 4 The Irish Council of State is composed of the prime minister, the decision is far from obvious or where mana a sense of submissiveness towards deputy prime minister, chief justice, president of the High he or she is unsure as to the validity the political executive. It would end the Court, presiding officers of the two houses of Parliament, attorney-general, any former president, prime minister or of the choice is compelled to make isolation a modern governor-general feels chief justice willing to serve and up to seven presidential decisions with minimal opportunity for when making major decisions to become nominees. consultation. The governor-general in a real guardian of the constitution. the exercise of the reserve powers, and in

References Constitution: 15 years past, 15 years forward’, New Zealand Centre Ackerman, B. (2000) ‘The new separation of powers’, Harvard Law for Public Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 26–27 August Review, 113 (3), pp.633-729 Kumarasingham, H. (2010) ‘What if the upper house had not been Armstrong, J. (2008) New Zealand Herald, 4 October abolished?’, in S. Levine (ed.), New Zealand as it Might Have Been Armstrong, J. (2009) Otago Daily Times, 23 May II, Wellington: Victoria University Press Boston, J. and J. Halligan (2009) ‘Public management and the new NZ Herald (2005) New Zealand Herald, 26 March political governance: reconciling political responsiveness and neutral NZ Herald (2009a,) New Zealand Herald, 10 March competence’, paper presented at the symposium in honour of Peter NZ Herald (2009b) New Zealand Herald, 8 September and 12 October Auconin, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, 11–13 November O’Sullivan, F. (2005) New Zealand Herald, 29 March Cooke, R. (1999) ‘Unicameralism in New Zealand: some lessons’, Parkinson, J. (2007) ‘The House of Lords: a deliberative democratic Canterbury Law Review, 7, pp.233–45 defence’, Political Quarterly, 8 (3), pp.374–81 Geddis, A. (2008) Post, 19 December Power, J. (2008) ‘A discipline colonised by a policy community? Semi- Geddis, A. (2009) New Zealand Herald, 22 July presidentialism and Australian political science’, paper presented at Hardie Boys, M. (1997) Speech to public law class at College House, the School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, 17 June Christchurch, 10 September, http://www.gov-gen.govt.nz, accessed 3 Power, S. (2009) ‘MMP referendum to be held at 2011 election’, http:// November 2008 www.beehive.govt.nz/release/mmp+referendum+be+held+2011+el Harris, B.V. (2006) ‘Constitutional change’, in R. Miller (ed.), New ection, accessed 20 October 2009 Zealand Government and Politics (4th edition), Melbourne: Oxford Secretary of State for Justice (2007) The Governance of Britain, University Press presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Justice and Hayward, M. (2010) ‘Leadership and the prime minister’, in R. Lord Chancellor by Command of Her Majesty, CM 7170, London: Miller (ed.), and Politics (5th edition), Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, July 2007 Melbourne: Oxford University Press Stockley, A. (2006) ‘Judiciary & courts’, in R. Miller (ed.), New Zealand House of Lords Appointments Commission (2008) Annual Report Government and Politics (4th edition), Melbourne: Oxford University 2007/08, London: House of Lords Appointments Commission Press James, C. (2009a) ‘An impatient PM and the constitution’, Otago Daily Waldron, J. (2008) ‘Parliamentary recklessness: why we need to legislate Times, 2 June more carefully’, John Graham Lecture, Maxim Institute, October, James, C. (2009b) ‘Who guards the guardians?’, address to the Institute originally published in Real Issues, 312, July, pp.14-20 of Public Administration, 25 June Joseph, P.A. (2008) ‘MMP and the constitution: future constitutional challenges’, paper presented at the symposium ‘MMP and the

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